aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/ssl/bad_dtls_test.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl/bad_dtls_test.c')
-rw-r--r--ssl/bad_dtls_test.c923
1 files changed, 923 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/bad_dtls_test.c b/ssl/bad_dtls_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d42817fc329e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssl/bad_dtls_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,923 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Unit test for Cisco DTLS1_BAD_VER session resume, as used by
+ * AnyConnect VPN protocol.
+ *
+ * This is designed to exercise the code paths in
+ * http://git.infradead.org/users/dwmw2/openconnect.git/blob/HEAD:/dtls.c
+ * which have frequently been affected by regressions in DTLS1_BAD_VER
+ * support.
+ *
+ * Note that unlike other SSL tests, we don't test against our own SSL
+ * server method. Firstly because we don't have one; we *only* support
+ * DTLS1_BAD_VER as a client. And secondly because even if that were
+ * fixed up it's the wrong thing to test against — because if changes
+ * are made in generic DTLS code which don't take DTLS1_BAD_VER into
+ * account, there's plenty of scope for making those changes such that
+ * they break *both* the client and the server in the same way.
+ *
+ * So we handle the server side manually. In a session resume there isn't
+ * much to be done anyway.
+ */
+#include <string.h>
+
+/* On Windows this will include <winsock2.h> and thus it needs to be
+ * included *before* anything that includes <windows.h>. Ick. */
+#include "e_os.h" /* for 'inline' */
+
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+/* PACKET functions lifted from OpenSSL 1.1's ssl/packet_locl.h */
+typedef struct {
+ /* Pointer to where we are currently reading from */
+ const unsigned char *curr;
+ /* Number of bytes remaining */
+ size_t remaining;
+} PACKET;
+
+/* Internal unchecked shorthand; don't use outside this file. */
+static inline void packet_forward(PACKET *pkt, size_t len)
+{
+ pkt->curr += len;
+ pkt->remaining -= len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the number of bytes remaining to be read in the PACKET
+ */
+static inline size_t PACKET_remaining(const PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ return pkt->remaining;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialise a PACKET with |len| bytes held in |buf|. This does not make a
+ * copy of the data so |buf| must be present for the whole time that the PACKET
+ * is being used.
+ */
+static inline int PACKET_buf_init(PACKET *pkt,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ /* Sanity check for negative values. */
+ if (len > (size_t)65536)
+ return 0;
+
+ pkt->curr = buf;
+ pkt->remaining = len;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns 1 if the packet has length |num| and its contents equal the |num|
+ * bytes read from |ptr|. Returns 0 otherwise (lengths or contents not equal).
+ * If lengths are equal, performs the comparison in constant time.
+ */
+static inline int PACKET_equal(const PACKET *pkt, const void *ptr,
+ size_t num)
+{
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != num)
+ return 0;
+ return CRYPTO_memcmp(pkt->curr, ptr, num) == 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Peek ahead at 2 bytes in network order from |pkt| and store the value in
+ * |*data|
+ */
+static inline int PACKET_peek_net_2(const PACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int *data)
+{
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) < 2)
+ return 0;
+
+ *data = ((unsigned int)(*pkt->curr)) << 8;
+ *data |= *(pkt->curr + 1);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Equivalent of n2s */
+/* Get 2 bytes in network order from |pkt| and store the value in |*data| */
+static inline int PACKET_get_net_2(PACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int *data)
+{
+ if (!PACKET_peek_net_2(pkt, data))
+ return 0;
+
+ packet_forward(pkt, 2);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Peek ahead at 1 byte from |pkt| and store the value in |*data| */
+static inline int PACKET_peek_1(const PACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int *data)
+{
+ if (!PACKET_remaining(pkt))
+ return 0;
+
+ *data = *pkt->curr;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Get 1 byte from |pkt| and store the value in |*data| */
+static inline int PACKET_get_1(PACKET *pkt, unsigned int *data)
+{
+ if (!PACKET_peek_1(pkt, data))
+ return 0;
+
+ packet_forward(pkt, 1);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Peek ahead at |len| bytes from the |pkt| and store a pointer to them in
+ * |*data|. This just points at the underlying buffer that |pkt| is using. The
+ * caller should not free this data directly (it will be freed when the
+ * underlying buffer gets freed
+ */
+static inline int PACKET_peek_bytes(const PACKET *pkt,
+ const unsigned char **data,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) < len)
+ return 0;
+
+ *data = pkt->curr;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read |len| bytes from the |pkt| and store a pointer to them in |*data|. This
+ * just points at the underlying buffer that |pkt| is using. The caller should
+ * not free this data directly (it will be freed when the underlying buffer gets
+ * freed
+ */
+static inline int PACKET_get_bytes(PACKET *pkt,
+ const unsigned char **data,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ if (!PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, data, len))
+ return 0;
+
+ packet_forward(pkt, len);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Peek ahead at |len| bytes from |pkt| and copy them to |data| */
+static inline int PACKET_peek_copy_bytes(const PACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned char *data,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) < len)
+ return 0;
+
+ memcpy(data, pkt->curr, len);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read |len| bytes from |pkt| and copy them to |data|.
+ * The caller is responsible for ensuring that |data| can hold |len| bytes.
+ */
+static inline int PACKET_copy_bytes(PACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned char *data,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ if (!PACKET_peek_copy_bytes(pkt, data, len))
+ return 0;
+
+ packet_forward(pkt, len);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+
+/* Move the current reading position forward |len| bytes */
+static inline int PACKET_forward(PACKET *pkt, size_t len)
+{
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) < len)
+ return 0;
+
+ packet_forward(pkt, len);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reads a variable-length vector prefixed with a one-byte length, and stores
+ * the contents in |subpkt|. |pkt| can equal |subpkt|.
+ * Data is not copied: the |subpkt| packet will share its underlying buffer with
+ * the original |pkt|, so data wrapped by |pkt| must outlive the |subpkt|.
+ * Upon failure, the original |pkt| and |subpkt| are not modified.
+ */
+static inline int PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(PACKET *pkt,
+ PACKET *subpkt)
+{
+ unsigned int length;
+ const unsigned char *data;
+ PACKET tmp = *pkt;
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(&tmp, &length) ||
+ !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmp, &data, (size_t)length)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ *pkt = tmp;
+ subpkt->curr = data;
+ subpkt->remaining = length;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#define OSSL_NELEM(x) (sizeof(x)/sizeof(x[0]))
+
+/* For DTLS1_BAD_VER packets the MAC doesn't include the handshake header */
+#define MAC_OFFSET (DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
+
+static unsigned char client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
+static unsigned char server_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
+
+/* These are all generated locally, sized purely according to our own whim */
+static unsigned char session_id[32];
+static unsigned char master_secret[48];
+static unsigned char cookie[20];
+
+/* We've hard-coded the cipher suite; we know it's 104 bytes */
+static unsigned char key_block[104];
+#define mac_key (key_block + 20)
+#define dec_key (key_block + 40)
+#define enc_key (key_block + 56)
+
+static EVP_MD_CTX handshake_md5;
+static EVP_MD_CTX handshake_sha1;
+
+/* PRF lifted from ssl/t1_enc.c since we can't easily use it directly */
+static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
+ int sec_len,
+ const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
+ const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
+ const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
+ unsigned char *out, int olen)
+{
+ int chunk;
+ size_t j;
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp, ctx_init;
+ EVP_PKEY *prf_mac_key;
+ unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ size_t A1_len;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ chunk = EVP_MD_size(md);
+ OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0);
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_init);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx_init, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+ prf_mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len);
+ if (!prf_mac_key)
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_init, NULL, md, NULL, prf_mac_key))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, &ctx_init))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len))
+ goto err;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ /* Reinit mac contexts */
+ if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, &ctx_init))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, A1, A1_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (olen > chunk && !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx_tmp, &ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (olen > chunk) {
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, out, &j))
+ goto err;
+ out += j;
+ olen -= j;
+ /* calc the next A1 value */
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp, A1, &A1_len))
+ goto err;
+ } else { /* last one */
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len))
+ goto err;
+ memcpy(out, A1, olen);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(prf_mac_key);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_init);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(A1, sizeof(A1));
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
+static int do_PRF(const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
+ const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
+ const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
+ unsigned char *out, int olen)
+{
+ unsigned char out2[104];
+ int i, len;
+
+ if (olen > (int)sizeof(out2))
+ return 0;
+
+ len = sizeof(master_secret) / 2;
+
+ if (!tls1_P_hash(EVP_md5(), master_secret, len,
+ seed1, seed1_len, seed2, seed2_len, seed3,
+ seed3_len, out, olen))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!tls1_P_hash(EVP_sha1(), master_secret + len, len,
+ seed1, seed1_len, seed2, seed2_len, seed3,
+ seed3_len, out2, olen))
+ return 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < olen; i++) {
+ out[i] ^= out2[i];
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static SSL_SESSION *client_session(void)
+{
+ static unsigned char session_asn1[] = {
+ 0x30, 0x5F, /* SEQUENCE, length 0x5F */
+ 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, /* INTEGER, SSL_SESSION_ASN1_VERSION */
+ 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, /* INTEGER, DTLS1_BAD_VER */
+ 0x04, 0x02, 0x00, 0x2F, /* OCTET_STRING, AES128-SHA */
+ 0x04, 0x20, /* OCTET_STRING, session id */
+#define SS_SESSID_OFS 15 /* Session ID goes here */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x04, 0x30, /* OCTET_STRING, master secret */
+#define SS_SECRET_OFS 49 /* Master secret goes here */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ };
+ const unsigned char *p = session_asn1;
+
+ /* Copy the randomly-generated fields into the above ASN1 */
+ memcpy(session_asn1 + SS_SESSID_OFS, session_id, sizeof(session_id));
+ memcpy(session_asn1 + SS_SECRET_OFS, master_secret, sizeof(master_secret));
+
+ return d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, sizeof(session_asn1));
+}
+
+/* Returns 1 for initial ClientHello, 2 for ClientHello with cookie */
+static int validate_client_hello(BIO *wbio)
+{
+ PACKET pkt, pkt2;
+ long len;
+ unsigned char *data;
+ int cookie_found = 0;
+ unsigned int u;
+
+ len = BIO_get_mem_data(wbio, (char **)&data);
+ if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, data, len))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Check record header type */
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &u) || u != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+ return 0;
+ /* Version */
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || u != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ return 0;
+ /* Skip the rest of the record header */
+ if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 3))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Check it's a ClientHello */
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &u) || u != SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
+ return 0;
+ /* Skip the rest of the handshake message header */
+ if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Check client version */
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || u != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Store random */
+ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Check session id length and content */
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &pkt2) ||
+ !PACKET_equal(&pkt2, session_id, sizeof(session_id)))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Check cookie */
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &pkt2))
+ return 0;
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&pkt2)) {
+ if (!PACKET_equal(&pkt2, cookie, sizeof(cookie)))
+ return 0;
+ cookie_found = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Skip ciphers */
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, u))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Skip compression */
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &u) || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, u))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Skip extensions */
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, u))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Now we are at the end */
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&pkt))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Update handshake MAC for second ClientHello (with cookie) */
+ if (cookie_found && (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&handshake_md5, data + MAC_OFFSET,
+ len - MAC_OFFSET) ||
+ !EVP_DigestUpdate(&handshake_sha1, data + MAC_OFFSET,
+ len - MAC_OFFSET)))
+ printf("EVP_DigestUpdate() failed\n");
+
+ (void)BIO_reset(wbio);
+
+ return 1 + cookie_found;
+}
+
+static int send_hello_verify(BIO *rbio)
+{
+ static unsigned char hello_verify[] = {
+ 0x16, /* Handshake */
+ 0x01, 0x00, /* DTLS1_BAD_VER */
+ 0x00, 0x00, /* Epoch 0 */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Seq# 0 */
+ 0x00, 0x23, /* Length */
+ 0x03, /* Hello Verify */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x17, /* Length */
+ 0x00, 0x00, /* Seq# 0 */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Fragment offset */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x17, /* Fragment length */
+ 0x01, 0x00, /* DTLS1_BAD_VER */
+ 0x14, /* Cookie length */
+#define HV_COOKIE_OFS 28 /* Cookie goes here */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ };
+
+ memcpy(hello_verify + HV_COOKIE_OFS, cookie, sizeof(cookie));
+
+ BIO_write(rbio, hello_verify, sizeof(hello_verify));
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int send_server_hello(BIO *rbio)
+{
+ static unsigned char server_hello[] = {
+ 0x16, /* Handshake */
+ 0x01, 0x00, /* DTLS1_BAD_VER */
+ 0x00, 0x00, /* Epoch 0 */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* Seq# 1 */
+ 0x00, 0x52, /* Length */
+ 0x02, /* Server Hello */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x46, /* Length */
+ 0x00, 0x01, /* Seq# */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Fragment offset */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x46, /* Fragment length */
+ 0x01, 0x00, /* DTLS1_BAD_VER */
+#define SH_RANDOM_OFS 27 /* Server random goes here */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x20, /* Session ID length */
+#define SH_SESSID_OFS 60 /* Session ID goes here */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x2f, /* Cipher suite AES128-SHA */
+ 0x00, /* Compression null */
+ };
+ static unsigned char change_cipher_spec[] = {
+ 0x14, /* Change Cipher Spec */
+ 0x01, 0x00, /* DTLS1_BAD_VER */
+ 0x00, 0x00, /* Epoch 0 */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, /* Seq# 2 */
+ 0x00, 0x03, /* Length */
+ 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, /* Message */
+ };
+
+ memcpy(server_hello + SH_RANDOM_OFS, server_random, sizeof(server_random));
+ memcpy(server_hello + SH_SESSID_OFS, session_id, sizeof(session_id));
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&handshake_md5, server_hello + MAC_OFFSET,
+ sizeof(server_hello) - MAC_OFFSET) ||
+ !EVP_DigestUpdate(&handshake_sha1, server_hello + MAC_OFFSET,
+ sizeof(server_hello) - MAC_OFFSET))
+ printf("EVP_DigestUpdate() failed\n");
+
+ BIO_write(rbio, server_hello, sizeof(server_hello));
+ BIO_write(rbio, change_cipher_spec, sizeof(change_cipher_spec));
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Create header, HMAC, pad, encrypt and send a record */
+static int send_record(BIO *rbio, unsigned char type, unsigned long seqnr,
+ const void *msg, size_t len)
+{
+ /* Note that the order of the record header fields on the wire,
+ * and in the HMAC, is different. So we just keep them in separate
+ * variables and handle them individually. */
+ static unsigned char epoch[2] = { 0x00, 0x01 };
+ static unsigned char seq[6] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
+ static unsigned char ver[2] = { 0x01, 0x00 }; /* DTLS1_BAD_VER */
+ unsigned char lenbytes[2];
+ HMAC_CTX ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX enc_ctx;
+ unsigned char iv[16];
+ unsigned char pad;
+ unsigned char *enc;
+
+#ifdef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG
+ seq[0] = (seqnr >> 40) & 0xff;
+ seq[1] = (seqnr >> 32) & 0xff;
+#endif
+ seq[2] = (seqnr >> 24) & 0xff;
+ seq[3] = (seqnr >> 16) & 0xff;
+ seq[4] = (seqnr >> 8) & 0xff;
+ seq[5] = seqnr & 0xff;
+
+ pad = 15 - ((len + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) % 16);
+ enc = OPENSSL_malloc(len + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1 + pad);
+ if (enc == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Copy record to encryption buffer */
+ memcpy(enc, msg, len);
+
+ /* Append HMAC to data */
+ HMAC_Init(&ctx, mac_key, 20, EVP_sha1());
+ HMAC_Update(&ctx, epoch, 2);
+ HMAC_Update(&ctx, seq, 6);
+ HMAC_Update(&ctx, &type, 1);
+ HMAC_Update(&ctx, ver, 2); /* Version */
+ lenbytes[0] = len >> 8;
+ lenbytes[1] = len & 0xff;
+ HMAC_Update(&ctx, lenbytes, 2); /* Length */
+ HMAC_Update(&ctx, enc, len); /* Finally the data itself */
+ HMAC_Final(&ctx, enc + len, NULL);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+ /* Append padding bytes */
+ len += SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ do {
+ enc[len++] = pad;
+ } while (len % 16);
+
+ /* Generate IV, and encrypt */
+ RAND_bytes(iv, sizeof(iv));
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&enc_ctx);
+ EVP_CipherInit_ex(&enc_ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, enc_key, iv, 1);
+ EVP_Cipher(&enc_ctx, enc, enc, len);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&enc_ctx);
+
+ /* Finally write header (from fragmented variables), IV and encrypted record */
+ BIO_write(rbio, &type, 1);
+ BIO_write(rbio, ver, 2);
+ BIO_write(rbio, epoch, 2);
+ BIO_write(rbio, seq, 6);
+ lenbytes[0] = (len + sizeof(iv)) >> 8;
+ lenbytes[1] = (len + sizeof(iv)) & 0xff;
+ BIO_write(rbio, lenbytes, 2);
+
+ BIO_write(rbio, iv, sizeof(iv));
+ BIO_write(rbio, enc, len);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(enc);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int send_finished(SSL *s, BIO *rbio)
+{
+ static unsigned char finished_msg[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH +
+ TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH] = {
+ 0x14, /* Finished */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x0c, /* Length */
+ 0x00, 0x03, /* Seq# 3 */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Fragment offset */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x0c, /* Fragment length */
+ /* Finished MAC (12 bytes) */
+ };
+ unsigned char handshake_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
+
+ /* Derive key material */
+ do_PRF(TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE,
+ server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ key_block, sizeof(key_block));
+
+ /* Generate Finished MAC */
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&handshake_md5, handshake_hash, NULL) ||
+ !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&handshake_sha1, handshake_hash + EVP_MD_CTX_size(&handshake_md5), NULL))
+ printf("EVP_DigestFinal_ex() failed\n");
+
+ do_PRF(TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+ handshake_hash, EVP_MD_CTX_size(&handshake_md5) + EVP_MD_CTX_size(&handshake_sha1),
+ NULL, 0,
+ finished_msg + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH);
+
+ return send_record(rbio, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, 0,
+ finished_msg, sizeof(finished_msg));
+}
+
+static int validate_ccs(BIO *wbio)
+{
+ PACKET pkt;
+ long len;
+ unsigned char *data;
+ unsigned int u;
+
+ len = BIO_get_mem_data(wbio, (char **)&data);
+ if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, data, len))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Check record header type */
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &u) || u != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
+ return 0;
+ /* Version */
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || u != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ return 0;
+ /* Skip the rest of the record header */
+ if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 3))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Check ChangeCipherSpec message */
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &u) || u != SSL3_MT_CCS)
+ return 0;
+ /* A DTLS1_BAD_VER ChangeCipherSpec also contains the
+ * handshake sequence number (which is 2 here) */
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || u != 0x0002)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Now check the Finished packet */
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &u) || u != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+ return 0;
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || u != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Check epoch is now 1 */
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || u != 0x0001)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* That'll do for now. If OpenSSL accepted *our* Finished packet
+ * then it's evidently remembered that DTLS1_BAD_VER doesn't
+ * include the handshake header in the MAC. There's not a lot of
+ * point in implementing decryption here, just to check that it
+ * continues to get it right for one more packet. */
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#define NODROP(x) { x##UL, 0 }
+#define DROP(x) { x##UL, 1 }
+
+static struct {
+ unsigned long seq;
+ int drop;
+} tests[] = {
+ NODROP(1), NODROP(3), NODROP(2),
+ NODROP(0x1234), NODROP(0x1230), NODROP(0x1235),
+ NODROP(0xffff), NODROP(0x10001), NODROP(0xfffe), NODROP(0x10000),
+ DROP(0x10001), DROP(0xff), NODROP(0x100000), NODROP(0x800000), NODROP(0x7fffe1),
+ NODROP(0xffffff), NODROP(0x1000000), NODROP(0xfffffe), DROP(0xffffff), NODROP(0x1000010),
+ NODROP(0xfffffd), NODROP(0x1000011), DROP(0x12), NODROP(0x1000012),
+ NODROP(0x1ffffff), NODROP(0x2000000), DROP(0x1ff00fe), NODROP(0x2000001),
+ NODROP(0x20fffff), NODROP(0x2105500), DROP(0x20ffffe), NODROP(0x21054ff),
+ NODROP(0x211ffff), DROP(0x2110000), NODROP(0x2120000)
+ /* The last test should be NODROP, because a DROP wouldn't get tested. */
+};
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ SSL_SESSION *sess;
+ SSL_CTX *ctx;
+ SSL *con;
+ BIO *rbio;
+ BIO *wbio;
+ BIO *err;
+ int testresult = 0;
+ int ret;
+ int i;
+
+ SSL_library_init();
+ SSL_load_error_strings();
+
+ err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
+
+ CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init();
+ CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_options(V_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL);
+ CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+ RAND_bytes(session_id, sizeof(session_id));
+ RAND_bytes(master_secret, sizeof(master_secret));
+ RAND_bytes(cookie, sizeof(cookie));
+ RAND_bytes(server_random + 4, sizeof(server_random) - 4);
+ time((void *)server_random);
+
+ sess = client_session();
+ if (sess == NULL) {
+ printf("Failed to generate SSL_SESSION\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&handshake_md5, EVP_md5(), NULL) ||
+ !EVP_DigestInit_ex(&handshake_sha1, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) {
+ printf("Failed to initialise handshake_md\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(DTLSv1_client_method());
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ printf("Failed to allocate SSL_CTX\n");
+ goto end_md;
+ }
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT);
+
+ if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, "AES128-SHA")) {
+ printf("SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list() failed\n");
+ goto end_ctx;
+ }
+
+ con = SSL_new(ctx);
+ if (!SSL_set_session(con, sess)) {
+ printf("SSL_set_session() failed\n");
+ goto end_con;
+ }
+ SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+
+ rbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ wbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+
+ BIO_set_nbio(rbio, 1);
+ BIO_set_nbio(wbio, 1);
+
+ SSL_set_bio(con, rbio, wbio);
+ SSL_set_connect_state(con);
+
+ /* Send initial ClientHello */
+ ret = SSL_do_handshake(con);
+ if (ret > 0 || SSL_get_error(con, ret) != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) {
+ printf("Unexpected handshake result at initial call!\n");
+ goto end_con;
+ }
+
+ if (validate_client_hello(wbio) != 1) {
+ printf("Initial ClientHello failed validation\n");
+ goto end_con;
+ }
+ if (send_hello_verify(rbio) != 1) {
+ printf("Failed to send HelloVerify\n");
+ goto end_con;
+ }
+ ret = SSL_do_handshake(con);
+ if (ret > 0 || SSL_get_error(con, ret) != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) {
+ printf("Unexpected handshake result after HelloVerify!\n");
+ goto end_con;
+ }
+ if (validate_client_hello(wbio) != 2) {
+ printf("Second ClientHello failed validation\n");
+ goto end_con;
+ }
+ if (send_server_hello(rbio) != 1) {
+ printf("Failed to send ServerHello\n");
+ goto end_con;
+ }
+ ret = SSL_do_handshake(con);
+ if (ret > 0 || SSL_get_error(con, ret) != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) {
+ printf("Unexpected handshake result after ServerHello!\n");
+ goto end_con;
+ }
+ if (send_finished(con, rbio) != 1) {
+ printf("Failed to send Finished\n");
+ goto end_con;
+ }
+ ret = SSL_do_handshake(con);
+ if (ret < 1) {
+ printf("Handshake not successful after Finished!\n");
+ goto end_con;
+ }
+ if (validate_ccs(wbio) != 1) {
+ printf("Failed to validate client CCS/Finished\n");
+ goto end_con;
+ }
+
+ /* While we're here and crafting packets by hand, we might as well do a
+ bit of a stress test on the DTLS record replay handling. Not Cisco-DTLS
+ specific but useful anyway for the general case. It's been broken
+ before, and in fact was broken even for a basic 0, 2, 1 test case
+ when this test was first added.... */
+ for (i = 0; i < (int)OSSL_NELEM(tests); i++) {
+ unsigned long recv_buf[2];
+
+ if (send_record(rbio, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, tests[i].seq,
+ &tests[i].seq, sizeof(unsigned long)) != 1) {
+ printf("Failed to send data seq #0x%lx (%d)\n",
+ tests[i].seq, i);
+ goto end_con;
+ }
+
+ if (tests[i].drop)
+ continue;
+
+ ret = SSL_read(con, recv_buf, 2 * sizeof(unsigned long));
+ if (ret != sizeof(unsigned long)) {
+ printf("SSL_read failed or wrong size on seq#0x%lx (%d)\n",
+ tests[i].seq, i);
+ goto end_con;
+ }
+ if (recv_buf[0] != tests[i].seq) {
+ printf("Wrong data packet received (0x%lx not 0x%lx) at packet %d\n",
+ recv_buf[0], tests[i].seq, i);
+ goto end_con;
+ }
+ }
+ if (tests[i-1].drop) {
+ printf("Error: last test cannot be DROP()\n");
+ goto end_con;
+ }
+ testresult=1;
+
+ end_con:
+ SSL_free(con);
+ end_ctx:
+ SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+ end_md:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&handshake_md5);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&handshake_sha1);
+ end:
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+
+ if (!testresult) {
+ printf("Cisco BadDTLS test: FAILED\n");
+ }
+
+ ERR_free_strings();
+ ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
+ EVP_cleanup();
+ CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
+ CRYPTO_mem_leaks(err);
+ BIO_free(err);
+
+ return testresult?0:1;
+}