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-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl_sess.c1785
1 files changed, 894 insertions, 891 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
index 235f92d824cd..fb4e8c52598f 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
@@ -5,21 +5,21 @@
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -139,323 +139,315 @@
#include <openssl/lhash.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-#include <openssl/engine.h>
+# include <openssl/engine.h>
#endif
#include "ssl_locl.h"
static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s);
-static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx,SSL_SESSION *s);
+static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s);
static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck);
SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl)
/* aka SSL_get0_session; gets 0 objects, just returns a copy of the pointer */
- {
- return(ssl->session);
- }
+{
+ return (ssl->session);
+}
SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl)
/* variant of SSL_get_session: caller really gets something */
- {
- SSL_SESSION *sess;
- /* Need to lock this all up rather than just use CRYPTO_add so that
- * somebody doesn't free ssl->session between when we check it's
- * non-null and when we up the reference count. */
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
- sess = ssl->session;
- if(sess)
- sess->references++;
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
- return(sess);
- }
-
-int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
- CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
- {
- return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, argl, argp,
- new_func, dup_func, free_func);
- }
+{
+ SSL_SESSION *sess;
+ /*
+ * Need to lock this all up rather than just use CRYPTO_add so that
+ * somebody doesn't free ssl->session between when we check it's non-null
+ * and when we up the reference count.
+ */
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+ sess = ssl->session;
+ if (sess)
+ sess->references++;
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+ return (sess);
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
+ CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+ CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
+ CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
+{
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, argl, argp,
+ new_func, dup_func, free_func);
+}
int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx, void *arg)
- {
- return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg));
- }
+{
+ return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg));
+}
void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *s, int idx)
- {
- return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx));
- }
+{
+ return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx));
+}
SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void)
- {
- SSL_SESSION *ss;
-
- ss=(SSL_SESSION *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
- if (ss == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return(0);
- }
- memset(ss,0,sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
-
- ss->verify_result = 1; /* avoid 0 (= X509_V_OK) just in case */
- ss->references=1;
- ss->timeout=60*5+4; /* 5 minute timeout by default */
- ss->time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
- ss->prev=NULL;
- ss->next=NULL;
- ss->compress_meth=0;
+{
+ SSL_SESSION *ss;
+
+ ss = (SSL_SESSION *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
+ if (ss == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ memset(ss, 0, sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
+
+ ss->verify_result = 1; /* avoid 0 (= X509_V_OK) just in case */
+ ss->references = 1;
+ ss->timeout = 60 * 5 + 4; /* 5 minute timeout by default */
+ ss->time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
+ ss->prev = NULL;
+ ss->next = NULL;
+ ss->compress_meth = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- ss->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
- ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
- ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
- ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = NULL;
-#endif
+ ss->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
+ ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
+ ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
+ ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = NULL;
+# endif
#endif
- CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
+ CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- ss->psk_identity_hint=NULL;
- ss->psk_identity=NULL;
+ ss->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+ ss->psk_identity = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- ss->srp_username=NULL;
+ ss->srp_username = NULL;
#endif
- return(ss);
- }
+ return (ss);
+}
-const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len)
- {
- if(len)
- *len = s->session_id_length;
- return s->session_id;
- }
+const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s,
+ unsigned int *len)
+{
+ if (len)
+ *len = s->session_id_length;
+ return s->session_id;
+}
unsigned int SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id(const SSL_SESSION *s)
- {
- return s->compress_meth;
- }
-
-/* Even with SSLv2, we have 16 bytes (128 bits) of session ID space. SSLv3/TLSv1
- * has 32 bytes (256 bits). As such, filling the ID with random gunk repeatedly
- * until we have no conflict is going to complete in one iteration pretty much
- * "most" of the time (btw: understatement). So, if it takes us 10 iterations
- * and we still can't avoid a conflict - well that's a reasonable point to call
- * it quits. Either the RAND code is broken or someone is trying to open roughly
- * very close to 2^128 (or 2^256) SSL sessions to our server. How you might
- * store that many sessions is perhaps a more interesting question ... */
+{
+ return s->compress_meth;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Even with SSLv2, we have 16 bytes (128 bits) of session ID space.
+ * SSLv3/TLSv1 has 32 bytes (256 bits). As such, filling the ID with random
+ * gunk repeatedly until we have no conflict is going to complete in one
+ * iteration pretty much "most" of the time (btw: understatement). So, if it
+ * takes us 10 iterations and we still can't avoid a conflict - well that's a
+ * reasonable point to call it quits. Either the RAND code is broken or
+ * someone is trying to open roughly very close to 2^128 (or 2^256) SSL
+ * sessions to our server. How you might store that many sessions is perhaps
+ * a more interesting question ...
+ */
#define MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS 10
static int def_generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
- unsigned int *id_len)
+ unsigned int *id_len)
{
- unsigned int retry = 0;
- do
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0)
- return 0;
- while(SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) &&
- (++retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS));
- if(retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)
- return 1;
- /* else - woops a session_id match */
- /* XXX We should also check the external cache --
- * but the probability of a collision is negligible, and
- * we could not prevent the concurrent creation of sessions
- * with identical IDs since we currently don't have means
- * to atomically check whether a session ID already exists
- * and make a reservation for it if it does not
- * (this problem applies to the internal cache as well).
- */
- return 0;
+ unsigned int retry = 0;
+ do
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ while (SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) &&
+ (++retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)) ;
+ if (retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)
+ return 1;
+ /* else - woops a session_id match */
+ /*
+ * XXX We should also check the external cache -- but the probability of
+ * a collision is negligible, and we could not prevent the concurrent
+ * creation of sessions with identical IDs since we currently don't have
+ * means to atomically check whether a session ID already exists and make
+ * a reservation for it if it does not (this problem applies to the
+ * internal cache as well).
+ */
+ return 0;
}
int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session)
- {
- /* This gets used by clients and servers. */
-
- unsigned int tmp;
- SSL_SESSION *ss=NULL;
- GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id;
-
- if ((ss=SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL) return(0);
-
- /* If the context has a default timeout, use it */
- if (s->session_ctx->session_timeout == 0)
- ss->timeout=SSL_get_default_timeout(s);
- else
- ss->timeout=s->session_ctx->session_timeout;
-
- if (s->session != NULL)
- {
- SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
- s->session=NULL;
- }
-
- if (session)
- {
- if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)
- {
- ss->ssl_version=SSL2_VERSION;
- ss->session_id_length=SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
- }
- else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
- {
- ss->ssl_version=SSL3_VERSION;
- ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
- }
- else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
- {
- ss->ssl_version=TLS1_VERSION;
- ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
- }
- else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
- {
- ss->ssl_version=TLS1_1_VERSION;
- ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
- }
- else if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
- {
- ss->ssl_version=TLS1_2_VERSION;
- ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
- }
- else if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
- {
- ss->ssl_version=DTLS1_BAD_VER;
- ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
- }
- else if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
- {
- ss->ssl_version=DTLS1_VERSION;
- ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
- }
- else
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION);
- SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
- return(0);
- }
+{
+ /* This gets used by clients and servers. */
+
+ unsigned int tmp;
+ SSL_SESSION *ss = NULL;
+ GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id;
+
+ if ((ss = SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL)
+ return (0);
+
+ /* If the context has a default timeout, use it */
+ if (s->session_ctx->session_timeout == 0)
+ ss->timeout = SSL_get_default_timeout(s);
+ else
+ ss->timeout = s->session_ctx->session_timeout;
+
+ if (s->session != NULL) {
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (session) {
+ if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION) {
+ ss->ssl_version = SSL2_VERSION;
+ ss->session_id_length = SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ ss->ssl_version = SSL3_VERSION;
+ ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ } else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) {
+ ss->ssl_version = TLS1_VERSION;
+ ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ } else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION) {
+ ss->ssl_version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+ ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ } else if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ ss->ssl_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+ ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ } else if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+ ss->ssl_version = DTLS1_BAD_VER;
+ ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ } else if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION) {
+ ss->ssl_version = DTLS1_VERSION;
+ ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return (0);
+ }
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- /*
- * If RFC5077 ticket, use empty session ID (as server).
- * Note that:
- * (a) ssl_get_prev_session() does lookahead into the
- * ClientHello extensions to find the session ticket.
- * When ssl_get_prev_session() fails, s3_srvr.c calls
- * ssl_get_new_session() in ssl3_get_client_hello().
- * At that point, it has not yet parsed the extensions,
- * however, because of the lookahead, it already knows
- * whether a ticket is expected or not.
- *
- * (b) s3_clnt.c calls ssl_get_new_session() before parsing
- * ServerHello extensions, and before recording the session
- * ID received from the server, so this block is a noop.
- */
- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
- {
- ss->session_id_length = 0;
- goto sess_id_done;
- }
+ /*-
+ * If RFC5077 ticket, use empty session ID (as server).
+ * Note that:
+ * (a) ssl_get_prev_session() does lookahead into the
+ * ClientHello extensions to find the session ticket.
+ * When ssl_get_prev_session() fails, s3_srvr.c calls
+ * ssl_get_new_session() in ssl3_get_client_hello().
+ * At that point, it has not yet parsed the extensions,
+ * however, because of the lookahead, it already knows
+ * whether a ticket is expected or not.
+ *
+ * (b) s3_clnt.c calls ssl_get_new_session() before parsing
+ * ServerHello extensions, and before recording the session
+ * ID received from the server, so this block is a noop.
+ */
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
+ ss->session_id_length = 0;
+ goto sess_id_done;
+ }
#endif
- /* Choose which callback will set the session ID */
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- if(s->generate_session_id)
- cb = s->generate_session_id;
- else if(s->session_ctx->generate_session_id)
- cb = s->session_ctx->generate_session_id;
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- /* Choose a session ID */
- tmp = ss->session_id_length;
- if(!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp))
- {
- /* The callback failed */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
- SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED);
- SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
- return(0);
- }
- /* Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero.
- * nor set it higher than it was. */
- if(!tmp || (tmp > ss->session_id_length))
- {
- /* The callback set an illegal length */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
- SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH);
- SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
- return(0);
- }
- /* If the session length was shrunk and we're SSLv2, pad it */
- if((tmp < ss->session_id_length) && (s->version == SSL2_VERSION))
- memset(ss->session_id + tmp, 0, ss->session_id_length - tmp);
- else
- ss->session_id_length = tmp;
- /* Finally, check for a conflict */
- if(SSL_has_matching_session_id(s, ss->session_id,
- ss->session_id_length))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
- SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT);
- SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
- return(0);
- }
+ /* Choose which callback will set the session ID */
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ if (s->generate_session_id)
+ cb = s->generate_session_id;
+ else if (s->session_ctx->generate_session_id)
+ cb = s->session_ctx->generate_session_id;
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ /* Choose a session ID */
+ tmp = ss->session_id_length;
+ if (!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp)) {
+ /* The callback failed */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
+ SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero. nor
+ * set it higher than it was.
+ */
+ if (!tmp || (tmp > ss->session_id_length)) {
+ /* The callback set an illegal length */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
+ SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ /* If the session length was shrunk and we're SSLv2, pad it */
+ if ((tmp < ss->session_id_length) && (s->version == SSL2_VERSION))
+ memset(ss->session_id + tmp, 0, ss->session_id_length - tmp);
+ else
+ ss->session_id_length = tmp;
+ /* Finally, check for a conflict */
+ if (SSL_has_matching_session_id(s, ss->session_id,
+ ss->session_id_length)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return (0);
+ }
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- sess_id_done:
- if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
- ss->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
- if (ss->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
- {
- if (ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
- if ((ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
- return 0;
- }
- ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
- memcpy(ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
- }
- if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
- {
- if (ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
- if ((ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
- return 0;
- }
- ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
- memcpy(ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
- }
+ sess_id_done:
+ if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
+ ss->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
+ if (ss->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
+ if (ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+ if ((ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
+ OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) ==
+ NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
+ s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+ memcpy(ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
+ s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
+ }
+ if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
+ if (ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
+ if ((ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
+ OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) ==
+ NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
+ s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
+ memcpy(ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
+ s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
+ }
+# endif
#endif
-#endif
- }
- else
- {
- ss->session_id_length=0;
- }
-
- if (s->sid_ctx_length > sizeof ss->sid_ctx)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
- return 0;
- }
- memcpy(ss->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx_length);
- ss->sid_ctx_length=s->sid_ctx_length;
- s->session=ss;
- ss->ssl_version=s->version;
- ss->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
-
- return(1);
- }
-
-/* ssl_get_prev attempts to find an SSL_SESSION to be used to resume this
+ } else {
+ ss->session_id_length = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (s->sid_ctx_length > sizeof ss->sid_ctx) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(ss->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
+ ss->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length;
+ s->session = ss;
+ ss->ssl_version = s->version;
+ ss->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
+
+ return (1);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * ssl_get_prev attempts to find an SSL_SESSION to be used to resume this
* connection. It is only called by servers.
*
* session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
@@ -475,699 +467,710 @@ int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session)
* if the server should issue a new session ticket (to 0 otherwise).
*/
int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
- const unsigned char *limit)
- {
- /* This is used only by servers. */
+ const unsigned char *limit)
+{
+ /* This is used only by servers. */
- SSL_SESSION *ret=NULL;
- int fatal = 0;
- int try_session_cache = 1;
+ SSL_SESSION *ret = NULL;
+ int fatal = 0;
+ int try_session_cache = 1;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- int r;
+ int r;
#endif
- if (len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)
- goto err;
+ if (len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)
+ goto err;
- if (len == 0)
- try_session_cache = 0;
+ if (len == 0)
+ try_session_cache = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- r = tls1_process_ticket(s, session_id, len, limit, &ret); /* sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected */
- switch (r)
- {
- case -1: /* Error during processing */
- fatal = 1;
- goto err;
- case 0: /* No ticket found */
- case 1: /* Zero length ticket found */
- break; /* Ok to carry on processing session id. */
- case 2: /* Ticket found but not decrypted. */
- case 3: /* Ticket decrypted, *ret has been set. */
- try_session_cache = 0;
- break;
- default:
- abort();
- }
+ /* sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected */
+ r = tls1_process_ticket(s, session_id, len, limit, &ret);
+ switch (r) {
+ case -1: /* Error during processing */
+ fatal = 1;
+ goto err;
+ case 0: /* No ticket found */
+ case 1: /* Zero length ticket found */
+ break; /* Ok to carry on processing session id. */
+ case 2: /* Ticket found but not decrypted. */
+ case 3: /* Ticket decrypted, *ret has been set. */
+ try_session_cache = 0;
+ break;
+ default:
+ abort();
+ }
#endif
- if (try_session_cache &&
- ret == NULL &&
- !(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP))
- {
- SSL_SESSION data;
- data.ssl_version=s->version;
- data.session_id_length=len;
- if (len == 0)
- return 0;
- memcpy(data.session_id,session_id,len);
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- ret=lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(s->session_ctx->sessions,&data);
- if (ret != NULL)
- {
- /* don't allow other threads to steal it: */
- CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
- }
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- if (ret == NULL)
- s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
- }
-
- if (try_session_cache &&
- ret == NULL &&
- s->session_ctx->get_session_cb != NULL)
- {
- int copy=1;
-
- if ((ret=s->session_ctx->get_session_cb(s,session_id,len,&copy)))
- {
- s->session_ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit++;
-
- /* Increment reference count now if the session callback
- * asks us to do so (note that if the session structures
- * returned by the callback are shared between threads,
- * it must handle the reference count itself [i.e. copy == 0],
- * or things won't be thread-safe). */
- if (copy)
- CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
-
- /* Add the externally cached session to the internal
- * cache as well if and only if we are supposed to. */
- if(!(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE))
- /* The following should not return 1, otherwise,
- * things are very strange */
- SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx,ret);
- }
- }
-
- if (ret == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- /* Now ret is non-NULL and we own one of its reference counts. */
-
- if (ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length
- || memcmp(ret->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,ret->sid_ctx_length))
- {
- /* We have the session requested by the client, but we don't
- * want to use it in this context. */
- goto err; /* treat like cache miss */
- }
-
- if((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && s->sid_ctx_length == 0)
- {
- /* We can't be sure if this session is being used out of
- * context, which is especially important for SSL_VERIFY_PEER.
- * The application should have used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context.
- *
- * For this error case, we generate an error instead of treating
- * the event like a cache miss (otherwise it would be easy for
- * applications to effectively disable the session cache by
- * accident without anyone noticing).
- */
-
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED);
- fatal = 1;
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (ret->cipher == NULL)
- {
- unsigned char buf[5],*p;
- unsigned long l;
-
- p=buf;
- l=ret->cipher_id;
- l2n(l,p);
- if ((ret->ssl_version>>8) >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
- ret->cipher=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,&(buf[2]));
- else
- ret->cipher=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,&(buf[1]));
- if (ret->cipher == NULL)
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (ret->timeout < (long)(time(NULL) - ret->time)) /* timeout */
- {
- s->session_ctx->stats.sess_timeout++;
- if (try_session_cache)
- {
- /* session was from the cache, so remove it */
- SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx,ret);
- }
- goto err;
- }
-
- s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
-
- if (s->session != NULL)
- SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
- s->session=ret;
- s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
- return 1;
+ if (try_session_cache &&
+ ret == NULL &&
+ !(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode &
+ SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) {
+ SSL_SESSION data;
+ data.ssl_version = s->version;
+ data.session_id_length = len;
+ if (len == 0)
+ return 0;
+ memcpy(data.session_id, session_id, len);
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ ret = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(s->session_ctx->sessions, &data);
+ if (ret != NULL) {
+ /* don't allow other threads to steal it: */
+ CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+ }
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
+ }
+
+ if (try_session_cache &&
+ ret == NULL && s->session_ctx->get_session_cb != NULL) {
+ int copy = 1;
+
+ if ((ret = s->session_ctx->get_session_cb(s, session_id, len, &copy))) {
+ s->session_ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit++;
+
+ /*
+ * Increment reference count now if the session callback asks us
+ * to do so (note that if the session structures returned by the
+ * callback are shared between threads, it must handle the
+ * reference count itself [i.e. copy == 0], or things won't be
+ * thread-safe).
+ */
+ if (copy)
+ CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+
+ /*
+ * Add the externally cached session to the internal cache as
+ * well if and only if we are supposed to.
+ */
+ if (!
+ (s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode &
+ SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE))
+ /*
+ * The following should not return 1, otherwise, things are
+ * very strange
+ */
+ SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, ret);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Now ret is non-NULL and we own one of its reference counts. */
+
+ if (ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length
+ || memcmp(ret->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, ret->sid_ctx_length)) {
+ /*
+ * We have the session requested by the client, but we don't want to
+ * use it in this context.
+ */
+ goto err; /* treat like cache miss */
+ }
+
+ if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && s->sid_ctx_length == 0) {
+ /*
+ * We can't be sure if this session is being used out of context,
+ * which is especially important for SSL_VERIFY_PEER. The application
+ * should have used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context. For this error
+ * case, we generate an error instead of treating the event like a
+ * cache miss (otherwise it would be easy for applications to
+ * effectively disable the session cache by accident without anyone
+ * noticing).
+ */
+
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,
+ SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED);
+ fatal = 1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (ret->cipher == NULL) {
+ unsigned char buf[5], *p;
+ unsigned long l;
+
+ p = buf;
+ l = ret->cipher_id;
+ l2n(l, p);
+ if ((ret->ssl_version >> 8) >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+ ret->cipher = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, &(buf[2]));
+ else
+ ret->cipher = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, &(buf[1]));
+ if (ret->cipher == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (ret->timeout < (long)(time(NULL) - ret->time)) { /* timeout */
+ s->session_ctx->stats.sess_timeout++;
+ if (try_session_cache) {
+ /* session was from the cache, so remove it */
+ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, ret);
+ }
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
+
+ if (s->session != NULL)
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = ret;
+ s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
+ return 1;
err:
- if (ret != NULL)
- {
- SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
+ if (ret != NULL) {
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (!try_session_cache)
- {
- /* The session was from a ticket, so we should
- * issue a ticket for the new session */
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- }
+ if (!try_session_cache) {
+ /*
+ * The session was from a ticket, so we should issue a ticket for
+ * the new session
+ */
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+ }
#endif
- }
- if (fatal)
- return -1;
- else
- return 0;
- }
+ }
+ if (fatal)
+ return -1;
+ else
+ return 0;
+}
int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c)
- {
- int ret=0;
- SSL_SESSION *s;
-
- /* add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache
- * even though it has two ways of access: each session is in a
- * doubly linked list and an lhash */
- CRYPTO_add(&c->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
- /* if session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment later */
-
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- s=lh_SSL_SESSION_insert(ctx->sessions,c);
-
- /* s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID.
- * In this case, s == c should hold (then we did not really modify
- * ctx->sessions), or we're in trouble. */
- if (s != NULL && s != c)
- {
- /* We *are* in trouble ... */
- SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,s);
- SSL_SESSION_free(s);
- /* ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache
- * (we cannot handle two SSL_SESSION structures with identical
- * session ID in the same cache, which could happen e.g. when
- * two threads concurrently obtain the same session from an external
- * cache) */
- s = NULL;
- }
-
- /* Put at the head of the queue unless it is already in the cache */
- if (s == NULL)
- SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx,c);
-
- if (s != NULL)
- {
- /* existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented reference
- * count because it already takes into account the cache */
-
- SSL_SESSION_free(s); /* s == c */
- ret=0;
- }
- else
- {
- /* new cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become too large */
-
- ret=1;
-
- if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0)
- {
- while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) >
- SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx))
- {
- if (!remove_session_lock(ctx,
- ctx->session_cache_tail, 0))
- break;
- else
- ctx->stats.sess_cache_full++;
- }
- }
- }
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- return(ret);
- }
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ SSL_SESSION *s;
+
+ /*
+ * add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache even though
+ * it has two ways of access: each session is in a doubly linked list and
+ * an lhash
+ */
+ CRYPTO_add(&c->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+ /*
+ * if session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment later
+ */
+
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ s = lh_SSL_SESSION_insert(ctx->sessions, c);
+
+ /*
+ * s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID. In this
+ * case, s == c should hold (then we did not really modify
+ * ctx->sessions), or we're in trouble.
+ */
+ if (s != NULL && s != c) {
+ /* We *are* in trouble ... */
+ SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s);
+ /*
+ * ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache (we cannot
+ * handle two SSL_SESSION structures with identical session ID in the
+ * same cache, which could happen e.g. when two threads concurrently
+ * obtain the same session from an external cache)
+ */
+ s = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Put at the head of the queue unless it is already in the cache */
+ if (s == NULL)
+ SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx, c);
+
+ if (s != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented reference
+ * count because it already takes into account the cache
+ */
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s); /* s == c */
+ ret = 0;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * new cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become too large
+ */
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0) {
+ while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) >
+ SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx)) {
+ if (!remove_session_lock(ctx, ctx->session_cache_tail, 0))
+ break;
+ else
+ ctx->stats.sess_cache_full++;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ return (ret);
+}
int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c)
{
- return remove_session_lock(ctx, c, 1);
+ return remove_session_lock(ctx, c, 1);
}
static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck)
- {
- SSL_SESSION *r;
- int ret=0;
-
- if ((c != NULL) && (c->session_id_length != 0))
- {
- if(lck) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- if ((r = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions,c)) == c)
- {
- ret=1;
- r=lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(ctx->sessions,c);
- SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,c);
- }
-
- if(lck) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-
- if (ret)
- {
- r->not_resumable=1;
- if (ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
- ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx,r);
- SSL_SESSION_free(r);
- }
- }
- else
- ret=0;
- return(ret);
- }
+{
+ SSL_SESSION *r;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if ((c != NULL) && (c->session_id_length != 0)) {
+ if (lck)
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ if ((r = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions, c)) == c) {
+ ret = 1;
+ r = lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(ctx->sessions, c);
+ SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, c);
+ }
+
+ if (lck)
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+
+ if (ret) {
+ r->not_resumable = 1;
+ if (ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
+ ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx, r);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(r);
+ }
+ } else
+ ret = 0;
+ return (ret);
+}
void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ss)
- {
- int i;
+{
+ int i;
- if(ss == NULL)
- return;
+ if (ss == NULL)
+ return;
- i=CRYPTO_add(&ss->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+ i = CRYPTO_add(&ss->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
#ifdef REF_PRINT
- REF_PRINT("SSL_SESSION",ss);
+ REF_PRINT("SSL_SESSION", ss);
#endif
- if (i > 0) return;
+ if (i > 0)
+ return;
#ifdef REF_CHECK
- if (i < 0)
- {
- fprintf(stderr,"SSL_SESSION_free, bad reference count\n");
- abort(); /* ok */
- }
+ if (i < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "SSL_SESSION_free, bad reference count\n");
+ abort(); /* ok */
+ }
#endif
- CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
-
- OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->key_arg,sizeof ss->key_arg);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->master_key,sizeof ss->master_key);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->session_id,sizeof ss->session_id);
- if (ss->sess_cert != NULL) ssl_sess_cert_free(ss->sess_cert);
- if (ss->peer != NULL) X509_free(ss->peer);
- if (ss->ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ss->ciphers);
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->key_arg, sizeof ss->key_arg);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->master_key, sizeof ss->master_key);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->session_id, sizeof ss->session_id);
+ if (ss->sess_cert != NULL)
+ ssl_sess_cert_free(ss->sess_cert);
+ if (ss->peer != NULL)
+ X509_free(ss->peer);
+ if (ss->ciphers != NULL)
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ss->ciphers);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (ss->tlsext_hostname != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_hostname);
- if (ss->tlsext_tick != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_tick);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
- if (ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
- ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
- if (ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+ if (ss->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_hostname);
+ if (ss->tlsext_tick != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_tick);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
+ if (ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+ ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
+ if (ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- if (ss->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity_hint);
- if (ss->psk_identity != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity);
+ if (ss->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity_hint);
+ if (ss->psk_identity != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (ss->srp_username != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(ss->srp_username);
+ if (ss->srp_username != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(ss->srp_username);
#endif
- OPENSSL_cleanse(ss,sizeof(*ss));
- OPENSSL_free(ss);
- }
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ss, sizeof(*ss));
+ OPENSSL_free(ss);
+}
int SSL_set_session(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *session)
- {
- int ret=0;
- const SSL_METHOD *meth;
-
- if (session != NULL)
- {
- meth=s->ctx->method->get_ssl_method(session->ssl_version);
- if (meth == NULL)
- meth=s->method->get_ssl_method(session->ssl_version);
- if (meth == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_SSL_METHOD);
- return(0);
- }
-
- if (meth != s->method)
- {
- if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s,meth))
- return(0);
- }
-
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ const SSL_METHOD *meth;
+
+ if (session != NULL) {
+ meth = s->ctx->method->get_ssl_method(session->ssl_version);
+ if (meth == NULL)
+ meth = s->method->get_ssl_method(session->ssl_version);
+ if (meth == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_SSL_METHOD);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ if (meth != s->method) {
+ if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s, meth))
+ return (0);
+ }
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if (s->kssl_ctx && !s->kssl_ctx->client_princ &&
- session->krb5_client_princ_len > 0)
- {
- s->kssl_ctx->client_princ = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(session->krb5_client_princ_len + 1);
- memcpy(s->kssl_ctx->client_princ,session->krb5_client_princ,
- session->krb5_client_princ_len);
- s->kssl_ctx->client_princ[session->krb5_client_princ_len] = '\0';
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-
- /* CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);*/
- CRYPTO_add(&session->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
- if (s->session != NULL)
- SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
- s->session=session;
- s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
- /* CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);*/
- ret=1;
- }
- else
- {
- if (s->session != NULL)
- {
- SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
- s->session=NULL;
- }
-
- meth=s->ctx->method;
- if (meth != s->method)
- {
- if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s,meth))
- return(0);
- }
- ret=1;
- }
- return(ret);
- }
+ if (s->kssl_ctx && !s->kssl_ctx->client_princ &&
+ session->krb5_client_princ_len > 0) {
+ s->kssl_ctx->client_princ =
+ (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(session->krb5_client_princ_len + 1);
+ memcpy(s->kssl_ctx->client_princ, session->krb5_client_princ,
+ session->krb5_client_princ_len);
+ s->kssl_ctx->client_princ[session->krb5_client_princ_len] = '\0';
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+ /* CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); */
+ CRYPTO_add(&session->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+ if (s->session != NULL)
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = session;
+ s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
+ /* CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); */
+ ret = 1;
+ } else {
+ if (s->session != NULL) {
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = NULL;
+ }
+
+ meth = s->ctx->method;
+ if (meth != s->method) {
+ if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s, meth))
+ return (0);
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t)
- {
- if (s == NULL) return(0);
- s->timeout=t;
- return(1);
- }
+{
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ s->timeout = t;
+ return (1);
+}
long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s)
- {
- if (s == NULL) return(0);
- return(s->timeout);
- }
+{
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ return (s->timeout);
+}
long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s)
- {
- if (s == NULL) return(0);
- return(s->time);
- }
+{
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ return (s->time);
+}
long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t)
- {
- if (s == NULL) return(0);
- s->time=t;
- return(t);
- }
+{
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ s->time = t;
+ return (t);
+}
X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(SSL_SESSION *s)
- {
- return s->peer;
- }
-
-int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *s,const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
- unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
- {
- if(sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT,SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
- return 0;
- }
- s->sid_ctx_length=sid_ctx_len;
- memcpy(s->sid_ctx,sid_ctx,sid_ctx_len);
-
- return 1;
- }
+{
+ return s->peer;
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
+ unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
+{
+ if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT,
+ SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len;
+ memcpy(s->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
+
+ return 1;
+}
long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *s, long t)
- {
- long l;
- if (s == NULL) return(0);
- l=s->session_timeout;
- s->session_timeout=t;
- return(l);
- }
+{
+ long l;
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ l = s->session_timeout;
+ s->session_timeout = t;
+ return (l);
+}
long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *s)
- {
- if (s == NULL) return(0);
- return(s->session_timeout);
- }
+{
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ return (s->session_timeout);
+}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-int SSL_set_session_secret_cb(SSL *s, int (*tls_session_secret_cb)(SSL *s, void *secret, int *secret_len,
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers, SSL_CIPHER **cipher, void *arg), void *arg)
- {
- if (s == NULL) return(0);
- s->tls_session_secret_cb = tls_session_secret_cb;
- s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg = arg;
- return(1);
- }
+int SSL_set_session_secret_cb(SSL *s,
+ int (*tls_session_secret_cb) (SSL *s,
+ void *secret,
+ int *secret_len,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
+ *peer_ciphers,
+ SSL_CIPHER
+ **cipher,
+ void *arg),
+ void *arg)
+{
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ s->tls_session_secret_cb = tls_session_secret_cb;
+ s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg = arg;
+ return (1);
+}
int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext_cb(SSL *s, tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn cb,
- void *arg)
- {
- if (s == NULL) return(0);
- s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb = cb;
- s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg = arg;
- return(1);
- }
+ void *arg)
+{
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb = cb;
+ s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg = arg;
+ return (1);
+}
int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(SSL *s, void *ext_data, int ext_len)
- {
- if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
- {
- if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
- s->tlsext_session_ticket = NULL;
- }
-
- s->tlsext_session_ticket = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT) + ext_len);
- if (!s->tlsext_session_ticket)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_TICKET_EXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (ext_data)
- {
- s->tlsext_session_ticket->length = ext_len;
- s->tlsext_session_ticket->data = s->tlsext_session_ticket + 1;
- memcpy(s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ext_data, ext_len);
- }
- else
- {
- s->tlsext_session_ticket->length = 0;
- s->tlsext_session_ticket->data = NULL;
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- return 0;
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
-
-typedef struct timeout_param_st
- {
- SSL_CTX *ctx;
- long time;
- LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *cache;
- } TIMEOUT_PARAM;
+{
+ if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION) {
+ if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
+ s->tlsext_session_ticket = NULL;
+ }
+
+ s->tlsext_session_ticket =
+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT) + ext_len);
+ if (!s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_TICKET_EXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ext_data) {
+ s->tlsext_session_ticket->length = ext_len;
+ s->tlsext_session_ticket->data = s->tlsext_session_ticket + 1;
+ memcpy(s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ext_data, ext_len);
+ } else {
+ s->tlsext_session_ticket->length = 0;
+ s->tlsext_session_ticket->data = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+
+typedef struct timeout_param_st {
+ SSL_CTX *ctx;
+ long time;
+ LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *cache;
+} TIMEOUT_PARAM;
static void timeout_doall_arg(SSL_SESSION *s, TIMEOUT_PARAM *p)
- {
- if ((p->time == 0) || (p->time > (s->time+s->timeout))) /* timeout */
- {
- /* The reason we don't call SSL_CTX_remove_session() is to
- * save on locking overhead */
- (void)lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(p->cache,s);
- SSL_SESSION_list_remove(p->ctx,s);
- s->not_resumable=1;
- if (p->ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
- p->ctx->remove_session_cb(p->ctx,s);
- SSL_SESSION_free(s);
- }
- }
+{
+ if ((p->time == 0) || (p->time > (s->time + s->timeout))) { /* timeout */
+ /*
+ * The reason we don't call SSL_CTX_remove_session() is to save on
+ * locking overhead
+ */
+ (void)lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(p->cache, s);
+ SSL_SESSION_list_remove(p->ctx, s);
+ s->not_resumable = 1;
+ if (p->ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
+ p->ctx->remove_session_cb(p->ctx, s);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s);
+ }
+}
static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(timeout, SSL_SESSION, TIMEOUT_PARAM)
void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *s, long t)
- {
- unsigned long i;
- TIMEOUT_PARAM tp;
-
- tp.ctx=s;
- tp.cache=s->sessions;
- if (tp.cache == NULL) return;
- tp.time=t;
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- i=CHECKED_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION, tp.cache)->down_load;
- CHECKED_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION, tp.cache)->down_load=0;
- lh_SSL_SESSION_doall_arg(tp.cache, LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(timeout),
- TIMEOUT_PARAM, &tp);
- CHECKED_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION, tp.cache)->down_load=i;
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- }
+{
+ unsigned long i;
+ TIMEOUT_PARAM tp;
+
+ tp.ctx = s;
+ tp.cache = s->sessions;
+ if (tp.cache == NULL)
+ return;
+ tp.time = t;
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ i = CHECKED_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION, tp.cache)->down_load;
+ CHECKED_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION, tp.cache)->down_load = 0;
+ lh_SSL_SESSION_doall_arg(tp.cache, LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(timeout),
+ TIMEOUT_PARAM, &tp);
+ CHECKED_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION, tp.cache)->down_load = i;
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+}
int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s)
- {
- if ( (s->session != NULL) &&
- !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) &&
- !(SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)))
- {
- SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
- return(1);
- }
- else
- return(0);
- }
+{
+ if ((s->session != NULL) &&
+ !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) &&
+ !(SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))) {
+ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
+ return (1);
+ } else
+ return (0);
+}
/* locked by SSL_CTX in the calling function */
static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s)
- {
- if ((s->next == NULL) || (s->prev == NULL)) return;
-
- if (s->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail))
- { /* last element in list */
- if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head))
- { /* only one element in list */
- ctx->session_cache_head=NULL;
- ctx->session_cache_tail=NULL;
- }
- else
- {
- ctx->session_cache_tail=s->prev;
- s->prev->next=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
- }
- }
- else
- {
- if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head))
- { /* first element in list */
- ctx->session_cache_head=s->next;
- s->next->prev=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
- }
- else
- { /* middle of list */
- s->next->prev=s->prev;
- s->prev->next=s->next;
- }
- }
- s->prev=s->next=NULL;
- }
+{
+ if ((s->next == NULL) || (s->prev == NULL))
+ return;
+
+ if (s->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail)) {
+ /* last element in list */
+ if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head)) {
+ /* only one element in list */
+ ctx->session_cache_head = NULL;
+ ctx->session_cache_tail = NULL;
+ } else {
+ ctx->session_cache_tail = s->prev;
+ s->prev->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head)) {
+ /* first element in list */
+ ctx->session_cache_head = s->next;
+ s->next->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
+ } else {
+ /* middle of list */
+ s->next->prev = s->prev;
+ s->prev->next = s->next;
+ }
+ }
+ s->prev = s->next = NULL;
+}
static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s)
- {
- if ((s->next != NULL) && (s->prev != NULL))
- SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,s);
-
- if (ctx->session_cache_head == NULL)
- {
- ctx->session_cache_head=s;
- ctx->session_cache_tail=s;
- s->prev=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
- s->next=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
- }
- else
- {
- s->next=ctx->session_cache_head;
- s->next->prev=s;
- s->prev=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
- ctx->session_cache_head=s;
- }
- }
+{
+ if ((s->next != NULL) && (s->prev != NULL))
+ SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s);
+
+ if (ctx->session_cache_head == NULL) {
+ ctx->session_cache_head = s;
+ ctx->session_cache_tail = s;
+ s->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
+ s->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
+ } else {
+ s->next = ctx->session_cache_head;
+ s->next->prev = s;
+ s->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
+ ctx->session_cache_head = s;
+ }
+}
void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- int (*cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl,SSL_SESSION *sess))
- {
- ctx->new_session_cb=cb;
- }
+ int (*cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl,
+ SSL_SESSION *sess))
+{
+ ctx->new_session_cb = cb;
+}
-int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess)
- {
- return ctx->new_session_cb;
- }
+int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess) {
+ return ctx->new_session_cb;
+}
void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- void (*cb)(SSL_CTX *ctx,SSL_SESSION *sess))
- {
- ctx->remove_session_cb=cb;
- }
+ void (*cb) (SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess))
+{
+ ctx->remove_session_cb = cb;
+}
-void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL_CTX * ctx,SSL_SESSION *sess)
- {
- return ctx->remove_session_cb;
- }
+void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ SSL_SESSION *sess) {
+ return ctx->remove_session_cb;
+}
void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- SSL_SESSION *(*cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl,
- unsigned char *data,int len,int *copy))
- {
- ctx->get_session_cb=cb;
- }
-
-SSL_SESSION * (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl,
- unsigned char *data,int len,int *copy)
- {
- return ctx->get_session_cb;
- }
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val))
- {
- ctx->info_callback=cb;
- }
-
-void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx))(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)
- {
- return ctx->info_callback;
- }
+ SSL_SESSION *(*cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl,
+ unsigned char *data, int len,
+ int *copy))
+{
+ ctx->get_session_cb = cb;
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl,
+ unsigned char *data,
+ int len, int *copy) {
+ return ctx->get_session_cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val))
+{
+ ctx->info_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (const SSL *ssl, int type,
+ int val) {
+ return ctx->info_callback;
+}
void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey))
- {
- ctx->client_cert_cb=cb;
- }
+ int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509,
+ EVP_PKEY **pkey))
+{
+ ctx->client_cert_cb = cb;
+}
-int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL * ssl, X509 ** x509 , EVP_PKEY **pkey)
- {
- return ctx->client_cert_cb;
- }
+int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509,
+ EVP_PKEY **pkey) {
+ return ctx->client_cert_cb;
+}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
int SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_CTX *ctx, ENGINE *e)
- {
- if (!ENGINE_init(e))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
- return 0;
- }
- if(!ENGINE_get_ssl_client_cert_function(e))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_METHOD);
- ENGINE_finish(e);
- return 0;
- }
- ctx->client_cert_engine = e;
- return 1;
- }
+{
+ if (!ENGINE_init(e)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!ENGINE_get_ssl_client_cert_function(e)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE,
+ SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_METHOD);
+ ENGINE_finish(e);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ctx->client_cert_engine = e;
+ return 1;
+}
#endif
void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len))
- {
- ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb=cb;
- }
+ int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+ unsigned char *cookie,
+ unsigned int *cookie_len))
+{
+ ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb = cb;
+}
void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len))
- {
- ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb=cb;
- }
+ int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie,
+ unsigned int cookie_len))
+{
+ ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb = cb;
+}
-IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION, PEM_STRING_SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
+IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION, PEM_STRING_SSL_SESSION,
+ SSL_SESSION)