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| author | Colin Percival <cperciva@FreeBSD.org> | 2006-09-28 13:06:23 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Colin Percival <cperciva@FreeBSD.org> | 2006-09-28 13:06:23 +0000 |
| commit | 30a6ffb3330a4ce39d12906a7dda5c4d9ed91dc3 (patch) | |
| tree | dd781c2038cbc6db2809f44aae4144784fa53814 /crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c | |
| parent | b55396780782c474e291f8557a14c033f4c6941d (diff) | |
| download | src-30a6ffb3330a4ce39d12906a7dda5c4d9ed91dc3.tar.gz src-30a6ffb3330a4ce39d12906a7dda5c4d9ed91dc3.zip | |
Correct multiple vulnerabilities in crypto(3).
Limit the size of public keys used in order to protect applications
from a denial of service via insane key sizes.
Security: FreeBSD-SA-06:23.openssl
Approved by: so (cperciva)
Notes
Notes:
svn path=/releng/4.11/; revision=162724
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c | 44 |
1 files changed, 44 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c index 5f7a1f20a359..43737cd00b97 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c @@ -105,6 +105,28 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *buf=NULL; BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; + if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); + return -1; + } + + if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); + return -1; + } + + /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */ + if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) + { + if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); + return -1; + } + } + BN_init(&f); BN_init(&ret); if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; @@ -505,6 +527,28 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *buf=NULL; BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; + if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); + return -1; + } + + if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); + return -1; + } + + /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */ + if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) + { + if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); + return -1; + } + } + BN_init(&f); BN_init(&ret); ctx=BN_CTX_new(); |