- Integrate OpenSSL revisions

   fb092ef4fca897344daf7189526f5f26be6487ce,
   a93cc7c57333f4538cbcdedd2e961a5a38caa52d, and
   76c61a5d1adb92388f39e585e4af860a20feb9bb.

   This removes the newly added orig_len field of SSL3_RECORD and
   restored ABI.

Approved by:	benl

1 files changed, 7 insertions, 7 deletions

diff --git a/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
index 3f0f9836981f..9db44c95f9bd 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -330,8 +330,8 @@ dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
 	int i,al;
 	int enc_err;
 	SSL_SESSION *sess;
-    SSL3_RECORD *rr;
-	unsigned int mac_size;
+	SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+	unsigned int mac_size, orig_len;
 	unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
 
 	rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
 
 	/* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
 	rr->data=rr->input;
-	rr->orig_len=rr->length;
+	orig_len=rr->length;
 
 	enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
 	/* enc_err is:
@@ -399,10 +399,10 @@ printf("\n");
 		 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
 		 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
 		 */
-		if (rr->orig_len < mac_size ||
+		if (orig_len < mac_size ||
 		    /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
 		    (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
-		     rr->orig_len < mac_size+1))
+		     orig_len < mac_size+1))
 			{
 			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
@@ -417,12 +417,12 @@ printf("\n");
 			 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
 			 * */
 			mac = mac_tmp;
-			ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
+			ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
 			rr->length -= mac_size;
 			}
 		else
 			{
-			/* In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len|
+			/* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
 			 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
 			 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
 			rr->length -= mac_size;