|author||Kyle Evans <kevans@FreeBSD.org>||2020-07-08 18:29:06 +0000|
|committer||Kyle Evans <kevans@FreeBSD.org>||2020-07-08 18:29:06 +0000|
MFC r361798, r361800: vfs: default disallow read(2) of a directory
This MFC is in accordance with the original MFC plan outlined in the commit message for r361798, appearing in full (with exception to metadata) below. To summarize: this MFC only merges back the sysctl with a default disallow policy, as in head, to ensure we hit any issues quickly but in a fashion that end users can easily revert. Interested parties can flip the security.bsd.allow_read_dir sysctl back to 1 to fully honor the previous behavior of allowing read(2) of any dir, filesystem permitting. r361798: vfs: add restrictions to read(2) of a directory [1/2] Historically, we've allowed read() of a directory and some filesystems will accommodate (e.g. ufs/ffs, msdosfs). From the history department staffed by Warner: <<EOF pdp-7 unix seemed to allow reading directories, but they were weird, special things there so I'm unsure (my pdp-7 assembler sucks). 1st Edition's sources are lost, mostly. The kernel allows it. The reconstructed sources from 2nd or 3rd edition read it though. V6 to V7 changed the filesystem format, and should have been a warning, but reading directories weren't materially changed. 4.1b BSD introduced readdir because of UFS. UFS broke all directory reading programs in 1983. ls, du, find, etc all had to be rewritten. readdir() and friends were introduced here. SysVr3 picked up readdir() in 1987 for the AT&T fork of Unix. SysVr4 updated all the directory reading programs in 1988 because different filesystem types were introduced. In the 90s, these interfaces became completely ubiquitous as PDP-11s running V7 faded from view and all the folks that initially started on V7 upgraded to SysV. Linux never supported this (though I've not done the software archeology to check) because it has always had a pathological diversity of filesystems. EOF Disallowing read(2) on a directory has the side-effect of masking application bugs from relying on other implementation's behavior (e.g. Linux) of rejecting these with EISDIR across the board, but allowing it has been a vector for at least one stack disclosure bug in the past. By POSIX, this is implementation-defined whether read() handles directories or not. Popular implementations have chosen to reject them, and this seems sensible: the data you're reading from a directory is not structured in some unified way across filesystem implementations like with readdir(2), so it is impossible for applications to portably rely on this. With this patch, we will reject most read(2) of a dirfd with EISDIR. Users that know what they're doing can conscientiously set bsd.security.allow_read_dir=1 to allow read(2) of directories, as it has proven useful for debugging or recovery. A future commit will further limit the sysctl to allow only the system root to read(2) directories, to make it at least relatively safe to leave on for longer periods of time. While we're adding logic pertaining to directory vnodes to vn_io_fault, an additional assertion has also been added to ensure that we're not reaching vn_io_fault with any write request on a directory vnode. Such request would be a logical error in the kernel, and must be debugged rather than allowing it to potentially silently error out. Commented out shell aliases have been placed in root's chsrc/shrc to promote awareness that grep may become noisy after this change, depending on your usage. A tentative MFC plan has been put together to try and make it as trivial as possible to identify issues and collect reports; note that this will be strongly re-evaluated. Tentatively, I will MFC this knob with the default as it is in HEAD to improve our odds of actually getting reports. The future priv(9) to further restrict the sysctl WILL NOT BE MERGED BACK, so the knob will be a faithful reversion on stable/12. We will go into the merge acknowledging that the sysctl default may be flipped back to restore historical behavior at *any* point if it's warranted.  https://www.freebsd.org/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-19:10.ufs.asc r361800: RELNOTES and UPDATING: Document the new policy on read(2) of dirfd These changes have been completely flushed as of r361799; note it. PR: 246412 Relnotes: yes 100%
Notes: svn path=/stable/12/; revision=363017
Diffstat (limited to 'UPDATING')
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 0 deletions
@@ -16,6 +16,16 @@ from older versions of FreeBSD, try WITHOUT_CLANG and WITH_GCC to bootstrap to
the tip of head, and then rebuild without this option. The bootstrap process
from older version of current across the gcc/clang cutover is a bit fragile.
+ read(2) of a directory fd is now rejected by default. root may
+ re-enable it for the entire system with the
+ security.bsd.allow_read_dir sysctl(8) MIB.
+ It may be advised to setup aliases for grep to default to `-d skip` if
+ commonly non-recursively grepping a list that includes directories and
+ the potential for the resulting stderr output is not tolerable. Example
+ aliases are now installed, commented out, in /root/.cshrc.
Upstream DTS from Linux 5.6 was merged and they now have the SID
and THS (Secure ID controller and THermal Sensor) node present.