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authorXin LI <delphij@FreeBSD.org>2013-04-02 17:34:42 +0000
committerXin LI <delphij@FreeBSD.org>2013-04-02 17:34:42 +0000
commit0d9d75b124880ee5a3aeb5c2af92a04340c02bef (patch)
tree953639ad57c000dc6351819b4798541490d39802 /crypto/openssl/crypto
parent660eb4006e69a82831062be4a4af070afccf64bc (diff)
downloadsrc-releng/9.0.tar.gz
src-releng/9.0.zip
Fix OpenSSL multiple vulnerabilities. [13:03]releng/9.0
Fix BIND remote denial of service. [13:04] Security: CVE-2013-0166, CVE-2013-0169 Security: FreeBSD-SA-13:03.openssl Security: CVE-2013-2266 Security: FreeBSD-SA-13:04.bind Approved by: so
Notes
Notes: svn path=/releng/9.0/; revision=249029
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/openssl/crypto')
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c18
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_strnid.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c6
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1.h2
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c7
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_name.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c14
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bf_buff.c15
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bio.h10
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c21
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/mo-586.pl4
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/ppc.pl2
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c37
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c1
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_word.c25
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms.h1
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c60
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_env.c12
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_io.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_lcl.h2
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c37
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/comp/c_rle.c3
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_api.c1
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c17
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/crypto.h13
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c5
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_key.c8
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c3
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c91
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c8
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_test.c1
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/o_init.c14
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c8
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c10
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h8
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/perlasm/cbc.pl2
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c25
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/openssl/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl2
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/rc4/rc4_skey.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c80
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/symhacks.h10
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c111
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_asid.c90
46 files changed, 599 insertions, 205 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
index 365e4673a95c..3ac2bc2a01a1 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ int a2d_ASN1_OBJECT(unsigned char *out, int olen, const char *buf, int num)
ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2D_ASN1_OBJECT,ASN1_R_INVALID_DIGIT);
goto err;
}
- if (!use_bn && l > (ULONG_MAX / 10L))
+ if (!use_bn && l >= ((ULONG_MAX - 80) / 10L))
{
use_bn = 1;
if (!bl)
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp,
/* Sanity check OID encoding: can't have leading 0x80 in
* subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2
*/
- for (i = 0, p = *pp + 1; i < len - 1; i++, p++)
+ for (i = 0, p = *pp; i < len; i++, p++)
{
if (*p == 0x80 && (!i || !(p[-1] & 0x80)))
{
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c
index 7fc14d3296c1..ead37ac32582 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c
@@ -74,6 +74,11 @@
#define CHARTYPE_BS_ESC (ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253 | CHARTYPE_FIRST_ESC_2253 | CHARTYPE_LAST_ESC_2253)
+#define ESC_FLAGS (ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253 | \
+ ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_QUOTE | \
+ ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL | \
+ ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB)
+
/* Three IO functions for sending data to memory, a BIO and
* and a FILE pointer.
@@ -148,6 +153,13 @@ static int do_esc_char(unsigned long c, unsigned char flags, char *do_quotes, ch
if(!io_ch(arg, tmphex, 3)) return -1;
return 3;
}
+ /* If we get this far and do any escaping at all must escape
+ * the escape character itself: backslash.
+ */
+ if (chtmp == '\\' && flags & ESC_FLAGS) {
+ if(!io_ch(arg, "\\\\", 2)) return -1;
+ return 2;
+ }
if(!io_ch(arg, &chtmp, 1)) return -1;
return 1;
}
@@ -292,11 +304,6 @@ static const signed char tag2nbyte[] = {
4, -1, 2 /* 28-30 */
};
-#define ESC_FLAGS (ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253 | \
- ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_QUOTE | \
- ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL | \
- ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB)
-
/* This is the main function, print out an
* ASN1_STRING taking note of various escape
* and display options. Returns number of
@@ -560,6 +567,7 @@ int ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(unsigned char **out, ASN1_STRING *in)
if(mbflag == -1) return -1;
mbflag |= MBSTRING_FLAG;
stmp.data = NULL;
+ stmp.length = 0;
ret = ASN1_mbstring_copy(&str, in->data, in->length, mbflag, B_ASN1_UTF8STRING);
if(ret < 0) return ret;
*out = stmp.data;
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_strnid.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_strnid.c
index fe515b52baed..b68ae433d4ea 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_strnid.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_strnid.c
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ unsigned long ASN1_STRING_get_default_mask(void)
* default: the default value, Printable, T61, BMP.
*/
-int ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc(char *p)
+int ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc(const char *p)
{
unsigned long mask;
char *end;
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
index da3efaaf8de5..7ded69b170f6 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
@@ -138,6 +138,12 @@ int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signat
unsigned char *buf_in=NULL;
int ret= -1,i,inl;
+ if (!pkey)
+ {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
i=OBJ_obj2nid(a->algorithm);
type=EVP_get_digestbyname(OBJ_nid2sn(i));
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1.h
index 1958298f749b..d9d5443a33ca 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1.h
@@ -1051,7 +1051,7 @@ ASN1_STRING *ASN1_pack_string(void *obj, i2d_of_void *i2d,
ASN1_STRING *ASN1_item_pack(void *obj, const ASN1_ITEM *it, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **oct);
void ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask(unsigned long mask);
-int ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc(char *p);
+int ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc(const char *p);
unsigned long ASN1_STRING_get_default_mask(void);
int ASN1_mbstring_copy(ASN1_STRING **out, const unsigned char *in, int len,
int inform, unsigned long mask);
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
index d8d9e76cc06d..ad8fbed90725 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
@@ -418,9 +418,9 @@ ASN1_VALUE *SMIME_read_ASN1(BIO *bio, BIO **bcont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
if(strcmp(hdr->value, "application/x-pkcs7-signature") &&
strcmp(hdr->value, "application/pkcs7-signature")) {
- sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free);
ASN1err(ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1,ASN1_R_SIG_INVALID_MIME_TYPE);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "type: ", hdr->value);
+ sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free);
sk_BIO_pop_free(parts, BIO_vfree);
return NULL;
}
@@ -790,12 +790,17 @@ static int mime_hdr_addparam(MIME_HEADER *mhdr, char *name, char *value)
static int mime_hdr_cmp(const MIME_HEADER * const *a,
const MIME_HEADER * const *b)
{
+ if (!(*a)->name || !(*b)->name)
+ return !!(*a)->name - !!(*b)->name;
+
return(strcmp((*a)->name, (*b)->name));
}
static int mime_param_cmp(const MIME_PARAM * const *a,
const MIME_PARAM * const *b)
{
+ if (!(*a)->param_name || !(*b)->param_name)
+ return !!(*a)->param_name - !!(*b)->param_name;
return(strcmp((*a)->param_name, (*b)->param_name));
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_name.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_name.c
index 04380abc3ff9..9a1a9f415ff3 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_name.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_name.c
@@ -196,7 +196,9 @@ static int x509_name_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val, const unsigned char **in, long len
*val = nm.a;
*in = p;
return ret;
- err:
+err:
+ if (nm.x != NULL)
+ X509_NAME_free(nm.x);
ASN1err(ASN1_F_X509_NAME_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c
index 91c275611611..bc8a7bf32717 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c
@@ -367,7 +367,19 @@ EVP_PKEY *X509_PUBKEY_get(X509_PUBKEY *key)
goto err;
}
- key->pkey = ret;
+ /* Check to see if another thread set key->pkey first */
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+ if (key->pkey)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
+ ret = key->pkey;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ key->pkey = ret;
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+ }
CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
return(ret);
err:
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bf_buff.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bf_buff.c
index c1fd75aaad80..4b5a132d8a18 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bf_buff.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bf_buff.c
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ start:
/* add to buffer and return */
if (i >= inl)
{
- memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_len]),in,inl);
+ memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_off+ctx->obuf_len]),in,inl);
ctx->obuf_len+=inl;
return(num+inl);
}
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ start:
{
if (i > 0) /* lets fill it up if we can */
{
- memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_len]),in,i);
+ memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_off+ctx->obuf_len]),in,i);
in+=i;
inl-=i;
num+=i;
@@ -294,9 +294,9 @@ static long buffer_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
case BIO_C_GET_BUFF_NUM_LINES:
ret=0;
p1=ctx->ibuf;
- for (i=ctx->ibuf_off; i<ctx->ibuf_len; i++)
+ for (i=0; i<ctx->ibuf_len; i++)
{
- if (p1[i] == '\n') ret++;
+ if (p1[ctx->ibuf_off + i] == '\n') ret++;
}
break;
case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING:
@@ -399,17 +399,18 @@ static long buffer_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
for (;;)
{
BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
- if (ctx->obuf_len > ctx->obuf_off)
+ if (ctx->obuf_len > 0)
{
r=BIO_write(b->next_bio,
&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_off]),
- ctx->obuf_len-ctx->obuf_off);
+ ctx->obuf_len);
#if 0
-fprintf(stderr,"FLUSH [%3d] %3d -> %3d\n",ctx->obuf_off,ctx->obuf_len-ctx->obuf_off,r);
+fprintf(stderr,"FLUSH [%3d] %3d -> %3d\n",ctx->obuf_off,ctx->obuf_len,r);
#endif
BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
if (r <= 0) return((long)r);
ctx->obuf_off+=r;
+ ctx->obuf_len-=r;
}
else
{
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bio.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bio.h
index ebb42781e6ef..03bd3b28758f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bio.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bio.h
@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ extern "C" {
/* #endif */
#define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU 40 /* as kernel for current MTU */
+#define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU 47
#define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU 41 /* get cached value for MTU */
#define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU 42 /* set cached value for
* MTU. want to use this
@@ -321,6 +322,15 @@ DECLARE_STACK_OF(BIO)
typedef struct bio_f_buffer_ctx_struct
{
+ /* Buffers are setup like this:
+ *
+ * <---------------------- size ----------------------->
+ * +---------------------------------------------------+
+ * | consumed | remaining | free space |
+ * +---------------------------------------------------+
+ * <-- off --><------- len ------->
+ */
+
/* BIO *bio; */ /* this is now in the BIO struct */
int ibuf_size; /* how big is the input buffer */
int obuf_size; /* how big is the output buffer */
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
index 14ca854b4af1..e0327bdea672 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
@@ -57,7 +57,6 @@
*
*/
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DGRAM
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
@@ -65,6 +64,7 @@
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DGRAM
#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
#include <sys/timeb.h>
@@ -288,7 +288,6 @@ static int dgram_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
*/
dgram_adjust_rcv_timeout(b);
ret=recvfrom(b->num,out,outl,0,&peer,(void *)&peerlen);
- dgram_reset_rcv_timeout(b);
if ( ! data->connected && ret >= 0)
BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEER, 0, &peer);
@@ -302,6 +301,8 @@ static int dgram_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
data->_errno = get_last_socket_error();
}
}
+
+ dgram_reset_rcv_timeout(b);
}
return(ret);
}
@@ -493,6 +494,9 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
ret = 0;
#endif
break;
+ case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU:
+ ret = 576 - 20 - 8;
+ break;
case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU:
return data->mtu;
break;
@@ -654,9 +658,13 @@ static int BIO_dgram_should_retry(int i)
{
err=get_last_socket_error();
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && 0 /* more microsoft stupidity? perhaps not? Ben 4/1/99 */
- if ((i == -1) && (err == 0))
- return(1);
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
+ /* If the socket return value (i) is -1
+ * and err is unexpectedly 0 at this point,
+ * the error code was overwritten by
+ * another system call before this error
+ * handling is called.
+ */
#endif
return(BIO_dgram_non_fatal_error(err));
@@ -719,7 +727,6 @@ int BIO_dgram_non_fatal_error(int err)
}
return(0);
}
-#endif
static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t)
{
@@ -737,3 +744,5 @@ static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t)
gettimeofday(t, NULL);
#endif
}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/mo-586.pl b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/mo-586.pl
index 0982293094d9..061127e0b11d 100755
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/mo-586.pl
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/mo-586.pl
@@ -539,8 +539,10 @@ $sbit=$num;
&jle (&label("sqradd"));
&mov ($carry,"edx");
- &lea ("edx",&DWP(0,$sbit,"edx",2));
+ &add ("edx","edx");
&shr ($carry,31);
+ &add ("edx",$sbit);
+ &adc ($carry,0);
&set_label("sqrlast");
&mov ($word,$_n0);
&mov ($inp,$_np);
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/ppc.pl b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/ppc.pl
index 806e53ad6e1d..84448836e3dd 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/ppc.pl
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/ppc.pl
@@ -1039,7 +1039,7 @@ sub data {
addze r11,r0
#mul_add_c(a[3],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
$LD r6,`3*$BNSZ`(r4)
- $LD r7,`2*$BNSZ`(r4)
+ $LD r7,`2*$BNSZ`(r5)
$UMULL r8,r6,r7
$UMULH r9,r6,r7
addc r12,r8,r12
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
index c11fb4ccc2d3..ca7f996bc8a1 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ struct bn_blinding_st
BIGNUM *mod; /* just a reference */
unsigned long thread_id; /* added in OpenSSL 0.9.6j and 0.9.7b;
* used only by crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c, rsa_lib.c */
- unsigned int counter;
+ int counter;
unsigned long flags;
BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx;
int (*bn_mod_exp)(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
@@ -157,7 +157,10 @@ BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *Ai, /* const */ BIGN
if (BN_get_flags(mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)
BN_set_flags(ret->mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- ret->counter = BN_BLINDING_COUNTER;
+ /* Set the counter to the special value -1
+ * to indicate that this is never-used fresh blinding
+ * that does not need updating before first use. */
+ ret->counter = -1;
return(ret);
err:
if (ret != NULL) BN_BLINDING_free(ret);
@@ -186,7 +189,10 @@ int BN_BLINDING_update(BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
goto err;
}
- if (--(b->counter) == 0 && b->e != NULL &&
+ if (b->counter == -1)
+ b->counter = 0;
+
+ if (++b->counter == BN_BLINDING_COUNTER && b->e != NULL &&
!(b->flags & BN_BLINDING_NO_RECREATE))
{
/* re-create blinding parameters */
@@ -201,8 +207,8 @@ int BN_BLINDING_update(BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
ret=1;
err:
- if (b->counter == 0)
- b->counter = BN_BLINDING_COUNTER;
+ if (b->counter == BN_BLINDING_COUNTER)
+ b->counter = 0;
return(ret);
}
@@ -223,6 +229,12 @@ int BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
return(0);
}
+ if (b->counter == -1)
+ /* Fresh blinding, doesn't need updating. */
+ b->counter = 0;
+ else if (!BN_BLINDING_update(b,ctx))
+ return(0);
+
if (r != NULL)
{
if (!BN_copy(r, b->Ai)) ret=0;
@@ -243,22 +255,19 @@ int BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ct
int ret;
bn_check_top(n);
- if ((b->A == NULL) || (b->Ai == NULL))
- {
- BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_INVERT_EX,BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED);
- return(0);
- }
if (r != NULL)
ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, r, b->mod, ctx);
else
- ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, b->Ai, b->mod, ctx);
-
- if (ret >= 0)
{
- if (!BN_BLINDING_update(b,ctx))
+ if (b->Ai == NULL)
+ {
+ BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_INVERT_EX,BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED);
return(0);
+ }
+ ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, b->Ai, b->mod, ctx);
}
+
bn_check_top(n);
return(ret);
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
index ae642ccb3943..5d90f1e88be2 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
@@ -607,6 +607,7 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_inv(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
while (!BN_is_odd(u))
{
+ if (BN_is_zero(u)) goto err;
if (!BN_rshift1(u, u)) goto err;
if (BN_is_odd(b))
{
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_word.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_word.c
index ee7b87c45ccd..de83a15b99c5 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_word.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_word.c
@@ -144,26 +144,17 @@ int BN_add_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w)
a->neg=!(a->neg);
return(i);
}
- /* Only expand (and risk failing) if it's possibly necessary */
- if (((BN_ULONG)(a->d[a->top - 1] + 1) == 0) &&
- (bn_wexpand(a,a->top+1) == NULL))
- return(0);
- i=0;
- for (;;)
+ for (i=0;w!=0 && i<a->top;i++)
{
- if (i >= a->top)
- l=w;
- else
- l=(a->d[i]+w)&BN_MASK2;
- a->d[i]=l;
- if (w > l)
- w=1;
- else
- break;
- i++;
+ a->d[i] = l = (a->d[i]+w)&BN_MASK2;
+ w = (w>l)?1:0;
}
- if (i >= a->top)
+ if (w && i==a->top)
+ {
+ if (bn_wexpand(a,a->top+1) == NULL) return 0;
a->top++;
+ a->d[i]=w;
+ }
bn_check_top(a);
return(1);
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms.h
index 25f88745f23e..75e3be0e4bc5 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms.h
@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(CMS_ReceiptRequest)
#define CMS_PARTIAL 0x4000
#define CMS_REUSE_DIGEST 0x8000
#define CMS_USE_KEYID 0x10000
+#define CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT 0x20000
const ASN1_OBJECT *CMS_get0_type(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
index bab26235bdc4..f873ce379445 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
const EVP_CIPHER *ciph;
X509_ALGOR *calg = ec->contentEncryptionAlgorithm;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], *piv = NULL;
+ unsigned char *tkey = NULL;
+ size_t tkeylen;
int ok = 0;
@@ -137,32 +139,57 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
goto err;
}
-
-
- if (enc && !ec->key)
+ tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+ /* Generate random session key */
+ if (!enc || !ec->key)
{
- /* Generate random key */
- if (!ec->keylen)
- ec->keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
- ec->key = OPENSSL_malloc(ec->keylen);
- if (!ec->key)
+ tkey = OPENSSL_malloc(tkeylen);
+ if (!tkey)
{
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(ctx, ec->key) <= 0)
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(ctx, tkey) <= 0)
goto err;
- keep_key = 1;
}
- else if (ec->keylen != (unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx))
+
+ if (!ec->key)
+ {
+ ec->key = tkey;
+ ec->keylen = tkeylen;
+ tkey = NULL;
+ if (enc)
+ keep_key = 1;
+ else
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ }
+
+ if (ec->keylen != tkeylen)
{
/* If necessary set key length */
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, ec->keylen) <= 0)
{
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
- CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
- goto err;
+ /* Only reveal failure if debugging so we don't
+ * leak information which may be useful in MMA.
+ */
+ if (enc || ec->debug)
+ {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
+ CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Use random key */
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen);
+ OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
+ ec->key = tkey;
+ ec->keylen = tkeylen;
+ tkey = NULL;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
}
}
@@ -198,6 +225,11 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
ec->key = NULL;
}
+ if (tkey)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tkey, tkeylen);
+ OPENSSL_free(tkey);
+ }
if (ok)
return b;
BIO_free(b);
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_env.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_env.c
index d499ae85b400..b8685fa17590 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_env.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_env.c
@@ -352,6 +352,8 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
unsigned char *ek = NULL;
int eklen;
int ret = 0;
+ CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
+ ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
if (ktri->pkey == NULL)
{
@@ -382,8 +384,14 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
ret = 1;
- cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->key = ek;
- cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->keylen = eklen;
+ if (ec->key)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen);
+ OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
+ }
+
+ ec->key = ek;
+ ec->keylen = eklen;
err:
if (!ret && ek)
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_io.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_io.c
index 30f5ddfe6d2d..6d3edba5f728 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_io.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_io.c
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static int cms_output_data(BIO *out, BIO *data, ASN1_VALUE *val, int flags,
cmsbio = tmpbio;
}
- return 1;
+ return r;
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_lcl.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_lcl.h
index 7d60fac67eb7..ce65d6ef665c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_lcl.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_lcl.h
@@ -175,6 +175,8 @@ struct CMS_EncryptedContentInfo_st
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
unsigned char *key;
size_t keylen;
+ /* Set to 1 if we are debugging decrypt and don't fake keys for MMA */
+ int debug;
};
struct CMS_RecipientInfo_st
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
index f35883aa22b3..2be07c2099af 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
@@ -622,7 +622,10 @@ int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert)
STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *ris;
CMS_RecipientInfo *ri;
int i, r;
+ int debug = 0;
ris = CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(cms);
+ if (ris)
+ debug = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug;
for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_num(ris); i++)
{
ri = sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_value(ris, i);
@@ -636,17 +639,38 @@ int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert)
CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(ri, pk);
r = CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(cms, ri);
CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(ri, NULL);
- if (r > 0)
- return 1;
if (cert)
{
+ /* If not debugging clear any error and
+ * return success to avoid leaking of
+ * information useful to MMA
+ */
+ if (!debug)
+ {
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (r > 0)
+ return 1;
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY,
CMS_R_DECRYPT_ERROR);
return 0;
}
- ERR_clear_error();
+ /* If no cert and not debugging don't leave loop
+ * after first successful decrypt. Always attempt
+ * to decrypt all recipients to avoid leaking timing
+ * of a successful decrypt.
+ */
+ else if (r > 0 && debug)
+ return 1;
}
}
+ /* If no cert and not debugging always return success */
+ if (!cert && !debug)
+ {
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ return 1;
+ }
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY, CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_RECIPIENT);
return 0;
@@ -705,9 +729,14 @@ int CMS_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert,
}
if (!dcont && !check_content(cms))
return 0;
+ if (flags & CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT)
+ cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 1;
+ else
+ cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 0;
+ if (!pk && !cert && !dcont && !out)
+ return 1;
if (pk && !CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(cms, pk, cert))
return 0;
-
cont = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont);
if (!cont)
return 0;
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/comp/c_rle.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/comp/c_rle.c
index efd366fa2239..18bceae51e76 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/comp/c_rle.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/comp/c_rle.c
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static int rle_expand_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
{
int i;
- if (olen < (ilen-1))
+ if (ilen == 0 || olen < (ilen-1))
{
/* ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ */
return(-1);
@@ -59,4 +59,3 @@ static int rle_expand_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
}
return(ilen-1);
}
-
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_api.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_api.c
index 909d72b4b89a..17bae8359f0c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_api.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_api.c
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@
#endif
#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/conf.h>
#include <openssl/conf_api.h>
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c
index 497d00363e96..dec3286f66d9 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c
@@ -396,7 +396,6 @@ BOOL WINAPI DllMain(HINSTANCE hinstDLL, DWORD fdwReason,
case DLL_THREAD_ATTACH:
break;
case DLL_THREAD_DETACH:
- ERR_remove_state(0);
break;
case DLL_PROCESS_DETACH:
break;
@@ -543,3 +542,19 @@ void OpenSSLDie(const char *file,int line,const char *assertion)
}
void *OPENSSL_stderr(void) { return stderr; }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
+
+int CRYPTO_memcmp(const void *in_a, const void *in_b, size_t len)
+ {
+ size_t i;
+ const unsigned char *a = in_a;
+ const unsigned char *b = in_b;
+ unsigned char x = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+ x |= a[i] ^ b[i];
+
+ return x;
+ }
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/crypto.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/crypto.h
index 0e4fb0723ced..6161697cdc5f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/crypto.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/crypto.h
@@ -588,15 +588,22 @@ int OPENSSL_isservice(void);
#endif /* def OPENSSL_FIPS */
+#define OPENSSL_HAVE_INIT 1
+void OPENSSL_init(void);
+
+/* CRYPTO_memcmp returns zero iff the |len| bytes at |a| and |b| are equal. It
+ * takes an amount of time dependent on |len|, but independent of the contents
+ * of |a| and |b|. Unlike memcmp, it cannot be used to put elements into a
+ * defined order as the return value when a != b is undefined, other than to be
+ * non-zero. */
+int CRYPTO_memcmp(const void *a, const void *b, size_t len);
+
/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
/* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
* made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
*/
void ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings(void);
-#define OPENSSL_HAVE_INIT 1
-void OPENSSL_init(void);
-
/* Error codes for the CRYPTO functions. */
/* Function codes. */
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c
index 522d036ca1da..c06b3b667f0b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c
@@ -821,7 +821,7 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BN_
field_sqr = group->meth->field_sqr;
/* only support affine coordinates */
- if (!point->Z_is_one) goto err;
+ if (!point->Z_is_one) return -1;
if (ctx == NULL)
{
@@ -871,6 +871,9 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT
{
return EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, b) ? 0 : 1;
}
+
+ if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, b))
+ return 1;
if (a->Z_is_one && b->Z_is_one)
{
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_key.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_key.c
index 12fb0e6d6d73..522802c07ae1 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_key.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_key.c
@@ -304,7 +304,13 @@ int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return 0;
}
-
+
+ if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key))
+ {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((point = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group)) == NULL)
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c
index 4d26f8bdf692..66a92e2a9005 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c
@@ -1406,6 +1406,9 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *
{
return EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, b) ? 0 : 1;
}
+
+ if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, b))
+ return 1;
if (a->Z_is_one && b->Z_is_one)
{
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c
index b07e31252b9b..1ad507d47172 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c
@@ -168,10 +168,9 @@ int fbytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
return 0;
}
fbytes_counter ++;
- ret = BN_bn2bin(tmp, buf);
- if (ret == 0 || ret != num)
+ if (num != BN_num_bytes(tmp) || !BN_bn2bin(tmp, buf))
ret = 0;
- else
+ else
ret = 1;
if (tmp)
BN_free(tmp);
@@ -287,9 +286,13 @@ int test_builtin(BIO *out)
size_t crv_len = 0, n = 0;
EC_KEY *eckey = NULL, *wrong_eckey = NULL;
EC_GROUP *group;
+ ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_sig = NULL;
unsigned char digest[20], wrong_digest[20];
- unsigned char *signature = NULL;
- unsigned int sig_len;
+ unsigned char *signature = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *sig_ptr;
+ unsigned char *sig_ptr2;
+ unsigned char *raw_buf = NULL;
+ unsigned int sig_len, degree, r_len, s_len, bn_len, buf_len;
int nid, ret = 0;
/* fill digest values with some random data */
@@ -339,7 +342,8 @@ int test_builtin(BIO *out)
if (EC_KEY_set_group(eckey, group) == 0)
goto builtin_err;
EC_GROUP_free(group);
- if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) < 160)
+ degree = EC_GROUP_get_degree(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey));
+ if (degree < 160)
/* drop the curve */
{
EC_KEY_free(eckey);
@@ -415,26 +419,89 @@ int test_builtin(BIO *out)
}
BIO_printf(out, ".");
(void)BIO_flush(out);
- /* modify a single byte of the signature */
- offset = signature[10] % sig_len;
- dirt = signature[11];
- signature[offset] ^= dirt ? dirt : 1;
+ /* wrong length */
+ if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len - 1,
+ eckey) == 1)
+ {
+ BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
+ goto builtin_err;
+ }
+ BIO_printf(out, ".");
+ (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+ /* Modify a single byte of the signature: to ensure we don't
+ * garble the ASN1 structure, we read the raw signature and
+ * modify a byte in one of the bignums directly. */
+ sig_ptr = signature;
+ if ((ecdsa_sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, &sig_ptr, sig_len)) == NULL)
+ {
+ BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
+ goto builtin_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Store the two BIGNUMs in raw_buf. */
+ r_len = BN_num_bytes(ecdsa_sig->r);
+ s_len = BN_num_bytes(ecdsa_sig->s);
+ bn_len = (degree + 7) / 8;
+ if ((r_len > bn_len) || (s_len > bn_len))
+ {
+ BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
+ goto builtin_err;
+ }
+ buf_len = 2 * bn_len;
+ if ((raw_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len)) == NULL)
+ goto builtin_err;
+ /* Pad the bignums with leading zeroes. */
+ memset(raw_buf, 0, buf_len);
+ BN_bn2bin(ecdsa_sig->r, raw_buf + bn_len - r_len);
+ BN_bn2bin(ecdsa_sig->s, raw_buf + buf_len - s_len);
+
+ /* Modify a single byte in the buffer. */
+ offset = raw_buf[10] % buf_len;
+ dirt = raw_buf[11] ? raw_buf[11] : 1;
+ raw_buf[offset] ^= dirt;
+ /* Now read the BIGNUMs back in from raw_buf. */
+ if ((BN_bin2bn(raw_buf, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->r) == NULL) ||
+ (BN_bin2bn(raw_buf + bn_len, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->s) == NULL))
+ goto builtin_err;
+
+ sig_ptr2 = signature;
+ sig_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(ecdsa_sig, &sig_ptr2);
if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len, eckey) == 1)
{
BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
goto builtin_err;
}
+ /* Sanity check: undo the modification and verify signature. */
+ raw_buf[offset] ^= dirt;
+ if ((BN_bin2bn(raw_buf, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->r) == NULL) ||
+ (BN_bin2bn(raw_buf + bn_len, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->s) == NULL))
+ goto builtin_err;
+
+ sig_ptr2 = signature;
+ sig_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(ecdsa_sig, &sig_ptr2);
+ if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len, eckey) != 1)
+ {
+ BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
+ goto builtin_err;
+ }
BIO_printf(out, ".");
(void)BIO_flush(out);
BIO_printf(out, " ok\n");
/* cleanup */
+ /* clean bogus errors */
+ ERR_clear_error();
OPENSSL_free(signature);
signature = NULL;
EC_KEY_free(eckey);
eckey = NULL;
EC_KEY_free(wrong_eckey);
wrong_eckey = NULL;
+ ECDSA_SIG_free(ecdsa_sig);
+ ecdsa_sig = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_free(raw_buf);
+ raw_buf = NULL;
}
ret = 1;
@@ -443,8 +510,12 @@ builtin_err:
EC_KEY_free(eckey);
if (wrong_eckey)
EC_KEY_free(wrong_eckey);
+ if (ecdsa_sig)
+ ECDSA_SIG_free(ecdsa_sig);
if (signature)
OPENSSL_free(signature);
+ if (raw_buf)
+ OPENSSL_free(raw_buf);
if (curves)
OPENSSL_free(curves);
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c
index 551cf5068fa2..1bbf328de54f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c
@@ -144,6 +144,14 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
}
while (BN_is_zero(k));
+ /* We do not want timing information to leak the length of k,
+ * so we compute G*k using an equivalent scalar of fixed
+ * bit-length. */
+
+ if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) goto err;
+ if (BN_num_bits(k) <= BN_num_bits(order))
+ if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) goto err;
+
/* compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k */
if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx))
{
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_test.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_test.c
index 436be20bf10a..a36ca7e4b376 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_test.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_test.c
@@ -435,6 +435,7 @@ int main(int argc,char **argv)
EXIT(3);
}
}
+ fclose(f);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
ENGINE_cleanup();
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/o_init.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/o_init.c
index d767a90a5f43..c89fda5890ad 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/o_init.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/o_init.c
@@ -93,4 +93,18 @@ void OPENSSL_init(void)
#endif
}
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+
+int CRYPTO_memcmp(const void *in_a, const void *in_b, size_t len)
+ {
+ size_t i;
+ const unsigned char *a = in_a;
+ const unsigned char *b = in_b;
+ unsigned char x = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+ x |= a[i] ^ b[i];
+
+ return x;
+ }
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c
index 27450811d720..441ccb7a9e4e 100755
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c
@@ -169,14 +169,14 @@ int OCSP_parse_url(char *url, char **phost, char **pport, char **ppath, int *pss
char *host, *port;
- /* dup the buffer since we are going to mess with it */
- buf = BUF_strdup(url);
- if (!buf) goto mem_err;
-
*phost = NULL;
*pport = NULL;
*ppath = NULL;
+ /* dup the buffer since we are going to mess with it */
+ buf = BUF_strdup(url);
+ if (!buf) goto mem_err;
+
/* Check for initial colon */
p = strchr(buf, ':');
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c
index 4a0c3870d83a..f24080fa0eda 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c
@@ -91,9 +91,12 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
{
EVP_PKEY *skey;
skey = X509_get_pubkey(signer);
- ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0);
- EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
- if(ret <= 0)
+ if (skey)
+ {
+ ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
+ }
+ if(!skey || ret <= 0)
{
OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
goto end;
@@ -108,6 +111,7 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, bs->certs);
if(!init_res)
{
+ ret = -1;
OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
goto end;
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h
index 0da91c26dd4e..bcaeaeed99bf 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h
@@ -25,11 +25,11 @@
* (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
* major minor fix final patch/beta)
*/
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x0090811f
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x0090819fL
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 0.9.8q-fips 2 Dec 2010"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 0.9.8y-fips 5 Feb 2013"
#else
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 0.9.8q 2 Dec 2010"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 0.9.8y 5 Feb 2013"
#endif
#define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@
* should only keep the versions that are binary compatible with the current.
*/
#define SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY ""
-#define SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "0.9.8"
+#define SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "6"
#endif /* HEADER_OPENSSLV_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/perlasm/cbc.pl b/crypto/openssl/crypto/perlasm/cbc.pl
index e43dc9ae15ed..6fc2510905be 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/perlasm/cbc.pl
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/perlasm/cbc.pl
@@ -158,7 +158,6 @@ sub cbc
&jmp_ptr($count);
&set_label("ej7");
- &xor("edx", "edx") if $ppro; # ppro friendly
&movb(&HB("edx"), &BP(6,$in,"",0));
&shl("edx",8);
&set_label("ej6");
@@ -170,7 +169,6 @@ sub cbc
&jmp(&label("ejend"));
&set_label("ej3");
&movb(&HB("ecx"), &BP(2,$in,"",0));
- &xor("ecx", "ecx") if $ppro; # ppro friendly
&shl("ecx",8);
&set_label("ej2");
&movb(&HB("ecx"), &BP(1,$in,"",0));
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c
index fd18ec3d95cf..6b458af3d795 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c
@@ -486,15 +486,34 @@ int PKCS7_decrypt(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert, BIO *data, int flags)
return 0;
}
ret = SMIME_text(bread, data);
+ if (ret > 0 && BIO_method_type(tmpmem) == BIO_TYPE_CIPHER)
+ {
+ if (!BIO_get_cipher_status(tmpmem))
+ ret = 0;
+ }
BIO_free_all(bread);
return ret;
} else {
for(;;) {
i = BIO_read(tmpmem, buf, sizeof(buf));
- if(i <= 0) break;
- BIO_write(data, buf, i);
+ if(i <= 0)
+ {
+ ret = 1;
+ if (BIO_method_type(tmpmem) == BIO_TYPE_CIPHER)
+ {
+ if (!BIO_get_cipher_status(tmpmem))
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+
+ break;
+ }
+ if (BIO_write(data, buf, i) != i)
+ {
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ }
}
BIO_free_all(tmpmem);
- return 1;
+ return ret;
}
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl b/crypto/openssl/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl
index 00c6fa28aaf9..53ce20ea92e5 100755
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
movzb ($dat,$XX[0]),$TX[0]#d
test \$-8,$len
jz .Lcloop1
- cmp \$0,260($dat)
+ cmpl \$0,260($dat)
jnz .Lcloop1
push %rbx
jmp .Lcloop8
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/rc4/rc4_skey.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/rc4/rc4_skey.c
index 4478d1a4b3b3..d1dc912b2414 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/rc4/rc4_skey.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/rc4/rc4_skey.c
@@ -138,9 +138,9 @@ void RC4_set_key(RC4_KEY *key, int len, const unsigned char *data)
*/
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
unsigned long *ia32cap_ptr = OPENSSL_ia32cap_loc();
- if (ia32cap_ptr && (*ia32cap_ptr & (1<<28))) {
+ if (ia32cap_ptr && (*ia32cap_ptr & (1<<20))) {
#else
- if (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P & (1<<28)) {
+ if (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P & (1<<20)) {
#endif
unsigned char *cp=(unsigned char *)d;
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
index 412d0eacf73a..d477f08c4cac 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
@@ -312,51 +312,56 @@ static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx)
return ret;
}
-static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, int local, BIGNUM *f,
- BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- if (local)
+static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
+ BN_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ if (unblind == NULL)
+ /* Local blinding: store the unblinding factor
+ * in BN_BLINDING. */
return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
else
{
- int ret;
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
- ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, r, b, ctx);
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
- return ret;
- }
-}
-
-static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, int local, BIGNUM *f,
- BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- if (local)
- return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
- else
- {
+ /* Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor
+ * outside BN_BLINDING. */
int ret;
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
- ret = BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, r, b, ctx);
+ ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
return ret;
}
-}
+ }
+
+static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
+ BN_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ /* For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex
+ * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING.
+ * If BN_BLINDING is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null:
+ * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor,
+ * and will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING.
+ * In both cases it's safe to access the blinding without a lock.
+ */
+ return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
+ }
/* signing */
static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
- BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br, *res;
+ BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res;
int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
int local_blinding = 0;
+ /* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
+ * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
+ * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */
+ BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- br = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
@@ -404,8 +409,15 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
}
if (blinding != NULL)
- if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx))
+ {
+ if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
goto err;
+ }
if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
((rsa->p != NULL) &&
@@ -439,7 +451,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
}
if (blinding)
- if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx))
+ if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
goto err;
if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING)
@@ -478,18 +490,21 @@ err:
static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
- BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br;
+ BIGNUM *f, *ret;
int j,num=0,r= -1;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
int local_blinding = 0;
+ /* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
+ * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
+ * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */
+ BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- br = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
@@ -527,8 +542,15 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
}
if (blinding != NULL)
- if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx))
+ {
+ if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
+ }
+ if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
/* do the decrypt */
if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
@@ -562,7 +584,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
}
if (blinding)
- if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx))
+ if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
goto err;
p=buf;
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
index 546ae5fcb2ed..b8e3edc000f2 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, phash, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
- if (memcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0 || bad)
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0 || bad)
goto decoding_err;
else
{
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/symhacks.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/symhacks.h
index 0114093c1ee7..c5407714502b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/symhacks.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/symhacks.h
@@ -252,15 +252,15 @@
#define EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m \
EC_POINT_set_compr_coords_GF2m
#undef ec_GF2m_simple_group_clear_finish
-#define ec_GF2m_simple_group_clear_finish ec_GF2m_simple_grp_clr_finish
+#define ec_GF2m_simple_group_clear_finish ec_GF2m_simple_grp_clr_finish
#undef ec_GF2m_simple_group_check_discriminant
#define ec_GF2m_simple_group_check_discriminant ec_GF2m_simple_grp_chk_discrim
#undef ec_GF2m_simple_point_clear_finish
-#define ec_GF2m_simple_point_clear_finish ec_GF2m_simple_pt_clr_finish
+#define ec_GF2m_simple_point_clear_finish ec_GF2m_simple_pt_clr_finish
#undef ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_to_infinity
-#define ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_to_infinity ec_GF2m_simple_pt_set_to_inf
+#define ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_to_infinity ec_GF2m_simple_pt_set_to_inf
#undef ec_GF2m_simple_points_make_affine
-#define ec_GF2m_simple_points_make_affine ec_GF2m_simple_pts_make_affine
+#define ec_GF2m_simple_points_make_affine ec_GF2m_simple_pts_make_affine
#undef ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates
#define ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates \
ec_GF2m_smp_pt_set_af_coords
@@ -288,8 +288,6 @@
#define ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity ec_GFp_simple_pt_set_to_inf
#undef ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine
#define ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine ec_GFp_simple_pts_make_affine
-#undef ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve_GFp
-#define ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve_GFp ec_GFp_simple_grp_get_curve_GFp
#undef ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp
#define ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp \
ec_GFp_smp_set_Jproj_coords_GFp
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index aeb6337688d4..b92758480548 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -1097,7 +1097,7 @@ int X509_cmp_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
- if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
+ if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
return 0;
if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c
index efdf7c3ba75a..c0e1d2d142e0 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c
@@ -142,12 +142,13 @@ unsigned int v3_addr_get_afi(const IPAddressFamily *f)
* Expand the bitstring form of an address into a raw byte array.
* At the moment this is coded for simplicity, not speed.
*/
-static void addr_expand(unsigned char *addr,
+static int addr_expand(unsigned char *addr,
const ASN1_BIT_STRING *bs,
const int length,
const unsigned char fill)
{
- OPENSSL_assert(bs->length >= 0 && bs->length <= length);
+ if (bs->length < 0 || bs->length > length)
+ return 0;
if (bs->length > 0) {
memcpy(addr, bs->data, bs->length);
if ((bs->flags & 7) != 0) {
@@ -159,6 +160,7 @@ static void addr_expand(unsigned char *addr,
}
}
memset(addr + bs->length, fill, length - bs->length);
+ return 1;
}
/*
@@ -177,13 +179,17 @@ static int i2r_address(BIO *out,
unsigned char addr[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
int i, n;
+ if (bs->length < 0)
+ return 0;
switch (afi) {
case IANA_AFI_IPV4:
- addr_expand(addr, bs, 4, fill);
+ if (!addr_expand(addr, bs, 4, fill))
+ return 0;
BIO_printf(out, "%d.%d.%d.%d", addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3]);
break;
case IANA_AFI_IPV6:
- addr_expand(addr, bs, 16, fill);
+ if (!addr_expand(addr, bs, 16, fill))
+ return 0;
for (n = 16; n > 1 && addr[n-1] == 0x00 && addr[n-2] == 0x00; n -= 2)
;
for (i = 0; i < n; i += 2)
@@ -309,6 +315,12 @@ static int i2r_IPAddrBlocks(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
/*
* Sort comparison function for a sequence of IPAddressOrRange
* elements.
+ *
+ * There's no sane answer we can give if addr_expand() fails, and an
+ * assertion failure on externally supplied data is seriously uncool,
+ * so we just arbitrarily declare that if given invalid inputs this
+ * function returns -1. If this messes up your preferred sort order
+ * for garbage input, tough noogies.
*/
static int IPAddressOrRange_cmp(const IPAddressOrRange *a,
const IPAddressOrRange *b,
@@ -321,22 +333,26 @@ static int IPAddressOrRange_cmp(const IPAddressOrRange *a,
switch (a->type) {
case IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix:
- addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00);
+ if (!addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00))
+ return -1;
prefixlen_a = addr_prefixlen(a->u.addressPrefix);
break;
case IPAddressOrRange_addressRange:
- addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00);
+ if (!addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00))
+ return -1;
prefixlen_a = length * 8;
break;
}
switch (b->type) {
case IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix:
- addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00);
+ if (!addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00))
+ return -1;
prefixlen_b = addr_prefixlen(b->u.addressPrefix);
break;
case IPAddressOrRange_addressRange:
- addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00);
+ if (!addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00))
+ return -1;
prefixlen_b = length * 8;
break;
}
@@ -378,6 +394,7 @@ static int range_should_be_prefix(const unsigned char *min,
unsigned char mask;
int i, j;
+ OPENSSL_assert(memcmp(min, max, length) <= 0);
for (i = 0; i < length && min[i] == max[i]; i++)
;
for (j = length - 1; j >= 0 && min[j] == 0x00 && max[j] == 0xFF; j--)
@@ -651,22 +668,22 @@ int v3_addr_add_range(IPAddrBlocks *addr,
/*
* Extract min and max values from an IPAddressOrRange.
*/
-static void extract_min_max(IPAddressOrRange *aor,
+static int extract_min_max(IPAddressOrRange *aor,
unsigned char *min,
unsigned char *max,
int length)
{
- OPENSSL_assert(aor != NULL && min != NULL && max != NULL);
+ if (aor == NULL || min == NULL || max == NULL)
+ return 0;
switch (aor->type) {
case IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix:
- addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00);
- addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0xFF);
- return;
+ return (addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00) &&
+ addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0xFF));
case IPAddressOrRange_addressRange:
- addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00);
- addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressRange->max, length, 0xFF);
- return;
+ return (addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00) &&
+ addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressRange->max, length, 0xFF));
}
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -682,9 +699,10 @@ int v3_addr_get_range(IPAddressOrRange *aor,
if (aor == NULL || min == NULL || max == NULL ||
afi_length == 0 || length < afi_length ||
(aor->type != IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix &&
- aor->type != IPAddressOrRange_addressRange))
+ aor->type != IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) ||
+ !extract_min_max(aor, min, max, afi_length))
return 0;
- extract_min_max(aor, min, max, afi_length);
+
return afi_length;
}
@@ -766,8 +784,9 @@ int v3_addr_is_canonical(IPAddrBlocks *addr)
IPAddressOrRange *a = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j);
IPAddressOrRange *b = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j + 1);
- extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length);
- extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length);
+ if (!extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length) ||
+ !extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length))
+ return 0;
/*
* Punt misordered list, overlapping start, or inverted range.
@@ -795,14 +814,17 @@ int v3_addr_is_canonical(IPAddrBlocks *addr)
}
/*
- * Check final range to see if it should be a prefix.
+ * Check range to see if it's inverted or should be a
+ * prefix.
*/
j = sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(aors) - 1;
{
IPAddressOrRange *a = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j);
- if (a->type == IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) {
- extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length);
- if (range_should_be_prefix(a_min, a_max, length) >= 0)
+ if (a != NULL && a->type == IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) {
+ if (!extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length))
+ return 0;
+ if (memcmp(a_min, a_max, length) > 0 ||
+ range_should_be_prefix(a_min, a_max, length) >= 0)
return 0;
}
}
@@ -836,8 +858,16 @@ static int IPAddressOrRanges_canonize(IPAddressOrRanges *aors,
unsigned char a_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], a_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
unsigned char b_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], b_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
- extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length);
- extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length);
+ if (!extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length) ||
+ !extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length))
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Punt inverted ranges.
+ */
+ if (memcmp(a_min, a_max, length) > 0 ||
+ memcmp(b_min, b_max, length) > 0)
+ return 0;
/*
* Punt overlaps.
@@ -864,6 +894,20 @@ static int IPAddressOrRanges_canonize(IPAddressOrRanges *aors,
}
}
+ /*
+ * Check for inverted final range.
+ */
+ j = sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(aors) - 1;
+ {
+ IPAddressOrRange *a = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j);
+ if (a != NULL && a->type == IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) {
+ unsigned char a_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], a_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
+ extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length);
+ if (memcmp(a_min, a_max, length) > 0)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
return 1;
}
@@ -1012,6 +1056,11 @@ static void *v2i_IPAddrBlocks(struct v3_ext_method *method,
X509V3_conf_err(val);
goto err;
}
+ if (memcmp(min, max, length_from_afi(afi)) > 0) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR);
+ X509V3_conf_err(val);
+ goto err;
+ }
if (!v3_addr_add_range(addr, afi, safi, min, max)) {
X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
@@ -1097,13 +1146,15 @@ static int addr_contains(IPAddressOrRanges *parent,
p = 0;
for (c = 0; c < sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(child); c++) {
- extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(child, c),
- c_min, c_max, length);
+ if (!extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(child, c),
+ c_min, c_max, length))
+ return -1;
for (;; p++) {
if (p >= sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(parent))
return 0;
- extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(parent, p),
- p_min, p_max, length);
+ if (!extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(parent, p),
+ p_min, p_max, length))
+ return 0;
if (memcmp(p_max, c_max, length) < 0)
continue;
if (memcmp(p_min, c_min, length) > 0)
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_asid.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_asid.c
index abd497ed1fd4..11aad0b8b438 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_asid.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_asid.c
@@ -61,7 +61,6 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
-#include <assert.h>
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/conf.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
@@ -172,11 +171,11 @@ static int ASIdOrRange_cmp(const ASIdOrRange * const *a_,
{
const ASIdOrRange *a = *a_, *b = *b_;
- assert((a->type == ASIdOrRange_id && a->u.id != NULL) ||
+ OPENSSL_assert((a->type == ASIdOrRange_id && a->u.id != NULL) ||
(a->type == ASIdOrRange_range && a->u.range != NULL &&
a->u.range->min != NULL && a->u.range->max != NULL));
- assert((b->type == ASIdOrRange_id && b->u.id != NULL) ||
+ OPENSSL_assert((b->type == ASIdOrRange_id && b->u.id != NULL) ||
(b->type == ASIdOrRange_range && b->u.range != NULL &&
b->u.range->min != NULL && b->u.range->max != NULL));
@@ -215,7 +214,7 @@ int v3_asid_add_inherit(ASIdentifiers *asid, int which)
if (*choice == NULL) {
if ((*choice = ASIdentifierChoice_new()) == NULL)
return 0;
- assert((*choice)->u.inherit == NULL);
+ OPENSSL_assert((*choice)->u.inherit == NULL);
if (((*choice)->u.inherit = ASN1_NULL_new()) == NULL)
return 0;
(*choice)->type = ASIdentifierChoice_inherit;
@@ -250,7 +249,7 @@ int v3_asid_add_id_or_range(ASIdentifiers *asid,
if (*choice == NULL) {
if ((*choice = ASIdentifierChoice_new()) == NULL)
return 0;
- assert((*choice)->u.asIdsOrRanges == NULL);
+ OPENSSL_assert((*choice)->u.asIdsOrRanges == NULL);
(*choice)->u.asIdsOrRanges = sk_ASIdOrRange_new(ASIdOrRange_cmp);
if ((*choice)->u.asIdsOrRanges == NULL)
return 0;
@@ -286,7 +285,7 @@ static void extract_min_max(ASIdOrRange *aor,
ASN1_INTEGER **min,
ASN1_INTEGER **max)
{
- assert(aor != NULL && min != NULL && max != NULL);
+ OPENSSL_assert(aor != NULL && min != NULL && max != NULL);
switch (aor->type) {
case ASIdOrRange_id:
*min = aor->u.id;
@@ -359,6 +358,20 @@ static int ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(ASIdentifierChoice *choice)
goto done;
}
+ /*
+ * Check for inverted range.
+ */
+ i = sk_ASIdOrRange_num(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges) - 1;
+ {
+ ASIdOrRange *a = sk_ASIdOrRange_value(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i);
+ ASN1_INTEGER *a_min, *a_max;
+ if (a != NULL && a->type == ASIdOrRange_range) {
+ extract_min_max(a, &a_min, &a_max);
+ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, a_max) > 0)
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+
ret = 1;
done:
@@ -373,7 +386,7 @@ static int ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(ASIdentifierChoice *choice)
int v3_asid_is_canonical(ASIdentifiers *asid)
{
return (asid == NULL ||
- (ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(asid->asnum) ||
+ (ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(asid->asnum) &&
ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(asid->rdi)));
}
@@ -393,9 +406,18 @@ static int ASIdentifierChoice_canonize(ASIdentifierChoice *choice)
return 1;
/*
- * We have a list. Sort it.
+ * If not a list, or if empty list, it's broken.
+ */
+ if (choice->type != ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges ||
+ sk_ASIdOrRange_num(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges) == 0) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_ASIDENTIFIERCHOICE_CANONIZE,
+ X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We have a non-empty list. Sort it.
*/
- assert(choice->type == ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges);
sk_ASIdOrRange_sort(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges);
/*
@@ -413,7 +435,14 @@ static int ASIdentifierChoice_canonize(ASIdentifierChoice *choice)
/*
* Make sure we're properly sorted (paranoia).
*/
- assert(ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, b_min) <= 0);
+ OPENSSL_assert(ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, b_min) <= 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Punt inverted ranges.
+ */
+ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, a_max) > 0 ||
+ ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(b_min, b_max) > 0)
+ goto done;
/*
* Check for overlaps.
@@ -466,13 +495,27 @@ static int ASIdentifierChoice_canonize(ASIdentifierChoice *choice)
break;
}
ASIdOrRange_free(b);
- (void)sk_ASIdOrRange_delete(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i + 1);
+ (void) sk_ASIdOrRange_delete(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i + 1);
i--;
continue;
}
}
- assert(ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(choice)); /* Paranoia */
+ /*
+ * Check for final inverted range.
+ */
+ i = sk_ASIdOrRange_num(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges) - 1;
+ {
+ ASIdOrRange *a = sk_ASIdOrRange_value(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i);
+ ASN1_INTEGER *a_min, *a_max;
+ if (a != NULL && a->type == ASIdOrRange_range) {
+ extract_min_max(a, &a_min, &a_max);
+ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, a_max) > 0)
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_assert(ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(choice)); /* Paranoia */
ret = 1;
@@ -499,6 +542,7 @@ static void *v2i_ASIdentifiers(struct v3_ext_method *method,
struct v3_ext_ctx *ctx,
STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values)
{
+ ASN1_INTEGER *min = NULL, *max = NULL;
ASIdentifiers *asid = NULL;
int i;
@@ -509,7 +553,6 @@ static void *v2i_ASIdentifiers(struct v3_ext_method *method,
for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(values); i++) {
CONF_VALUE *val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(values, i);
- ASN1_INTEGER *min = NULL, *max = NULL;
int i1, i2, i3, is_range, which;
/*
@@ -579,18 +622,19 @@ static void *v2i_ASIdentifiers(struct v3_ext_method *method,
max = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, s + i2);
OPENSSL_free(s);
if (min == NULL || max == NULL) {
- ASN1_INTEGER_free(min);
- ASN1_INTEGER_free(max);
X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
+ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(min, max) > 0) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS, X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
}
if (!v3_asid_add_id_or_range(asid, which, min, max)) {
- ASN1_INTEGER_free(min);
- ASN1_INTEGER_free(max);
X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
+ min = max = NULL;
}
/*
@@ -602,6 +646,8 @@ static void *v2i_ASIdentifiers(struct v3_ext_method *method,
err:
ASIdentifiers_free(asid);
+ ASN1_INTEGER_free(min);
+ ASN1_INTEGER_free(max);
return NULL;
}
@@ -709,9 +755,9 @@ static int v3_asid_validate_path_internal(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
int i, ret = 1, inherit_as = 0, inherit_rdi = 0;
X509 *x = NULL;
- assert(chain != NULL && sk_X509_num(chain) > 0);
- assert(ctx != NULL || ext != NULL);
- assert(ctx == NULL || ctx->verify_cb != NULL);
+ OPENSSL_assert(chain != NULL && sk_X509_num(chain) > 0);
+ OPENSSL_assert(ctx != NULL || ext != NULL);
+ OPENSSL_assert(ctx == NULL || ctx->verify_cb != NULL);
/*
* Figure out where to start. If we don't have an extension to
@@ -723,7 +769,7 @@ static int v3_asid_validate_path_internal(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
} else {
i = 0;
x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
- assert(x != NULL);
+ OPENSSL_assert(x != NULL);
if ((ext = x->rfc3779_asid) == NULL)
goto done;
}
@@ -756,7 +802,7 @@ static int v3_asid_validate_path_internal(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
*/
for (i++; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
- assert(x != NULL);
+ OPENSSL_assert(x != NULL);
if (x->rfc3779_asid == NULL) {
if (child_as != NULL || child_rdi != NULL)
validation_err(X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE);