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-rw-r--r--ACKNOWLEDGMENTS32
-rw-r--r--CHANGES48
-rwxr-xr-xConfigure33
-rw-r--r--FREEBSD-upgrade4
-rw-r--r--INSTALL8
-rw-r--r--LICENSE2
-rw-r--r--Makefile40
-rw-r--r--Makefile.org38
-rw-r--r--NEWS5
-rw-r--r--README13
-rw-r--r--apps/engine.c2
-rw-r--r--apps/ocsp.c2
-rw-r--r--apps/pkcs12.c42
-rw-r--r--apps/pkeyutl.c38
-rw-r--r--apps/s_client.c2
-rw-r--r--apps/s_server.c2
-rw-r--r--apps/speed.c2
-rw-r--r--apps/x509.c7
-rw-r--r--crypto/aes/aes.h2
-rw-r--r--crypto/aes/aes_cbc.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/aes/aes_cfb.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/aes/aes_core.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/aes/aes_ctr.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/aes/aes_ecb.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/aes/aes_ige.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/aes/aes_locl.h2
-rw-r--r--crypto/aes/aes_misc.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/aes/aes_ofb.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/aes/aes_x86core.c2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/aes/asm/aesni-mb-x86_64.pl2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl2
-rw-r--r--crypto/bio/bio.h8
-rw-r--r--crypto/bio/bss_bio.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/bio/bss_conn.c31
-rw-r--r--crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl2
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_exp.c41
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/exptest.c82
-rw-r--r--crypto/camellia/camellia.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/camellia/camellia.h2
-rw-r--r--crypto/camellia/cmll_cbc.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/camellia/cmll_cfb.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/camellia/cmll_ctr.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/camellia/cmll_ecb.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/camellia/cmll_locl.h2
-rw-r--r--crypto/camellia/cmll_misc.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/camellia/cmll_ofb.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/camellia/cmll_utl.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/des/des_old.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/des/des_old.h2
-rw-r--r--crypto/des/des_old2.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/dh/dh.h1
-rw-r--r--crypto/dh/dh_check.c35
-rw-r--r--crypto/dh/dhtest.c85
-rw-r--r--crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c8
-rw-r--r--crypto/dso/dso.h2
-rw-r--r--crypto/dso/dso_dl.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/dso/dso_lib.c2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl2
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c1
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/ec_key.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256_table.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/ectest.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/engine/eng_all.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/e_camellia.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/e_old.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/e_seed.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/mem_clr.c2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/modes/asm/aesni-gcm-x86_64.pl2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl2
-rw-r--r--crypto/o_dir.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/o_dir.h2
-rw-r--r--crypto/o_dir_test.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/o_str.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/o_str.h2
-rw-r--r--crypto/o_time.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/o_time.h2
-rw-r--r--crypto/opensslv.h6
-rw-r--r--crypto/rc4/rc4_utl.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/seed/seed_cbc.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/seed/seed_cfb.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/seed/seed_ecb.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/seed/seed_ofb.c2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/sha/asm/sha1-mb-x86_64.pl2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/sha/asm/sha256-mb-x86_64.pl2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/sha/asm/sha512-x86_64.pl2
-rw-r--r--crypto/sha/sha1test.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/store/store.h2
-rw-r--r--crypto/store/str_lib.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/store/str_locl.h2
-rw-r--r--crypto/store/str_mem.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/store/str_meth.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c3
-rw-r--r--crypto/ui/ui.h2
-rw-r--r--crypto/ui/ui_compat.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/ui/ui_compat.h2
-rw-r--r--crypto/ui/ui_lib.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/ui/ui_locl.h2
-rw-r--r--crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/ui/ui_util.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c39
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h2
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c3
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509v3/v3nametest.c10
-rw-r--r--doc/apps/s_time.pod4
-rw-r--r--doc/crypto/BIO_s_connect.pod4
-rw-r--r--doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store.pod8
-rw-r--r--doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb.pod73
-rw-r--r--doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod29
-rw-r--r--engines/e_chil.c2
-rw-r--r--ssl/d1_both.c70
-rw-r--r--ssl/kssl.c2
-rw-r--r--ssl/kssl.h2
-rw-r--r--ssl/kssl_lcl.h2
-rw-r--r--ssl/s2_srvr.c20
-rw-r--r--ssl/s3_clnt.c63
-rw-r--r--ssl/s3_lib.c34
-rw-r--r--ssl/s3_srvr.c25
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl.h6
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl_err.c2
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl_lib.c5
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl_sess.c3
-rw-r--r--ssl/t1_enc.c2
-rw-r--r--ssl/t1_lib.c22
-rwxr-xr-xutil/domd4
-rw-r--r--util/pl/VC-32.pl8
-rwxr-xr-xutil/pod2mantest58
137 files changed, 846 insertions, 445 deletions
diff --git a/ACKNOWLEDGMENTS b/ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
index 59c6f01f97f6..d21dccbb79cf 100644
--- a/ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
+++ b/ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
@@ -1,30 +1,2 @@
-The OpenSSL project depends on volunteer efforts and financial support from
-the end user community. That support comes in the form of donations and paid
-sponsorships, software support contracts, paid consulting services
-and commissioned software development.
-
-Since all these activities support the continued development and improvement
-of OpenSSL we consider all these clients and customers as sponsors of the
-OpenSSL project.
-
-We would like to identify and thank the following such sponsors for their past
-or current significant support of the OpenSSL project:
-
-Major support:
-
- Qualys http://www.qualys.com/
-
-Very significant support:
-
- OpenGear: http://www.opengear.com/
-
-Significant support:
-
- PSW Group: http://www.psw.net/
- Acano Ltd. http://acano.com/
-
-Please note that we ask permission to identify sponsors and that some sponsors
-we consider eligible for inclusion here have requested to remain anonymous.
-
-Additional sponsorship or financial support is always welcome: for more
-information please contact the OpenSSL Software Foundation.
+Please https://www.openssl.org/community/thanks.html for the current
+acknowledgements.
diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 5e9225b57cd9..18693f70efe9 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -2,6 +2,54 @@
OpenSSL CHANGES
_______________
+ Changes between 1.0.2e and 1.0.2f [28 Jan 2016]
+
+ *) DH small subgroups
+
+ Historically OpenSSL only ever generated DH parameters based on "safe"
+ primes. More recently (in version 1.0.2) support was provided for
+ generating X9.42 style parameter files such as those required for RFC 5114
+ support. The primes used in such files may not be "safe". Where an
+ application is using DH configured with parameters based on primes that are
+ not "safe" then an attacker could use this fact to find a peer's private
+ DH exponent. This attack requires that the attacker complete multiple
+ handshakes in which the peer uses the same private DH exponent. For example
+ this could be used to discover a TLS server's private DH exponent if it's
+ reusing the private DH exponent or it's using a static DH ciphersuite.
+
+ OpenSSL provides the option SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE for ephemeral DH (DHE) in
+ TLS. It is not on by default. If the option is not set then the server
+ reuses the same private DH exponent for the life of the server process and
+ would be vulnerable to this attack. It is believed that many popular
+ applications do set this option and would therefore not be at risk.
+
+ The fix for this issue adds an additional check where a "q" parameter is
+ available (as is the case in X9.42 based parameters). This detects the
+ only known attack, and is the only possible defense for static DH
+ ciphersuites. This could have some performance impact.
+
+ Additionally the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option has been switched on by
+ default and cannot be disabled. This could have some performance impact.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Antonio Sanso (Adobe).
+ (CVE-2016-0701)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) SSLv2 doesn't block disabled ciphers
+
+ A malicious client can negotiate SSLv2 ciphers that have been disabled on
+ the server and complete SSLv2 handshakes even if all SSLv2 ciphers have
+ been disabled, provided that the SSLv2 protocol was not also disabled via
+ SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th December 2015 by Nimrod Aviram
+ and Sebastian Schinzel.
+ (CVE-2015-3197)
+ [Viktor Dukhovni]
+
+ *) Reject DH handshakes with parameters shorter than 1024 bits.
+ [Kurt Roeckx]
+
Changes between 1.0.2d and 1.0.2e [3 Dec 2015]
*) BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64
diff --git a/Configure b/Configure
index ac86cd6cf6a2..4a715dc43732 100755
--- a/Configure
+++ b/Configure
@@ -124,6 +124,9 @@ my $clang_disabled_warnings = "-Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-missing-field-initiali
# -Wextended-offsetof
my $clang_devteam_warn = "-Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-missing-field-initializers -Wno-language-extension-token -Wno-extended-offsetof -Qunused-arguments";
+# Warn that "make depend" should be run?
+my $warn_make_depend = 0;
+
my $strict_warnings = 0;
my $x86_gcc_des="DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL";
@@ -1513,7 +1516,7 @@ if ($target =~ /\-icc$/) # Intel C compiler
# linker only when --prefix is not /usr.
if ($target =~ /^BSD\-/)
{
- $shared_ldflag.=" -Wl,-rpath,\$(LIBRPATH)" if ($prefix !~ m|^/usr[/]*$|);
+ $shared_ldflag.=" -Wl,-rpath,\$\$(LIBRPATH)" if ($prefix !~ m|^/usr[/]*$|);
}
if ($sys_id ne "")
@@ -2028,14 +2031,8 @@ EOF
&dofile("apps/CA.pl",'/usr/local/bin/perl','^#!/', '#!%s');
}
if ($depflags ne $default_depflags && !$make_depend) {
- print <<EOF;
-
-Since you've disabled or enabled at least one algorithm, you need to do
-the following before building:
-
- make depend
-EOF
- }
+ $warn_make_depend++;
+ }
}
# create the ms/version32.rc file if needed
@@ -2114,12 +2111,18 @@ EOF
print <<\EOF if ($no_shared_warn);
-You gave the option 'shared'. Normally, that would give you shared libraries.
-Unfortunately, the OpenSSL configuration doesn't include shared library support
-for this platform yet, so it will pretend you gave the option 'no-shared'. If
-you can inform the developpers (openssl-dev\@openssl.org) how to support shared
-libraries on this platform, they will at least look at it and try their best
-(but please first make sure you have tried with a current version of OpenSSL).
+You gave the option 'shared', which is not supported on this platform, so
+we will pretend you gave the option 'no-shared'. If you know how to implement
+shared libraries, please let us know (but please first make sure you have
+tried with a current version of OpenSSL).
+EOF
+
+print <<EOF if ($warn_make_depend);
+
+*** Because of configuration changes, you MUST do the following before
+*** building:
+
+ make depend
EOF
exit(0);
diff --git a/FREEBSD-upgrade b/FREEBSD-upgrade
index 161ef406b3af..2c12105b0bdb 100644
--- a/FREEBSD-upgrade
+++ b/FREEBSD-upgrade
@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ First, read http://wiki.freebsd.org/SubversionPrimer/VendorImports
# Xlist
setenv XLIST /FreeBSD/work/openssl/svn-FREEBSD-files/FREEBSD-Xlist
setenv FSVN "svn+ssh://repo.freebsd.org/base"
-setenv OSSLVER 1.0.2e
-# OSSLTAG format: v1_0_2e
+setenv OSSLVER 1.0.2f
+# OSSLTAG format: v1_0_2f
###setenv OSSLTAG v`echo ${OSSLVER} | tr . _`
diff --git a/INSTALL b/INSTALL
index 1325079f2a99..679b30d4c790 100644
--- a/INSTALL
+++ b/INSTALL
@@ -164,10 +164,10 @@
standard headers). If it is a problem with OpenSSL itself, please
report the problem to <openssl-bugs@openssl.org> (note that your
message will be recorded in the request tracker publicly readable
- via http://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html and will be forwarded to a
- public mailing list). Include the output of "make report" in your message.
- Please check out the request tracker. Maybe the bug was already
- reported or has already been fixed.
+ at https://www.openssl.org/community/index.html#bugs and will be
+ forwarded to a public mailing list). Include the output of "make
+ report" in your message. Please check out the request tracker. Maybe
+ the bug was already reported or has already been fixed.
[If you encounter assembler error messages, try the "no-asm"
configuration option as an immediate fix.]
diff --git a/LICENSE b/LICENSE
index e47d101f1025..fb03713dd111 100644
--- a/LICENSE
+++ b/LICENSE
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
---------------
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index e2bbb475c7df..ee04c02cc1ca 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
## Makefile for OpenSSL
##
-VERSION=1.0.2e
+VERSION=1.0.2f
MAJOR=1
MINOR=0.2
SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0
@@ -182,8 +182,7 @@ SHARED_LDFLAGS=
GENERAL= Makefile
BASENAME= openssl
NAME= $(BASENAME)-$(VERSION)
-TARFILE= $(NAME).tar
-WTARFILE= $(NAME)-win.tar
+TARFILE= ../$(NAME).tar
EXHEADER= e_os2.h
HEADER= e_os.h
@@ -501,38 +500,35 @@ TABLE: Configure
# would occur. Therefore the list of files is temporarily stored into a file
# and read directly, requiring GNU-Tar. Call "make TAR=gtar dist" if the normal
# tar does not support the --files-from option.
-TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list \
- --owner openssl:0 --group openssl:0 \
- --transform 's|^|openssl-$(VERSION)/|' \
+TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from $(TARFILE).list \
+ --owner 0 --group 0 \
+ --transform 's|^|$(NAME)/|' \
-cvf -
-../$(TARFILE).list:
+$(TARFILE).list:
find * \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \
\! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*' \! -name 'openssl' \
- \! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' \
- | sort > ../$(TARFILE).list
+ \( \! -name '*test' -o -name bctest -o -name pod2mantest \) \
+ \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' \! -type l \
+ | sort > $(TARFILE).list
-tar: ../$(TARFILE).list
+tar: $(TARFILE).list
find . -type d -print | xargs chmod 755
find . -type f -print | xargs chmod a+r
find . -type f -perm -0100 -print | xargs chmod a+x
- $(TAR_COMMAND) | gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz
- rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
- ls -l ../$(TARFILE).gz
+ $(TAR_COMMAND) | gzip --best > $(TARFILE).gz
+ rm -f $(TARFILE).list
+ ls -l $(TARFILE).gz
-tar-snap: ../$(TARFILE).list
- $(TAR_COMMAND) > ../$(TARFILE)
- rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
- ls -l ../$(TARFILE)
+tar-snap: $(TARFILE).list
+ $(TAR_COMMAND) > $(TARFILE)
+ rm -f $(TARFILE).list
+ ls -l $(TARFILE)
dist:
$(PERL) Configure dist
- @$(MAKE) dist_pem_h
@$(MAKE) SDIRS='$(SDIRS)' clean
- @$(MAKE) TAR='$(TAR)' TARFLAGS='$(TARFLAGS)' tar
-
-dist_pem_h:
- (cd crypto/pem; $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) pem.h; $(MAKE) clean)
+ @$(MAKE) TAR='$(TAR)' TARFLAGS='$(TARFLAGS)' $(DISTTARVARS) tar
install: all install_docs install_sw
diff --git a/Makefile.org b/Makefile.org
index 0333644415a2..76fdbdf6ac5c 100644
--- a/Makefile.org
+++ b/Makefile.org
@@ -180,8 +180,7 @@ SHARED_LDFLAGS=
GENERAL= Makefile
BASENAME= openssl
NAME= $(BASENAME)-$(VERSION)
-TARFILE= $(NAME).tar
-WTARFILE= $(NAME)-win.tar
+TARFILE= ../$(NAME).tar
EXHEADER= e_os2.h
HEADER= e_os.h
@@ -499,38 +498,35 @@ TABLE: Configure
# would occur. Therefore the list of files is temporarily stored into a file
# and read directly, requiring GNU-Tar. Call "make TAR=gtar dist" if the normal
# tar does not support the --files-from option.
-TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list \
- --owner openssl:0 --group openssl:0 \
- --transform 's|^|openssl-$(VERSION)/|' \
+TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from $(TARFILE).list \
+ --owner 0 --group 0 \
+ --transform 's|^|$(NAME)/|' \
-cvf -
-../$(TARFILE).list:
+$(TARFILE).list:
find * \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \
\! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*' \! -name 'openssl' \
- \! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' \
- | sort > ../$(TARFILE).list
+ \( \! -name '*test' -o -name bctest -o -name pod2mantest \) \
+ \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' \! -type l \
+ | sort > $(TARFILE).list
-tar: ../$(TARFILE).list
+tar: $(TARFILE).list
find . -type d -print | xargs chmod 755
find . -type f -print | xargs chmod a+r
find . -type f -perm -0100 -print | xargs chmod a+x
- $(TAR_COMMAND) | gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz
- rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
- ls -l ../$(TARFILE).gz
+ $(TAR_COMMAND) | gzip --best > $(TARFILE).gz
+ rm -f $(TARFILE).list
+ ls -l $(TARFILE).gz
-tar-snap: ../$(TARFILE).list
- $(TAR_COMMAND) > ../$(TARFILE)
- rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
- ls -l ../$(TARFILE)
+tar-snap: $(TARFILE).list
+ $(TAR_COMMAND) > $(TARFILE)
+ rm -f $(TARFILE).list
+ ls -l $(TARFILE)
dist:
$(PERL) Configure dist
- @$(MAKE) dist_pem_h
@$(MAKE) SDIRS='$(SDIRS)' clean
- @$(MAKE) TAR='$(TAR)' TARFLAGS='$(TARFLAGS)' tar
-
-dist_pem_h:
- (cd crypto/pem; $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) pem.h; $(MAKE) clean)
+ @$(MAKE) TAR='$(TAR)' TARFLAGS='$(TARFLAGS)' $(DISTTARVARS) tar
install: all install_docs install_sw
diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index e1c78f834f08..06c77025e999 100644
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -5,6 +5,11 @@
This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2e and OpenSSL 1.0.2f [28 Jan 2016]
+
+ o DH small subgroups (CVE-2016-0701)
+ o SSLv2 doesn't block disabled ciphers (CVE-2015-3197)
+
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2d and OpenSSL 1.0.2e [3 Dec 2015]
o BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64 (CVE-2015-3193)
diff --git a/README b/README
index 49c4c9f147c3..1e9869daee00 100644
--- a/README
+++ b/README
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
- OpenSSL 1.0.2e 3 Dec 2015
+ OpenSSL 1.0.2f 28 Jan 2016
Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project
Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
@@ -90,11 +90,12 @@
In order to avoid spam, this is a moderated mailing list, and it might
take a day for the ticket to show up. (We also scan posts to make sure
- that security disclosures aren't publically posted by mistake.) Mail to
- this address is recorded in the public RT (request tracker) database (see
- https://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html for details) and also forwarded
- the public openssl-dev mailing list. Confidential mail may be sent to
- openssl-security@openssl.org (PGP key available from the key servers).
+ that security disclosures aren't publically posted by mistake.) Mail
+ to this address is recorded in the public RT (request tracker) database
+ (see https://www.openssl.org/community/index.html#bugs for details) and
+ also forwarded the public openssl-dev mailing list. Confidential mail
+ may be sent to openssl-security@openssl.org (PGP key available from the
+ key servers).
Please do NOT use this for general assistance or support queries.
Just because something doesn't work the way you expect does not mean it
diff --git a/apps/engine.c b/apps/engine.c
index 460ec60cb14c..f54631b50d81 100644
--- a/apps/engine.c
+++ b/apps/engine.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* apps/engine.c -*- mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* apps/engine.c */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte <richard@levitte.org> for the OpenSSL project
* 2000.
diff --git a/apps/ocsp.c b/apps/ocsp.c
index 6ed255d4b563..5da51df5148c 100644
--- a/apps/ocsp.c
+++ b/apps/ocsp.c
@@ -1041,7 +1041,7 @@ static int make_ocsp_response(OCSP_RESPONSE **resp, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
bs = OCSP_BASICRESP_new();
thisupd = X509_gmtime_adj(NULL, 0);
if (ndays != -1)
- nextupd = X509_gmtime_adj(NULL, nmin * 60 + ndays * 3600 * 24);
+ nextupd = X509_time_adj_ex(NULL, ndays, nmin * 60, NULL);
/* Examine each certificate id in the request */
for (i = 0; i < id_count; i++) {
diff --git a/apps/pkcs12.c b/apps/pkcs12.c
index e41b445a50b0..cbb75b7d5fe4 100644
--- a/apps/pkcs12.c
+++ b/apps/pkcs12.c
@@ -79,7 +79,8 @@ const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
# define CLCERTS 0x8
# define CACERTS 0x10
-int get_cert_chain(X509 *cert, X509_STORE *store, STACK_OF(X509) **chain);
+static int get_cert_chain(X509 *cert, X509_STORE *store,
+ STACK_OF(X509) **chain);
int dump_certs_keys_p12(BIO *out, PKCS12 *p12, char *pass, int passlen,
int options, char *pempass);
int dump_certs_pkeys_bags(BIO *out, STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags,
@@ -594,7 +595,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
vret = get_cert_chain(ucert, store, &chain2);
X509_STORE_free(store);
- if (!vret) {
+ if (vret == X509_V_OK) {
/* Exclude verified certificate */
for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(chain2); i++)
sk_X509_push(certs, sk_X509_value(chain2, i));
@@ -602,7 +603,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
X509_free(sk_X509_value(chain2, 0));
sk_X509_free(chain2);
} else {
- if (vret >= 0)
+ if (vret != X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED)
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error %s getting chain.\n",
X509_verify_cert_error_string(vret));
else
@@ -906,36 +907,25 @@ int dump_certs_pkeys_bag(BIO *out, PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, char *pass,
/* Given a single certificate return a verified chain or NULL if error */
-/* Hope this is OK .... */
-
-int get_cert_chain(X509 *cert, X509_STORE *store, STACK_OF(X509) **chain)
+static int get_cert_chain(X509 *cert, X509_STORE *store,
+ STACK_OF(X509) **chain)
{
X509_STORE_CTX store_ctx;
- STACK_OF(X509) *chn;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chn = NULL;
int i = 0;
- /*
- * FIXME: Should really check the return status of X509_STORE_CTX_init
- * for an error, but how that fits into the return value of this function
- * is less obvious.
- */
- X509_STORE_CTX_init(&store_ctx, store, cert, NULL);
- if (X509_verify_cert(&store_ctx) <= 0) {
- i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&store_ctx);
- if (i == 0)
- /*
- * avoid returning 0 if X509_verify_cert() did not set an
- * appropriate error value in the context
- */
- i = -1;
- chn = NULL;
- goto err;
- } else
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&store_ctx, store, cert, NULL)) {
+ *chain = NULL;
+ return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
+ }
+
+ if (X509_verify_cert(&store_ctx) > 0)
chn = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&store_ctx);
- err:
+ else if ((i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&store_ctx)) == 0)
+ i = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
+
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&store_ctx);
*chain = chn;
-
return i;
}
diff --git a/apps/pkeyutl.c b/apps/pkeyutl.c
index aaa90740ad4d..c8d513b44ac4 100644
--- a/apps/pkeyutl.c
+++ b/apps/pkeyutl.c
@@ -74,10 +74,11 @@ static void usage(void);
static EVP_PKEY_CTX *init_ctx(int *pkeysize,
char *keyfile, int keyform, int key_type,
- char *passargin, int pkey_op, ENGINE *e);
+ char *passargin, int pkey_op, ENGINE *e,
+ int impl);
static int setup_peer(BIO *err, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int peerform,
- const char *file);
+ const char *file, ENGINE* e);
static int do_keyop(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int pkey_op,
unsigned char *out, size_t *poutlen,
@@ -97,6 +98,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
char *passargin = NULL;
int keysize = -1;
+ int engine_impl = 0;
unsigned char *buf_in = NULL, *buf_out = NULL, *sig = NULL;
size_t buf_outlen;
@@ -137,7 +139,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
else {
ctx = init_ctx(&keysize,
*(++argv), keyform, key_type,
- passargin, pkey_op, e);
+ passargin, pkey_op, e, engine_impl);
if (!ctx) {
BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error initializing context\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
@@ -147,7 +149,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
} else if (!strcmp(*argv, "-peerkey")) {
if (--argc < 1)
badarg = 1;
- else if (!setup_peer(bio_err, ctx, peerform, *(++argv)))
+ else if (!setup_peer(bio_err, ctx, peerform, *(++argv), e))
badarg = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(*argv, "-passin")) {
if (--argc < 1)
@@ -171,6 +173,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
badarg = 1;
else
e = setup_engine(bio_err, *(++argv), 0);
+ } else if (!strcmp(*argv, "-engine_impl")) {
+ engine_impl = 1;
}
#endif
else if (!strcmp(*argv, "-pubin"))
@@ -368,7 +372,8 @@ static void usage()
BIO_printf(bio_err, "-hexdump hex dump output\n");
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-engine e use engine e, possibly a hardware device.\n");
+ "-engine e use engine e, maybe a hardware device, for loading keys.\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-engine_impl also use engine given by -engine for crypto operations\n");
#endif
BIO_printf(bio_err, "-passin arg pass phrase source\n");
@@ -376,10 +381,12 @@ static void usage()
static EVP_PKEY_CTX *init_ctx(int *pkeysize,
char *keyfile, int keyform, int key_type,
- char *passargin, int pkey_op, ENGINE *e)
+ char *passargin, int pkey_op, ENGINE *e,
+ int engine_impl)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ ENGINE *impl = NULL;
char *passin = NULL;
int rv = -1;
X509 *x;
@@ -418,9 +425,14 @@ static EVP_PKEY_CTX *init_ctx(int *pkeysize,
if (!pkey)
goto end;
-
- ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, e);
-
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ if (engine_impl)
+ impl = e;
+#endif
+
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, impl);
+
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (!ctx)
@@ -467,16 +479,20 @@ static EVP_PKEY_CTX *init_ctx(int *pkeysize,
}
static int setup_peer(BIO *err, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int peerform,
- const char *file)
+ const char *file, ENGINE* e)
{
EVP_PKEY *peer = NULL;
+ ENGINE* engine = NULL;
int ret;
if (!ctx) {
BIO_puts(err, "-peerkey command before -inkey\n");
return 0;
}
- peer = load_pubkey(bio_err, file, peerform, 0, NULL, NULL, "Peer Key");
+ if (peerform == FORMAT_ENGINE)
+ engine = e;
+
+ peer = load_pubkey(bio_err, file, peerform, 0, NULL, engine, "Peer Key");
if (!peer) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading peer key %s\n", file);
diff --git a/apps/s_client.c b/apps/s_client.c
index f80711fd5e58..caf76d35dc5a 100644
--- a/apps/s_client.c
+++ b/apps/s_client.c
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
" -connect host:port - who to connect to (default is %s:%s)\n",
SSL_HOST_NAME, PORT_STR);
BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -verify_host host - check peer certificate matches \"host\"\n");
+ " -verify_hostname host - check peer certificate matches \"host\"\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -verify_email email - check peer certificate matches \"email\"\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
diff --git a/apps/s_server.c b/apps/s_server.c
index f19532b75fab..65cbaaf6eb9b 100644
--- a/apps/s_server.c
+++ b/apps/s_server.c
@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -accept arg - port to accept on (default is %d)\n", PORT);
BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -verify_host host - check peer certificate matches \"host\"\n");
+ " -verify_hostname host - check peer certificate matches \"host\"\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -verify_email email - check peer certificate matches \"email\"\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
diff --git a/apps/speed.c b/apps/speed.c
index 3697b71ec18b..95adcc19cc15 100644
--- a/apps/speed.c
+++ b/apps/speed.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* apps/speed.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* apps/speed.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
diff --git a/apps/x509.c b/apps/x509.c
index 864a60dda2e7..7c215bced001 100644
--- a/apps/x509.c
+++ b/apps/x509.c
@@ -1226,12 +1226,7 @@ static int sign(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, int days, int clrext,
if (X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notBefore(x), 0) == NULL)
goto err;
- /* Lets just make it 12:00am GMT, Jan 1 1970 */
- /* memcpy(x->cert_info->validity->notBefore,"700101120000Z",13); */
- /* 28 days to be certified */
-
- if (X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notAfter(x), (long)60 * 60 * 24 * days) ==
- NULL)
+ if (X509_time_adj_ex(X509_get_notAfter(x), days, 0, NULL) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!X509_set_pubkey(x, pkey))
diff --git a/crypto/aes/aes.h b/crypto/aes/aes.h
index 87bf60f6f2bf..faa66c49148f 100644
--- a/crypto/aes/aes.h
+++ b/crypto/aes/aes.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/aes/aes.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/aes/aes.h */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
diff --git a/crypto/aes/aes_cbc.c b/crypto/aes/aes_cbc.c
index e39231f17cb8..805d0e260a6f 100644
--- a/crypto/aes/aes_cbc.c
+++ b/crypto/aes/aes_cbc.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/aes/aes_cbc.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/aes/aes_cbc.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
diff --git a/crypto/aes/aes_cfb.c b/crypto/aes/aes_cfb.c
index 1c79ce2dbaa1..1225000963ea 100644
--- a/crypto/aes/aes_cfb.c
+++ b/crypto/aes/aes_cfb.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/aes/aes_cfb.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/aes/aes_cfb.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2002-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
diff --git a/crypto/aes/aes_core.c b/crypto/aes/aes_core.c
index 2ddb0860d78a..7019b5d7aa3a 100644
--- a/crypto/aes/aes_core.c
+++ b/crypto/aes/aes_core.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/aes/aes_core.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/aes/aes_core.c */
/**
* rijndael-alg-fst.c
*
diff --git a/crypto/aes/aes_ctr.c b/crypto/aes/aes_ctr.c
index 3ee382299881..9e760c4b12ad 100644
--- a/crypto/aes/aes_ctr.c
+++ b/crypto/aes/aes_ctr.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/aes/aes_ctr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/aes/aes_ctr.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
diff --git a/crypto/aes/aes_ecb.c b/crypto/aes/aes_ecb.c
index 2e0d20ca224e..52151a5c70f4 100644
--- a/crypto/aes/aes_ecb.c
+++ b/crypto/aes/aes_ecb.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/aes/aes_ecb.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/aes/aes_ecb.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
diff --git a/crypto/aes/aes_ige.c b/crypto/aes/aes_ige.c
index cf31c9bba44a..8f2b7706472a 100644
--- a/crypto/aes/aes_ige.c
+++ b/crypto/aes/aes_ige.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/aes/aes_ige.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/aes/aes_ige.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
diff --git a/crypto/aes/aes_locl.h b/crypto/aes/aes_locl.h
index fabfd02ac095..7acd74ec1603 100644
--- a/crypto/aes/aes_locl.h
+++ b/crypto/aes/aes_locl.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/aes/aes.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/aes/aes.h */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
diff --git a/crypto/aes/aes_misc.c b/crypto/aes/aes_misc.c
index ab948ad85eb4..fafad4d6f57a 100644
--- a/crypto/aes/aes_misc.c
+++ b/crypto/aes/aes_misc.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/aes/aes_misc.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/aes/aes_misc.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
diff --git a/crypto/aes/aes_ofb.c b/crypto/aes/aes_ofb.c
index e6153f99ba70..64a08caaec6d 100644
--- a/crypto/aes/aes_ofb.c
+++ b/crypto/aes/aes_ofb.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/aes/aes_ofb.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/aes/aes_ofb.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2002-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
diff --git a/crypto/aes/aes_x86core.c b/crypto/aes/aes_x86core.c
index c869ed719852..b5dd6976772a 100644
--- a/crypto/aes/aes_x86core.c
+++ b/crypto/aes/aes_x86core.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/aes/aes_core.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/aes/aes_core.c */
/**
* rijndael-alg-fst.c
*
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-mb-x86_64.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-mb-x86_64.pl
index 5a100fa8983b..d7ad7882c4ee 100755
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-mb-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-mb-x86_64.pl
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
}
-if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
}
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl
index c803cdebc112..8c84260856e1 100755
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ $avx=1 if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) &&
$avx=1 if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
`ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./ &&
$1>=10);
-$avx=1 if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/ && $2>=3.0);
+$avx=1 if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/ && $2>=3.0);
$shaext=1; ### set to zero if compiling for 1.0.1
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl
index bfe29268c781..72f44ecf6253 100755
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=12);
}
-if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
}
diff --git a/crypto/bio/bio.h b/crypto/bio/bio.h
index f78796b069f5..6e2293bc66da 100644
--- a/crypto/bio/bio.h
+++ b/crypto/bio/bio.h
@@ -479,11 +479,11 @@ struct bio_dgram_sctp_prinfo {
# define BIO_get_conn_hostname(b) BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,0)
# define BIO_get_conn_port(b) BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,1)
# define BIO_get_conn_ip(b) BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,2)
-# define BIO_get_conn_int_port(b) BIO_int_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,3,0)
+# define BIO_get_conn_int_port(b) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,3,0,NULL)
# define BIO_set_nbio(b,n) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_NBIO,(n),NULL)
-/* BIO_s_accept_socket() */
+/* BIO_s_accept() */
# define BIO_set_accept_port(b,name) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_ACCEPT,0,(char *)name)
# define BIO_get_accept_port(b) BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_ACCEPT,0)
/* #define BIO_set_nbio(b,n) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_NBIO,(n),NULL) */
@@ -496,6 +496,7 @@ struct bio_dgram_sctp_prinfo {
# define BIO_set_bind_mode(b,mode) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BIND_MODE,mode,NULL)
# define BIO_get_bind_mode(b,mode) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_BIND_MODE,0,NULL)
+/* BIO_s_accept() and BIO_s_connect() */
# define BIO_do_connect(b) BIO_do_handshake(b)
# define BIO_do_accept(b) BIO_do_handshake(b)
# define BIO_do_handshake(b) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE,0,NULL)
@@ -515,12 +516,15 @@ struct bio_dgram_sctp_prinfo {
# define BIO_get_url(b,url) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_PROXY_PARAM,2,(char *)(url))
# define BIO_get_no_connect_return(b) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_PROXY_PARAM,5,NULL)
+/* BIO_s_datagram(), BIO_s_fd(), BIO_s_socket(), BIO_s_accept() and BIO_s_connect() */
# define BIO_set_fd(b,fd,c) BIO_int_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_FD,c,fd)
# define BIO_get_fd(b,c) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_FD,0,(char *)c)
+/* BIO_s_file() */
# define BIO_set_fp(b,fp,c) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_FILE_PTR,c,(char *)fp)
# define BIO_get_fp(b,fpp) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_FILE_PTR,0,(char *)fpp)
+/* BIO_s_fd() and BIO_s_file() */
# define BIO_seek(b,ofs) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_FILE_SEEK,ofs,NULL)
# define BIO_tell(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_FILE_TELL,0,NULL)
diff --git a/crypto/bio/bss_bio.c b/crypto/bio/bss_bio.c
index d629a37a5a1d..4d8727f8f890 100644
--- a/crypto/bio/bss_bio.c
+++ b/crypto/bio/bss_bio.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/bio/bss_bio.c -*- Mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/bio/bss_bio.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2003 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
diff --git a/crypto/bio/bss_conn.c b/crypto/bio/bss_conn.c
index 42d0afffbc6c..7d15ad29dcd7 100644
--- a/crypto/bio/bss_conn.c
+++ b/crypto/bio/bss_conn.c
@@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ static long conn_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
{
BIO *dbio;
int *ip;
- const char **pptr;
+ const char **pptr = NULL;
long ret = 1;
BIO_CONNECT *data;
@@ -442,19 +442,28 @@ static long conn_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
case BIO_C_GET_CONNECT:
if (ptr != NULL) {
pptr = (const char **)ptr;
- if (num == 0) {
- *pptr = data->param_hostname;
+ }
- } else if (num == 1) {
- *pptr = data->param_port;
- } else if (num == 2) {
- *pptr = (char *)&(data->ip[0]);
- } else if (num == 3) {
- *((int *)ptr) = data->port;
+ if (b->init) {
+ if (pptr != NULL) {
+ ret = 1;
+ if (num == 0) {
+ *pptr = data->param_hostname;
+ } else if (num == 1) {
+ *pptr = data->param_port;
+ } else if (num == 2) {
+ *pptr = (char *)&(data->ip[0]);
+ } else {
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if (num == 3) {
+ ret = data->port;
}
- if ((!b->init) || (ptr == NULL))
+ } else {
+ if (pptr != NULL)
*pptr = "not initialized";
- ret = 1;
+ ret = 0;
}
break;
case BIO_C_SET_CONNECT:
diff --git a/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c b/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
index 7fcd831da06b..bdd7bf88ea0e 100644
--- a/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
+++ b/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
@@ -519,10 +519,8 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
switch (cmd) {
case BIO_CTRL_RESET:
num = 0;
- case BIO_C_FILE_SEEK:
ret = 0;
break;
- case BIO_C_FILE_TELL:
case BIO_CTRL_INFO:
ret = 0;
break;
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl
index 12b571c282dc..091cdc2069da 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$addx = ($1>=12);
}
-if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10
$addx = ($ver>=3.03);
}
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl
index 725833d022e2..e82e451388c7 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$addx = ($1>=12);
}
-if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10
$addx = ($ver>=3.03);
}
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
index 64e668f140c2..292409c4ffb8 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$addx = ($1>=12);
}
-if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10
$addx = ($ver>=3.03);
}
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c b/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
index 50cf3231b07b..6d30d1e0fff5 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
@@ -282,9 +282,14 @@ int BN_mod_exp_recp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
}
bits = BN_num_bits(p);
-
if (bits == 0) {
- ret = BN_one(r);
+ /* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
+ if (BN_is_one(m)) {
+ ret = 1;
+ BN_zero(r);
+ } else {
+ ret = BN_one(r);
+ }
return ret;
}
@@ -418,7 +423,13 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
}
bits = BN_num_bits(p);
if (bits == 0) {
- ret = BN_one(rr);
+ /* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
+ if (BN_is_one(m)) {
+ ret = 1;
+ BN_zero(rr);
+ } else {
+ ret = BN_one(rr);
+ }
return ret;
}
@@ -639,7 +650,7 @@ static int MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF(BIGNUM *b, int top,
* precomputation memory layout to limit data-dependency to a minimum to
* protect secret exponents (cf. the hyper-threading timing attacks pointed
* out by Colin Percival,
- * http://www.daemong-consideredperthreading-considered-harmful/)
+ * http://www.daemonology.net/hyperthreading-considered-harmful/)
*/
int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
@@ -671,7 +682,13 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
bits = BN_num_bits(p);
if (bits == 0) {
- ret = BN_one(rr);
+ /* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
+ if (BN_is_one(m)) {
+ ret = 1;
+ BN_zero(rr);
+ } else {
+ ret = BN_one(rr);
+ }
return ret;
}
@@ -1182,8 +1199,9 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_word(BIGNUM *rr, BN_ULONG a, const BIGNUM *p,
if (BN_is_one(m)) {
ret = 1;
BN_zero(rr);
- } else
+ } else {
ret = BN_one(rr);
+ }
return ret;
}
if (a == 0) {
@@ -1297,9 +1315,14 @@ int BN_mod_exp_simple(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
}
bits = BN_num_bits(p);
-
- if (bits == 0) {
- ret = BN_one(r);
+ if (bits == 0) {
+ /* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
+ if (BN_is_one(m)) {
+ ret = 1;
+ BN_zero(r);
+ } else {
+ ret = BN_one(r);
+ }
return ret;
}
diff --git a/crypto/bn/exptest.c b/crypto/bn/exptest.c
index 8b3a4bae4328..ac611c2e2614 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/exptest.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/exptest.c
@@ -73,14 +73,34 @@ static const char rnd_seed[] =
"string to make the random number generator think it has entropy";
/*
+ * Test that r == 0 in test_exp_mod_zero(). Returns one on success,
+ * returns zero and prints debug output otherwise.
+ */
+static int a_is_zero_mod_one(const char *method, const BIGNUM *r,
+ const BIGNUM *a) {
+ if (!BN_is_zero(r)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s failed:\n", method);
+ fprintf(stderr, "a ** 0 mod 1 = r (should be 0)\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "a = ");
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, a);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\nr = ");
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, r);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
* test_exp_mod_zero tests that x**0 mod 1 == 0. It returns zero on success.
*/
static int test_exp_mod_zero()
{
BIGNUM a, p, m;
BIGNUM r;
+ BN_ULONG one_word = 1;
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- int ret = 1;
+ int ret = 1, failed = 0;
BN_init(&m);
BN_one(&m);
@@ -92,21 +112,65 @@ static int test_exp_mod_zero()
BN_zero(&p);
BN_init(&r);
- BN_mod_exp(&r, &a, &p, &m, ctx);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- if (BN_is_zero(&r))
- ret = 0;
- else {
- printf("1**0 mod 1 = ");
- BN_print_fp(stdout, &r);
- printf(", should be 0\n");
+ if (!BN_rand(&a, 1024, 0, 0))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_mod_exp(&r, &a, &p, &m, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!a_is_zero_mod_one("BN_mod_exp", &r, &a))
+ failed = 1;
+
+ if (!BN_mod_exp_recp(&r, &a, &p, &m, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!a_is_zero_mod_one("BN_mod_exp_recp", &r, &a))
+ failed = 1;
+
+ if (!BN_mod_exp_simple(&r, &a, &p, &m, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!a_is_zero_mod_one("BN_mod_exp_simple", &r, &a))
+ failed = 1;
+
+ if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(&r, &a, &p, &m, ctx, NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!a_is_zero_mod_one("BN_mod_exp_mont", &r, &a))
+ failed = 1;
+
+ if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(&r, &a, &p, &m, ctx, NULL)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!a_is_zero_mod_one("BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime", &r, &a))
+ failed = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * A different codepath exists for single word multiplication
+ * in non-constant-time only.
+ */
+ if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_word(&r, one_word, &p, &m, ctx, NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_is_zero(&r)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp_mont_word failed:\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "1 ** 0 mod 1 = r (should be 0)\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "r = ");
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, &r);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ return 0;
}
+ ret = failed;
+
+ err:
BN_free(&r);
BN_free(&a);
BN_free(&p);
BN_free(&m);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/crypto/camellia/camellia.c b/crypto/camellia/camellia.c
index b4a6766c623c..719fa61cf627 100644
--- a/crypto/camellia/camellia.c
+++ b/crypto/camellia/camellia.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/camellia/camellia.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/camellia/camellia.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2006 NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation) .
* ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@
/*
* Algorithm Specification
- * http://info.isl.llia/specicrypt/eng/camellia/specifications.html
+ * http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/camellia/specifications.html
*/
/*
diff --git a/crypto/camellia/camellia.h b/crypto/camellia/camellia.h
index 9be7c0fd9996..45e8d25b1dd5 100644
--- a/crypto/camellia/camellia.h
+++ b/crypto/camellia/camellia.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/camellia/camellia.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/camellia/camellia.h */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
diff --git a/crypto/camellia/cmll_cbc.c b/crypto/camellia/cmll_cbc.c
index a4907ca05f78..4017e00d9272 100644
--- a/crypto/camellia/cmll_cbc.c
+++ b/crypto/camellia/cmll_cbc.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/camellia/camellia_cbc.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/camellia/camellia_cbc.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
diff --git a/crypto/camellia/cmll_cfb.c b/crypto/camellia/cmll_cfb.c
index 59b85225c35e..78f2ae4566b1 100644
--- a/crypto/camellia/cmll_cfb.c
+++ b/crypto/camellia/cmll_cfb.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/camellia/camellia_cfb.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/camellia/camellia_cfb.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
diff --git a/crypto/camellia/cmll_ctr.c b/crypto/camellia/cmll_ctr.c
index b8f523d44648..95e26621b7d8 100644
--- a/crypto/camellia/cmll_ctr.c
+++ b/crypto/camellia/cmll_ctr.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/camellia/camellia_ctr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/camellia/camellia_ctr.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
diff --git a/crypto/camellia/cmll_ecb.c b/crypto/camellia/cmll_ecb.c
index 16f1af86ac38..b030791b275c 100644
--- a/crypto/camellia/cmll_ecb.c
+++ b/crypto/camellia/cmll_ecb.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/camellia/camellia_ecb.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/camellia/camellia_ecb.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
diff --git a/crypto/camellia/cmll_locl.h b/crypto/camellia/cmll_locl.h
index 4e4707b6213e..2bd79b8c4eb3 100644
--- a/crypto/camellia/cmll_locl.h
+++ b/crypto/camellia/cmll_locl.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/camellia/camellia_locl.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/camellia/camellia_locl.h */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2006 NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation) .
* ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
diff --git a/crypto/camellia/cmll_misc.c b/crypto/camellia/cmll_misc.c
index cbd250227bec..694d2fac8f1f 100644
--- a/crypto/camellia/cmll_misc.c
+++ b/crypto/camellia/cmll_misc.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/camellia/camellia_misc.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/camellia/camellia_misc.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
diff --git a/crypto/camellia/cmll_ofb.c b/crypto/camellia/cmll_ofb.c
index 46c3ae2af737..85eb8921568f 100644
--- a/crypto/camellia/cmll_ofb.c
+++ b/crypto/camellia/cmll_ofb.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/camellia/camellia_ofb.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/camellia/camellia_ofb.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
diff --git a/crypto/camellia/cmll_utl.c b/crypto/camellia/cmll_utl.c
index d19ee19317ce..d5eb6b4d68b1 100644
--- a/crypto/camellia/cmll_utl.c
+++ b/crypto/camellia/cmll_utl.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/camellia/cmll_utl.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/camellia/cmll_utl.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2011 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
diff --git a/crypto/des/des_old.c b/crypto/des/des_old.c
index 54b0968e663b..c5c5a00f00c1 100644
--- a/crypto/des/des_old.c
+++ b/crypto/des/des_old.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/des/des_old.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/des/des_old.c */
/*-
* WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING
diff --git a/crypto/des/des_old.h b/crypto/des/des_old.h
index f1e1e2cb09cf..ee7607a2415f 100644
--- a/crypto/des/des_old.h
+++ b/crypto/des/des_old.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/des/des_old.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/des/des_old.h */
/*-
* WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING
diff --git a/crypto/des/des_old2.c b/crypto/des/des_old2.c
index f7d28a671355..247ff8dcf85f 100644
--- a/crypto/des/des_old2.c
+++ b/crypto/des/des_old2.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/des/des_old.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/des/des_old.c */
/*
* WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING The
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh.h b/crypto/dh/dh.h
index b17767328183..5498a9dc1060 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dh.h
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh.h
@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ struct dh_st {
/* DH_check_pub_key error codes */
# define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL 0x01
# define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE 0x02
+# define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID 0x03
/*
* primes p where (p-1)/2 is prime too are called "safe"; we define this for
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
index 347467c6a433..5adedc0d264e 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
@@ -151,23 +151,38 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
{
int ok = 0;
- BIGNUM *q = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
*ret = 0;
- q = BN_new();
- if (q == NULL)
+ ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
- BN_set_word(q, 1);
- if (BN_cmp(pub_key, q) <= 0)
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (tmp == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ BN_set_word(tmp, 1);
+ if (BN_cmp(pub_key, tmp) <= 0)
*ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL;
- BN_copy(q, dh->p);
- BN_sub_word(q, 1);
- if (BN_cmp(pub_key, q) >= 0)
+ BN_copy(tmp, dh->p);
+ BN_sub_word(tmp, 1);
+ if (BN_cmp(pub_key, tmp) >= 0)
*ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE;
+ if (dh->q != NULL) {
+ /* Check pub_key^q == 1 mod p */
+ if (!BN_mod_exp(tmp, pub_key, dh->q, dh->p, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_is_one(tmp))
+ *ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
+ }
+
ok = 1;
err:
- if (q != NULL)
- BN_free(q);
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
return (ok);
}
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dhtest.c b/crypto/dh/dhtest.c
index 6fe8ff4c0c49..c5d3d87ea549 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dhtest.c
+++ b/crypto/dh/dhtest.c
@@ -471,6 +471,31 @@ static const unsigned char dhtest_2048_256_Z[] = {
0xC2, 0x6C, 0x5D, 0x7C
};
+static const unsigned char dhtest_rfc5114_2048_224_bad_y[] = {
+ 0x45, 0x32, 0x5F, 0x51, 0x07, 0xE5, 0xDF, 0x1C, 0xD6, 0x02, 0x82, 0xB3,
+ 0x32, 0x8F, 0xA4, 0x0F, 0x87, 0xB8, 0x41, 0xFE, 0xB9, 0x35, 0xDE, 0xAD,
+ 0xC6, 0x26, 0x85, 0xB4, 0xFF, 0x94, 0x8C, 0x12, 0x4C, 0xBF, 0x5B, 0x20,
+ 0xC4, 0x46, 0xA3, 0x26, 0xEB, 0xA4, 0x25, 0xB7, 0x68, 0x8E, 0xCC, 0x67,
+ 0xBA, 0xEA, 0x58, 0xD0, 0xF2, 0xE9, 0xD2, 0x24, 0x72, 0x60, 0xDA, 0x88,
+ 0x18, 0x9C, 0xE0, 0x31, 0x6A, 0xAD, 0x50, 0x6D, 0x94, 0x35, 0x8B, 0x83,
+ 0x4A, 0x6E, 0xFA, 0x48, 0x73, 0x0F, 0x83, 0x87, 0xFF, 0x6B, 0x66, 0x1F,
+ 0xA8, 0x82, 0xC6, 0x01, 0xE5, 0x80, 0xB5, 0xB0, 0x52, 0xD0, 0xE9, 0xD8,
+ 0x72, 0xF9, 0x7D, 0x5B, 0x8B, 0xA5, 0x4C, 0xA5, 0x25, 0x95, 0x74, 0xE2,
+ 0x7A, 0x61, 0x4E, 0xA7, 0x8F, 0x12, 0xE2, 0xD2, 0x9D, 0x8C, 0x02, 0x70,
+ 0x34, 0x44, 0x32, 0xC7, 0xB2, 0xF3, 0xB9, 0xFE, 0x17, 0x2B, 0xD6, 0x1F,
+ 0x8B, 0x7E, 0x4A, 0xFA, 0xA3, 0xB5, 0x3E, 0x7A, 0x81, 0x9A, 0x33, 0x66,
+ 0x62, 0xA4, 0x50, 0x18, 0x3E, 0xA2, 0x5F, 0x00, 0x07, 0xD8, 0x9B, 0x22,
+ 0xE4, 0xEC, 0x84, 0xD5, 0xEB, 0x5A, 0xF3, 0x2A, 0x31, 0x23, 0xD8, 0x44,
+ 0x22, 0x2A, 0x8B, 0x37, 0x44, 0xCC, 0xC6, 0x87, 0x4B, 0xBE, 0x50, 0x9D,
+ 0x4A, 0xC4, 0x8E, 0x45, 0xCF, 0x72, 0x4D, 0xC0, 0x89, 0xB3, 0x72, 0xED,
+ 0x33, 0x2C, 0xBC, 0x7F, 0x16, 0x39, 0x3B, 0xEB, 0xD2, 0xDD, 0xA8, 0x01,
+ 0x73, 0x84, 0x62, 0xB9, 0x29, 0xD2, 0xC9, 0x51, 0x32, 0x9E, 0x7A, 0x6A,
+ 0xCF, 0xC1, 0x0A, 0xDB, 0x0E, 0xE0, 0x62, 0x77, 0x6F, 0x59, 0x62, 0x72,
+ 0x5A, 0x69, 0xA6, 0x5B, 0x70, 0xCA, 0x65, 0xC4, 0x95, 0x6F, 0x9A, 0xC2,
+ 0xDF, 0x72, 0x6D, 0xB1, 0x1E, 0x54, 0x7B, 0x51, 0xB4, 0xEF, 0x7F, 0x89,
+ 0x93, 0x74, 0x89, 0x59
+};
+
typedef struct {
DH *(*get_param) (void);
const unsigned char *xA;
@@ -503,10 +528,15 @@ static const rfc5114_td rfctd[] = {
static int run_rfc5114_tests(void)
{
int i;
+ DH *dhA = NULL;
+ DH *dhB = NULL;
+ unsigned char *Z1 = NULL;
+ unsigned char *Z2 = NULL;
+ const rfc5114_td *td = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *bady = NULL;
+
for (i = 0; i < (int)(sizeof(rfctd) / sizeof(rfc5114_td)); i++) {
- DH *dhA, *dhB;
- unsigned char *Z1 = NULL, *Z2 = NULL;
- const rfc5114_td *td = rfctd + i;
+ td = rfctd + i;
/* Set up DH structures setting key components */
dhA = td->get_param();
dhB = td->get_param();
@@ -549,14 +579,63 @@ static int run_rfc5114_tests(void)
DH_free(dhB);
OPENSSL_free(Z1);
OPENSSL_free(Z2);
+ dhA = NULL;
+ dhB = NULL;
+ Z1 = NULL;
+ Z2 = NULL;
+ }
+ /* Now i == OSSL_NELEM(rfctd) */
+ /* RFC5114 uses unsafe primes, so now test an invalid y value */
+ dhA = DH_get_2048_224();
+ if (dhA == NULL)
+ goto bad_err;
+ Z1 = OPENSSL_malloc(DH_size(dhA));
+ if (Z1 == NULL)
+ goto bad_err;
+
+ bady = BN_bin2bn(dhtest_rfc5114_2048_224_bad_y,
+ sizeof(dhtest_rfc5114_2048_224_bad_y), NULL);
+ if (bady == NULL)
+ goto bad_err;
+
+ if (!DH_generate_key(dhA))
+ goto bad_err;
+
+ if (DH_compute_key(Z1, bady, dhA) != -1) {
+ /*
+ * DH_compute_key should fail with -1. If we get here we unexpectedly
+ * allowed an invalid y value
+ */
+ goto err;
}
+ /* We'll have a stale error on the queue from the above test so clear it */
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ printf("RFC5114 parameter test %d OK\n", i + 1);
+
+ BN_free(bady);
+ DH_free(dhA);
+ OPENSSL_free(Z1);
+
return 1;
bad_err:
+ BN_free(bady);
+ DH_free(dhA);
+ DH_free(dhB);
+ OPENSSL_free(Z1);
+ OPENSSL_free(Z2);
+
fprintf(stderr, "Initalisation error RFC5114 set %d\n", i + 1);
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
return 0;
err:
+ BN_free(bady);
+ DH_free(dhA);
+ DH_free(dhB);
+ OPENSSL_free(Z1);
+ OPENSSL_free(Z2);
+
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed RFC5114 set %d\n", i + 1);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
index f0ec8faa84cc..efc4f1b6aeba 100644
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
@@ -187,9 +187,6 @@ static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, kinv, dsa->q, ctx))
goto err;
- ret = DSA_SIG_new();
- if (ret == NULL)
- goto err;
/*
* Redo if r or s is zero as required by FIPS 186-3: this is very
* unlikely.
@@ -201,11 +198,14 @@ static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
}
goto redo;
}
+ ret = DSA_SIG_new();
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ goto err;
ret->r = r;
ret->s = s;
err:
- if (!ret) {
+ if (ret == NULL) {
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_SIGN, reason);
BN_free(r);
BN_free(s);
diff --git a/crypto/dso/dso.h b/crypto/dso/dso.h
index 7c4a1dc4a620..c9013f5cea8b 100644
--- a/crypto/dso/dso.h
+++ b/crypto/dso/dso.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dso.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* dso.h */
/*
* Written by Geoff Thorpe (geoff@geoffthorpe.net) for the OpenSSL project
* 2000.
diff --git a/crypto/dso/dso_dl.c b/crypto/dso/dso_dl.c
index 0087ac54afe1..ceedf66e8856 100644
--- a/crypto/dso/dso_dl.c
+++ b/crypto/dso/dso_dl.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dso_dl.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* dso_dl.c */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2000.
diff --git a/crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c b/crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c
index f629f0380d8c..78df723ffbae 100644
--- a/crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c
+++ b/crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dso_dlfcn.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* dso_dlfcn.c */
/*
* Written by Geoff Thorpe (geoff@geoffthorpe.net) for the OpenSSL project
* 2000.
diff --git a/crypto/dso/dso_lib.c b/crypto/dso/dso_lib.c
index 09b8eafccacc..3312450eae67 100644
--- a/crypto/dso/dso_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/dso/dso_lib.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dso_lib.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* dso_lib.c */
/*
* Written by Geoff Thorpe (geoff@geoffthorpe.net) for the OpenSSL project
* 2000.
diff --git a/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl b/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl
index 648c969be621..e6acfd59f0d4 100755
--- a/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$addx = ($1>=12);
}
-if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10
$avx = ($ver>=3.0) + ($ver>=3.01);
$addx = ($ver>=3.03);
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c b/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c
index 077c7fc8dda5..5b27b91fcc94 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c
@@ -746,6 +746,7 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
goto err;
if (!BN_one(&point->Z))
goto err;
+ point->Z_is_one = 1;
ret = 1;
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_key.c b/crypto/ec/ec_key.c
index c784b6fd30a3..bc94ab5661ff 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_key.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_key.c
@@ -387,6 +387,8 @@ int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x,
tx = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
ty = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (ty == NULL)
+ goto err;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
tmp_nid = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(key->group));
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256_table.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256_table.c
index 216d024e0120..2f0797db6b9b 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256_table.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256_table.c
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ __attribute((aligned(4096)))
#elif defined(_MSC_VER)
__declspec(align(4096))
#elif defined(__SUNPRO_C)
-# pragma align 4096(ecp_nistz256_precomputed)
+# pragma align 64(ecp_nistz256_precomputed)
#endif
static const BN_ULONG ecp_nistz256_precomputed[37][64 *
sizeof(P256_POINT_AFFINE) /
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ectest.c b/crypto/ec/ectest.c
index fede530bc139..efab0b07b1d2 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ectest.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ectest.c
@@ -1591,7 +1591,7 @@ struct nistp_test_params {
int degree;
/*
* Qx, Qy and D are taken from
- * http://csrcdocut.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/documents/Examples/ECDSA_Prime.pdf
+ * http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/documents/Examples/ECDSA_Prime.pdf
* Otherwise, values are standard curve parameters from FIPS 180-3
*/
const char *p, *a, *b, *Qx, *Qy, *Gx, *Gy, *order, *d;
diff --git a/crypto/engine/eng_all.c b/crypto/engine/eng_all.c
index 195a3a95542a..48ad0d26b41e 100644
--- a/crypto/engine/eng_all.c
+++ b/crypto/engine/eng_all.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/engine/eng_all.c -*- mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/engine/eng_all.c */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte <richard@levitte.org> for the OpenSSL project
* 2000.
diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_camellia.c b/crypto/evp/e_camellia.c
index f9c84013675d..f273f9c9475a 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/e_camellia.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/e_camellia.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/evp/e_camellia.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/evp/e_camellia.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_old.c b/crypto/evp/e_old.c
index c93f5a548163..a23d143b7fae 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/e_old.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/e_old.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/evp/e_old.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/evp/e_old.c */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2004.
diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_seed.c b/crypto/evp/e_seed.c
index c948a8f3914f..7249d1b1eecb 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/e_seed.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/e_seed.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/evp/e_seed.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/evp/e_seed.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
diff --git a/crypto/mem_clr.c b/crypto/mem_clr.c
index 1a06636d0ce8..ab85344eef38 100644
--- a/crypto/mem_clr.c
+++ b/crypto/mem_clr.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/mem_clr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/mem_clr.c */
/*
* Written by Geoff Thorpe (geoff@geoffthorpe.net) for the OpenSSL project
* 2002.
diff --git a/crypto/modes/asm/aesni-gcm-x86_64.pl b/crypto/modes/asm/aesni-gcm-x86_64.pl
index 4be25571ea28..bd6bf72fe487 100755
--- a/crypto/modes/asm/aesni-gcm-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/modes/asm/aesni-gcm-x86_64.pl
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
}
-if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
}
diff --git a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl
index 0bcb6d4e028b..4ff2d39aa7b2 100755
--- a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
}
-if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
}
diff --git a/crypto/o_dir.c b/crypto/o_dir.c
index 26242444c885..f9dbed871127 100644
--- a/crypto/o_dir.c
+++ b/crypto/o_dir.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/o_dir.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/o_dir.c */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2004.
diff --git a/crypto/o_dir.h b/crypto/o_dir.h
index d55431194ef2..bf45a14d02ec 100644
--- a/crypto/o_dir.h
+++ b/crypto/o_dir.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/o_dir.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/o_dir.h */
/*
* Copied from Richard Levitte's (richard@levitte.org) LP library. All
* symbol names have been changed, with permission from the author.
diff --git a/crypto/o_dir_test.c b/crypto/o_dir_test.c
index 7cdbbbc403e7..60436b72ce37 100644
--- a/crypto/o_dir_test.c
+++ b/crypto/o_dir_test.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/o_dir.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/o_dir.h */
/*
* Copied from Richard Levitte's (richard@levitte.org) LP library. All
* symbol names have been changed, with permission from the author.
diff --git a/crypto/o_str.c b/crypto/o_str.c
index 4e2d096704f0..7e61cde85a27 100644
--- a/crypto/o_str.c
+++ b/crypto/o_str.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/o_str.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/o_str.c */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2003.
diff --git a/crypto/o_str.h b/crypto/o_str.h
index 5313528ed926..fa512eb39784 100644
--- a/crypto/o_str.h
+++ b/crypto/o_str.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/o_str.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/o_str.h */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2003.
diff --git a/crypto/o_time.c b/crypto/o_time.c
index 58413fe97d09..635dae184d2f 100644
--- a/crypto/o_time.c
+++ b/crypto/o_time.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/o_time.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/o_time.c */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2001.
diff --git a/crypto/o_time.h b/crypto/o_time.h
index a83a3d247d41..f192c6dccf37 100644
--- a/crypto/o_time.h
+++ b/crypto/o_time.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/o_time.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/o_time.h */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2001.
diff --git a/crypto/opensslv.h b/crypto/opensslv.h
index abcef15b17d9..03b8c4843784 100644
--- a/crypto/opensslv.h
+++ b/crypto/opensslv.h
@@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ extern "C" {
* (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
* major minor fix final patch/beta)
*/
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000205fL
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000206fL
# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2e-fips 3 Dec 2015"
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2f-fips 28 Jan 2016"
# else
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2e 3 Dec 2015"
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2f 28 Jan 2016"
# endif
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
diff --git a/crypto/rc4/rc4_utl.c b/crypto/rc4/rc4_utl.c
index 7c6a15f1c71f..cbd4a24e4b4d 100644
--- a/crypto/rc4/rc4_utl.c
+++ b/crypto/rc4/rc4_utl.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/rc4/rc4_utl.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/rc4/rc4_utl.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2011 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c
index f4383860b58b..607faa00171e 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c -*- Mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
index 82ca8324dfbc..ed63a1d8b0e3 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ int RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
return 0;
}
#endif
- if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER) && rsa->meth->rsa_sign) {
+ if (rsa->meth->rsa_sign) {
return rsa->meth->rsa_sign(type, m, m_len, sigret, siglen, rsa);
}
/* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ int RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa)
{
- if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER) && rsa->meth->rsa_verify) {
+ if (rsa->meth->rsa_verify) {
return rsa->meth->rsa_verify(dtype, m, m_len, sigbuf, siglen, rsa);
}
diff --git a/crypto/seed/seed_cbc.c b/crypto/seed/seed_cbc.c
index 33e6887740e9..ee1115b4c113 100644
--- a/crypto/seed/seed_cbc.c
+++ b/crypto/seed/seed_cbc.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/seed/seed_cbc.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/seed/seed_cbc.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
diff --git a/crypto/seed/seed_cfb.c b/crypto/seed/seed_cfb.c
index 3437d7b4e111..b6a5648b35fd 100644
--- a/crypto/seed/seed_cfb.c
+++ b/crypto/seed/seed_cfb.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/seed/seed_cfb.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/seed/seed_cfb.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
diff --git a/crypto/seed/seed_ecb.c b/crypto/seed/seed_ecb.c
index 937a31b42a87..9363d5508044 100644
--- a/crypto/seed/seed_ecb.c
+++ b/crypto/seed/seed_ecb.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/seed/seed_ecb.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/seed/seed_ecb.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
diff --git a/crypto/seed/seed_ofb.c b/crypto/seed/seed_ofb.c
index 6974302ce80f..48b71224c52c 100644
--- a/crypto/seed/seed_ofb.c
+++ b/crypto/seed/seed_ofb.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/seed/seed_ofb.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/seed/seed_ofb.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-mb-x86_64.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-mb-x86_64.pl
index f856bb888b0e..a8d8708d4b75 100755
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-mb-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-mb-x86_64.pl
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
}
-if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
}
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl
index 9a6acc347d33..5f375fc6886b 100755
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
}
-if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
}
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-mb-x86_64.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-mb-x86_64.pl
index 3d37ae31ad3e..9770286b9596 100755
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-mb-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-mb-x86_64.pl
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
}
-if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
}
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-x86_64.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-x86_64.pl
index 58665667f149..78e445f3fe4a 100755
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-x86_64.pl
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
}
-if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
}
diff --git a/crypto/sha/sha1test.c b/crypto/sha/sha1test.c
index 0052a95c7dd4..551a348df37f 100644
--- a/crypto/sha/sha1test.c
+++ b/crypto/sha/sha1test.c
@@ -157,8 +157,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
if (err)
printf("ERROR: %d\n", err);
# endif
- EXIT(err);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&c);
+ EXIT(err);
return (0);
}
diff --git a/crypto/store/store.h b/crypto/store/store.h
index 834334104907..ce3709d9f00b 100644
--- a/crypto/store/store.h
+++ b/crypto/store/store.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/store/store.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/store/store.h */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2003.
diff --git a/crypto/store/str_lib.c b/crypto/store/str_lib.c
index 227b797b5949..e3d5da938868 100644
--- a/crypto/store/str_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/store/str_lib.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/store/str_lib.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/store/str_lib.c */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2003.
diff --git a/crypto/store/str_locl.h b/crypto/store/str_locl.h
index ac55784df0aa..c0b40f0db674 100644
--- a/crypto/store/str_locl.h
+++ b/crypto/store/str_locl.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/store/str_locl.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/store/str_locl.h */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2003.
diff --git a/crypto/store/str_mem.c b/crypto/store/str_mem.c
index 8edd0eb41b12..6eee5bba2922 100644
--- a/crypto/store/str_mem.c
+++ b/crypto/store/str_mem.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/store/str_mem.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/store/str_mem.c */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2003.
diff --git a/crypto/store/str_meth.c b/crypto/store/str_meth.c
index d83a6de0fc47..c83fbc565aac 100644
--- a/crypto/store/str_meth.c
+++ b/crypto/store/str_meth.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/store/str_meth.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/store/str_meth.c */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2003.
diff --git a/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c b/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c
index da8991173ced..29aa5a497e89 100644
--- a/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c
@@ -255,7 +255,8 @@ static int TS_verify_cert(X509_STORE *store, STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted,
/* chain is an out argument. */
*chain = NULL;
- X509_STORE_CTX_init(&cert_ctx, store, signer, untrusted);
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&cert_ctx, store, signer, untrusted))
+ return 0;
X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(&cert_ctx, X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN);
i = X509_verify_cert(&cert_ctx);
if (i <= 0) {
diff --git a/crypto/ui/ui.h b/crypto/ui/ui.h
index b917edab3a7a..0dc16330b870 100644
--- a/crypto/ui/ui.h
+++ b/crypto/ui/ui.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/ui/ui.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/ui/ui.h */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2001.
diff --git a/crypto/ui/ui_compat.c b/crypto/ui/ui_compat.c
index 0ca5284f91c0..e79d54eea682 100644
--- a/crypto/ui/ui_compat.c
+++ b/crypto/ui/ui_compat.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/ui/ui_compat.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/ui/ui_compat.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2001-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
diff --git a/crypto/ui/ui_compat.h b/crypto/ui/ui_compat.h
index 42fb9ff6500f..bf541542c041 100644
--- a/crypto/ui/ui_compat.h
+++ b/crypto/ui/ui_compat.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/ui/ui.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/ui/ui.h */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2001.
diff --git a/crypto/ui/ui_lib.c b/crypto/ui/ui_lib.c
index 5ddd7317e52b..2f580352ce8f 100644
--- a/crypto/ui/ui_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/ui/ui_lib.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/ui/ui_lib.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/ui/ui_lib.c */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2001.
diff --git a/crypto/ui/ui_locl.h b/crypto/ui/ui_locl.h
index 0d919cd7b1cc..bebc13abfc52 100644
--- a/crypto/ui/ui_locl.h
+++ b/crypto/ui/ui_locl.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/ui/ui.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/ui/ui.h */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2001.
diff --git a/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c b/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c
index 5d66276418fc..9ab259b8f605 100644
--- a/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c
+++ b/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) and others for the
* OpenSSL project 2001.
diff --git a/crypto/ui/ui_util.c b/crypto/ui/ui_util.c
index f65f80d71de6..0f290115d0f8 100644
--- a/crypto/ui/ui_util.c
+++ b/crypto/ui/ui_util.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/ui/ui_util.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/ui/ui_util.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2001-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index ab94948f0135..0429767032fd 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -2283,9 +2283,10 @@ int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
ctx->current_reasons = 0;
ctx->tree = NULL;
ctx->parent = NULL;
+ /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */
+ memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
-
if (!ctx->param) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
@@ -2294,7 +2295,6 @@ int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
/*
* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
*/
-
if (store)
ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
else
@@ -2302,6 +2302,7 @@ int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
if (store) {
ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
+ /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, else must be idempotent */
ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
} else
ctx->cleanup = 0;
@@ -2312,7 +2313,7 @@ int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
if (ret == 0) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
+ goto err;
}
if (store && store->check_issued)
@@ -2367,19 +2368,18 @@ int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
+ if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
+ &ctx->ex_data))
+ return 1;
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+
+ err:
/*
- * This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
- * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
- * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation.
+ * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not
+ * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so.
*/
- /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
- if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
- &(ctx->ex_data))) {
- OPENSSL_free(ctx);
- X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -2395,8 +2395,17 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
- if (ctx->cleanup)
+ /*
+ * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls
+ * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free()
+ * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the
+ * pointers below after they're freed!
+ */
+ /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */
+ if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) {
ctx->cleanup(ctx);
+ ctx->cleanup = NULL;
+ }
if (ctx->param != NULL) {
if (ctx->parent == NULL)
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h
index bd8613c62ba4..2663e1c0a362 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth);
X509_LOOKUP_ctrl((x),X509_L_ADD_DIR,(name),(long)(type),NULL)
# define X509_V_OK 0
-/* illegal error (for uninitialized values, to avoid X509_V_OK): 1 */
+# define X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED 1
# define X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT 2
# define X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL 3
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c
index 592a8a5f6a5c..1ac15a881a10 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c
@@ -94,11 +94,11 @@ static int int_x509_param_set_hosts(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id, int mode,
* Refuse names with embedded NUL bytes, except perhaps as final byte.
* XXX: Do we need to push an error onto the error stack?
*/
- if (namelen == 0)
+ if (namelen == 0 || name == NULL)
namelen = name ? strlen(name) : 0;
else if (name && memchr(name, '\0', namelen > 1 ? namelen - 1 : namelen))
return 0;
- if (name && name[namelen - 1] == '\0')
+ if (namelen > 0 && name[namelen - 1] == '\0')
--namelen;
if (mode == SET_HOST && id->hosts) {
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c
index 48ac0959cb10..34cad53cb5f0 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* v3_pci.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* v3_pci.c */
/*
* Contributed to the OpenSSL Project 2004 by Richard Levitte
* (richard@levitte.org)
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c
index 43fd362aeda0..e53c82e8dc79 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* v3_pcia.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* v3_pcia.c */
/*
* Contributed to the OpenSSL Project 2004 by Richard Levitte
* (richard@levitte.org)
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c
index 4d1ecc58bf94..43b9cb9c5861 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c
@@ -841,7 +841,8 @@ static const unsigned char *valid_star(const unsigned char *p, size_t len,
state = LABEL_START;
++dots;
} else if (p[i] == '-') {
- if ((state & LABEL_HYPHEN) != 0)
+ /* no domain/subdomain starts with '-' */
+ if ((state & LABEL_START) != 0)
return NULL;
state |= LABEL_HYPHEN;
} else
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3nametest.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3nametest.c
index 7b5c1c8e5127..ac5c9ff432d9 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3nametest.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3nametest.c
@@ -6,12 +6,16 @@
static const char *const names[] = {
"a", "b", ".", "*", "@",
".a", "a.", ".b", "b.", ".*", "*.", "*@", "@*", "a@", "@a", "b@", "..",
+ "-example.com", "example-.com",
"@@", "**", "*.com", "*com", "*.*.com", "*com", "com*", "*example.com",
"*@example.com", "test@*.example.com", "example.com", "www.example.com",
"test.www.example.com", "*.example.com", "*.www.example.com",
"test.*.example.com", "www.*.com",
".www.example.com", "*www.example.com",
"example.net", "xn--rger-koa.example.com",
+ "*.xn--rger-koa.example.com", "www.xn--rger-koa.example.com",
+ "*.good--example.com", "www.good--example.com",
+ "*.xn--bar.com", "xn--foo.xn--bar.com",
"a.example.com", "b.example.com",
"postmaster@example.com", "Postmaster@example.com",
"postmaster@EXAMPLE.COM",
@@ -27,6 +31,9 @@ static const char *const exceptions[] = {
"set CN: host: [*.www.example.com] matches [.www.example.com]",
"set CN: host: [*www.example.com] matches [www.example.com]",
"set CN: host: [test.www.example.com] matches [.www.example.com]",
+ "set CN: host: [*.xn--rger-koa.example.com] matches [www.xn--rger-koa.example.com]",
+ "set CN: host: [*.xn--bar.com] matches [xn--foo.xn--bar.com]",
+ "set CN: host: [*.good--example.com] matches [www.good--example.com]",
"set CN: host-no-wildcards: [*.www.example.com] matches [.www.example.com]",
"set CN: host-no-wildcards: [test.www.example.com] matches [.www.example.com]",
"set emailAddress: email: [postmaster@example.com] does not match [Postmaster@example.com]",
@@ -43,6 +50,9 @@ static const char *const exceptions[] = {
"set dnsName: host: [*.www.example.com] matches [.www.example.com]",
"set dnsName: host: [*www.example.com] matches [www.example.com]",
"set dnsName: host: [test.www.example.com] matches [.www.example.com]",
+ "set dnsName: host: [*.xn--rger-koa.example.com] matches [www.xn--rger-koa.example.com]",
+ "set dnsName: host: [*.xn--bar.com] matches [xn--foo.xn--bar.com]",
+ "set dnsName: host: [*.good--example.com] matches [www.good--example.com]",
"set rfc822Name: email: [postmaster@example.com] does not match [Postmaster@example.com]",
"set rfc822Name: email: [Postmaster@example.com] does not match [postmaster@example.com]",
"set rfc822Name: email: [Postmaster@example.com] does not match [postmaster@EXAMPLE.COM]",
diff --git a/doc/apps/s_time.pod b/doc/apps/s_time.pod
index 5a38aa2e0394..9082d876feeb 100644
--- a/doc/apps/s_time.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/s_time.pod
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ B<openssl> B<s_time>
=head1 DESCRIPTION
-The B<s_client> command implements a generic SSL/TLS client which connects to a
+The B<s_time> command implements a generic SSL/TLS client which connects to a
remote host using SSL/TLS. It can request a page from the server and includes
the time to transfer the payload data in its timing measurements. It measures
the number of connections within a given timeframe, the amount of data
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ and the link speed determine how many connections B<s_time> can establish.
=head1 NOTES
-B<s_client> can be used to measure the performance of an SSL connection.
+B<s_time> can be used to measure the performance of an SSL connection.
To connect to an SSL HTTP server and get the default page the command
openssl s_time -connect servername:443 -www / -CApath yourdir -CAfile yourfile.pem -cipher commoncipher [-ssl3]
diff --git a/doc/crypto/BIO_s_connect.pod b/doc/crypto/BIO_s_connect.pod
index 18ece4c91f66..345a468a5d74 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/BIO_s_connect.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/BIO_s_connect.pod
@@ -21,8 +21,8 @@ BIO_set_nbio, BIO_do_connect - connect BIO
long BIO_set_conn_int_port(BIO *b, char *port);
char *BIO_get_conn_hostname(BIO *b);
char *BIO_get_conn_port(BIO *b);
- char *BIO_get_conn_ip(BIO *b, dummy);
- long BIO_get_conn_int_port(BIO *b, int port);
+ char *BIO_get_conn_ip(BIO *b);
+ long BIO_get_conn_int_port(BIO *b);
long BIO_set_nbio(BIO *b, long n);
diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store.pod
index 493cca481940..3e3a4fa90c0e 100644
--- a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store.pod
+++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store.pod
@@ -17,10 +17,10 @@ verification or chain store
int SSL_CTX_set0_chain_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *st);
int SSL_CTX_set1_chain_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *st);
- int SSL_set0_verify_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *st);
- int SSL_set1_verify_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *st);
- int SSL_set0_chain_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *st);
- int SSL_set1_chain_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *st);
+ int SSL_set0_verify_cert_store(SSL *ctx, X509_STORE *st);
+ int SSL_set1_verify_cert_store(SSL *ctx, X509_STORE *st);
+ int SSL_set0_chain_cert_store(SSL *ctx, X509_STORE *st);
+ int SSL_set1_chain_cert_store(SSL *ctx, X509_STORE *st);
=head1 DESCRIPTION
diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb.pod
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b8147baecf98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb, SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg,
+SSL_set_tlsext_status_type, SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp,
+SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp - OCSP Certificate Status Request functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/tls1.h>
+
+ long SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int (*callback)(SSL *, void *));
+ long SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg);
+
+ long SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(SSL *s, int type);
+
+ long SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(ssl, unsigned char **resp);
+ long SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(ssl, unsigned char *resp, int len);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+A client application may request that a server send back an OCSP status response
+(also known as OCSP stapling). To do so the client should call the
+SSL_set_tlsext_status_type() function prior to the start of the handshake.
+Currently the only supported type is B<TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp>. This value
+should be passed in the B<type> argument. The client should additionally provide
+a callback function to decide what to do with the returned OCSP response by
+calling SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(). The callback function should determine
+whether the returned OCSP response is acceptable or not. The callback will be
+passed as an argument the value previously set via a call to
+SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(). Note that the callback will not be called in
+the event of a handshake where session resumption occurs (because there are no
+Certificates exchanged in such a handshake).
+
+The response returned by the server can be obtained via a call to
+SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(). The value B<*resp> will be updated to point
+to the OCSP response data and the return value will be the length of that data.
+Typically a callback would obtain an OCSP_RESPONSE object from this data via a
+call to the d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE() function. If the server has not provided any
+response data then B<*resp> will be NULL and the return value from
+SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp() will be -1.
+
+A server application must also call the SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb() function
+if it wants to be able to provide clients with OCSP Certificate Status
+responses. Typically the server callback would obtain the server certificate
+that is being sent back to the client via a call to SSL_get_certificate();
+obtain the OCSP response to be sent back; and then set that response data by
+calling SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(). A pointer to the response data should
+be provided in the B<resp> argument, and the length of that data should be in
+the B<len> argument.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The callback when used on the client side should return a negative value on
+error; 0 if the response is not acceptable (in which case the handshake will
+fail) or a positive value if it is acceptable.
+
+The callback when used on the server side should return with either
+SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK (meaning that the OCSP response that has been set should be
+returned), SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK (meaning that an OCSP response should not be
+returned) or SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL (meaning that a fatal error has
+occurred).
+
+SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(), SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(),
+SSL_set_tlsext_status_type() and SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp() return 0 on
+error or 1 on success.
+
+SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp() returns the length of the OCSP response data
+or -1 if there is no OCSP response data.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod
index b754c16a86e6..234fbc845002 100644
--- a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod
+++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod
@@ -48,25 +48,8 @@ even if he gets hold of the normal (certified) key, as this key was
only used for signing.
In order to perform a DH key exchange the server must use a DH group
-(DH parameters) and generate a DH key.
-The server will always generate a new DH key during the negotiation
-if either the DH parameters are supplied via callback or the
-SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option of SSL_CTX_set_options(3) is set (or both).
-It will immediately create a DH key if DH parameters are supplied via
-SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() and SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is not set.
-In this case,
-it may happen that a key is generated on initialization without later
-being needed, while on the other hand the computer time during the
-negotiation is being saved.
-
-If "strong" primes were used to generate the DH parameters, it is not strictly
-necessary to generate a new key for each handshake but it does improve forward
-secrecy. If it is not assured that "strong" primes were used,
-SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE must be used in order to prevent small subgroup
-attacks. Always using SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE has an impact on the
-computer time needed during negotiation, but it is not very large, so
-application authors/users should consider always enabling this option.
-The option is required to implement perfect forward secrecy (PFS).
+(DH parameters) and generate a DH key. The server will always generate
+a new DH key during the negotiation.
As generating DH parameters is extremely time consuming, an application
should not generate the parameters on the fly but supply the parameters.
@@ -93,10 +76,9 @@ can supply the DH parameters via a callback function.
Previous versions of the callback used B<is_export> and B<keylength>
parameters to control parameter generation for export and non-export
cipher suites. Modern servers that do not support export ciphersuites
-are advised to either use SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() in combination with
-SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE, or alternatively, use the callback but ignore
-B<keylength> and B<is_export> and simply supply at least 2048-bit
-parameters in the callback.
+are advised to either use SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() or alternatively, use
+the callback but ignore B<keylength> and B<is_export> and simply
+supply at least 2048-bit parameters in the callback.
=head1 EXAMPLES
@@ -128,7 +110,6 @@ partly left out.)
if (SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh_2048) != 1) {
/* Error. */
}
- SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
...
=head1 RETURN VALUES
diff --git a/engines/e_chil.c b/engines/e_chil.c
index 72d14fe383a4..5dfab5134527 100644
--- a/engines/e_chil.c
+++ b/engines/e_chil.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/engine/e_chil.c -*- mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/engine/e_chil.c */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org), Geoff Thorpe
* (geoff@geoffthorpe.net) and Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for
diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
index c2c8d57e9d9c..d1fc716d5c5c 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -295,8 +295,44 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
blocksize = 0;
frag_off = 0;
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+
/* s->init_num shouldn't ever be < 0...but just in case */
while (s->init_num > 0) {
+ if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && s->init_off != 0) {
+ /* We must be writing a fragment other than the first one */
+
+ if (frag_off > 0) {
+ /* This is the first attempt at writing out this fragment */
+
+ if (s->init_off <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+ /*
+ * Each fragment that was already sent must at least have
+ * contained the message header plus one other byte.
+ * Therefore |init_off| must have progressed by at least
+ * |DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 1| bytes. If not something went
+ * wrong.
+ */
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Adjust |init_off| and |init_num| to allow room for a new
+ * message header for this fragment.
+ */
+ s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * We must have been called again after a retry so use the
+ * fragment offset from our last attempt. We do not need
+ * to adjust |init_off| and |init_num| as above, because
+ * that should already have been done before the retry.
+ */
+ frag_off = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.frag_off;
+ }
+ }
+
used_len = BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ mac_size + blocksize;
if (s->d1->mtu > used_len)
@@ -309,8 +345,10 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
* grr.. we could get an error if MTU picked was wrong
*/
ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
- if (ret <= 0)
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
return ret;
+ }
used_len = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + mac_size + blocksize;
if (s->d1->mtu > used_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - used_len;
@@ -336,25 +374,6 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
* XDTLS: this function is too long. split out the CCS part
*/
if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
- if (s->init_off != 0) {
- OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off > DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
- s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-
- /*
- * We just checked that s->init_num > 0 so this cast should
- * be safe
- */
- if (((unsigned int)s->init_num) > curr_mtu)
- len = curr_mtu;
- else
- len = s->init_num;
- }
-
- /* Shouldn't ever happen */
- if (len > INT_MAX)
- len = INT_MAX;
-
if (len < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
/*
* len is so small that we really can't do anything sensible
@@ -442,7 +461,16 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
}
s->init_off += ret;
s->init_num -= ret;
- frag_off += (ret -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+ ret -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ frag_off += ret;
+
+ /*
+ * We save the fragment offset for the next fragment so we have it
+ * available in case of an IO retry. We don't know the length of the
+ * next fragment yet so just set that to 0 for now. It will be
+ * updated again later.
+ */
+ dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off, 0);
}
}
return (0);
diff --git a/ssl/kssl.c b/ssl/kssl.c
index cf585679dccc..f2839bdcd7f5 100644
--- a/ssl/kssl.c
+++ b/ssl/kssl.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* ssl/kssl.c -*- mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* ssl/kssl.c */
/*
* Written by Vern Staats <staatsvr@asc.hpc.mil> for the OpenSSL project
* 2000.
diff --git a/ssl/kssl.h b/ssl/kssl.h
index 9a5767280150..ae8a51f472da 100644
--- a/ssl/kssl.h
+++ b/ssl/kssl.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* ssl/kssl.h -*- mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* ssl/kssl.h */
/*
* Written by Vern Staats <staatsvr@asc.hpc.mil> for the OpenSSL project
* 2000. project 2000.
diff --git a/ssl/kssl_lcl.h b/ssl/kssl_lcl.h
index 46dcef22d16c..8e6a6d69e949 100644
--- a/ssl/kssl_lcl.h
+++ b/ssl/kssl_lcl.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* ssl/kssl.h -*- mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* ssl/kssl.h */
/*
* Written by Vern Staats <staatsvr@asc.hpc.mil> for the OpenSSL project
* 2000. project 2000.
diff --git a/ssl/s2_srvr.c b/ssl/s2_srvr.c
index 4289272b73d3..07e9df82820a 100644
--- a/ssl/s2_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s2_srvr.c
@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
}
cp = ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(p);
- if (cp == NULL) {
+ if (cp == NULL || sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(s->session->ciphers, cp) < 0) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
return (-1);
@@ -598,6 +598,11 @@ static int get_client_hello(SSL *s)
s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length = i;
n2s(p, i);
s->s2->tmp.session_id_length = i;
+ if ((i < 0) || (i > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) {
+ ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return -1;
+ }
n2s(p, i);
s->s2->challenge_length = i;
if ((i < SSL2_MIN_CHALLENGE_LENGTH) ||
@@ -687,8 +692,12 @@ static int get_client_hello(SSL *s)
prio = cs;
allow = cl;
}
+
+ /* Generate list of SSLv2 ciphers shared between client and server */
for (z = 0; z < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio); z++) {
- if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow, sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio, z)) < 0) {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cp = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio, z);
+ if ((cp->algorithm_ssl & SSL_SSLV2) == 0 ||
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow, cp) < 0) {
(void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_delete(prio, z);
z--;
}
@@ -697,6 +706,13 @@ static int get_client_hello(SSL *s)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
s->session->ciphers = prio;
}
+
+ /* Make sure we have at least one cipher in common */
+ if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(s->session->ciphers) == 0) {
+ ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
+ return -1;
+ }
/*
* s->session->ciphers should now have a list of ciphers that are on
* both the client and server. This list is ordered by the order the
diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index bc5254c81160..04cc9f54a92d 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -2350,37 +2350,44 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B,
- SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, 16384, &ok);
+ -1, 16384, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
- if (n < 4) {
- /* need at least status type + length */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
- if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- n2l3(p, resplen);
- if (resplen + 4 != n) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen);
- if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto f_err;
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
+ /*
+ * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
+ * tlsext_status_expected is set
+ */
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+ } else {
+ if (n < 4) {
+ /* need at least status type + length */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+ if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ n2l3(p, resplen);
+ if (resplen + 4 != n) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen);
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
}
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
int ret;
ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
@@ -3603,7 +3610,7 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
DH_free(dh_srvr);
}
- if ((!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 768)
+ if ((!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 1024)
|| (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 512)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
goto f_err;
diff --git a/ssl/s3_lib.c b/ssl/s3_lib.c
index 64793d6af34f..f846cb5b7b01 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_lib.c
@@ -3206,13 +3206,6 @@ long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
return (ret);
}
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)) {
- if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
- DH_free(dh);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- return (ret);
- }
- }
if (s->cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
DH_free(s->cert->dh_tmp);
s->cert->dh_tmp = dh;
@@ -3263,6 +3256,8 @@ long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME:
if (larg == TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) {
+ size_t len;
+
if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname);
s->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
@@ -3270,7 +3265,8 @@ long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
ret = 1;
if (parg == NULL)
break;
- if (strlen((char *)parg) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
+ len = strlen((char *)parg);
+ if (len == 0 || len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME);
return 0;
}
@@ -3710,13 +3706,6 @@ long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
return 0;
}
- if (!(ctx->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)) {
- if (!DH_generate_key(new)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- DH_free(new);
- return 0;
- }
- }
if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
DH_free(cert->dh_tmp);
cert->dh_tmp = new;
@@ -4337,6 +4326,21 @@ int ssl3_shutdown(SSL *s)
}
#endif
} else if (!(s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)) {
+ if (SSL_in_init(s)) {
+ /*
+ * We can't shutdown properly if we are in the middle of a
+ * handshake. Doing so is problematic because the peer may send a
+ * CCS before it acts on our close_notify. However we should not
+ * continue to process received handshake messages or CCS once our
+ * close_notify has been sent. Therefore any close_notify from
+ * the peer will be unreadable because we have not moved to the next
+ * cipher state. Its best just to avoid this can-of-worms. Return
+ * an error if we are wanting to wait for a close_notify from the
+ * peer and we are in init.
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_SHUTDOWN_WHILE_IN_INIT);
+ return -1;
+ }
/*
* If we are waiting for a close from our peer, we are closed
*/
diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index ee83105b75bf..ab28702ee972 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* ssl/s3_srvr.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
@@ -1004,6 +1004,12 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
goto f_err;
}
+ if ((j < 0) || (j > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
s->hit = 0;
/*
* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
@@ -1681,20 +1687,9 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
}
s->s3->tmp.dh = dh;
- if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
- dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
- (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
- if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
- dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
- if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
+ if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
}
r[0] = dh->p;
r[1] = dh->g;
diff --git a/ssl/ssl.h b/ssl/ssl.h
index afec1f5bf29f..ae8c92575e03 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl.h
@@ -625,7 +625,7 @@ struct ssl_session_st {
# define SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0x00040000L
/* If set, always create a new key when using tmp_ecdh parameters */
# define SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE 0x00080000L
-/* If set, always create a new key when using tmp_dh parameters */
+/* Does nothing: retained for compatibility */
# define SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE 0x00100000L
/* Does nothing: retained for compatibiity */
# define SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA 0x0
@@ -2092,7 +2092,7 @@ DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
# define SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list(ctx, s) \
SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST,0,(char *)s)
# define SSL_set1_sigalgs(ctx, slist, slistlen) \
- SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS,clistlen,(int *)slist)
+ SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS,slistlen,(int *)slist)
# define SSL_set1_sigalgs_list(ctx, s) \
SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST,0,(char *)s)
# define SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs(ctx, slist, slistlen) \
@@ -2713,6 +2713,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
# define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK 157
# define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER 156
# define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER 291
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_SHUTDOWN 396
# define SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES 158
# define SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING 159
# define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN 318
@@ -3056,6 +3057,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
# define SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 275
# define SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED 277
# define SSL_R_SHORT_READ 219
+# define SSL_R_SHUTDOWN_WHILE_IN_INIT 407
# define SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR 360
# define SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE 220
# define SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC 361
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_err.c b/ssl/ssl_err.c
index 6d1366f2a59d..dd3b2afd1ea6 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_err.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_err.c
@@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK), "ssl3_setup_key_block"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER), "ssl3_setup_read_buffer"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER), "ssl3_setup_write_buffer"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SHUTDOWN), "ssl3_shutdown"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES), "ssl3_write_bytes"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING), "ssl3_write_pending"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN), "ssl_add_cert_chain"},
@@ -647,6 +648,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[] = {
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED),
"session id context uninitialized"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SHORT_READ), "short read"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SHUTDOWN_WHILE_IN_INIT), "shutdown while in init"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR),
"signature algorithms error"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE),
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index f2071db93702..2744be8ad8ce 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -1060,10 +1060,7 @@ int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s)
return -1;
}
- if ((s != NULL) && !SSL_in_init(s))
- return (s->method->ssl_shutdown(s));
- else
- return (1);
+ return s->method->ssl_shutdown(s);
}
int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s)
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
index 68390d310809..b18299834384 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
@@ -573,9 +573,6 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
int r;
#endif
- if (len < 0 || len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)
- goto err;
-
if (session_id + len > limit) {
fatal = 1;
goto err;
diff --git a/ssl/t1_enc.c b/ssl/t1_enc.c
index f46544b4d713..514fcb3e4e74 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -1155,7 +1155,7 @@ int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
so = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input;
/*
* must be same as col (see
- * draft-resc-00.txts-opaque-prf-input-00.txt, section 3.1)
+ * draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt, section 3.1)
*/
sol = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
}
diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 3176d1e3baba..d9ba99d73584 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -3157,22 +3157,20 @@ int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
}
# endif
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
/*
* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
* callback
*/
if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
- && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
+ && !(s->hit) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
int r;
/*
- * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
- * response.
+ * Call callback with resp == NULL and resplen == -1 so callback
+ * knows there is no response
*/
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
- }
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
if (r == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
@@ -3583,7 +3581,7 @@ static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
{
- int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
+ int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
return;
if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
@@ -3599,9 +3597,9 @@ static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
*psign_nid = sign_nid;
}
if (psignhash_nid) {
- if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
- OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
- else
+ if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
+ || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid,
+ sign_nid) <= 0)
*psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
}
}
diff --git a/util/domd b/util/domd
index 6a628c7f96c2..95bb1b06e257 100755
--- a/util/domd
+++ b/util/domd
@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ if [ "$MAKEDEPEND" = "" ]; then MAKEDEPEND=makedepend; fi
cp Makefile Makefile.save
# fake the presence of Kerberos
touch $TOP/krb5.h
-if ${MAKEDEPEND} --version 2>&1 | grep -q "clang" ||
- echo $MAKEDEPEND | grep -q "gcc"; then
+if ${MAKEDEPEND} --version 2>&1 | grep "clang" > /dev/null ||
+ echo $MAKEDEPEND | grep "gcc" > /dev/null; then
args=""
while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
if [ "$1" != "--" ]; then args="$args $1"; fi
diff --git a/util/pl/VC-32.pl b/util/pl/VC-32.pl
index 284fe0381ed9..0f5547f056c2 100644
--- a/util/pl/VC-32.pl
+++ b/util/pl/VC-32.pl
@@ -361,9 +361,13 @@ sub do_link_rule
$ret.="$target: $files $dep_libs";
if ($standalone == 1)
{
- $ret.=" \$(OBJ_D)${o}applink.obj\n";
+ $ret.=" \$(OBJ_D)${o}applink.obj" if $shlib;
+ $ret.="\n";
$ret.=" \$(LINK) \$(LFLAGS) $efile$target @<<\n\t";
- $ret.= "\$(EX_LIBS) \$(OBJ_D)${o}applink.obj " if ($files =~ /O_FIPSCANISTER/ && !$fipscanisterbuild);
+ if ($files =~ /O_FIPSCANISTER/ && !$fipscanisterbuild) {
+ $ret.= "\$(EX_LIBS) ";
+ $ret.= "\$(OBJ_D)${o}applink.obj " if $shlib;
+ }
$ret.="$files $libs\n<<\n";
}
elsif ($standalone == 2)
diff --git a/util/pod2mantest b/util/pod2mantest
new file mode 100755
index 000000000000..384e683df4cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/util/pod2mantest
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+# This script is used by test/Makefile to check whether a sane 'pod2man'
+# is installed.
+# ('make install' should not try to run 'pod2man' if it does not exist or if
+# it is a broken 'pod2man' version that is known to cause trouble. if we find
+# the system 'pod2man' to be broken, we use our own copy instead)
+#
+# In any case, output an appropriate command line for running (or not
+# running) pod2man.
+
+
+IFS=:
+if test "$OSTYPE" = "msdosdjgpp"; then IFS=";"; fi
+
+try_without_dir=true
+# First we try "pod2man", then "$dir/pod2man" for each item in $PATH.
+for dir in dummy${IFS}$PATH; do
+ if [ "$try_without_dir" = true ]; then
+ # first iteration
+ pod2man=pod2man
+ try_without_dir=false
+ else
+ # second and later iterations
+ pod2man="$dir/pod2man"
+ if [ ! -f "$pod2man" ]; then # '-x' is not available on Ultrix
+ pod2man=''
+ fi
+ fi
+
+ if [ ! "$pod2man" = '' ]; then
+ failure=none
+
+ if "$pod2man" --section=1 --center=OpenSSL --release=dev pod2mantest.pod | fgrep OpenSSL >/dev/null; then
+ :
+ else
+ failure=BasicTest
+ fi
+
+ if [ "$failure" = none ]; then
+ if "$pod2man" --section=1 --center=OpenSSL --release=dev pod2mantest.pod | grep '^MARKER - ' >/dev/null; then
+ failure=MultilineTest
+ fi
+ fi
+
+
+ if [ "$failure" = none ]; then
+ echo "$pod2man"
+ exit 0
+ fi
+
+ echo "$pod2man does not work properly ('$failure' failed). Looking for another pod2man ..." >&2
+ fi
+done
+
+echo "No working pod2man found. Consider installing a new version." >&2
+echo "As a workaround, we'll use a bundled old copy of pod2man.pl." >&2
+echo "$1 ../../util/pod2man.pl"