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-rw-r--r--crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c478
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 478 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c b/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 16d4f59b9ba9..000000000000
--- a/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,478 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c */
-/*
- * Written by Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include "ecs_locl.h"
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-
-static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
- const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
- EC_KEY *eckey);
-static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
- BIGNUM **rp);
-static int ecdsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
- const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey);
-
-static ECDSA_METHOD openssl_ecdsa_meth = {
- "OpenSSL ECDSA method",
- ecdsa_do_sign,
- ecdsa_sign_setup,
- ecdsa_do_verify,
-#if 0
- NULL, /* init */
- NULL, /* finish */
-#endif
- 0, /* flags */
- NULL /* app_data */
-};
-
-const ECDSA_METHOD *ECDSA_OpenSSL(void)
-{
- return &openssl_ecdsa_meth;
-}
-
-static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
- BIGNUM **rp)
-{
- BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- BIGNUM *k = NULL, *r = NULL, *order = NULL, *X = NULL;
- EC_POINT *tmp_point = NULL;
- const EC_GROUP *group;
- int ret = 0;
- int order_bits;
-
- if (eckey == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (ctx_in == NULL) {
- if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- } else
- ctx = ctx_in;
-
- k = BN_new(); /* this value is later returned in *kinvp */
- r = BN_new(); /* this value is later returned in *rp */
- order = BN_new();
- X = BN_new();
- if (!k || !r || !order || !X) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- if ((tmp_point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx)) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Preallocate space */
- order_bits = BN_num_bits(order);
- if (!BN_set_bit(k, order_bits)
- || !BN_set_bit(r, order_bits)
- || !BN_set_bit(X, order_bits))
- goto err;
-
- do {
- /* get random k */
- do
- if (!BN_rand_range(k, order)) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP,
- ECDSA_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
- while (BN_is_zero(k)) ;
-
- /*
- * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we
- * compute G*k using an equivalent scalar of fixed bit-length.
- *
- * We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent a
- * small timing information leakage. We then choose the sum that is
- * one bit longer than the order. This guarantees the code
- * path used in the constant time implementations elsewhere.
- *
- * TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic
- * conditional copy.
- */
- if (!BN_add(r, k, order)
- || !BN_add(X, r, order)
- || !BN_copy(k, BN_num_bits(r) > order_bits ? r : X))
- goto err;
-
- /* compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k */
- if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) ==
- NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
- if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp
- (group, tmp_point, X, NULL, ctx)) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
- else { /* NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */
-
- if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group,
- tmp_point, X, NULL,
- ctx)) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-#endif
- if (!BN_nnmod(r, X, order, ctx)) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- while (BN_is_zero(r));
-
- /* compute the inverse of k */
- if (EC_GROUP_get_mont_data(group) != NULL) {
- /*
- * We want inverse in constant time, therefore we utilize the fact
- * order must be prime and use Fermats Little Theorem instead.
- */
- if (!BN_set_word(X, 2)) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!BN_mod_sub(X, order, X, order, ctx)) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- BN_set_flags(X, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime
- (k, k, X, order, ctx, EC_GROUP_get_mont_data(group))) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- if (!BN_mod_inverse(k, k, order, ctx)) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- /* clear old values if necessary */
- if (*rp != NULL)
- BN_clear_free(*rp);
- if (*kinvp != NULL)
- BN_clear_free(*kinvp);
- /* save the pre-computed values */
- *rp = r;
- *kinvp = k;
- ret = 1;
- err:
- if (!ret) {
- if (k != NULL)
- BN_clear_free(k);
- if (r != NULL)
- BN_clear_free(r);
- }
- if (ctx_in == NULL)
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- if (order != NULL)
- BN_free(order);
- if (tmp_point != NULL)
- EC_POINT_free(tmp_point);
- if (X)
- BN_clear_free(X);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
- const BIGNUM *in_kinv, const BIGNUM *in_r,
- EC_KEY *eckey)
-{
- int ok = 0, i;
- BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *s, *m = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *order = NULL;
- const BIGNUM *ckinv;
- BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- const EC_GROUP *group;
- ECDSA_SIG *ret;
- ECDSA_DATA *ecdsa;
- const BIGNUM *priv_key;
-
- ecdsa = ecdsa_check(eckey);
- group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey);
- priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(eckey);
-
- if (group == NULL || priv_key == NULL || ecdsa == NULL) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- ret = ECDSA_SIG_new();
- if (!ret) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
- }
- s = ret->s;
-
- if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL || (order = BN_new()) == NULL ||
- (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL || (m = BN_new()) == NULL) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx)) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- i = BN_num_bits(order);
- /*
- * Need to truncate digest if it is too long: first truncate whole bytes.
- */
- if (8 * dgst_len > i)
- dgst_len = (i + 7) / 8;
- if (!BN_bin2bn(dgst, dgst_len, m)) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- /* If still too long truncate remaining bits with a shift */
- if ((8 * dgst_len > i) && !BN_rshift(m, m, 8 - (i & 0x7))) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- do {
- if (in_kinv == NULL || in_r == NULL) {
- if (!ECDSA_sign_setup(eckey, ctx, &kinv, &ret->r)) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- ckinv = kinv;
- } else {
- ckinv = in_kinv;
- if (BN_copy(ret->r, in_r) == NULL) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, priv_key, ret->r, order, ctx)) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!BN_mod_add_quick(s, tmp, m, order)) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, ckinv, order, ctx)) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (BN_is_zero(s)) {
- /*
- * if kinv and r have been supplied by the caller don't to
- * generate new kinv and r values
- */
- if (in_kinv != NULL && in_r != NULL) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN,
- ECDSA_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES);
- goto err;
- }
- } else
- /* s != 0 => we have a valid signature */
- break;
- }
- while (1);
-
- ok = 1;
- err:
- if (!ok) {
- ECDSA_SIG_free(ret);
- ret = NULL;
- }
- if (ctx)
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- if (m)
- BN_clear_free(m);
- if (tmp)
- BN_clear_free(tmp);
- if (order)
- BN_free(order);
- if (kinv)
- BN_clear_free(kinv);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int ecdsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
- const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey)
-{
- int ret = -1, i;
- BN_CTX *ctx;
- BIGNUM *order, *u1, *u2, *m, *X;
- EC_POINT *point = NULL;
- const EC_GROUP *group;
- const EC_POINT *pub_key;
-
- /* check input values */
- if (eckey == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL ||
- (pub_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(eckey)) == NULL || sig == NULL) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ECDSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
- return -1;
- }
-
- ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- if (!ctx) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return -1;
- }
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- order = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- u1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- u2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- m = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- X = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- if (!X) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx)) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || BN_is_negative(sig->r) ||
- BN_ucmp(sig->r, order) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(sig->s) ||
- BN_is_negative(sig->s) || BN_ucmp(sig->s, order) >= 0) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ECDSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- ret = 0; /* signature is invalid */
- goto err;
- }
- /* calculate tmp1 = inv(S) mod order */
- if (!BN_mod_inverse(u2, sig->s, order, ctx)) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- /* digest -> m */
- i = BN_num_bits(order);
- /*
- * Need to truncate digest if it is too long: first truncate whole bytes.
- */
- if (8 * dgst_len > i)
- dgst_len = (i + 7) / 8;
- if (!BN_bin2bn(dgst, dgst_len, m)) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- /* If still too long truncate remaining bits with a shift */
- if ((8 * dgst_len > i) && !BN_rshift(m, m, 8 - (i & 0x7))) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- /* u1 = m * tmp mod order */
- if (!BN_mod_mul(u1, m, u2, order, ctx)) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- /* u2 = r * w mod q */
- if (!BN_mod_mul(u2, sig->r, u2, order, ctx)) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, point, u1, pub_key, u2, ctx)) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) ==
- NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
- if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, X, NULL, ctx)) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
- else { /* NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */
-
- if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, point, X, NULL, ctx)) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-#endif
- if (!BN_nnmod(u1, X, order, ctx)) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- /* if the signature is correct u1 is equal to sig->r */
- ret = (BN_ucmp(u1, sig->r) == 0);
- err:
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- if (point)
- EC_POINT_free(point);
- return ret;
-}