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authorJung-uk Kim <jkim@FreeBSD.org>2020-03-17 21:27:57 +0000
committerJung-uk Kim <jkim@FreeBSD.org>2020-03-17 21:27:57 +0000
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downloadsrc-aa144ced5d61b5c7fb74acaebb37d85bd08f0416.tar.gz
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Import OpenSSL 1.1.1e.vendor/openssl/1.1.1e
Notes
Notes: svn path=/vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/; revision=359051 svn path=/vendor-crypto/openssl/1.1.1e/; revision=359052; tag=vendor/openssl/1.1.1e
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- HOWTO proxy certificates
-
-0. WARNING
-
-NONE OF THE CODE PRESENTED HERE HAS BEEN CHECKED! The code is just examples to
-show you how things could be done. There might be typos or type conflicts, and
-you will have to resolve them.
-
-1. Introduction
-
-Proxy certificates are defined in RFC 3820. They are really usual certificates
-with the mandatory extension proxyCertInfo.
-
-Proxy certificates are issued by an End Entity (typically a user), either
-directly with the EE certificate as issuing certificate, or by extension through
-an already issued proxy certificate. Proxy certificates are used to extend
-rights to some other entity (a computer process, typically, or sometimes to the
-user itself). This allows the entity to perform operations on behalf of the
-owner of the EE certificate.
-
-See https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3820.txt for more information.
-
-
-2. A warning about proxy certificates
-
-No one seems to have tested proxy certificates with security in mind. To this
-date, it seems that proxy certificates have only been used in a context highly
-aware of them.
-
-Existing applications might misbehave when trying to validate a chain of
-certificates which use a proxy certificate. They might incorrectly consider the
-leaf to be the certificate to check for authorisation data, which is controlled
-by the EE certificate owner.
-
-subjectAltName and issuerAltName are forbidden in proxy certificates, and this
-is enforced in OpenSSL. The subject must be the same as the issuer, with one
-commonName added on.
-
-Possible threats we can think of at this time include:
-
- - impersonation through commonName (think server certificates).
- - use of additional extensions, possibly non-standard ones used in certain
- environments, that would grant extra or different authorisation rights.
-
-For these reasons, OpenSSL requires that the use of proxy certificates be
-explicitly allowed. Currently, this can be done using the following methods:
-
- - if the application directly calls X509_verify_cert(), it can first call:
-
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
-
- Where ctx is the pointer which then gets passed to X509_verify_cert().
-
- - proxy certificate validation can be enabled before starting the application
- by setting the environment variable OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS.
-
-In the future, it might be possible to enable proxy certificates by editing
-openssl.cnf.
-
-
-3. How to create proxy certificates
-
-Creating proxy certificates is quite easy, by taking advantage of a lack of
-checks in the 'openssl x509' application (*ahem*). You must first create a
-configuration section that contains a definition of the proxyCertInfo extension,
-for example:
-
- [ v3_proxy ]
- # A proxy certificate MUST NEVER be a CA certificate.
- basicConstraints=CA:FALSE
-
- # Usual authority key ID
- authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer:always
-
- # The extension which marks this certificate as a proxy
- proxyCertInfo=critical,language:id-ppl-anyLanguage,pathlen:1,policy:text:AB
-
-It's also possible to specify the proxy extension in a separate section:
-
- proxyCertInfo=critical,@proxy_ext
-
- [ proxy_ext ]
- language=id-ppl-anyLanguage
- pathlen=0
- policy=text:BC
-
-The policy value has a specific syntax, {syntag}:{string}, where the syntag
-determines what will be done with the string. The following syntags are
-recognised:
-
- text indicates that the string is simply bytes, without any encoding:
-
- policy=text:räksmörgås
-
- Previous versions of this design had a specific tag for UTF-8 text.
- However, since the bytes are copied as-is anyway, there is no need for
- such a specific tag.
-
- hex indicates the string is encoded in hex, with colons between each byte
- (every second hex digit):
-
- policy=hex:72:E4:6B:73:6D:F6:72:67:E5:73
-
- Previous versions of this design had a tag to insert a complete DER
- blob. However, the only legal use for this would be to surround the
- bytes that would go with the hex: tag with whatever is needed to
- construct a correct OCTET STRING. The DER tag therefore felt
- superfluous, and was removed.
-
- file indicates that the text of the policy should really be taken from a
- file. The string is then really a file name. This is useful for
- policies that are large (more than a few lines, e.g. XML documents).
-
-The 'policy' setting can be split up in multiple lines like this:
-
- 0.policy=This is
- 1.policy= a multi-
- 2.policy=line policy.
-
-NOTE: the proxy policy value is the part which determines the rights granted to
-the process using the proxy certificate. The value is completely dependent on
-the application reading and interpreting it!
-
-Now that you have created an extension section for your proxy certificate, you
-can easily create a proxy certificate by doing:
-
- openssl req -new -config openssl.cnf -out proxy.req -keyout proxy.key
- openssl x509 -req -CAcreateserial -in proxy.req -days 7 -out proxy.crt \
- -CA user.crt -CAkey user.key -extfile openssl.cnf -extensions v3_proxy
-
-You can also create a proxy certificate using another proxy certificate as
-issuer (note: I'm using a different configuration section for it):
-
- openssl req -new -config openssl.cnf -out proxy2.req -keyout proxy2.key
- openssl x509 -req -CAcreateserial -in proxy2.req -days 7 -out proxy2.crt \
- -CA proxy.crt -CAkey proxy.key -extfile openssl.cnf -extensions v3_proxy2
-
-
-4. How to have your application interpret the policy?
-
-The basic way to interpret proxy policies is to start with some default rights,
-then compute the resulting rights by checking the proxy certificate against
-the chain of proxy certificates, user certificate and CA certificates. You then
-use the final computed rights. Sounds easy, huh? It almost is.
-
-The slightly complicated part is figuring out how to pass data between your
-application and the certificate validation procedure.
-
-You need the following ingredients:
-
- - a callback function that will be called for every certificate being
- validated. The callback be called several times for each certificate,
- so you must be careful to do the proxy policy interpretation at the right
- time. You also need to fill in the defaults when the EE certificate is
- checked.
-
- - a data structure that is shared between your application code and the
- callback.
-
- - a wrapper function that sets it all up.
-
- - an ex_data index function that creates an index into the generic ex_data
- store that is attached to an X509 validation context.
-
-Here is some skeleton code you can fill in:
-
- #include <string.h>
- #include <netdb.h>
- #include <openssl/x509.h>
- #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-
- #define total_rights 25
-
- /*
- * In this example, I will use a view of granted rights as a bit
- * array, one bit for each possible right.
- */
- typedef struct your_rights {
- unsigned char rights[(total_rights + 7) / 8];
- } YOUR_RIGHTS;
-
- /*
- * The following procedure will create an index for the ex_data
- * store in the X509 validation context the first time it's called.
- * Subsequent calls will return the same index. */
- static int get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
- {
- static volatile int idx = -1;
- if (idx < 0) {
- X509_STORE_lock(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_store(ctx));
- if (idx < 0) {
- idx = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0,
- "for verify callback",
- NULL,NULL,NULL);
- }
- X509_STORE_unlock(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_store(ctx));
- }
- return idx;
- }
-
- /* Callback to be given to the X509 validation procedure. */
- static int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
- {
- if (ok == 1) {
- /*
- * It's REALLY important you keep the proxy policy
- * check within this section. It's important to know
- * that when ok is 1, the certificates are checked
- * from top to bottom. You get the CA root first,
- * followed by the possible chain of intermediate
- * CAs, followed by the EE certificate, followed by
- * the possible proxy certificates.
- */
- X509 *xs = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
-
- if (X509_get_extension_flags(xs) & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
- YOUR_RIGHTS *rights =
- (YOUR_RIGHTS *)X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,
- get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx(ctx));
- PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci =
- X509_get_ext_d2i(xs, NID_proxyCertInfo, NULL, NULL);
-
- switch (OBJ_obj2nid(pci->proxyPolicy->policyLanguage)) {
- case NID_Independent:
- /*
- * Do whatever you need to grant explicit rights to
- * this particular proxy certificate, usually by
- * pulling them from some database. If there are none
- * to be found, clear all rights (making this and any
- * subsequent proxy certificate void of any rights).
- */
- memset(rights->rights, 0, sizeof(rights->rights));
- break;
- case NID_id_ppl_inheritAll:
- /*
- * This is basically a NOP, we simply let the current
- * rights stand as they are.
- */
- break;
- default:
- /* This is usually the most complex section of code.
- * You really do whatever you want as long as you
- * follow RFC 3820. In the example we use here, the
- * simplest thing to do is to build another, temporary
- * bit array and fill it with the rights granted by
- * the current proxy certificate, then use it as a
- * mask on the accumulated rights bit array, and
- * voilà, you now have a new accumulated rights bit
- * array.
- */
- {
- int i;
- YOUR_RIGHTS tmp_rights;
- memset(tmp_rights.rights, 0, sizeof(tmp_rights.rights));
-
- /*
- * process_rights() is supposed to be a procedure
- * that takes a string and its length, interprets
- * it and sets the bits in the YOUR_RIGHTS pointed
- * at by the third argument.
- */
- process_rights((char *) pci->proxyPolicy->policy->data,
- pci->proxyPolicy->policy->length,
- &tmp_rights);
-
- for(i = 0; i < total_rights / 8; i++)
- rights->rights[i] &= tmp_rights.rights[i];
- }
- break;
- }
- PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci);
- } else if (!(X509_get_extension_flags(xs) & EXFLAG_CA)) {
- /* We have an EE certificate, let's use it to set default! */
- YOUR_RIGHTS *rights =
- (YOUR_RIGHTS *)X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,
- get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx(ctx));
-
- /* The following procedure finds out what rights the owner
- * of the current certificate has, and sets them in the
- * YOUR_RIGHTS structure pointed at by the second
- * argument.
- */
- set_default_rights(xs, rights);
- }
- }
- return ok;
- }
-
- static int my_X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
- YOUR_RIGHTS *needed_rights)
- {
- int ok;
- int (*save_verify_cb)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) =
- X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(ctx);
- YOUR_RIGHTS rights;
-
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, verify_callback);
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx, get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx(ctx), &rights);
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
- ok = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
-
- if (ok == 1) {
- ok = check_needed_rights(rights, needed_rights);
- }
-
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, save_verify_cb);
-
- return ok;
- }
-
-
-If you use SSL or TLS, you can easily set up a callback to have the
-certificates checked properly, using the code above:
-
- SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(s_ctx, my_X509_verify_cert, &needed_rights);
-
-
---
-Richard Levitte