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authorJung-uk Kim <jkim@FreeBSD.org>2018-09-13 19:18:07 +0000
committerJung-uk Kim <jkim@FreeBSD.org>2018-09-13 19:18:07 +0000
commita43ce912fc025d11e1395506111f75fc194d7ba5 (patch)
tree9794cf7720d75938ed0ea4f499c0dcd4b6eacdda /crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
parent02be298e504b8554caca6dc85af450e1ea44d19d (diff)
downloadsrc-a43ce912fc025d11e1395506111f75fc194d7ba5.tar.gz
src-a43ce912fc025d11e1395506111f75fc194d7ba5.zip
Import OpenSSL 1.1.1.vendor/openssl/1.1.1
Notes
Notes: svn path=/vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/; revision=338658 svn path=/vendor-crypto/openssl/1.1.1/; revision=338659; tag=vendor/openssl/1.1.1
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c')
-rw-r--r--crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c406
1 files changed, 197 insertions, 209 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c b/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
index c8bc7a94b26c..17b35c00f9da 100644
--- a/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
@@ -1,194 +1,176 @@
-/* crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c */
/*
- * Written by Christophe Renou (christophe.renou@edelweb.fr) with the
- * precious help of Peter Sylvester (peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr) for the
- * EdelKey project and contributed to the OpenSSL project 2004.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ * Copyright 2004-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, EdelKey Project. All Rights Reserved.
*
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*
+ * Originally written by Christophe Renou and Peter Sylvester,
+ * for the EdelKey project.
*/
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-# include "cryptlib.h"
-# include "srp_lcl.h"
+# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+# include "internal/evp_int.h"
+# include <openssl/sha.h>
# include <openssl/srp.h>
# include <openssl/evp.h>
# include <openssl/buffer.h>
# include <openssl/rand.h>
# include <openssl/txt_db.h>
+# include <openssl/err.h>
# define SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN 20
# define MAX_LEN 2500
-static char b64table[] =
- "0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz./";
-
/*
- * the following two conversion routines have been inspired by code from
- * Stanford
+ * Note that SRP uses its own variant of base 64 encoding. A different base64
+ * alphabet is used and no padding '=' characters are added. Instead we pad to
+ * the front with 0 bytes and subsequently strip off leading encoded padding.
+ * This variant is used for compatibility with other SRP implementations -
+ * notably libsrp, but also others. It is also required for backwards
+ * compatibility in order to load verifier files from other OpenSSL versions.
*/
/*
* Convert a base64 string into raw byte array representation.
+ * Returns the length of the decoded data, or -1 on error.
*/
static int t_fromb64(unsigned char *a, size_t alen, const char *src)
{
- char *loc;
- int i, j;
- int size;
+ EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx;
+ int outl = 0, outl2 = 0;
+ size_t size, padsize;
+ const unsigned char *pad = (const unsigned char *)"00";
- if (alen == 0 || alen > INT_MAX)
- return -1;
-
- while (*src && (*src == ' ' || *src == '\t' || *src == '\n'))
+ while (*src == ' ' || *src == '\t' || *src == '\n')
++src;
size = strlen(src);
- if (size < 0 || size >= (int)alen)
+ padsize = 4 - (size & 3);
+ padsize &= 3;
+
+ /* Four bytes in src become three bytes output. */
+ if (size > INT_MAX || ((size + padsize) / 4) * 3 > alen)
+ return -1;
+
+ ctx = EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL)
return -1;
- i = 0;
- while (i < size) {
- loc = strchr(b64table, src[i]);
- if (loc == (char *)0)
- break;
- else
- a[i] = loc - b64table;
- ++i;
+ /*
+ * This should never occur because 1 byte of data always requires 2 bytes of
+ * encoding, i.e.
+ * 0 bytes unencoded = 0 bytes encoded
+ * 1 byte unencoded = 2 bytes encoded
+ * 2 bytes unencoded = 3 bytes encoded
+ * 3 bytes unencoded = 4 bytes encoded
+ * 4 bytes unencoded = 6 bytes encoded
+ * etc
+ */
+ if (padsize == 3) {
+ outl = -1;
+ goto err;
}
- /* if nothing valid to process we have a zero length response */
- if (i == 0)
- return 0;
- size = i;
- i = size - 1;
- j = size;
- while (1) {
- a[j] = a[i];
- if (--i < 0)
- break;
- a[j] |= (a[i] & 3) << 6;
- --j;
- a[j] = (unsigned char)((a[i] & 0x3c) >> 2);
- if (--i < 0)
- break;
- a[j] |= (a[i] & 0xf) << 4;
- --j;
- a[j] = (unsigned char)((a[i] & 0x30) >> 4);
- if (--i < 0)
- break;
- a[j] |= (a[i] << 2);
-
- a[--j] = 0;
- if (--i < 0)
- break;
+
+ /* Valid padsize values are now 0, 1 or 2 */
+
+ EVP_DecodeInit(ctx);
+ evp_encode_ctx_set_flags(ctx, EVP_ENCODE_CTX_USE_SRP_ALPHABET);
+
+ /* Add any encoded padding that is required */
+ if (padsize != 0
+ && EVP_DecodeUpdate(ctx, a, &outl, pad, padsize) < 0) {
+ outl = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EVP_DecodeUpdate(ctx, a, &outl2, (const unsigned char *)src, size) < 0) {
+ outl = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ outl += outl2;
+ EVP_DecodeFinal(ctx, a + outl, &outl2);
+ outl += outl2;
+
+ /* Strip off the leading padding */
+ if (padsize != 0) {
+ if ((int)padsize >= outl) {
+ outl = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we added 1 byte of padding prior to encoding then we have 2 bytes
+ * of "real" data which gets spread across 4 encoded bytes like this:
+ * (6 bits pad)(2 bits pad | 4 bits data)(6 bits data)(6 bits data)
+ * So 1 byte of pre-encoding padding results in 1 full byte of encoded
+ * padding.
+ * If we added 2 bytes of padding prior to encoding this gets encoded
+ * as:
+ * (6 bits pad)(6 bits pad)(4 bits pad | 2 bits data)(6 bits data)
+ * So 2 bytes of pre-encoding padding results in 2 full bytes of encoded
+ * padding, i.e. we have to strip the same number of bytes of padding
+ * from the encoded data as we added to the pre-encoded data.
+ */
+ memmove(a, a + padsize, outl - padsize);
+ outl -= padsize;
}
- while (j <= size && a[j] == 0)
- ++j;
- i = 0;
- while (j <= size)
- a[i++] = a[j++];
- return i;
+
+ err:
+ EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+ return outl;
}
/*
* Convert a raw byte string into a null-terminated base64 ASCII string.
+ * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error.
*/
-static char *t_tob64(char *dst, const unsigned char *src, int size)
+static int t_tob64(char *dst, const unsigned char *src, int size)
{
- int c, pos = size % 3;
- unsigned char b0 = 0, b1 = 0, b2 = 0, notleading = 0;
- char *olddst = dst;
-
- switch (pos) {
- case 1:
- b2 = src[0];
- break;
- case 2:
- b1 = src[0];
- b2 = src[1];
- break;
+ EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx = EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new();
+ int outl = 0, outl2 = 0;
+ unsigned char pad[2] = {0, 0};
+ size_t leadz = 0;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ EVP_EncodeInit(ctx);
+ evp_encode_ctx_set_flags(ctx, EVP_ENCODE_CTX_NO_NEWLINES
+ | EVP_ENCODE_CTX_USE_SRP_ALPHABET);
+
+ /*
+ * We pad at the front with zero bytes until the length is a multiple of 3
+ * so that EVP_EncodeUpdate/EVP_EncodeFinal does not add any of its own "="
+ * padding
+ */
+ leadz = 3 - (size % 3);
+ if (leadz != 3
+ && !EVP_EncodeUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)dst, &outl, pad,
+ leadz)) {
+ EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return 0;
}
- while (1) {
- c = (b0 & 0xfc) >> 2;
- if (notleading || c != 0) {
- *dst++ = b64table[c];
- notleading = 1;
- }
- c = ((b0 & 3) << 4) | ((b1 & 0xf0) >> 4);
- if (notleading || c != 0) {
- *dst++ = b64table[c];
- notleading = 1;
- }
- c = ((b1 & 0xf) << 2) | ((b2 & 0xc0) >> 6);
- if (notleading || c != 0) {
- *dst++ = b64table[c];
- notleading = 1;
- }
- c = b2 & 0x3f;
- if (notleading || c != 0) {
- *dst++ = b64table[c];
- notleading = 1;
- }
- if (pos >= size)
- break;
- else {
- b0 = src[pos++];
- b1 = src[pos++];
- b2 = src[pos++];
- }
+ if (!EVP_EncodeUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)dst + outl, &outl2, src,
+ size)) {
+ EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ outl += outl2;
+ EVP_EncodeFinal(ctx, (unsigned char *)dst + outl, &outl2);
+ outl += outl2;
+
+ /* Strip the encoded padding at the front */
+ if (leadz != 3) {
+ memmove(dst, dst + leadz, outl - leadz);
+ dst[outl - leadz] = '\0';
}
- *dst++ = '\0';
- return olddst;
+ EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return 1;
}
void SRP_user_pwd_free(SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd)
@@ -202,11 +184,14 @@ void SRP_user_pwd_free(SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd)
OPENSSL_free(user_pwd);
}
-static SRP_user_pwd *SRP_user_pwd_new()
+static SRP_user_pwd *SRP_user_pwd_new(void)
{
- SRP_user_pwd *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SRP_user_pwd));
- if (ret == NULL)
+ SRP_user_pwd *ret;
+
+ if ((ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) {
+ /* SRPerr(SRP_F_SRP_USER_PWD_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); */ /*ckerr_ignore*/
return NULL;
+ }
ret->N = NULL;
ret->g = NULL;
ret->s = NULL;
@@ -226,9 +211,9 @@ static void SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const BIGNUM *g,
static int SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const char *id,
const char *info)
{
- if (id != NULL && NULL == (vinfo->id = BUF_strdup(id)))
+ if (id != NULL && NULL == (vinfo->id = OPENSSL_strdup(id)))
return 0;
- return (info == NULL || NULL != (vinfo->info = BUF_strdup(info)));
+ return (info == NULL || NULL != (vinfo->info = OPENSSL_strdup(info)));
}
static int SRP_user_pwd_set_sv(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const char *s,
@@ -285,19 +270,19 @@ static SRP_user_pwd *srp_user_pwd_dup(SRP_user_pwd *src)
SRP_VBASE *SRP_VBASE_new(char *seed_key)
{
- SRP_VBASE *vb = (SRP_VBASE *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SRP_VBASE));
+ SRP_VBASE *vb = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*vb));
if (vb == NULL)
return NULL;
- if (!(vb->users_pwd = sk_SRP_user_pwd_new_null()) ||
- !(vb->gN_cache = sk_SRP_gN_cache_new_null())) {
+ if ((vb->users_pwd = sk_SRP_user_pwd_new_null()) == NULL
+ || (vb->gN_cache = sk_SRP_gN_cache_new_null()) == NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(vb);
return NULL;
}
vb->default_g = NULL;
vb->default_N = NULL;
vb->seed_key = NULL;
- if ((seed_key != NULL) && (vb->seed_key = BUF_strdup(seed_key)) == NULL) {
+ if ((seed_key != NULL) && (vb->seed_key = OPENSSL_strdup(seed_key)) == NULL) {
sk_SRP_user_pwd_free(vb->users_pwd);
sk_SRP_gN_cache_free(vb->gN_cache);
OPENSSL_free(vb);
@@ -306,22 +291,22 @@ SRP_VBASE *SRP_VBASE_new(char *seed_key)
return vb;
}
-int SRP_VBASE_free(SRP_VBASE *vb)
+void SRP_VBASE_free(SRP_VBASE *vb)
{
+ if (!vb)
+ return;
sk_SRP_user_pwd_pop_free(vb->users_pwd, SRP_user_pwd_free);
sk_SRP_gN_cache_free(vb->gN_cache);
OPENSSL_free(vb->seed_key);
OPENSSL_free(vb);
- return 0;
}
static SRP_gN_cache *SRP_gN_new_init(const char *ch)
{
unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN];
int len;
+ SRP_gN_cache *newgN = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*newgN));
- SRP_gN_cache *newgN =
- (SRP_gN_cache *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SRP_gN_cache));
if (newgN == NULL)
return NULL;
@@ -329,7 +314,7 @@ static SRP_gN_cache *SRP_gN_new_init(const char *ch)
if (len < 0)
goto err;
- if ((newgN->b64_bn = BUF_strdup(ch)) == NULL)
+ if ((newgN->b64_bn = OPENSSL_strdup(ch)) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((newgN->bn = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL)))
@@ -430,13 +415,14 @@ int SRP_VBASE_init(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *verifier_file)
* we add this couple in the internal Stack
*/
- if ((gN = (SRP_gN *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SRP_gN))) == NULL)
+ if ((gN = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*gN))) == NULL)
goto err;
- if (!(gN->id = BUF_strdup(pp[DB_srpid]))
- || !(gN->N =
- SRP_gN_place_bn(vb->gN_cache, pp[DB_srpverifier]))
- || !(gN->g = SRP_gN_place_bn(vb->gN_cache, pp[DB_srpsalt]))
+ if ((gN->id = OPENSSL_strdup(pp[DB_srpid])) == NULL
+ || (gN->N = SRP_gN_place_bn(vb->gN_cache, pp[DB_srpverifier]))
+ == NULL
+ || (gN->g = SRP_gN_place_bn(vb->gN_cache, pp[DB_srpsalt]))
+ == NULL
|| sk_SRP_gN_insert(SRP_gN_tab, gN, 0) == 0)
goto err;
@@ -447,7 +433,8 @@ int SRP_VBASE_init(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *verifier_file)
}
} else if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_VALID) {
/* it is a user .... */
- SRP_gN *lgN;
+ const SRP_gN *lgN;
+
if ((lgN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(pp[DB_srpgN], SRP_gN_tab)) != NULL) {
error_code = SRP_ERR_MEMORY;
if ((user_pwd = SRP_user_pwd_new()) == NULL)
@@ -465,7 +452,7 @@ int SRP_VBASE_init(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *verifier_file)
if (sk_SRP_user_pwd_insert(vb->users_pwd, user_pwd, 0) == 0)
goto err;
- user_pwd = NULL; /* abandon responsability */
+ user_pwd = NULL; /* abandon responsibility */
}
}
}
@@ -496,10 +483,8 @@ int SRP_VBASE_init(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *verifier_file)
SRP_user_pwd_free(user_pwd);
- if (tmpdb)
- TXT_DB_free(tmpdb);
- if (in)
- BIO_free_all(in);
+ TXT_DB_free(tmpdb);
+ BIO_free_all(in);
sk_SRP_gN_free(SRP_gN_tab);
@@ -524,7 +509,9 @@ static SRP_user_pwd *find_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)
return NULL;
}
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
/*
+ * DEPRECATED: use SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user instead.
* This method ignores the configured seed and fails for an unknown user.
* Ownership of the returned pointer is not released to the caller.
* In other words, caller must not free the result.
@@ -533,6 +520,7 @@ SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)
{
return find_user(vb, username);
}
+# endif
/*
* Ownership of the returned pointer is released to the caller.
@@ -543,7 +531,7 @@ SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)
SRP_user_pwd *user;
unsigned char digv[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned char digs[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- EVP_MD_CTX ctxt;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctxt = NULL;
if (vb == NULL)
return NULL;
@@ -565,20 +553,25 @@ SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)
if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(user, username, NULL))
goto err;
- if (RAND_bytes(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0)
+ if (RAND_priv_bytes(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ ctxt = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (ctxt == NULL
+ || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctxt, EVP_sha1(), NULL)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctxt, vb->seed_key, strlen(vb->seed_key))
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctxt, username, strlen(username))
+ || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctxt, digs, NULL))
goto err;
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctxt);
- EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctxt, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctxt, vb->seed_key, strlen(vb->seed_key));
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctxt, username, strlen(username));
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctxt, digs, NULL);
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctxt);
- if (SRP_user_pwd_set_sv_BN
- (user, BN_bin2bn(digs, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, NULL),
- BN_bin2bn(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, NULL)))
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctxt);
+ ctxt = NULL;
+ if (SRP_user_pwd_set_sv_BN(user,
+ BN_bin2bn(digs, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, NULL),
+ BN_bin2bn(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, NULL)))
return user;
- err:SRP_user_pwd_free(user);
+ err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctxt);
+ SRP_user_pwd_free(user);
return NULL;
}
@@ -590,7 +583,8 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
{
int len;
char *result = NULL, *vf = NULL;
- BIGNUM *N_bn = NULL, *g_bn = NULL, *s = NULL, *v = NULL;
+ const BIGNUM *N_bn = NULL, *g_bn = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *N_bn_alloc = NULL, *g_bn_alloc = NULL, *s = NULL, *v = NULL;
unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN];
unsigned char tmp2[MAX_LEN];
char *defgNid = NULL;
@@ -601,12 +595,14 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
goto err;
if (N) {
- if (!(len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), N)))
+ if ((len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), N)) <= 0)
goto err;
- N_bn = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL);
- if (!(len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), g)))
+ N_bn_alloc = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL);
+ N_bn = N_bn_alloc;
+ if ((len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp) ,g)) <= 0)
goto err;
- g_bn = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL);
+ g_bn_alloc = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL);
+ g_bn = g_bn_alloc;
defgNid = "*";
} else {
SRP_gN *gN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(g, NULL);
@@ -623,7 +619,7 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
s = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL);
} else {
- if (!(len = t_fromb64(tmp2, sizeof(tmp2), *salt)))
+ if ((len = t_fromb64(tmp2, sizeof(tmp2), *salt)) <= 0)
goto err;
s = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, len, NULL);
}
@@ -652,13 +648,9 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
result = defgNid;
err:
- if (N) {
- BN_free(N_bn);
- BN_free(g_bn);
- }
- if (vf != NULL)
- OPENSSL_cleanse(vf, vfsize);
- OPENSSL_free(vf);
+ BN_free(N_bn_alloc);
+ BN_free(g_bn_alloc);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(vf, vfsize);
BN_clear_free(s);
BN_clear_free(v);
return result;
@@ -674,7 +666,8 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
* BIGNUMS.
*/
int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
- BIGNUM **verifier, BIGNUM *N, BIGNUM *g)
+ BIGNUM **verifier, const BIGNUM *N,
+ const BIGNUM *g)
{
int result = 0;
BIGNUM *x = NULL;
@@ -688,9 +681,6 @@ int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
(verifier == NULL) || (N == NULL) || (g == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
goto err;
- srp_bn_print(N);
- srp_bn_print(g);
-
if (*salt == NULL) {
if (RAND_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) <= 0)
goto err;
@@ -711,13 +701,11 @@ int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
goto err;
}
- srp_bn_print(*verifier);
-
result = 1;
*salt = salttmp;
err:
- if (*salt != salttmp)
+ if (salt != NULL && *salt != salttmp)
BN_clear_free(salttmp);
BN_clear_free(x);
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);