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-rw-r--r--crypto/LPdir_unix.c4
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/aes/asm/bsaes-armv7.pl24
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/a_bytes.c58
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/a_object.c10
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/a_set.c9
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/a_strex.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/a_strnid.c1
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c32
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/bio_asn1.c6
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c1
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/charmap.pl14
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c8
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/f_enum.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/f_int.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/f_string.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/i2d_pr.c9
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/p5_pbe.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/p5_pbev2.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/t_req.c1
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c8
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c26
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/tasn_prn.c16
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/tasn_utl.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c15
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/x_name.c6
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/x_x509.c54
-rw-r--r--crypto/bio/b_print.c12
-rw-r--r--crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/bio/bio.h6
-rw-r--r--crypto/bio/bss_bio.c19
-rw-r--r--crypto/bio/bss_file.c6
-rw-r--r--crypto/bio/bss_rtcp.c2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.pl41
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl185
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl227
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn.h2
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_div.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_lib.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_print.c35
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_rand.c23
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_word.c22
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bntest.c8
-rw-r--r--crypto/cms/cms_enc.c12
-rw-r--r--crypto/cms/cms_ess.c3
-rw-r--r--crypto/cms/cms_lib.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/comp/comp.h4
-rw-r--r--crypto/conf/conf_def.h44
-rw-r--r--crypto/conf/conf_mod.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/conf/keysets.pl118
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/des/asm/dest4-sparcv9.pl8
-rw-r--r--crypto/des/des.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/des/enc_writ.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c7
-rw-r--r--crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c7
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/Makefile2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl139
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c32
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/ec_key.c13
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c125
-rw-r--r--crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c29
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/bio_enc.c21
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/bio_ok.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/c_all.c5
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/digest.c16
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/e_rc4_hmac_md5.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/e_seed.c3
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/evp_enc.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/evp_test.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/openbsd_hw.c22
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/p_lib.c8
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/pmeth_gn.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/hmac/hmac.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/jpake/jpake.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/lhash/lhash.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/md2/md2_dgst.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/md32_common.h10
-rw-r--r--crypto/mdc2/mdc2dgst.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/mem.c44
-rw-r--r--crypto/mem_clr.c24
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/modes/asm/ghash-sparcv9.pl2
-rw-r--r--crypto/o_init.c3
-rw-r--r--crypto/o_time.c73
-rw-r--r--crypto/objects/o_names.c7
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/ocsp/ocsp_cl.c4
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c12
-rw-r--r--crypto/opensslv.h6
-rw-r--r--crypto/ossl_typ.h2
-rw-r--r--crypto/pem/pem.h6
-rw-r--r--crypto/pem/pem_err.c3
-rw-r--r--crypto/pem/pem_lib.c14
-rw-r--r--crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c7
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/perlasm/sparcv9_modes.pl4
-rw-r--r--crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c113
-rw-r--r--crypto/pkcs12/p12_utl.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/pkcs12/pkcs12.h2
-rw-r--r--crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/rand/md_rand.c6
-rw-r--r--crypto/rand/rand_unix.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/rand/randfile.c53
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c8
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c89
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c1
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c4
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl4
-rw-r--r--crypto/sparccpuid.S2
-rw-r--r--crypto/srp/srp_lib.c24
-rw-r--r--crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c45
-rw-r--r--crypto/ts/ts.h3
-rw-r--r--crypto/ts/ts_lib.c5
-rw-r--r--crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c27
-rw-r--r--crypto/ui/ui_lib.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/whrlpool/wp_dgst.c3
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509/by_dir.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509/x509.h6
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509/x509_att.c12
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509/x509_err.c3
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509/x509_obj.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509/x509_r2x.c14
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509/x509_txt.c7
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c168
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h9
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509/x509spki.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c6
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509v3/v3_conf.c4
134 files changed, 1578 insertions, 885 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/LPdir_unix.c b/crypto/LPdir_unix.c
index bead6abd7156..c97e260492b9 100644
--- a/crypto/LPdir_unix.c
+++ b/crypto/LPdir_unix.c
@@ -1,8 +1,4 @@
/*
- * $LP: LPlib/source/LPdir_unix.c,v 1.11 2004/09/23 22:07:22 _cvs_levitte Exp
- * $
- */
-/*
* Copyright (c) 2004, Richard Levitte <richard@levitte.org>
* All rights reserved.
*
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-armv7.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-armv7.pl
index fcc81d1a4933..83343e2de1af 100755
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-armv7.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-armv7.pl
@@ -1797,8 +1797,6 @@ $code.=<<___;
b .Lxts_enc_done
.align 4
.Lxts_enc_6:
- vst1.64 {@XMM[14]}, [r0,:128] @ next round tweak
-
veor @XMM[4], @XMM[4], @XMM[12]
#ifndef BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY
add r4, sp, #0x90 @ pass key schedule
@@ -1834,8 +1832,6 @@ $code.=<<___;
.align 5
.Lxts_enc_5:
- vst1.64 {@XMM[13]}, [r0,:128] @ next round tweak
-
veor @XMM[3], @XMM[3], @XMM[11]
#ifndef BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY
add r4, sp, #0x90 @ pass key schedule
@@ -1864,8 +1860,6 @@ $code.=<<___;
b .Lxts_enc_done
.align 4
.Lxts_enc_4:
- vst1.64 {@XMM[12]}, [r0,:128] @ next round tweak
-
veor @XMM[2], @XMM[2], @XMM[10]
#ifndef BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY
add r4, sp, #0x90 @ pass key schedule
@@ -1891,8 +1885,6 @@ $code.=<<___;
b .Lxts_enc_done
.align 4
.Lxts_enc_3:
- vst1.64 {@XMM[11]}, [r0,:128] @ next round tweak
-
veor @XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[9]
#ifndef BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY
add r4, sp, #0x90 @ pass key schedule
@@ -1917,8 +1909,6 @@ $code.=<<___;
b .Lxts_enc_done
.align 4
.Lxts_enc_2:
- vst1.64 {@XMM[10]}, [r0,:128] @ next round tweak
-
veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[8]
#ifndef BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY
add r4, sp, #0x90 @ pass key schedule
@@ -1941,7 +1931,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.align 4
.Lxts_enc_1:
mov r0, sp
- veor @XMM[0], @XMM[8]
+ veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[8]
mov r1, sp
vst1.8 {@XMM[0]}, [sp,:128]
mov r2, $key
@@ -2251,8 +2241,6 @@ $code.=<<___;
b .Lxts_dec_done
.align 4
.Lxts_dec_5:
- vst1.64 {@XMM[13]}, [r0,:128] @ next round tweak
-
veor @XMM[3], @XMM[3], @XMM[11]
#ifndef BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY
add r4, sp, #0x90 @ pass key schedule
@@ -2281,8 +2269,6 @@ $code.=<<___;
b .Lxts_dec_done
.align 4
.Lxts_dec_4:
- vst1.64 {@XMM[12]}, [r0,:128] @ next round tweak
-
veor @XMM[2], @XMM[2], @XMM[10]
#ifndef BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY
add r4, sp, #0x90 @ pass key schedule
@@ -2308,8 +2294,6 @@ $code.=<<___;
b .Lxts_dec_done
.align 4
.Lxts_dec_3:
- vst1.64 {@XMM[11]}, [r0,:128] @ next round tweak
-
veor @XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[9]
#ifndef BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY
add r4, sp, #0x90 @ pass key schedule
@@ -2334,8 +2318,6 @@ $code.=<<___;
b .Lxts_dec_done
.align 4
.Lxts_dec_2:
- vst1.64 {@XMM[10]}, [r0,:128] @ next round tweak
-
veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[8]
#ifndef BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY
add r4, sp, #0x90 @ pass key schedule
@@ -2358,12 +2340,12 @@ $code.=<<___;
.align 4
.Lxts_dec_1:
mov r0, sp
- veor @XMM[0], @XMM[8]
+ veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[8]
mov r1, sp
vst1.8 {@XMM[0]}, [sp,:128]
+ mov r5, $magic @ preserve magic
mov r2, $key
mov r4, $fp @ preserve fp
- mov r5, $magic @ preserve magic
bl AES_decrypt
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_bytes.c b/crypto/asn1/a_bytes.c
index 385b53986a29..65e5394664a4 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_bytes.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_bytes.c
@@ -60,7 +60,12 @@
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
-static int asn1_collate_primitive(ASN1_STRING *a, ASN1_const_CTX *c);
+static int asn1_collate_primitive(ASN1_STRING *a, ASN1_const_CTX *c,
+ int depth);
+static ASN1_STRING *int_d2i_ASN1_bytes(ASN1_STRING **a,
+ const unsigned char **pp, long length,
+ int Ptag, int Pclass, int depth,
+ int *perr);
/*
* type is a 'bitmap' of acceptable string types.
*/
@@ -99,7 +104,7 @@ ASN1_STRING *d2i_ASN1_type_bytes(ASN1_STRING **a, const unsigned char **pp,
ret = (*a);
if (len != 0) {
- s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((int)len + 1);
+ s = OPENSSL_malloc((int)len + 1);
if (s == NULL) {
i = ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE;
goto err;
@@ -154,15 +159,38 @@ int i2d_ASN1_bytes(ASN1_STRING *a, unsigned char **pp, int tag, int xclass)
return (r);
}
+/*
+ * Maximum recursion depth of d2i_ASN1_bytes(): much more than should be
+ * encountered in pratice.
+ */
+
+#define ASN1_BYTES_MAXDEPTH 20
+
ASN1_STRING *d2i_ASN1_bytes(ASN1_STRING **a, const unsigned char **pp,
long length, int Ptag, int Pclass)
{
+ int err = 0;
+ ASN1_STRING *s = int_d2i_ASN1_bytes(a, pp, length, Ptag, Pclass, 0, &err);
+ if (err != 0)
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_BYTES, err);
+ return s;
+}
+
+static ASN1_STRING *int_d2i_ASN1_bytes(ASN1_STRING **a,
+ const unsigned char **pp, long length,
+ int Ptag, int Pclass,
+ int depth, int *perr)
+{
ASN1_STRING *ret = NULL;
const unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *s;
long len;
int inf, tag, xclass;
- int i = 0;
+
+ if (depth > ASN1_BYTES_MAXDEPTH) {
+ *perr = ASN1_R_NESTED_ASN1_STRING;
+ return NULL;
+ }
if ((a == NULL) || ((*a) == NULL)) {
if ((ret = ASN1_STRING_new()) == NULL)
@@ -173,18 +201,19 @@ ASN1_STRING *d2i_ASN1_bytes(ASN1_STRING **a, const unsigned char **pp,
p = *pp;
inf = ASN1_get_object(&p, &len, &tag, &xclass, length);
if (inf & 0x80) {
- i = ASN1_R_BAD_OBJECT_HEADER;
+ *perr = ASN1_R_BAD_OBJECT_HEADER;
goto err;
}
if (tag != Ptag) {
- i = ASN1_R_WRONG_TAG;
+ *perr = ASN1_R_WRONG_TAG;
goto err;
}
if (inf & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED) {
ASN1_const_CTX c;
+ c.error = 0;
c.pp = pp;
c.p = p;
c.inf = inf;
@@ -192,17 +221,18 @@ ASN1_STRING *d2i_ASN1_bytes(ASN1_STRING **a, const unsigned char **pp,
c.tag = Ptag;
c.xclass = Pclass;
c.max = (length == 0) ? 0 : (p + length);
- if (!asn1_collate_primitive(ret, &c))
+ if (!asn1_collate_primitive(ret, &c, depth)) {
+ *perr = c.error;
goto err;
- else {
+ } else {
p = c.p;
}
} else {
if (len != 0) {
if ((ret->length < len) || (ret->data == NULL)) {
- s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((int)len + 1);
+ s = OPENSSL_malloc((int)len + 1);
if (s == NULL) {
- i = ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE;
+ *perr = ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE;
goto err;
}
if (ret->data != NULL)
@@ -230,7 +260,6 @@ ASN1_STRING *d2i_ASN1_bytes(ASN1_STRING **a, const unsigned char **pp,
err:
if ((ret != NULL) && ((a == NULL) || (*a != ret)))
ASN1_STRING_free(ret);
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_BYTES, i);
return (NULL);
}
@@ -242,7 +271,8 @@ ASN1_STRING *d2i_ASN1_bytes(ASN1_STRING **a, const unsigned char **pp,
* There have been a few bug fixes for this function from Paul Keogh
* <paul.keogh@sse.ie>, many thanks to him
*/
-static int asn1_collate_primitive(ASN1_STRING *a, ASN1_const_CTX *c)
+static int asn1_collate_primitive(ASN1_STRING *a, ASN1_const_CTX *c,
+ int depth)
{
ASN1_STRING *os = NULL;
BUF_MEM b;
@@ -270,9 +300,8 @@ static int asn1_collate_primitive(ASN1_STRING *a, ASN1_const_CTX *c)
}
c->q = c->p;
- if (d2i_ASN1_bytes(&os, &c->p, c->max - c->p, c->tag, c->xclass)
- == NULL) {
- c->error = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB;
+ if (int_d2i_ASN1_bytes(&os, &c->p, c->max - c->p, c->tag, c->xclass,
+ depth + 1, &c->error) == NULL) {
goto err;
}
@@ -297,7 +326,6 @@ static int asn1_collate_primitive(ASN1_STRING *a, ASN1_const_CTX *c)
ASN1_STRING_free(os);
return (1);
err:
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_COLLATE_PRIMITIVE, c->error);
if (os != NULL)
ASN1_STRING_free(os);
if (b.data != NULL)
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_object.c b/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
index 27f9c1691462..229a40ffa344 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ int i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT *a, unsigned char **pp)
return (0);
objsize = ASN1_object_size(0, a->length, V_ASN1_OBJECT);
- if (pp == NULL)
+ if (pp == NULL || objsize == -1)
return objsize;
p = *pp;
@@ -174,8 +174,12 @@ int a2d_ASN1_OBJECT(unsigned char *out, int olen, const char *buf, int num)
if (!tmp)
goto err;
}
- while (blsize--)
- tmp[i++] = (unsigned char)BN_div_word(bl, 0x80L);
+ while (blsize--) {
+ BN_ULONG t = BN_div_word(bl, 0x80L);
+ if (t == (BN_ULONG)-1)
+ goto err;
+ tmp[i++] = (unsigned char)t;
+ }
} else {
for (;;) {
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_set.c b/crypto/asn1/a_set.c
index bf3f97188926..5fb58655757d 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_set.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_set.c
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
*/
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <limits.h>
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/asn1_mac.h>
@@ -98,10 +99,14 @@ int i2d_ASN1_SET(STACK_OF(OPENSSL_BLOCK) *a, unsigned char **pp,
if (a == NULL)
return (0);
- for (i = sk_OPENSSL_BLOCK_num(a) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+ for (i = sk_OPENSSL_BLOCK_num(a) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ int tmplen = i2d(sk_OPENSSL_BLOCK_value(a, i), NULL);
+ if (tmplen > INT_MAX - ret)
+ return -1;
ret += i2d(sk_OPENSSL_BLOCK_value(a, i), NULL);
+ }
r = ASN1_object_size(1, ret, ex_tag);
- if (pp == NULL)
+ if (pp == NULL || r == -1)
return (r);
p = *pp;
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c b/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c
index 35fd44cd22b8..2d562f93452f 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ static const signed char tag2nbyte[] = {
-1, -1, -1, -1, -1, /* 5-9 */
-1, -1, 0, -1, /* 10-13 */
-1, -1, -1, -1, /* 15-17 */
- -1, 1, 1, /* 18-20 */
+ 1, 1, 1, /* 18-20 */
-1, 1, 1, 1, /* 21-24 */
-1, 1, -1, /* 25-27 */
4, -1, 2 /* 28-30 */
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_strnid.c b/crypto/asn1/a_strnid.c
index 52243453689a..2d2303d8599e 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_strnid.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_strnid.c
@@ -250,6 +250,7 @@ int ASN1_STRING_TABLE_add(int nid,
}
tmp->flags = flags | STABLE_FLAGS_MALLOC;
tmp->nid = nid;
+ tmp->minsize = tmp->maxsize = -1;
new_nid = 1;
} else
tmp->flags = (tmp->flags & STABLE_FLAGS_MALLOC) | flags;
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c b/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c
index 5389c0434740..43ddebba33a6 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c
@@ -93,7 +93,9 @@ static const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *standard_methods[] = {
&eckey_asn1_meth,
#endif
&hmac_asn1_meth,
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMAC
&cmac_asn1_meth,
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
&dhx_asn1_meth
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c b/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c
index 874b1af8b09a..e63e82a8b476 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c
@@ -256,26 +256,30 @@ static void asn1_put_length(unsigned char **pp, int length)
int ASN1_object_size(int constructed, int length, int tag)
{
- int ret;
-
- ret = length;
- ret++;
+ int ret = 1;
+ if (length < 0)
+ return -1;
if (tag >= 31) {
while (tag > 0) {
tag >>= 7;
ret++;
}
}
- if (constructed == 2)
- return ret + 3;
- ret++;
- if (length > 127) {
- while (length > 0) {
- length >>= 8;
- ret++;
+ if (constructed == 2) {
+ ret += 3;
+ } else {
+ ret++;
+ if (length > 127) {
+ int tmplen = length;
+ while (tmplen > 0) {
+ tmplen >>= 8;
+ ret++;
+ }
}
}
- return (ret);
+ if (ret >= INT_MAX - length)
+ return -1;
+ return ret + length;
}
static int _asn1_Finish(ASN1_const_CTX *c)
@@ -324,7 +328,7 @@ int asn1_GetSequence(ASN1_const_CTX *c, long *length)
return (0);
}
if (c->inf == (1 | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED))
- c->slen = *length + *(c->pp) - c->p;
+ c->slen = *length;
c->eos = 0;
return (1);
}
@@ -366,7 +370,7 @@ int ASN1_STRING_set(ASN1_STRING *str, const void *_data, int len)
else
len = strlen(data);
}
- if ((str->length < len) || (str->data == NULL)) {
+ if ((str->length <= len) || (str->data == NULL)) {
c = str->data;
if (c == NULL)
str->data = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1);
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c b/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
index 96110c540f3d..5170906c62da 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ int SMIME_write_ASN1(BIO *bio, ASN1_VALUE *val, BIO *data, int flags,
if ((flags & SMIME_DETACHED) && data) {
/* We want multipart/signed */
/* Generate a random boundary */
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes((unsigned char *)bound, 32) < 0)
+ if (RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)bound, 32) <= 0)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
c = bound[i] & 0xf;
@@ -623,6 +623,8 @@ static int multi_split(BIO *bio, char *bound, STACK_OF(BIO) **ret)
if (bpart)
sk_BIO_push(parts, bpart);
bpart = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ if (bpart == NULL)
+ return 1;
BIO_set_mem_eof_return(bpart, 0);
} else if (eol)
BIO_write(bpart, "\r\n", 2);
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/bio_asn1.c b/crypto/asn1/bio_asn1.c
index 60189b3b2c53..c3afff69dc7e 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/bio_asn1.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/bio_asn1.c
@@ -170,10 +170,12 @@ static int asn1_bio_init(BIO_ASN1_BUF_CTX *ctx, int size)
ctx->copylen = 0;
ctx->asn1_class = V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL;
ctx->asn1_tag = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
- ctx->ex_buf = 0;
- ctx->ex_pos = 0;
+ ctx->ex_buf = NULL;
ctx->ex_len = 0;
+ ctx->ex_pos = 0;
ctx->state = ASN1_STATE_START;
+ ctx->prefix = ctx->prefix_free = ctx->suffix = ctx->suffix_free = NULL;
+ ctx->ex_arg = NULL;
return 1;
}
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c b/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c
index 31949b87940f..8d7046633cfe 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c
@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ BIO *BIO_new_NDEF(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *val, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
ndef_aux->ndef_bio = sarg.ndef_bio;
ndef_aux->boundary = sarg.boundary;
ndef_aux->out = out;
+ ndef_aux->derbuf = NULL;
BIO_ctrl(asn_bio, BIO_C_SET_EX_ARG, 0, ndef_aux);
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/charmap.pl b/crypto/asn1/charmap.pl
index 25ebf2c205d0..12ac34ad7423 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/charmap.pl
+++ b/crypto/asn1/charmap.pl
@@ -67,17 +67,19 @@ $arr[ord("?")] |= $PSTRING_CHAR;
# Now generate the C code
print <<EOF;
-/* Auto generated with chartype.pl script.
- * Mask of various character properties
+/*
+ * Auto generated with chartype.pl script. Mask of various character
+ * properties
*/
-static unsigned char char_type[] = {
+static const unsigned char char_type[] = {
EOF
+print " ";
for($i = 0; $i < 128; $i++) {
- print("\n") if($i && (($i % 16) == 0));
- printf("%2d", $arr[$i]);
+ print("\n ") if($i && (($i % 16) == 0));
+ printf(" %d", $arr[$i]);
print(",") if ($i != 127);
}
-print("\n};\n\n");
+print("\n};\n");
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c b/crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c
index d21829af192f..86dcf5fba9d7 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c
@@ -97,15 +97,17 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey(int type, EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
if (!ret->ameth->old_priv_decode ||
!ret->ameth->old_priv_decode(ret, &p, length)) {
if (ret->ameth->priv_decode) {
+ EVP_PKEY *tmp;
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = NULL;
p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &p, length);
if (!p8)
goto err;
- EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
- ret = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8);
+ tmp = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8);
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
- if (ret == NULL)
+ if (tmp == NULL)
goto err;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
+ ret = tmp;
} else {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto err;
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/f_enum.c b/crypto/asn1/f_enum.c
index 591c3b578127..94cd54dbeedd 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/f_enum.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/f_enum.c
@@ -160,8 +160,6 @@ int a2i_ASN1_ENUMERATED(BIO *bp, ASN1_ENUMERATED *bs, char *buf, int size)
i * 2);
if (sp == NULL) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_ENUMERATED, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- if (s != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(s);
goto err;
}
s = sp;
@@ -199,5 +197,7 @@ int a2i_ASN1_ENUMERATED(BIO *bp, ASN1_ENUMERATED *bs, char *buf, int size)
err_sl:
ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_ENUMERATED, ASN1_R_SHORT_LINE);
}
+ if (ret != 1)
+ OPENSSL_free(s);
return (ret);
}
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/f_int.c b/crypto/asn1/f_int.c
index 4a81f81c8832..2bdc78d74491 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/f_int.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/f_int.c
@@ -172,8 +172,6 @@ int a2i_ASN1_INTEGER(BIO *bp, ASN1_INTEGER *bs, char *buf, int size)
sp = OPENSSL_realloc_clean(s, slen, num + i * 2);
if (sp == NULL) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_INTEGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- if (s != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(s);
goto err;
}
s = sp;
@@ -211,5 +209,7 @@ int a2i_ASN1_INTEGER(BIO *bp, ASN1_INTEGER *bs, char *buf, int size)
err_sl:
ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_INTEGER, ASN1_R_SHORT_LINE);
}
+ if (ret != 1)
+ OPENSSL_free(s);
return (ret);
}
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/f_string.c b/crypto/asn1/f_string.c
index 6a6cf3471408..0f7b9cfb119b 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/f_string.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/f_string.c
@@ -166,8 +166,6 @@ int a2i_ASN1_STRING(BIO *bp, ASN1_STRING *bs, char *buf, int size)
i * 2);
if (sp == NULL) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_STRING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- if (s != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(s);
goto err;
}
s = sp;
@@ -205,5 +203,7 @@ int a2i_ASN1_STRING(BIO *bp, ASN1_STRING *bs, char *buf, int size)
err_sl:
ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_STRING, ASN1_R_SHORT_LINE);
}
+ if (ret != 1)
+ OPENSSL_free(s);
return (ret);
}
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/i2d_pr.c b/crypto/asn1/i2d_pr.c
index 4d338ac55aed..12966ec536e1 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/i2d_pr.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/i2d_pr.c
@@ -69,10 +69,13 @@ int i2d_PrivateKey(EVP_PKEY *a, unsigned char **pp)
}
if (a->ameth && a->ameth->priv_encode) {
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(a);
- int ret = i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(p8, pp);
- PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
+ int ret = 0;
+ if (p8 != NULL) {
+ ret = i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(p8, pp);
+ PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
+ }
return ret;
}
ASN1err(ASN1_F_I2D_PRIVATEKEY, ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE);
- return (-1);
+ return -1;
}
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/p5_pbe.c b/crypto/asn1/p5_pbe.c
index bdbfdcd67c07..e2a1def53f1d 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/p5_pbe.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/p5_pbe.c
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ int PKCS5_pbe_set0_algor(X509_ALGOR *algor, int alg, int iter,
sstr = ASN1_STRING_data(pbe->salt);
if (salt)
memcpy(sstr, salt, saltlen);
- else if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(sstr, saltlen) < 0)
+ else if (RAND_bytes(sstr, saltlen) <= 0)
goto err;
if (!ASN1_item_pack(pbe, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBEPARAM), &pbe_str)) {
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/p5_pbev2.c b/crypto/asn1/p5_pbev2.c
index 73ba4a3d67aa..388053e0a1bf 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/p5_pbev2.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/p5_pbev2.c
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ X509_ALGOR *PKCS5_pbe2_set_iv(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int iter,
if (EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)) {
if (aiv)
memcpy(iv, aiv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher));
- else if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)) < 0)
+ else if (RAND_bytes(iv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)) <= 0)
goto err;
}
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ X509_ALGOR *PKCS5_pbkdf2_set(int iter, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen,
if (salt)
memcpy(osalt->data, salt, saltlen);
- else if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(osalt->data, saltlen) < 0)
+ else if (RAND_bytes(osalt->data, saltlen) <= 0)
goto merr;
if (iter <= 0)
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/t_req.c b/crypto/asn1/t_req.c
index 024553ab196f..70aba4cc3b3b 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/t_req.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/t_req.c
@@ -196,6 +196,7 @@ int X509_REQ_print_ex(BIO *bp, X509_REQ *x, unsigned long nmflags,
if (BIO_puts(bp, ":") <= 0)
goto err;
if ((type == V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING) ||
+ (type == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) ||
(type == V_ASN1_T61STRING) ||
(type == V_ASN1_IA5STRING)) {
if (BIO_write(bp, (char *)bs->data, bs->length)
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c b/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
index 6bdcd5c542ca..d25402730b8b 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
@@ -400,7 +400,9 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_ADB_MASK) {
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
- seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1);
+ seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 0);
+ if (seqtt == NULL)
+ continue;
pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt);
ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt);
}
@@ -411,7 +413,7 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1);
- if (!seqtt)
+ if (seqtt == NULL)
goto err;
pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt);
/* Have we ran out of data? */
@@ -476,7 +478,7 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
for (; i < it->tcount; tt++, i++) {
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1);
- if (!seqtt)
+ if (seqtt == NULL)
goto err;
if (seqtt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL) {
ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c b/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c
index f7f83e56a981..081a9d534f8a 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@
#include <stddef.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <limits.h>
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
@@ -216,17 +217,19 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; tt++, i++) {
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
+ int tmplen;
seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1);
if (!seqtt)
return 0;
pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt);
- /* FIXME: check for errors in enhanced version */
- seqcontlen += asn1_template_ex_i2d(pseqval, NULL, seqtt,
- -1, aclass);
+ tmplen = asn1_template_ex_i2d(pseqval, NULL, seqtt, -1, aclass);
+ if (tmplen == -1 || (tmplen > INT_MAX - seqcontlen))
+ return -1;
+ seqcontlen += tmplen;
}
seqlen = ASN1_object_size(ndef, seqcontlen, tag);
- if (!out)
+ if (!out || seqlen == -1)
return seqlen;
/* Output SEQUENCE header */
ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, seqcontlen, tag, aclass);
@@ -339,19 +342,24 @@ static int asn1_template_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
/* Determine total length of items */
skcontlen = 0;
for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk); i++) {
+ int tmplen;
skitem = sk_ASN1_VALUE_value(sk, i);
- skcontlen += ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&skitem, NULL,
- ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item),
- -1, iclass);
+ tmplen = ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&skitem, NULL, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item),
+ -1, iclass);
+ if (tmplen == -1 || (skcontlen > INT_MAX - tmplen))
+ return -1;
+ skcontlen += tmplen;
}
sklen = ASN1_object_size(ndef, skcontlen, sktag);
+ if (sklen == -1)
+ return -1;
/* If EXPLICIT need length of surrounding tag */
if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG)
ret = ASN1_object_size(ndef, sklen, ttag);
else
ret = sklen;
- if (!out)
+ if (!out || ret == -1)
return ret;
/* Now encode this lot... */
@@ -380,7 +388,7 @@ static int asn1_template_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
return 0;
/* Find length of EXPLICIT tag */
ret = ASN1_object_size(ndef, i, ttag);
- if (out) {
+ if (out && ret != -1) {
/* Output tag and item */
ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, i, ttag, tclass);
ASN1_item_ex_i2d(pval, out, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), -1, iclass);
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/tasn_prn.c b/crypto/asn1/tasn_prn.c
index 5e7d53e9854a..f628caddbd05 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/tasn_prn.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/tasn_prn.c
@@ -204,7 +204,8 @@ static int asn1_item_print_ctx(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **fld, int indent,
} else
asn1_cb = 0;
- if (*fld == NULL) {
+ if (((it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE)
+ || (it->utype != V_ASN1_BOOLEAN)) && *fld == NULL) {
if (pctx->flags & ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_ABSENT) {
if (!nohdr && !asn1_print_fsname(out, indent, fname, sname, pctx))
return 0;
@@ -446,6 +447,8 @@ static int asn1_print_integer_ctx(BIO *out, ASN1_INTEGER *str,
char *s;
int ret = 1;
s = i2s_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, str);
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return 0;
if (BIO_puts(out, s) <= 0)
ret = 0;
OPENSSL_free(s);
@@ -496,11 +499,16 @@ static int asn1_primitive_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **fld,
return 0;
if (pf && pf->prim_print)
return pf->prim_print(out, fld, it, indent, pctx);
- str = (ASN1_STRING *)*fld;
- if (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING)
+ if (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING) {
+ str = (ASN1_STRING *)*fld;
utype = str->type & ~V_ASN1_NEG;
- else
+ } else {
utype = it->utype;
+ if (utype == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN)
+ str = NULL;
+ else
+ str = (ASN1_STRING *)*fld;
+ }
if (utype == V_ASN1_ANY) {
ASN1_TYPE *atype = (ASN1_TYPE *)*fld;
utype = atype->type;
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/tasn_utl.c b/crypto/asn1/tasn_utl.c
index 41726d8feb4e..e14889feb156 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/tasn_utl.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/tasn_utl.c
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ const ASN1_TEMPLATE *asn1_do_adb(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt,
sfld = offset2ptr(*pval, adb->offset);
/* Check if NULL */
- if (!sfld) {
+ if (*sfld == NULL) {
if (!adb->null_tt)
goto err;
return adb->null_tt;
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c b/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c
index eaf046639d6a..c644199c9f81 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c
@@ -78,6 +78,8 @@ static int bn_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype,
const ASN1_ITEM *it);
static int bn_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+static int bn_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+ int indent, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx);
static ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS bignum_pf = {
NULL, 0,
@@ -85,7 +87,8 @@ static ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS bignum_pf = {
bn_free,
0,
bn_c2i,
- bn_i2c
+ bn_i2c,
+ bn_print
};
ASN1_ITEM_start(BIGNUM)
@@ -151,3 +154,13 @@ static int bn_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
}
return 1;
}
+
+static int bn_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+ int indent, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
+{
+ if (!BN_print(out, *(BIGNUM **)pval))
+ return 0;
+ if (BIO_puts(out, "\n") <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/x_name.c b/crypto/asn1/x_name.c
index a858c2993b90..26378fdb2a02 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/x_name.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/x_name.c
@@ -199,10 +199,8 @@ static int x509_name_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
int i, j, ret;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *entries;
X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry;
- if (len > X509_NAME_MAX) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_X509_NAME_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
- return 0;
- }
+ if (len > X509_NAME_MAX)
+ len = X509_NAME_MAX;
q = p;
/* Get internal representation of Name */
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c b/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c
index e31e1e750d9d..aada4a8413f2 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c
@@ -199,12 +199,26 @@ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
return NULL;
}
-int i2d_X509_AUX(X509 *a, unsigned char **pp)
+/*
+ * Serialize trusted certificate to *pp or just return the required buffer
+ * length if pp == NULL. We ultimately want to avoid modifying *pp in the
+ * error path, but that depends on similar hygiene in lower-level functions.
+ * Here we avoid compounding the problem.
+ */
+static int i2d_x509_aux_internal(X509 *a, unsigned char **pp)
{
int length, tmplen;
unsigned char *start = pp != NULL ? *pp : NULL;
+
+ OPENSSL_assert(pp == NULL || *pp != NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * This might perturb *pp on error, but fixing that belongs in i2d_X509()
+ * not here. It should be that if a == NULL length is zero, but we check
+ * both just in case.
+ */
length = i2d_X509(a, pp);
- if (length < 0 || a == NULL)
+ if (length <= 0 || a == NULL)
return length;
tmplen = i2d_X509_CERT_AUX(a->aux, pp);
@@ -218,6 +232,42 @@ int i2d_X509_AUX(X509 *a, unsigned char **pp)
return length;
}
+/*
+ * Serialize trusted certificate to *pp, or just return the required buffer
+ * length if pp == NULL.
+ *
+ * When pp is not NULL, but *pp == NULL, we allocate the buffer, but since
+ * we're writing two ASN.1 objects back to back, we can't have i2d_X509() do
+ * the allocation, nor can we allow i2d_X509_CERT_AUX() to increment the
+ * allocated buffer.
+ */
+int i2d_X509_AUX(X509 *a, unsigned char **pp)
+{
+ int length;
+ unsigned char *tmp;
+
+ /* Buffer provided by caller */
+ if (pp == NULL || *pp != NULL)
+ return i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, pp);
+
+ /* Obtain the combined length */
+ if ((length = i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, NULL)) <= 0)
+ return length;
+
+ /* Allocate requisite combined storage */
+ *pp = tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(length);
+ if (tmp == NULL)
+ return -1; /* Push error onto error stack? */
+
+ /* Encode, but keep *pp at the originally malloced pointer */
+ length = i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, &tmp);
+ if (length <= 0) {
+ OPENSSL_free(*pp);
+ *pp = NULL;
+ }
+ return length;
+}
+
int i2d_re_X509_tbs(X509 *x, unsigned char **pp)
{
x->cert_info->enc.modified = 1;
diff --git a/crypto/bio/b_print.c b/crypto/bio/b_print.c
index 90248fa2aaba..987fe068c6de 100644
--- a/crypto/bio/b_print.c
+++ b/crypto/bio/b_print.c
@@ -423,9 +423,15 @@ _dopr(char **sbuffer,
break;
}
}
- *truncated = (currlen > *maxlen - 1);
- if (*truncated)
- currlen = *maxlen - 1;
+ /*
+ * We have to truncate if there is no dynamic buffer and we have filled the
+ * static buffer.
+ */
+ if (buffer == NULL) {
+ *truncated = (currlen > *maxlen - 1);
+ if (*truncated)
+ currlen = *maxlen - 1;
+ }
if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, '\0'))
return 0;
*retlen = currlen - 1;
diff --git a/crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c b/crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c
index a04f32a00817..4842bb4c82ff 100644
--- a/crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c
+++ b/crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ static int nbiof_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
#if 1
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&n, 1) < 0)
+ if (RAND_bytes(&n, 1) <= 0)
return -1;
num = (n & 0x07);
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static int nbiof_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
num = nt->lwn;
nt->lwn = 0;
} else {
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&n, 1) < 0)
+ if (RAND_bytes(&n, 1) <= 0)
return -1;
num = (n & 7);
}
diff --git a/crypto/bio/bio.h b/crypto/bio/bio.h
index 6790aed28e0b..8f2438cdad70 100644
--- a/crypto/bio/bio.h
+++ b/crypto/bio/bio.h
@@ -559,11 +559,11 @@ int BIO_read_filename(BIO *b, const char *name);
# define BIO_get_ssl(b,sslp) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_SSL,0,(char *)sslp)
# define BIO_set_ssl_mode(b,client) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SSL_MODE,client,NULL)
# define BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_bytes(b,num) \
- BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_BYTES,num,NULL);
+ BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_BYTES,num,NULL)
# define BIO_get_num_renegotiates(b) \
- BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_SSL_NUM_RENEGOTIATES,0,NULL);
+ BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_SSL_NUM_RENEGOTIATES,0,NULL)
# define BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_timeout(b,seconds) \
- BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_TIMEOUT,seconds,NULL);
+ BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_TIMEOUT,seconds,NULL)
/* defined in evp.h */
/* #define BIO_set_md(b,md) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_MD,1,(char *)md) */
diff --git a/crypto/bio/bss_bio.c b/crypto/bio/bss_bio.c
index 4d8727f8f890..3dd818772942 100644
--- a/crypto/bio/bss_bio.c
+++ b/crypto/bio/bss_bio.c
@@ -149,9 +149,13 @@ static int bio_new(BIO *bio)
return 0;
b->peer = NULL;
+ b->closed = 0;
+ b->len = 0;
+ b->offset = 0;
/* enough for one TLS record (just a default) */
b->size = 17 * 1024;
b->buf = NULL;
+ b->request = 0;
bio->ptr = b;
return 1;
@@ -655,16 +659,15 @@ static long bio_ctrl(BIO *bio, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
break;
case BIO_CTRL_EOF:
- {
- BIO *other_bio = ptr;
-
- if (other_bio) {
- struct bio_bio_st *other_b = other_bio->ptr;
+ if (b->peer != NULL) {
+ struct bio_bio_st *peer_b = b->peer->ptr;
- assert(other_b != NULL);
- ret = other_b->len == 0 && other_b->closed;
- } else
+ if (peer_b->len == 0 && peer_b->closed)
ret = 1;
+ else
+ ret = 0;
+ } else {
+ ret = 1;
}
break;
diff --git a/crypto/bio/bss_file.c b/crypto/bio/bss_file.c
index bfba93e62bbd..a6e3b3ac0130 100644
--- a/crypto/bio/bss_file.c
+++ b/crypto/bio/bss_file.c
@@ -174,7 +174,11 @@ BIO *BIO_new_file(const char *filename, const char *mode)
if (file == NULL) {
SYSerr(SYS_F_FOPEN, get_last_sys_error());
ERR_add_error_data(5, "fopen('", filename, "','", mode, "')");
- if (errno == ENOENT)
+ if (errno == ENOENT
+# ifdef ENXIO
+ || errno == ENXIO
+# endif
+ )
BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_FILE, BIO_R_NO_SUCH_FILE);
else
BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
diff --git a/crypto/bio/bss_rtcp.c b/crypto/bio/bss_rtcp.c
index 09f14f48dc03..5c98a8234d42 100644
--- a/crypto/bio/bss_rtcp.c
+++ b/crypto/bio/bss_rtcp.c
@@ -170,6 +170,8 @@ static int rtcp_new(BIO *bi)
bi->num = 0;
bi->flags = 0;
bi->ptr = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(struct rpc_ctx));
+ if (bi->ptr == NULL)
+ return (0);
ctx = (struct rpc_ctx *)bi->ptr;
ctx->filled = 0;
ctx->pos = 0;
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.pl
index 89f4de61e896..1c4003efc20a 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.pl
@@ -63,27 +63,26 @@ $frame=32; # size of above frame rounded up to 16n
&lea ("esi",&wparam(0)); # put aside pointer to argument block
&lea ("edx",&wparam(1)); # load ap
- &mov ("ebp","esp"); # saved stack pointer!
&add ("edi",2); # extra two words on top of tp
&neg ("edi");
- &lea ("esp",&DWP(-$frame,"esp","edi",4)); # alloca($frame+4*(num+2))
+ &lea ("ebp",&DWP(-$frame,"esp","edi",4)); # future alloca($frame+4*(num+2))
&neg ("edi");
# minimize cache contention by arraning 2K window between stack
# pointer and ap argument [np is also position sensitive vector,
# but it's assumed to be near ap, as it's allocated at ~same
# time].
- &mov ("eax","esp");
+ &mov ("eax","ebp");
&sub ("eax","edx");
&and ("eax",2047);
- &sub ("esp","eax"); # this aligns sp and ap modulo 2048
+ &sub ("ebp","eax"); # this aligns sp and ap modulo 2048
- &xor ("edx","esp");
+ &xor ("edx","ebp");
&and ("edx",2048);
&xor ("edx",2048);
- &sub ("esp","edx"); # this splits them apart modulo 4096
+ &sub ("ebp","edx"); # this splits them apart modulo 4096
- &and ("esp",-64); # align to cache line
+ &and ("ebp",-64); # align to cache line
# Some OSes, *cough*-dows, insist on stack being "wired" to
# physical memory in strictly sequential manner, i.e. if stack
@@ -91,20 +90,28 @@ $frame=32; # size of above frame rounded up to 16n
# be punishable by SEGV. But page walking can do good even on
# other OSes, because it guarantees that villain thread hits
# the guard page before it can make damage to innocent one...
- &mov ("eax","ebp");
- &sub ("eax","esp");
+ &mov ("eax","esp");
+ &sub ("eax","ebp");
&and ("eax",-4096);
-&set_label("page_walk");
- &mov ("edx",&DWP(0,"esp","eax"));
- &sub ("eax",4096);
- &data_byte(0x2e);
- &jnc (&label("page_walk"));
+ &mov ("edx","esp"); # saved stack pointer!
+ &lea ("esp",&DWP(0,"ebp","eax"));
+ &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"esp"));
+ &cmp ("esp","ebp");
+ &ja (&label("page_walk"));
+ &jmp (&label("page_walk_done"));
+
+&set_label("page_walk",16);
+ &lea ("esp",&DWP(-4096,"esp"));
+ &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"esp"));
+ &cmp ("esp","ebp");
+ &ja (&label("page_walk"));
+&set_label("page_walk_done");
################################# load argument block...
&mov ("eax",&DWP(0*4,"esi"));# BN_ULONG *rp
&mov ("ebx",&DWP(1*4,"esi"));# const BN_ULONG *ap
&mov ("ecx",&DWP(2*4,"esi"));# const BN_ULONG *bp
- &mov ("edx",&DWP(3*4,"esi"));# const BN_ULONG *np
+ &mov ("ebp",&DWP(3*4,"esi"));# const BN_ULONG *np
&mov ("esi",&DWP(4*4,"esi"));# const BN_ULONG *n0
#&mov ("edi",&DWP(5*4,"esi"));# int num
@@ -112,11 +119,11 @@ $frame=32; # size of above frame rounded up to 16n
&mov ($_rp,"eax"); # ... save a copy of argument block
&mov ($_ap,"ebx");
&mov ($_bp,"ecx");
- &mov ($_np,"edx");
+ &mov ($_np,"ebp");
&mov ($_n0,"esi");
&lea ($num,&DWP(-3,"edi")); # num=num-1 to assist modulo-scheduling
#&mov ($_num,$num); # redundant as $num is not reused
- &mov ($_sp,"ebp"); # saved stack pointer!
+ &mov ($_sp,"edx"); # saved stack pointer!
if($sse2) {
$acc0="mm0"; # mmx register bank layout
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c
index d77dc433d405..1729b479d43e 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l, BN_ULONG d)
BN_ULONG ret, waste;
asm("divq %4":"=a"(ret), "=d"(waste)
- : "a"(l), "d"(h), "g"(d)
+ : "a"(l), "d"(h), "r"(d)
: "cc");
return ret;
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl
index 8fb6c994e1ef..044fd7ecc0fd 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl
@@ -97,6 +97,8 @@ $code=<<___;
.type bn_mul_mont,\@function,6
.align 16
bn_mul_mont:
+ mov ${num}d,${num}d
+ mov %rsp,%rax
test \$3,${num}d
jnz .Lmul_enter
cmp \$8,${num}d
@@ -121,29 +123,36 @@ $code.=<<___;
push %r14
push %r15
- mov ${num}d,${num}d
- lea 2($num),%r10
+ neg $num
mov %rsp,%r11
- neg %r10
- lea (%rsp,%r10,8),%rsp # tp=alloca(8*(num+2))
- and \$-1024,%rsp # minimize TLB usage
+ lea -16(%rsp,$num,8),%r10 # future alloca(8*(num+2))
+ neg $num # restore $num
+ and \$-1024,%r10 # minimize TLB usage
- mov %r11,8(%rsp,$num,8) # tp[num+1]=%rsp
-.Lmul_body:
# Some OSes, *cough*-dows, insist on stack being "wired" to
# physical memory in strictly sequential manner, i.e. if stack
# allocation spans two pages, then reference to farmost one can
# be punishable by SEGV. But page walking can do good even on
# other OSes, because it guarantees that villain thread hits
# the guard page before it can make damage to innocent one...
- sub %rsp,%r11
+ sub %r10,%r11
and \$-4096,%r11
+ lea (%r10,%r11),%rsp
+ mov (%rsp),%r11
+ cmp %r10,%rsp
+ ja .Lmul_page_walk
+ jmp .Lmul_page_walk_done
+
+.align 16
.Lmul_page_walk:
- mov (%rsp,%r11),%r10
- sub \$4096,%r11
- .byte 0x66,0x2e # predict non-taken
- jnc .Lmul_page_walk
+ lea -4096(%rsp),%rsp
+ mov (%rsp),%r11
+ cmp %r10,%rsp
+ ja .Lmul_page_walk
+.Lmul_page_walk_done:
+ mov %rax,8(%rsp,$num,8) # tp[num+1]=%rsp
+.Lmul_body:
mov $bp,%r12 # reassign $bp
___
$bp="%r12";
@@ -314,13 +323,13 @@ $code.=<<___;
mov 8(%rsp,$num,8),%rsi # restore %rsp
mov \$1,%rax
- mov (%rsi),%r15
- mov 8(%rsi),%r14
- mov 16(%rsi),%r13
- mov 24(%rsi),%r12
- mov 32(%rsi),%rbp
- mov 40(%rsi),%rbx
- lea 48(%rsi),%rsp
+ mov -48(%rsi),%r15
+ mov -40(%rsi),%r14
+ mov -32(%rsi),%r13
+ mov -24(%rsi),%r12
+ mov -16(%rsi),%rbp
+ mov -8(%rsi),%rbx
+ lea (%rsi),%rsp
.Lmul_epilogue:
ret
.size bn_mul_mont,.-bn_mul_mont
@@ -332,6 +341,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type bn_mul4x_mont,\@function,6
.align 16
bn_mul4x_mont:
+ mov ${num}d,${num}d
+ mov %rsp,%rax
.Lmul4x_enter:
___
$code.=<<___ if ($addx);
@@ -347,23 +358,29 @@ $code.=<<___;
push %r14
push %r15
- mov ${num}d,${num}d
- lea 4($num),%r10
+ neg $num
mov %rsp,%r11
- neg %r10
- lea (%rsp,%r10,8),%rsp # tp=alloca(8*(num+4))
- and \$-1024,%rsp # minimize TLB usage
+ lea -32(%rsp,$num,8),%r10 # future alloca(8*(num+4))
+ neg $num # restore
+ and \$-1024,%r10 # minimize TLB usage
- mov %r11,8(%rsp,$num,8) # tp[num+1]=%rsp
-.Lmul4x_body:
- sub %rsp,%r11
+ sub %r10,%r11
and \$-4096,%r11
+ lea (%r10,%r11),%rsp
+ mov (%rsp),%r11
+ cmp %r10,%rsp
+ ja .Lmul4x_page_walk
+ jmp .Lmul4x_page_walk_done
+
.Lmul4x_page_walk:
- mov (%rsp,%r11),%r10
- sub \$4096,%r11
- .byte 0x2e # predict non-taken
- jnc .Lmul4x_page_walk
+ lea -4096(%rsp),%rsp
+ mov (%rsp),%r11
+ cmp %r10,%rsp
+ ja .Lmul4x_page_walk
+.Lmul4x_page_walk_done:
+ mov %rax,8(%rsp,$num,8) # tp[num+1]=%rsp
+.Lmul4x_body:
mov $rp,16(%rsp,$num,8) # tp[num+2]=$rp
mov %rdx,%r12 # reassign $bp
___
@@ -742,13 +759,13 @@ ___
$code.=<<___;
mov 8(%rsp,$num,8),%rsi # restore %rsp
mov \$1,%rax
- mov (%rsi),%r15
- mov 8(%rsi),%r14
- mov 16(%rsi),%r13
- mov 24(%rsi),%r12
- mov 32(%rsi),%rbp
- mov 40(%rsi),%rbx
- lea 48(%rsi),%rsp
+ mov -48(%rsi),%r15
+ mov -40(%rsi),%r14
+ mov -32(%rsi),%r13
+ mov -24(%rsi),%r12
+ mov -16(%rsi),%rbp
+ mov -8(%rsi),%rbx
+ lea (%rsi),%rsp
.Lmul4x_epilogue:
ret
.size bn_mul4x_mont,.-bn_mul4x_mont
@@ -778,14 +795,15 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type bn_sqr8x_mont,\@function,6
.align 32
bn_sqr8x_mont:
-.Lsqr8x_enter:
mov %rsp,%rax
+.Lsqr8x_enter:
push %rbx
push %rbp
push %r12
push %r13
push %r14
push %r15
+.Lsqr8x_prologue:
mov ${num}d,%r10d
shl \$3,${num}d # convert $num to bytes
@@ -798,33 +816,42 @@ bn_sqr8x_mont:
# do its job.
#
lea -64(%rsp,$num,2),%r11
+ mov %rsp,%rbp
mov ($n0),$n0 # *n0
sub $aptr,%r11
and \$4095,%r11
cmp %r11,%r10
jb .Lsqr8x_sp_alt
- sub %r11,%rsp # align with $aptr
- lea -64(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(frame+2*$num)
+ sub %r11,%rbp # align with $aptr
+ lea -64(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp # future alloca(frame+2*$num)
jmp .Lsqr8x_sp_done
.align 32
.Lsqr8x_sp_alt:
lea 4096-64(,$num,2),%r10 # 4096-frame-2*$num
- lea -64(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(frame+2*$num)
+ lea -64(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp # future alloca(frame+2*$num)
sub %r10,%r11
mov \$0,%r10
cmovc %r10,%r11
- sub %r11,%rsp
+ sub %r11,%rbp
.Lsqr8x_sp_done:
- and \$-64,%rsp
- mov %rax,%r11
- sub %rsp,%r11
+ and \$-64,%rbp
+ mov %rsp,%r11
+ sub %rbp,%r11
and \$-4096,%r11
+ lea (%rbp,%r11),%rsp
+ mov (%rsp),%r10
+ cmp %rbp,%rsp
+ ja .Lsqr8x_page_walk
+ jmp .Lsqr8x_page_walk_done
+
+.align 16
.Lsqr8x_page_walk:
- mov (%rsp,%r11),%r10
- sub \$4096,%r11
- .byte 0x2e # predict non-taken
- jnc .Lsqr8x_page_walk
+ lea -4096(%rsp),%rsp
+ mov (%rsp),%r10
+ cmp %rbp,%rsp
+ ja .Lsqr8x_page_walk
+.Lsqr8x_page_walk_done:
mov $num,%r10
neg $num
@@ -948,30 +975,38 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type bn_mulx4x_mont,\@function,6
.align 32
bn_mulx4x_mont:
-.Lmulx4x_enter:
mov %rsp,%rax
+.Lmulx4x_enter:
push %rbx
push %rbp
push %r12
push %r13
push %r14
push %r15
+.Lmulx4x_prologue:
shl \$3,${num}d # convert $num to bytes
- .byte 0x67
xor %r10,%r10
sub $num,%r10 # -$num
mov ($n0),$n0 # *n0
- lea -72(%rsp,%r10),%rsp # alloca(frame+$num+8)
- and \$-128,%rsp
- mov %rax,%r11
- sub %rsp,%r11
+ lea -72(%rsp,%r10),%rbp # future alloca(frame+$num+8)
+ and \$-128,%rbp
+ mov %rsp,%r11
+ sub %rbp,%r11
and \$-4096,%r11
+ lea (%rbp,%r11),%rsp
+ mov (%rsp),%r10
+ cmp %rbp,%rsp
+ ja .Lmulx4x_page_walk
+ jmp .Lmulx4x_page_walk_done
+
+.align 16
.Lmulx4x_page_walk:
- mov (%rsp,%r11),%r10
- sub \$4096,%r11
- .byte 0x66,0x2e # predict non-taken
- jnc .Lmulx4x_page_walk
+ lea -4096(%rsp),%rsp
+ mov (%rsp),%r10
+ cmp %rbp,%rsp
+ ja .Lmulx4x_page_walk
+.Lmulx4x_page_walk_done:
lea ($bp,$num),%r10
##############################################################
@@ -1332,22 +1367,8 @@ mul_handler:
mov 192($context),%r10 # pull $num
mov 8(%rax,%r10,8),%rax # pull saved stack pointer
- lea 48(%rax),%rax
-
- mov -8(%rax),%rbx
- mov -16(%rax),%rbp
- mov -24(%rax),%r12
- mov -32(%rax),%r13
- mov -40(%rax),%r14
- mov -48(%rax),%r15
- mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx
- mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp
- mov %r12,216($context) # restore context->R12
- mov %r13,224($context) # restore context->R13
- mov %r14,232($context) # restore context->R14
- mov %r15,240($context) # restore context->R15
- jmp .Lcommon_seh_tail
+ jmp .Lcommon_pop_regs
.size mul_handler,.-mul_handler
.type sqr_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
@@ -1375,15 +1396,21 @@ sqr_handler:
cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip<.Lsqr_body
jb .Lcommon_seh_tail
+ mov 4(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[1]
+ lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # body label
+ cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=.Lsqr_epilogue
+ jb .Lcommon_pop_regs
+
mov 152($context),%rax # pull context->Rsp
- mov 4(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[1]
+ mov 8(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[2]
lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # epilogue label
cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=.Lsqr_epilogue
jae .Lcommon_seh_tail
mov 40(%rax),%rax # pull saved stack pointer
+.Lcommon_pop_regs:
mov -8(%rax),%rbx
mov -16(%rax),%rbp
mov -24(%rax),%r12
@@ -1470,13 +1497,15 @@ $code.=<<___;
.LSEH_info_bn_sqr8x_mont:
.byte 9,0,0,0
.rva sqr_handler
- .rva .Lsqr8x_body,.Lsqr8x_epilogue # HandlerData[]
+ .rva .Lsqr8x_prologue,.Lsqr8x_body,.Lsqr8x_epilogue # HandlerData[]
+.align 8
___
$code.=<<___ if ($addx);
.LSEH_info_bn_mulx4x_mont:
.byte 9,0,0,0
.rva sqr_handler
- .rva .Lmulx4x_body,.Lmulx4x_epilogue # HandlerData[]
+ .rva .Lmulx4x_prologue,.Lmulx4x_body,.Lmulx4x_epilogue # HandlerData[]
+.align 8
___
}
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
index 938e17081803..f1fbb45b532b 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
@@ -86,6 +86,8 @@ $code=<<___;
.type bn_mul_mont_gather5,\@function,6
.align 64
bn_mul_mont_gather5:
+ mov ${num}d,${num}d
+ mov %rsp,%rax
test \$7,${num}d
jnz .Lmul_enter
___
@@ -97,10 +99,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.align 16
.Lmul_enter:
- mov ${num}d,${num}d
- mov %rsp,%rax
movd `($win64?56:8)`(%rsp),%xmm5 # load 7th argument
- lea .Linc(%rip),%r10
push %rbx
push %rbp
push %r12
@@ -108,26 +107,36 @@ $code.=<<___;
push %r14
push %r15
- lea 2($num),%r11
- neg %r11
- lea -264(%rsp,%r11,8),%rsp # tp=alloca(8*(num+2)+256+8)
- and \$-1024,%rsp # minimize TLB usage
+ neg $num
+ mov %rsp,%r11
+ lea -280(%rsp,$num,8),%r10 # future alloca(8*(num+2)+256+8)
+ neg $num # restore $num
+ and \$-1024,%r10 # minimize TLB usage
- mov %rax,8(%rsp,$num,8) # tp[num+1]=%rsp
-.Lmul_body:
# Some OSes, *cough*-dows, insist on stack being "wired" to
# physical memory in strictly sequential manner, i.e. if stack
# allocation spans two pages, then reference to farmost one can
# be punishable by SEGV. But page walking can do good even on
# other OSes, because it guarantees that villain thread hits
# the guard page before it can make damage to innocent one...
- sub %rsp,%rax
- and \$-4096,%rax
+ sub %r10,%r11
+ and \$-4096,%r11
+ lea (%r10,%r11),%rsp
+ mov (%rsp),%r11
+ cmp %r10,%rsp
+ ja .Lmul_page_walk
+ jmp .Lmul_page_walk_done
+
.Lmul_page_walk:
- mov (%rsp,%rax),%r11
- sub \$4096,%rax
- .byte 0x2e # predict non-taken
- jnc .Lmul_page_walk
+ lea -4096(%rsp),%rsp
+ mov (%rsp),%r11
+ cmp %r10,%rsp
+ ja .Lmul_page_walk
+.Lmul_page_walk_done:
+
+ lea .Linc(%rip),%r10
+ mov %rax,8(%rsp,$num,8) # tp[num+1]=%rsp
+.Lmul_body:
lea 128($bp),%r12 # reassign $bp (+size optimization)
___
@@ -433,6 +442,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type bn_mul4x_mont_gather5,\@function,6
.align 32
bn_mul4x_mont_gather5:
+ .byte 0x67
+ mov %rsp,%rax
.Lmul4x_enter:
___
$code.=<<___ if ($addx);
@@ -441,14 +452,13 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($addx);
je .Lmulx4x_enter
___
$code.=<<___;
- .byte 0x67
- mov %rsp,%rax
push %rbx
push %rbp
push %r12
push %r13
push %r14
push %r15
+.Lmul4x_prologue:
.byte 0x67
shl \$3,${num}d # convert $num to bytes
@@ -465,32 +475,40 @@ $code.=<<___;
# calculated from 7th argument, the index.]
#
lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%r11
+ mov %rsp,%rbp
sub $rp,%r11
and \$4095,%r11
cmp %r11,%r10
jb .Lmul4xsp_alt
- sub %r11,%rsp # align with $rp
- lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(frame+2*num*8+256)
+ sub %r11,%rbp # align with $rp
+ lea -320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp # future alloca(frame+2*num*8+256)
jmp .Lmul4xsp_done
.align 32
.Lmul4xsp_alt:
lea 4096-320(,$num,2),%r10
- lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(frame+2*num*8+256)
+ lea -320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp # future alloca(frame+2*num*8+256)
sub %r10,%r11
mov \$0,%r10
cmovc %r10,%r11
- sub %r11,%rsp
+ sub %r11,%rbp
.Lmul4xsp_done:
- and \$-64,%rsp
- mov %rax,%r11
- sub %rsp,%r11
+ and \$-64,%rbp
+ mov %rsp,%r11
+ sub %rbp,%r11
and \$-4096,%r11
+ lea (%rbp,%r11),%rsp
+ mov (%rsp),%r10
+ cmp %rbp,%rsp
+ ja .Lmul4x_page_walk
+ jmp .Lmul4x_page_walk_done
+
.Lmul4x_page_walk:
- mov (%rsp,%r11),%r10
- sub \$4096,%r11
- .byte 0x2e # predict non-taken
- jnc .Lmul4x_page_walk
+ lea -4096(%rsp),%rsp
+ mov (%rsp),%r10
+ cmp %rbp,%rsp
+ ja .Lmul4x_page_walk
+.Lmul4x_page_walk_done:
neg $num
@@ -1034,6 +1052,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type bn_power5,\@function,6
.align 32
bn_power5:
+ mov %rsp,%rax
___
$code.=<<___ if ($addx);
mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%r11d
@@ -1042,13 +1061,13 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($addx);
je .Lpowerx5_enter
___
$code.=<<___;
- mov %rsp,%rax
push %rbx
push %rbp
push %r12
push %r13
push %r14
push %r15
+.Lpower5_prologue:
shl \$3,${num}d # convert $num to bytes
lea ($num,$num,2),%r10d # 3*$num
@@ -1063,32 +1082,40 @@ $code.=<<___;
# calculated from 7th argument, the index.]
#
lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%r11
+ mov %rsp,%rbp
sub $rptr,%r11
and \$4095,%r11
cmp %r11,%r10
jb .Lpwr_sp_alt
- sub %r11,%rsp # align with $aptr
- lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(frame+2*num*8+256)
+ sub %r11,%rbp # align with $aptr
+ lea -320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp # future alloca(frame+2*num*8+256)
jmp .Lpwr_sp_done
.align 32
.Lpwr_sp_alt:
lea 4096-320(,$num,2),%r10
- lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(frame+2*num*8+256)
+ lea -320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp # future alloca(frame+2*num*8+256)
sub %r10,%r11
mov \$0,%r10
cmovc %r10,%r11
- sub %r11,%rsp
+ sub %r11,%rbp
.Lpwr_sp_done:
- and \$-64,%rsp
- mov %rax,%r11
- sub %rsp,%r11
+ and \$-64,%rbp
+ mov %rsp,%r11
+ sub %rbp,%r11
and \$-4096,%r11
+ lea (%rbp,%r11),%rsp
+ mov (%rsp),%r10
+ cmp %rbp,%rsp
+ ja .Lpwr_page_walk
+ jmp .Lpwr_page_walk_done
+
.Lpwr_page_walk:
- mov (%rsp,%r11),%r10
- sub \$4096,%r11
- .byte 0x2e # predict non-taken
- jnc .Lpwr_page_walk
+ lea -4096(%rsp),%rsp
+ mov (%rsp),%r10
+ cmp %rbp,%rsp
+ ja .Lpwr_page_walk
+.Lpwr_page_walk_done:
mov $num,%r10
neg $num
@@ -2028,6 +2055,7 @@ bn_from_mont8x:
push %r13
push %r14
push %r15
+.Lfrom_prologue:
shl \$3,${num}d # convert $num to bytes
lea ($num,$num,2),%r10 # 3*$num in bytes
@@ -2042,32 +2070,40 @@ bn_from_mont8x:
# last operation, we use the opportunity to cleanse it.
#
lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%r11
+ mov %rsp,%rbp
sub $rptr,%r11
and \$4095,%r11
cmp %r11,%r10
jb .Lfrom_sp_alt
- sub %r11,%rsp # align with $aptr
- lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(frame+2*$num*8+256)
+ sub %r11,%rbp # align with $aptr
+ lea -320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp # future alloca(frame+2*$num*8+256)
jmp .Lfrom_sp_done
.align 32
.Lfrom_sp_alt:
lea 4096-320(,$num,2),%r10
- lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(frame+2*$num*8+256)
+ lea -320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp # future alloca(frame+2*$num*8+256)
sub %r10,%r11
mov \$0,%r10
cmovc %r10,%r11
- sub %r11,%rsp
+ sub %r11,%rbp
.Lfrom_sp_done:
- and \$-64,%rsp
- mov %rax,%r11
- sub %rsp,%r11
+ and \$-64,%rbp
+ mov %rsp,%r11
+ sub %rbp,%r11
and \$-4096,%r11
+ lea (%rbp,%r11),%rsp
+ mov (%rsp),%r10
+ cmp %rbp,%rsp
+ ja .Lfrom_page_walk
+ jmp .Lfrom_page_walk_done
+
.Lfrom_page_walk:
- mov (%rsp,%r11),%r10
- sub \$4096,%r11
- .byte 0x2e # predict non-taken
- jnc .Lfrom_page_walk
+ lea -4096(%rsp),%rsp
+ mov (%rsp),%r10
+ cmp %rbp,%rsp
+ ja .Lfrom_page_walk
+.Lfrom_page_walk_done:
mov $num,%r10
neg $num
@@ -2173,14 +2209,15 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5,\@function,6
.align 32
bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5:
-.Lmulx4x_enter:
mov %rsp,%rax
+.Lmulx4x_enter:
push %rbx
push %rbp
push %r12
push %r13
push %r14
push %r15
+.Lmulx4x_prologue:
shl \$3,${num}d # convert $num to bytes
lea ($num,$num,2),%r10 # 3*$num in bytes
@@ -2197,31 +2234,39 @@ bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5:
# calculated from 7th argument, the index.]
#
lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%r11
+ mov %rsp,%rbp
sub $rp,%r11
and \$4095,%r11
cmp %r11,%r10
jb .Lmulx4xsp_alt
- sub %r11,%rsp # align with $aptr
- lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(frame+2*$num*8+256)
+ sub %r11,%rbp # align with $aptr
+ lea -320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp # future alloca(frame+2*$num*8+256)
jmp .Lmulx4xsp_done
.Lmulx4xsp_alt:
lea 4096-320(,$num,2),%r10
- lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(frame+2*$num*8+256)
+ lea -320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp # future alloca(frame+2*$num*8+256)
sub %r10,%r11
mov \$0,%r10
cmovc %r10,%r11
- sub %r11,%rsp
+ sub %r11,%rbp
.Lmulx4xsp_done:
- and \$-64,%rsp # ensure alignment
- mov %rax,%r11
- sub %rsp,%r11
+ and \$-64,%rbp # ensure alignment
+ mov %rsp,%r11
+ sub %rbp,%r11
and \$-4096,%r11
+ lea (%rbp,%r11),%rsp
+ mov (%rsp),%r10
+ cmp %rbp,%rsp
+ ja .Lmulx4x_page_walk
+ jmp .Lmulx4x_page_walk_done
+
.Lmulx4x_page_walk:
- mov (%rsp,%r11),%r10
- sub \$4096,%r11
- .byte 0x2e # predict non-taken
- jnc .Lmulx4x_page_walk
+ lea -4096(%rsp),%rsp
+ mov (%rsp),%r10
+ cmp %rbp,%rsp
+ ja .Lmulx4x_page_walk
+.Lmulx4x_page_walk_done:
##############################################################
# Stack layout
@@ -2629,14 +2674,15 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type bn_powerx5,\@function,6
.align 32
bn_powerx5:
-.Lpowerx5_enter:
mov %rsp,%rax
+.Lpowerx5_enter:
push %rbx
push %rbp
push %r12
push %r13
push %r14
push %r15
+.Lpowerx5_prologue:
shl \$3,${num}d # convert $num to bytes
lea ($num,$num,2),%r10 # 3*$num in bytes
@@ -2651,32 +2697,40 @@ bn_powerx5:
# calculated from 7th argument, the index.]
#
lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%r11
+ mov %rsp,%rbp
sub $rptr,%r11
and \$4095,%r11
cmp %r11,%r10
jb .Lpwrx_sp_alt
- sub %r11,%rsp # align with $aptr
- lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(frame+2*$num*8+256)
+ sub %r11,%rbp # align with $aptr
+ lea -320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp # future alloca(frame+2*$num*8+256)
jmp .Lpwrx_sp_done
.align 32
.Lpwrx_sp_alt:
lea 4096-320(,$num,2),%r10
- lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(frame+2*$num*8+256)
+ lea -320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp # alloca(frame+2*$num*8+256)
sub %r10,%r11
mov \$0,%r10
cmovc %r10,%r11
- sub %r11,%rsp
+ sub %r11,%rbp
.Lpwrx_sp_done:
- and \$-64,%rsp
- mov %rax,%r11
- sub %rsp,%r11
+ and \$-64,%rbp
+ mov %rsp,%r11
+ sub %rbp,%r11
and \$-4096,%r11
+ lea (%rbp,%r11),%rsp
+ mov (%rsp),%r10
+ cmp %rbp,%rsp
+ ja .Lpwrx_page_walk
+ jmp .Lpwrx_page_walk_done
+
.Lpwrx_page_walk:
- mov (%rsp,%r11),%r10
- sub \$4096,%r11
- .byte 0x2e # predict non-taken
- jnc .Lpwrx_page_walk
+ lea -4096(%rsp),%rsp
+ mov (%rsp),%r10
+ cmp %rbp,%rsp
+ ja .Lpwrx_page_walk
+.Lpwrx_page_walk_done:
mov $num,%r10
neg $num
@@ -3607,9 +3661,14 @@ mul_handler:
cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip<end of prologue label
jb .Lcommon_seh_tail
+ mov 4(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[1]
+ lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # epilogue label
+ cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=epilogue label
+ jb .Lcommon_pop_regs
+
mov 152($context),%rax # pull context->Rsp
- mov 4(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[1]
+ mov 8(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[2]
lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # epilogue label
cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=epilogue label
jae .Lcommon_seh_tail
@@ -3621,11 +3680,11 @@ mul_handler:
mov 192($context),%r10 # pull $num
mov 8(%rax,%r10,8),%rax # pull saved stack pointer
- jmp .Lbody_proceed
+ jmp .Lcommon_pop_regs
.Lbody_40:
mov 40(%rax),%rax # pull saved stack pointer
-.Lbody_proceed:
+.Lcommon_pop_regs:
mov -8(%rax),%rbx
mov -16(%rax),%rbp
mov -24(%rax),%r12
@@ -3716,34 +3775,34 @@ $code.=<<___;
.LSEH_info_bn_mul_mont_gather5:
.byte 9,0,0,0
.rva mul_handler
- .rva .Lmul_body,.Lmul_epilogue # HandlerData[]
+ .rva .Lmul_body,.Lmul_body,.Lmul_epilogue # HandlerData[]
.align 8
.LSEH_info_bn_mul4x_mont_gather5:
.byte 9,0,0,0
.rva mul_handler
- .rva .Lmul4x_body,.Lmul4x_epilogue # HandlerData[]
+ .rva .Lmul4x_prologue,.Lmul4x_body,.Lmul4x_epilogue # HandlerData[]
.align 8
.LSEH_info_bn_power5:
.byte 9,0,0,0
.rva mul_handler
- .rva .Lpower5_body,.Lpower5_epilogue # HandlerData[]
+ .rva .Lpower5_prologue,.Lpower5_body,.Lpower5_epilogue # HandlerData[]
.align 8
.LSEH_info_bn_from_mont8x:
.byte 9,0,0,0
.rva mul_handler
- .rva .Lfrom_body,.Lfrom_epilogue # HandlerData[]
+ .rva .Lfrom_prologue,.Lfrom_body,.Lfrom_epilogue # HandlerData[]
___
$code.=<<___ if ($addx);
.align 8
.LSEH_info_bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5:
.byte 9,0,0,0
.rva mul_handler
- .rva .Lmulx4x_body,.Lmulx4x_epilogue # HandlerData[]
+ .rva .Lmulx4x_prologue,.Lmulx4x_body,.Lmulx4x_epilogue # HandlerData[]
.align 8
.LSEH_info_bn_powerx5:
.byte 9,0,0,0
.rva mul_handler
- .rva .Lpowerx5_body,.Lpowerx5_epilogue # HandlerData[]
+ .rva .Lpowerx5_prologue,.Lpowerx5_body,.Lpowerx5_epilogue # HandlerData[]
___
$code.=<<___;
.align 8
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn.h b/crypto/bn/bn.h
index 86264ae6315f..633d1b1f6013 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn.h
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn.h
@@ -842,6 +842,8 @@ int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
if (*(ftl--)) break; \
(a)->top = tmp_top; \
} \
+ if ((a)->top == 0) \
+ (a)->neg = 0; \
bn_pollute(a); \
}
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_div.c b/crypto/bn/bn_div.c
index 72e6ce3f74c0..bc37671cf138 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_div.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_div.c
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d,
({ asm volatile ( \
"divl %4" \
: "=a"(q), "=d"(rem) \
- : "a"(n1), "d"(n0), "g"(d0) \
+ : "a"(n1), "d"(n0), "r"(d0) \
: "cc"); \
q; \
})
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d,
({ asm volatile ( \
"divq %4" \
: "=a"(q), "=d"(rem) \
- : "a"(n1), "d"(n0), "g"(d0) \
+ : "a"(n1), "d"(n0), "r"(d0) \
: "cc"); \
q; \
})
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c b/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
index 80105fff410c..10b78f512607 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
@@ -569,7 +569,7 @@ void BN_clear(BIGNUM *a)
{
bn_check_top(a);
if (a->d != NULL)
- memset(a->d, 0, a->dmax * sizeof(a->d[0]));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(a->d, a->dmax * sizeof(a->d[0]));
a->top = 0;
a->neg = 0;
}
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_print.c b/crypto/bn/bn_print.c
index bfa31efc5621..f121fb6e9a08 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_print.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_print.c
@@ -72,12 +72,9 @@ char *BN_bn2hex(const BIGNUM *a)
char *buf;
char *p;
- if (a->neg && BN_is_zero(a)) {
- /* "-0" == 3 bytes including NULL terminator */
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(3);
- } else {
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(a->top * BN_BYTES * 2 + 2);
- }
+ if (BN_is_zero(a))
+ return OPENSSL_strdup("0");
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(a->top * BN_BYTES * 2 + 2);
if (buf == NULL) {
BNerr(BN_F_BN_BN2HEX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
@@ -111,6 +108,7 @@ char *BN_bn2dec(const BIGNUM *a)
char *p;
BIGNUM *t = NULL;
BN_ULONG *bn_data = NULL, *lp;
+ int bn_data_num;
/*-
* get an upper bound for the length of the decimal integer
@@ -120,9 +118,9 @@ char *BN_bn2dec(const BIGNUM *a)
*/
i = BN_num_bits(a) * 3;
num = (i / 10 + i / 1000 + 1) + 1;
- bn_data =
- (BN_ULONG *)OPENSSL_malloc((num / BN_DEC_NUM + 1) * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
- buf = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num + 3);
+ bn_data_num = num / BN_DEC_NUM + 1;
+ bn_data = OPENSSL_malloc(bn_data_num * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num + 3);
if ((buf == NULL) || (bn_data == NULL)) {
BNerr(BN_F_BN_BN2DEC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
@@ -140,9 +138,12 @@ char *BN_bn2dec(const BIGNUM *a)
if (BN_is_negative(t))
*p++ = '-';
- i = 0;
while (!BN_is_zero(t)) {
+ if (lp - bn_data >= bn_data_num)
+ goto err;
*lp = BN_div_word(t, BN_DEC_CONV);
+ if (*lp == (BN_ULONG)-1)
+ goto err;
lp++;
}
lp--;
@@ -240,10 +241,12 @@ int BN_hex2bn(BIGNUM **bn, const char *a)
}
ret->top = h;
bn_correct_top(ret);
- ret->neg = neg;
*bn = ret;
bn_check_top(ret);
+ /* Don't set the negative flag if it's zero. */
+ if (ret->top != 0)
+ ret->neg = neg;
return (num);
err:
if (*bn == NULL)
@@ -295,7 +298,7 @@ int BN_dec2bn(BIGNUM **bn, const char *a)
if (j == BN_DEC_NUM)
j = 0;
l = 0;
- while (*a) {
+ while (--i >= 0) {
l *= 10;
l += *a - '0';
a++;
@@ -306,11 +309,13 @@ int BN_dec2bn(BIGNUM **bn, const char *a)
j = 0;
}
}
- ret->neg = neg;
bn_correct_top(ret);
*bn = ret;
bn_check_top(ret);
+ /* Don't set the negative flag if it's zero. */
+ if (ret->top != 0)
+ ret->neg = neg;
return (num);
err:
if (*bn == NULL)
@@ -321,6 +326,7 @@ int BN_dec2bn(BIGNUM **bn, const char *a)
int BN_asc2bn(BIGNUM **bn, const char *a)
{
const char *p = a;
+
if (*p == '-')
p++;
@@ -331,7 +337,8 @@ int BN_asc2bn(BIGNUM **bn, const char *a)
if (!BN_dec2bn(bn, p))
return 0;
}
- if (*a == '-')
+ /* Don't set the negative flag if it's zero. */
+ if (*a == '-' && (*bn)->top != 0)
(*bn)->neg = 1;
return 1;
}
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c b/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c
index f9fb2e9e45e0..60d3f2260ba1 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c
@@ -121,15 +121,14 @@ static int bnrand(int pseudorand, BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)
int ret = 0, bit, bytes, mask;
time_t tim;
- if (bits < 0 || (bits == 1 && top > 0)) {
- BNerr(BN_F_BNRAND, BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL);
- return 0;
- }
-
if (bits == 0) {
+ if (top != -1 || bottom != 0)
+ goto toosmall;
BN_zero(rnd);
return 1;
}
+ if (bits < 0 || (bits == 1 && top > 0))
+ goto toosmall;
bytes = (bits + 7) / 8;
bit = (bits - 1) % 8;
@@ -145,13 +144,9 @@ static int bnrand(int pseudorand, BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)
time(&tim);
RAND_add(&tim, sizeof(tim), 0.0);
- if (pseudorand) {
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(buf, bytes) == -1)
- goto err;
- } else {
- if (RAND_bytes(buf, bytes) <= 0)
- goto err;
- }
+ /* We ignore the value of pseudorand and always call RAND_bytes */
+ if (RAND_bytes(buf, bytes) <= 0)
+ goto err;
#if 1
if (pseudorand == 2) {
@@ -199,6 +194,10 @@ static int bnrand(int pseudorand, BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)
}
bn_check_top(rnd);
return (ret);
+
+toosmall:
+ BNerr(BN_F_BNRAND, BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL);
+ return 0;
}
int BN_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_word.c b/crypto/bn/bn_word.c
index b031a60b5bf8..9b5f9cb98c3a 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_word.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_word.c
@@ -72,10 +72,32 @@ BN_ULONG BN_mod_word(const BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w)
if (w == 0)
return (BN_ULONG)-1;
+#ifndef BN_LLONG
+ /*
+ * If |w| is too long and we don't have BN_ULLONG then we need to fall
+ * back to using BN_div_word
+ */
+ if (w > ((BN_ULONG)1 << BN_BITS4)) {
+ BIGNUM *tmp = BN_dup(a);
+ if (tmp == NULL)
+ return (BN_ULONG)-1;
+
+ ret = BN_div_word(tmp, w);
+ BN_free(tmp);
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif
+
bn_check_top(a);
w &= BN_MASK2;
for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
#ifndef BN_LLONG
+ /*
+ * We can assume here that | w <= ((BN_ULONG)1 << BN_BITS4) | and so
+ * | ret < ((BN_ULONG)1 << BN_BITS4) | and therefore the shifts here are
+ * safe and will not overflow
+ */
ret = ((ret << BN_BITS4) | ((a->d[i] >> BN_BITS4) & BN_MASK2l)) % w;
ret = ((ret << BN_BITS4) | (a->d[i] & BN_MASK2l)) % w;
#else
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bntest.c b/crypto/bn/bntest.c
index 1e35988022bb..a327b1a647b2 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bntest.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bntest.c
@@ -514,7 +514,7 @@ static void print_word(BIO *bp, BN_ULONG w)
int test_div_word(BIO *bp)
{
BIGNUM a, b;
- BN_ULONG r, s;
+ BN_ULONG r, rmod, s;
int i;
BN_init(&a);
@@ -528,8 +528,14 @@ int test_div_word(BIO *bp)
s = b.d[0];
BN_copy(&b, &a);
+ rmod = BN_mod_word(&b, s);
r = BN_div_word(&b, s);
+ if (rmod != r) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Mod (word) test failed!\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (bp != NULL) {
if (!results) {
BN_print(bp, &a);
diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c b/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
index b14b4b68b5c9..90b1fcc75075 100644
--- a/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
+++ b/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
/* Generate a random IV if we need one */
ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
if (ivlen > 0) {
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0)
+ if (RAND_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0)
goto err;
piv = iv;
}
@@ -179,10 +179,9 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
CMS_R_CIPHER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
goto err;
}
-
- if (piv) {
+ if (enc) {
calg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new();
- if (!calg->parameter) {
+ if (calg->parameter == NULL) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
@@ -191,6 +190,11 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
goto err;
}
+ /* If parameter type not set omit parameter */
+ if (calg->parameter->type == V_ASN1_UNDEF) {
+ ASN1_TYPE_free(calg->parameter);
+ calg->parameter = NULL;
+ }
}
ok = 1;
diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_ess.c b/crypto/cms/cms_ess.c
index 8631a2eb2b30..8212560628a9 100644
--- a/crypto/cms/cms_ess.c
+++ b/crypto/cms/cms_ess.c
@@ -107,8 +107,7 @@ CMS_ReceiptRequest *CMS_ReceiptRequest_create0(unsigned char *id, int idlen,
else {
if (!ASN1_STRING_set(rr->signedContentIdentifier, NULL, 32))
goto merr;
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rr->signedContentIdentifier->data, 32)
- <= 0)
+ if (RAND_bytes(rr->signedContentIdentifier->data, 32) <= 0)
goto err;
}
diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_lib.c b/crypto/cms/cms_lib.c
index d6cb60d02d15..6d27c4969b92 100644
--- a/crypto/cms/cms_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/cms/cms_lib.c
@@ -413,6 +413,8 @@ static STACK_OF(CMS_CertificateChoices)
return &cms->d.signedData->certificates;
case NID_pkcs7_enveloped:
+ if (cms->d.envelopedData->originatorInfo == NULL)
+ return NULL;
return &cms->d.envelopedData->originatorInfo->certificates;
default:
@@ -488,6 +490,8 @@ static STACK_OF(CMS_RevocationInfoChoice)
return &cms->d.signedData->crls;
case NID_pkcs7_enveloped:
+ if (cms->d.envelopedData->originatorInfo == NULL)
+ return NULL;
return &cms->d.envelopedData->originatorInfo->crls;
default:
diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c b/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
index b91c01691fec..5c817caf2f05 100644
--- a/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
+++ b/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add0_recipient_password(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
if (ivlen > 0) {
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0)
+ if (RAND_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0)
goto err;
if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv) <= 0) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ static int kek_wrap_key(unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
memcpy(out + 4, in, inlen);
/* Add random padding to end */
if (olen > inlen + 4
- && RAND_pseudo_bytes(out + 4 + inlen, olen - 4 - inlen) < 0)
+ && RAND_bytes(out + 4 + inlen, olen - 4 - inlen) <= 0)
return 0;
/* Encrypt twice */
EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &dummy, out, olen);
diff --git a/crypto/comp/comp.h b/crypto/comp/comp.h
index 60a073404e92..df599ba3314b 100644
--- a/crypto/comp/comp.h
+++ b/crypto/comp/comp.h
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ extern "C" {
typedef struct comp_ctx_st COMP_CTX;
-typedef struct comp_method_st {
+struct comp_method_st {
int type; /* NID for compression library */
const char *name; /* A text string to identify the library */
int (*init) (COMP_CTX *ctx);
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ typedef struct comp_method_st {
*/
long (*ctrl) (void);
long (*callback_ctrl) (void);
-} COMP_METHOD;
+};
struct comp_ctx_st {
COMP_METHOD *meth;
diff --git a/crypto/conf/conf_def.h b/crypto/conf/conf_def.h
index 7d897b89f182..48b344218114 100644
--- a/crypto/conf/conf_def.h
+++ b/crypto/conf/conf_def.h
@@ -81,34 +81,34 @@
#define KEYTYPES(c) ((unsigned short *)((c)->meth_data))
#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
-# define IS_COMMENT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_COMMENT)
-# define IS_FCOMMENT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_FCOMMENT)
-# define IS_EOF(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_EOF)
-# define IS_ESC(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_ESC)
-# define IS_NUMBER(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_NUMBER)
-# define IS_WS(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_WS)
-# define IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC)
+# define IS_COMMENT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_COMMENT)
+# define IS_FCOMMENT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_FCOMMENT)
+# define IS_EOF(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_EOF)
+# define IS_ESC(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_ESC)
+# define IS_NUMBER(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_NUMBER)
+# define IS_WS(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_WS)
+# define IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC)
# define IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT(c,a) \
(KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT)
-# define IS_QUOTE(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_QUOTE)
-# define IS_DQUOTE(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_DQUOTE)
-# define IS_HIGHBIT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_HIGHBIT)
+# define IS_QUOTE(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_QUOTE)
+# define IS_DQUOTE(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_DQUOTE)
+# define IS_HIGHBIT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_HIGHBIT)
-#else /* CHARSET_EBCDIC */
+#else /*CHARSET_EBCDIC*/
-# define IS_COMMENT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_COMMENT)
-# define IS_FCOMMENT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_FCOMMENT)
-# define IS_EOF(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_EOF)
-# define IS_ESC(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_ESC)
-# define IS_NUMBER(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_NUMBER)
-# define IS_WS(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_WS)
-# define IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC)
+# define IS_COMMENT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_COMMENT)
+# define IS_FCOMMENT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_FCOMMENT)
+# define IS_EOF(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_EOF)
+# define IS_ESC(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_ESC)
+# define IS_NUMBER(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_NUMBER)
+# define IS_WS(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_WS)
+# define IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC)
# define IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT(c,a) \
(KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT)
-# define IS_QUOTE(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_QUOTE)
-# define IS_DQUOTE(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_DQUOTE)
-# define IS_HIGHBIT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_HIGHBIT)
-#endif /* CHARSET_EBCDIC */
+# define IS_QUOTE(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_QUOTE)
+# define IS_DQUOTE(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_DQUOTE)
+# define IS_HIGHBIT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_HIGHBIT)
+#endif /*CHARSET_EBCDIC*/
static unsigned short CONF_type_default[256] = {
0x0008, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000,
diff --git a/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c b/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c
index 9acfca4f7198..e0c9a67ff68f 100644
--- a/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c
+++ b/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c
@@ -288,6 +288,10 @@ static CONF_MODULE *module_add(DSO *dso, const char *name,
tmod->dso = dso;
tmod->name = BUF_strdup(name);
+ if (tmod->name == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(tmod);
+ return NULL;
+ }
tmod->init = ifunc;
tmod->finish = ffunc;
tmod->links = 0;
diff --git a/crypto/conf/keysets.pl b/crypto/conf/keysets.pl
index 50ed67fa527c..5c9b2aaef8aa 100644
--- a/crypto/conf/keysets.pl
+++ b/crypto/conf/keysets.pl
@@ -59,21 +59,21 @@ print <<"EOF";
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay\@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh\@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
@@ -88,10 +88,10 @@ print <<"EOF";
* Eric Young (eay\@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh\@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -103,83 +103,85 @@ print <<"EOF";
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
-/* THIS FILE WAS AUTOMAGICALLY GENERATED!
- Please modify and use keysets.pl to regenerate it. */
-
-#define CONF_NUMBER $NUMBER
-#define CONF_UPPER $UPPER
-#define CONF_LOWER $LOWER
-#define CONF_UNDER $UNDER
-#define CONF_PUNCTUATION $PUNCTUATION
-#define CONF_WS $WS
-#define CONF_ESC $ESC
-#define CONF_QUOTE $QUOTE
-#define CONF_DQUOTE $DQUOTE
-#define CONF_COMMENT $COMMENT
-#define CONF_FCOMMENT $FCOMMENT
-#define CONF_EOF $EOF
-#define CONF_HIGHBIT $HIGHBIT
-#define CONF_ALPHA (CONF_UPPER|CONF_LOWER)
-#define CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC (CONF_ALPHA|CONF_NUMBER|CONF_UNDER)
+/*
+ * THIS FILE WAS AUTOMAGICALLY GENERATED! Please modify and use keysets.pl to
+ * regenerate it.
+ */
+
+#define CONF_NUMBER $NUMBER
+#define CONF_UPPER $UPPER
+#define CONF_LOWER $LOWER
+#define CONF_UNDER $UNDER
+#define CONF_PUNCTUATION $PUNCTUATION
+#define CONF_WS $WS
+#define CONF_ESC $ESC
+#define CONF_QUOTE $QUOTE
+#define CONF_DQUOTE $DQUOTE
+#define CONF_COMMENT $COMMENT
+#define CONF_FCOMMENT $FCOMMENT
+#define CONF_EOF $EOF
+#define CONF_HIGHBIT $HIGHBIT
+#define CONF_ALPHA (CONF_UPPER|CONF_LOWER)
+#define CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC (CONF_ALPHA|CONF_NUMBER|CONF_UNDER)
#define CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT (CONF_ALPHA|CONF_NUMBER|CONF_UNDER| \\
- CONF_PUNCTUATION)
+ CONF_PUNCTUATION)
-#define KEYTYPES(c) ((unsigned short *)((c)->meth_data))
+#define KEYTYPES(c) ((unsigned short *)((c)->meth_data))
#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
-#define IS_COMMENT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_COMMENT)
-#define IS_FCOMMENT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_FCOMMENT)
-#define IS_EOF(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_EOF)
-#define IS_ESC(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_ESC)
-#define IS_NUMBER(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_NUMBER)
-#define IS_WS(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_WS)
-#define IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC)
-#define IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT(c,a) \\
- (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT)
-#define IS_QUOTE(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_QUOTE)
-#define IS_DQUOTE(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_DQUOTE)
-#define IS_HIGHBIT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_HIGHBIT)
+# define IS_COMMENT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_COMMENT)
+# define IS_FCOMMENT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_FCOMMENT)
+# define IS_EOF(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_EOF)
+# define IS_ESC(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_ESC)
+# define IS_NUMBER(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_NUMBER)
+# define IS_WS(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_WS)
+# define IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC)
+# define IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT(c,a) \\
+ (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT)
+# define IS_QUOTE(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_QUOTE)
+# define IS_DQUOTE(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_DQUOTE)
+# define IS_HIGHBIT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_HIGHBIT)
#else /*CHARSET_EBCDIC*/
-#define IS_COMMENT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_COMMENT)
-#define IS_FCOMMENT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_FCOMMENT)
-#define IS_EOF(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_EOF)
-#define IS_ESC(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_ESC)
-#define IS_NUMBER(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_NUMBER)
-#define IS_WS(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_WS)
-#define IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC)
-#define IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT(c,a) \\
- (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT)
-#define IS_QUOTE(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_QUOTE)
-#define IS_DQUOTE(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_DQUOTE)
-#define IS_HIGHBIT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_HIGHBIT)
+# define IS_COMMENT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_COMMENT)
+# define IS_FCOMMENT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_FCOMMENT)
+# define IS_EOF(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_EOF)
+# define IS_ESC(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_ESC)
+# define IS_NUMBER(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_NUMBER)
+# define IS_WS(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_WS)
+# define IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC)
+# define IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT(c,a) \\
+ (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT)
+# define IS_QUOTE(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_QUOTE)
+# define IS_DQUOTE(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_DQUOTE)
+# define IS_HIGHBIT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a]&0xff]&CONF_HIGHBIT)
#endif /*CHARSET_EBCDIC*/
EOF
-print "static unsigned short CONF_type_default[256]={";
+print "static unsigned short CONF_type_default[256] = {";
for ($i=0; $i<256; $i++)
{
- print "\n\t" if ($i % 8) == 0;
- printf "0x%04X,",$V_def[$i];
+ print "\n " if ($i % 8) == 0;
+ printf " 0x%04X,",$V_def[$i];
}
-print "\n\t};\n\n";
+print "\n};\n\n";
-print "static unsigned short CONF_type_win32[256]={";
+print "static unsigned short CONF_type_win32[256] = {";
for ($i=0; $i<256; $i++)
{
- print "\n\t" if ($i % 8) == 0;
- printf "0x%04X,",$V_w32[$i];
+ print "\n " if ($i % 8) == 0;
+ printf " 0x%04X,",$V_w32[$i];
}
-print "\n\t};\n\n";
+print "\n};\n";
diff --git a/crypto/des/asm/dest4-sparcv9.pl b/crypto/des/asm/dest4-sparcv9.pl
index 1dc60243d4fb..5f3a511dba27 100755
--- a/crypto/des/asm/dest4-sparcv9.pl
+++ b/crypto/des/asm/dest4-sparcv9.pl
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
des_t4_cbc_encrypt:
cmp $len, 0
be,pn $::size_t_cc, .Lcbc_abort
- nop
+ srln $len, 0, $len ! needed on v8+, "nop" on v9
ld [$ivec + 0], %f0 ! load ivec
ld [$ivec + 4], %f1
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ des_t4_cbc_encrypt:
des_t4_cbc_decrypt:
cmp $len, 0
be,pn $::size_t_cc, .Lcbc_abort
- nop
+ srln $len, 0, $len ! needed on v8+, "nop" on v9
ld [$ivec + 0], %f2 ! load ivec
ld [$ivec + 4], %f3
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
des_t4_ede3_cbc_encrypt:
cmp $len, 0
be,pn $::size_t_cc, .Lcbc_abort
- nop
+ srln $len, 0, $len ! needed on v8+, "nop" on v9
ld [$ivec + 0], %f0 ! load ivec
ld [$ivec + 4], %f1
@@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ des_t4_ede3_cbc_encrypt:
des_t4_ede3_cbc_decrypt:
cmp $len, 0
be,pn $::size_t_cc, .Lcbc_abort
- nop
+ srln $len, 0, $len ! needed on v8+, "nop" on v9
ld [$ivec + 0], %f2 ! load ivec
ld [$ivec + 4], %f3
diff --git a/crypto/des/des.c b/crypto/des/des.c
index 586aed72378c..d7374382d83a 100644
--- a/crypto/des/des.c
+++ b/crypto/des/des.c
@@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ void doencryption(void)
len = l - rem;
if (feof(DES_IN)) {
for (i = 7 - rem; i > 0; i--) {
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(buf + l++, 1) < 0)
+ if (RAND_bytes(buf + l++, 1) <= 0)
goto problems;
}
buf[l++] = rem;
diff --git a/crypto/des/enc_writ.c b/crypto/des/enc_writ.c
index bfaabde516ae..c2aaa8e98ca2 100644
--- a/crypto/des/enc_writ.c
+++ b/crypto/des/enc_writ.c
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ int DES_enc_write(int fd, const void *_buf, int len,
if (len < 8) {
cp = shortbuf;
memcpy(shortbuf, buf, len);
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(shortbuf + len, 8 - len) < 0) {
+ if (RAND_bytes(shortbuf + len, 8 - len) <= 0) {
return -1;
}
rnum = 8;
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c b/crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c
index ac72468bd14b..4558283576b3 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c
@@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ static int dh_copy_parameters(EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from)
static int dh_missing_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *a)
{
- if (!a->pkey.dh->p || !a->pkey.dh->g)
+ if (a->pkey.dh == NULL || a->pkey.dh->p == NULL || a->pkey.dh->g == NULL)
return 1;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
index cc83d6e6ad3b..c4fa105747fe 100644
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
@@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ static int dsa_missing_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
DSA *dsa;
dsa = pkey->pkey.dsa;
- if ((dsa->p == NULL) || (dsa->q == NULL) || (dsa->g == NULL))
+ if (dsa == NULL || dsa->p == NULL || dsa->q == NULL || dsa->g == NULL)
return 1;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
index 15f3bb4f3f39..1fce0f81c242 100644
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
@@ -185,6 +185,9 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits,
p = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
test = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (test == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
if (!BN_lshift(test, BN_value_one(), bits - 1))
goto err;
@@ -197,7 +200,7 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits,
goto err;
if (!seed_len || !seed_in) {
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(seed, qsize) < 0)
+ if (RAND_bytes(seed, qsize) <= 0)
goto err;
seed_is_random = 1;
} else {
@@ -491,7 +494,7 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen2(DSA *ret, size_t L, size_t N,
goto err;
if (!seed_in) {
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(seed, seed_len) < 0)
+ if (RAND_bytes(seed, seed_len) <= 0)
goto err;
}
/* step 2 */
diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
index efc4f1b6aeba..58013a4a13b5 100644
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
@@ -247,11 +247,13 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
do
if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q))
goto err;
- while (BN_is_zero(&k)) ;
+ while (BN_is_zero(&k));
+
if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
+
if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
CRYPTO_LOCK_DSA, dsa->p, ctx))
@@ -264,6 +266,8 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
if (!BN_copy(&kq, &k))
goto err;
+ BN_set_flags(&kq, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
/*
* We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we
* compute g^k using an equivalent exponent of fixed length. (This
@@ -282,6 +286,7 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
} else {
K = &k;
}
+
DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx,
dsa->method_mont_p);
if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx))
diff --git a/crypto/ec/Makefile b/crypto/ec/Makefile
index 89491454a441..6628390ba48e 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/ec/Makefile
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ ec_ameth.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
ec_ameth.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
ec_ameth.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
ec_ameth.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../asn1/asn1_locl.h ../cryptlib.h
-ec_ameth.o: ec_ameth.c
+ec_ameth.o: ec_ameth.c ec_lcl.h
ec_asn1.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/asn1t.h
ec_asn1.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
ec_asn1.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
diff --git a/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl b/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl
index 7140860e245b..7948bf71b51e 100755
--- a/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl
@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2:
push %r13
mov 8*0($a_ptr), $a0
+ xor $t4,$t4
mov 8*1($a_ptr), $a1
add $a0, $a0 # a0:a3+a0:a3
mov 8*2($a_ptr), $a2
@@ -138,7 +139,7 @@ ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2:
adc $a2, $a2
adc $a3, $a3
mov $a1, $t1
- sbb $t4, $t4
+ adc \$0, $t4
sub 8*0($a_ptr), $a0
mov $a2, $t2
@@ -146,14 +147,14 @@ ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2:
sbb 8*2($a_ptr), $a2
mov $a3, $t3
sbb 8*3($a_ptr), $a3
- test $t4, $t4
+ sbb \$0, $t4
- cmovz $t0, $a0
- cmovz $t1, $a1
+ cmovc $t0, $a0
+ cmovc $t1, $a1
mov $a0, 8*0($r_ptr)
- cmovz $t2, $a2
+ cmovc $t2, $a2
mov $a1, 8*1($r_ptr)
- cmovz $t3, $a3
+ cmovc $t3, $a3
mov $a2, 8*2($r_ptr)
mov $a3, 8*3($r_ptr)
@@ -250,12 +251,12 @@ ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3:
sbb \$0, $a2
mov $a3, $t3
sbb .Lpoly+8*3(%rip), $a3
- test $t4, $t4
+ sbb \$0, $t4
- cmovz $t0, $a0
- cmovz $t1, $a1
- cmovz $t2, $a2
- cmovz $t3, $a3
+ cmovc $t0, $a0
+ cmovc $t1, $a1
+ cmovc $t2, $a2
+ cmovc $t3, $a3
xor $t4, $t4
add 8*0($a_ptr), $a0 # a0:a3+=a_ptr[0:3]
@@ -272,14 +273,14 @@ ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3:
sbb \$0, $a2
mov $a3, $t3
sbb .Lpoly+8*3(%rip), $a3
- test $t4, $t4
+ sbb \$0, $t4
- cmovz $t0, $a0
- cmovz $t1, $a1
+ cmovc $t0, $a0
+ cmovc $t1, $a1
mov $a0, 8*0($r_ptr)
- cmovz $t2, $a2
+ cmovc $t2, $a2
mov $a1, 8*1($r_ptr)
- cmovz $t3, $a3
+ cmovc $t3, $a3
mov $a2, 8*2($r_ptr)
mov $a3, 8*3($r_ptr)
@@ -318,14 +319,14 @@ ecp_nistz256_add:
sbb 8*2($a_ptr), $a2
mov $a3, $t3
sbb 8*3($a_ptr), $a3
- test $t4, $t4
+ sbb \$0, $t4
- cmovz $t0, $a0
- cmovz $t1, $a1
+ cmovc $t0, $a0
+ cmovc $t1, $a1
mov $a0, 8*0($r_ptr)
- cmovz $t2, $a2
+ cmovc $t2, $a2
mov $a1, 8*1($r_ptr)
- cmovz $t3, $a3
+ cmovc $t3, $a3
mov $a2, 8*2($r_ptr)
mov $a3, 8*3($r_ptr)
@@ -1840,13 +1841,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type __ecp_nistz256_add_toq,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
__ecp_nistz256_add_toq:
+ xor $t4,$t4
add 8*0($b_ptr), $a0
adc 8*1($b_ptr), $a1
mov $a0, $t0
adc 8*2($b_ptr), $a2
adc 8*3($b_ptr), $a3
mov $a1, $t1
- sbb $t4, $t4
+ adc \$0, $t4
sub \$-1, $a0
mov $a2, $t2
@@ -1854,14 +1856,14 @@ __ecp_nistz256_add_toq:
sbb \$0, $a2
mov $a3, $t3
sbb $poly3, $a3
- test $t4, $t4
+ sbb \$0, $t4
- cmovz $t0, $a0
- cmovz $t1, $a1
+ cmovc $t0, $a0
+ cmovc $t1, $a1
mov $a0, 8*0($r_ptr)
- cmovz $t2, $a2
+ cmovc $t2, $a2
mov $a1, 8*1($r_ptr)
- cmovz $t3, $a3
+ cmovc $t3, $a3
mov $a2, 8*2($r_ptr)
mov $a3, 8*3($r_ptr)
@@ -1929,13 +1931,14 @@ __ecp_nistz256_subq:
.type __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2q,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2q:
+ xor $t4, $t4
add $a0, $a0 # a0:a3+a0:a3
adc $a1, $a1
mov $a0, $t0
adc $a2, $a2
adc $a3, $a3
mov $a1, $t1
- sbb $t4, $t4
+ adc \$0, $t4
sub \$-1, $a0
mov $a2, $t2
@@ -1943,14 +1946,14 @@ __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2q:
sbb \$0, $a2
mov $a3, $t3
sbb $poly3, $a3
- test $t4, $t4
+ sbb \$0, $t4
- cmovz $t0, $a0
- cmovz $t1, $a1
+ cmovc $t0, $a0
+ cmovc $t1, $a1
mov $a0, 8*0($r_ptr)
- cmovz $t2, $a2
+ cmovc $t2, $a2
mov $a1, 8*1($r_ptr)
- cmovz $t3, $a3
+ cmovc $t3, $a3
mov $a2, 8*2($r_ptr)
mov $a3, 8*3($r_ptr)
@@ -2241,16 +2244,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
mov $b_org, $a_ptr # reassign
movdqa %xmm0, $in1_x(%rsp)
movdqa %xmm1, $in1_x+0x10(%rsp)
- por %xmm0, %xmm1
movdqa %xmm2, $in1_y(%rsp)
movdqa %xmm3, $in1_y+0x10(%rsp)
- por %xmm2, %xmm3
movdqa %xmm4, $in1_z(%rsp)
movdqa %xmm5, $in1_z+0x10(%rsp)
- por %xmm1, %xmm3
+ por %xmm4, %xmm5
movdqu 0x00($a_ptr), %xmm0 # copy *(P256_POINT *)$b_ptr
- pshufd \$0xb1, %xmm3, %xmm5
+ pshufd \$0xb1, %xmm5, %xmm3
movdqu 0x10($a_ptr), %xmm1
movdqu 0x20($a_ptr), %xmm2
por %xmm3, %xmm5
@@ -2262,14 +2263,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
movdqa %xmm0, $in2_x(%rsp)
pshufd \$0x1e, %xmm5, %xmm4
movdqa %xmm1, $in2_x+0x10(%rsp)
- por %xmm0, %xmm1
- movq $r_ptr, %xmm0 # save $r_ptr
+ movdqu 0x40($a_ptr),%xmm0 # in2_z again
+ movdqu 0x50($a_ptr),%xmm1
movdqa %xmm2, $in2_y(%rsp)
movdqa %xmm3, $in2_y+0x10(%rsp)
- por %xmm2, %xmm3
por %xmm4, %xmm5
pxor %xmm4, %xmm4
- por %xmm1, %xmm3
+ por %xmm0, %xmm1
+ movq $r_ptr, %xmm0 # save $r_ptr
lea 0x40-$bias($a_ptr), $a_ptr # $a_ptr is still valid
mov $src0, $in2_z+8*0(%rsp) # make in2_z copy
@@ -2280,8 +2281,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
call __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont$x # p256_sqr_mont(Z2sqr, in2_z);
pcmpeqd %xmm4, %xmm5
- pshufd \$0xb1, %xmm3, %xmm4
- por %xmm3, %xmm4
+ pshufd \$0xb1, %xmm1, %xmm4
+ por %xmm1, %xmm4
pshufd \$0, %xmm5, %xmm5 # in1infty
pshufd \$0x1e, %xmm4, %xmm3
por %xmm3, %xmm4
@@ -2405,6 +2406,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
#lea $Hsqr(%rsp), $r_ptr # 2*U1*H^2
#call __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2 # ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2(Hsqr, U2);
+ xor $t4, $t4
add $acc0, $acc0 # a0:a3+a0:a3
lea $Rsqr(%rsp), $a_ptr
adc $acc1, $acc1
@@ -2412,7 +2414,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
adc $acc2, $acc2
adc $acc3, $acc3
mov $acc1, $t1
- sbb $t4, $t4
+ adc \$0, $t4
sub \$-1, $acc0
mov $acc2, $t2
@@ -2420,15 +2422,15 @@ $code.=<<___;
sbb \$0, $acc2
mov $acc3, $t3
sbb $poly3, $acc3
- test $t4, $t4
+ sbb \$0, $t4
- cmovz $t0, $acc0
+ cmovc $t0, $acc0
mov 8*0($a_ptr), $t0
- cmovz $t1, $acc1
+ cmovc $t1, $acc1
mov 8*1($a_ptr), $t1
- cmovz $t2, $acc2
+ cmovc $t2, $acc2
mov 8*2($a_ptr), $t2
- cmovz $t3, $acc3
+ cmovc $t3, $acc3
mov 8*3($a_ptr), $t3
call __ecp_nistz256_sub$x # p256_sub(res_x, Rsqr, Hsqr);
@@ -2612,16 +2614,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
mov 0x40+8*3($a_ptr), $acc0
movdqa %xmm0, $in1_x(%rsp)
movdqa %xmm1, $in1_x+0x10(%rsp)
- por %xmm0, %xmm1
movdqa %xmm2, $in1_y(%rsp)
movdqa %xmm3, $in1_y+0x10(%rsp)
- por %xmm2, %xmm3
movdqa %xmm4, $in1_z(%rsp)
movdqa %xmm5, $in1_z+0x10(%rsp)
- por %xmm1, %xmm3
+ por %xmm4, %xmm5
movdqu 0x00($b_ptr), %xmm0 # copy *(P256_POINT_AFFINE *)$b_ptr
- pshufd \$0xb1, %xmm3, %xmm5
+ pshufd \$0xb1, %xmm5, %xmm3
movdqu 0x10($b_ptr), %xmm1
movdqu 0x20($b_ptr), %xmm2
por %xmm3, %xmm5
@@ -2710,6 +2710,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
#lea $Hsqr(%rsp), $r_ptr # 2*U1*H^2
#call __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2 # ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2(Hsqr, U2);
+ xor $t4, $t4
add $acc0, $acc0 # a0:a3+a0:a3
lea $Rsqr(%rsp), $a_ptr
adc $acc1, $acc1
@@ -2717,7 +2718,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
adc $acc2, $acc2
adc $acc3, $acc3
mov $acc1, $t1
- sbb $t4, $t4
+ adc \$0, $t4
sub \$-1, $acc0
mov $acc2, $t2
@@ -2725,15 +2726,15 @@ $code.=<<___;
sbb \$0, $acc2
mov $acc3, $t3
sbb $poly3, $acc3
- test $t4, $t4
+ sbb \$0, $t4
- cmovz $t0, $acc0
+ cmovc $t0, $acc0
mov 8*0($a_ptr), $t0
- cmovz $t1, $acc1
+ cmovc $t1, $acc1
mov 8*1($a_ptr), $t1
- cmovz $t2, $acc2
+ cmovc $t2, $acc2
mov 8*2($a_ptr), $t2
- cmovz $t3, $acc3
+ cmovc $t3, $acc3
mov 8*3($a_ptr), $t3
call __ecp_nistz256_sub$x # p256_sub(res_x, Rsqr, Hsqr);
@@ -2885,14 +2886,14 @@ __ecp_nistz256_add_tox:
sbb \$0, $a2
mov $a3, $t3
sbb $poly3, $a3
+ sbb \$0, $t4
- bt \$0, $t4
- cmovnc $t0, $a0
- cmovnc $t1, $a1
+ cmovc $t0, $a0
+ cmovc $t1, $a1
mov $a0, 8*0($r_ptr)
- cmovnc $t2, $a2
+ cmovc $t2, $a2
mov $a1, 8*1($r_ptr)
- cmovnc $t3, $a3
+ cmovc $t3, $a3
mov $a2, 8*2($r_ptr)
mov $a3, 8*3($r_ptr)
@@ -2980,14 +2981,14 @@ __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2x:
sbb \$0, $a2
mov $a3, $t3
sbb $poly3, $a3
+ sbb \$0, $t4
- bt \$0, $t4
- cmovnc $t0, $a0
- cmovnc $t1, $a1
+ cmovc $t0, $a0
+ cmovc $t1, $a1
mov $a0, 8*0($r_ptr)
- cmovnc $t2, $a2
+ cmovc $t2, $a2
mov $a1, 8*1($r_ptr)
- cmovnc $t3, $a3
+ cmovc $t3, $a3
mov $a2, 8*2($r_ptr)
mov $a3, 8*3($r_ptr)
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c b/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c
index 83e208cfe491..d089af7a2830 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c
@@ -66,9 +66,12 @@
#endif
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
#include "asn1_locl.h"
+#include "ec_lcl.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
static int ecdh_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
static int ecdh_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
+#endif
static int eckey_param2type(int *pptype, void **ppval, EC_KEY *ec_key)
{
@@ -221,6 +224,8 @@ static int eckey_pub_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
const EC_GROUP *group = EC_KEY_get0_group(b->pkey.ec);
const EC_POINT *pa = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(a->pkey.ec),
*pb = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(b->pkey.ec);
+ if (group == NULL || pa == NULL || pb == NULL)
+ return -2;
r = EC_POINT_cmp(group, pa, pb, NULL);
if (r == 0)
return 1;
@@ -299,15 +304,13 @@ static int eckey_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
static int eckey_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
- EC_KEY *ec_key;
+ EC_KEY ec_key = *(pkey->pkey.ec);
unsigned char *ep, *p;
int eplen, ptype;
void *pval;
- unsigned int tmp_flags, old_flags;
-
- ec_key = pkey->pkey.ec;
+ unsigned int old_flags;
- if (!eckey_param2type(&ptype, &pval, ec_key)) {
+ if (!eckey_param2type(&ptype, &pval, &ec_key)) {
ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_ENCODE, EC_R_DECODE_ERROR);
return 0;
}
@@ -318,30 +321,25 @@ static int eckey_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
* do not include the parameters in the SEC1 private key see PKCS#11
* 12.11
*/
- old_flags = EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(ec_key);
- tmp_flags = old_flags | EC_PKEY_NO_PARAMETERS;
- EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(ec_key, tmp_flags);
- eplen = i2d_ECPrivateKey(ec_key, NULL);
+ old_flags = EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(&ec_key);
+ EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(&ec_key, old_flags | EC_PKEY_NO_PARAMETERS);
+
+ eplen = i2d_ECPrivateKey(&ec_key, NULL);
if (!eplen) {
- EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(ec_key, old_flags);
ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
return 0;
}
ep = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(eplen);
if (!ep) {
- EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(ec_key, old_flags);
ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
p = ep;
- if (!i2d_ECPrivateKey(ec_key, &p)) {
- EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(ec_key, old_flags);
+ if (!i2d_ECPrivateKey(&ec_key, &p)) {
OPENSSL_free(ep);
ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
return 0;
}
- /* restore old encoding flags */
- EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(ec_key, old_flags);
if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey), 0,
ptype, pval, ep, eplen))
@@ -378,7 +376,7 @@ static int ec_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
static int ec_missing_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
- if (EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec) == NULL)
+ if (pkey->pkey.ec == NULL || EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec) == NULL)
return 1;
return 0;
}
@@ -398,6 +396,8 @@ static int ec_cmp_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
{
const EC_GROUP *group_a = EC_KEY_get0_group(a->pkey.ec),
*group_b = EC_KEY_get0_group(b->pkey.ec);
+ if (group_a == NULL || group_b == NULL)
+ return -2;
if (EC_GROUP_cmp(group_a, group_b, NULL))
return 0;
else
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_key.c b/crypto/ec/ec_key.c
index bc94ab5661ff..456080ecfede 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_key.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_key.c
@@ -377,9 +377,9 @@ int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x,
return 0;
}
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- if (!ctx)
- goto err;
-
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
point = EC_POINT_new(key->group);
if (!point)
@@ -432,10 +432,9 @@ int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x,
ok = 1;
err:
- if (ctx)
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- if (point)
- EC_POINT_free(point);
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EC_POINT_free(point);
return ok;
}
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c
index ca44d0aaeec4..99b8d613c833 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c
@@ -82,19 +82,36 @@ typedef struct ec_pre_comp_st {
} EC_PRE_COMP;
/* Functions implemented in assembly */
+/*
+ * Most of below mentioned functions *preserve* the property of inputs
+ * being fully reduced, i.e. being in [0, modulus) range. Simply put if
+ * inputs are fully reduced, then output is too. Note that reverse is
+ * not true, in sense that given partially reduced inputs output can be
+ * either, not unlikely reduced. And "most" in first sentence refers to
+ * the fact that given the calculations flow one can tolerate that
+ * addition, 1st function below, produces partially reduced result *if*
+ * multiplications by 2 and 3, which customarily use addition, fully
+ * reduce it. This effectively gives two options: a) addition produces
+ * fully reduced result [as long as inputs are, just like remaining
+ * functions]; b) addition is allowed to produce partially reduced
+ * result, but multiplications by 2 and 3 perform additional reduction
+ * step. Choice between the two can be platform-specific, but it was a)
+ * in all cases so far...
+ */
+/* Modular add: res = a+b mod P */
+void ecp_nistz256_add(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS],
+ const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS],
+ const BN_ULONG b[P256_LIMBS]);
/* Modular mul by 2: res = 2*a mod P */
void ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS],
const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS]);
-/* Modular div by 2: res = a/2 mod P */
-void ecp_nistz256_div_by_2(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS],
- const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS]);
/* Modular mul by 3: res = 3*a mod P */
void ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS],
const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS]);
-/* Modular add: res = a+b mod P */
-void ecp_nistz256_add(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS],
- const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS],
- const BN_ULONG b[P256_LIMBS]);
+
+/* Modular div by 2: res = a/2 mod P */
+void ecp_nistz256_div_by_2(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS],
+ const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS]);
/* Modular sub: res = a-b mod P */
void ecp_nistz256_sub(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS],
const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS],
@@ -205,21 +222,29 @@ static BN_ULONG is_equal(const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS],
return is_zero(res);
}
-static BN_ULONG is_one(const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS])
+static BN_ULONG is_one(const BIGNUM *z)
{
- BN_ULONG res;
-
- res = a[0] ^ ONE[0];
- res |= a[1] ^ ONE[1];
- res |= a[2] ^ ONE[2];
- res |= a[3] ^ ONE[3];
- if (P256_LIMBS == 8) {
- res |= a[4] ^ ONE[4];
- res |= a[5] ^ ONE[5];
- res |= a[6] ^ ONE[6];
+ BN_ULONG res = 0;
+ BN_ULONG *a = z->d;
+
+ if (z->top == (P256_LIMBS - P256_LIMBS / 8)) {
+ res = a[0] ^ ONE[0];
+ res |= a[1] ^ ONE[1];
+ res |= a[2] ^ ONE[2];
+ res |= a[3] ^ ONE[3];
+ if (P256_LIMBS == 8) {
+ res |= a[4] ^ ONE[4];
+ res |= a[5] ^ ONE[5];
+ res |= a[6] ^ ONE[6];
+ /*
+ * no check for a[7] (being zero) on 32-bit platforms,
+ * because value of "one" takes only 7 limbs.
+ */
+ }
+ res = is_zero(res);
}
- return is_zero(res);
+ return res;
}
static int ecp_nistz256_set_words(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG words[P256_LIMBS])
@@ -315,19 +340,16 @@ static void ecp_nistz256_point_add(P256_POINT *r,
const BN_ULONG *in2_y = b->Y;
const BN_ULONG *in2_z = b->Z;
- /* We encode infinity as (0,0), which is not on the curve,
- * so it is OK. */
- in1infty = (in1_x[0] | in1_x[1] | in1_x[2] | in1_x[3] |
- in1_y[0] | in1_y[1] | in1_y[2] | in1_y[3]);
+ /*
+ * Infinity in encoded as (,,0)
+ */
+ in1infty = (in1_z[0] | in1_z[1] | in1_z[2] | in1_z[3]);
if (P256_LIMBS == 8)
- in1infty |= (in1_x[4] | in1_x[5] | in1_x[6] | in1_x[7] |
- in1_y[4] | in1_y[5] | in1_y[6] | in1_y[7]);
+ in1infty |= (in1_z[4] | in1_z[5] | in1_z[6] | in1_z[7]);
- in2infty = (in2_x[0] | in2_x[1] | in2_x[2] | in2_x[3] |
- in2_y[0] | in2_y[1] | in2_y[2] | in2_y[3]);
+ in2infty = (in2_z[0] | in2_z[1] | in2_z[2] | in2_z[3]);
if (P256_LIMBS == 8)
- in2infty |= (in2_x[4] | in2_x[5] | in2_x[6] | in2_x[7] |
- in2_y[4] | in2_y[5] | in2_y[6] | in2_y[7]);
+ in2infty |= (in2_z[4] | in2_z[5] | in2_z[6] | in2_z[7]);
in1infty = is_zero(in1infty);
in2infty = is_zero(in2infty);
@@ -416,15 +438,16 @@ static void ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine(P256_POINT *r,
const BN_ULONG *in2_y = b->Y;
/*
- * In affine representation we encode infty as (0,0), which is not on the
- * curve, so it is OK
+ * Infinity in encoded as (,,0)
*/
- in1infty = (in1_x[0] | in1_x[1] | in1_x[2] | in1_x[3] |
- in1_y[0] | in1_y[1] | in1_y[2] | in1_y[3]);
+ in1infty = (in1_z[0] | in1_z[1] | in1_z[2] | in1_z[3]);
if (P256_LIMBS == 8)
- in1infty |= (in1_x[4] | in1_x[5] | in1_x[6] | in1_x[7] |
- in1_y[4] | in1_y[5] | in1_y[6] | in1_y[7]);
+ in1infty |= (in1_z[4] | in1_z[5] | in1_z[6] | in1_z[7]);
+ /*
+ * In affine representation we encode infinity as (0,0), which is
+ * not on the curve, so it is OK
+ */
in2infty = (in2_x[0] | in2_x[1] | in2_x[2] | in2_x[3] |
in2_y[0] | in2_y[1] | in2_y[2] | in2_y[3]);
if (P256_LIMBS == 8)
@@ -741,9 +764,8 @@ static int ecp_nistz256_is_affine_G(const EC_POINT *generator)
{
return (generator->X.top == P256_LIMBS) &&
(generator->Y.top == P256_LIMBS) &&
- (generator->Z.top == (P256_LIMBS - P256_LIMBS / 8)) &&
is_equal(generator->X.d, def_xG) &&
- is_equal(generator->Y.d, def_yG) && is_one(generator->Z.d);
+ is_equal(generator->Y.d, def_yG) && is_one(&generator->Z);
}
static int ecp_nistz256_mult_precompute(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
@@ -1249,6 +1271,8 @@ static int ecp_nistz256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group,
} else
#endif
{
+ BN_ULONG infty;
+
/* First window */
wvalue = (p_str[0] << 1) & mask;
index += window_size;
@@ -1260,7 +1284,30 @@ static int ecp_nistz256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group,
ecp_nistz256_neg(p.p.Z, p.p.Y);
copy_conditional(p.p.Y, p.p.Z, wvalue & 1);
- memcpy(p.p.Z, ONE, sizeof(ONE));
+ /*
+ * Since affine infinity is encoded as (0,0) and
+ * Jacobian ias (,,0), we need to harmonize them
+ * by assigning "one" or zero to Z.
+ */
+ infty = (p.p.X[0] | p.p.X[1] | p.p.X[2] | p.p.X[3] |
+ p.p.Y[0] | p.p.Y[1] | p.p.Y[2] | p.p.Y[3]);
+ if (P256_LIMBS == 8)
+ infty |= (p.p.X[4] | p.p.X[5] | p.p.X[6] | p.p.X[7] |
+ p.p.Y[4] | p.p.Y[5] | p.p.Y[6] | p.p.Y[7]);
+
+ infty = 0 - is_zero(infty);
+ infty = ~infty;
+
+ p.p.Z[0] = ONE[0] & infty;
+ p.p.Z[1] = ONE[1] & infty;
+ p.p.Z[2] = ONE[2] & infty;
+ p.p.Z[3] = ONE[3] & infty;
+ if (P256_LIMBS == 8) {
+ p.p.Z[4] = ONE[4] & infty;
+ p.p.Z[5] = ONE[5] & infty;
+ p.p.Z[6] = ONE[6] & infty;
+ p.p.Z[7] = ONE[7] & infty;
+ }
for (i = 1; i < 37; i++) {
unsigned int off = (index - 1) / 8;
@@ -1331,7 +1378,7 @@ static int ecp_nistz256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group,
!ecp_nistz256_set_words(&r->Z, p.p.Z)) {
goto err;
}
- r->Z_is_one = is_one(p.p.Z) & 1;
+ r->Z_is_one = is_one(&r->Z) & 1;
ret = 1;
diff --git a/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c b/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c
index 8fb9c3373dd6..65a74df2362e 100644
--- a/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c
+++ b/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
*
*/
+#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
@@ -934,11 +935,15 @@ static int cryptodev_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from)
return (0);
}
+ dstate->mac_len = fstate->mac_len;
if (fstate->mac_len != 0) {
if (fstate->mac_data != NULL) {
dstate->mac_data = OPENSSL_malloc(fstate->mac_len);
+ if (dstate->ac_data == NULL) {
+ printf("cryptodev_digest_init: malloc failed\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
memcpy(dstate->mac_data, fstate->mac_data, fstate->mac_len);
- dstate->mac_len = fstate->mac_len;
}
}
@@ -1064,8 +1069,7 @@ static void zapparams(struct crypt_kop *kop)
int i;
for (i = 0; i < kop->crk_iparams + kop->crk_oparams; i++) {
- if (kop->crk_param[i].crp_p)
- free(kop->crk_param[i].crp_p);
+ OPENSSL_free(kop->crk_param[i].crp_p);
kop->crk_param[i].crp_p = NULL;
kop->crk_param[i].crp_nbits = 0;
}
@@ -1078,16 +1082,25 @@ cryptodev_asym(struct crypt_kop *kop, int rlen, BIGNUM *r, int slen,
int fd, ret = -1;
if ((fd = get_asym_dev_crypto()) < 0)
- return (ret);
+ return ret;
if (r) {
- kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams].crp_p = calloc(rlen, sizeof(char));
+ kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams].crp_p = OPENSSL_malloc(rlen);
+ if (kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams].crp_p == NULL)
+ return ret;
+ memset(kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams].crp_p, 0, (size_t)rlen);
kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams].crp_nbits = rlen * 8;
kop->crk_oparams++;
}
if (s) {
- kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams + 1].crp_p =
- calloc(slen, sizeof(char));
+ kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams + 1].crp_p = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
+ /* No need to free the kop->crk_iparams parameter if it was allocated,
+ * callers of this routine have to free allocated parameters through
+ * zapparams both in case of success and failure
+ */
+ if (kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams+1].crp_p == NULL)
+ return ret;
+ memset(kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams + 1].crp_p, 0, (size_t)slen);
kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams + 1].crp_nbits = slen * 8;
kop->crk_oparams++;
}
@@ -1100,7 +1113,7 @@ cryptodev_asym(struct crypt_kop *kop, int rlen, BIGNUM *r, int slen,
ret = 0;
}
- return (ret);
+ return ret;
}
static int
diff --git a/crypto/evp/bio_enc.c b/crypto/evp/bio_enc.c
index 363e0246aedc..0806f233b67d 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/bio_enc.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/bio_enc.c
@@ -201,9 +201,14 @@ static int enc_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
break;
}
} else {
- EVP_CipherUpdate(&(ctx->cipher),
- (unsigned char *)ctx->buf, &ctx->buf_len,
- (unsigned char *)&(ctx->buf[BUF_OFFSET]), i);
+ if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(&ctx->cipher,
+ (unsigned char *)ctx->buf, &ctx->buf_len,
+ (unsigned char *)&(ctx->buf[BUF_OFFSET]),
+ i)) {
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+ ctx->ok = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
ctx->cont = 1;
/*
* Note: it is possible for EVP_CipherUpdate to decrypt zero
@@ -260,9 +265,13 @@ static int enc_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
ctx->buf_off = 0;
while (inl > 0) {
n = (inl > ENC_BLOCK_SIZE) ? ENC_BLOCK_SIZE : inl;
- EVP_CipherUpdate(&(ctx->cipher),
- (unsigned char *)ctx->buf, &ctx->buf_len,
- (unsigned char *)in, n);
+ if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(&ctx->cipher,
+ (unsigned char *)ctx->buf, &ctx->buf_len,
+ (unsigned char *)in, n)) {
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+ ctx->ok = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
inl -= n;
in += n;
diff --git a/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c b/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c
index 5c32e35e17b9..16e151f11017 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c
@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ static int sig_out(BIO *b)
* FIXME: there's absolutely no guarantee this makes any sense at all,
* particularly now EVP_MD_CTX has been restructured.
*/
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(md->md_data, md->digest->md_size) < 0)
+ if (RAND_bytes(md->md_data, md->digest->md_size) <= 0)
goto berr;
memcpy(&(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_len]), md->md_data, md->digest->md_size);
longswap(&(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_len]), md->digest->md_size);
diff --git a/crypto/evp/c_all.c b/crypto/evp/c_all.c
index a3ed00d4c169..719e34d22fde 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/c_all.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/c_all.c
@@ -82,9 +82,4 @@ void OPENSSL_add_all_algorithms_noconf(void)
OPENSSL_cpuid_setup();
OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers();
OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-# if defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(HAVE_CRYPTODEV)
- ENGINE_setup_bsd_cryptodev();
-# endif
-#endif
}
diff --git a/crypto/evp/digest.c b/crypto/evp/digest.c
index 5b642b23fc1c..4db179629d04 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/digest.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/digest.c
@@ -253,10 +253,10 @@ int EVP_DigestInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *impl)
int EVP_DigestUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- return FIPS_digestupdate(ctx, data, count);
-#else
- return ctx->update(ctx, data, count);
+ if (FIPS_mode())
+ return FIPS_digestupdate(ctx, data, count);
#endif
+ return ctx->update(ctx, data, count);
}
/* The caller can assume that this removes any secret data from the context */
@@ -271,10 +271,11 @@ int EVP_DigestFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *size)
/* The caller can assume that this removes any secret data from the context */
int EVP_DigestFinal_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *size)
{
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- return FIPS_digestfinal(ctx, md, size);
-#else
int ret;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (FIPS_mode())
+ return FIPS_digestfinal(ctx, md, size);
+#endif
OPENSSL_assert(ctx->digest->md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
ret = ctx->digest->final(ctx, md);
@@ -284,9 +285,8 @@ int EVP_DigestFinal_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *size)
ctx->digest->cleanup(ctx);
EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_CLEANED);
}
- memset(ctx->md_data, 0, ctx->digest->ctx_size);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->md_data, ctx->digest->ctx_size);
return ret;
-#endif
}
int EVP_MD_CTX_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *out, const EVP_MD_CTX *in)
diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_rc4_hmac_md5.c b/crypto/evp/e_rc4_hmac_md5.c
index 2da11178294d..5e92855dfdc0 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/e_rc4_hmac_md5.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/e_rc4_hmac_md5.c
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ static int rc4_hmac_md5_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
return 1;
}
-# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && ( \
+# if defined(RC4_ASM) && defined(MD5_ASM) && ( \
defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
defined(__INTEL__) ) && \
@@ -254,6 +254,8 @@ static int rc4_hmac_md5_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
MD5_Init(&key->tail);
MD5_Update(&key->tail, hmac_key, sizeof(hmac_key));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(hmac_key, sizeof(hmac_key));
+
return 1;
}
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_seed.c b/crypto/evp/e_seed.c
index 7249d1b1eecb..3d01eacac06e 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/e_seed.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/e_seed.c
@@ -70,7 +70,8 @@ typedef struct {
} EVP_SEED_KEY;
IMPLEMENT_BLOCK_CIPHER(seed, ks, SEED, EVP_SEED_KEY, NID_seed,
- 16, 16, 16, 128, 0, seed_init_key, 0, 0, 0, 0)
+ 16, 16, 16, 128, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1,
+ seed_init_key, 0, 0, 0, 0)
static int seed_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c b/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
index 7d7be245b021..0e40f09f2f91 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ int EVP_CipherInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (FIPS_mode()) {
- const EVP_CIPHER *fcipher;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *fcipher = NULL;
if (cipher)
fcipher = evp_get_fips_cipher(cipher);
if (fcipher)
diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_test.c b/crypto/evp/evp_test.c
index d7441ec7b702..98796427bf49 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/evp_test.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp_test.c
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ static void hexdump(FILE *f, const char *title, const unsigned char *s, int l)
static int convert(unsigned char *s)
{
unsigned char *d;
+ int digits = 0;
for (d = s; *s; s += 2, ++d) {
unsigned int n;
@@ -86,8 +87,9 @@ static int convert(unsigned char *s)
}
sscanf((char *)s, "%2x", &n);
*d = (unsigned char)n;
+ digits++;
}
- return s - d;
+ return digits;
}
static char *sstrsep(char **string, const char *delim)
diff --git a/crypto/evp/openbsd_hw.c b/crypto/evp/openbsd_hw.c
index 75d12e233028..07decf267433 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/openbsd_hw.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/openbsd_hw.c
@@ -133,6 +133,10 @@ static int dev_crypto_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int cipher,
return 0;
CDATA(ctx)->key = OPENSSL_malloc(MAX_HW_KEY);
+ if (CDATA(ctx)->key == NULL {
+ err("CDATA(ctx)->key memory allocation failed");
+ return 0;
+ }
assert(ctx->cipher->iv_len <= MAX_HW_IV);
@@ -186,6 +190,11 @@ static int dev_crypto_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
if (((unsigned long)in & 3) || cinl != inl) {
cin = OPENSSL_malloc(cinl);
+ if (cin == NULL) {
+ err("cin - memory allocation failed");
+ abort();
+ return 0;
+ }
memcpy(cin, in, inl);
cryp.src = cin;
}
@@ -334,6 +343,11 @@ static int do_digest(int ses, unsigned char *md, const void *data, int len)
char *dcopy;
dcopy = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+ if (dcopy == NULL) {
+ err("dcopy - memory allocation failed");
+ abort();
+ return 0;
+ }
memcpy(dcopy, data, len);
cryp.src = dcopy;
cryp.dst = cryp.src; // FIXME!!!
@@ -364,6 +378,10 @@ static int dev_crypto_md5_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
return do_digest(md_data->sess.ses, md_data->md, data, len);
md_data->data = OPENSSL_realloc(md_data->data, md_data->len + len);
+ if (md_data->data == NULL) {
+ err("DEV_CRYPTO_MD5_UPDATE: unable to allocate memory");
+ abort();
+ }
memcpy(md_data->data + md_data->len, data, len);
md_data->len += len;
@@ -397,6 +415,10 @@ static int dev_crypto_md5_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from)
assert(from->digest->flags & EVP_MD_FLAG_ONESHOT);
to_md->data = OPENSSL_malloc(from_md->len);
+ if (to_md->data == NULL) {
+ err("DEV_CRYPTO_MD5_COPY: unable to allocate memory");
+ abort();
+ }
memcpy(to_md->data, from_md->data, from_md->len);
return 1;
diff --git a/crypto/evp/p_lib.c b/crypto/evp/p_lib.c
index c0171244d5d0..545d04fd7744 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/p_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/p_lib.c
@@ -130,6 +130,14 @@ int EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from)
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_COPY_PARAMETERS, EVP_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
goto err;
}
+
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(to)) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(to, from) == 1)
+ return 1;
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_COPY_PARAMETERS, EVP_R_DIFFERENT_PARAMETERS);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (from->ameth && from->ameth->param_copy)
return from->ameth->param_copy(to, from);
err:
diff --git a/crypto/evp/pmeth_gn.c b/crypto/evp/pmeth_gn.c
index 6435f1b632cf..6a4d3573ff76 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/pmeth_gn.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/pmeth_gn.c
@@ -149,8 +149,10 @@ int EVP_PKEY_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
if (!ppkey)
return -1;
- if (!*ppkey)
+ if (*ppkey == NULL)
*ppkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+ if (*ppkey == NULL)
+ return -1;
ret = ctx->pmeth->keygen(ctx, *ppkey);
if (ret <= 0) {
diff --git a/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c b/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
index 9f81d10021a0..9668b3a9bcfb 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
@@ -91,7 +91,9 @@ static const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *standard_methods[] = {
&ec_pkey_meth,
#endif
&hmac_pkey_meth,
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMAC
&cmac_pkey_meth,
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
&dhx_pkey_meth
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/hmac/hmac.c b/crypto/hmac/hmac.c
index 51a0a3efcd67..213504e85fee 100644
--- a/crypto/hmac/hmac.c
+++ b/crypto/hmac/hmac.c
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ void HMAC_CTX_cleanup(HMAC_CTX *ctx)
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->i_ctx);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->o_ctx);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->md_ctx);
- memset(ctx, 0, sizeof *ctx);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx, sizeof *ctx);
}
unsigned char *HMAC(const EVP_MD *evp_md, const void *key, int key_len,
diff --git a/crypto/jpake/jpake.c b/crypto/jpake/jpake.c
index ebc09755756d..2ba75f0172c1 100644
--- a/crypto/jpake/jpake.c
+++ b/crypto/jpake/jpake.c
@@ -116,6 +116,8 @@ JPAKE_CTX *JPAKE_CTX_new(const char *name, const char *peer_name,
const BIGNUM *secret)
{
JPAKE_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ctx);
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return NULL;
JPAKE_CTX_init(ctx, name, peer_name, p, g, q, secret);
@@ -151,6 +153,8 @@ static void hashbn(SHA_CTX *sha, const BIGNUM *bn)
size_t l = BN_num_bytes(bn);
unsigned char *bin = OPENSSL_malloc(l);
+ if (bin == NULL)
+ return;
hashlength(sha, l);
BN_bn2bin(bn, bin);
SHA1_Update(sha, bin, l);
diff --git a/crypto/lhash/lhash.c b/crypto/lhash/lhash.c
index 53c5c138bb67..f20353aea33f 100644
--- a/crypto/lhash/lhash.c
+++ b/crypto/lhash/lhash.c
@@ -335,8 +335,8 @@ static void expand(_LHASH *lh)
n = (LHASH_NODE **)OPENSSL_realloc(lh->b,
(int)(sizeof(LHASH_NODE *) * j));
if (n == NULL) {
-/* fputs("realloc error in lhash",stderr); */
lh->error++;
+ lh->num_nodes--;
lh->p = 0;
return;
}
diff --git a/crypto/md2/md2_dgst.c b/crypto/md2/md2_dgst.c
index 9cd79f8d70c3..7f5d9ba69ba2 100644
--- a/crypto/md2/md2_dgst.c
+++ b/crypto/md2/md2_dgst.c
@@ -219,6 +219,6 @@ int MD2_Final(unsigned char *md, MD2_CTX *c)
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
md[i] = (UCHAR) (p1[i] & 0xff);
- memset((char *)&c, 0, sizeof(c));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(c, sizeof(*c));
return 1;
}
diff --git a/crypto/md32_common.h b/crypto/md32_common.h
index 96828d2693a1..b5a04bf133bd 100644
--- a/crypto/md32_common.h
+++ b/crypto/md32_common.h
@@ -109,6 +109,8 @@
* <appro@fy.chalmers.se>
*/
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
#if !defined(DATA_ORDER_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) && !defined(DATA_ORDER_IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN)
# error "DATA_ORDER must be defined!"
#endif
@@ -329,6 +331,12 @@ int HASH_UPDATE(HASH_CTX *c, const void *data_, size_t len)
data += n;
len -= n;
c->num = 0;
+ /*
+ * We use memset rather than OPENSSL_cleanse() here deliberately.
+ * Using OPENSSL_cleanse() here could be a performance issue. It
+ * will get properly cleansed on finalisation so this isn't a
+ * security problem.
+ */
memset(p, 0, HASH_CBLOCK); /* keep it zeroed */
} else {
memcpy(p + n, data, len);
@@ -384,7 +392,7 @@ int HASH_FINAL(unsigned char *md, HASH_CTX *c)
p -= HASH_CBLOCK;
HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER(c, p, 1);
c->num = 0;
- memset(p, 0, HASH_CBLOCK);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(p, HASH_CBLOCK);
#ifndef HASH_MAKE_STRING
# error "HASH_MAKE_STRING must be defined!"
diff --git a/crypto/mdc2/mdc2dgst.c b/crypto/mdc2/mdc2dgst.c
index 6615cf84d7d2..2dce4936337a 100644
--- a/crypto/mdc2/mdc2dgst.c
+++ b/crypto/mdc2/mdc2dgst.c
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ int MDC2_Update(MDC2_CTX *c, const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
i = c->num;
if (i != 0) {
- if (i + len < MDC2_BLOCK) {
+ if (len < MDC2_BLOCK - i) {
/* partial block */
memcpy(&(c->data[i]), in, len);
c->num += (int)len;
diff --git a/crypto/mem.c b/crypto/mem.c
index fdad49b76ec0..06c3960cc6c0 100644
--- a/crypto/mem.c
+++ b/crypto/mem.c
@@ -82,6 +82,14 @@ static void *default_malloc_ex(size_t num, const char *file, int line)
static void *(*malloc_ex_func) (size_t, const char *file, int line)
= default_malloc_ex;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+# if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
+# define realloc _realloc64
+# elif __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 32
+# define realloc _realloc32
+# endif
+#endif
+
static void *(*realloc_func) (void *, size_t) = realloc;
static void *default_realloc_ex(void *str, size_t num,
const char *file, int line)
@@ -92,7 +100,11 @@ static void *default_realloc_ex(void *str, size_t num,
static void *(*realloc_ex_func) (void *, size_t, const char *file, int line)
= default_realloc_ex;
-static void (*free_func) (void *) = free;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ static void (*free_func) (__void_ptr64) = free;
+#else
+ static void (*free_func) (void *) = free;
+#endif
static void *(*malloc_locked_func) (size_t) = malloc;
static void *default_malloc_locked_ex(size_t num, const char *file, int line)
@@ -103,7 +115,11 @@ static void *default_malloc_locked_ex(size_t num, const char *file, int line)
static void *(*malloc_locked_ex_func) (size_t, const char *file, int line)
= default_malloc_locked_ex;
-static void (*free_locked_func) (void *) = free;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ static void (*free_locked_func) (__void_ptr64) = free;
+#else
+ static void (*free_locked_func) (void *) = free;
+#endif
/* may be changed as long as 'allow_customize_debug' is set */
/* XXX use correct function pointer types */
@@ -298,18 +314,6 @@ void *CRYPTO_malloc_locked(int num, const char *file, int line)
if (malloc_debug_func != NULL)
malloc_debug_func(ret, num, file, line, 1);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ
- /*
- * Create a dependency on the value of 'cleanse_ctr' so our memory
- * sanitisation function can't be optimised out. NB: We only do this for
- * >2Kb so the overhead doesn't bother us.
- */
- if (ret && (num > 2048)) {
- extern unsigned char cleanse_ctr;
- ((unsigned char *)ret)[0] = cleanse_ctr;
- }
-#endif
-
return ret;
}
@@ -346,18 +350,6 @@ void *CRYPTO_malloc(int num, const char *file, int line)
if (malloc_debug_func != NULL)
malloc_debug_func(ret, num, file, line, 1);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ
- /*
- * Create a dependency on the value of 'cleanse_ctr' so our memory
- * sanitisation function can't be optimised out. NB: We only do this for
- * >2Kb so the overhead doesn't bother us.
- */
- if (ret && (num > 2048)) {
- extern unsigned char cleanse_ctr;
- ((unsigned char *)ret)[0] = cleanse_ctr;
- }
-#endif
-
return ret;
}
diff --git a/crypto/mem_clr.c b/crypto/mem_clr.c
index ab85344eef38..579e9d18251d 100644
--- a/crypto/mem_clr.c
+++ b/crypto/mem_clr.c
@@ -60,22 +60,16 @@
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-unsigned char cleanse_ctr = 0;
+/*
+ * Pointer to memset is volatile so that compiler must de-reference
+ * the pointer and can't assume that it points to any function in
+ * particular (such as memset, which it then might further "optimize")
+ */
+typedef void *(*memset_t)(void *,int,size_t);
+
+static volatile memset_t memset_func = memset;
void OPENSSL_cleanse(void *ptr, size_t len)
{
- unsigned char *p = ptr;
- size_t loop = len, ctr = cleanse_ctr;
-
- if (ptr == NULL)
- return;
-
- while (loop--) {
- *(p++) = (unsigned char)ctr;
- ctr += (17 + ((size_t)p & 0xF));
- }
- p = memchr(ptr, (unsigned char)ctr, len);
- if (p)
- ctr += (63 + (size_t)p);
- cleanse_ctr = (unsigned char)ctr;
+ memset_func(ptr, 0, len);
}
diff --git a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-sparcv9.pl b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-sparcv9.pl
index 5bc28702019a..b129ba706f0f 100755
--- a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-sparcv9.pl
+++ b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-sparcv9.pl
@@ -445,6 +445,8 @@ gcm_gmult_vis3:
.align 32
gcm_ghash_vis3:
save %sp,-$frame,%sp
+ nop
+ srln $len,0,$len ! needed on v8+, "nop" on v9
ldx [$Xip+8],$C2 ! load Xi
ldx [$Xip+0],$C3
diff --git a/crypto/o_init.c b/crypto/o_init.c
index 2088388128e6..185841ea048c 100644
--- a/crypto/o_init.c
+++ b/crypto/o_init.c
@@ -73,6 +73,9 @@ void OPENSSL_init(void)
done = 1;
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
FIPS_set_locking_callbacks(CRYPTO_lock, CRYPTO_add_lock);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
+ FIPS_crypto_set_id_callback(CRYPTO_thread_id);
+# endif
FIPS_set_error_callbacks(ERR_put_error, ERR_add_error_vdata);
FIPS_set_malloc_callbacks(CRYPTO_malloc, CRYPTO_free);
RAND_init_fips();
diff --git a/crypto/o_time.c b/crypto/o_time.c
index 635dae184d2f..b99e5990b4e4 100644
--- a/crypto/o_time.c
+++ b/crypto/o_time.c
@@ -78,7 +78,28 @@
# include <descrip.h>
# include <stdlib.h>
# endif /* ndef VMS_GMTIME_OK */
-#endif
+
+
+/*
+ * Needed to pick up the correct definitions and declarations in some of the
+ * DEC C Header Files (*.H).
+ */
+# define __NEW_STARLET 1
+
+# if (defined(__alpha) || defined(__ia64))
+# include <iledef.h>
+# else
+
+/* VAX */
+typedef struct _ile3 { /* Copied from ILEDEF.H for Alpha */
+# pragma __nomember_alignment
+ unsigned short int ile3$w_length; /* Length of buffer in bytes */
+ unsigned short int ile3$w_code; /* Item code value */
+ void *ile3$ps_bufaddr; /* Buffer address */
+ unsigned short int *ile3$ps_retlen_addr; /* Address of word for returned length */
+} ILE3;
+# endif /* alpha || ia64 */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VMS */
struct tm *OPENSSL_gmtime(const time_t *timer, struct tm *result)
{
@@ -105,26 +126,42 @@ struct tm *OPENSSL_gmtime(const time_t *timer, struct tm *result)
static $DESCRIPTOR(lognam, "SYS$TIMEZONE_DIFFERENTIAL");
char logvalue[256];
unsigned int reslen = 0;
- struct {
- short buflen;
- short code;
- void *bufaddr;
- unsigned int *reslen;
- } itemlist[] = {
- {
- 0, LNM$_STRING, 0, 0
- },
- {
- 0, 0, 0, 0
- },
- };
+# if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
+ ILEB_64 itemlist[2], *pitem;
+# else
+ ILE3 itemlist[2], *pitem;
+# endif
int status;
time_t t;
+
+ /*
+ * Setup an itemlist for the call to $TRNLNM - Translate Logical Name.
+ */
+ pitem = itemlist;
+
+# if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
+ pitem->ileb_64$w_mbo = 1;
+ pitem->ileb_64$w_code = LNM$_STRING;
+ pitem->ileb_64$l_mbmo = -1;
+ pitem->ileb_64$q_length = sizeof (logvalue);
+ pitem->ileb_64$pq_bufaddr = logvalue;
+ pitem->ileb_64$pq_retlen_addr = (unsigned __int64 *) &reslen;
+ pitem++;
+ /* Last item of the item list is null terminated */
+ pitem->ileb_64$q_length = pitem->ileb_64$w_code = 0;
+# else
+ pitem->ile3$w_length = sizeof (logvalue);
+ pitem->ile3$w_code = LNM$_STRING;
+ pitem->ile3$ps_bufaddr = logvalue;
+ pitem->ile3$ps_retlen_addr = (unsigned short int *) &reslen;
+ pitem++;
+ /* Last item of the item list is null terminated */
+ pitem->ile3$w_length = pitem->ile3$w_code = 0;
+# endif
+
+
/* Get the value for SYS$TIMEZONE_DIFFERENTIAL */
- itemlist[0].buflen = sizeof(logvalue);
- itemlist[0].bufaddr = logvalue;
- itemlist[0].reslen = &reslen;
status = sys$trnlnm(0, &tabnam, &lognam, 0, itemlist);
if (!(status & 1))
return NULL;
@@ -132,7 +169,7 @@ struct tm *OPENSSL_gmtime(const time_t *timer, struct tm *result)
t = *timer;
-/* The following is extracted from the DEC C header time.h */
+ /* The following is extracted from the DEC C header time.h */
/*
** Beginning in OpenVMS Version 7.0 mktime, time, ctime, strftime
** have two implementations. One implementation is provided
diff --git a/crypto/objects/o_names.c b/crypto/objects/o_names.c
index 24859926ace6..f106905ffa77 100644
--- a/crypto/objects/o_names.c
+++ b/crypto/objects/o_names.c
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ int OBJ_NAME_add(const char *name, int type, const char *data)
onp = (OBJ_NAME *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(OBJ_NAME));
if (onp == NULL) {
/* ERROR */
- return (0);
+ return 0;
}
onp->name = name;
@@ -216,10 +216,11 @@ int OBJ_NAME_add(const char *name, int type, const char *data)
} else {
if (lh_OBJ_NAME_error(names_lh)) {
/* ERROR */
- return (0);
+ OPENSSL_free(onp);
+ return 0;
}
}
- return (1);
+ return 1;
}
int OBJ_NAME_remove(const char *name, int type)
diff --git a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_cl.c b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_cl.c
index b3612c8dfc79..fca7db0b71d6 100755
--- a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_cl.c
+++ b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_cl.c
@@ -93,8 +93,10 @@ OCSP_ONEREQ *OCSP_request_add0_id(OCSP_REQUEST *req, OCSP_CERTID *cid)
if (one->reqCert)
OCSP_CERTID_free(one->reqCert);
one->reqCert = cid;
- if (req && !sk_OCSP_ONEREQ_push(req->tbsRequest->requestList, one))
+ if (req && !sk_OCSP_ONEREQ_push(req->tbsRequest->requestList, one)) {
+ one->reqCert = NULL; /* do not free on error */
goto err;
+ }
return one;
err:
OCSP_ONEREQ_free(one);
diff --git a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c
index c19648c7329b..55af31b5734a 100755
--- a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c
+++ b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c
@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ static int ocsp_add1_nonce(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **exts,
ASN1_put_object(&tmpval, 0, len, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL);
if (val)
memcpy(tmpval, val, len);
- else if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmpval, len) < 0)
+ else if (RAND_bytes(tmpval, len) <= 0)
goto err;
if (!X509V3_add1_i2d(exts, NID_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce,
&os, 0, X509V3_ADD_REPLACE))
diff --git a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c
index cabf53933a44..ff781e56e73e 100755
--- a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c
@@ -271,12 +271,18 @@ int OCSP_parse_url(const char *url, char **phost, char **pport, char **ppath,
err:
if (buf)
OPENSSL_free(buf);
- if (*ppath)
+ if (*ppath) {
OPENSSL_free(*ppath);
- if (*pport)
+ *ppath = NULL;
+ }
+ if (*pport) {
OPENSSL_free(*pport);
- if (*phost)
+ *pport = NULL;
+ }
+ if (*phost) {
OPENSSL_free(*phost);
+ *phost = NULL;
+ }
return 0;
}
diff --git a/crypto/opensslv.h b/crypto/opensslv.h
index 13fe440231cd..2f585f0e0480 100644
--- a/crypto/opensslv.h
+++ b/crypto/opensslv.h
@@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ extern "C" {
* (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
* major minor fix final patch/beta)
*/
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000208fL
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000209fL
# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2h-fips 3 May 2016"
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2i-fips 22 Sep 2016"
# else
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2h 3 May 2016"
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2i 22 Sep 2016"
# endif
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
diff --git a/crypto/ossl_typ.h b/crypto/ossl_typ.h
index 9144ea2cf60b..364d26238e8c 100644
--- a/crypto/ossl_typ.h
+++ b/crypto/ossl_typ.h
@@ -178,6 +178,8 @@ typedef struct engine_st ENGINE;
typedef struct ssl_st SSL;
typedef struct ssl_ctx_st SSL_CTX;
+typedef struct comp_method_st COMP_METHOD;
+
typedef struct X509_POLICY_NODE_st X509_POLICY_NODE;
typedef struct X509_POLICY_LEVEL_st X509_POLICY_LEVEL;
typedef struct X509_POLICY_TREE_st X509_POLICY_TREE;
diff --git a/crypto/pem/pem.h b/crypto/pem/pem.h
index d3b23fc997d6..aac72fb21eda 100644
--- a/crypto/pem/pem.h
+++ b/crypto/pem/pem.h
@@ -531,6 +531,7 @@ int i2b_PVK_bio(BIO *out, EVP_PKEY *pk, int enclevel,
* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
* made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
*/
+
void ERR_load_PEM_strings(void);
/* Error codes for the PEM functions. */
@@ -592,6 +593,7 @@ void ERR_load_PEM_strings(void);
# define PEM_R_ERROR_CONVERTING_PRIVATE_KEY 115
# define PEM_R_EXPECTING_PRIVATE_KEY_BLOB 119
# define PEM_R_EXPECTING_PUBLIC_KEY_BLOB 120
+# define PEM_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG 128
# define PEM_R_INCONSISTENT_HEADER 121
# define PEM_R_KEYBLOB_HEADER_PARSE_ERROR 122
# define PEM_R_KEYBLOB_TOO_SHORT 123
@@ -609,7 +611,7 @@ void ERR_load_PEM_strings(void);
# define PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION 114
# define PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_COMPONENTS 126
-#ifdef __cplusplus
+# ifdef __cplusplus
}
-#endif
+# endif
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/pem/pem_err.c b/crypto/pem/pem_err.c
index e1f4fdb432d0..4e5f8e936cd1 100644
--- a/crypto/pem/pem_err.c
+++ b/crypto/pem/pem_err.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* crypto/pem/pem_err.c */
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2011 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA PEM_str_reasons[] = {
"expecting private key blob"},
{ERR_REASON(PEM_R_EXPECTING_PUBLIC_KEY_BLOB),
"expecting public key blob"},
+ {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG), "header too long"},
{ERR_REASON(PEM_R_INCONSISTENT_HEADER), "inconsistent header"},
{ERR_REASON(PEM_R_KEYBLOB_HEADER_PARSE_ERROR),
"keyblob header parse error"},
diff --git a/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c b/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
index fe881d664171..c82b3c0ae263 100644
--- a/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
@@ -105,17 +105,23 @@ int PEM_def_callback(char *buf, int num, int w, void *key)
prompt = "Enter PEM pass phrase:";
for (;;) {
- i = EVP_read_pw_string_min(buf, MIN_LENGTH, num, prompt, w);
+ /*
+ * We assume that w == 0 means decryption,
+ * while w == 1 means encryption
+ */
+ int min_len = w ? MIN_LENGTH : 0;
+
+ i = EVP_read_pw_string_min(buf, min_len, num, prompt, w);
if (i != 0) {
PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_DEF_CALLBACK, PEM_R_PROBLEMS_GETTING_PASSWORD);
memset(buf, 0, (unsigned int)num);
return (-1);
}
j = strlen(buf);
- if (j < MIN_LENGTH) {
+ if (min_len && j < min_len) {
fprintf(stderr,
"phrase is too short, needs to be at least %d chars\n",
- MIN_LENGTH);
+ min_len);
} else
break;
}
@@ -387,7 +393,7 @@ int PEM_ASN1_write_bio(i2d_of_void *i2d, const char *name, BIO *bp,
}
RAND_add(data, i, 0); /* put in the RSA key. */
OPENSSL_assert(enc->iv_len <= (int)sizeof(iv));
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, enc->iv_len) < 0) /* Generate a salt */
+ if (RAND_bytes(iv, enc->iv_len) <= 0) /* Generate a salt */
goto err;
/*
* The 'iv' is used as the iv and as a salt. It is NOT taken from
diff --git a/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c b/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c
index 61864468f6d4..1ce5a1e319c5 100644
--- a/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c
+++ b/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c
@@ -127,6 +127,9 @@ static int read_lebn(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int nbyte, BIGNUM **r)
# define MS_KEYTYPE_KEYX 0x1
# define MS_KEYTYPE_SIGN 0x2
+/* Maximum length of a blob after header */
+# define BLOB_MAX_LENGTH 102400
+
/* The PVK file magic number: seems to spell out "bobsfile", who is Bob? */
# define MS_PVKMAGIC 0xb0b5f11eL
/* Salt length for PVK files */
@@ -272,6 +275,10 @@ static EVP_PKEY *do_b2i_bio(BIO *in, int ispub)
return NULL;
length = blob_length(bitlen, isdss, ispub);
+ if (length > BLOB_MAX_LENGTH) {
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_B2I_BIO, PEM_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG);
+ return NULL;
+ }
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(length);
if (!buf) {
PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_B2I_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
diff --git a/crypto/perlasm/sparcv9_modes.pl b/crypto/perlasm/sparcv9_modes.pl
index eb267a57ed81..ac8da328b00e 100755
--- a/crypto/perlasm/sparcv9_modes.pl
+++ b/crypto/perlasm/sparcv9_modes.pl
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ ${alg}${bits}_t4_cbc_encrypt:
save %sp, -$::frame, %sp
cmp $len, 0
be,pn $::size_t_cc, .L${bits}_cbc_enc_abort
+ srln $len, 0, $len ! needed on v8+, "nop" on v9
sub $inp, $out, $blk_init ! $inp!=$out
___
$::code.=<<___ if (!$::evp);
@@ -254,6 +255,7 @@ ${alg}${bits}_t4_cbc_decrypt:
save %sp, -$::frame, %sp
cmp $len, 0
be,pn $::size_t_cc, .L${bits}_cbc_dec_abort
+ srln $len, 0, $len ! needed on v8+, "nop" on v9
sub $inp, $out, $blk_init ! $inp!=$out
___
$::code.=<<___ if (!$::evp);
@@ -613,6 +615,7 @@ $::code.=<<___;
.align 32
${alg}${bits}_t4_ctr32_encrypt:
save %sp, -$::frame, %sp
+ srln $len, 0, $len ! needed on v8+, "nop" on v9
prefetch [$inp], 20
prefetch [$inp + 63], 20
@@ -916,6 +919,7 @@ $::code.=<<___;
.align 32
${alg}${bits}_t4_xts_${dir}crypt:
save %sp, -$::frame-16, %sp
+ srln $len, 0, $len ! needed on v8+, "nop" on v9
mov $ivec, %o0
add %fp, $::bias-16, %o1
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
index a9277827ff2d..cbf34da05ada 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ int PKCS12_setup_mac(PKCS12 *p12, int iter, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen,
}
p12->mac->salt->length = saltlen;
if (!salt) {
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p12->mac->salt->data, saltlen) < 0)
+ if (RAND_bytes(p12->mac->salt->data, saltlen) <= 0)
return 0;
} else
memcpy(p12->mac->salt->data, salt, saltlen);
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c
index a89b61abab37..9e8ebb2a78c3 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c
@@ -66,17 +66,18 @@
/* PKCS#12 password change routine */
-static int newpass_p12(PKCS12 *p12, char *oldpass, char *newpass);
-static int newpass_bags(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, char *oldpass,
- char *newpass);
-static int newpass_bag(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, char *oldpass, char *newpass);
+static int newpass_p12(PKCS12 *p12, const char *oldpass, const char *newpass);
+static int newpass_bags(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, const char *oldpass,
+ const char *newpass);
+static int newpass_bag(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *oldpass,
+ const char *newpass);
static int alg_get(X509_ALGOR *alg, int *pnid, int *piter, int *psaltlen);
/*
* Change the password on a PKCS#12 structure.
*/
-int PKCS12_newpass(PKCS12 *p12, char *oldpass, char *newpass)
+int PKCS12_newpass(PKCS12 *p12, const char *oldpass, const char *newpass)
{
/* Check for NULL PKCS12 structure */
@@ -103,20 +104,21 @@ int PKCS12_newpass(PKCS12 *p12, char *oldpass, char *newpass)
/* Parse the outer PKCS#12 structure */
-static int newpass_p12(PKCS12 *p12, char *oldpass, char *newpass)
+static int newpass_p12(PKCS12 *p12, const char *oldpass, const char *newpass)
{
- STACK_OF(PKCS7) *asafes, *newsafes;
- STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags;
+ STACK_OF(PKCS7) *asafes = NULL, *newsafes = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags = NULL;
int i, bagnid, pbe_nid = 0, pbe_iter = 0, pbe_saltlen = 0;
PKCS7 *p7, *p7new;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING *p12_data_tmp = NULL, *macnew = NULL;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *p12_data_tmp = NULL;
unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int maclen;
+ int rv = 0;
- if (!(asafes = PKCS12_unpack_authsafes(p12)))
- return 0;
- if (!(newsafes = sk_PKCS7_new_null()))
- return 0;
+ if ((asafes = PKCS12_unpack_authsafes(p12)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if ((newsafes = sk_PKCS7_new_null()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_num(asafes); i++) {
p7 = sk_PKCS7_value(asafes, i);
bagnid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
@@ -125,67 +127,57 @@ static int newpass_p12(PKCS12 *p12, char *oldpass, char *newpass)
} else if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {
bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(p7, oldpass, -1);
if (!alg_get(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm,
- &pbe_nid, &pbe_iter, &pbe_saltlen)) {
- sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
- bags = NULL;
- }
- } else
+ &pbe_nid, &pbe_iter, &pbe_saltlen))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
continue;
- if (!bags) {
- sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!newpass_bags(bags, oldpass, newpass)) {
- sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
- sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
- return 0;
}
+ if (bags == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!newpass_bags(bags, oldpass, newpass))
+ goto err;
/* Repack bag in same form with new password */
if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_data)
p7new = PKCS12_pack_p7data(bags);
else
p7new = PKCS12_pack_p7encdata(pbe_nid, newpass, -1, NULL,
pbe_saltlen, pbe_iter, bags);
+ if (!p7new || !sk_PKCS7_push(newsafes, p7new))
+ goto err;
sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
- if (!p7new) {
- sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
- return 0;
- }
- sk_PKCS7_push(newsafes, p7new);
+ bags = NULL;
}
- sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
/* Repack safe: save old safe in case of error */
p12_data_tmp = p12->authsafes->d.data;
- if (!(p12->authsafes->d.data = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()))
- goto saferr;
+ if ((p12->authsafes->d.data = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
if (!PKCS12_pack_authsafes(p12, newsafes))
- goto saferr;
-
+ goto err;
if (!PKCS12_gen_mac(p12, newpass, -1, mac, &maclen))
- goto saferr;
- if (!(macnew = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()))
- goto saferr;
- if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(macnew, mac, maclen))
- goto saferr;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(p12->mac->dinfo->digest);
- p12->mac->dinfo->digest = macnew;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(p12_data_tmp);
-
- return 1;
-
- saferr:
- /* Restore old safe */
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(p12->authsafes->d.data);
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(macnew);
- p12->authsafes->d.data = p12_data_tmp;
- return 0;
-
+ goto err;
+ if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(p12->mac->dinfo->digest, mac, maclen))
+ goto err;
+
+ rv = 1;
+
+err:
+ /* Restore old safe if necessary */
+ if (rv == 1) {
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(p12_data_tmp);
+ } else if (p12_data_tmp != NULL) {
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(p12->authsafes->d.data);
+ p12->authsafes->d.data = p12_data_tmp;
+ }
+ sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
+ sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
+ sk_PKCS7_pop_free(newsafes, PKCS7_free);
+ return rv;
}
-static int newpass_bags(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, char *oldpass,
- char *newpass)
+static int newpass_bags(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, const char *oldpass,
+ const char *newpass)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_num(bags); i++) {
@@ -197,7 +189,8 @@ static int newpass_bags(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, char *oldpass,
/* Change password of safebag: only needs handle shrouded keybags */
-static int newpass_bag(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, char *oldpass, char *newpass)
+static int newpass_bag(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *oldpass,
+ const char *newpass)
{
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8;
X509_SIG *p8new;
@@ -210,8 +203,10 @@ static int newpass_bag(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, char *oldpass, char *newpass)
return 0;
if (!alg_get(bag->value.shkeybag->algor, &p8_nid, &p8_iter, &p8_saltlen))
return 0;
- if (!(p8new = PKCS8_encrypt(p8_nid, NULL, newpass, -1, NULL, p8_saltlen,
- p8_iter, p8)))
+ p8new = PKCS8_encrypt(p8_nid, NULL, newpass, -1, NULL, p8_saltlen,
+ p8_iter, p8);
+ PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
+ if (p8new == NULL)
return 0;
X509_SIG_free(bag->value.shkeybag);
bag->value.shkeybag = p8new;
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_utl.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_utl.c
index a0b992eab66c..e466f762ffda 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_utl.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_utl.c
@@ -91,6 +91,10 @@ char *OPENSSL_uni2asc(unsigned char *uni, int unilen)
{
int asclen, i;
char *asctmp;
+
+ /* string must contain an even number of bytes */
+ if (unilen & 1)
+ return NULL;
asclen = unilen / 2;
/* If no terminating zero allow for one */
if (!unilen || uni[unilen - 1])
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/pkcs12.h b/crypto/pkcs12/pkcs12.h
index a39adf5eb52e..21f1f62b36c6 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs12/pkcs12.h
+++ b/crypto/pkcs12/pkcs12.h
@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ int i2d_PKCS12_bio(BIO *bp, PKCS12 *p12);
int i2d_PKCS12_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS12 *p12);
PKCS12 *d2i_PKCS12_bio(BIO *bp, PKCS12 **p12);
PKCS12 *d2i_PKCS12_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS12 **p12);
-int PKCS12_newpass(PKCS12 *p12, char *oldpass, char *newpass);
+int PKCS12_newpass(PKCS12 *p12, const char *oldpass, const char *newpass);
/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
/*
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
index 946aaa65435b..6cf8253bc238 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataInit(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(evp_cipher);
xalg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_CIPHER_type(evp_cipher));
if (ivlen > 0)
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0)
+ if (RAND_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0)
goto err;
if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, evp_cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1) <= 0)
goto err;
@@ -642,6 +642,8 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
} else {
# if 0
bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ if (bio == NULL)
+ goto err;
/*
* We need to set this so that when we have read all the data, the
* encrypt BIO, if present, will read EOF and encode the last few
diff --git a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
index 5c13d57765b0..bd76e23e3deb 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@
/* #define PREDICT 1 */
#define STATE_SIZE 1023
-static int state_num = 0, state_index = 0;
+static size_t state_num = 0, state_index = 0;
static unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
static unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
static long md_count[2] = { 0, 0 };
@@ -336,8 +336,8 @@ static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo, int lock)
{
static volatile int stirred_pool = 0;
- int i, j, k, st_num, st_idx;
- int num_ceil;
+ int i, j, k;
+ size_t num_ceil, st_idx, st_num;
int ok;
long md_c[2];
unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c b/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
index 266111edda8c..6c5b65da0070 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
rnd >>= 8;
}
RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), ENTROPY_NEEDED);
- memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, sizeof(buf));
return 1;
}
diff --git a/crypto/rand/randfile.c b/crypto/rand/randfile.c
index 9537c56a7895..728fd0a721b5 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/randfile.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/randfile.c
@@ -56,11 +56,6 @@
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
-/* We need to define this to get macros like S_IFBLK and S_IFCHR */
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
-# define _XOPEN_SOURCE 500
-#endif
-
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
@@ -80,6 +75,29 @@
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
# include <sys/stat.h>
# include <fcntl.h>
+/*
+ * Following should not be needed, and we could have been stricter
+ * and demand S_IS*. But some systems just don't comply... Formally
+ * below macros are "anatomically incorrect", because normally they
+ * would look like ((m) & MASK == TYPE), but since MASK availability
+ * is as questionable, we settle for this poor-man fallback...
+ */
+# if !defined(S_ISBLK)
+# if defined(_S_IFBLK)
+# define S_ISBLK(m) ((m) & _S_IFBLK)
+# elif defined(S_IFBLK)
+# define S_ISBLK(m) ((m) & S_IFBLK)
+# elif defined(_WIN32)
+# define S_ISBLK(m) 0 /* no concept of block devices on Windows */
+# endif
+# endif
+# if !defined(S_ISCHR)
+# if defined(_S_IFCHR)
+# define S_ISCHR(m) ((m) & _S_IFCHR)
+# elif defined(S_IFCHR)
+# define S_ISCHR(m) ((m) & S_IFCHR)
+# endif
+# endif
#endif
#ifdef _WIN32
@@ -93,7 +111,7 @@
#define BUFSIZE 1024
#define RAND_DATA 1024
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+#if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && (defined(__alpha) || defined(__ia64)))
/*
* This declaration is a nasty hack to get around vms' extension to fopen for
* passing in sharing options being disabled by our /STANDARD=ANSI89
@@ -122,7 +140,24 @@ int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long bytes)
struct stat sb;
#endif
int i, ret = 0, n;
+/*
+ * If setvbuf() is to be called, then the FILE pointer
+ * to it must be 32 bit.
+*/
+
+#if !defined OPENSSL_NO_SETVBUF_IONBF && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__VMS_VER) && (__VMS_VER >= 70000000)
+ /* For 64-bit-->32 bit API Support*/
+#if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
+#pragma __required_pointer_size __save
+#pragma __required_pointer_size 32
+#endif
+ FILE *in; /* setvbuf() requires 32-bit pointers */
+#if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
+#pragma __required_pointer_size __restore
+#endif
+#else
FILE *in;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VMS */
if (file == NULL)
return (0);
@@ -151,8 +186,8 @@ int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long bytes)
#endif
if (in == NULL)
goto err;
-#if defined(S_IFBLK) && defined(S_IFCHR) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO)
- if (sb.st_mode & (S_IFBLK | S_IFCHR)) {
+#if defined(S_ISBLK) && defined(S_ISCHR) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO)
+ if (S_ISBLK(sb.st_mode) || S_ISCHR(sb.st_mode)) {
/*
* this file is a device. we don't want read an infinite number of
* bytes from a random device, nor do we want to use buffered I/O
@@ -231,7 +266,7 @@ int RAND_write_file(const char *file)
}
#endif
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+#if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && (defined(__alpha) || defined(__ia64)))
/*
* VMS NOTE: Prior versions of this routine created a _new_ version of
* the rand file for each call into this routine, then deleted all
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
index 4e0621827cf3..951e1d5ca32b 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
@@ -68,10 +68,12 @@
#endif
#include "asn1_locl.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
static int rsa_cms_sign(CMS_SignerInfo *si);
static int rsa_cms_verify(CMS_SignerInfo *si);
static int rsa_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
static int rsa_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
+#endif
static int rsa_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
@@ -665,6 +667,7 @@ static int rsa_pss_to_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx,
return rv;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
static int rsa_cms_verify(CMS_SignerInfo *si)
{
int nid, nid2;
@@ -683,6 +686,7 @@ static int rsa_cms_verify(CMS_SignerInfo *si)
}
return 0;
}
+#endif
/*
* Customised RSA item verification routine. This is called when a signature
@@ -705,6 +709,7 @@ static int rsa_item_verify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn,
return -1;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
static int rsa_cms_sign(CMS_SignerInfo *si)
{
int pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
@@ -729,6 +734,7 @@ static int rsa_cms_sign(CMS_SignerInfo *si)
X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsassaPss), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os);
return 1;
}
+#endif
static int rsa_item_sign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn,
X509_ALGOR *alg1, X509_ALGOR *alg2,
@@ -785,6 +791,7 @@ static RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *rsa_oaep_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg,
return pss;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
static int rsa_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
{
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx;
@@ -920,6 +927,7 @@ static int rsa_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
ASN1_STRING_free(os);
return rv;
}
+#endif
const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD rsa_asn1_meths[] = {
{
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c
index 607faa00171e..475dfc56289a 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c
@@ -56,7 +56,6 @@ int RSA_check_key(const RSA *key)
{
BIGNUM *i, *j, *k, *l, *m;
BN_CTX *ctx;
- int r;
int ret = 1;
if (!key->p || !key->q || !key->n || !key->e || !key->d) {
@@ -70,75 +69,68 @@ int RSA_check_key(const RSA *key)
l = BN_new();
m = BN_new();
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- if (i == NULL || j == NULL || k == NULL || l == NULL ||
- m == NULL || ctx == NULL) {
+ if (i == NULL || j == NULL || k == NULL || l == NULL
+ || m == NULL || ctx == NULL) {
ret = -1;
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
+ if (BN_is_one(key->e)) {
+ ret = 0;
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+ }
+ if (!BN_is_odd(key->e)) {
+ ret = 0;
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+ }
+
/* p prime? */
- r = BN_is_prime_ex(key->p, BN_prime_checks, NULL, NULL);
- if (r != 1) {
- ret = r;
- if (r != 0)
- goto err;
+ if (BN_is_prime_ex(key->p, BN_prime_checks, NULL, NULL) != 1) {
+ ret = 0;
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME);
}
/* q prime? */
- r = BN_is_prime_ex(key->q, BN_prime_checks, NULL, NULL);
- if (r != 1) {
- ret = r;
- if (r != 0)
- goto err;
+ if (BN_is_prime_ex(key->q, BN_prime_checks, NULL, NULL) != 1) {
+ ret = 0;
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME);
}
/* n = p*q? */
- r = BN_mul(i, key->p, key->q, ctx);
- if (!r) {
+ if (!BN_mul(i, key->p, key->q, ctx)) {
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
-
if (BN_cmp(i, key->n) != 0) {
ret = 0;
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q);
}
/* d*e = 1 mod lcm(p-1,q-1)? */
-
- r = BN_sub(i, key->p, BN_value_one());
- if (!r) {
+ if (!BN_sub(i, key->p, BN_value_one())) {
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
- r = BN_sub(j, key->q, BN_value_one());
- if (!r) {
+ if (!BN_sub(j, key->q, BN_value_one())) {
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
/* now compute k = lcm(i,j) */
- r = BN_mul(l, i, j, ctx);
- if (!r) {
+ if (!BN_mul(l, i, j, ctx)) {
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
- r = BN_gcd(m, i, j, ctx);
- if (!r) {
+ if (!BN_gcd(m, i, j, ctx)) {
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
- r = BN_div(k, NULL, l, m, ctx); /* remainder is 0 */
- if (!r) {
+ if (!BN_div(k, NULL, l, m, ctx)) { /* remainder is 0 */
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
-
- r = BN_mod_mul(i, key->d, key->e, k, ctx);
- if (!r) {
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(i, key->d, key->e, k, ctx)) {
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
@@ -150,36 +142,28 @@ int RSA_check_key(const RSA *key)
if (key->dmp1 != NULL && key->dmq1 != NULL && key->iqmp != NULL) {
/* dmp1 = d mod (p-1)? */
- r = BN_sub(i, key->p, BN_value_one());
- if (!r) {
+ if (!BN_sub(i, key->p, BN_value_one())) {
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
-
- r = BN_mod(j, key->d, i, ctx);
- if (!r) {
+ if (!BN_mod(j, key->d, i, ctx)) {
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
-
if (BN_cmp(j, key->dmp1) != 0) {
ret = 0;
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, RSA_R_DMP1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D);
}
/* dmq1 = d mod (q-1)? */
- r = BN_sub(i, key->q, BN_value_one());
- if (!r) {
+ if (!BN_sub(i, key->q, BN_value_one())) {
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
-
- r = BN_mod(j, key->d, i, ctx);
- if (!r) {
+ if (!BN_mod(j, key->d, i, ctx)) {
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
-
if (BN_cmp(j, key->dmq1) != 0) {
ret = 0;
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, RSA_R_DMQ1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D);
@@ -190,7 +174,6 @@ int RSA_check_key(const RSA *key)
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
-
if (BN_cmp(i, key->iqmp) != 0) {
ret = 0;
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q);
@@ -198,17 +181,11 @@ int RSA_check_key(const RSA *key)
}
err:
- if (i != NULL)
- BN_free(i);
- if (j != NULL)
- BN_free(j);
- if (k != NULL)
- BN_free(k);
- if (l != NULL)
- BN_free(l);
- if (m != NULL)
- BN_free(m);
- if (ctx != NULL)
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- return (ret);
+ BN_free(i);
+ BN_free(j);
+ BN_free(k);
+ BN_free(l);
+ BN_free(m);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return ret;
}
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
index a6805debc890..6ea6b40dc6fd 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ RSA *RSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine)
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
+ memset(ret,0,sizeof(RSA));
ret->meth = RSA_get_default_method();
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
index 203635595f4c..94db87a0637d 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
@@ -545,8 +545,10 @@ static int pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP:
- if (!p2)
+ if (p2 == NULL || !BN_is_odd((BIGNUM *)p2) || BN_is_one((BIGNUM *)p2)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
return -2;
+ }
BN_free(rctx->pub_exp);
rctx->pub_exp = p2;
return 1;
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl
index 5f375fc6886b..752138b0eac1 100755
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl
@@ -372,9 +372,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
.align 16
.Loop_shaext:
dec $num
- lea 0x40($inp),%rax # next input block
+ lea 0x40($inp),%r8 # next input block
paddd @MSG[0],$E
- cmovne %rax,$inp
+ cmovne %r8,$inp
movdqa $ABCD,$ABCD_SAVE # offload $ABCD
___
for($i=0;$i<20-4;$i+=2) {
diff --git a/crypto/sparccpuid.S b/crypto/sparccpuid.S
index 7b12ec293154..51ba441440bb 100644
--- a/crypto/sparccpuid.S
+++ b/crypto/sparccpuid.S
@@ -429,6 +429,7 @@ OPENSSL_cleanse:
.size OPENSSL_cleanse,.-OPENSSL_cleanse
.global _sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus
+.weak _sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus
.align 8
_sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus:
mov %o1,%o3 ! save cnt
@@ -467,6 +468,7 @@ _sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus:
.size _sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus,.-_sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus
.global _sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus2
+.weak _sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus2
.align 8
_sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus2:
mov %o1,%o3 ! save cnt
diff --git a/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c b/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c
index e9a2e058f687..6df3b1cee72e 100644
--- a/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c
@@ -159,8 +159,7 @@ BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_server_key(BIGNUM *A, BIGNUM *v, BIGNUM *u, BIGNUM *b,
if (u == NULL || A == NULL || v == NULL || b == NULL || N == NULL)
return NULL;
- if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL ||
- (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL || (S = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL || (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
/* S = (A*v**u) ** b */
@@ -169,8 +168,12 @@ BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_server_key(BIGNUM *A, BIGNUM *v, BIGNUM *u, BIGNUM *b,
goto err;
if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, A, tmp, N, bn_ctx))
goto err;
- if (!BN_mod_exp(S, tmp, b, N, bn_ctx))
- goto err;
+
+ S = BN_new();
+ if (S != NULL && !BN_mod_exp(S, tmp, b, N, bn_ctx)) {
+ BN_free(S);
+ S = NULL;
+ }
err:
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
BN_clear_free(tmp);
@@ -267,7 +270,7 @@ BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_client_key(BIGNUM *N, BIGNUM *B, BIGNUM *g, BIGNUM *x,
if ((tmp = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(tmp2 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
- (tmp3 = BN_new()) == NULL || (K = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ (tmp3 = BN_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!BN_mod_exp(tmp, g, x, N, bn_ctx))
@@ -279,12 +282,15 @@ BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_client_key(BIGNUM *N, BIGNUM *B, BIGNUM *g, BIGNUM *x,
if (!BN_mod_sub(tmp, B, tmp2, N, bn_ctx))
goto err;
- if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp3, u, x, N, bn_ctx))
+ if (!BN_mul(tmp3, u, x, bn_ctx))
goto err;
- if (!BN_mod_add(tmp2, a, tmp3, N, bn_ctx))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_mod_exp(K, tmp, tmp2, N, bn_ctx))
+ if (!BN_add(tmp2, a, tmp3))
goto err;
+ K = BN_new();
+ if (K != NULL && !BN_mod_exp(K, tmp, tmp2, N, bn_ctx)) {
+ BN_free(K);
+ K = NULL;
+ }
err:
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
diff --git a/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c b/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
index 26ad3e07b4bb..a8ec52a4dadc 100644
--- a/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ static char b64table[] =
/*
* Convert a base64 string into raw byte array representation.
*/
-static int t_fromb64(unsigned char *a, const char *src)
+static int t_fromb64(unsigned char *a, size_t alen, const char *src)
{
char *loc;
int i, j;
@@ -89,6 +89,9 @@ static int t_fromb64(unsigned char *a, const char *src)
while (*src && (*src == ' ' || *src == '\t' || *src == '\n'))
++src;
size = strlen(src);
+ if (alen > INT_MAX || size > (int)alen)
+ return -1;
+
i = 0;
while (i < size) {
loc = strchr(b64table, src[i]);
@@ -231,13 +234,25 @@ static int SRP_user_pwd_set_sv(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const char *s,
unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN];
int len;
- if (strlen(s) > MAX_LEN || strlen(v) > MAX_LEN)
+ vinfo->v = NULL;
+ vinfo->s = NULL;
+
+ len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), v);
+ if (len < 0)
return 0;
- len = t_fromb64(tmp, v);
if (NULL == (vinfo->v = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL)))
return 0;
- len = t_fromb64(tmp, s);
- return ((vinfo->s = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL)) != NULL);
+ len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), s);
+ if (len < 0)
+ goto err;
+ vinfo->s = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL);
+ if (vinfo->s == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ BN_free(vinfo->v);
+ vinfo->v = NULL;
+ return 0;
}
static int SRP_user_pwd_set_sv_BN(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, BIGNUM *s, BIGNUM *v)
@@ -307,10 +322,13 @@ static SRP_gN_cache *SRP_gN_new_init(const char *ch)
if (newgN == NULL)
return NULL;
+ len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), ch);
+ if (len < 0)
+ goto err;
+
if ((newgN->b64_bn = BUF_strdup(ch)) == NULL)
goto err;
- len = t_fromb64(tmp, ch);
if ((newgN->bn = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL)))
return newgN;
@@ -544,7 +562,7 @@ SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)
if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(user, username, NULL))
goto err;
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) < 0)
+ if (RAND_bytes(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0)
goto err;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctxt);
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctxt, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
@@ -580,10 +598,10 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
goto err;
if (N) {
- if (!(len = t_fromb64(tmp, N)))
+ if (!(len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), N)))
goto err;
N_bn = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL);
- if (!(len = t_fromb64(tmp, g)))
+ if (!(len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), g)))
goto err;
g_bn = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL);
defgNid = "*";
@@ -597,12 +615,12 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
}
if (*salt == NULL) {
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) < 0)
+ if (RAND_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) <= 0)
goto err;
s = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL);
} else {
- if (!(len = t_fromb64(tmp2, *salt)))
+ if (!(len = t_fromb64(tmp2, sizeof(tmp2), *salt)))
goto err;
s = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, len, NULL);
}
@@ -635,7 +653,8 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
BN_free(N_bn);
BN_free(g_bn);
}
- OPENSSL_cleanse(vf, vfsize);
+ if (vf != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(vf, vfsize);
OPENSSL_free(vf);
BN_clear_free(s);
BN_clear_free(v);
@@ -670,7 +689,7 @@ int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
srp_bn_print(g);
if (*salt == NULL) {
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) < 0)
+ if (RAND_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) <= 0)
goto err;
salttmp = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL);
diff --git a/crypto/ts/ts.h b/crypto/ts/ts.h
index 16eccbb38d95..2daa1b2fb594 100644
--- a/crypto/ts/ts.h
+++ b/crypto/ts/ts.h
@@ -565,6 +565,9 @@ int TS_RESP_CTX_set_clock_precision_digits(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx,
/* At most we accept usec precision. */
# define TS_MAX_CLOCK_PRECISION_DIGITS 6
+/* Maximum status message length */
+# define TS_MAX_STATUS_LENGTH (1024 * 1024)
+
/* No flags are set by default. */
void TS_RESP_CTX_add_flags(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, int flags);
diff --git a/crypto/ts/ts_lib.c b/crypto/ts/ts_lib.c
index c51538a17f42..e0f106353723 100644
--- a/crypto/ts/ts_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/ts/ts_lib.c
@@ -90,9 +90,8 @@ int TS_OBJ_print_bio(BIO *bio, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj)
{
char obj_txt[128];
- int len = OBJ_obj2txt(obj_txt, sizeof(obj_txt), obj, 0);
- BIO_write(bio, obj_txt, len);
- BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1);
+ OBJ_obj2txt(obj_txt, sizeof(obj_txt), obj, 0);
+ BIO_printf(bio, "%s\n", obj_txt);
return 1;
}
diff --git a/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c b/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c
index 29aa5a497e89..7918236287f3 100644
--- a/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c
@@ -434,51 +434,58 @@ static int int_TS_RESP_verify_token(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx,
unsigned char *imprint = NULL;
unsigned imprint_len = 0;
int ret = 0;
+ int flags = ctx->flags;
+
+ /* Some options require us to also check the signature */
+ if (((flags & TS_VFY_SIGNER) && tsa_name != NULL)
+ || (flags & TS_VFY_TSA_NAME)) {
+ flags |= TS_VFY_SIGNATURE;
+ }
/* Verify the signature. */
- if ((ctx->flags & TS_VFY_SIGNATURE)
+ if ((flags & TS_VFY_SIGNATURE)
&& !TS_RESP_verify_signature(token, ctx->certs, ctx->store, &signer))
goto err;
/* Check version number of response. */
- if ((ctx->flags & TS_VFY_VERSION)
+ if ((flags & TS_VFY_VERSION)
&& TS_TST_INFO_get_version(tst_info) != 1) {
TSerr(TS_F_INT_TS_RESP_VERIFY_TOKEN, TS_R_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION);
goto err;
}
/* Check policies. */
- if ((ctx->flags & TS_VFY_POLICY)
+ if ((flags & TS_VFY_POLICY)
&& !TS_check_policy(ctx->policy, tst_info))
goto err;
/* Check message imprints. */
- if ((ctx->flags & TS_VFY_IMPRINT)
+ if ((flags & TS_VFY_IMPRINT)
&& !TS_check_imprints(ctx->md_alg, ctx->imprint, ctx->imprint_len,
tst_info))
goto err;
/* Compute and check message imprints. */
- if ((ctx->flags & TS_VFY_DATA)
+ if ((flags & TS_VFY_DATA)
&& (!TS_compute_imprint(ctx->data, tst_info,
&md_alg, &imprint, &imprint_len)
|| !TS_check_imprints(md_alg, imprint, imprint_len, tst_info)))
goto err;
/* Check nonces. */
- if ((ctx->flags & TS_VFY_NONCE)
+ if ((flags & TS_VFY_NONCE)
&& !TS_check_nonces(ctx->nonce, tst_info))
goto err;
/* Check whether TSA name and signer certificate match. */
- if ((ctx->flags & TS_VFY_SIGNER)
+ if ((flags & TS_VFY_SIGNER)
&& tsa_name && !TS_check_signer_name(tsa_name, signer)) {
TSerr(TS_F_INT_TS_RESP_VERIFY_TOKEN, TS_R_TSA_NAME_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
/* Check whether the TSA is the expected one. */
- if ((ctx->flags & TS_VFY_TSA_NAME)
+ if ((flags & TS_VFY_TSA_NAME)
&& !TS_check_signer_name(ctx->tsa_name, signer)) {
TSerr(TS_F_INT_TS_RESP_VERIFY_TOKEN, TS_R_TSA_UNTRUSTED);
goto err;
@@ -548,13 +555,15 @@ static int TS_check_status_info(TS_RESP *response)
static char *TS_get_status_text(STACK_OF(ASN1_UTF8STRING) *text)
{
int i;
- unsigned int length = 0;
+ int length = 0;
char *result = NULL;
char *p;
/* Determine length first. */
for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_num(text); ++i) {
ASN1_UTF8STRING *current = sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_value(text, i);
+ if (ASN1_STRING_length(current) > TS_MAX_STATUS_LENGTH - length - 1)
+ return NULL;
length += ASN1_STRING_length(current);
length += 1; /* separator character */
}
diff --git a/crypto/ui/ui_lib.c b/crypto/ui/ui_lib.c
index 2f580352ce8f..d25b4f37bd11 100644
--- a/crypto/ui/ui_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/ui/ui_lib.c
@@ -413,6 +413,8 @@ char *UI_construct_prompt(UI *ui, const char *object_desc,
len += sizeof(prompt3) - 1;
prompt = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1);
+ if (prompt == NULL)
+ return NULL;
BUF_strlcpy(prompt, prompt1, len + 1);
BUF_strlcat(prompt, object_desc, len + 1);
if (object_name) {
diff --git a/crypto/whrlpool/wp_dgst.c b/crypto/whrlpool/wp_dgst.c
index e33bb4f833b5..807d1c49b2d3 100644
--- a/crypto/whrlpool/wp_dgst.c
+++ b/crypto/whrlpool/wp_dgst.c
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
* input. This is done for perfomance.
*/
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include "wp_locl.h"
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <string.h>
@@ -237,7 +238,7 @@ int WHIRLPOOL_Final(unsigned char *md, WHIRLPOOL_CTX *c)
if (md) {
memcpy(md, c->H.c, WHIRLPOOL_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(c, sizeof(*c));
return (1);
}
return (0);
diff --git a/crypto/x509/by_dir.c b/crypto/x509/by_dir.c
index 9ee8f8d8597a..bbc3189381e5 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/by_dir.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/by_dir.c
@@ -401,6 +401,10 @@ static int get_cert_by_subject(X509_LOOKUP *xl, int type, X509_NAME *name,
}
if (!hent) {
hent = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BY_DIR_HASH));
+ if (hent == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_GET_CERT_BY_SUBJECT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto finish;
+ }
hent->hash = h;
hent->suffix = k;
if (!sk_BY_DIR_HASH_push(ent->hashes, hent)) {
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509.h b/crypto/x509/x509.h
index fc613ce63526..6fa28ebada46 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509.h
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509.h
@@ -1234,6 +1234,7 @@ int X509_TRUST_get_trust(X509_TRUST *xp);
* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
* made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
*/
+
void ERR_load_X509_strings(void);
/* Error codes for the X509 functions. */
@@ -1241,6 +1242,7 @@ void ERR_load_X509_strings(void);
/* Function codes. */
# define X509_F_ADD_CERT_DIR 100
# define X509_F_BY_FILE_CTRL 101
+# define X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS 106
# define X509_F_CHECK_POLICY 145
# define X509_F_DIR_CTRL 102
# define X509_F_GET_CERT_BY_SUBJECT 103
@@ -1322,7 +1324,7 @@ void ERR_load_X509_strings(void);
# define X509_R_WRONG_LOOKUP_TYPE 112
# define X509_R_WRONG_TYPE 122
-#ifdef __cplusplus
+# ifdef __cplusplus
}
-#endif
+# endif
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_att.c b/crypto/x509/x509_att.c
index bd59281f9dac..25010753078c 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_att.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_att.c
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ int X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_object(X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj)
int X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_data(X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr, int attrtype,
const void *data, int len)
{
- ASN1_TYPE *ttmp;
+ ASN1_TYPE *ttmp = NULL;
ASN1_STRING *stmp = NULL;
int atype = 0;
if (!attr)
@@ -324,20 +324,26 @@ int X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_data(X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr, int attrtype,
* least one value but some types use and zero length SET and require
* this.
*/
- if (attrtype == 0)
+ if (attrtype == 0) {
+ ASN1_STRING_free(stmp);
return 1;
+ }
if (!(ttmp = ASN1_TYPE_new()))
goto err;
if ((len == -1) && !(attrtype & MBSTRING_FLAG)) {
if (!ASN1_TYPE_set1(ttmp, attrtype, data))
goto err;
- } else
+ } else {
ASN1_TYPE_set(ttmp, atype, stmp);
+ stmp = NULL;
+ }
if (!sk_ASN1_TYPE_push(attr->value.set, ttmp))
goto err;
return 1;
err:
X509err(X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_SET1_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ASN1_TYPE_free(ttmp);
+ ASN1_STRING_free(stmp);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_err.c b/crypto/x509/x509_err.c
index 1e779fefd9c1..a2a8e1b08bb2 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_err.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_err.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* crypto/x509/x509_err.c */
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2012 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@
static ERR_STRING_DATA X509_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_FUNC(X509_F_ADD_CERT_DIR), "ADD_CERT_DIR"},
{ERR_FUNC(X509_F_BY_FILE_CTRL), "BY_FILE_CTRL"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS), "CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS"},
{ERR_FUNC(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY), "CHECK_POLICY"},
{ERR_FUNC(X509_F_DIR_CTRL), "DIR_CTRL"},
{ERR_FUNC(X509_F_GET_CERT_BY_SUBJECT), "GET_CERT_BY_SUBJECT"},
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_obj.c b/crypto/x509/x509_obj.c
index 3de3ac720411..0a839f3e54ce 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_obj.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_obj.c
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ char *X509_NAME_oneline(X509_NAME *a, char *buf, int len)
type == V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING ||
type == V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING ||
type == V_ASN1_TELETEXSTRING ||
- type == V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING || type == V_ASN1_IA5STRING) {
+ type == V_ASN1_IA5STRING) {
if (num > (int)sizeof(ebcdic_buf))
num = sizeof(ebcdic_buf);
ascii2ebcdic(ebcdic_buf, q, num);
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_r2x.c b/crypto/x509/x509_r2x.c
index 0ff439c99f1b..2879569ead41 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_r2x.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_r2x.c
@@ -70,10 +70,12 @@ X509 *X509_REQ_to_X509(X509_REQ *r, int days, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
X509 *ret = NULL;
X509_CINF *xi = NULL;
X509_NAME *xn;
+ EVP_PKEY *pubkey = NULL;
+ int res;
if ((ret = X509_new()) == NULL) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_REQ_TO_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
+ return NULL;
}
/* duplicate the request */
@@ -89,9 +91,9 @@ X509 *X509_REQ_to_X509(X509_REQ *r, int days, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
}
xn = X509_REQ_get_subject_name(r);
- if (X509_set_subject_name(ret, X509_NAME_dup(xn)) == 0)
+ if (X509_set_subject_name(ret, xn) == 0)
goto err;
- if (X509_set_issuer_name(ret, X509_NAME_dup(xn)) == 0)
+ if (X509_set_issuer_name(ret, xn) == 0)
goto err;
if (X509_gmtime_adj(xi->validity->notBefore, 0) == NULL)
@@ -100,9 +102,11 @@ X509 *X509_REQ_to_X509(X509_REQ *r, int days, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
NULL)
goto err;
- X509_set_pubkey(ret, X509_REQ_get_pubkey(r));
+ pubkey = X509_REQ_get_pubkey(r);
+ res = X509_set_pubkey(ret, pubkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
- if (!X509_sign(ret, pkey, EVP_md5()))
+ if (!res || !X509_sign(ret, pkey, EVP_md5()))
goto err;
if (0) {
err:
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c b/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c
index 3d46d3ff8366..35db09559133 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c
@@ -204,6 +204,13 @@ const char *X509_verify_cert_error_string(long n)
case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH:
return ("IP address mismatch");
+ case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL:
+ return ("Invalid certificate verification context");
+ case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP:
+ return ("Issuer certificate lookup error");
+ case X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION:
+ return ("proxy subject name violation");
+
default:
BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "error number %ld", n);
return (buf);
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index 4d34dbac9314..8334b3fcff7f 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -199,6 +199,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
return -1;
}
if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
@@ -207,6 +208,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
* cannot do another one.
*/
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
return -1;
}
@@ -219,6 +221,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
(!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
ok = -1;
goto err;
}
@@ -229,6 +232,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
&& (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
ok = -1;
goto err;
}
@@ -253,8 +257,10 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
*/
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) {
ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
- if (ok < 0)
+ if (ok < 0) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
goto err;
+ }
/*
* If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up
* again later.
@@ -271,6 +277,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
if (xtmp != NULL) {
if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
ok = -1;
goto err;
}
@@ -352,14 +359,17 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
break;
ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
- if (ok < 0)
+ if (ok < 0) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
goto err;
+ }
if (ok == 0)
break;
x = xtmp;
if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
X509_free(xtmp);
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
ok = -1;
goto err;
}
@@ -386,8 +396,10 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
while (j-- > 1) {
xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
- if (ok < 0)
+ if (ok < 0) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
goto err;
+ }
/* Check if we found an alternate chain */
if (ok > 0) {
/*
@@ -515,6 +527,10 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
sk_X509_free(sktmp);
if (chain_ss != NULL)
X509_free(chain_ss);
+
+ /* Safety net, error returns must set ctx->error */
+ if (ok <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK)
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
return ok;
}
@@ -697,13 +713,27 @@ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
* the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
*/
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
- if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
- ctx->error_depth = i;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- ok = cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto end;
+ /*
+ * RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint
+ * is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to
+ * the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length
+ * should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it.
+ *
+ * Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start
+ * with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC,
+ * and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally,
+ * increment proxy_path_length.
+ */
+ if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1) {
+ if (proxy_path_length > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ok = cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
+ }
+ proxy_path_length = x->ex_pcpathlen;
}
proxy_path_length++;
must_be_ca = 0;
@@ -726,6 +756,81 @@ static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
/* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
continue;
+
+ /*
+ * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the
+ * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry
+ * added.
+ * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4))
+ */
+ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
+ X509_NAME *tmpsubject = X509_get_subject_name(x);
+ X509_NAME *tmpissuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpentry = NULL;
+ int last_object_nid = 0;
+ int err = X509_V_OK;
+ int last_object_loc = X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) - 1;
+
+ /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */
+ if (last_object_loc < 1) {
+ err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
+ goto proxy_name_done;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as
+ * there is in issuer.
+ */
+ if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject)
+ != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer) + 1) {
+ err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
+ goto proxy_name_done;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a
+ * multivalued RDN
+ */
+ if (X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc)->set
+ == X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc - 1)->set) {
+ err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
+ goto proxy_name_done;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that
+ * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly
+ */
+ tmpsubject = X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject);
+ if (tmpsubject == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ tmpentry =
+ X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc);
+ last_object_nid =
+ OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry));
+
+ if (last_object_nid != NID_commonName
+ || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject, tmpissuer) != 0) {
+ err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
+ }
+
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry);
+ X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject);
+
+ proxy_name_done:
+ if (err != X509_V_OK) {
+ ctx->error = err;
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
/*
* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
* including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
@@ -736,12 +841,19 @@ static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
if (nc) {
rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
- if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
+ switch (rv) {
+ case X509_V_OK:
+ continue;
+ case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
+ ctx->error = rv;
+ return 0;
+ default:
ctx->error = rv;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
return 0;
+ break;
}
}
}
@@ -880,6 +992,8 @@ static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
ctx->current_reasons = 0;
+ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
+ return 1;
while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
/* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
@@ -1010,13 +1124,25 @@ static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
reasons = *preasons;
crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
-
- if (crl_score > best_score) {
- best_crl = crl;
- best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
- best_score = crl_score;
- best_reasons = reasons;
+ if (crl_score < best_score)
+ continue;
+ /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
+ if (crl_score == best_score) {
+ int day, sec;
+ if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(best_crl),
+ X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0)
+ continue;
+ /*
+ * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
+ * and |sec|.
+ */
+ if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0)
+ continue;
}
+ best_crl = crl;
+ best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
+ best_score = crl_score;
+ best_reasons = reasons;
}
if (best_crl) {
@@ -1630,6 +1756,7 @@ static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
if (ret == 0) {
X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
return 0;
}
/* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
@@ -1658,7 +1785,12 @@ static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
ctx->current_cert = NULL;
- ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
+ /*
+ * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
+ * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
+ * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
+ * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
+ */
if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
return 0;
}
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h
index 2663e1c0a362..50626826e0b9 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h
@@ -368,6 +368,7 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth);
# define X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION 47
# define X509_V_ERR_EXCLUDED_VIOLATION 48
# define X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX 49
+# define X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION 50
# define X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE 51
# define X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_SYNTAX 52
# define X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX 53
@@ -386,8 +387,12 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth);
# define X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH 63
# define X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH 64
-/* The application is not happy */
-# define X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION 50
+/* Caller error */
+# define X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL 65
+/* Issuer lookup error */
+# define X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP 66
+
+# define X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION 67
/* Certificate verify flags */
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509spki.c b/crypto/x509/x509spki.c
index 2df84ead9ef9..5ae5d30a3516 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509spki.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509spki.c
@@ -112,6 +112,8 @@ char *NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_encode(NETSCAPE_SPKI *spki)
der_spki = OPENSSL_malloc(der_len);
b64_str = OPENSSL_malloc(der_len * 2);
if (!der_spki || !b64_str) {
+ OPENSSL_free(der_spki);
+ OPENSSL_free(b64_str);
X509err(X509_F_NETSCAPE_SPKI_B64_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c
index 94cfed050910..1290dec9bb8c 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c
@@ -1211,6 +1211,11 @@ int v3_addr_subset(IPAddrBlocks *a, IPAddrBlocks *b)
/*
* Core code for RFC 3779 2.3 path validation.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 for success, 0 on error.
+ *
+ * When returning 0, ctx->error MUST be set to an appropriate value other than
+ * X509_V_OK.
*/
static int v3_addr_validate_path_internal(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
@@ -1245,6 +1250,7 @@ static int v3_addr_validate_path_internal(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
if ((child = sk_IPAddressFamily_dup(ext)) == NULL) {
X509V3err(X509V3_F_V3_ADDR_VALIDATE_PATH_INTERNAL,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
ret = 0;
goto done;
}
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c
index 22ec202846ec..7f1e71dd1a42 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c
@@ -573,6 +573,8 @@ static int do_othername(GENERAL_NAME *gen, char *value, X509V3_CTX *ctx)
return 0;
objlen = p - value;
objtmp = OPENSSL_malloc(objlen + 1);
+ if (objtmp == NULL)
+ return 0;
strncpy(objtmp, value, objlen);
objtmp[objlen] = 0;
gen->d.otherName->type_id = OBJ_txt2obj(objtmp, 0);
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_conf.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_conf.c
index eeff8bd18502..c1b4c1a89f74 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_conf.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_conf.c
@@ -135,11 +135,13 @@ static X509_EXTENSION *do_ext_nconf(CONF *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, int ext_nid,
nval = NCONF_get_section(conf, value + 1);
else
nval = X509V3_parse_list(value);
- if (sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval) <= 0) {
+ if (nval == NULL || sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval) <= 0) {
X509V3err(X509V3_F_DO_EXT_NCONF,
X509V3_R_INVALID_EXTENSION_STRING);
ERR_add_error_data(4, "name=", OBJ_nid2sn(ext_nid), ",section=",
value);
+ if (*value != '@')
+ sk_CONF_VALUE_free(nval);
return NULL;
}
ext_struc = method->v2i(method, ctx, nval);