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+NTP 4.2.8p9 (Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>, 2016/11/21)
+
+Focus: Security, Bug fixes, enhancements.
+
+Severity: HIGH
+
+In addition to bug fixes and enhancements, this release fixes the
+following 1 high- (Windows only), 2 medium-, 2 medium-/low, and
+5 low-severity vulnerabilities, and provides 28 other non-security
+fixes and improvements:
+
+* Trap crash
+ Date Resolved: 21 November 2016; Dev (4.3.94) 21 November 2016
+ References: Sec 3119 / CVE-2016-9311 / VU#633847
+ Affects: ntp-4.0.90 (21 July 1999), possibly earlier, up to but not
+ including 4.2.8p9, and ntp-4.3.0 up to but not including ntp-4.3.94.
+ CVSS2: MED 4.9 (AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C)
+ CVSS3: MED 4.4 CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
+ Summary:
+ ntpd does not enable trap service by default. If trap service
+ has been explicitly enabled, an attacker can send a specially
+ crafted packet to cause a null pointer dereference that will
+ crash ntpd, resulting in a denial of service.
+ Mitigation:
+ Implement BCP-38.
+ Use "restrict default noquery ..." in your ntp.conf file. Only
+ allow mode 6 queries from trusted networks and hosts.
+ Upgrade to 4.2.8p9, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
+ or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
+ Properly monitor your ntpd instances, and auto-restart ntpd
+ (without -g) if it stops running.
+ Credit: This weakness was discovered by Matthew Van Gundy of Cisco.
+
+* Mode 6 information disclosure and DDoS vector
+ Date Resolved: 21 November 2016; Dev (4.3.94) 21 November 2016
+ References: Sec 3118 / CVE-2016-9310 / VU#633847
+ Affects: ntp-4.0.90 (21 July 1999), possibly earlier, up to but not
+ including 4.2.8p9, and ntp-4.3.0 up to but not including ntp-4.3.94.
+ CVSS2: MED 6.4 (AV:A/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P)
+ CVSS3: MED 6.5 CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
+ Summary:
+ An exploitable configuration modification vulnerability exists
+ in the control mode (mode 6) functionality of ntpd. If, against
+ long-standing BCP recommendations, "restrict default noquery ..."
+ is not specified, a specially crafted control mode packet can set
+ ntpd traps, providing information disclosure and DDoS
+ amplification, and unset ntpd traps, disabling legitimate
+ monitoring. A remote, unauthenticated, network attacker can
+ trigger this vulnerability.
+ Mitigation:
+ Implement BCP-38.
+ Use "restrict default noquery ..." in your ntp.conf file.
+ Upgrade to 4.2.8p9, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
+ or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
+ Properly monitor your ntpd instances, and auto-restart ntpd
+ (without -g) if it stops running.
+ Credit: This weakness was discovered by Matthew Van Gundy of Cisco.
+
+* Broadcast Mode Replay Prevention DoS
+ Date Resolved: 21 November 2016; Dev (4.3.94) 21 November 2016
+ References: Sec 3114 / CVE-2016-7427 / VU#633847
+ Affects: ntp-4.2.8p6, up to but not including ntp-4.2.8p9, and
+ ntp-4.3.90 up to, but not including ntp-4.3.94.
+ CVSS2: LOW 3.3 (AV:A/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P)
+ CVSS3: MED 4.3 CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
+ Summary:
+ The broadcast mode of NTP is expected to only be used in a
+ trusted network. If the broadcast network is accessible to an
+ attacker, a potentially exploitable denial of service
+ vulnerability in ntpd's broadcast mode replay prevention
+ functionality can be abused. An attacker with access to the NTP
+ broadcast domain can periodically inject specially crafted
+ broadcast mode NTP packets into the broadcast domain which,
+ while being logged by ntpd, can cause ntpd to reject broadcast
+ mode packets from legitimate NTP broadcast servers.
+ Mitigation:
+ Implement BCP-38.
+ Upgrade to 4.2.8p9, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
+ or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
+ Properly monitor your ntpd instances, and auto-restart ntpd
+ (without -g) if it stops running.
+ Credit: This weakness was discovered by Matthew Van Gundy of Cisco.
+
+* Broadcast Mode Poll Interval Enforcement DoS
+ Date Resolved: 21 November 2016; Dev (4.3.94) 21 November 2016
+ References: Sec 3113 / CVE-2016-7428 / VU#633847
+ Affects: ntp-4.2.8p6, up to but not including ntp-4.2.8p9, and
+ ntp-4.3.90 up to, but not including ntp-4.3.94
+ CVSS2: LOW 3.3 (AV:A/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P)
+ CVSS3: MED 4.3 CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
+ Summary:
+ The broadcast mode of NTP is expected to only be used in a
+ trusted network. If the broadcast network is accessible to an
+ attacker, a potentially exploitable denial of service
+ vulnerability in ntpd's broadcast mode poll interval enforcement
+ functionality can be abused. To limit abuse, ntpd restricts the
+ rate at which each broadcast association will process incoming
+ packets. ntpd will reject broadcast mode packets that arrive
+ before the poll interval specified in the preceding broadcast
+ packet expires. An attacker with access to the NTP broadcast
+ domain can send specially crafted broadcast mode NTP packets to
+ the broadcast domain which, while being logged by ntpd, will
+ cause ntpd to reject broadcast mode packets from legitimate NTP
+ broadcast servers.
+ Mitigation:
+ Implement BCP-38.
+ Upgrade to 4.2.8p9, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
+ or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
+ Properly monitor your ntpd instances, and auto-restart ntpd
+ (without -g) if it stops running.
+ Credit: This weakness was discovered by Matthew Van Gundy of Cisco.
+
+* Windows: ntpd DoS by oversized UDP packet
+ Date Resolved: 21 November 2016; Dev (4.3.94) 21 November 2016
+ References: Sec 3110 / CVE-2016-9312 / VU#633847
+ Affects Windows only: ntp-4.?.?, up to but not including ntp-4.2.8p9,
+ and ntp-4.3.0 up to, but not including ntp-4.3.94.
+ CVSS2: HIGH 7.8 (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C)
+ CVSS3: HIGH 7.5 CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
+ Summary:
+ If a vulnerable instance of ntpd on Windows receives a crafted
+ malicious packet that is "too big", ntpd will stop working.
+ Mitigation:
+ Implement BCP-38.
+ Upgrade to 4.2.8p9, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
+ or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
+ Properly monitor your ntpd instances, and auto-restart ntpd
+ (without -g) if it stops running.
+ Credit: This weakness was discovered by Robert Pajak of ABB.
+
+* 0rigin (zero origin) issues
+ Date Resolved: 21 November 2016; Dev (4.3.94) 21 November 2016
+ References: Sec 3102 / CVE-2016-7431 / VU#633847
+ Affects: ntp-4.2.8p8, and ntp-4.3.93.
+ CVSS2: MED 5.0 (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N)
+ CVSS3: MED 5.3 CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
+ Summary:
+ Zero Origin timestamp problems were fixed by Bug 2945 in
+ ntp-4.2.8p6. However, subsequent timestamp validation checks
+ introduced a regression in the handling of some Zero origin
+ timestamp checks.
+ Mitigation:
+ Implement BCP-38.
+ Upgrade to 4.2.8p9, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
+ or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
+ Properly monitor your ntpd instances, and auto-restart ntpd
+ (without -g) if it stops running.
+ Credit: This weakness was discovered by Sharon Goldberg and Aanchal
+ Malhotra of Boston University.
+
+* read_mru_list() does inadequate incoming packet checks
+ Date Resolved: 21 November 2016; Dev (4.3.94) 21 November 2016
+ References: Sec 3082 / CVE-2016-7434 / VU#633847
+ Affects: ntp-4.2.7p22, up to but not including ntp-4.2.8p9, and
+ ntp-4.3.0 up to, but not including ntp-4.3.94.
+ CVSS2: LOW 3.8 (AV:L/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C)
+ CVSS3: LOW 3.8 CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
+ Summary:
+ If ntpd is configured to allow mrulist query requests from a
+ server that sends a crafted malicious packet, ntpd will crash
+ on receipt of that crafted malicious mrulist query packet.
+ Mitigation:
+ Only allow mrulist query packets from trusted hosts.
+ Implement BCP-38.
+ Upgrade to 4.2.8p9, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
+ or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
+ Properly monitor your ntpd instances, and auto-restart ntpd
+ (without -g) if it stops running.
+ Credit: This weakness was discovered by Magnus Stubman.
+
+* Attack on interface selection
+ Date Resolved: 21 November 2016; Dev (4.3.94) 21 November 2016
+ References: Sec 3072 / CVE-2016-7429 / VU#633847
+ Affects: ntp-4.2.7p385, up to but not including ntp-4.2.8p9, and
+ ntp-4.3.0 up to, but not including ntp-4.3.94
+ CVSS2: LOW 1.0 (AV:L/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:P)
+ CVSS3: LOW 1.6 CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
+ Summary:
+ When ntpd receives a server response on a socket that corresponds
+ to a different interface than was used for the request, the peer
+ structure is updated to use the interface for new requests. If
+ ntpd is running on a host with multiple interfaces in separate
+ networks and the operating system doesn't check source address in
+ received packets (e.g. rp_filter on Linux is set to 0), an
+ attacker that knows the address of the source can send a packet
+ with spoofed source address which will cause ntpd to select wrong
+ interface for the source and prevent it from sending new requests
+ until the list of interfaces is refreshed, which happens on
+ routing changes or every 5 minutes by default. If the attack is
+ repeated often enough (once per second), ntpd will not be able to
+ synchronize with the source.
+ Mitigation:
+ Implement BCP-38.
+ Upgrade to 4.2.8p9, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
+ or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
+ If you are going to configure your OS to disable source address
+ checks, also configure your firewall configuration to control
+ what interfaces can receive packets from what networks.
+ Properly monitor your ntpd instances, and auto-restart ntpd
+ (without -g) if it stops running.
+ Credit: This weakness was discovered by Miroslav Lichvar of Red Hat.
+
+* Client rate limiting and server responses
+ Date Resolved: 21 November 2016; Dev (4.3.94) 21 November 2016
+ References: Sec 3071 / CVE-2016-7426 / VU#633847
+ Affects: ntp-4.2.5p203, up to but not including ntp-4.2.8p9, and
+ ntp-4.3.0 up to, but not including ntp-4.3.94
+ CVSS2: LOW 1.0 (AV:L/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:P)
+ CVSS3: LOW 1.6 CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
+ Summary:
+ When ntpd is configured with rate limiting for all associations
+ (restrict default limited in ntp.conf), the limits are applied
+ also to responses received from its configured sources. An
+ attacker who knows the sources (e.g., from an IPv4 refid in
+ server response) and knows the system is (mis)configured in this
+ way can periodically send packets with spoofed source address to
+ keep the rate limiting activated and prevent ntpd from accepting
+ valid responses from its sources.
+
+ While this blanket rate limiting can be useful to prevent
+ brute-force attacks on the origin timestamp, it allows this DoS
+ attack. Similarly, it allows the attacker to prevent mobilization
+ of ephemeral associations.
+ Mitigation:
+ Implement BCP-38.
+ Upgrade to 4.2.8p9, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
+ or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
+ Properly monitor your ntpd instances, and auto-restart ntpd
+ (without -g) if it stops running.
+ Credit: This weakness was discovered by Miroslav Lichvar of Red Hat.
+
+* Fix for bug 2085 broke initial sync calculations
+ Date Resolved: 21 November 2016; Dev (4.3.94) 21 November 2016
+ References: Sec 3067 / CVE-2016-7433 / VU#633847
+ Affects: ntp-4.2.7p385, up to but not including ntp-4.2.8p9, and
+ ntp-4.3.0 up to, but not including ntp-4.3.94. But the
+ root-distance calculation in general is incorrect in all versions
+ of ntp-4 until this release.
+ CVSS2: LOW 1.2 (AV:L/AC:H/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P)
+ CVSS3: LOW 1.6 CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
+ Summary:
+ Bug 2085 described a condition where the root delay was included
+ twice, causing the jitter value to be higher than expected. Due
+ to a misinterpretation of a small-print variable in The Book, the
+ fix for this problem was incorrect, resulting in a root distance
+ that did not include the peer dispersion. The calculations and
+ formulae have been reviewed and reconciled, and the code has been
+ updated accordingly.
+ Mitigation:
+ Upgrade to 4.2.8p9, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
+ or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
+ Properly monitor your ntpd instances, and auto-restart ntpd
+ (without -g) if it stops running.
+ Credit: This weakness was discovered independently by Brian Utterback of
+ Oracle, and Sharon Goldberg and Aanchal Malhotra of Boston University.
+
+Other fixes:
+
+* [Bug 3142] bug in netmask prefix length detection <perlinger@ntp.org>
+* [Bug 3138] gpsdjson refclock should honor fudgetime1. stenn@ntp.org
+* [Bug 3129] Unknown hosts can put resolver thread into a hard loop
+ - moved retry decision where it belongs. <perlinger@ntp.org>
+* [Bug 3125] NTPD doesn't fully start when ntp.conf entries are out of order
+ using the loopback-ppsapi-provider.dll <perlinger@ntp.org>
+* [Bug 3116] unit tests for NTP time stamp expansion. <perlinger@ntp.org>
+* [Bug 3100] ntpq can't retrieve daemon_version <perlinger@ntp.org>
+ - fixed extended sysvar lookup (bug introduced with bug 3008 fix)
+* [Bug 3095] Compatibility with openssl 1.1 <perlinger@ntp.org>
+ - applied patches by Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> to source
+ - added shim layer for SSL API calls with issues (both directions)
+* [Bug 3089] Serial Parser does not work anymore for hopfser like device
+ - simplified / refactored hex-decoding in driver. <perlinger@ntp.org>
+* [Bug 3084] update-leap mis-parses the leapfile name. HStenn.
+* [Bug 3068] Linker warnings when building on Solaris. perlinger@ntp.org
+ - applied patch thanks to Andrew Stormont <andyjstormont@gmail.com>
+* [Bug 3067] Root distance calculation needs improvement. HStenn
+* [Bug 3066] NMEA clock ignores pps. perlinger@ntp.org
+ - PPS-HACK works again.
+* [Bug 3059] Potential buffer overrun from oversized hash <perlinger@ntp.org>
+ - applied patch by Brian Utterback <brian.utterback@oracle.com>
+* [Bug 3053] ntp_loopfilter.c frequency calc precedence error. Sarah White.
+* [Bug 3050] Fix for bug #2960 causes [...] spurious error message.
+ <perlinger@ntp.org>
+ - patches by Reinhard Max <max@suse.com> and Havard Eidnes <he@uninett.no>
+* [Bug 3047] Fix refclock_jjy C-DEX JST2000. abe@ntp.org
+ - Patch provided by Kuramatsu.
+* [Bug 3021] unity_fixture.c needs pragma weak <perlinger@ntp.org>
+ - removed unnecessary & harmful decls of 'setUp()' & 'tearDown()'
+* [Bug 3019] Windows: ERROR_HOST_UNREACHABLE block packet processing. DMayer
+* [Bug 2998] sntp/tests/packetProcessing.c broken without openssl. JPerlinger
+* [Bug 2961] sntp/tests/packetProcessing.c assumes AUTOKEY. HStenn.
+* [Bug 2959] refclock_jupiter: gps week correction <perlinger@ntp.org>
+ - fixed GPS week expansion to work based on build date. Special thanks
+ to Craig Leres for initial patch and testing.
+* [Bug 2951] ntpd tests fail: multiple definition of `send_via_ntp_signd'
+ - fixed Makefile.am <perlinger@ntp.org>
+* [Bug 2689] ATOM driver processes last PPS pulse at startup,
+ even if it is very old <perlinger@ntp.org>
+ - make sure PPS source is alive before processing samples
+ - improve stability close to the 500ms phase jump (phase gate)
+* Fix typos in include/ntp.h.
+* Shim X509_get_signature_nid() if needed
+* git author attribution cleanup
+* bk ignore file cleanup
+* remove locks in Windows IO, use rpc-like thread synchronisation instead
+
+---
NTP 4.2.8p8 (Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>, 2016/06/02)
Focus: Security, Bug fixes, enhancements.