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-rw-r--r--ssl/t1_enc.c2113
1 files changed, 1092 insertions, 1021 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/t1_enc.c b/ssl/t1_enc.c
index 1308c0344fea..4e2845fa6ec9 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -5,21 +5,21 @@
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -138,541 +138,580 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-#include <openssl/comp.h>
+# include <openssl/comp.h>
#endif
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-#include <openssl/des.h>
+# include <openssl/des.h>
#endif
/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
- int sec_len,
- const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
- const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
- const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
- const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
- const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
- unsigned char *out, int olen)
- {
- int chunk;
- size_t j;
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp;
- EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
- unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- size_t A1_len;
- int ret = 0;
-
- chunk=EVP_MD_size(md);
- OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0);
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
- EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
- EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx_tmp, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
- mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len);
- if (!mac_key)
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
- goto err;
- if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
- goto err;
- if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
- goto err;
- if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
- goto err;
- if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
- goto err;
- if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
- goto err;
-
- for (;;)
- {
- /* Reinit mac contexts */
- if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,A1,A1_len))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx_tmp,A1,A1_len))
- goto err;
- if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
- goto err;
- if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
- goto err;
- if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
- goto err;
- if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
- goto err;
- if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
- goto err;
-
- if (olen > chunk)
- {
- if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,out,&j))
- goto err;
- out+=j;
- olen-=j;
- /* calc the next A1 value */
- if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp,A1,&A1_len))
- goto err;
- }
- else /* last one */
- {
- if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
- goto err;
- memcpy(out,A1,olen);
- break;
- }
- }
- ret = 1;
-err:
- EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(A1,sizeof(A1));
- return ret;
- }
+ int sec_len,
+ const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
+ const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
+ const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
+ const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
+ const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
+ unsigned char *out, int olen)
+{
+ int chunk;
+ size_t j;
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp;
+ EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
+ unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ size_t A1_len;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ chunk = EVP_MD_size(md);
+ OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0);
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx_tmp, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+ mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len);
+ if (!mac_key)
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len))
+ goto err;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ /* Reinit mac contexts */
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, A1, A1_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx_tmp, A1, A1_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (olen > chunk) {
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, out, &j))
+ goto err;
+ out += j;
+ olen -= j;
+ /* calc the next A1 value */
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp, A1, &A1_len))
+ goto err;
+ } else { /* last one */
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len))
+ goto err;
+ memcpy(out, A1, olen);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(A1, sizeof(A1));
+ return ret;
+}
/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask,
- const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
- const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
- const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
- const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
- const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
- const unsigned char *sec, int slen,
- unsigned char *out1,
- unsigned char *out2, int olen)
- {
- int len,i,idx,count;
- const unsigned char *S1;
- long m;
- const EVP_MD *md;
- int ret = 0;
-
- /* Count number of digests and partition sec evenly */
- count=0;
- for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) {
- if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) count++;
- }
- len=slen/count;
- if (count == 1)
- slen = 0;
- S1=sec;
- memset(out1,0,olen);
- for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) {
- if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) {
- if (!md) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF,
- SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!tls1_P_hash(md ,S1,len+(slen&1),
- seed1,seed1_len,seed2,seed2_len,seed3,seed3_len,seed4,seed4_len,seed5,seed5_len,
- out2,olen))
- goto err;
- S1+=len;
- for (i=0; i<olen; i++)
- {
- out1[i]^=out2[i];
- }
- }
- }
- ret = 1;
-err:
- return ret;
+ const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
+ const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
+ const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
+ const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
+ const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
+ const unsigned char *sec, int slen,
+ unsigned char *out1, unsigned char *out2, int olen)
+{
+ int len, i, idx, count;
+ const unsigned char *S1;
+ long m;
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /* Count number of digests and partition sec evenly */
+ count = 0;
+ for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &m, &md); idx++) {
+ if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask)
+ count++;
+ }
+ if(!count) {
+ /* Should never happen */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ len = slen / count;
+ if (count == 1)
+ slen = 0;
+ S1 = sec;
+ memset(out1, 0, olen);
+ for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &m, &md); idx++) {
+ if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) {
+ if (!md) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!tls1_P_hash(md, S1, len + (slen & 1),
+ seed1, seed1_len, seed2, seed2_len, seed3,
+ seed3_len, seed4, seed4_len, seed5, seed5_len,
+ out2, olen))
+ goto err;
+ S1 += len;
+ for (i = 0; i < olen; i++) {
+ out1[i] ^= out2[i];
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ return ret;
}
+
static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km,
- unsigned char *tmp, int num)
- {
- int ret;
- ret = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
- TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE,
- s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- NULL,0,NULL,0,
- s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
- km,tmp,num);
+ unsigned char *tmp, int num)
+{
+ int ret;
+ ret = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
+ TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, s->s3->server_random,
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, 0, s->session->master_key,
+ s->session->master_key_length, km, tmp, num);
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr,"tls1_generate_key_block() ==> %d byte master_key =\n\t",
- s->session->master_key_length);
- {
+ fprintf(stderr, "tls1_generate_key_block() ==> %d byte master_key =\n\t",
+ s->session->master_key_length);
+ {
int i;
- for (i=0; i < s->session->master_key_length; i++)
- {
- fprintf(stderr,"%02X", s->session->master_key[i]);
- }
- fprintf(stderr,"\n"); }
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- return ret;
- }
+ for (i = 0; i < s->session->master_key_length; i++) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%02X", s->session->master_key[i]);
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ }
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ return ret;
+}
int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
- {
- static const unsigned char empty[]="";
- unsigned char *p,*mac_secret;
- unsigned char *exp_label;
- unsigned char tmp1[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
- unsigned char tmp2[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
- unsigned char iv1[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2];
- unsigned char iv2[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2];
- unsigned char *ms,*key,*iv;
- int client_write;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
- const EVP_CIPHER *c;
+{
+ static const unsigned char empty[] = "";
+ unsigned char *p, *mac_secret;
+ unsigned char *exp_label;
+ unsigned char tmp1[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char tmp2[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char iv1[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH * 2];
+ unsigned char iv2[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH * 2];
+ unsigned char *ms, *key, *iv;
+ int client_write;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *c;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- const SSL_COMP *comp;
+ const SSL_COMP *comp;
#endif
- const EVP_MD *m;
- int mac_type;
- int *mac_secret_size;
- EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx;
- EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
- int is_export,n,i,j,k,exp_label_len,cl;
- int reuse_dd = 0;
-
- is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
- c=s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
- m=s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
- mac_type = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type;
+ const EVP_MD *m;
+ int mac_type;
+ int *mac_secret_size;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx;
+ EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
+ int is_export, n, i, j, k, exp_label_len, cl;
+ int reuse_dd = 0;
+
+ is_export = SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
+ c = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
+ m = s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
+ mac_type = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- comp=s->s3->tmp.new_compression;
+ comp = s->s3->tmp.new_compression;
#endif
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr,"tls1_change_cipher_state(which= %d) w/\n", which);
- fprintf(stderr,"\talg= %ld/%ld, comp= %p\n",
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth,
- comp);
- fprintf(stderr,"\tevp_cipher == %p ==? &d_cbc_ede_cipher3\n", c);
- fprintf(stderr,"\tevp_cipher: nid, blksz= %d, %d, keylen=%d, ivlen=%d\n",
- c->nid,c->block_size,c->key_len,c->iv_len);
- fprintf(stderr,"\tkey_block: len= %d, data= ", s->s3->tmp.key_block_length);
- {
+ fprintf(stderr, "tls1_change_cipher_state(which= %d) w/\n", which);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\talg= %ld/%ld, comp= %p\n",
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, comp);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\tevp_cipher == %p ==? &d_cbc_ede_cipher3\n", c);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\tevp_cipher: nid, blksz= %d, %d, keylen=%d, ivlen=%d\n",
+ c->nid, c->block_size, c->key_len, c->iv_len);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\tkey_block: len= %d, data= ",
+ s->s3->tmp.key_block_length);
+ {
int i;
- for (i=0; i<s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; i++)
- fprintf(stderr,"%02x", s->s3->tmp.key_block[i]); fprintf(stderr,"\n");
- }
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if (which & SSL3_CC_READ)
- {
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
- s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
- else
- s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
-
- if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
- reuse_dd = 1;
- else if ((s->enc_read_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
- goto err;
- else
- /* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx);
- dd= s->enc_read_ctx;
- mac_ctx=ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash,NULL);
+ for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; i++)
+ fprintf(stderr, "%02x", s->s3->tmp.key_block[i]);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ }
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
+ s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
+ else
+ s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
+
+ if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
+ reuse_dd = 1;
+ else if ((s->enc_read_ctx =
+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ else
+ /*
+ * make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error
+ */
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx);
+ dd = s->enc_read_ctx;
+ mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, NULL);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- if (s->expand != NULL)
- {
- COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
- s->expand=NULL;
- }
- if (comp != NULL)
- {
- s->expand=COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
- if (s->expand == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
- goto err2;
- }
- if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
- s->s3->rrec.comp=(unsigned char *)
- OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH);
- if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
- goto err;
- }
+ if (s->expand != NULL) {
+ COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
+ s->expand = NULL;
+ }
+ if (comp != NULL) {
+ s->expand = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
+ if (s->expand == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+ SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+ if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
+ s->s3->rrec.comp = (unsigned char *)
+ OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH);
+ if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
#endif
- /* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION */
- if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
- memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]),0,8);
- mac_secret= &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
- mac_secret_size=&(s->s3->read_mac_secret_size);
- }
- else
- {
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
- s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
- else
- s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
- if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
- reuse_dd = 1;
- else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- dd= s->enc_write_ctx;
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
- {
- mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
- if (!mac_ctx)
- goto err;
- s->write_hash = mac_ctx;
- }
- else
- mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash,NULL);
+ /*
+ * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION
+ */
+ if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]), 0, 8);
+ mac_secret = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
+ mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret_size);
+ } else {
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
+ s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
+ else
+ s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
+ if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+ reuse_dd = 1;
+ else if ((s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ dd = s->enc_write_ctx;
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ if (!mac_ctx)
+ goto err;
+ s->write_hash = mac_ctx;
+ } else
+ mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, NULL);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- if (s->compress != NULL)
- {
- COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
- s->compress=NULL;
- }
- if (comp != NULL)
- {
- s->compress=COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
- if (s->compress == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
- goto err2;
- }
- }
+ if (s->compress != NULL) {
+ COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
+ s->compress = NULL;
+ }
+ if (comp != NULL) {
+ s->compress = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
+ if (s->compress == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+ SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+ }
#endif
- /* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION */
- if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
- memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]),0,8);
- mac_secret= &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
- mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret_size);
- }
-
- if (reuse_dd)
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(dd);
-
- p=s->s3->tmp.key_block;
- i=*mac_secret_size=s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
-
- cl=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
- j=is_export ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ?
- cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl;
- /* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
- /* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */
- if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
- k = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
- else
- k=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
- if ( (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
- (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
- {
- ms= &(p[ 0]); n=i+i;
- key= &(p[ n]); n+=j+j;
- iv= &(p[ n]); n+=k+k;
- exp_label=(unsigned char *)TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
- exp_label_len=TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
- client_write=1;
- }
- else
- {
- n=i;
- ms= &(p[ n]); n+=i+j;
- key= &(p[ n]); n+=j+k;
- iv= &(p[ n]); n+=k;
- exp_label=(unsigned char *)TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
- exp_label_len=TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
- client_write=0;
- }
-
- if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err2;
- }
-
- memcpy(mac_secret,ms,i);
-
- if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER))
- {
- mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL,
- mac_secret,*mac_secret_size);
- EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx,NULL,m,NULL,mac_key);
- EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
- }
+ /*
+ * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION
+ */
+ if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]), 0, 8);
+ mac_secret = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
+ mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret_size);
+ }
+
+ if (reuse_dd)
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(dd);
+
+ p = s->s3->tmp.key_block;
+ i = *mac_secret_size = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
+
+ cl = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
+ j = is_export ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ?
+ cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl;
+ /* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
+ /* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+ k = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
+ else
+ k = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+ if ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
+ (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
+ ms = &(p[0]);
+ n = i + i;
+ key = &(p[n]);
+ n += j + j;
+ iv = &(p[n]);
+ n += k + k;
+ exp_label = (unsigned char *)TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
+ exp_label_len = TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
+ client_write = 1;
+ } else {
+ n = i;
+ ms = &(p[n]);
+ n += i + j;
+ key = &(p[n]);
+ n += j + k;
+ iv = &(p[n]);
+ n += k;
+ exp_label = (unsigned char *)TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
+ exp_label_len = TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
+ client_write = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(mac_secret, ms, i);
+
+ if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) {
+ mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL,
+ mac_secret, *mac_secret_size);
+ EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, m, NULL, mac_key);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+ }
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-printf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which);
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<i; z++) printf("%02X%c",ms[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
+ printf("which = %04X\nmac key=", which);
+ {
+ int z;
+ for (z = 0; z < i; z++)
+ printf("%02X%c", ms[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
+ }
#endif
- if (is_export)
- {
- /* In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the
- * same value since only the correct one will be used :-).
- */
- if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
- exp_label,exp_label_len,
- s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- NULL,0,NULL,0,
- key,j,tmp1,tmp2,EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
- goto err2;
- key=tmp1;
-
- if (k > 0)
- {
- if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
- TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST,TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE,
- s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- NULL,0,NULL,0,
- empty,0,iv1,iv2,k*2))
- goto err2;
- if (client_write)
- iv=iv1;
- else
- iv= &(iv1[k]);
- }
- }
-
- s->session->key_arg_length=0;
+ if (is_export) {
+ /*
+ * In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the same value
+ * since only the correct one will be used :-).
+ */
+ if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
+ exp_label, exp_label_len,
+ s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
+ key, j, tmp1, tmp2, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
+ goto err2;
+ key = tmp1;
+
+ if (k > 0) {
+ if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
+ TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST, TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE,
+ s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, 0, empty, 0, iv1, iv2, k * 2))
+ goto err2;
+ if (client_write)
+ iv = iv1;
+ else
+ iv = &(iv1[k]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ s->session->key_arg_length = 0;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- {
+ {
int i;
- fprintf(stderr,"EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,key=,iv=,which)\n");
- fprintf(stderr,"\tkey= "); for (i=0; i<c->key_len; i++) fprintf(stderr,"%02x", key[i]);
- fprintf(stderr,"\n");
- fprintf(stderr,"\t iv= "); for (i=0; i<c->iv_len; i++) fprintf(stderr,"%02x", iv[i]);
- fprintf(stderr,"\n");
- }
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
- {
- EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,NULL,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv);
- }
- else
- EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,iv,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
-
- /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
- if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size)
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd,EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
- *mac_secret_size,mac_secret);
+ fprintf(stderr, "EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,key=,iv=,which)\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "\tkey= ");
+ for (i = 0; i < c->key_len; i++)
+ fprintf(stderr, "%02x", key[i]);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "\t iv= ");
+ for (i = 0; i < c->iv_len; i++)
+ fprintf(stderr, "%02x", iv[i]);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ }
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
+ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
+ || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, iv, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
+ if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size
+ && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
+ *mac_secret_size, mac_secret)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-printf("which = %04X\nkey=",which);
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++) printf("%02X%c",key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-printf("\niv=");
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<k; z++) printf("%02X%c",iv[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-printf("\n");
+ printf("which = %04X\nkey=", which);
+ {
+ int z;
+ for (z = 0; z < EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++)
+ printf("%02X%c", key[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
+ }
+ printf("\niv=");
+ {
+ int z;
+ for (z = 0; z < k; z++)
+ printf("%02X%c", iv[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
+ }
+ printf("\n");
#endif
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp1,sizeof(tmp1));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2,sizeof(tmp1));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(iv1,sizeof(iv1));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(iv2,sizeof(iv2));
- return(1);
-err:
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-err2:
- return(0);
- }
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp1, sizeof(tmp1));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2, sizeof(tmp1));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(iv1, sizeof(iv1));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(iv2, sizeof(iv2));
+ return (1);
+ err:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ err2:
+ return (0);
+}
int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
- {
- unsigned char *p1,*p2=NULL;
- const EVP_CIPHER *c;
- const EVP_MD *hash;
- int num;
- SSL_COMP *comp;
- int mac_type= NID_undef,mac_secret_size=0;
- int ret=0;
+{
+ unsigned char *p1, *p2 = NULL;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *c;
+ const EVP_MD *hash;
+ int num;
+ SSL_COMP *comp;
+ int mac_type = NID_undef, mac_secret_size = 0;
+ int ret = 0;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr,"tls1_setup_key_block()\n");
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
- return(1);
-
- if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&hash,&mac_type,&mac_secret_size,&comp))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
- return(0);
- }
-
- s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc=c;
- s->s3->tmp.new_hash=hash;
- s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type;
- s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;
- num=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)+mac_secret_size+EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
- num*=2;
-
- ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
-
- if ((p1=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=num;
- s->s3->tmp.key_block=p1;
-
- if ((p2=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
+ fprintf(stderr, "tls1_setup_key_block()\n");
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
+ return (1);
+
+ if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp
+ (s->session, &c, &hash, &mac_type, &mac_secret_size, &comp)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
+ s->s3->tmp.new_hash = hash;
+ s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type;
+ s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;
+ num =
+ EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c) + mac_secret_size + EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+ num *= 2;
+
+ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+
+ if ((p1 = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = num;
+ s->s3->tmp.key_block = p1;
+
+ if ((p2 = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ OPENSSL_free(p1);
+ goto err;
+ }
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-printf("client random\n");
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->s3->client_random[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-printf("server random\n");
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->s3->server_random[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-printf("pre-master\n");
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<s->session->master_key_length; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->session->master_key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
+ printf("client random\n");
+ {
+ int z;
+ for (z = 0; z < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++)
+ printf("%02X%c", s->s3->client_random[z],
+ ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
+ }
+ printf("server random\n");
+ {
+ int z;
+ for (z = 0; z < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++)
+ printf("%02X%c", s->s3->server_random[z],
+ ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
+ }
+ printf("pre-master\n");
+ {
+ int z;
+ for (z = 0; z < s->session->master_key_length; z++)
+ printf("%02X%c", s->session->master_key[z],
+ ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
+ }
#endif
- if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s,p1,p2,num))
- goto err;
+ if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, p1, p2, num))
+ goto err;
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-printf("\nkey block\n");
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<num; z++) printf("%02X%c",p1[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
+ printf("\nkey block\n");
+ {
+ int z;
+ for (z = 0; z < num; z++)
+ printf("%02X%c", p1[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
+ }
#endif
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)
- && s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION)
- {
- /* enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with
- * known-IV problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
- */
- s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1;
-
- if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
- {
- if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
- s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
-
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)
+ && s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION) {
+ /*
+ * enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with known-IV
+ * problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
+ */
+ s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1;
+
+ if (s->session->cipher != NULL) {
+ if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
+ s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
- if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
- s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
+ if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
+ s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
#endif
- }
- }
-
- ret = 1;
-err:
- if (p2)
- {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(p2,num);
- OPENSSL_free(p2);
- }
- return(ret);
- }
-
-/* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ if (p2) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(p2, num);
+ OPENSSL_free(p2);
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
*
* Returns:
* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
@@ -682,570 +721,602 @@ err:
* an internal error occured.
*/
int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
- {
- SSL3_RECORD *rec;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
- unsigned long l;
- int bs,i,j,k,pad=0,ret,mac_size=0;
- const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
-
- if (send)
- {
- if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash))
- {
- int n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
- OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
- }
- ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
- rec= &(s->s3->wrec);
- if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
- enc=NULL;
- else
- {
- int ivlen;
- enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
- /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
- if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION
- && EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
- ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc);
- else
- ivlen = 0;
- if (ivlen > 1)
- {
- if ( rec->data != rec->input)
- /* we can't write into the input stream:
- * Can this ever happen?? (steve)
- */
- fprintf(stderr,
- "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n",
- __FILE__, __LINE__);
- else if (RAND_bytes(rec->input, ivlen) <= 0)
- return -1;
- }
- }
- }
- else
- {
- if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash))
- {
- int n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
- OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
- }
- ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
- rec= &(s->s3->rrec);
- if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
- enc=NULL;
- else
- enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
- }
+{
+ SSL3_RECORD *rec;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
+ unsigned long l;
+ int bs, i, j, k, pad = 0, ret, mac_size = 0;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
+
+ if (send) {
+ if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) {
+ int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+ OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
+ }
+ ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
+ rec = &(s->s3->wrec);
+ if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
+ enc = NULL;
+ else {
+ int ivlen;
+ enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
+ if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION
+ && EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+ ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc);
+ else
+ ivlen = 0;
+ if (ivlen > 1) {
+ if (rec->data != rec->input)
+ /*
+ * we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever
+ * happen?? (steve)
+ */
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n",
+ __FILE__, __LINE__);
+ else if (RAND_bytes(rec->input, ivlen) <= 0)
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) {
+ int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
+ }
+ ds = s->enc_read_ctx;
+ rec = &(s->s3->rrec);
+ if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
+ enc = NULL;
+ else
+ enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
+ }
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr,"tls1_enc(%d)\n", send);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL))
- {
- memmove(rec->data,rec->input,rec->length);
- rec->input=rec->data;
- ret = 1;
- }
- else
- {
- l=rec->length;
- bs=EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
-
- if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
- {
- unsigned char buf[13],*seq;
-
- seq = send?s->s3->write_sequence:s->s3->read_sequence;
-
- if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
- {
- unsigned char dtlsseq[9],*p=dtlsseq;
-
- s2n(send?s->d1->w_epoch:s->d1->r_epoch,p);
- memcpy(p,&seq[2],6);
- memcpy(buf,dtlsseq,8);
- }
- else
- {
- memcpy(buf,seq,8);
- for (i=7; i>=0; i--) /* increment */
- {
- ++seq[i];
- if (seq[i] != 0) break;
- }
- }
-
- buf[8]=rec->type;
- buf[9]=(unsigned char)(s->version>>8);
- buf[10]=(unsigned char)(s->version);
- buf[11]=rec->length>>8;
- buf[12]=rec->length&0xff;
- pad=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds,EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,13,buf);
- if (send)
- {
- l+=pad;
- rec->length+=pad;
- }
- }
- else if ((bs != 1) && send)
- {
- i=bs-((int)l%bs);
-
- /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */
-
- /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */
- j=i-1;
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
- {
- if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
- j++;
- }
- for (k=(int)l; k<(int)(l+i); k++)
- rec->input[k]=j;
- l+=i;
- rec->length+=i;
- }
-
+ fprintf(stderr, "tls1_enc(%d)\n", send);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) {
+ memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length);
+ rec->input = rec->data;
+ ret = 1;
+ } else {
+ l = rec->length;
+ bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
+
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
+ unsigned char buf[13], *seq;
+
+ seq = send ? s->s3->write_sequence : s->s3->read_sequence;
+
+ if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+ unsigned char dtlsseq[9], *p = dtlsseq;
+
+ s2n(send ? s->d1->w_epoch : s->d1->r_epoch, p);
+ memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
+ memcpy(buf, dtlsseq, 8);
+ } else {
+ memcpy(buf, seq, 8);
+ for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { /* increment */
+ ++seq[i];
+ if (seq[i] != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ buf[8] = rec->type;
+ buf[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
+ buf[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
+ buf[11] = rec->length >> 8;
+ buf[12] = rec->length & 0xff;
+ pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, 13, buf);
+ if (send) {
+ l += pad;
+ rec->length += pad;
+ }
+ } else if ((bs != 1) && send) {
+ i = bs - ((int)l % bs);
+
+ /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */
+
+ /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */
+ j = i - 1;
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) {
+ if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
+ j++;
+ }
+ for (k = (int)l; k < (int)(l + i); k++)
+ rec->input[k] = j;
+ l += i;
+ rec->length += i;
+ }
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- {
- unsigned long ui;
- fprintf(stderr,"EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n",
- ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
- fprintf(stderr,"\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%lu %lu], %d iv_len\n",
- ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len,
- DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
- ds->cipher->iv_len);
- fprintf(stderr,"\t\tIV: ");
- for (i=0; i<ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) fprintf(stderr,"%02X", ds->iv[i]);
- fprintf(stderr,"\n");
- fprintf(stderr,"\trec->input=");
- for (ui=0; ui<l; ui++) fprintf(stderr," %02x", rec->input[ui]);
- fprintf(stderr,"\n");
- }
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if (!send)
- {
- if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
- return 0;
- }
-
- i = EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
- if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER)
- ?(i<0)
- :(i==0))
- return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
- if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send)
- {
- rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- }
+ {
+ unsigned long ui;
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n",
+ ds, rec->data, rec->input, l);
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%lu %lu], %d iv_len\n",
+ ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len, DES_KEY_SZ,
+ DES_SCHEDULE_SZ, ds->cipher->iv_len);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\t\tIV: ");
+ for (i = 0; i < ds->cipher->iv_len; i++)
+ fprintf(stderr, "%02X", ds->iv[i]);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "\trec->input=");
+ for (ui = 0; ui < l; ui++)
+ fprintf(stderr, " %02x", rec->input[ui]);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ }
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if (!send) {
+ if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ i = EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l);
+ if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER)
+ ? (i < 0)
+ : (i == 0))
+ return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send) {
+ rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ }
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- {
- unsigned long i;
- fprintf(stderr,"\trec->data=");
- for (i=0; i<l; i++)
- fprintf(stderr," %02x", rec->data[i]); fprintf(stderr,"\n");
- }
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- ret = 1;
- if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
- mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
- if ((bs != 1) && !send)
- ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
- if (pad && !send)
- rec->length -= pad;
- }
- return ret;
- }
+ {
+ unsigned long i;
+ fprintf(stderr, "\trec->data=");
+ for (i = 0; i < l; i++)
+ fprintf(stderr, " %02x", rec->data[i]);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ }
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ ret = 1;
+ if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
+ mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ if ((bs != 1) && !send)
+ ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
+ if (pad && !send)
+ rec->length -= pad;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out)
- {
- unsigned int ret;
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d=NULL;
- int i;
-
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
- return 0;
-
- for (i=0;i<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;i++)
- {
- if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]&&EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i])==md_nid)
- {
- d=s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
- break;
- }
- }
- if (!d) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC,SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST);
- return 0;
- }
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
- EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,d);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,out,&ret);
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- return((int)ret);
- }
+{
+ unsigned int ret;
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d = NULL;
+ int i;
+
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ return 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) {
+ if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]
+ && EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]) == md_nid) {
+ d = s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!d) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC, SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, d);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &ret);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ return ((int)ret);
+}
int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
- const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out)
- {
- unsigned int i;
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
- unsigned char buf[2*EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned char *q,buf2[12];
- int idx;
- long mask;
- int err=0;
- const EVP_MD *md;
-
- q=buf;
-
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
- return 0;
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-
- for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&mask,&md);idx++)
- {
- if (mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s))
- {
- int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
- EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx];
- if (!hdgst || hashsize < 0 || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q-buf)))
- {
- /* internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite! */
- err = 1;
- }
- else
- {
- if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst) ||
- !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,q,&i) ||
- (i != (unsigned int)hashsize))
- err = 1;
- q+=hashsize;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
- str,slen, buf,(int)(q-buf), NULL,0, NULL,0, NULL,0,
- s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
- out,buf2,sizeof buf2))
- err = 1;
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
- if (err)
- return 0;
- else
- return sizeof buf2;
- }
+ const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+ unsigned char buf[2 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned char *q, buf2[12];
+ int idx;
+ long mask;
+ int err = 0;
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+
+ q = buf;
+
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ return 0;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+
+ for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &mask, &md); idx++) {
+ if (mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s)) {
+ int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
+ EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx];
+ if (!hdgst || hashsize < 0
+ || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q - buf))) {
+ /*
+ * internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite!
+ */
+ err = 1;
+ } else {
+ if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst) ||
+ !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, q, &i) ||
+ (i != (unsigned int)hashsize))
+ err = 1;
+ q += hashsize;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
+ str, slen, buf, (int)(q - buf), NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
+ s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
+ out, buf2, sizeof buf2))
+ err = 1;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, (int)(q - buf));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf2, sizeof(buf2));
+ if (err)
+ return 0;
+ else
+ return sizeof buf2;
+}
int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
- {
- SSL3_RECORD *rec;
- unsigned char *seq;
- EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
- size_t md_size, orig_len;
- int i;
- EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx;
- unsigned char header[13];
- int stream_mac = (send?(ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM):(ssl->mac_flags&SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM));
- int t;
-
- if (send)
- {
- rec= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
- seq= &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]);
- hash=ssl->write_hash;
- }
- else
- {
- rec= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
- seq= &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]);
- hash=ssl->read_hash;
- }
-
- t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
- OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
- md_size=t;
-
- /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
- if (stream_mac)
- {
- mac_ctx = hash;
- }
- else
- {
- if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac,hash))
- return -1;
- mac_ctx = &hmac;
- }
-
- if (ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION || ssl->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
- {
- unsigned char dtlsseq[8],*p=dtlsseq;
-
- s2n(send?ssl->d1->w_epoch:ssl->d1->r_epoch, p);
- memcpy (p,&seq[2],6);
-
- memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
- }
- else
- memcpy(header, seq, 8);
-
- /* kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */
- orig_len = rec->length+md_size+((unsigned int)rec->type>>8);
- rec->type &= 0xff;
-
- header[8]=rec->type;
- header[9]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8);
- header[10]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version);
- header[11]=(rec->length)>>8;
- header[12]=(rec->length)&0xff;
-
- if (!send &&
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
- ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx))
- {
- /* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
- * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of
- * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a
- * timing-oracle. */
- ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
- mac_ctx,
- md, &md_size,
- header, rec->input,
- rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
- ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
- ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size,
- 0 /* not SSLv3 */);
- }
- else
- {
- EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,header,sizeof(header));
- EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
- t=EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size);
- OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
+{
+ SSL3_RECORD *rec;
+ unsigned char *seq;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
+ size_t md_size, orig_len;
+ int i;
+ EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx;
+ unsigned char header[13];
+ int stream_mac = (send ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM)
+ : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM));
+ int t;
+
+ if (send) {
+ rec = &(ssl->s3->wrec);
+ seq = &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]);
+ hash = ssl->write_hash;
+ } else {
+ rec = &(ssl->s3->rrec);
+ seq = &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]);
+ hash = ssl->read_hash;
+ }
+
+ t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
+ OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
+ md_size = t;
+
+ /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
+ if (stream_mac) {
+ mac_ctx = hash;
+ } else {
+ if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac, hash))
+ return -1;
+ mac_ctx = &hmac;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION || ssl->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+ unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;
+
+ s2n(send ? ssl->d1->w_epoch : ssl->d1->r_epoch, p);
+ memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
+
+ memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
+ } else
+ memcpy(header, seq, 8);
+
+ /*
+ * kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type
+ */
+ orig_len = rec->length + md_size + ((unsigned int)rec->type >> 8);
+ rec->type &= 0xff;
+
+ header[8] = rec->type;
+ header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8);
+ header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version);
+ header[11] = (rec->length) >> 8;
+ header[12] = (rec->length) & 0xff;
+
+ if (!send &&
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+ ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) {
+ /*
+ * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
+ * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we
+ * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle.
+ */
+ /* Final param == not SSLv3 */
+ ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx,
+ md, &md_size,
+ header, rec->input,
+ rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
+ ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
+ ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 0);
+ } else {
+ EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header));
+ EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length);
+ t = EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size);
+ OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- if (!send && FIPS_mode())
- tls_fips_digest_extra(
- ssl->enc_read_ctx,
- mac_ctx, rec->input,
- rec->length, orig_len);
+ if (!send && FIPS_mode())
+ tls_fips_digest_extra(ssl->enc_read_ctx,
+ mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length, orig_len);
#endif
- }
-
- if (!stream_mac)
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
+ }
+
+ if (!stream_mac)
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-fprintf(stderr,"seq=");
-{int z; for (z=0; z<8; z++) fprintf(stderr,"%02X ",seq[z]); fprintf(stderr,"\n"); }
-fprintf(stderr,"rec=");
-{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rec->length; z++) fprintf(stderr,"%02X ",rec->data[z]); fprintf(stderr,"\n"); }
+ fprintf(stderr, "seq=");
+ {
+ int z;
+ for (z = 0; z < 8; z++)
+ fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", seq[z]);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "rec=");
+ {
+ unsigned int z;
+ for (z = 0; z < rec->length; z++)
+ fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", rec->data[z]);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ }
#endif
- if (ssl->version != DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
- {
- for (i=7; i>=0; i--)
- {
- ++seq[i];
- if (seq[i] != 0) break;
- }
- }
-
+ if (ssl->version != DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+ for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
+ ++seq[i];
+ if (seq[i] != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ }
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) fprintf(stderr,"%02X ",md[z]); fprintf(stderr,"\n"); }
+ {
+ unsigned int z;
+ for (z = 0; z < md_size; z++)
+ fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", md[z]);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ }
#endif
- return(md_size);
- }
+ return (md_size);
+}
int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
- int len)
- {
- unsigned char buff[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
- const void *co = NULL, *so = NULL;
- int col = 0, sol = 0;
-
+ int len)
+{
+ unsigned char buff[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+ const void *co = NULL, *so = NULL;
+ int col = 0, sol = 0;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr,"tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s,out, p,len);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ fprintf(stderr, "tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s, out, p,
+ len);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
- if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
- s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len > 0 &&
- s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
- {
- co = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input;
- col = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
- so = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input;
- sol = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; /* must be same as col (see draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt, section 3.1) */
- }
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL
+ && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL
+ && s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len > 0
+ && s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len ==
+ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) {
+ co = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input;
+ col = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
+ so = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input;
+ /*
+ * must be same as col (see
+ * draft-resc-00.txts-opaque-prf-input-00.txt, section 3.1)
+ */
+ sol = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
+ }
#endif
- tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
- TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
- s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- co, col,
- s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- so, sol,
- p,len,
- s->session->master_key,buff,sizeof buff);
+ tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
+ TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
+ s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ co, col,
+ s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ so, sol, p, len, s->session->master_key, buff, sizeof buff);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, sizeof buff);
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n");
- BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len);
- fprintf(stderr, "Client Random:\n");
- BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- fprintf(stderr, "Server Random:\n");
- BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- fprintf(stderr, "Master Secret:\n");
- BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->session->master_key, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n");
+ BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Client Random:\n");
+ BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Server Random:\n");
+ BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Master Secret:\n");
+ BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->session->master_key,
+ SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
#endif
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr,"tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n");
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- return(SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
- }
+ fprintf(stderr, "tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n");
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ return (SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
+}
int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
- const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context,
- size_t contextlen, int use_context)
- {
- unsigned char *buff;
- unsigned char *val = NULL;
- size_t vallen, currentvalpos;
- int rv;
+ const char *label, size_t llen,
+ const unsigned char *context,
+ size_t contextlen, int use_context)
+{
+ unsigned char *buff;
+ unsigned char *val = NULL;
+ size_t vallen, currentvalpos;
+ int rv;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr,"tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%lu,%s,%lu,%p,%lu)\n", s, out, olen, label, llen, context, contextlen);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- buff = OPENSSL_malloc(olen);
- if (buff == NULL) goto err2;
-
- /* construct PRF arguments
- * we construct the PRF argument ourself rather than passing separate
- * values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the concatenation of values
- * does not create a prohibited label.
- */
- vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2;
- if (use_context)
- {
- vallen += 2 + contextlen;
- }
-
- val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen);
- if (val == NULL) goto err2;
- currentvalpos = 0;
- memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *) label, llen);
- currentvalpos += llen;
- memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
- memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
- if (use_context)
- {
- val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff;
- currentvalpos++;
- val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff;
- currentvalpos++;
- if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL))
- {
- memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen);
- }
- }
-
- /* disallow prohibited labels
- * note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited label len) =
- * 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and the
- * comparisons won't have buffer overflow
- */
- if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,
- TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
- if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,
- TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
- if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
- TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
- if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
- TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
-
- rv = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
- val, vallen,
- NULL, 0,
- NULL, 0,
- NULL, 0,
- NULL, 0,
- s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
- out,buff,olen);
+ fprintf(stderr, "tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%lu,%s,%lu,%p,%lu)\n",
+ s, out, olen, label, llen, context, contextlen);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ buff = OPENSSL_malloc(olen);
+ if (buff == NULL)
+ goto err2;
+
+ /*
+ * construct PRF arguments we construct the PRF argument ourself rather
+ * than passing separate values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the
+ * concatenation of values does not create a prohibited label.
+ */
+ vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2;
+ if (use_context) {
+ vallen += 2 + contextlen;
+ }
+
+ val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen);
+ if (val == NULL)
+ goto err2;
+ currentvalpos = 0;
+ memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *)label, llen);
+ currentvalpos += llen;
+ memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+ memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+ if (use_context) {
+ val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff;
+ currentvalpos++;
+ val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff;
+ currentvalpos++;
+ if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL)) {
+ memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * disallow prohibited labels note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited
+ * label len) = 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and
+ * the comparisons won't have buffer overflow
+ */
+ if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
+ goto err1;
+ if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
+ goto err1;
+ if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
+ goto err1;
+ if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
+ goto err1;
+
+ rv = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
+ val, vallen,
+ NULL, 0,
+ NULL, 0,
+ NULL, 0,
+ NULL, 0,
+ s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
+ out, buff, olen);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(val, vallen);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, olen);
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr,"tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n");
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- goto ret;
-err1:
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
- rv = 0;
- goto ret;
-err2:
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- rv = 0;
-ret:
- if (buff != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buff);
- if (val != NULL) OPENSSL_free(val);
- return(rv);
- }
+ fprintf(stderr, "tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n");
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ goto ret;
+ err1:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL,
+ SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
+ rv = 0;
+ goto ret;
+ err2:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ rv = 0;
+ ret:
+ if (buff != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(buff);
+ if (val != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(val);
+ return (rv);
+}
int tls1_alert_code(int code)
- {
- switch (code)
- {
- case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY: return(SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
- case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE: return(SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC: return(SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
- case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED: return(TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW: return(TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW);
- case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:return(SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE);
- case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE: return(-1);
- case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE: return(SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
- case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:return(SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
- case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED);
- case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED);
- case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN);
- case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER: return(SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
- case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA: return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA);
- case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED: return(TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED);
- case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR: return(TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR: return(TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
- case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION: return(TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION);
- case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION: return(TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
- case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:return(TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY);
- case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR: return(TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED: return(TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED);
- case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION: return(TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
- case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: return(TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION);
- case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: return(TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE);
- case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME: return(TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME);
- case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
- case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE);
- case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
- case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:return(TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
-#if 0 /* not appropriate for TLS, not used for DTLS */
- case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE: return
- (DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
+{
+ switch (code) {
+ case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
+ return (SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
+ case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:
+ return (SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:
+ return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+ case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:
+ return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:
+ return (TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW);
+ case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:
+ return (SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:
+ return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:
+ return (-1);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
+ return (SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+ case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:
+ return (SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
+ case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:
+ return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED);
+ case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:
+ return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED);
+ case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:
+ return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN);
+ case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:
+ return (SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:
+ return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA);
+ case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:
+ return (TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED);
+ case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR:
+ return (TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:
+ return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
+ case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:
+ return (TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION);
+ case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
+ return (TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
+ case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:
+ return (TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY);
+ case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:
+ return (TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED:
+ return (TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED);
+ case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:
+ return (TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+ case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION:
+ return (TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION);
+ case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE:
+ return (TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE);
+ case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:
+ return (TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE:
+ return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE:
+ return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE);
+ case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:
+ return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
+ case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:
+ return (TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+#if 0
+ /* not appropriate for TLS, not used for DTLS */
+ case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE:
+ return (DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
#endif
- default: return(-1);
- }
- }
+ default:
+ return (-1);
+ }
+}