aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorColin Percival <cperciva@FreeBSD.org>2006-09-28 13:06:23 +0000
committerColin Percival <cperciva@FreeBSD.org>2006-09-28 13:06:23 +0000
commit30a6ffb3330a4ce39d12906a7dda5c4d9ed91dc3 (patch)
treedd781c2038cbc6db2809f44aae4144784fa53814 /crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
parentb55396780782c474e291f8557a14c033f4c6941d (diff)
downloadsrc-30a6ffb3330a4ce39d12906a7dda5c4d9ed91dc3.tar.gz
src-30a6ffb3330a4ce39d12906a7dda5c4d9ed91dc3.zip
Correct multiple vulnerabilities in crypto(3).
Limit the size of public keys used in order to protect applications from a denial of service via insane key sizes. Security: FreeBSD-SA-06:23.openssl Approved by: so (cperciva)
Notes
Notes: svn path=/releng/4.11/; revision=162724
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c')
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c44
1 files changed, 44 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
index 5f7a1f20a359..43737cd00b97 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
@@ -105,6 +105,28 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
+ {
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
BN_init(&f);
BN_init(&ret);
if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
@@ -505,6 +527,28 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
+ {
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
BN_init(&f);
BN_init(&ret);
ctx=BN_CTX_new();