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-rw-r--r--lib/tsan/rtl/tsan_platform_linux.cpp515
1 files changed, 515 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/tsan/rtl/tsan_platform_linux.cpp b/lib/tsan/rtl/tsan_platform_linux.cpp
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index 000000000000..33fa586ca1b0
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+++ b/lib/tsan/rtl/tsan_platform_linux.cpp
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+//===-- tsan_platform_linux.cpp -------------------------------------------===//
+//
+// Part of the LLVM Project, under the Apache License v2.0 with LLVM Exceptions.
+// See https://llvm.org/LICENSE.txt for license information.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 WITH LLVM-exception
+//
+//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
+//
+// This file is a part of ThreadSanitizer (TSan), a race detector.
+//
+// Linux- and FreeBSD-specific code.
+//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
+
+
+#include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_platform.h"
+#if SANITIZER_LINUX || SANITIZER_FREEBSD || SANITIZER_NETBSD
+
+#include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common.h"
+#include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_libc.h"
+#include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux.h"
+#include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_platform_limits_netbsd.h"
+#include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_platform_limits_posix.h"
+#include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_posix.h"
+#include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_procmaps.h"
+#include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_stoptheworld.h"
+#include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_stackdepot.h"
+#include "tsan_platform.h"
+#include "tsan_rtl.h"
+#include "tsan_flags.h"
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <pthread.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#if SANITIZER_LINUX
+#include <sys/personality.h>
+#include <setjmp.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sched.h>
+#include <dlfcn.h>
+#if SANITIZER_LINUX
+#define __need_res_state
+#include <resolv.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef sa_handler
+# undef sa_handler
+#endif
+
+#ifdef sa_sigaction
+# undef sa_sigaction
+#endif
+
+#if SANITIZER_FREEBSD
+extern "C" void *__libc_stack_end;
+void *__libc_stack_end = 0;
+#endif
+
+#if SANITIZER_LINUX && defined(__aarch64__) && !SANITIZER_GO
+# define INIT_LONGJMP_XOR_KEY 1
+#else
+# define INIT_LONGJMP_XOR_KEY 0
+#endif
+
+#if INIT_LONGJMP_XOR_KEY
+#include "interception/interception.h"
+// Must be declared outside of other namespaces.
+DECLARE_REAL(int, _setjmp, void *env)
+#endif
+
+namespace __tsan {
+
+#if INIT_LONGJMP_XOR_KEY
+static void InitializeLongjmpXorKey();
+static uptr longjmp_xor_key;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef TSAN_RUNTIME_VMA
+// Runtime detected VMA size.
+uptr vmaSize;
+#endif
+
+enum {
+ MemTotal = 0,
+ MemShadow = 1,
+ MemMeta = 2,
+ MemFile = 3,
+ MemMmap = 4,
+ MemTrace = 5,
+ MemHeap = 6,
+ MemOther = 7,
+ MemCount = 8,
+};
+
+void FillProfileCallback(uptr p, uptr rss, bool file,
+ uptr *mem, uptr stats_size) {
+ mem[MemTotal] += rss;
+ if (p >= ShadowBeg() && p < ShadowEnd())
+ mem[MemShadow] += rss;
+ else if (p >= MetaShadowBeg() && p < MetaShadowEnd())
+ mem[MemMeta] += rss;
+#if !SANITIZER_GO
+ else if (p >= HeapMemBeg() && p < HeapMemEnd())
+ mem[MemHeap] += rss;
+ else if (p >= LoAppMemBeg() && p < LoAppMemEnd())
+ mem[file ? MemFile : MemMmap] += rss;
+ else if (p >= HiAppMemBeg() && p < HiAppMemEnd())
+ mem[file ? MemFile : MemMmap] += rss;
+#else
+ else if (p >= AppMemBeg() && p < AppMemEnd())
+ mem[file ? MemFile : MemMmap] += rss;
+#endif
+ else if (p >= TraceMemBeg() && p < TraceMemEnd())
+ mem[MemTrace] += rss;
+ else
+ mem[MemOther] += rss;
+}
+
+void WriteMemoryProfile(char *buf, uptr buf_size, uptr nthread, uptr nlive) {
+ uptr mem[MemCount];
+ internal_memset(mem, 0, sizeof(mem[0]) * MemCount);
+ __sanitizer::GetMemoryProfile(FillProfileCallback, mem, 7);
+ StackDepotStats *stacks = StackDepotGetStats();
+ internal_snprintf(buf, buf_size,
+ "RSS %zd MB: shadow:%zd meta:%zd file:%zd mmap:%zd"
+ " trace:%zd heap:%zd other:%zd stacks=%zd[%zd] nthr=%zd/%zd\n",
+ mem[MemTotal] >> 20, mem[MemShadow] >> 20, mem[MemMeta] >> 20,
+ mem[MemFile] >> 20, mem[MemMmap] >> 20, mem[MemTrace] >> 20,
+ mem[MemHeap] >> 20, mem[MemOther] >> 20,
+ stacks->allocated >> 20, stacks->n_uniq_ids,
+ nlive, nthread);
+}
+
+#if SANITIZER_LINUX
+void FlushShadowMemoryCallback(
+ const SuspendedThreadsList &suspended_threads_list,
+ void *argument) {
+ ReleaseMemoryPagesToOS(ShadowBeg(), ShadowEnd());
+}
+#endif
+
+void FlushShadowMemory() {
+#if SANITIZER_LINUX
+ StopTheWorld(FlushShadowMemoryCallback, 0);
+#endif
+}
+
+#if !SANITIZER_GO
+// Mark shadow for .rodata sections with the special kShadowRodata marker.
+// Accesses to .rodata can't race, so this saves time, memory and trace space.
+static void MapRodata() {
+ // First create temp file.
+ const char *tmpdir = GetEnv("TMPDIR");
+ if (tmpdir == 0)
+ tmpdir = GetEnv("TEST_TMPDIR");
+#ifdef P_tmpdir
+ if (tmpdir == 0)
+ tmpdir = P_tmpdir;
+#endif
+ if (tmpdir == 0)
+ return;
+ char name[256];
+ internal_snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%s/tsan.rodata.%d",
+ tmpdir, (int)internal_getpid());
+ uptr openrv = internal_open(name, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, 0600);
+ if (internal_iserror(openrv))
+ return;
+ internal_unlink(name); // Unlink it now, so that we can reuse the buffer.
+ fd_t fd = openrv;
+ // Fill the file with kShadowRodata.
+ const uptr kMarkerSize = 512 * 1024 / sizeof(u64);
+ InternalMmapVector<u64> marker(kMarkerSize);
+ // volatile to prevent insertion of memset
+ for (volatile u64 *p = marker.data(); p < marker.data() + kMarkerSize; p++)
+ *p = kShadowRodata;
+ internal_write(fd, marker.data(), marker.size() * sizeof(u64));
+ // Map the file into memory.
+ uptr page = internal_mmap(0, GetPageSizeCached(), PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+ MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, fd, 0);
+ if (internal_iserror(page)) {
+ internal_close(fd);
+ return;
+ }
+ // Map the file into shadow of .rodata sections.
+ MemoryMappingLayout proc_maps(/*cache_enabled*/true);
+ // Reusing the buffer 'name'.
+ MemoryMappedSegment segment(name, ARRAY_SIZE(name));
+ while (proc_maps.Next(&segment)) {
+ if (segment.filename[0] != 0 && segment.filename[0] != '[' &&
+ segment.IsReadable() && segment.IsExecutable() &&
+ !segment.IsWritable() && IsAppMem(segment.start)) {
+ // Assume it's .rodata
+ char *shadow_start = (char *)MemToShadow(segment.start);
+ char *shadow_end = (char *)MemToShadow(segment.end);
+ for (char *p = shadow_start; p < shadow_end;
+ p += marker.size() * sizeof(u64)) {
+ internal_mmap(p, Min<uptr>(marker.size() * sizeof(u64), shadow_end - p),
+ PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED, fd, 0);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ internal_close(fd);
+}
+
+void InitializeShadowMemoryPlatform() {
+ MapRodata();
+}
+
+#endif // #if !SANITIZER_GO
+
+void InitializePlatformEarly() {
+#ifdef TSAN_RUNTIME_VMA
+ vmaSize =
+ (MostSignificantSetBitIndex(GET_CURRENT_FRAME()) + 1);
+#if defined(__aarch64__)
+# if !SANITIZER_GO
+ if (vmaSize != 39 && vmaSize != 42 && vmaSize != 48) {
+ Printf("FATAL: ThreadSanitizer: unsupported VMA range\n");
+ Printf("FATAL: Found %zd - Supported 39, 42 and 48\n", vmaSize);
+ Die();
+ }
+#else
+ if (vmaSize != 48) {
+ Printf("FATAL: ThreadSanitizer: unsupported VMA range\n");
+ Printf("FATAL: Found %zd - Supported 48\n", vmaSize);
+ Die();
+ }
+#endif
+#elif defined(__powerpc64__)
+# if !SANITIZER_GO
+ if (vmaSize != 44 && vmaSize != 46 && vmaSize != 47) {
+ Printf("FATAL: ThreadSanitizer: unsupported VMA range\n");
+ Printf("FATAL: Found %zd - Supported 44, 46, and 47\n", vmaSize);
+ Die();
+ }
+# else
+ if (vmaSize != 46 && vmaSize != 47) {
+ Printf("FATAL: ThreadSanitizer: unsupported VMA range\n");
+ Printf("FATAL: Found %zd - Supported 46, and 47\n", vmaSize);
+ Die();
+ }
+# endif
+#endif
+#endif
+}
+
+void InitializePlatform() {
+ DisableCoreDumperIfNecessary();
+
+ // Go maps shadow memory lazily and works fine with limited address space.
+ // Unlimited stack is not a problem as well, because the executable
+ // is not compiled with -pie.
+#if !SANITIZER_GO
+ {
+ bool reexec = false;
+ // TSan doesn't play well with unlimited stack size (as stack
+ // overlaps with shadow memory). If we detect unlimited stack size,
+ // we re-exec the program with limited stack size as a best effort.
+ if (StackSizeIsUnlimited()) {
+ const uptr kMaxStackSize = 32 * 1024 * 1024;
+ VReport(1, "Program is run with unlimited stack size, which wouldn't "
+ "work with ThreadSanitizer.\n"
+ "Re-execing with stack size limited to %zd bytes.\n",
+ kMaxStackSize);
+ SetStackSizeLimitInBytes(kMaxStackSize);
+ reexec = true;
+ }
+
+ if (!AddressSpaceIsUnlimited()) {
+ Report("WARNING: Program is run with limited virtual address space,"
+ " which wouldn't work with ThreadSanitizer.\n");
+ Report("Re-execing with unlimited virtual address space.\n");
+ SetAddressSpaceUnlimited();
+ reexec = true;
+ }
+#if SANITIZER_LINUX && defined(__aarch64__)
+ // After patch "arm64: mm: support ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS." is introduced in
+ // linux kernel, the random gap between stack and mapped area is increased
+ // from 128M to 36G on 39-bit aarch64. As it is almost impossible to cover
+ // this big range, we should disable randomized virtual space on aarch64.
+ int old_personality = personality(0xffffffff);
+ if (old_personality != -1 && (old_personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) == 0) {
+ VReport(1, "WARNING: Program is run with randomized virtual address "
+ "space, which wouldn't work with ThreadSanitizer.\n"
+ "Re-execing with fixed virtual address space.\n");
+ CHECK_NE(personality(old_personality | ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE), -1);
+ reexec = true;
+ }
+ // Initialize the xor key used in {sig}{set,long}jump.
+ InitializeLongjmpXorKey();
+#endif
+ if (reexec)
+ ReExec();
+ }
+
+ CheckAndProtect();
+ InitTlsSize();
+#endif // !SANITIZER_GO
+}
+
+#if !SANITIZER_GO
+// Extract file descriptors passed to glibc internal __res_iclose function.
+// This is required to properly "close" the fds, because we do not see internal
+// closes within glibc. The code is a pure hack.
+int ExtractResolvFDs(void *state, int *fds, int nfd) {
+#if SANITIZER_LINUX && !SANITIZER_ANDROID
+ int cnt = 0;
+ struct __res_state *statp = (struct __res_state*)state;
+ for (int i = 0; i < MAXNS && cnt < nfd; i++) {
+ if (statp->_u._ext.nsaddrs[i] && statp->_u._ext.nssocks[i] != -1)
+ fds[cnt++] = statp->_u._ext.nssocks[i];
+ }
+ return cnt;
+#else
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+// Extract file descriptors passed via UNIX domain sockets.
+// This is requried to properly handle "open" of these fds.
+// see 'man recvmsg' and 'man 3 cmsg'.
+int ExtractRecvmsgFDs(void *msgp, int *fds, int nfd) {
+ int res = 0;
+ msghdr *msg = (msghdr*)msgp;
+ struct cmsghdr *cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(msg);
+ for (; cmsg; cmsg = CMSG_NXTHDR(msg, cmsg)) {
+ if (cmsg->cmsg_level != SOL_SOCKET || cmsg->cmsg_type != SCM_RIGHTS)
+ continue;
+ int n = (cmsg->cmsg_len - CMSG_LEN(0)) / sizeof(fds[0]);
+ for (int i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ fds[res++] = ((int*)CMSG_DATA(cmsg))[i];
+ if (res == nfd)
+ return res;
+ }
+ }
+ return res;
+}
+
+// Reverse operation of libc stack pointer mangling
+static uptr UnmangleLongJmpSp(uptr mangled_sp) {
+#if defined(__x86_64__)
+# if SANITIZER_LINUX
+ // Reverse of:
+ // xor %fs:0x30, %rsi
+ // rol $0x11, %rsi
+ uptr sp;
+ asm("ror $0x11, %0 \n"
+ "xor %%fs:0x30, %0 \n"
+ : "=r" (sp)
+ : "0" (mangled_sp));
+ return sp;
+# else
+ return mangled_sp;
+# endif
+#elif defined(__aarch64__)
+# if SANITIZER_LINUX
+ return mangled_sp ^ longjmp_xor_key;
+# else
+ return mangled_sp;
+# endif
+#elif defined(__powerpc64__)
+ // Reverse of:
+ // ld r4, -28696(r13)
+ // xor r4, r3, r4
+ uptr xor_key;
+ asm("ld %0, -28696(%%r13)" : "=r" (xor_key));
+ return mangled_sp ^ xor_key;
+#elif defined(__mips__)
+ return mangled_sp;
+#else
+ #error "Unknown platform"
+#endif
+}
+
+#ifdef __powerpc__
+# define LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT 0
+#elif SANITIZER_FREEBSD
+# define LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT 2
+#elif SANITIZER_NETBSD
+# define LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT 6
+#elif SANITIZER_LINUX
+# ifdef __aarch64__
+# define LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT 13
+# elif defined(__mips64)
+# define LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT 1
+# else
+# define LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT 6
+# endif
+#endif
+
+uptr ExtractLongJmpSp(uptr *env) {
+ uptr mangled_sp = env[LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT];
+ return UnmangleLongJmpSp(mangled_sp);
+}
+
+#if INIT_LONGJMP_XOR_KEY
+// GLIBC mangles the function pointers in jmp_buf (used in {set,long}*jmp
+// functions) by XORing them with a random key. For AArch64 it is a global
+// variable rather than a TCB one (as for x86_64/powerpc). We obtain the key by
+// issuing a setjmp and XORing the SP pointer values to derive the key.
+static void InitializeLongjmpXorKey() {
+ // 1. Call REAL(setjmp), which stores the mangled SP in env.
+ jmp_buf env;
+ REAL(_setjmp)(env);
+
+ // 2. Retrieve vanilla/mangled SP.
+ uptr sp;
+ asm("mov %0, sp" : "=r" (sp));
+ uptr mangled_sp = ((uptr *)&env)[LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT];
+
+ // 3. xor SPs to obtain key.
+ longjmp_xor_key = mangled_sp ^ sp;
+}
+#endif
+
+void ImitateTlsWrite(ThreadState *thr, uptr tls_addr, uptr tls_size) {
+ // Check that the thr object is in tls;
+ const uptr thr_beg = (uptr)thr;
+ const uptr thr_end = (uptr)thr + sizeof(*thr);
+ CHECK_GE(thr_beg, tls_addr);
+ CHECK_LE(thr_beg, tls_addr + tls_size);
+ CHECK_GE(thr_end, tls_addr);
+ CHECK_LE(thr_end, tls_addr + tls_size);
+ // Since the thr object is huge, skip it.
+ MemoryRangeImitateWrite(thr, /*pc=*/2, tls_addr, thr_beg - tls_addr);
+ MemoryRangeImitateWrite(thr, /*pc=*/2, thr_end,
+ tls_addr + tls_size - thr_end);
+}
+
+// Note: this function runs with async signals enabled,
+// so it must not touch any tsan state.
+int call_pthread_cancel_with_cleanup(int(*fn)(void *c, void *m,
+ void *abstime), void *c, void *m, void *abstime,
+ void(*cleanup)(void *arg), void *arg) {
+ // pthread_cleanup_push/pop are hardcore macros mess.
+ // We can't intercept nor call them w/o including pthread.h.
+ int res;
+ pthread_cleanup_push(cleanup, arg);
+ res = fn(c, m, abstime);
+ pthread_cleanup_pop(0);
+ return res;
+}
+#endif // !SANITIZER_GO
+
+#if !SANITIZER_GO
+void ReplaceSystemMalloc() { }
+#endif
+
+#if !SANITIZER_GO
+#if SANITIZER_ANDROID
+// On Android, one thread can call intercepted functions after
+// DestroyThreadState(), so add a fake thread state for "dead" threads.
+static ThreadState *dead_thread_state = nullptr;
+
+ThreadState *cur_thread() {
+ ThreadState* thr = reinterpret_cast<ThreadState*>(*get_android_tls_ptr());
+ if (thr == nullptr) {
+ __sanitizer_sigset_t emptyset;
+ internal_sigfillset(&emptyset);
+ __sanitizer_sigset_t oldset;
+ CHECK_EQ(0, internal_sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &emptyset, &oldset));
+ thr = reinterpret_cast<ThreadState*>(*get_android_tls_ptr());
+ if (thr == nullptr) {
+ thr = reinterpret_cast<ThreadState*>(MmapOrDie(sizeof(ThreadState),
+ "ThreadState"));
+ *get_android_tls_ptr() = reinterpret_cast<uptr>(thr);
+ if (dead_thread_state == nullptr) {
+ dead_thread_state = reinterpret_cast<ThreadState*>(
+ MmapOrDie(sizeof(ThreadState), "ThreadState"));
+ dead_thread_state->fast_state.SetIgnoreBit();
+ dead_thread_state->ignore_interceptors = 1;
+ dead_thread_state->is_dead = true;
+ *const_cast<int*>(&dead_thread_state->tid) = -1;
+ CHECK_EQ(0, internal_mprotect(dead_thread_state, sizeof(ThreadState),
+ PROT_READ));
+ }
+ }
+ CHECK_EQ(0, internal_sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oldset, nullptr));
+ }
+ return thr;
+}
+
+void set_cur_thread(ThreadState *thr) {
+ *get_android_tls_ptr() = reinterpret_cast<uptr>(thr);
+}
+
+void cur_thread_finalize() {
+ __sanitizer_sigset_t emptyset;
+ internal_sigfillset(&emptyset);
+ __sanitizer_sigset_t oldset;
+ CHECK_EQ(0, internal_sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &emptyset, &oldset));
+ ThreadState* thr = reinterpret_cast<ThreadState*>(*get_android_tls_ptr());
+ if (thr != dead_thread_state) {
+ *get_android_tls_ptr() = reinterpret_cast<uptr>(dead_thread_state);
+ UnmapOrDie(thr, sizeof(ThreadState));
+ }
+ CHECK_EQ(0, internal_sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oldset, nullptr));
+}
+#endif // SANITIZER_ANDROID
+#endif // if !SANITIZER_GO
+
+} // namespace __tsan
+
+#endif // SANITIZER_LINUX || SANITIZER_FREEBSD || SANITIZER_NETBSD