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authorJung-uk Kim <jkim@FreeBSD.org>2018-09-13 19:18:07 +0000
committerJung-uk Kim <jkim@FreeBSD.org>2018-09-13 19:18:07 +0000
commita43ce912fc025d11e1395506111f75fc194d7ba5 (patch)
tree9794cf7720d75938ed0ea4f499c0dcd4b6eacdda /ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
parent02be298e504b8554caca6dc85af450e1ea44d19d (diff)
downloadsrc-a43ce912fc025d11e1395506111f75fc194d7ba5.tar.gz
src-a43ce912fc025d11e1395506111f75fc194d7ba5.zip
Import OpenSSL 1.1.1.vendor/openssl/1.1.1
Notes
Notes: svn path=/vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/; revision=338658 svn path=/vendor-crypto/openssl/1.1.1/; revision=338659; tag=vendor/openssl/1.1.1
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c')
-rw-r--r--ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c3833
1 files changed, 3833 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8c658da8990d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3833 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include "../ssl_locl.h"
+#include "statem_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <internal/cryptlib.h>
+
+static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
+static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
+
+static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
+static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
+static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
+ WPACKET *pkt);
+
+/*
+ * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
+ *
+ * Return values are:
+ * 1: Yes
+ * 0: No
+ */
+static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
+{
+ /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
+ if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
+ && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
+ || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
+ *
+ * Return values are:
+ * 1: Yes
+ * 0: No
+ */
+static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
+{
+ long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+ /*
+ * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
+ * ciphersuite or for SRP
+ */
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
+ | SSL_kSRP)) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
+ * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
+ * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
+ * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
+ *
+ * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
+ * (transition not allowed)
+ */
+static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
+{
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+ /*
+ * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
+ * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
+ * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
+ */
+
+ switch (st->hand_state) {
+ default:
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
+ /*
+ * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
+ * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
+ */
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
+ if (s->hit) {
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_OK:
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
+#if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
+# error TODO(DTLS1.3): Restore digest for PHA before adding message.
+#endif
+ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) {
+ s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
+ /*
+ * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
+ * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
+ * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
+ * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
+ */
+ if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* No valid transition found */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
+ * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
+ * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
+ * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
+ *
+ * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
+ * (transition not allowed)
+ */
+int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
+{
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+ int ske_expected;
+
+ /*
+ * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
+ * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
+ */
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
+ goto err;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ switch (st->hand_state) {
+ default:
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
+ st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
+ /*
+ * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
+ * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
+ * HelloRetryRequest.
+ */
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
+ if (s->hit) {
+ if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
+ st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
+ return 1;
+ } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
+ && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
+ && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
+ && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ /*
+ * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
+ * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
+ * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
+ * the server is resuming.
+ */
+ s->hit = 1;
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
+ return 1;
+ } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
+ & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
+ /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
+ if (ske_expected
+ || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
+ && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
+ && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
+ return 1;
+ } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
+ /*
+ * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
+ * |ext.status_expected| is set
+ */
+ if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ /* Fall through */
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
+ ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
+ /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
+ if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
+ && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Fall through */
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
+ if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Fall through */
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
+ if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_OK:
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ err:
+ /* No valid transition found */
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ BIO *rbio;
+
+ /*
+ * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
+ * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
+ */
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
+ BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
+ SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION,
+ SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
+ * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
+ * server.
+ */
+static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
+{
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+ /*
+ * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
+ * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
+ * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
+ */
+ switch (st->hand_state) {
+ default:
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
+ if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ }
+ /*
+ * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after
+ * we already sent close_notify
+ */
+ if (!ossl_assert((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0)) {
+ /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
+ }
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
+ if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
+ || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
+ else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
+ && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
+ else
+ st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
+ : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
+ if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ }
+ /* Fall through */
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
+ case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
+ st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
+ : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
+ /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
+ st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
+ : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
+ if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ }
+ /* Fall through */
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
+ case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
+ case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_OK:
+ if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ }
+
+ /* Try to read from the server instead */
+ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
+ * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
+ */
+WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
+{
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+ /*
+ * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
+ * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
+ * later
+ */
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
+ return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
+
+ switch (st->hand_state) {
+ default:
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
+
+ case TLS_ST_OK:
+ if (!s->renegotiate) {
+ /*
+ * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
+ * received a message from the server. Better read it.
+ */
+ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
+ }
+ /* Renegotiation */
+ /* fall thru */
+ case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
+ if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
+ /*
+ * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
+ * actually selected a version yet.
+ */
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
+ else
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ }
+ /*
+ * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
+ * we will be sent
+ */
+ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
+ /*
+ * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
+ * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
+ * because we did early data.
+ */
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
+ && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
+ else
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
+ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
+
+ case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
+ else
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
+ /*
+ * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
+ * sent, but no verify packet is sent
+ */
+ /*
+ * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
+ * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
+ * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
+ * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
+ */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
+ } else {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
+ }
+ if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
+ }
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
+ if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
+ } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
+ } else {
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
+#else
+ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
+ else
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
+#endif
+ }
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+ case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+#endif
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
+ if (s->hit) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ } else {
+ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
+ }
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
+ if (s->hit) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ } else {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ }
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
+ /*
+ * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
+ * convenient time.
+ */
+ if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
+ if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
+ }
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ }
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
+ * the client to the server.
+ */
+WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
+{
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+ switch (st->hand_state) {
+ default:
+ /* No pre work to be done */
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
+ s->shutdown = 0;
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
+ if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (s->hit) {
+ /*
+ * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
+ * messages unless we need to.
+ */
+ st->use_timer = 0;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
+ /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
+ return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
+ /*
+ * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
+ * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
+ * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
+ */
+ if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
+ || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
+ return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+ /* Fall through */
+
+ case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
+ return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1);
+
+ case TLS_ST_OK:
+ /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
+ return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
+ }
+
+ return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
+ * client to the server.
+ */
+WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
+{
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ switch (st->hand_state) {
+ default:
+ /* No post work to be done */
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
+ if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
+ && s->max_early_data > 0) {
+ /*
+ * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
+ * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
+ * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
+ */
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) {
+ if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
+ /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
+ } else if (!statem_flush(s)) {
+ return WORK_MORE_A;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
+ s->first_packet = 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
+ /*
+ * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
+ * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
+ */
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
+ if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
+ break;
+ if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
+ && s->max_early_data > 0) {
+ /*
+ * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
+ * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
+ * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
+ */
+ if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ break;
+ }
+ s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ s->session->compress_meth = 0;
+#else
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+ s->session->compress_meth = 0;
+ else
+ s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
+#endif
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ if (s->hit) {
+ /*
+ * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
+ * no SCTP used.
+ */
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
+ 0, NULL);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
+ /*
+ * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
+ * no SCTP used.
+ */
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
+ 0, NULL);
+ }
+#endif
+ if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
+ return WORK_MORE_B;
+
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
+ if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
+ if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
+ return WORK_MORE_A;
+ if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
+ * client
+ *
+ * Valid return values are:
+ * 1: Success
+ * 0: Error
+ */
+int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
+{
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+ switch (st->hand_state) {
+ default:
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
+ SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
+ return 0;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+ *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
+ else
+ *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
+ *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
+ *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
+ *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
+ *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
+ *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
+ *confunc = NULL;
+ *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
+ *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
+ *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
+ *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
+ *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
+ *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
+ *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
+ break;
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+ case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
+ *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
+ *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
+ break;
+#endif
+ case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
+ *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
+ *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
+ *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
+ *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
+ * reading. Excludes the message header.
+ */
+size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
+{
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+ switch (st->hand_state) {
+ default:
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ return 0;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
+ return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+ case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
+ return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
+ return s->max_cert_list;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
+ return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
+ return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
+ return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
+ /*
+ * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
+ * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
+ * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
+ */
+ return s->max_cert_list;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
+ return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
+ if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ return 3;
+ return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
+ return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
+ return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
+ return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
+ return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
+ */
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+ switch (st->hand_state) {
+ default:
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
+ return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
+
+ case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
+ return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
+ return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
+ return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
+ return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
+ return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
+ return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
+ return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
+ return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
+ return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
+ return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
+ return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
+ return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
+ return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
+ * from the server
+ */
+WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
+{
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+ switch (st->hand_state) {
+ default:
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
+ return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
+ }
+}
+
+int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+ size_t sess_id_len;
+ int i, protverr;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ SSL_COMP *comp;
+#endif
+ SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
+ unsigned char *session_id;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
+ /* Should not happen */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
+ protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
+ if (protverr != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ protverr);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (sess == NULL
+ || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL)
+ || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
+ if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
+ && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ /* else use the pre-loaded session */
+
+ p = s->s3->client_random;
+
+ /*
+ * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
+ * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
+ */
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ size_t idx;
+ i = 1;
+ for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
+ if (p[idx]) {
+ i = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE);
+ }
+
+ if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random),
+ DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*-
+ * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
+ * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
+ * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
+ * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
+ * choke if we initially report a higher version then
+ * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
+ * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
+ * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
+ * 1.0.
+ *
+ * Possible scenario with previous logic:
+ * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
+ * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
+ * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
+ * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
+ * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
+ * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
+ * know that is maximum server supports.
+ * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
+ * containing version 1.0.
+ *
+ * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
+ * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
+ * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
+ * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
+ * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
+ * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
+ * the negotiated version.
+ *
+ * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
+ * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
+ */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
+ || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Session ID */
+ session_id = s->session->session_id;
+ if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
+ && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) {
+ sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id);
+ s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
+ session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
+ if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
+ && RAND_bytes(s->tmp_session_id, sess_id_len) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ sess_id_len = 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ assert(s->session->session_id_length <= sizeof(s->session->session_id));
+ sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
+ if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
+ memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len);
+ }
+ }
+ if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
+ || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id,
+ sess_id_len))
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
+ s->d1->cookie_len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Ciphers supported */
+ if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* COMPRESSION */
+ if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
+ && s->ctx->comp_methods
+ && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
+ int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
+ for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
+ comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ /* Add the NULL method */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* TLS extensions */
+ if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ size_t cookie_len;
+ PACKET cookiepkt;
+
+ if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
+ if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ }
+ s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
+
+ return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
+}
+
+static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars)
+{
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ int i;
+
+ c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ /* unknown cipher */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
+ SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
+ * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
+ */
+ if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
+ i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL
+ && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
+ /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
+ * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
+ * set and use it for comparison.
+ */
+ if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
+ s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
+ if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ /*
+ * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
+ * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
+ */
+ if (ssl_md(c->algorithm2)
+ != ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
+ SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
+ * ciphersuite.
+ */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
+ SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ PACKET session_id, extpkt;
+ size_t session_id_len;
+ const unsigned char *cipherchars;
+ int hrr = 0;
+ unsigned int compression;
+ unsigned int sversion;
+ unsigned int context;
+ RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ SSL_COMP *comp;
+#endif
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* load the server random */
+ if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
+ && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION
+ && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) {
+ s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
+ hrr = 1;
+ if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Get the session-id. */
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
+ if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
+ || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* TLS extensions */
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) {
+ PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
+ } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!hrr) {
+ if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
+ SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
+ &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) {
+ if (compression != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len
+ || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id,
+ session_id_len) != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (hrr) {
+ if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
+ * are appropriate for this version.
+ */
+ context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
+ : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
+ if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->hit = 0;
+
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ /*
+ * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
+ * the message must be on a record boundary.
+ */
+ if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
+ if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
+ SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
+ extensions, NULL, 0)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
+ * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
+ * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
+ * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
+ * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
+ * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
+ * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
+ * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
+ * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
+ * message to see if the server wants to resume.
+ */
+ if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
+ && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
+ /*
+ * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
+ * backwards compat reasons
+ */
+ int master_key_length;
+ master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
+ if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
+ &master_key_length,
+ NULL, &pref_cipher,
+ s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
+ && master_key_length > 0) {
+ s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
+ s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
+ pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
+ } else {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (session_id_len != 0
+ && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
+ && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
+ session_id_len) == 0)
+ s->hit = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (s->hit) {
+ if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
+ || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
+ /* actually a client application bug */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
+ * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
+ * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
+ * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
+ * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
+ */
+ if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
+ || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ && s->session->ext.tick_identity
+ != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
+ tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss);
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
+ /*
+ * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
+ * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
+ * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
+ * used for resumption.
+ */
+ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
+ /* session_id_len could be 0 */
+ if (session_id_len > 0)
+ memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
+ session_id_len);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
+ if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
+ * version.
+ */
+ s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
+ s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
+
+ if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (compression != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
+ * using compression.
+ */
+ if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
+ goto err;
+ }
+#else
+ if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (compression == 0)
+ comp = NULL;
+ else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
+ }
+
+ if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
+ unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
+ char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
+
+ /*
+ * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
+ * no SCTP used.
+ */
+ memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
+ sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
+
+ if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
+ sizeof(sctpauthkey),
+ labelbuffer,
+ sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
+ BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
+ sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
+ * we're done with this message
+ */
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
+ || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_free(extensions);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_free(extensions);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+}
+
+static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s,
+ PACKET *extpkt)
+{
+ RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
+ * should not be used.
+ */
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
+
+ if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
+ &extensions, NULL, 1)
+ || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
+ extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_free(extensions);
+ extensions = NULL;
+
+ if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
+ && s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL
+#endif
+ ) {
+ /*
+ * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
+ * ClientHello will not change
+ */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_AS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
+ SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
+ * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
+ */
+ if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
+ * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
+ * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
+ * for HRR messages.
+ */
+ if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
+ s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_free(extensions);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+}
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ int i;
+ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ size_t chainidx, certidx;
+ unsigned int context = 0;
+ const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
+
+ if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
+ || context != 0
+ || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
+ || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ certstart = certbytes;
+ x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
+ if (x == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
+ PACKET extensions;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
+ SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
+ NULL, chainidx == 0)
+ || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
+ rawexts, x, chainidx,
+ PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
+ /* SSLfatal already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
+ }
+
+ if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ x = NULL;
+ }
+
+ i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
+ /*
+ * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
+ * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
+ * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
+ * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
+ * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
+ * reverted because at least one application *only* set
+ * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
+ * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
+ * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
+ * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
+ * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
+ * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
+ */
+ if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
+ if (i > 1) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->session->peer_chain = sk;
+ /*
+ * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
+ * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
+ */
+ x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
+ sk = NULL;
+
+ pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
+
+ if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
+ x = NULL;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) {
+ x = NULL;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
+ * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
+ * type.
+ */
+ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if ((clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
+ x = NULL;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ s->session->peer_type = certidx;
+
+ X509_free(s->session->peer);
+ X509_up_ref(x);
+ s->session->peer = x;
+ s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
+ x = NULL;
+
+ /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
+ sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
+ &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+
+ err:
+ X509_free(x);
+ sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ PACKET psk_identity_hint;
+
+ /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
+ * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
+ * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
+ * identity.
+ */
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+ s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+ } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
+ &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+#else
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
+ if ((s->srp_ctx.N =
+ BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
+ (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
+ || (s->srp_ctx.g =
+ BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
+ (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
+ || (s->srp_ctx.s =
+ BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
+ (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
+ || (s->srp_ctx.B =
+ BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
+ (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
+ ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* We must check if there is a certificate */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
+ *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+
+ return 1;
+#else
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
+ EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
+
+ DH *dh = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
+
+ int check_bits = 0;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
+ dh = DH_new();
+
+ if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
+ p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
+ g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
+ NULL);
+ bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
+ (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
+ if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
+ ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* test non-zero pubkey */
+ if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
+ SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
+ ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p = g = NULL;
+
+ if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
+ SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
+ ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ bnpub_key = NULL;
+
+ if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
+ SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
+ ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
+
+ /*
+ * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
+ * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
+ */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
+ *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+ /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
+
+ return 1;
+
+ err:
+ BN_free(p);
+ BN_free(g);
+ BN_free(bnpub_key);
+ DH_free(dh);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
+
+ return 0;
+#else
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ PACKET encoded_pt;
+ unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
+
+ /*
+ * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
+ * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
+ * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
+ */
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
+ * server has sent an invalid curve.
+ */
+ if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
+ || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id, 1)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((s->s3->peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id)) == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
+ SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
+ PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
+ PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
+ SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
+ * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
+ * and ECDSA.
+ */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
+ *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+ else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
+ *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+ /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
+
+ return 1;
+#else
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ long alg_k;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
+ PACKET save_param_start, signature;
+
+ alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+ save_param_start = *pkt;
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
+ s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
+ if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
+ } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
+ if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
+ if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
+ if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else if (alg_k) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* if it was signed, check the signature */
+ if (pkey != NULL) {
+ PACKET params;
+ int maxsig;
+ const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+ unsigned char *tbs;
+ size_t tbslen;
+ int rv;
+
+ /*
+ * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
+ * equals the length of the parameters.
+ */
+ if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, &params,
+ PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
+ PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+ unsigned int sigalg;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
+ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
+#endif
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+ if (maxsig < 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check signature length
+ */
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
+ /* wrong packet length */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (md_ctx == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
+ RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(&params),
+ PACKET_remaining(&params));
+ if (tbslen == 0) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
+ PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
+ OPENSSL_free(tbs);
+ if (rv <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
+ md_ctx = NULL;
+ } else {
+ /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
+ && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
+ /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
+ if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_BAD_DATA);
+ }
+ /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* still data left over */
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+ err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+}
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ /* Clear certificate validity flags */
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+ s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
+
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ PACKET reqctx, extensions;
+ RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
+
+ if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
+ /*
+ * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3
+ * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so
+ * we just ignore it
+ */
+ return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
+ }
+
+ /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
+ s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
+ s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
+ OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
+ s->pha_context = NULL;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) ||
+ !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ }
+ if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
+ SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ &rawexts, NULL, 1)
+ || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
+ if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ }
+ } else {
+ PACKET ctypes;
+
+ /* get the certificate types */
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+ PACKET sigalgs;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
+ * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
+ */
+ if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ }
+ if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* get the CA RDNs */
+ if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
+
+ return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
+}
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ unsigned int ticklen;
+ unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
+ unsigned int sess_len;
+ RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
+ PACKET nonce;
+
+ PACKET_null_init(&nonce);
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
+ || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)))
+ || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
+ || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen)
+ : PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
+ * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
+ * be 0 here in that instance
+ */
+ if (ticklen == 0)
+ return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+
+ /*
+ * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
+ * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
+ * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
+ * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
+ * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
+ * cache.
+ */
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
+ SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
+
+ /*
+ * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
+ * one
+ */
+ if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0
+ && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ /*
+ * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that
+ * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the
+ * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
+ */
+ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
+ }
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = new_sess;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
+ * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
+ */
+ s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
+ s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
+ s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
+
+ s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
+ if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
+ s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
+ s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
+
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ PACKET extpkt;
+
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
+ SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts,
+ NULL, 1)
+ || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
+ SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+ exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
+ * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
+ * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
+ * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
+ * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
+ * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
+ * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
+ * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
+ * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
+ */
+ /*
+ * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
+ * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
+ */
+ if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
+ s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
+ EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+ ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
+ s->session->not_resumable = 0;
+
+ /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
+ int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
+ size_t hashlen;
+ static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
+
+ /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
+ if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
+
+ if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
+ nonce_label,
+ sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
+ PACKET_data(&nonce),
+ PACKET_remaining(&nonce),
+ s->session->master_key,
+ hashlen)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
+
+ OPENSSL_free(exts);
+ ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
+ }
+
+ return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_free(exts);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+}
+
+/*
+ * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
+ * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
+ */
+int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ size_t resplen;
+ unsigned int type;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
+ || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
+ SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
+ if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
+ * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
+ * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
+ * on failure.
+ */
+int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s)
+{
+ /*
+ * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
+ * the server
+ */
+ if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
+ * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
+ * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
+ */
+ if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
+ && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
+ int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
+
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
+ SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+ if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
+ /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
+ if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
+ /* should contain no data */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
+ if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
+ SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
+}
+
+static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ int ret = 0;
+ /*
+ * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
+ * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
+ * strnlen.
+ */
+ char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
+ size_t identitylen = 0;
+ unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
+ unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
+ char *tmpidentity = NULL;
+ size_t psklen = 0;
+
+ if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
+ SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
+
+ psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
+ identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
+ psk, sizeof(psk));
+
+ if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ } else if (psklen == 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
+ SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ identitylen = strlen(identity);
+ if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
+ tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
+ if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
+ s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
+ s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
+ tmppsk = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
+ s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
+ tmpidentity = NULL;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
+
+ return ret;
+#else
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
+ size_t enclen;
+ unsigned char *pms = NULL;
+ size_t pmslen = 0;
+
+ if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
+ */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
+ pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
+ if (pms == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
+ pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
+ /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
+ if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
+ if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
+ ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
+ || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
+ SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ pctx = NULL;
+
+ /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
+ if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
+ s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
+
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+
+ return 0;
+#else
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ DH *dh_clnt = NULL;
+ const BIGNUM *pub_key;
+ EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
+ unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
+
+ skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
+ if (skey == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
+ if (ckey == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
+
+ if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* send off the data */
+ DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
+ if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key),
+ &keybytes)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
+
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
+ return 0;
+#else
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
+ size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
+ EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
+ if (skey == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
+ if (ckey == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Generate encoding of client key */
+ encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
+
+ if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
+ ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
+ return ret;
+#else
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ /* GOST key exchange message creation */
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
+ X509 *peer_cert;
+ size_t msglen;
+ unsigned int md_len;
+ unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
+ int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
+ unsigned char *pms = NULL;
+ size_t pmslen = 0;
+
+ if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
+ dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
+
+ /*
+ * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
+ */
+ peer_cert = s->session->peer;
+ if (!peer_cert) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
+ SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
+ if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
+ * parameters match those of server certificate, use
+ * certificate key for key exchange
+ */
+
+ /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
+ pmslen = 32;
+ pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
+ if (pms == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
+ /* Generate session key
+ * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
+ */
+ || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ };
+ /*
+ * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
+ * data
+ */
+ ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (ukm_hash == NULL
+ || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
+ ukm_hash = NULL;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
+ SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
+ /*
+ * Encapsulate it into sequence
+ */
+ msglen = 255;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
+ SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
+ || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+ s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
+ s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
+
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
+ return 0;
+#else
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
+
+ if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
+ || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
+ &abytes)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
+ s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
+ if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+#else
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+ unsigned long alg_k;
+
+ alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+ /*
+ * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
+ * no need to do so here.
+ */
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
+ && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
+ if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt))
+ goto err;
+ } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
+ if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt))
+ goto err;
+ } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
+ if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt))
+ goto err;
+ } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
+ if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt))
+ goto err;
+ } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
+ if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt))
+ goto err;
+ } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
+ s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
+ s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *pms = NULL;
+ size_t pmslen = 0;
+
+ pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
+ pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ /* Check for SRP */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
+ if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
+ pms = NULL;
+ pmslen = 0;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ pms = NULL;
+ pmslen = 0;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
+ char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
+
+ /*
+ * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
+ * used.
+ */
+ memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
+ sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
+
+ if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
+ sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
+ sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
+ sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
+ s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
+ * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
+ * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
+ */
+static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
+{
+ /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
+ if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
+ * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
+ */
+ if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
+ !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
+{
+ X509 *x509 = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ int i;
+
+ if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
+ /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
+ if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
+ i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ return WORK_MORE_A;
+ }
+ if (i == 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ }
+ if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) {
+ if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
+ return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
+ }
+ return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+ }
+
+ /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
+ wst = WORK_MORE_B;
+ }
+
+ /* We need to get a client cert */
+ if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
+ /*
+ * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ * return(-1); We then get retied later
+ */
+ i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ return WORK_MORE_B;
+ }
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
+ if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
+ i = 0;
+ } else if (i == 1) {
+ i = 0;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
+ }
+
+ X509_free(x509);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
+ i = 0;
+ if (i == 0) {
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
+ return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+ } else {
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
+ return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
+ return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+ }
+
+ /* Shouldn't ever get here */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+}
+
+int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (s->pha_context == NULL) {
+ /* no context available, add 0-length context */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
+ (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
+ : s->cert->key)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
+ && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
+ /*
+ * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
+ * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
+ */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
+{
+ const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
+ size_t idx;
+ long alg_k, alg_a;
+
+ alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+
+ /* we don't have a certificate */
+ if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
+ return 1;
+
+ /* This is the passed certificate */
+ clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx);
+
+ /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
+ if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
+ if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
+ return 1;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+ size_t len, padding_len;
+ unsigned char *padding = NULL;
+
+ len = s->ext.npn_len;
+ padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
+
+ if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
+ /* should contain no data */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
+ * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
+ * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
+ * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
+ * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
+ */
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+ SSL_renegotiate(s);
+ else
+ SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
+
+ return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
+}
+
+static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ PACKET extensions;
+ RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
+
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
+ SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
+ NULL, 1)
+ || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
+ rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+}
+
+int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
+ i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
+ SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
+ px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (i != 0)
+ return i;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
+ i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
+ return i;
+}
+
+int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+ int i;
+ size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
+ int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
+
+ /* Set disabled masks for this session */
+ if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
+ SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (sk == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
+# if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
+# error Max cipher length too short
+# endif
+ /*
+ * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
+ * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
+ * use TLS v1.2
+ */
+ if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+ maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
+ else
+#endif
+ /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
+ maxlen = 0xfffe;
+
+ if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
+ maxlen -= 2;
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
+ maxlen -= 2;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+
+ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
+ /* Skip disabled ciphers */
+ if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
+ continue;
+
+ if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
+ if (!maxverok) {
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
+ && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver))
+ maxverok = 1;
+ } else {
+ if (c->max_tls >= s->s3->tmp.max_ver
+ && c->min_tls <= s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
+ maxverok = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ totlen += len;
+ }
+
+ if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
+ SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
+
+ if (!maxverok)
+ ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
+ "SSL/TLS version");
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (totlen != 0) {
+ if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
+ static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
+ 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+ };
+ if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
+ static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
+ 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+ };
+ if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+ if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
+ && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
+ ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;
+ return 1;
+}