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authorJung-uk Kim <jkim@FreeBSD.org>2019-02-26 18:06:51 +0000
committerJung-uk Kim <jkim@FreeBSD.org>2019-02-26 18:06:51 +0000
commit851f7386fd78b9787f4f6669ad271886a2a003f1 (patch)
tree952920d27fdcd105b7f77b6e5fef3fedae8f74ea
parent8c3f9abd70b3f447a4795c1b00b386b044fb322d (diff)
downloadsrc-851f7386fd78b9787f4f6669ad271886a2a003f1.tar.gz
src-851f7386fd78b9787f4f6669ad271886a2a003f1.zip
Import OpenSSL 1.1.1b.vendor/openssl/1.1.1b
Notes
Notes: svn path=/vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/; revision=344595 svn path=/vendor-crypto/openssl/1.1.1b/; revision=344596; tag=vendor/openssl/1.1.1b
-rw-r--r--CHANGES38
-rw-r--r--CONTRIBUTING2
-rwxr-xr-xConfigure11
-rw-r--r--FREEBSD-upgrade2
-rw-r--r--INSTALL33
-rw-r--r--LICENSE16
-rw-r--r--NEWS7
-rw-r--r--README2
-rw-r--r--apps/apps.c6
-rw-r--r--apps/ct_log_list.cnf4
-rw-r--r--apps/dh1024.pem2
-rw-r--r--apps/dh2048.pem4
-rw-r--r--apps/dh4096.pem4
-rw-r--r--apps/ocsp.c34
-rw-r--r--apps/openssl.cnf4
-rw-r--r--apps/pkcs12.c9
-rw-r--r--apps/rehash.c22
-rw-r--r--apps/s_cb.c6
-rw-r--r--apps/s_client.c96
-rw-r--r--apps/s_server.c23
-rw-r--r--apps/speed.c8
-rw-r--r--apps/verify.c15
-rwxr-xr-xconfig18
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/aes/asm/aes-x86_64.pl20
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl18
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl4
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/aes/asm/bsaes-x86_64.pl8
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/aes/asm/vpaes-armv8.pl20
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86_64.pl28
-rw-r--r--crypto/armcap.c79
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/a_digest.c12
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/a_sign.c32
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/a_verify.c18
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c28
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/charmap.h2
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/charmap.pl2
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/d2i_pu.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/bio/b_addr.c7
-rw-r--r--crypto/bio/bss_file.c11
-rw-r--r--crypto/bio/bss_mem.c26
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/armv8-mont.pl6
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S6
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/mips.pl6
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl8
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/asm/sparcv8plus.S6
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl4
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_ctx.c8
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_depr.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_div.c319
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_exp.c66
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_lib.c66
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_prime.h2
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl2
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_shift.c130
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/chacha/asm/chacha-armv8.pl10
-rw-r--r--crypto/cms/cms_kari.c7
-rw-r--r--crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c1
-rw-r--r--crypto/conf/conf_def.c9
-rw-r--r--crypto/conf/conf_def.h2
-rw-r--r--crypto/conf/conf_lib.c28
-rw-r--r--crypto/conf/conf_mod.c5
-rw-r--r--crypto/conf/conf_sap.c25
-rw-r--r--crypto/conf/conf_ssl.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/conf/keysets.pl2
-rw-r--r--crypto/cryptlib.c18
-rw-r--r--crypto/des/asm/des_enc.m46
-rw-r--r--crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c7
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-armv8.pl30
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl36
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/curve25519.c4541
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/curve448/eddsa.c30
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/curve448/point_448.h16
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c20
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/ec_err.c9
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h14
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/ecp_mont.c51
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/ecp_nist.c3
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c3
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c3
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c3
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c3
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c51
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/ecx_meth.c3
-rw-r--r--crypto/engine/README2
-rw-r--r--crypto/engine/eng_devcrypto.c276
-rw-r--r--crypto/engine/eng_lib.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/err/err.c112
-rw-r--r--crypto/err/openssl.txt9
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/evp_enc.c45
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/evp_err.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/p_lib.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/include/internal/bn_int.h9
-rw-r--r--crypto/init.c135
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl14
-rw-r--r--crypto/objects/obj_dat.h2
-rw-r--r--crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl2
-rw-r--r--crypto/objects/obj_xref.h2
-rw-r--r--crypto/objects/objects.pl2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/objects/objxref.pl2
-rw-r--r--crypto/pem/pem_info.c4
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl19
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-armv8.pl4
-rw-r--r--crypto/ppc_arch.h4
-rw-r--r--crypto/ppccap.c76
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/ppccpuid.pl125
-rw-r--r--crypto/rand/rand_unix.c23
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c9
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c82
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c17
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c95
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c133
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_x931g.c2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/sha/asm/keccak1600-armv8.pl16
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/sha/asm/sha512-armv8.pl4
-rw-r--r--crypto/srp/srp_lib.c6
-rw-r--r--crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c25
-rw-r--r--crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c8
-rw-r--r--crypto/uid.c5
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c11
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509/x_crl.c14
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c3
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509/x_x509.c25
-rw-r--r--doc/HOWTO/certificates.txt2
-rw-r--r--doc/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt2
-rw-r--r--doc/fingerprints.txt2
-rw-r--r--doc/man1/ca.pod6
-rw-r--r--doc/man1/ciphers.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man1/cms.pod10
-rw-r--r--doc/man1/dgst.pod6
-rw-r--r--doc/man1/ec.pod6
-rw-r--r--doc/man1/enc.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man1/genpkey.pod6
-rw-r--r--doc/man1/ocsp.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man1/pkcs12.pod5
-rw-r--r--doc/man1/pkcs8.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man1/req.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man1/s_client.pod30
-rw-r--r--doc/man1/s_server.pod29
-rw-r--r--doc/man1/smime.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man1/storeutl.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man1/verify.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man1/x509.pod4
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new.pod8
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/ASYNC_start_job.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/BIO_new_CMS.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/BN_generate_prime.pod4
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/BN_rand.pod3
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/BN_security_bits.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/BUF_MEM_new.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/CMS_get0_type.pod9
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/CONF_modules_load_file.pod12
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index.pod4
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/DH_size.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/DTLS_get_data_mtu.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/DTLS_set_timer_cb.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/DTLSv1_listen.pod6
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/EC_GROUP_copy.pod4
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/EVP_DigestInit.pod8
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/EVP_DigestSignInit.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/EVP_DigestVerifyInit.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/EVP_EncryptInit.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod5
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_new.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_asn1_get_count.pod4
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_derive.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_encrypt.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_keygen.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_new.pod9
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_print_private.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_sign.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_verify.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_verify_recover.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/EVP_SignInit.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/HMAC.pod4
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/OPENSSL_init_crypto.pod48
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/OPENSSL_malloc.pod8
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/OPENSSL_secure_malloc.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/OSSL_STORE_INFO.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/OSSL_STORE_LOADER.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/OSSL_STORE_SEARCH.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/OSSL_STORE_expect.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/OSSL_STORE_open.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/PEM_read_bio_ex.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/PEM_write_bio_PKCS7_stream.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/PKCS12_parse.pod3
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/PKCS7_sign.pod4
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/PKCS7_sign_add_signer.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/RAND_bytes.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/RIPEMD160_Init.pod4
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/RSA_get0_key.pod1
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod7
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/RSA_size.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_CIPHER_get_name.pod14
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_COMP_add_compression_method.pod5
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_CONF_CTX_new.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod18
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd_argv.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_CTX_config.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_CTX_dane_enable.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_CTX_get0_param.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set0_CA_list.pod4
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_curves.pod4
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_list_file.pod4
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_info_callback.pod16
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod13
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback.pod3
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_num_tickets.pod8
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod6
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_record_padding_callback.pod6
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_session_ticket_cb.pod4
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment.pod4
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version.pod4
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb.pod4
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_free.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher.pod4
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_get0_hostname.pod4
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version.pod4
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_has_ticket.pod4
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_is_resumable.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_set1_id.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_export_keying_material.pod5
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_extension_supported.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_get_all_async_fds.pod4
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_get_error.pod17
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_get_version.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_key_update.pod6
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_read.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_read_early_data.pod4
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_set1_host.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_shutdown.pod4
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_want.pod3
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/SSL_write.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/UI_create_method.pod5
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/UI_new.pod5
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object.pod3
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod4
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb.pod3
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/X509_STORE_new.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func.pod7
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod8
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/X509_get0_signature.pod10
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/X509_get_serialNumber.pod5
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/X509_get_subject_name.pod4
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/X509_sign.pod8
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/d2i_PrivateKey.pod18
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/i2d_CMS_bio_stream.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/man5/config.pod9
-rw-r--r--doc/man7/ct.pod4
-rw-r--r--e_os.h3
-rw-r--r--engines/e_dasync.c21
-rw-r--r--include/internal/conf.h11
-rw-r--r--include/internal/constant_time_locl.h6
-rw-r--r--include/internal/cryptlib.h4
-rw-r--r--include/internal/sockets.h8
-rw-r--r--include/internal/thread_once.h94
-rw-r--r--include/internal/tsan_assist.h4
-rw-r--r--include/openssl/crypto.h18
-rw-r--r--include/openssl/e_os2.h9
-rw-r--r--include/openssl/ecerr.h6
-rw-r--r--include/openssl/evp.h13
-rw-r--r--include/openssl/evperr.h1
-rw-r--r--include/openssl/lhash.h55
-rw-r--r--include/openssl/obj_mac.h2
-rw-r--r--include/openssl/opensslv.h4
-rw-r--r--include/openssl/safestack.h85
-rw-r--r--include/openssl/ssl.h35
-rw-r--r--include/openssl/sslerr.h3
-rw-r--r--include/openssl/x509_vfy.h6
-rw-r--r--ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c15
-rw-r--r--ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c10
-rw-r--r--ssl/s3_enc.c8
-rw-r--r--ssl/s3_lib.c2
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl_ciph.c4
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl_err.c4
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl_init.c19
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl_lib.c46
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl_locl.h6
-rw-r--r--ssl/statem/extensions.c17
-rw-r--r--ssl/statem/statem.c8
-rw-r--r--ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c30
-rw-r--r--ssl/statem/statem_lib.c44
-rw-r--r--ssl/statem/statem_locl.h5
-rw-r--r--ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c39
-rw-r--r--ssl/t1_enc.c14
-rw-r--r--ssl/t1_lib.c21
-rw-r--r--ssl/tls13_enc.c81
302 files changed, 5478 insertions, 3541 deletions
diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 4b68f4832909..67a6bd233816 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -7,6 +7,44 @@
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commits/ and pick the appropriate
release branch.
+ Changes between 1.1.1a and 1.1.1b [26 Feb 2019]
+
+ *) Added SCA hardening for modular field inversion in EC_GROUP through
+ a new dedicated field_inv() pointer in EC_METHOD.
+ This also addresses a leakage affecting conversions from projective
+ to affine coordinates.
+ [Billy Bob Brumley, Nicola Tuveri]
+
+ *) Change the info callback signals for the start and end of a post-handshake
+ message exchange in TLSv1.3. In 1.1.1/1.1.1a we used SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
+ and SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE. Experience has shown that many applications get
+ confused by this and assume that a TLSv1.2 renegotiation has started. This
+ can break KeyUpdate handling. Instead we no longer signal the start and end
+ of a post handshake message exchange (although the messages themselves are
+ still signalled). This could break some applications that were expecting
+ the old signals. However without this KeyUpdate is not usable for many
+ applications.
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Fix a bug in the computation of the endpoint-pair shared secret used
+ by DTLS over SCTP. This breaks interoperability with older versions
+ of OpenSSL like OpenSSL 1.1.0 and OpenSSL 1.0.2. There is a runtime
+ switch SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG (off by default) enabling
+ interoperability with such broken implementations. However, enabling
+ this switch breaks interoperability with correct implementations.
+
+ *) Fix a use after free bug in d2i_X509_PUBKEY when overwriting a
+ re-used X509_PUBKEY object if the second PUBKEY is malformed.
+ [Bernd Edlinger]
+
+ *) Move strictness check from EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() to EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0().
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Remove the 'dist' target and add a tarball building script. The
+ 'dist' target has fallen out of use, and it shouldn't be
+ necessary to configure just to create a source distribution.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
Changes between 1.1.1 and 1.1.1a [20 Nov 2018]
*) Timing vulnerability in DSA signature generation
diff --git a/CONTRIBUTING b/CONTRIBUTING
index c0eed39e34b2..5d717763d51e 100644
--- a/CONTRIBUTING
+++ b/CONTRIBUTING
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ guidelines:
7. For user visible changes (API changes, behaviour changes, ...),
consider adding a note in CHANGES. This could be a summarising
description of the change, and could explain the grander details.
- Have a look through existing entries for inspiration.
+ Have a look through existing entries for inspiration.
Please note that this is NOT simply a copy of git-log oneliners.
Also note that security fixes get an entry in CHANGES.
This file helps users get more in depth information of what comes
diff --git a/Configure b/Configure
index d5dc36c285ba..608012225cc9 100755
--- a/Configure
+++ b/Configure
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#! /usr/bin/env perl
# -*- mode: perl; -*-
-# Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+# Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
#
# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -144,6 +144,8 @@ my $gcc_devteam_warn = "-DDEBUG_UNUSED"
# -Wlanguage-extension-token -- no, we use asm()
# -Wunused-macros -- no, too tricky for BN and _XOPEN_SOURCE etc
# -Wextended-offsetof -- no, needed in CMS ASN1 code
+# -Wunused-function -- no, it forces header use of safestack et al
+# DEFINE macros
my $clang_devteam_warn = ""
. " -Wswitch-default"
. " -Wno-parentheses-equality"
@@ -153,6 +155,7 @@ my $clang_devteam_warn = ""
. " -Wincompatible-pointer-types-discards-qualifiers"
. " -Wmissing-variable-declarations"
. " -Wno-unknown-warning-option"
+ . " -Wno-unused-function"
;
# This adds backtrace information to the memory leak info. Is only used
@@ -374,6 +377,7 @@ my @disablables = (
"msan",
"multiblock",
"nextprotoneg",
+ "pinshared",
"ocb",
"ocsp",
"pic",
@@ -1110,13 +1114,13 @@ foreach my $feature (@{$target{disable}}) {
$disabled{$feature} = 'config';
}
foreach my $feature (@{$target{enable}}) {
- if ("default" eq ($disabled{$_} // "")) {
+ if ("default" eq ($disabled{$feature} // "")) {
if (exists $deprecated_disablables{$feature}) {
warn "***** config $target enables deprecated feature $feature\n";
} elsif (!grep { $feature eq $_ } @disablables) {
die "***** config $target enables unknown feature $feature\n";
}
- delete $disabled{$_};
+ delete $disabled{$feature};
}
}
@@ -1370,6 +1374,7 @@ unless ($disabled{asm}) {
push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT" if ($target{bn_asm_src} =~ /-mont/);
push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5" if ($target{bn_asm_src} =~ /-mont5/);
push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "OPENSSL_BN_ASM_GF2m" if ($target{bn_asm_src} =~ /-gf2m/);
+ push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "BN_DIV3W" if ($target{bn_asm_src} =~ /-div3w/);
if ($target{sha1_asm_src}) {
push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "SHA1_ASM" if ($target{sha1_asm_src} =~ /sx86/ || $target{sha1_asm_src} =~ /sha1/);
diff --git a/FREEBSD-upgrade b/FREEBSD-upgrade
index 5cbf37021a5b..099b7894b1b3 100644
--- a/FREEBSD-upgrade
+++ b/FREEBSD-upgrade
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ First, read http://wiki.freebsd.org/SubversionPrimer/VendorImports
# Xlist
setenv XLIST /FreeBSD/work/openssl/svn-FREEBSD-files/FREEBSD-Xlist
setenv FSVN "svn+ssh://repo.freebsd.org/base"
-setenv OSSLVER 1.1.1
+setenv OSSLVER 1.1.1b
###setenv OSSLTAG v`echo ${OSSLVER} | tr . _`
diff --git a/INSTALL b/INSTALL
index 4ce6651b6b34..7fe55d428f2f 100644
--- a/INSTALL
+++ b/INSTALL
@@ -326,6 +326,11 @@
Don't build support for datagram based BIOs. Selecting this
option will also force the disabling of DTLS.
+ enable-devcryptoeng
+ Build the /dev/crypto engine. It is automatically selected
+ on BSD implementations, in which case it can be disabled with
+ no-devcryptoeng.
+
no-dso
Don't build support for loading Dynamic Shared Objects.
@@ -402,6 +407,24 @@
no-pic
Don't build with support for Position Independent Code.
+ no-pinshared By default OpenSSL will attempt to stay in memory until the
+ process exits. This is so that libcrypto and libssl can be
+ properly cleaned up automatically via an "atexit()" handler.
+ The handler is registered by libcrypto and cleans up both
+ libraries. On some platforms the atexit() handler will run on
+ unload of libcrypto (if it has been dynamically loaded)
+ rather than at process exit. This option can be used to stop
+ OpenSSL from attempting to stay in memory until the process
+ exits. This could lead to crashes if either libcrypto or
+ libssl have already been unloaded at the point
+ that the atexit handler is invoked, e.g. on a platform which
+ calls atexit() on unload of the library, and libssl is
+ unloaded before libcrypto then a crash is likely to happen.
+ Applications can suppress running of the atexit() handler at
+ run time by using the OPENSSL_INIT_NO_ATEXIT option to
+ OPENSSL_init_crypto(). See the man page for it for further
+ details.
+
no-posix-io
Don't use POSIX IO capabilities.
@@ -941,10 +964,10 @@
* COMPILING existing applications
- OpenSSL 1.1.0 hides a number of structures that were previously
- open. This includes all internal libssl structures and a number
- of EVP types. Accessor functions have been added to allow
- controlled access to the structures' data.
+ Starting with version 1.1.0, OpenSSL hides a number of structures
+ that were previously open. This includes all internal libssl
+ structures and a number of EVP types. Accessor functions have
+ been added to allow controlled access to the structures' data.
This means that some software needs to be rewritten to adapt to
the new ways of doing things. This often amounts to allocating
@@ -1047,7 +1070,7 @@
depend
Rebuild the dependencies in the Makefiles. This is a legacy
- option that no longer needs to be used in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+ option that no longer needs to be used since OpenSSL 1.1.0.
install
Install all OpenSSL components.
diff --git a/LICENSE b/LICENSE
index e953f590cb76..9601ab43575f 100644
--- a/LICENSE
+++ b/LICENSE
@@ -10,14 +10,14 @@
---------------
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -72,21 +72,21 @@
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
@@ -101,10 +101,10 @@
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index b95e93027f83..aa104ddc053e 100644
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -5,6 +5,13 @@
This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1a and OpenSSL 1.1.1b [26 Feb 2019]
+
+ o Change the info callback signals for the start and end of a post-handshake
+ message exchange in TLSv1.3.
+ o Fix a bug in DTLS over SCTP. This breaks interoperability with older versions
+ of OpenSSL like OpenSSL 1.1.0 and OpenSSL 1.0.2.
+
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1 and OpenSSL 1.1.1a [20 Nov 2018]
o Timing vulnerability in DSA signature generation (CVE-2018-0734)
diff --git a/README b/README
index affb172e8ba8..d0023229572f 100644
--- a/README
+++ b/README
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
- OpenSSL 1.1.1a 20 Nov 2018
+ OpenSSL 1.1.1b 26 Feb 2019
Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project
Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
diff --git a/apps/apps.c b/apps/apps.c
index 653e3973e04d..36cb0b278337 100644
--- a/apps/apps.c
+++ b/apps/apps.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -1561,7 +1561,7 @@ CA_DB *load_index(const char *dbfile, DB_ATTR *db_attr)
#else
BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s-attr", dbfile);
#endif
- dbattr_conf = app_load_config(buf);
+ dbattr_conf = app_load_config_quiet(buf);
retdb = app_malloc(sizeof(*retdb), "new DB");
retdb->db = tmpdb;
@@ -2196,7 +2196,7 @@ double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime)
return ret;
}
-#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYSTEM_VXWORKS)
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
# include <time.h>
double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime)
diff --git a/apps/ct_log_list.cnf b/apps/ct_log_list.cnf
index 650aa22da59c..e643cfdbdf3f 100644
--- a/apps/ct_log_list.cnf
+++ b/apps/ct_log_list.cnf
@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
# that are to be trusted.
# Google's list of logs can be found here:
-# www.certificate-transparency.org/known-logs
+# www.certificate-transparency.org/known-logs
# A Python program to convert the log list to OpenSSL's format can be
# found here:
-# https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency/blob/master/python/utilities/log_list/print_log_list.py
+# https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency/blob/master/python/utilities/log_list/print_log_list.py
# Use the "--openssl_output" flag.
diff --git a/apps/dh1024.pem b/apps/dh1024.pem
index f1a5e180aa95..813e8a4a4822 100644
--- a/apps/dh1024.pem
+++ b/apps/dh1024.pem
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Sgh5jjQE3e+VGbPNOkMbMCsKbfJfFDdP4TVtbVHCReSFtXZiXn7G9ExC6aY37WsL
/1y29Aa37e44a/taiZ+lrp8kEXxLH+ZJKGZR7OZTgf//////////AgEC
-----END DH PARAMETERS-----
-These are the 1024-bit DH parameters from "Internet Key Exchange
+These are the 1024-bit DH parameters from "Internet Key Exchange
Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)": https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5996
See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2412 for how they were generated.
diff --git a/apps/dh2048.pem b/apps/dh2048.pem
index e899f2e0296d..288a20997e5a 100644
--- a/apps/dh2048.pem
+++ b/apps/dh2048.pem
@@ -7,8 +7,8 @@ fDKQXkYuNs474553LBgOhgObJ4Oi7Aeij7XFXfBvTFLJ3ivL9pVYFxg5lUl86pVq
5RXSJhiY+gUQFXKOWoqsqmj//////////wIBAg==
-----END DH PARAMETERS-----
-These are the 2048-bit DH parameters from "More Modular Exponential
-(MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)":
+These are the 2048-bit DH parameters from "More Modular Exponential
+(MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)":
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3526
See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2412 for how they were generated.
diff --git a/apps/dh4096.pem b/apps/dh4096.pem
index adada2b55815..08560e1284e2 100644
--- a/apps/dh4096.pem
+++ b/apps/dh4096.pem
@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ ARpyPBKnh+bXiHGaEL26WyaZwycYavTiPBqUaDS2FQvaJYPpyirUTOjbu8LbBN6O
HNAGkSfVsFqpk7TqmI2P3cGG/7fckKbAj030Nck0BjGZ//////////8CAQI=
-----END DH PARAMETERS-----
-These are the 4096-bit DH parameters from "More Modular Exponential
-(MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)":
+These are the 4096-bit DH parameters from "More Modular Exponential
+(MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)":
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3526
See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2412 for how they were generated.
diff --git a/apps/ocsp.c b/apps/ocsp.c
index 7fd78624bbcc..e8aeb11cc51d 100644
--- a/apps/ocsp.c
+++ b/apps/ocsp.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2001-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -36,7 +36,21 @@ NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
# include <openssl/x509v3.h>
# include <openssl/rand.h>
-# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK) \
+#ifndef HAVE_FORK
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
+# define HAVE_FORK 0
+# else
+# define HAVE_FORK 1
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#if HAVE_FORK
+# undef NO_FORK
+#else
+# define NO_FORK
+#endif
+
+# if !defined(NO_FORK) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK) \
&& !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO)
# define OCSP_DAEMON
# include <sys/types.h>
@@ -53,6 +67,20 @@ NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
# define LOG_ERR 2
# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
+/* not supported */
+int setpgid(pid_t pid, pid_t pgid)
+{
+ errno = ENOSYS;
+ return 0;
+}
+/* not supported */
+pid_t fork(void)
+{
+ errno = ENOSYS;
+ return (pid_t) -1;
+}
+# endif
/* Maximum leeway in validity period: default 5 minutes */
# define MAX_VALIDITY_PERIOD (5 * 60)
@@ -863,6 +891,7 @@ static void killall(int ret, pid_t *kidpids)
for (i = 0; i < multi; ++i)
if (kidpids[i] != 0)
(void)kill(kidpids[i], SIGTERM);
+ OPENSSL_free(kidpids);
sleep(1);
exit(ret);
}
@@ -977,7 +1006,6 @@ static void spawn_loop(void)
}
/* The loop above can only break on termsig */
- OPENSSL_free(kidpids);
syslog(LOG_INFO, "terminating on signal: %d", termsig);
killall(0, kidpids);
}
diff --git a/apps/openssl.cnf b/apps/openssl.cnf
index 6df2878d5021..4acca4b0446f 100644
--- a/apps/openssl.cnf
+++ b/apps/openssl.cnf
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ oid_section = new_oids
# To use this configuration file with the "-extfile" option of the
# "openssl x509" utility, name here the section containing the
# X.509v3 extensions to use:
-# extensions =
+# extensions =
# (Alternatively, use a configuration file that has only
# X.509v3 extensions in its main [= default] section.)
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ x509_extensions = v3_ca # The extensions to add to the self signed cert
# input_password = secret
# output_password = secret
-# This sets a mask for permitted string types. There are several options.
+# This sets a mask for permitted string types. There are several options.
# default: PrintableString, T61String, BMPString.
# pkix : PrintableString, BMPString (PKIX recommendation before 2004)
# utf8only: only UTF8Strings (PKIX recommendation after 2004).
diff --git a/apps/pkcs12.c b/apps/pkcs12.c
index c8fc452ec6d2..719a309a860c 100644
--- a/apps/pkcs12.c
+++ b/apps/pkcs12.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1999-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -311,6 +311,13 @@ int pkcs12_main(int argc, char **argv)
if (cpass != NULL) {
mpass = cpass;
noprompt = 1;
+ if (twopass) {
+ if (export_cert)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Option -twopass cannot be used with -passout or -password\n");
+ else
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Option -twopass cannot be used with -passin or -password\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
} else {
cpass = pass;
mpass = macpass;
diff --git a/apps/rehash.c b/apps/rehash.c
index bb41d3129f9c..2b769fbceb87 100644
--- a/apps/rehash.c
+++ b/apps/rehash.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2015-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2013-2014 Timo Teräs <timo.teras@gmail.com>
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
@@ -51,6 +51,26 @@
# endif
# define MAX_COLLISIONS 256
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
+/*
+ * VxWorks has no symbolic links
+ */
+
+# define lstat(path, buf) stat(path, buf)
+
+int symlink(const char *target, const char *linkpath)
+{
+ errno = ENOSYS;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+ssize_t readlink(const char *pathname, char *buf, size_t bufsiz)
+{
+ errno = ENOSYS;
+ return -1;
+}
+# endif
+
typedef struct hentry_st {
struct hentry_st *next;
char *filename;
diff --git a/apps/s_cb.c b/apps/s_cb.c
index 2d4568f40ccb..d0e332a7088a 100644
--- a/apps/s_cb.c
+++ b/apps/s_cb.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
#define COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH 16
-VERIFY_CB_ARGS verify_args = { 0, 0, X509_V_OK, 0 };
+VERIFY_CB_ARGS verify_args = { -1, 0, X509_V_OK, 0 };
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
static unsigned char cookie_secret[COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH];
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
if (!ok) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify error:num=%d:%s\n", err,
X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
- if (verify_args.depth >= depth) {
+ if (verify_args.depth < 0 || verify_args.depth >= depth) {
if (!verify_args.return_error)
ok = 1;
verify_args.error = err;
diff --git a/apps/s_client.c b/apps/s_client.c
index dcaa10cf44eb..4dd6e2fef4e4 100644
--- a/apps/s_client.c
+++ b/apps/s_client.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ static void print_stuff(BIO *berr, SSL *con, int full);
static int ocsp_resp_cb(SSL *s, void *arg);
#endif
static int ldap_ExtendedResponse_parse(const char *buf, long rem);
+static int is_dNS_name(const char *host);
static int saved_errno;
@@ -596,6 +597,7 @@ typedef enum OPTION_choice {
#endif
OPT_DANE_TLSA_RRDATA, OPT_DANE_EE_NO_NAME,
OPT_ENABLE_PHA,
+ OPT_SCTP_LABEL_BUG,
OPT_R_ENUM
} OPTION_CHOICE;
@@ -750,6 +752,7 @@ const OPTIONS s_client_options[] = {
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
{"sctp", OPT_SCTP, '-', "Use SCTP"},
+ {"sctp_label_bug", OPT_SCTP_LABEL_BUG, '-', "Enable SCTP label length bug"},
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE
{"trace", OPT_TRACE, '-', "Show trace output of protocol messages"},
@@ -976,6 +979,9 @@ int s_client_main(int argc, char **argv)
#endif
char *psksessf = NULL;
int enable_pha = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ int sctp_label_bug = 0;
+#endif
FD_ZERO(&readfds);
FD_ZERO(&writefds);
@@ -1121,6 +1127,7 @@ int s_client_main(int argc, char **argv)
goto opthelp;
break;
case OPT_VERIFY_RET_ERROR:
+ verify = SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
verify_args.return_error = 1;
break;
case OPT_VERIFY_QUIET:
@@ -1323,6 +1330,11 @@ int s_client_main(int argc, char **argv)
protocol = IPPROTO_SCTP;
#endif
break;
+ case OPT_SCTP_LABEL_BUG:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ sctp_label_bug = 1;
+#endif
+ break;
case OPT_TIMEOUT:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
enable_timeouts = 1;
@@ -1707,6 +1719,11 @@ int s_client_main(int argc, char **argv)
}
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ if (protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP && sctp_label_bug == 1)
+ SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG);
+#endif
+
if (min_version != 0
&& SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, min_version) == 0)
goto end;
@@ -1975,9 +1992,11 @@ int s_client_main(int argc, char **argv)
SSL_set_mode(con, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV);
if (!noservername && (servername != NULL || dane_tlsa_domain == NULL)) {
- if (servername == NULL)
- servername = (host == NULL) ? "localhost" : host;
- if (!SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(con, servername)) {
+ if (servername == NULL) {
+ if(host == NULL || is_dNS_name(host))
+ servername = (host == NULL) ? "localhost" : host;
+ }
+ if (servername != NULL && !SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(con, servername)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unable to set TLS servername extension.\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
@@ -3031,9 +3050,7 @@ int s_client_main(int argc, char **argv)
BIO_printf(bio_err, "RENEGOTIATING\n");
SSL_renegotiate(con);
cbuf_len = 0;
- }
-
- if (!c_ign_eof && (cbuf[0] == 'K' || cbuf[0] == 'k' )
+ } else if (!c_ign_eof && (cbuf[0] == 'K' || cbuf[0] == 'k' )
&& cmdletters) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "KEYUPDATE\n");
SSL_key_update(con,
@@ -3459,4 +3476,69 @@ static int ldap_ExtendedResponse_parse(const char *buf, long rem)
return ret;
}
+/*
+ * Host dNS Name verifier: used for checking that the hostname is in dNS format
+ * before setting it as SNI
+ */
+static int is_dNS_name(const char *host)
+{
+ const size_t MAX_LABEL_LENGTH = 63;
+ size_t i;
+ int isdnsname = 0;
+ size_t length = strlen(host);
+ size_t label_length = 0;
+ int all_numeric = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Deviation from strict DNS name syntax, also check names with '_'
+ * Check DNS name syntax, any '-' or '.' must be internal,
+ * and on either side of each '.' we can't have a '-' or '.'.
+ *
+ * If the name has just one label, we don't consider it a DNS name.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < length && label_length < MAX_LABEL_LENGTH; ++i) {
+ char c = host[i];
+
+ if ((c >= 'a' && c <= 'z')
+ || (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z')
+ || c == '_') {
+ label_length += 1;
+ all_numeric = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') {
+ label_length += 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Dot and hyphen cannot be first or last. */
+ if (i > 0 && i < length - 1) {
+ if (c == '-') {
+ label_length += 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Next to a dot the preceding and following characters must not be
+ * another dot or a hyphen. Otherwise, record that the name is
+ * plausible, since it has two or more labels.
+ */
+ if (c == '.'
+ && host[i + 1] != '.'
+ && host[i - 1] != '-'
+ && host[i + 1] != '-') {
+ label_length = 0;
+ isdnsname = 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ isdnsname = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* dNS name must not be all numeric and labels must be shorter than 64 characters. */
+ isdnsname &= !all_numeric && !(label_length == MAX_LABEL_LENGTH);
+
+ return isdnsname;
+}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SOCK */
diff --git a/apps/s_server.c b/apps/s_server.c
index ac7dca607ba4..929a08bd85b0 100644
--- a/apps/s_server.c
+++ b/apps/s_server.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
@@ -751,7 +751,7 @@ typedef enum OPTION_choice {
OPT_CERT2, OPT_KEY2, OPT_NEXTPROTONEG, OPT_ALPN,
OPT_SRTP_PROFILES, OPT_KEYMATEXPORT, OPT_KEYMATEXPORTLEN,
OPT_KEYLOG_FILE, OPT_MAX_EARLY, OPT_RECV_MAX_EARLY, OPT_EARLY_DATA,
- OPT_S_NUM_TICKETS, OPT_ANTI_REPLAY, OPT_NO_ANTI_REPLAY,
+ OPT_S_NUM_TICKETS, OPT_ANTI_REPLAY, OPT_NO_ANTI_REPLAY, OPT_SCTP_LABEL_BUG,
OPT_R_ENUM,
OPT_S_ENUM,
OPT_V_ENUM,
@@ -938,6 +938,7 @@ const OPTIONS s_server_options[] = {
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
{"sctp", OPT_SCTP, '-', "Use SCTP"},
+ {"sctp_label_bug", OPT_SCTP_LABEL_BUG, '-', "Enable SCTP label length bug"},
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
{"no_dhe", OPT_NO_DHE, '-', "Disable ephemeral DH"},
@@ -1047,6 +1048,9 @@ int s_server_main(int argc, char *argv[])
const char *keylog_file = NULL;
int max_early_data = -1, recv_max_early_data = -1;
char *psksessf = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ int sctp_label_bug = 0;
+#endif
/* Init of few remaining global variables */
local_argc = argc;
@@ -1407,7 +1411,7 @@ int s_server_main(int argc, char *argv[])
for (p = psk_key = opt_arg(); *p; p++) {
if (isxdigit(_UC(*p)))
continue;
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Not a hex number '%s'\n", *argv);
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Not a hex number '%s'\n", psk_key);
goto end;
}
break;
@@ -1490,6 +1494,11 @@ int s_server_main(int argc, char *argv[])
protocol = IPPROTO_SCTP;
#endif
break;
+ case OPT_SCTP_LABEL_BUG:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ sctp_label_bug = 1;
+#endif
+ break;
case OPT_TIMEOUT:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
enable_timeouts = 1;
@@ -1792,6 +1801,12 @@ int s_server_main(int argc, char *argv[])
goto end;
}
}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ if (protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP && sctp_label_bug == 1)
+ SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG);
+#endif
+
if (min_version != 0
&& SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, min_version) == 0)
goto end;
@@ -2754,6 +2769,8 @@ static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con)
BIO_ADDR_free(client);
return 0;
}
+
+ (void)BIO_ctrl_set_connected(wbio, client);
BIO_ADDR_free(client);
dtlslisten = 0;
} else {
diff --git a/apps/speed.c b/apps/speed.c
index 40e990408ab9..506737d05fc6 100644
--- a/apps/speed.c
+++ b/apps/speed.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@
#include <openssl/modes.h>
#ifndef HAVE_FORK
-# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
# define HAVE_FORK 0
# else
# define HAVE_FORK 1
@@ -1499,11 +1499,11 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
{"nistp192", NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 192},
{"nistp224", NID_secp224r1, 224},
{"nistp256", NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 256},
- {"nistp384", NID_secp384r1, 384},
+ {"nistp384", NID_secp384r1, 384},
{"nistp521", NID_secp521r1, 521},
/* Binary Curves */
{"nistk163", NID_sect163k1, 163},
- {"nistk233", NID_sect233k1, 233},
+ {"nistk233", NID_sect233k1, 233},
{"nistk283", NID_sect283k1, 283},
{"nistk409", NID_sect409k1, 409},
{"nistk571", NID_sect571k1, 571},
diff --git a/apps/verify.c b/apps/verify.c
index 38377a57e4a9..1f9385606046 100644
--- a/apps/verify.c
+++ b/apps/verify.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -286,16 +286,19 @@ static int cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
cert_error,
X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx),
X509_verify_cert_error_string(cert_error));
+
+ /*
+ * Pretend that some errors are ok, so they don't stop further
+ * processing of the certificate chain. Setting ok = 1 does this.
+ * After X509_verify_cert() is done, we verify that there were
+ * no actual errors, even if the returned value was positive.
+ */
switch (cert_error) {
case X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY:
policies_print(ctx);
/* fall thru */
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
-
- /*
- * since we are just checking the certificates, it is ok if they
- * are self signed. But we should still warn the user.
- */
+ /* Continue even if the leaf is a self signed cert */
case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
/* Continue after extension errors too */
case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
diff --git a/config b/config
index b8adf3499953..d0e31b6512ef 100755
--- a/config
+++ b/config
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#!/bin/sh
-# Copyright 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+# Copyright 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
#
# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ THERE=`dirname $0`
# pick up any command line args to config
for i
do
-case "$i" in
+case "$i" in
-d*) options=$options" --debug";;
-t*) DRYRUN="true" VERBOSE="true";;
-v*) VERBOSE="true";;
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ __CNF_LDLIBS=
# Now test for ISC and SCO, since it is has a braindamaged uname.
#
-# We need to work around FreeBSD 1.1.5.1
+# We need to work around FreeBSD 1.1.5.1
(
XREL=`uname -X 2>/dev/null | grep "^Release" | awk '{print $3}'`
if [ "x$XREL" != "x" ]; then
@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ esac
# At this point we gone through all the one's
# we know of: Punt
-echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-${SYSTEM}"
+echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-${SYSTEM}"
exit 0
) 2>/dev/null | (
@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ fi
CCVER=${CCVER:-0}
-# read the output of the embedded GuessOS
+# read the output of the embedded GuessOS
read GUESSOS
echo Operating system: $GUESSOS
@@ -732,7 +732,7 @@ case "$GUESSOS" in
*-*-[Uu]nix[Ww]are7)
if [ "$CC" = "gcc" ]; then
OUT="unixware-7-gcc" ; options="$options no-sse2"
- else
+ else
OUT="unixware-7" ; options="$options no-sse2"
__CNF_CPPFLAGS="$__CNF_CPPFLAGS -D__i386__"
fi
@@ -793,7 +793,7 @@ case "$GUESSOS" in
OUT="aix64-gcc"
fi
elif [ $OBJECT_MODE -eq 64 ]; then
- echo 'Your $OBJECT_MODE was found to be set to 64'
+ echo 'Your $OBJECT_MODE was found to be set to 64'
OUT="aix64-cc"
else
OUT="aix-cc"
@@ -897,7 +897,7 @@ if [ ".$PERL" = . ] ; then
exit 1
fi
-# run Configure to check to see if we need to specify the
+# run Configure to check to see if we need to specify the
# compiler for the platform ... in which case we add it on
# the end ... otherwise we leave it off
@@ -920,7 +920,7 @@ if [ $? = "0" ]; then
__CNF_LDFLAGS="'$__CNF_LDFLAGS'" \
__CNF_LDLIBS="'$__CNF_LDLIBS'" \
$PERL $THERE/Configure $OUT $options
- fi
+ fi
if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" ]; then
# eval to make sure quoted options, possibly with spaces inside,
# are treated right
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aes-x86_64.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aes-x86_64.pl
index 4d1dc9c70199..d87e20114771 100755
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aes-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aes-x86_64.pl
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#! /usr/bin/env perl
-# Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+# Copyright 2005-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
#
# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -554,6 +554,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type _x86_64_AES_encrypt_compact,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
_x86_64_AES_encrypt_compact:
+.cfi_startproc
lea 128($sbox),$inp # size optimization
mov 0-128($inp),$acc1 # prefetch Te4
mov 32-128($inp),$acc2
@@ -587,6 +588,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
xor 8($key),$s2
xor 12($key),$s3
.byte 0xf3,0xc3 # rep ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size _x86_64_AES_encrypt_compact,.-_x86_64_AES_encrypt_compact
___
@@ -1161,6 +1163,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type _x86_64_AES_decrypt_compact,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
_x86_64_AES_decrypt_compact:
+.cfi_startproc
lea 128($sbox),$inp # size optimization
mov 0-128($inp),$acc1 # prefetch Td4
mov 32-128($inp),$acc2
@@ -1203,6 +1206,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
xor 8($key),$s2
xor 12($key),$s3
.byte 0xf3,0xc3 # rep ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size _x86_64_AES_decrypt_compact,.-_x86_64_AES_decrypt_compact
___
@@ -1365,6 +1369,7 @@ AES_set_encrypt_key:
.type _x86_64_AES_set_encrypt_key,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
_x86_64_AES_set_encrypt_key:
+.cfi_startproc
mov %esi,%ecx # %ecx=bits
mov %rdi,%rsi # %rsi=userKey
mov %rdx,%rdi # %rdi=key
@@ -1546,6 +1551,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
mov \$-1,%rax
.Lexit:
.byte 0xf3,0xc3 # rep ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size _x86_64_AES_set_encrypt_key,.-_x86_64_AES_set_encrypt_key
___
@@ -1728,7 +1734,9 @@ AES_cbc_encrypt:
cmp \$0,%rdx # check length
je .Lcbc_epilogue
pushfq
-.cfi_push 49 # %rflags
+# This could be .cfi_push 49, but libunwind fails on registers it does not
+# recognize. See https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=217087.
+.cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
push %rbx
.cfi_push %rbx
push %rbp
@@ -1751,6 +1759,7 @@ AES_cbc_encrypt:
cmp \$0,%r9
cmoveq %r10,$sbox
+.cfi_remember_state
mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P(%rip),%r10d
cmp \$$speed_limit,%rdx
jb .Lcbc_slow_prologue
@@ -1986,6 +1995,7 @@ AES_cbc_encrypt:
#--------------------------- SLOW ROUTINE ---------------------------#
.align 16
.Lcbc_slow_prologue:
+.cfi_restore_state
# allocate aligned stack frame...
lea -88(%rsp),%rbp
and \$-64,%rbp
@@ -1997,8 +2007,10 @@ AES_cbc_encrypt:
sub %r10,%rbp
xchg %rsp,%rbp
+.cfi_def_cfa_register %rbp
#add \$8,%rsp # reserve for return address!
mov %rbp,$_rsp # save %rsp
+.cfi_cfa_expression $_rsp,deref,+64
.Lcbc_slow_body:
#mov %rdi,$_inp # save copy of inp
#mov %rsi,$_out # save copy of out
@@ -2187,7 +2199,9 @@ AES_cbc_encrypt:
.cfi_def_cfa %rsp,16
.Lcbc_popfq:
popfq
-.cfi_pop 49 # %rflags
+# This could be .cfi_pop 49, but libunwind fails on registers it does not
+# recognize. See https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=217087.
+.cfi_adjust_cfa_offset -8
.Lcbc_epilogue:
ret
.cfi_endproc
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl
index 2a202c53e5f8..b68c14da60ca 100755
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#! /usr/bin/env perl
-# Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+# Copyright 2009-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
#
# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -274,6 +274,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type ${PREFIX}_encrypt,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
${PREFIX}_encrypt:
+.cfi_startproc
movups ($inp),$inout0 # load input
mov 240($key),$rounds # key->rounds
___
@@ -284,12 +285,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
movups $inout0,($out) # output
pxor $inout0,$inout0
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size ${PREFIX}_encrypt,.-${PREFIX}_encrypt
.globl ${PREFIX}_decrypt
.type ${PREFIX}_decrypt,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
${PREFIX}_decrypt:
+.cfi_startproc
movups ($inp),$inout0 # load input
mov 240($key),$rounds # key->rounds
___
@@ -300,6 +303,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
movups $inout0,($out) # output
pxor $inout0,$inout0
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size ${PREFIX}_decrypt, .-${PREFIX}_decrypt
___
}
@@ -325,6 +329,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type _aesni_${dir}rypt2,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
_aesni_${dir}rypt2:
+.cfi_startproc
$movkey ($key),$rndkey0
shl \$4,$rounds
$movkey 16($key),$rndkey1
@@ -350,6 +355,7 @@ _aesni_${dir}rypt2:
aes${dir}last $rndkey0,$inout0
aes${dir}last $rndkey0,$inout1
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size _aesni_${dir}rypt2,.-_aesni_${dir}rypt2
___
}
@@ -361,6 +367,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type _aesni_${dir}rypt3,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
_aesni_${dir}rypt3:
+.cfi_startproc
$movkey ($key),$rndkey0
shl \$4,$rounds
$movkey 16($key),$rndkey1
@@ -391,6 +398,7 @@ _aesni_${dir}rypt3:
aes${dir}last $rndkey0,$inout1
aes${dir}last $rndkey0,$inout2
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size _aesni_${dir}rypt3,.-_aesni_${dir}rypt3
___
}
@@ -406,6 +414,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type _aesni_${dir}rypt4,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
_aesni_${dir}rypt4:
+.cfi_startproc
$movkey ($key),$rndkey0
shl \$4,$rounds
$movkey 16($key),$rndkey1
@@ -442,6 +451,7 @@ _aesni_${dir}rypt4:
aes${dir}last $rndkey0,$inout2
aes${dir}last $rndkey0,$inout3
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size _aesni_${dir}rypt4,.-_aesni_${dir}rypt4
___
}
@@ -453,6 +463,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type _aesni_${dir}rypt6,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
_aesni_${dir}rypt6:
+.cfi_startproc
$movkey ($key),$rndkey0
shl \$4,$rounds
$movkey 16($key),$rndkey1
@@ -503,6 +514,7 @@ _aesni_${dir}rypt6:
aes${dir}last $rndkey0,$inout4
aes${dir}last $rndkey0,$inout5
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size _aesni_${dir}rypt6,.-_aesni_${dir}rypt6
___
}
@@ -514,6 +526,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type _aesni_${dir}rypt8,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
_aesni_${dir}rypt8:
+.cfi_startproc
$movkey ($key),$rndkey0
shl \$4,$rounds
$movkey 16($key),$rndkey1
@@ -574,6 +587,7 @@ _aesni_${dir}rypt8:
aes${dir}last $rndkey0,$inout6
aes${dir}last $rndkey0,$inout7
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size _aesni_${dir}rypt8,.-_aesni_${dir}rypt8
___
}
@@ -598,6 +612,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type aesni_ecb_encrypt,\@function,5
.align 16
aesni_ecb_encrypt:
+.cfi_startproc
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
lea -0x58(%rsp),%rsp
@@ -943,6 +958,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($win64);
___
$code.=<<___;
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size aesni_ecb_encrypt,.-aesni_ecb_encrypt
___
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl
index 8b37cfc452a0..eec0ed230a88 100755
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#! /usr/bin/env perl
-# Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+# Copyright 2014-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
#
# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -262,6 +262,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
${prefix}_set_decrypt_key:
___
$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/);
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
___
@@ -305,6 +306,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /64/);
___
$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/);
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ret
___
$code.=<<___;
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-x86_64.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-x86_64.pl
index 2c79c2b67c89..e62342729e7f 100755
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-x86_64.pl
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#! /usr/bin/env perl
-# Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+# Copyright 2011-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
#
# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -816,6 +816,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type _bsaes_encrypt8,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 64
_bsaes_encrypt8:
+.cfi_startproc
lea .LBS0(%rip), $const # constants table
movdqa ($key), @XMM[9] # round 0 key
@@ -875,11 +876,13 @@ $code.=<<___;
pxor @XMM[8], @XMM[0]
pxor @XMM[8], @XMM[1]
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size _bsaes_encrypt8,.-_bsaes_encrypt8
.type _bsaes_decrypt8,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 64
_bsaes_decrypt8:
+.cfi_startproc
lea .LBS0(%rip), $const # constants table
movdqa ($key), @XMM[9] # round 0 key
@@ -937,6 +940,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
pxor @XMM[8], @XMM[0]
pxor @XMM[8], @XMM[1]
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size _bsaes_decrypt8,.-_bsaes_decrypt8
___
}
@@ -971,6 +975,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type _bsaes_key_convert,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
_bsaes_key_convert:
+.cfi_startproc
lea .Lmasks(%rip), $const
movdqu ($inp), %xmm7 # load round 0 key
lea 0x10($inp), $inp
@@ -1049,6 +1054,7 @@ _bsaes_key_convert:
movdqa 0x50($const), %xmm7 # .L63
#movdqa %xmm6, ($out) # don't save last round key
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size _bsaes_key_convert,.-_bsaes_key_convert
___
}
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-armv8.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-armv8.pl
index 5131e13a09a2..e38288af5558 100755
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-armv8.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-armv8.pl
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#! /usr/bin/env perl
-# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+# Copyright 2015-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
#
# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -255,6 +255,7 @@ _vpaes_encrypt_core:
.type vpaes_encrypt,%function
.align 4
vpaes_encrypt:
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -264,6 +265,7 @@ vpaes_encrypt:
st1 {v0.16b}, [$out]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ret
.size vpaes_encrypt,.-vpaes_encrypt
@@ -486,6 +488,7 @@ _vpaes_decrypt_core:
.type vpaes_decrypt,%function
.align 4
vpaes_decrypt:
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -495,6 +498,7 @@ vpaes_decrypt:
st1 {v0.16b}, [$out]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ret
.size vpaes_decrypt,.-vpaes_decrypt
@@ -665,6 +669,7 @@ _vpaes_key_preheat:
.type _vpaes_schedule_core,%function
.align 4
_vpaes_schedule_core:
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp x29, x30, [sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -829,6 +834,7 @@ _vpaes_schedule_core:
eor v6.16b, v6.16b, v6.16b // vpxor %xmm6, %xmm6, %xmm6
eor v7.16b, v7.16b, v7.16b // vpxor %xmm7, %xmm7, %xmm7
ldp x29, x30, [sp],#16
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ret
.size _vpaes_schedule_core,.-_vpaes_schedule_core
@@ -1041,6 +1047,7 @@ _vpaes_schedule_mangle:
.type vpaes_set_encrypt_key,%function
.align 4
vpaes_set_encrypt_key:
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
stp d8,d9,[sp,#-16]! // ABI spec says so
@@ -1056,6 +1063,7 @@ vpaes_set_encrypt_key:
ldp d8,d9,[sp],#16
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ret
.size vpaes_set_encrypt_key,.-vpaes_set_encrypt_key
@@ -1063,6 +1071,7 @@ vpaes_set_encrypt_key:
.type vpaes_set_decrypt_key,%function
.align 4
vpaes_set_decrypt_key:
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
stp d8,d9,[sp,#-16]! // ABI spec says so
@@ -1082,6 +1091,7 @@ vpaes_set_decrypt_key:
ldp d8,d9,[sp],#16
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ret
.size vpaes_set_decrypt_key,.-vpaes_set_decrypt_key
___
@@ -1098,6 +1108,7 @@ vpaes_cbc_encrypt:
cmp w5, #0 // check direction
b.eq vpaes_cbc_decrypt
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -1120,6 +1131,7 @@ vpaes_cbc_encrypt:
st1 {v0.16b}, [$ivec] // write ivec
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
.Lcbc_abort:
ret
.size vpaes_cbc_encrypt,.-vpaes_cbc_encrypt
@@ -1127,6 +1139,7 @@ vpaes_cbc_encrypt:
.type vpaes_cbc_decrypt,%function
.align 4
vpaes_cbc_decrypt:
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
stp d8,d9,[sp,#-16]! // ABI spec says so
@@ -1168,6 +1181,7 @@ vpaes_cbc_decrypt:
ldp d10,d11,[sp],#16
ldp d8,d9,[sp],#16
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ret
.size vpaes_cbc_decrypt,.-vpaes_cbc_decrypt
___
@@ -1177,6 +1191,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type vpaes_ecb_encrypt,%function
.align 4
vpaes_ecb_encrypt:
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
stp d8,d9,[sp,#-16]! // ABI spec says so
@@ -1210,6 +1225,7 @@ vpaes_ecb_encrypt:
ldp d10,d11,[sp],#16
ldp d8,d9,[sp],#16
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ret
.size vpaes_ecb_encrypt,.-vpaes_ecb_encrypt
@@ -1217,6 +1233,7 @@ vpaes_ecb_encrypt:
.type vpaes_ecb_decrypt,%function
.align 4
vpaes_ecb_decrypt:
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
stp d8,d9,[sp,#-16]! // ABI spec says so
@@ -1250,6 +1267,7 @@ vpaes_ecb_decrypt:
ldp d10,d11,[sp],#16
ldp d8,d9,[sp],#16
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ret
.size vpaes_ecb_decrypt,.-vpaes_ecb_decrypt
___
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86_64.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86_64.pl
index b715aca167d1..33d293e623d5 100755
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86_64.pl
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#! /usr/bin/env perl
-# Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+# Copyright 2011-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
#
# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type _vpaes_encrypt_core,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
_vpaes_encrypt_core:
+.cfi_startproc
mov %rdx, %r9
mov \$16, %r11
mov 240(%rdx),%eax
@@ -171,6 +172,7 @@ _vpaes_encrypt_core:
pxor %xmm4, %xmm0 # 0 = A
pshufb %xmm1, %xmm0
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size _vpaes_encrypt_core,.-_vpaes_encrypt_core
##
@@ -181,6 +183,7 @@ _vpaes_encrypt_core:
.type _vpaes_decrypt_core,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
_vpaes_decrypt_core:
+.cfi_startproc
mov %rdx, %r9 # load key
mov 240(%rdx),%eax
movdqa %xmm9, %xmm1
@@ -277,6 +280,7 @@ _vpaes_decrypt_core:
pxor %xmm4, %xmm0 # 0 = A
pshufb %xmm2, %xmm0
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size _vpaes_decrypt_core,.-_vpaes_decrypt_core
########################################################
@@ -287,6 +291,7 @@ _vpaes_decrypt_core:
.type _vpaes_schedule_core,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
_vpaes_schedule_core:
+.cfi_startproc
# rdi = key
# rsi = size in bits
# rdx = buffer
@@ -453,6 +458,7 @@ _vpaes_schedule_core:
pxor %xmm6, %xmm6
pxor %xmm7, %xmm7
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size _vpaes_schedule_core,.-_vpaes_schedule_core
##
@@ -472,6 +478,7 @@ _vpaes_schedule_core:
.type _vpaes_schedule_192_smear,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
_vpaes_schedule_192_smear:
+.cfi_startproc
pshufd \$0x80, %xmm6, %xmm1 # d c 0 0 -> c 0 0 0
pshufd \$0xFE, %xmm7, %xmm0 # b a _ _ -> b b b a
pxor %xmm1, %xmm6 # -> c+d c 0 0
@@ -480,6 +487,7 @@ _vpaes_schedule_192_smear:
movdqa %xmm6, %xmm0
movhlps %xmm1, %xmm6 # clobber low side with zeros
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size _vpaes_schedule_192_smear,.-_vpaes_schedule_192_smear
##
@@ -503,6 +511,7 @@ _vpaes_schedule_192_smear:
.type _vpaes_schedule_round,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
_vpaes_schedule_round:
+.cfi_startproc
# extract rcon from xmm8
pxor %xmm1, %xmm1
palignr \$15, %xmm8, %xmm1
@@ -556,6 +565,7 @@ _vpaes_schedule_low_round:
pxor %xmm7, %xmm0
movdqa %xmm0, %xmm7
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size _vpaes_schedule_round,.-_vpaes_schedule_round
##
@@ -570,6 +580,7 @@ _vpaes_schedule_low_round:
.type _vpaes_schedule_transform,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
_vpaes_schedule_transform:
+.cfi_startproc
movdqa %xmm9, %xmm1
pandn %xmm0, %xmm1
psrld \$4, %xmm1
@@ -580,6 +591,7 @@ _vpaes_schedule_transform:
pshufb %xmm1, %xmm0
pxor %xmm2, %xmm0
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size _vpaes_schedule_transform,.-_vpaes_schedule_transform
##
@@ -608,6 +620,7 @@ _vpaes_schedule_transform:
.type _vpaes_schedule_mangle,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
_vpaes_schedule_mangle:
+.cfi_startproc
movdqa %xmm0, %xmm4 # save xmm0 for later
movdqa .Lk_mc_forward(%rip),%xmm5
test %rcx, %rcx
@@ -672,6 +685,7 @@ _vpaes_schedule_mangle:
and \$0x30, %r8
movdqu %xmm3, (%rdx)
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size _vpaes_schedule_mangle,.-_vpaes_schedule_mangle
#
@@ -681,6 +695,7 @@ _vpaes_schedule_mangle:
.type ${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key,\@function,3
.align 16
${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key:
+.cfi_startproc
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
lea -0xb8(%rsp),%rsp
@@ -723,12 +738,14 @@ ___
$code.=<<___;
xor %eax,%eax
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size ${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key,.-${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key
.globl ${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key
.type ${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key,\@function,3
.align 16
${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key:
+.cfi_startproc
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
lea -0xb8(%rsp),%rsp
@@ -776,12 +793,14 @@ ___
$code.=<<___;
xor %eax,%eax
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size ${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key,.-${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key
.globl ${PREFIX}_encrypt
.type ${PREFIX}_encrypt,\@function,3
.align 16
${PREFIX}_encrypt:
+.cfi_startproc
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
lea -0xb8(%rsp),%rsp
@@ -819,12 +838,14 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($win64);
___
$code.=<<___;
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size ${PREFIX}_encrypt,.-${PREFIX}_encrypt
.globl ${PREFIX}_decrypt
.type ${PREFIX}_decrypt,\@function,3
.align 16
${PREFIX}_decrypt:
+.cfi_startproc
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
lea -0xb8(%rsp),%rsp
@@ -862,6 +883,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($win64);
___
$code.=<<___;
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size ${PREFIX}_decrypt,.-${PREFIX}_decrypt
___
{
@@ -874,6 +896,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type ${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt,\@function,6
.align 16
${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt:
+.cfi_startproc
xchg $key,$len
___
($len,$key)=($key,$len);
@@ -944,6 +967,7 @@ ___
$code.=<<___;
.Lcbc_abort:
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size ${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt,.-${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt
___
}
@@ -957,6 +981,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type _vpaes_preheat,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
_vpaes_preheat:
+.cfi_startproc
lea .Lk_s0F(%rip), %r10
movdqa -0x20(%r10), %xmm10 # .Lk_inv
movdqa -0x10(%r10), %xmm11 # .Lk_inv+16
@@ -966,6 +991,7 @@ _vpaes_preheat:
movdqa 0x50(%r10), %xmm15 # .Lk_sb2
movdqa 0x60(%r10), %xmm14 # .Lk_sb2+16
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size _vpaes_preheat,.-_vpaes_preheat
########################################################
## ##
diff --git a/crypto/armcap.c b/crypto/armcap.c
index 1b3c2722d1e1..58e54f0da2e1 100644
--- a/crypto/armcap.c
+++ b/crypto/armcap.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 2011-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2011-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -62,14 +62,12 @@ uint32_t OPENSSL_rdtsc(void)
# if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2
void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void) __attribute__ ((constructor));
# endif
-/*
- * Use a weak reference to getauxval() so we can use it if it is available but
- * don't break the build if it is not.
- */
-# if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && defined(__ELF__)
-extern unsigned long getauxval(unsigned long type) __attribute__ ((weak));
-# else
-static unsigned long (*getauxval) (unsigned long) = NULL;
+
+# if defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ)
+# if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 16)
+# include <sys/auxv.h>
+# define OSSL_IMPLEMENT_GETAUXVAL
+# endif
# endif
/*
@@ -134,6 +132,33 @@ void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void)
*/
# endif
+ OPENSSL_armcap_P = 0;
+
+# ifdef OSSL_IMPLEMENT_GETAUXVAL
+ if (getauxval(HWCAP) & HWCAP_NEON) {
+ unsigned long hwcap = getauxval(HWCAP_CE);
+
+ OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV7_NEON;
+
+ if (hwcap & HWCAP_CE_AES)
+ OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_AES;
+
+ if (hwcap & HWCAP_CE_PMULL)
+ OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_PMULL;
+
+ if (hwcap & HWCAP_CE_SHA1)
+ OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_SHA1;
+
+ if (hwcap & HWCAP_CE_SHA256)
+ OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_SHA256;
+
+# ifdef __aarch64__
+ if (hwcap & HWCAP_CE_SHA512)
+ OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_SHA512;
+# endif
+ }
+# endif
+
sigfillset(&all_masked);
sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGILL);
sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGTRAP);
@@ -141,8 +166,6 @@ void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void)
sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGBUS);
sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGSEGV);
- OPENSSL_armcap_P = 0;
-
memset(&ill_act, 0, sizeof(ill_act));
ill_act.sa_handler = ill_handler;
ill_act.sa_mask = all_masked;
@@ -150,30 +173,9 @@ void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void)
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &ill_act.sa_mask, &oset);
sigaction(SIGILL, &ill_act, &ill_oact);
- if (getauxval != NULL) {
- if (getauxval(HWCAP) & HWCAP_NEON) {
- unsigned long hwcap = getauxval(HWCAP_CE);
-
- OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV7_NEON;
-
- if (hwcap & HWCAP_CE_AES)
- OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_AES;
-
- if (hwcap & HWCAP_CE_PMULL)
- OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_PMULL;
-
- if (hwcap & HWCAP_CE_SHA1)
- OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_SHA1;
-
- if (hwcap & HWCAP_CE_SHA256)
- OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_SHA256;
-
-# ifdef __aarch64__
- if (hwcap & HWCAP_CE_SHA512)
- OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_SHA512;
-# endif
- }
- } else if (sigsetjmp(ill_jmp, 1) == 0) {
+ /* If we used getauxval, we already have all the values */
+# ifndef OSSL_IMPLEMENT_GETAUXVAL
+ if (sigsetjmp(ill_jmp, 1) == 0) {
_armv7_neon_probe();
OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV7_NEON;
if (sigsetjmp(ill_jmp, 1) == 0) {
@@ -191,13 +193,16 @@ void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void)
_armv8_sha256_probe();
OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_SHA256;
}
-# if defined(__aarch64__) && !defined(__APPLE__)
+# if defined(__aarch64__) && !defined(__APPLE__)
if (sigsetjmp(ill_jmp, 1) == 0) {
_armv8_sha512_probe();
OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_SHA512;
}
-# endif
+# endif
}
+# endif
+
+ /* Things that getauxval didn't tell us */
if (sigsetjmp(ill_jmp, 1) == 0) {
_armv7_tick();
OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV7_TICK;
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_digest.c b/crypto/asn1/a_digest.c
index f4cc1f2e0eaa..cc3532ea7df2 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_digest.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_digest.c
@@ -23,18 +23,22 @@
int ASN1_digest(i2d_of_void *i2d, const EVP_MD *type, char *data,
unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len)
{
- int i;
+ int inl;
unsigned char *str, *p;
- i = i2d(data, NULL);
- if ((str = OPENSSL_malloc(i)) == NULL) {
+ inl = i2d(data, NULL);
+ if (inl <= 0) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_DIGEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((str = OPENSSL_malloc(inl)) == NULL) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_DIGEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
p = str;
i2d(data, &p);
- if (!EVP_Digest(str, i, md, len, type, NULL)) {
+ if (!EVP_Digest(str, inl, md, len, type, NULL)) {
OPENSSL_free(str);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_sign.c b/crypto/asn1/a_sign.c
index 130e23eaaa1e..146fdb962628 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_sign.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_sign.c
@@ -29,7 +29,8 @@ int ASN1_sign(i2d_of_void *i2d, X509_ALGOR *algor1, X509_ALGOR *algor2,
{
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
unsigned char *p, *buf_in = NULL, *buf_out = NULL;
- int i, inl = 0, outl = 0, outll = 0;
+ int i, inl = 0, outl = 0;
+ size_t inll = 0, outll = 0;
X509_ALGOR *a;
if (ctx == NULL) {
@@ -70,10 +71,15 @@ int ASN1_sign(i2d_of_void *i2d, X509_ALGOR *algor1, X509_ALGOR *algor2,
}
}
inl = i2d(data, NULL);
- buf_in = OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)inl);
+ if (inl <= 0) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_SIGN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ inll = (size_t)inl;
+ buf_in = OPENSSL_malloc(inll);
outll = outl = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
- buf_out = OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)outl);
- if ((buf_in == NULL) || (buf_out == NULL)) {
+ buf_out = OPENSSL_malloc(outll);
+ if (buf_in == NULL || buf_out == NULL) {
outl = 0;
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
@@ -101,7 +107,7 @@ int ASN1_sign(i2d_of_void *i2d, X509_ALGOR *algor1, X509_ALGOR *algor2,
signature->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
- OPENSSL_clear_free((char *)buf_in, (unsigned int)inl);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free((char *)buf_in, inll);
OPENSSL_clear_free((char *)buf_out, outll);
return outl;
}
@@ -138,7 +144,7 @@ int ASN1_item_sign_ctx(const ASN1_ITEM *it,
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
unsigned char *buf_in = NULL, *buf_out = NULL;
size_t inl = 0, outl = 0, outll = 0;
- int signid, paramtype;
+ int signid, paramtype, buf_len = 0;
int rv;
type = EVP_MD_CTX_md(ctx);
@@ -198,10 +204,16 @@ int ASN1_item_sign_ctx(const ASN1_ITEM *it,
}
- inl = ASN1_item_i2d(asn, &buf_in, it);
+ buf_len = ASN1_item_i2d(asn, &buf_in, it);
+ if (buf_len <= 0) {
+ outl = 0;
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_SIGN_CTX, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ inl = buf_len;
outll = outl = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
- buf_out = OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)outl);
- if ((buf_in == NULL) || (buf_out == NULL)) {
+ buf_out = OPENSSL_malloc(outll);
+ if (buf_in == NULL || buf_out == NULL) {
outl = 0;
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_SIGN_CTX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
@@ -223,7 +235,7 @@ int ASN1_item_sign_ctx(const ASN1_ITEM *it,
signature->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07);
signature->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
err:
- OPENSSL_clear_free((char *)buf_in, (unsigned int)inl);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free((char *)buf_in, inl);
OPENSSL_clear_free((char *)buf_out, outll);
return outl;
}
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c b/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
index 973d50d24de9..cdaf17c3cbc1 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ int ASN1_verify(i2d_of_void *i2d, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature,
}
inl = i2d(data, NULL);
+ if (inl <= 0) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
buf_in = OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)inl);
if (buf_in == NULL) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
@@ -87,8 +91,8 @@ int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a,
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
unsigned char *buf_in = NULL;
int ret = -1, inl = 0;
-
int mdnid, pknid;
+ size_t inll = 0;
if (!pkey) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
@@ -127,8 +131,8 @@ int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a,
goto err;
ret = -1;
} else {
- const EVP_MD *type;
- type = EVP_get_digestbynid(mdnid);
+ const EVP_MD *type = EVP_get_digestbynid(mdnid);
+
if (type == NULL) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,
ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
@@ -150,11 +154,15 @@ int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a,
}
inl = ASN1_item_i2d(asn, &buf_in, it);
-
+ if (inl <= 0) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
if (buf_in == NULL) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
+ inll = inl;
ret = EVP_DigestVerify(ctx, signature->data, (size_t)signature->length,
buf_in, inl);
@@ -164,7 +172,7 @@ int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a,
}
ret = 1;
err:
- OPENSSL_clear_free(buf_in, (unsigned int)inl);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(buf_in, inll);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c b/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c
index 9a1644148af5..d7d270dbb581 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c
@@ -140,6 +140,22 @@ int EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0(const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth)
{
EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD tmp = { 0, };
+ /*
+ * One of the following must be true:
+ *
+ * pem_str == NULL AND ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS is set
+ * pem_str != NULL AND ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS is clear
+ *
+ * Anything else is an error and may lead to a corrupt ASN1 method table
+ */
+ if (!((ameth->pem_str == NULL
+ && (ameth->pkey_flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS) != 0)
+ || (ameth->pem_str != NULL
+ && (ameth->pkey_flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS) == 0))) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_ASN1_ADD0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (app_methods == NULL) {
app_methods = sk_EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD_new(ameth_cmp);
if (app_methods == NULL)
@@ -216,18 +232,6 @@ EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_new(int id, int flags,
goto err;
}
- /*
- * One of the following must be true:
- *
- * pem_str == NULL AND ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS is set
- * pem_str != NULL AND ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS is clear
- *
- * Anything else is an error and may lead to a corrupt ASN1 method table
- */
- if (!((pem_str == NULL && (flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS) != 0)
- || (pem_str != NULL && (flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS) == 0)))
- goto err;
-
if (pem_str) {
ameth->pem_str = OPENSSL_strdup(pem_str);
if (!ameth->pem_str)
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/charmap.h b/crypto/asn1/charmap.h
index bfccac2cb4e3..f15d72d73661 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/charmap.h
+++ b/crypto/asn1/charmap.h
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
* WARNING: do not edit!
* Generated by crypto/asn1/charmap.pl
*
- * Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/charmap.pl b/crypto/asn1/charmap.pl
index fbab1f3b0ad7..dadd8df7749d 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/charmap.pl
+++ b/crypto/asn1/charmap.pl
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#! /usr/bin/env perl
-# Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+# Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
#
# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/d2i_pu.c b/crypto/asn1/d2i_pu.c
index 9452e08a5874..7bc16c7bceb4 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/d2i_pu.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/d2i_pu.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PublicKey(int type, EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
} else
ret = *a;
- if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(ret, type)) {
+ if (type != EVP_PKEY_id(ret) && !EVP_PKEY_set_type(ret, type)) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_PUBLICKEY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
diff --git a/crypto/bio/b_addr.c b/crypto/bio/b_addr.c
index abec7bb8dbba..4395ab7a0683 100644
--- a/crypto/bio/b_addr.c
+++ b/crypto/bio/b_addr.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -782,7 +782,12 @@ int BIO_lookup_ex(const char *host, const char *service, int lookup_type,
* anyway [above getaddrinfo/gai_strerror is]. We just let
* system administrator figure this out...
*/
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
+ /* h_errno doesn't exist on VxWorks */
+ SYSerr(SYS_F_GETHOSTBYNAME, 1000 );
+# else
SYSerr(SYS_F_GETHOSTBYNAME, 1000 + h_errno);
+# endif
#else
SYSerr(SYS_F_GETHOSTBYNAME, WSAGetLastError());
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/bio/bss_file.c b/crypto/bio/bss_file.c
index 8de2391267af..057344783d61 100644
--- a/crypto/bio/bss_file.c
+++ b/crypto/bio/bss_file.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -253,9 +253,7 @@ static long file_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
}
# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32_CYGWIN)
int fd = fileno((FILE *)ptr);
- if (num & BIO_FP_TEXT)
- setmode(fd, O_TEXT);
- else
+ if (!(num & BIO_FP_TEXT))
setmode(fd, O_BINARY);
# endif
}
@@ -279,11 +277,14 @@ static long file_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
ret = 0;
break;
}
-# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32_CYGWIN)
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
if (!(num & BIO_FP_TEXT))
OPENSSL_strlcat(p, "b", sizeof(p));
else
OPENSSL_strlcat(p, "t", sizeof(p));
+# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32_CYGWIN)
+ if (!(num & BIO_FP_TEXT))
+ OPENSSL_strlcat(p, "b", sizeof(p));
# endif
fp = openssl_fopen(ptr, p);
if (fp == NULL) {
diff --git a/crypto/bio/bss_mem.c b/crypto/bio/bss_mem.c
index e0a97c3b43e1..10fcbf7a7c4f 100644
--- a/crypto/bio/bss_mem.c
+++ b/crypto/bio/bss_mem.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ static long mem_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2);
static int mem_new(BIO *h);
static int secmem_new(BIO *h);
static int mem_free(BIO *data);
-static int mem_buf_free(BIO *data, int free_all);
+static int mem_buf_free(BIO *data);
static int mem_buf_sync(BIO *h);
static const BIO_METHOD mem_method = {
@@ -140,10 +140,20 @@ static int secmem_new(BIO *bi)
static int mem_free(BIO *a)
{
- return mem_buf_free(a, 1);
+ BIO_BUF_MEM *bb;
+
+ if (a == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ bb = (BIO_BUF_MEM *)a->ptr;
+ if (!mem_buf_free(a))
+ return 0;
+ OPENSSL_free(bb->readp);
+ OPENSSL_free(bb);
+ return 1;
}
-static int mem_buf_free(BIO *a, int free_all)
+static int mem_buf_free(BIO *a)
{
if (a == NULL)
return 0;
@@ -155,11 +165,6 @@ static int mem_buf_free(BIO *a, int free_all)
if (a->flags & BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY)
b->data = NULL;
BUF_MEM_free(b);
- if (free_all) {
- OPENSSL_free(bb->readp);
- OPENSSL_free(bb);
- }
- a->ptr = NULL;
}
return 1;
}
@@ -266,11 +271,10 @@ static long mem_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
}
break;
case BIO_C_SET_BUF_MEM:
- mem_buf_free(b, 0);
+ mem_buf_free(b);
b->shutdown = (int)num;
bbm->buf = ptr;
*bbm->readp = *bbm->buf;
- b->ptr = bbm;
break;
case BIO_C_GET_BUF_MEM_PTR:
if (ptr != NULL) {
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/armv8-mont.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/armv8-mont.pl
index 5d5af1b6be25..d8347bf93249 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/armv8-mont.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/armv8-mont.pl
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#! /usr/bin/env perl
-# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+# Copyright 2015-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
#
# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -287,6 +287,7 @@ __bn_sqr8x_mont:
cmp $ap,$bp
b.ne __bn_mul4x_mont
.Lsqr8x_mont:
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-128]!
add x29,sp,#0
stp x19,x20,[sp,#16]
@@ -1040,6 +1041,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldr x29,[sp],#128
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ret
.size __bn_sqr8x_mont,.-__bn_sqr8x_mont
___
@@ -1063,6 +1065,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type __bn_mul4x_mont,%function
.align 5
__bn_mul4x_mont:
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-128]!
add x29,sp,#0
stp x19,x20,[sp,#16]
@@ -1496,6 +1499,7 @@ __bn_mul4x_mont:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldr x29,[sp],#128
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ret
.size __bn_mul4x_mont,.-__bn_mul4x_mont
___
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S b/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S
index d235c45e2d63..0a26735c6979 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
.ident "ia64.S, Version 2.1"
.ident "IA-64 ISA artwork by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>"
-// Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+// Copyright 2001-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
//
// Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
// this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
// on Itanium2! What to do? Reschedule loops for Itanium2? But then
// Itanium would exhibit anti-scalability. So I've chosen to reschedule
// for worst latency for every instruction aiming for best *all-round*
-// performance.
+// performance.
// Q. How much faster does it get?
// A. Here is the output from 'openssl speed rsa dsa' for vanilla
@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@ bn_mul_add_words:
.global bn_sqr_words#
.proc bn_sqr_words#
.align 64
-.skip 32 // makes the loop body aligned at 64-byte boundary
+.skip 32 // makes the loop body aligned at 64-byte boundary
bn_sqr_words:
.prologue
.save ar.pfs,r2
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/mips.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/mips.pl
index da35ec1b30ce..3875132bd25d 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/mips.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/mips.pl
@@ -798,6 +798,11 @@ $code.=<<___;
move $a0,$v0
.end bn_sub_words_internal
+#if 0
+/*
+ * The bn_div_3_words entry point is re-used for constant-time interface.
+ * Implementation is retained as hystorical reference.
+ */
.align 5
.globl bn_div_3_words
.ent bn_div_3_words
@@ -877,6 +882,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
jr $ra
move $a0,$v0
.end bn_div_3_words_internal
+#endif
.align 5
.globl bn_div_words
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl
index f1292cc75cfb..85cd73c668bd 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#! /usr/bin/env perl
-# Copyright 2013-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+# Copyright 2013-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
# Copyright (c) 2012, Intel Corporation. All Rights Reserved.
#
# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
@@ -1492,6 +1492,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type rsaz_1024_red2norm_avx2,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
rsaz_1024_red2norm_avx2:
+.cfi_startproc
sub \$-128,$inp # size optimization
xor %rax,%rax
___
@@ -1525,12 +1526,14 @@ ___
}
$code.=<<___;
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size rsaz_1024_red2norm_avx2,.-rsaz_1024_red2norm_avx2
.globl rsaz_1024_norm2red_avx2
.type rsaz_1024_norm2red_avx2,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
rsaz_1024_norm2red_avx2:
+.cfi_startproc
sub \$-128,$out # size optimization
mov ($inp),@T[0]
mov \$0x1fffffff,%eax
@@ -1562,6 +1565,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
mov @T[0],`8*($j+2)-128`($out)
mov @T[0],`8*($j+3)-128`($out)
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size rsaz_1024_norm2red_avx2,.-rsaz_1024_norm2red_avx2
___
}
@@ -1573,6 +1577,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2:
+.cfi_startproc
vzeroupper
vmovdqu .Lscatter_permd(%rip),%ymm5
shl \$4,$power
@@ -1592,6 +1597,7 @@ rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2:
vzeroupper
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2,.-rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2
.globl rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/sparcv8plus.S b/crypto/bn/asm/sparcv8plus.S
index fe4699b2bdd1..d520ffa7c248 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/sparcv8plus.S
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/sparcv8plus.S
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
/*
* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1999-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -154,9 +154,9 @@
.register %g2,#scratch
.register %g3,#scratch
# define FRAME_SIZE -192
-#else
+#else
# define FRAME_SIZE -96
-#endif
+#endif
/*
* GNU assembler can't stand stuw:-(
*/
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
index ad6e8ada3ce7..f43e13d11643 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#! /usr/bin/env perl
-# Copyright 2011-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+# Copyright 2011-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
#
# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -2910,6 +2910,7 @@ bn_powerx5:
.align 32
bn_sqrx8x_internal:
__bn_sqrx8x_internal:
+.cfi_startproc
##################################################################
# Squaring part:
#
@@ -3542,6 +3543,7 @@ __bn_sqrx8x_reduction:
cmp 8+8(%rsp),%r8 # end of t[]?
jb .Lsqrx8x_reduction_loop
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size bn_sqrx8x_internal,.-bn_sqrx8x_internal
___
}
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_ctx.c b/crypto/bn/bn_ctx.c
index aa08b31a34bb..54b799961aa4 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_ctx.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_ctx.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -227,6 +227,8 @@ BIGNUM *BN_CTX_get(BN_CTX *ctx)
}
/* OK, make sure the returned bignum is "zero" */
BN_zero(ret);
+ /* clear BN_FLG_CONSTTIME if leaked from previous frames */
+ ret->flags &= (~BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
ctx->used++;
CTXDBG_RET(ctx, ret);
return ret;
@@ -256,7 +258,7 @@ static int BN_STACK_push(BN_STACK *st, unsigned int idx)
unsigned int newsize =
st->size ? (st->size * 3 / 2) : BN_CTX_START_FRAMES;
unsigned int *newitems;
-
+
if ((newitems = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*newitems) * newsize)) == NULL) {
BNerr(BN_F_BN_STACK_PUSH, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
@@ -310,7 +312,7 @@ static BIGNUM *BN_POOL_get(BN_POOL *p, int flag)
/* Full; allocate a new pool item and link it in. */
if (p->used == p->size) {
BN_POOL_ITEM *item;
-
+
if ((item = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*item))) == NULL) {
BNerr(BN_F_BN_POOL_GET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_depr.c b/crypto/bn/bn_depr.c
index 7d89214b1c16..58bcf197a490 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_depr.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_depr.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2002-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ BIGNUM *BN_generate_prime(BIGNUM *ret, int bits, int safe,
goto err;
/* we have a prime :-) */
- return ret;
+ return rnd;
err:
BN_free(rnd);
return NULL;
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_div.c b/crypto/bn/bn_div.c
index 70add10c7d6c..3a6fa0a1b194 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_div.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_div.c
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
+#include <assert.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "bn_lcl.h"
@@ -86,6 +87,77 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d,
#else
+# if defined(BN_DIV3W)
+BN_ULONG bn_div_3_words(const BN_ULONG *m, BN_ULONG d1, BN_ULONG d0);
+# elif 0
+/*
+ * This is #if-ed away, because it's a reference for assembly implementations,
+ * where it can and should be made constant-time. But if you want to test it,
+ * just replace 0 with 1.
+ */
+# if BN_BITS2 == 64 && defined(__SIZEOF_INT128__) && __SIZEOF_INT128__==16
+# undef BN_ULLONG
+# define BN_ULLONG __uint128_t
+# define BN_LLONG
+# endif
+
+# ifdef BN_LLONG
+# define BN_DIV3W
+/*
+ * Interface is somewhat quirky, |m| is pointer to most significant limb,
+ * and less significant limb is referred at |m[-1]|. This means that caller
+ * is responsible for ensuring that |m[-1]| is valid. Second condition that
+ * has to be met is that |d0|'s most significant bit has to be set. Or in
+ * other words divisor has to be "bit-aligned to the left." bn_div_fixed_top
+ * does all this. The subroutine considers four limbs, two of which are
+ * "overlapping," hence the name...
+ */
+static BN_ULONG bn_div_3_words(const BN_ULONG *m, BN_ULONG d1, BN_ULONG d0)
+{
+ BN_ULLONG R = ((BN_ULLONG)m[0] << BN_BITS2) | m[-1];
+ BN_ULLONG D = ((BN_ULLONG)d0 << BN_BITS2) | d1;
+ BN_ULONG Q = 0, mask;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < BN_BITS2; i++) {
+ Q <<= 1;
+ if (R >= D) {
+ Q |= 1;
+ R -= D;
+ }
+ D >>= 1;
+ }
+
+ mask = 0 - (Q >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)); /* does it overflow? */
+
+ Q <<= 1;
+ Q |= (R >= D);
+
+ return (Q | mask) & BN_MASK2;
+}
+# endif
+# endif
+
+static int bn_left_align(BIGNUM *num)
+{
+ BN_ULONG *d = num->d, n, m, rmask;
+ int top = num->top;
+ int rshift = BN_num_bits_word(d[top - 1]), lshift, i;
+
+ lshift = BN_BITS2 - rshift;
+ rshift %= BN_BITS2; /* say no to undefined behaviour */
+ rmask = (BN_ULONG)0 - rshift; /* rmask = 0 - (rshift != 0) */
+ rmask |= rmask >> 8;
+
+ for (i = 0, m = 0; i < top; i++) {
+ n = d[i];
+ d[i] = ((n << lshift) | m) & BN_MASK2;
+ m = (n >> rshift) & rmask;
+ }
+
+ return lshift;
+}
+
# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM) \
&& !defined(PEDANTIC) && !defined(BN_DIV3W)
# if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2
@@ -137,55 +209,73 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d,
int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num, const BIGNUM *divisor,
BN_CTX *ctx)
{
- int norm_shift, i, loop;
- BIGNUM *tmp, wnum, *snum, *sdiv, *res;
- BN_ULONG *resp, *wnump;
- BN_ULONG d0, d1;
- int num_n, div_n;
- int no_branch = 0;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (BN_is_zero(divisor)) {
+ BNerr(BN_F_BN_DIV, BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO);
+ return 0;
+ }
/*
* Invalid zero-padding would have particularly bad consequences so don't
* just rely on bn_check_top() here (bn_check_top() works only for
* BN_DEBUG builds)
*/
- if ((num->top > 0 && num->d[num->top - 1] == 0) ||
- (divisor->top > 0 && divisor->d[divisor->top - 1] == 0)) {
+ if (divisor->d[divisor->top - 1] == 0) {
BNerr(BN_F_BN_DIV, BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED);
return 0;
}
- bn_check_top(num);
- bn_check_top(divisor);
+ ret = bn_div_fixed_top(dv, rm, num, divisor, ctx);
- if ((BN_get_flags(num, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)
- || (BN_get_flags(divisor, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)) {
- no_branch = 1;
+ if (ret) {
+ if (dv != NULL)
+ bn_correct_top(dv);
+ if (rm != NULL)
+ bn_correct_top(rm);
}
- bn_check_top(dv);
- bn_check_top(rm);
- /*- bn_check_top(num); *//*
- * 'num' has been checked already
- */
- /*- bn_check_top(divisor); *//*
- * 'divisor' has been checked already
- */
+ return ret;
+}
- if (BN_is_zero(divisor)) {
- BNerr(BN_F_BN_DIV, BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO);
- return 0;
- }
+/*
+ * It's argued that *length* of *significant* part of divisor is public.
+ * Even if it's private modulus that is. Again, *length* is assumed
+ * public, but not *value*. Former is likely to be pre-defined by
+ * algorithm with bit granularity, though below subroutine is invariant
+ * of limb length. Thanks to this assumption we can require that |divisor|
+ * may not be zero-padded, yet claim this subroutine "constant-time"(*).
+ * This is because zero-padded dividend, |num|, is tolerated, so that
+ * caller can pass dividend of public length(*), but with smaller amount
+ * of significant limbs. This naturally means that quotient, |dv|, would
+ * contain correspongly less significant limbs as well, and will be zero-
+ * padded accordingly. Returned remainder, |rm|, will have same bit length
+ * as divisor, also zero-padded if needed. These actually leave sign bits
+ * in ambiguous state. In sense that we try to avoid negative zeros, while
+ * zero-padded zeros would retain sign.
+ *
+ * (*) "Constant-time-ness" has two pre-conditions:
+ *
+ * - availability of constant-time bn_div_3_words;
+ * - dividend is at least as "wide" as divisor, limb-wise, zero-padded
+ * if so requied, which shouldn't be a privacy problem, because
+ * divisor's length is considered public;
+ */
+int bn_div_fixed_top(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num,
+ const BIGNUM *divisor, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int norm_shift, i, j, loop;
+ BIGNUM *tmp, *snum, *sdiv, *res;
+ BN_ULONG *resp, *wnum, *wnumtop;
+ BN_ULONG d0, d1;
+ int num_n, div_n;
- if (!no_branch && BN_ucmp(num, divisor) < 0) {
- if (rm != NULL) {
- if (BN_copy(rm, num) == NULL)
- return 0;
- }
- if (dv != NULL)
- BN_zero(dv);
- return 1;
- }
+ assert(divisor->top > 0 && divisor->d[divisor->top - 1] != 0);
+
+ bn_check_top(num);
+ bn_check_top(divisor);
+ bn_check_top(dv);
+ bn_check_top(rm);
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
res = (dv == NULL) ? BN_CTX_get(ctx) : dv;
@@ -196,113 +286,72 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num, const BIGNUM *divisor,
goto err;
/* First we normalise the numbers */
- norm_shift = BN_BITS2 - ((BN_num_bits(divisor)) % BN_BITS2);
- if (!(BN_lshift(sdiv, divisor, norm_shift)))
+ if (!BN_copy(sdiv, divisor))
goto err;
+ norm_shift = bn_left_align(sdiv);
sdiv->neg = 0;
- norm_shift += BN_BITS2;
- if (!(BN_lshift(snum, num, norm_shift)))
+ /*
+ * Note that bn_lshift_fixed_top's output is always one limb longer
+ * than input, even when norm_shift is zero. This means that amount of
+ * inner loop iterations is invariant of dividend value, and that one
+ * doesn't need to compare dividend and divisor if they were originally
+ * of the same bit length.
+ */
+ if (!(bn_lshift_fixed_top(snum, num, norm_shift)))
goto err;
- snum->neg = 0;
-
- if (no_branch) {
- /*
- * Since we don't know whether snum is larger than sdiv, we pad snum
- * with enough zeroes without changing its value.
- */
- if (snum->top <= sdiv->top + 1) {
- if (bn_wexpand(snum, sdiv->top + 2) == NULL)
- goto err;
- for (i = snum->top; i < sdiv->top + 2; i++)
- snum->d[i] = 0;
- snum->top = sdiv->top + 2;
- } else {
- if (bn_wexpand(snum, snum->top + 1) == NULL)
- goto err;
- snum->d[snum->top] = 0;
- snum->top++;
- }
- }
div_n = sdiv->top;
num_n = snum->top;
+
+ if (num_n <= div_n) {
+ /* caller didn't pad dividend -> no constant-time guarantee... */
+ if (bn_wexpand(snum, div_n + 1) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ memset(&(snum->d[num_n]), 0, (div_n - num_n + 1) * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+ snum->top = num_n = div_n + 1;
+ }
+
loop = num_n - div_n;
/*
* Lets setup a 'window' into snum This is the part that corresponds to
* the current 'area' being divided
*/
- wnum.neg = 0;
- wnum.d = &(snum->d[loop]);
- wnum.top = div_n;
- wnum.flags = BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA;
- /*
- * only needed when BN_ucmp messes up the values between top and max
- */
- wnum.dmax = snum->dmax - loop; /* so we don't step out of bounds */
+ wnum = &(snum->d[loop]);
+ wnumtop = &(snum->d[num_n - 1]);
/* Get the top 2 words of sdiv */
- /* div_n=sdiv->top; */
d0 = sdiv->d[div_n - 1];
d1 = (div_n == 1) ? 0 : sdiv->d[div_n - 2];
- /* pointer to the 'top' of snum */
- wnump = &(snum->d[num_n - 1]);
-
- /* Setup to 'res' */
- if (!bn_wexpand(res, (loop + 1)))
+ /* Setup quotient */
+ if (!bn_wexpand(res, loop))
goto err;
res->neg = (num->neg ^ divisor->neg);
- res->top = loop - no_branch;
- resp = &(res->d[loop - 1]);
+ res->top = loop;
+ res->flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP;
+ resp = &(res->d[loop]);
/* space for temp */
if (!bn_wexpand(tmp, (div_n + 1)))
goto err;
- if (!no_branch) {
- if (BN_ucmp(&wnum, sdiv) >= 0) {
- /*
- * If BN_DEBUG_RAND is defined BN_ucmp changes (via bn_pollute)
- * the const bignum arguments => clean the values between top and
- * max again
- */
- bn_clear_top2max(&wnum);
- bn_sub_words(wnum.d, wnum.d, sdiv->d, div_n);
- *resp = 1;
- } else
- res->top--;
- }
-
- /* Increase the resp pointer so that we never create an invalid pointer. */
- resp++;
-
- /*
- * if res->top == 0 then clear the neg value otherwise decrease the resp
- * pointer
- */
- if (res->top == 0)
- res->neg = 0;
- else
- resp--;
-
- for (i = 0; i < loop - 1; i++, wnump--) {
+ for (i = 0; i < loop; i++, wnumtop--) {
BN_ULONG q, l0;
/*
* the first part of the loop uses the top two words of snum and sdiv
* to calculate a BN_ULONG q such that | wnum - sdiv * q | < sdiv
*/
-# if defined(BN_DIV3W) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM)
- BN_ULONG bn_div_3_words(BN_ULONG *, BN_ULONG, BN_ULONG);
- q = bn_div_3_words(wnump, d1, d0);
+# if defined(BN_DIV3W)
+ q = bn_div_3_words(wnumtop, d1, d0);
# else
BN_ULONG n0, n1, rem = 0;
- n0 = wnump[0];
- n1 = wnump[-1];
+ n0 = wnumtop[0];
+ n1 = wnumtop[-1];
if (n0 == d0)
q = BN_MASK2;
else { /* n0 < d0 */
-
+ BN_ULONG n2 = (wnumtop == wnum) ? 0 : wnumtop[-2];
# ifdef BN_LLONG
BN_ULLONG t2;
@@ -322,7 +371,7 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num, const BIGNUM *divisor,
t2 = (BN_ULLONG) d1 *q;
for (;;) {
- if (t2 <= ((((BN_ULLONG) rem) << BN_BITS2) | wnump[-2]))
+ if (t2 <= ((((BN_ULLONG) rem) << BN_BITS2) | n2))
break;
q--;
rem += d0;
@@ -355,7 +404,7 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num, const BIGNUM *divisor,
# endif
for (;;) {
- if ((t2h < rem) || ((t2h == rem) && (t2l <= wnump[-2])))
+ if ((t2h < rem) || ((t2h == rem) && (t2l <= n2)))
break;
q--;
rem += d0;
@@ -371,43 +420,33 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num, const BIGNUM *divisor,
l0 = bn_mul_words(tmp->d, sdiv->d, div_n, q);
tmp->d[div_n] = l0;
- wnum.d--;
+ wnum--;
/*
- * ingore top values of the bignums just sub the two BN_ULONG arrays
+ * ignore top values of the bignums just sub the two BN_ULONG arrays
* with bn_sub_words
*/
- if (bn_sub_words(wnum.d, wnum.d, tmp->d, div_n + 1)) {
- /*
- * Note: As we have considered only the leading two BN_ULONGs in
- * the calculation of q, sdiv * q might be greater than wnum (but
- * then (q-1) * sdiv is less or equal than wnum)
- */
- q--;
- if (bn_add_words(wnum.d, wnum.d, sdiv->d, div_n))
- /*
- * we can't have an overflow here (assuming that q != 0, but
- * if q == 0 then tmp is zero anyway)
- */
- (*wnump)++;
- }
- /* store part of the result */
- resp--;
- *resp = q;
- }
- bn_correct_top(snum);
- if (rm != NULL) {
+ l0 = bn_sub_words(wnum, wnum, tmp->d, div_n + 1);
+ q -= l0;
/*
- * Keep a copy of the neg flag in num because if rm==num BN_rshift()
- * will overwrite it.
+ * Note: As we have considered only the leading two BN_ULONGs in
+ * the calculation of q, sdiv * q might be greater than wnum (but
+ * then (q-1) * sdiv is less or equal than wnum)
*/
- int neg = num->neg;
- BN_rshift(rm, snum, norm_shift);
- if (!BN_is_zero(rm))
- rm->neg = neg;
- bn_check_top(rm);
+ for (l0 = 0 - l0, j = 0; j < div_n; j++)
+ tmp->d[j] = sdiv->d[j] & l0;
+ l0 = bn_add_words(wnum, wnum, tmp->d, div_n);
+ (*wnumtop) += l0;
+ assert((*wnumtop) == 0);
+
+ /* store part of the result */
+ *--resp = q;
}
- if (no_branch)
- bn_correct_top(res);
+ /* snum holds remainder, it's as wide as divisor */
+ snum->neg = num->neg;
+ snum->top = div_n;
+ snum->flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP;
+ if (rm != NULL)
+ bn_rshift_fixed_top(rm, snum, norm_shift);
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return 1;
err:
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c b/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
index c026ffcb339c..88f2baf0e553 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -648,34 +648,41 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
goto err;
}
+ if (a->neg || BN_ucmp(a, m) >= 0) {
+ BIGNUM *reduced = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (reduced == NULL
+ || !BN_nnmod(reduced, a, m, ctx)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ a = reduced;
+ }
+
#ifdef RSAZ_ENABLED
- if (!a->neg) {
- /*
- * If the size of the operands allow it, perform the optimized
- * RSAZ exponentiation. For further information see
- * crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.c and accompanying assembly modules.
- */
- if ((16 == a->top) && (16 == p->top) && (BN_num_bits(m) == 1024)
- && rsaz_avx2_eligible()) {
- if (NULL == bn_wexpand(rr, 16))
- goto err;
- RSAZ_1024_mod_exp_avx2(rr->d, a->d, p->d, m->d, mont->RR.d,
- mont->n0[0]);
- rr->top = 16;
- rr->neg = 0;
- bn_correct_top(rr);
- ret = 1;
+ /*
+ * If the size of the operands allow it, perform the optimized
+ * RSAZ exponentiation. For further information see
+ * crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.c and accompanying assembly modules.
+ */
+ if ((16 == a->top) && (16 == p->top) && (BN_num_bits(m) == 1024)
+ && rsaz_avx2_eligible()) {
+ if (NULL == bn_wexpand(rr, 16))
goto err;
- } else if ((8 == a->top) && (8 == p->top) && (BN_num_bits(m) == 512)) {
- if (NULL == bn_wexpand(rr, 8))
- goto err;
- RSAZ_512_mod_exp(rr->d, a->d, p->d, m->d, mont->n0[0], mont->RR.d);
- rr->top = 8;
- rr->neg = 0;
- bn_correct_top(rr);
- ret = 1;
+ RSAZ_1024_mod_exp_avx2(rr->d, a->d, p->d, m->d, mont->RR.d,
+ mont->n0[0]);
+ rr->top = 16;
+ rr->neg = 0;
+ bn_correct_top(rr);
+ ret = 1;
+ goto err;
+ } else if ((8 == a->top) && (8 == p->top) && (BN_num_bits(m) == 512)) {
+ if (NULL == bn_wexpand(rr, 8))
goto err;
- }
+ RSAZ_512_mod_exp(rr->d, a->d, p->d, m->d, mont->n0[0], mont->RR.d);
+ rr->top = 8;
+ rr->neg = 0;
+ bn_correct_top(rr);
+ ret = 1;
+ goto err;
}
#endif
@@ -747,12 +754,7 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
goto err;
/* prepare a^1 in Montgomery domain */
- if (a->neg || BN_ucmp(a, m) >= 0) {
- if (!BN_nnmod(&am, a, m, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (!bn_to_mont_fixed_top(&am, &am, mont, ctx))
- goto err;
- } else if (!bn_to_mont_fixed_top(&am, a, mont, ctx))
+ if (!bn_to_mont_fixed_top(&am, a, mont, ctx))
goto err;
#if defined(SPARC_T4_MONT)
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c b/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
index 80f910c80779..8286b3855a2c 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -695,6 +695,9 @@ int bn_cmp_words(const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int n)
int i;
BN_ULONG aa, bb;
+ if (n == 0)
+ return 0;
+
aa = a[n - 1];
bb = b[n - 1];
if (aa != bb)
@@ -737,26 +740,25 @@ int bn_cmp_part_words(const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int cl, int dl)
return bn_cmp_words(a, b, cl);
}
-/*
+/*-
* Constant-time conditional swap of a and b.
- * a and b are swapped if condition is not 0. The code assumes that at most one bit of condition is set.
- * nwords is the number of words to swap. The code assumes that at least nwords are allocated in both a and b,
- * and that no more than nwords are used by either a or b.
- * a and b cannot be the same number
+ * a and b are swapped if condition is not 0.
+ * nwords is the number of words to swap.
+ * Assumes that at least nwords are allocated in both a and b.
+ * Assumes that no more than nwords are used by either a or b.
*/
void BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG condition, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords)
{
BN_ULONG t;
int i;
+ if (a == b)
+ return;
+
bn_wcheck_size(a, nwords);
bn_wcheck_size(b, nwords);
- assert(a != b);
- assert((condition & (condition - 1)) == 0);
- assert(sizeof(BN_ULONG) >= sizeof(int));
-
- condition = ((condition - 1) >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)) - 1;
+ condition = ((~condition & ((condition - 1))) >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)) - 1;
t = (a->top ^ b->top) & condition;
a->top ^= t;
@@ -794,42 +796,16 @@ void BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG condition, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords)
a->flags ^= t;
b->flags ^= t;
-#define BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(ind) \
- do { \
- t = (a->d[ind] ^ b->d[ind]) & condition; \
- a->d[ind] ^= t; \
- b->d[ind] ^= t; \
- } while (0)
-
- switch (nwords) {
- default:
- for (i = 10; i < nwords; i++)
- BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(i);
- /* Fallthrough */
- case 10:
- BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(9); /* Fallthrough */
- case 9:
- BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(8); /* Fallthrough */
- case 8:
- BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(7); /* Fallthrough */
- case 7:
- BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(6); /* Fallthrough */
- case 6:
- BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(5); /* Fallthrough */
- case 5:
- BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(4); /* Fallthrough */
- case 4:
- BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(3); /* Fallthrough */
- case 3:
- BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(2); /* Fallthrough */
- case 2:
- BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(1); /* Fallthrough */
- case 1:
- BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(0);
- }
-#undef BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP
+ /* conditionally swap the data */
+ for (i = 0; i < nwords; i++) {
+ t = (a->d[i] ^ b->d[i]) & condition;
+ a->d[i] ^= t;
+ b->d[i] ^= t;
+ }
}
+#undef BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP_FLAGS
+
/* Bits of security, see SP800-57 */
int BN_security_bits(int L, int N)
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_prime.h b/crypto/bn/bn_prime.h
index a64c9630f3b0..2eb7b52f76f9 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_prime.h
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_prime.h
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
* WARNING: do not edit!
* Generated by crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl
*
- * Copyright 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl b/crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl
index eeca475b9366..b0b16087429b 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#! /usr/bin/env perl
-# Copyright 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+# Copyright 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
#
# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_shift.c b/crypto/bn/bn_shift.c
index 15d4b321ba26..b7a1e0ff9ae3 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_shift.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_shift.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
+#include <assert.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "bn_lcl.h"
@@ -82,40 +83,70 @@ int BN_rshift1(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a)
int BN_lshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n)
{
- int i, nw, lb, rb;
- BN_ULONG *t, *f;
- BN_ULONG l;
-
- bn_check_top(r);
- bn_check_top(a);
+ int ret;
if (n < 0) {
BNerr(BN_F_BN_LSHIFT, BN_R_INVALID_SHIFT);
return 0;
}
+ ret = bn_lshift_fixed_top(r, a, n);
+
+ bn_correct_top(r);
+ bn_check_top(r);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * In respect to shift factor the execution time is invariant of
+ * |n % BN_BITS2|, but not |n / BN_BITS2|. Or in other words pre-condition
+ * for constant-time-ness is |n < BN_BITS2| or |n / BN_BITS2| being
+ * non-secret.
+ */
+int bn_lshift_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n)
+{
+ int i, nw;
+ unsigned int lb, rb;
+ BN_ULONG *t, *f;
+ BN_ULONG l, m, rmask = 0;
+
+ assert(n >= 0);
+
+ bn_check_top(r);
+ bn_check_top(a);
+
nw = n / BN_BITS2;
if (bn_wexpand(r, a->top + nw + 1) == NULL)
return 0;
- r->neg = a->neg;
- lb = n % BN_BITS2;
- rb = BN_BITS2 - lb;
- f = a->d;
- t = r->d;
- t[a->top + nw] = 0;
- if (lb == 0)
- for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--)
- t[nw + i] = f[i];
- else
- for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
- l = f[i];
- t[nw + i + 1] |= (l >> rb) & BN_MASK2;
- t[nw + i] = (l << lb) & BN_MASK2;
+
+ if (a->top != 0) {
+ lb = (unsigned int)n % BN_BITS2;
+ rb = BN_BITS2 - lb;
+ rb %= BN_BITS2; /* say no to undefined behaviour */
+ rmask = (BN_ULONG)0 - rb; /* rmask = 0 - (rb != 0) */
+ rmask |= rmask >> 8;
+ f = &(a->d[0]);
+ t = &(r->d[nw]);
+ l = f[a->top - 1];
+ t[a->top] = (l >> rb) & rmask;
+ for (i = a->top - 1; i > 0; i--) {
+ m = l << lb;
+ l = f[i - 1];
+ t[i] = (m | ((l >> rb) & rmask)) & BN_MASK2;
}
- memset(t, 0, sizeof(*t) * nw);
+ t[0] = (l << lb) & BN_MASK2;
+ } else {
+ /* shouldn't happen, but formally required */
+ r->d[nw] = 0;
+ }
+ if (nw != 0)
+ memset(r->d, 0, sizeof(*t) * nw);
+
+ r->neg = a->neg;
r->top = a->top + nw + 1;
- bn_correct_top(r);
- bn_check_top(r);
+ r->flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP;
+
return 1;
}
@@ -173,3 +204,54 @@ int BN_rshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n)
bn_check_top(r);
return 1;
}
+
+/*
+ * In respect to shift factor the execution time is invariant of
+ * |n % BN_BITS2|, but not |n / BN_BITS2|. Or in other words pre-condition
+ * for constant-time-ness for sufficiently[!] zero-padded inputs is
+ * |n < BN_BITS2| or |n / BN_BITS2| being non-secret.
+ */
+int bn_rshift_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n)
+{
+ int i, top, nw;
+ unsigned int lb, rb;
+ BN_ULONG *t, *f;
+ BN_ULONG l, m, mask;
+
+ bn_check_top(r);
+ bn_check_top(a);
+
+ assert(n >= 0);
+
+ nw = n / BN_BITS2;
+ if (nw >= a->top) {
+ /* shouldn't happen, but formally required */
+ BN_zero(r);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ rb = (unsigned int)n % BN_BITS2;
+ lb = BN_BITS2 - rb;
+ lb %= BN_BITS2; /* say no to undefined behaviour */
+ mask = (BN_ULONG)0 - lb; /* mask = 0 - (lb != 0) */
+ mask |= mask >> 8;
+ top = a->top - nw;
+ if (r != a && bn_wexpand(r, top) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ t = &(r->d[0]);
+ f = &(a->d[nw]);
+ l = f[0];
+ for (i = 0; i < top - 1; i++) {
+ m = f[i + 1];
+ t[i] = (l >> rb) | ((m << lb) & mask);
+ l = m;
+ }
+ t[i] = l >> rb;
+
+ r->neg = a->neg;
+ r->top = top;
+ r->flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP;
+
+ return 1;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-armv8.pl b/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-armv8.pl
index 4a838bc2b32e..e90be6d0e5bd 100755
--- a/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-armv8.pl
+++ b/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-armv8.pl
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#! /usr/bin/env perl
-# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+# Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
#
# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -157,6 +157,7 @@ ChaCha20_ctr32:
b.ne ChaCha20_neon
.Lshort:
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-96]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -276,6 +277,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
.Labort:
ret
@@ -332,6 +334,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ret
.size ChaCha20_ctr32,.-ChaCha20_ctr32
___
@@ -377,6 +380,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type ChaCha20_neon,%function
.align 5
ChaCha20_neon:
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-96]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -575,6 +579,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ret
.Ltail_neon:
@@ -684,6 +689,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ret
.size ChaCha20_neon,.-ChaCha20_neon
___
@@ -696,6 +702,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type ChaCha20_512_neon,%function
.align 5
ChaCha20_512_neon:
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-96]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -1114,6 +1121,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ret
.size ChaCha20_512_neon,.-ChaCha20_512_neon
___
diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_kari.c b/crypto/cms/cms_kari.c
index 3bc46febf640..5e83814d0fcf 100644
--- a/crypto/cms/cms_kari.c
+++ b/crypto/cms/cms_kari.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2013-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ static int cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari,
return rv;
}
-/* Initialise a ktri based on passed certificate and key */
+/* Initialise a kari based on passed certificate and key */
int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip,
EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned int flags)
@@ -299,6 +299,9 @@ int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip,
kari->version = 3;
rek = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey);
+ if (rek == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
if (!sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_push(kari->recipientEncryptedKeys, rek)) {
M_ASN1_free_of(rek, CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey);
return 0;
diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c b/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
index eac9c2fc862e..26e3bdcf9e41 100644
--- a/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
+++ b/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
@@ -373,6 +373,7 @@ int cms_RecipientInfo_pwri_crypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
goto err;
}
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ec->key, ec->keylen);
ec->key = key;
ec->keylen = keylen;
diff --git a/crypto/conf/conf_def.c b/crypto/conf/conf_def.c
index 7f0d70ea695e..8e3f42a0caca 100644
--- a/crypto/conf/conf_def.c
+++ b/crypto/conf/conf_def.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -348,10 +348,15 @@ static int def_load_bio(CONF *conf, BIO *in, long *line)
psection = section;
}
p = eat_ws(conf, end);
- if (strncmp(pname, ".include", 8) == 0 && p != pname + 8) {
+ if (strncmp(pname, ".include", 8) == 0
+ && (p != pname + 8 || *p == '=')) {
char *include = NULL;
BIO *next;
+ if (*p == '=') {
+ p++;
+ p = eat_ws(conf, p);
+ }
trim_ws(conf, p);
if (!str_copy(conf, psection, &include, p))
goto err;
diff --git a/crypto/conf/conf_def.h b/crypto/conf/conf_def.h
index 73e88baa8ba1..2016d31b8929 100644
--- a/crypto/conf/conf_def.h
+++ b/crypto/conf/conf_def.h
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
* WARNING: do not edit!
* Generated by crypto/conf/keysets.pl
*
- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
diff --git a/crypto/conf/conf_lib.c b/crypto/conf/conf_lib.c
index 07110d8502a4..2d40ac97ec27 100644
--- a/crypto/conf/conf_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/conf/conf_lib.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -358,11 +358,36 @@ OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *OPENSSL_INIT_new(void)
if (ret != NULL)
memset(ret, 0, sizeof(*ret));
+ ret->flags = DEFAULT_CONF_MFLAGS;
+
return ret;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int OPENSSL_INIT_set_config_filename(OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings,
+ const char *filename)
+{
+ char *newfilename = NULL;
+
+ if (filename != NULL) {
+ newfilename = strdup(filename);
+ if (newfilename == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ free(settings->filename);
+ settings->filename = newfilename;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void OPENSSL_INIT_set_config_file_flags(OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ settings->flags = flags;
+}
+
int OPENSSL_INIT_set_config_appname(OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings,
const char *appname)
{
@@ -383,6 +408,7 @@ int OPENSSL_INIT_set_config_appname(OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings,
void OPENSSL_INIT_free(OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings)
{
+ free(settings->filename);
free(settings->appname);
free(settings);
}
diff --git a/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c b/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c
index 51f262e774dd..e703d97f5451 100644
--- a/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c
+++ b/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 2002-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2002-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -142,6 +142,9 @@ int CONF_modules_load_file(const char *filename, const char *appname,
OPENSSL_free(file);
NCONF_free(conf);
+ if (flags & CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_RETURN_CODES)
+ return 1;
+
return ret;
}
diff --git a/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c b/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c
index 3d2e065e5b07..2ce42f0c6740 100644
--- a/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c
+++ b/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2002-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -39,10 +39,24 @@ void OPENSSL_config(const char *appname)
}
#endif
-void openssl_config_int(const char *appname)
+int openssl_config_int(const OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings)
{
+ int ret;
+ const char *filename;
+ const char *appname;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
if (openssl_configured)
- return;
+ return 1;
+
+ filename = settings ? settings->filename : NULL;
+ appname = settings ? settings->appname : NULL;
+ flags = settings ? settings->flags : DEFAULT_CONF_MFLAGS;
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: openssl_config_int(%s, %s, %lu)\n",
+ filename, appname, flags);
+#endif
OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules();
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
@@ -51,11 +65,10 @@ void openssl_config_int(const char *appname)
#endif
ERR_clear_error();
#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI
- CONF_modules_load_file(NULL, appname,
- CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION |
- CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE);
+ ret = CONF_modules_load_file(filename, appname, flags);
#endif
openssl_configured = 1;
+ return ret;
}
void openssl_no_config_int(void)
diff --git a/crypto/conf/conf_ssl.c b/crypto/conf/conf_ssl.c
index 024bdb4808e3..387f2cf46c31 100644
--- a/crypto/conf/conf_ssl.c
+++ b/crypto/conf/conf_ssl.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2015-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -78,6 +78,8 @@ static int ssl_module_init(CONF_IMODULE *md, const CONF *cnf)
cnt = sk_CONF_VALUE_num(cmd_lists);
ssl_module_free(md);
ssl_names = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ssl_names) * cnt);
+ if (ssl_names == NULL)
+ goto err;
ssl_names_count = cnt;
for (i = 0; i < ssl_names_count; i++) {
struct ssl_conf_name_st *ssl_name = ssl_names + i;
diff --git a/crypto/conf/keysets.pl b/crypto/conf/keysets.pl
index cfa230ec3a1a..27a7214cc519 100644
--- a/crypto/conf/keysets.pl
+++ b/crypto/conf/keysets.pl
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#! /usr/bin/env perl
-# Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+# Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
#
# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/crypto/cryptlib.c b/crypto/cryptlib.c
index 1cd77c96d2f7..7b761a3adced 100644
--- a/crypto/cryptlib.c
+++ b/crypto/cryptlib.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
@@ -352,9 +352,9 @@ void OPENSSL_showfatal(const char *fmta, ...)
/*
* TODO: (For non GUI and no std error cases)
- * Add event logging feature here.
+ * Add event logging feature here.
*/
-
+
# if !defined(NDEBUG)
/*
* We are in a situation where we tried to report a critical
@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ void OPENSSL_showfatal(const char *fmta, ...)
# endif
# else
MessageBox(NULL, buf, _T("OpenSSL: FATAL"), MB_OK | MB_ICONERROR);
-# endif
+# endif
}
#else
void OPENSSL_showfatal(const char *fmta, ...)
@@ -460,4 +460,14 @@ uint32_t OPENSSL_rdtsc(void)
{
return 0;
}
+
+size_t OPENSSL_instrument_bus(unsigned int *out, size_t cnt)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+size_t OPENSSL_instrument_bus2(unsigned int *out, size_t cnt, size_t max)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/des/asm/des_enc.m4 b/crypto/des/asm/des_enc.m4
index 4a0d15620c00..4ada97b175d9 100644
--- a/crypto/des/asm/des_enc.m4
+++ b/crypto/des/asm/des_enc.m4
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-! Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+! Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
!
! Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
! this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ $4:
sll out1, 28, out1 ! rotate
xor $1, local1, $1 ! 1 finished, local1 now sbox 7
- ld [global2+local2], local2 ! 2
+ ld [global2+local2], local2 ! 2
srl out0, 24, local1 ! 7
or out1, local0, out1 ! rotate
@@ -1392,7 +1392,7 @@ DES_ncbc_encrypt:
add %o7,global1,global1
sub global1,.PIC.DES_SPtrans-.des_and,out2
- cmp in5, 0 ! enc
+ cmp in5, 0 ! enc
be .ncbc.dec
STPTR in4, IVEC
diff --git a/crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c b/crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c
index ad8899c289a3..4240f5f5e30c 100644
--- a/crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c
+++ b/crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#endif
#include "dso_locl.h"
+#include "e_os.h"
#ifdef DSO_DLFCN
@@ -99,6 +100,7 @@ static int dlfcn_load(DSO *dso)
/* See applicable comments in dso_dl.c */
char *filename = DSO_convert_filename(dso, NULL);
int flags = DLOPEN_FLAG;
+ int saveerrno = get_last_sys_error();
if (filename == NULL) {
DSOerr(DSO_F_DLFCN_LOAD, DSO_R_NO_FILENAME);
@@ -118,6 +120,11 @@ static int dlfcn_load(DSO *dso)
ERR_add_error_data(4, "filename(", filename, "): ", dlerror());
goto err;
}
+ /*
+ * Some dlopen() implementations (e.g. solaris) do no preserve errno, even
+ * on a successful call.
+ */
+ set_sys_error(saveerrno);
if (!sk_void_push(dso->meth_data, (char *)ptr)) {
DSOerr(DSO_F_DLFCN_LOAD, DSO_R_STACK_ERROR);
goto err;
diff --git a/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-armv8.pl b/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-armv8.pl
index 1361cb395ffb..887ddfb1ea9b 100755
--- a/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-armv8.pl
+++ b/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-armv8.pl
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#! /usr/bin/env perl
-# Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+# Copyright 2015-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
#
# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type ecp_nistz256_to_mont,%function
.align 6
ecp_nistz256_to_mont:
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-32]!
add x29,sp,#0
stp x19,x20,[sp,#16]
@@ -134,6 +135,7 @@ ecp_nistz256_to_mont:
ldp x19,x20,[sp,#16]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#32
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ret
.size ecp_nistz256_to_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_to_mont
@@ -142,6 +144,7 @@ ecp_nistz256_to_mont:
.type ecp_nistz256_from_mont,%function
.align 4
ecp_nistz256_from_mont:
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-32]!
add x29,sp,#0
stp x19,x20,[sp,#16]
@@ -157,6 +160,7 @@ ecp_nistz256_from_mont:
ldp x19,x20,[sp,#16]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#32
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ret
.size ecp_nistz256_from_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_from_mont
@@ -166,6 +170,7 @@ ecp_nistz256_from_mont:
.type ecp_nistz256_mul_mont,%function
.align 4
ecp_nistz256_mul_mont:
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-32]!
add x29,sp,#0
stp x19,x20,[sp,#16]
@@ -180,6 +185,7 @@ ecp_nistz256_mul_mont:
ldp x19,x20,[sp,#16]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#32
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ret
.size ecp_nistz256_mul_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_mul_mont
@@ -188,6 +194,7 @@ ecp_nistz256_mul_mont:
.type ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont,%function
.align 4
ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont:
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-32]!
add x29,sp,#0
stp x19,x20,[sp,#16]
@@ -201,6 +208,7 @@ ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont:
ldp x19,x20,[sp,#16]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#32
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ret
.size ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont
@@ -210,6 +218,7 @@ ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont:
.type ecp_nistz256_add,%function
.align 4
ecp_nistz256_add:
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -223,6 +232,7 @@ ecp_nistz256_add:
bl __ecp_nistz256_add
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ret
.size ecp_nistz256_add,.-ecp_nistz256_add
@@ -231,6 +241,7 @@ ecp_nistz256_add:
.type ecp_nistz256_div_by_2,%function
.align 4
ecp_nistz256_div_by_2:
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -242,6 +253,7 @@ ecp_nistz256_div_by_2:
bl __ecp_nistz256_div_by_2
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ret
.size ecp_nistz256_div_by_2,.-ecp_nistz256_div_by_2
@@ -250,6 +262,7 @@ ecp_nistz256_div_by_2:
.type ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2,%function
.align 4
ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2:
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -265,6 +278,7 @@ ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2:
bl __ecp_nistz256_add // ret = a+a // 2*a
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ret
.size ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2,.-ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2
@@ -273,6 +287,7 @@ ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2:
.type ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3,%function
.align 4
ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3:
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -299,6 +314,7 @@ ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3:
bl __ecp_nistz256_add // ret += a // 2*a+a=3*a
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ret
.size ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3,.-ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3
@@ -308,6 +324,7 @@ ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3:
.type ecp_nistz256_sub,%function
.align 4
ecp_nistz256_sub:
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -319,6 +336,7 @@ ecp_nistz256_sub:
bl __ecp_nistz256_sub_from
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ret
.size ecp_nistz256_sub,.-ecp_nistz256_sub
@@ -327,6 +345,7 @@ ecp_nistz256_sub:
.type ecp_nistz256_neg,%function
.align 4
ecp_nistz256_neg:
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -341,6 +360,7 @@ ecp_nistz256_neg:
bl __ecp_nistz256_sub_from
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ret
.size ecp_nistz256_neg,.-ecp_nistz256_neg
@@ -701,6 +721,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type ecp_nistz256_point_double,%function
.align 5
ecp_nistz256_point_double:
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-80]!
add x29,sp,#0
stp x19,x20,[sp,#16]
@@ -835,6 +856,7 @@ ecp_nistz256_point_double:
ldp x19,x20,[x29,#16]
ldp x21,x22,[x29,#32]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#80
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ret
.size ecp_nistz256_point_double,.-ecp_nistz256_point_double
___
@@ -857,6 +879,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type ecp_nistz256_point_add,%function
.align 5
ecp_nistz256_point_add:
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-80]!
add x29,sp,#0
stp x19,x20,[sp,#16]
@@ -1094,12 +1117,13 @@ $code.=<<___;
stp $acc2,$acc3,[$rp_real,#$i+16]
.Ladd_done:
- add sp,x29,#0 // destroy frame
+ add sp,x29,#0 // destroy frame
ldp x19,x20,[x29,#16]
ldp x21,x22,[x29,#32]
ldp x23,x24,[x29,#48]
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#80
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ret
.size ecp_nistz256_point_add,.-ecp_nistz256_point_add
___
@@ -1121,6 +1145,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine,%function
.align 5
ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine:
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-80]!
add x29,sp,#0
stp x19,x20,[sp,#16]
@@ -1309,6 +1334,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
ldp x23,x24,[x29,#48]
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#80
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ret
.size ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine,.-ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine
___
diff --git a/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl b/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl
index eba6ffd430be..87149e7f680d 100755
--- a/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#! /usr/bin/env perl
-# Copyright 2014-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+# Copyright 2014-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
# Copyright (c) 2014, Intel Corporation. All Rights Reserved.
# Copyright (c) 2015 CloudFlare, Inc.
#
@@ -1674,6 +1674,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type __ecp_nistz256_mul_montq,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
__ecp_nistz256_mul_montq:
+.cfi_startproc
########################################################################
# Multiply a by b[0]
mov %rax, $t1
@@ -1885,6 +1886,7 @@ __ecp_nistz256_mul_montq:
mov $acc1, 8*3($r_ptr)
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size __ecp_nistz256_mul_montq,.-__ecp_nistz256_mul_montq
################################################################################
@@ -1968,6 +1970,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type __ecp_nistz256_sqr_montq,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
__ecp_nistz256_sqr_montq:
+.cfi_startproc
mov %rax, $acc5
mulq $acc6 # a[1]*a[0]
mov %rax, $acc1
@@ -2125,6 +2128,7 @@ __ecp_nistz256_sqr_montq:
mov $acc7, 8*3($r_ptr)
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size __ecp_nistz256_sqr_montq,.-__ecp_nistz256_sqr_montq
___
@@ -2133,6 +2137,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type __ecp_nistz256_mul_montx,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
__ecp_nistz256_mul_montx:
+.cfi_startproc
########################################################################
# Multiply by b[0]
mulx $acc1, $acc0, $acc1
@@ -2295,11 +2300,13 @@ __ecp_nistz256_mul_montx:
mov $acc1, 8*3($r_ptr)
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size __ecp_nistz256_mul_montx,.-__ecp_nistz256_mul_montx
.type __ecp_nistz256_sqr_montx,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
__ecp_nistz256_sqr_montx:
+.cfi_startproc
mulx $acc6, $acc1, $acc2 # a[0]*a[1]
mulx $acc7, $t0, $acc3 # a[0]*a[2]
xor %eax, %eax
@@ -2423,6 +2430,7 @@ __ecp_nistz256_sqr_montx:
mov $acc7, 8*3($r_ptr)
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size __ecp_nistz256_sqr_montx,.-__ecp_nistz256_sqr_montx
___
}
@@ -2578,6 +2586,7 @@ ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5:
.type ecp_nistz256_gather_w5,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
ecp_nistz256_gather_w5:
+.cfi_startproc
___
$code.=<<___ if ($avx>1);
mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip), %eax
@@ -2666,6 +2675,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($win64);
___
$code.=<<___;
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.LSEH_end_ecp_nistz256_gather_w5:
.size ecp_nistz256_gather_w5,.-ecp_nistz256_gather_w5
@@ -2694,6 +2704,7 @@ ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7:
.type ecp_nistz256_gather_w7,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
ecp_nistz256_gather_w7:
+.cfi_startproc
___
$code.=<<___ if ($avx>1);
mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip), %eax
@@ -2771,6 +2782,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($win64);
___
$code.=<<___;
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.LSEH_end_ecp_nistz256_gather_w7:
.size ecp_nistz256_gather_w7,.-ecp_nistz256_gather_w7
___
@@ -2787,6 +2799,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w5,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w5:
+.cfi_startproc
.Lavx2_gather_w5:
vzeroupper
___
@@ -2874,6 +2887,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($win64);
___
$code.=<<___;
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.LSEH_end_ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w5:
.size ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w5,.-ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w5
___
@@ -2893,6 +2907,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w7,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w7:
+.cfi_startproc
.Lavx2_gather_w7:
vzeroupper
___
@@ -2995,6 +3010,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($win64);
___
$code.=<<___;
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.LSEH_end_ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w7:
.size ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w7,.-ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w7
___
@@ -3064,6 +3080,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type __ecp_nistz256_add_toq,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
__ecp_nistz256_add_toq:
+.cfi_startproc
xor $t4,$t4
add 8*0($b_ptr), $a0
adc 8*1($b_ptr), $a1
@@ -3091,11 +3108,13 @@ __ecp_nistz256_add_toq:
mov $a3, 8*3($r_ptr)
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size __ecp_nistz256_add_toq,.-__ecp_nistz256_add_toq
.type __ecp_nistz256_sub_fromq,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
__ecp_nistz256_sub_fromq:
+.cfi_startproc
sub 8*0($b_ptr), $a0
sbb 8*1($b_ptr), $a1
mov $a0, $t0
@@ -3122,11 +3141,13 @@ __ecp_nistz256_sub_fromq:
mov $a3, 8*3($r_ptr)
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size __ecp_nistz256_sub_fromq,.-__ecp_nistz256_sub_fromq
.type __ecp_nistz256_subq,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
__ecp_nistz256_subq:
+.cfi_startproc
sub $a0, $t0
sbb $a1, $t1
mov $t0, $a0
@@ -3149,11 +3170,13 @@ __ecp_nistz256_subq:
cmovnz $t3, $a3
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size __ecp_nistz256_subq,.-__ecp_nistz256_subq
.type __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2q,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2q:
+.cfi_startproc
xor $t4, $t4
add $a0, $a0 # a0:a3+a0:a3
adc $a1, $a1
@@ -3181,6 +3204,7 @@ __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2q:
mov $a3, 8*3($r_ptr)
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2q,.-__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2q
___
}
@@ -3620,7 +3644,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
movq %xmm1, $a_ptr # restore $a_ptr
movq %xmm0, $r_ptr # restore $r_ptr
add \$`32*(18-5)`, %rsp # difference in frame sizes
+.cfi_adjust_cfa_offset `-32*(18-5)`
jmp .Lpoint_double_shortcut$x
+.cfi_adjust_cfa_offset `32*(18-5)`
.align 32
.Ladd_proceed$x:
@@ -4156,6 +4182,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type __ecp_nistz256_add_tox,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
__ecp_nistz256_add_tox:
+.cfi_startproc
xor $t4, $t4
adc 8*0($b_ptr), $a0
adc 8*1($b_ptr), $a1
@@ -4184,11 +4211,13 @@ __ecp_nistz256_add_tox:
mov $a3, 8*3($r_ptr)
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size __ecp_nistz256_add_tox,.-__ecp_nistz256_add_tox
.type __ecp_nistz256_sub_fromx,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
__ecp_nistz256_sub_fromx:
+.cfi_startproc
xor $t4, $t4
sbb 8*0($b_ptr), $a0
sbb 8*1($b_ptr), $a1
@@ -4217,11 +4246,13 @@ __ecp_nistz256_sub_fromx:
mov $a3, 8*3($r_ptr)
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size __ecp_nistz256_sub_fromx,.-__ecp_nistz256_sub_fromx
.type __ecp_nistz256_subx,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
__ecp_nistz256_subx:
+.cfi_startproc
xor $t4, $t4
sbb $a0, $t0
sbb $a1, $t1
@@ -4246,11 +4277,13 @@ __ecp_nistz256_subx:
cmovc $t3, $a3
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size __ecp_nistz256_subx,.-__ecp_nistz256_subx
.type __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2x,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2x:
+.cfi_startproc
xor $t4, $t4
adc $a0, $a0 # a0:a3+a0:a3
adc $a1, $a1
@@ -4279,6 +4312,7 @@ __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2x:
mov $a3, 8*3($r_ptr)
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2x,.-__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2x
___
}
diff --git a/crypto/ec/curve25519.c b/crypto/ec/curve25519.c
index abe9b9cbf6dd..aa999cc5914e 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/curve25519.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/curve25519.c
@@ -744,91 +744,99 @@ static void x25519_scalar_mult(uint8_t out[32], const uint8_t scalar[32],
/*
* Reference base 2^25.5 implementation.
- */
-/*
+ *
* This code is mostly taken from the ref10 version of Ed25519 in SUPERCOP
* 20141124 (http://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html).
*
* The field functions are shared by Ed25519 and X25519 where possible.
*/
-/* fe means field element. Here the field is \Z/(2^255-19). An element t,
+/*
+ * fe means field element. Here the field is \Z/(2^255-19). An element t,
* entries t[0]...t[9], represents the integer t[0]+2^26 t[1]+2^51 t[2]+2^77
* t[3]+2^102 t[4]+...+2^230 t[9]. Bounds on each t[i] vary depending on
- * context. */
+ * context.
+ */
typedef int32_t fe[10];
+static const int64_t kBottom21Bits = 0x1fffffLL;
static const int64_t kBottom25Bits = 0x1ffffffLL;
static const int64_t kBottom26Bits = 0x3ffffffLL;
static const int64_t kTop39Bits = 0xfffffffffe000000LL;
static const int64_t kTop38Bits = 0xfffffffffc000000LL;
-static uint64_t load_3(const uint8_t *in) {
- uint64_t result;
- result = (uint64_t)in[0];
- result |= ((uint64_t)in[1]) << 8;
- result |= ((uint64_t)in[2]) << 16;
- return result;
+static uint64_t load_3(const uint8_t *in)
+{
+ uint64_t result;
+
+ result = ((uint64_t)in[0]);
+ result |= ((uint64_t)in[1]) << 8;
+ result |= ((uint64_t)in[2]) << 16;
+ return result;
}
-static uint64_t load_4(const uint8_t *in) {
- uint64_t result;
- result = (uint64_t)in[0];
- result |= ((uint64_t)in[1]) << 8;
- result |= ((uint64_t)in[2]) << 16;
- result |= ((uint64_t)in[3]) << 24;
- return result;
+static uint64_t load_4(const uint8_t *in)
+{
+ uint64_t result;
+
+ result = ((uint64_t)in[0]);
+ result |= ((uint64_t)in[1]) << 8;
+ result |= ((uint64_t)in[2]) << 16;
+ result |= ((uint64_t)in[3]) << 24;
+ return result;
}
-static void fe_frombytes(fe h, const uint8_t *s) {
- /* Ignores top bit of h. */
- int64_t h0 = load_4(s);
- int64_t h1 = load_3(s + 4) << 6;
- int64_t h2 = load_3(s + 7) << 5;
- int64_t h3 = load_3(s + 10) << 3;
- int64_t h4 = load_3(s + 13) << 2;
- int64_t h5 = load_4(s + 16);
- int64_t h6 = load_3(s + 20) << 7;
- int64_t h7 = load_3(s + 23) << 5;
- int64_t h8 = load_3(s + 26) << 4;
- int64_t h9 = (load_3(s + 29) & 8388607) << 2;
- int64_t carry0;
- int64_t carry1;
- int64_t carry2;
- int64_t carry3;
- int64_t carry4;
- int64_t carry5;
- int64_t carry6;
- int64_t carry7;
- int64_t carry8;
- int64_t carry9;
-
- carry9 = h9 + (1 << 24); h0 += (carry9 >> 25) * 19; h9 -= carry9 & kTop39Bits;
- carry1 = h1 + (1 << 24); h2 += carry1 >> 25; h1 -= carry1 & kTop39Bits;
- carry3 = h3 + (1 << 24); h4 += carry3 >> 25; h3 -= carry3 & kTop39Bits;
- carry5 = h5 + (1 << 24); h6 += carry5 >> 25; h5 -= carry5 & kTop39Bits;
- carry7 = h7 + (1 << 24); h8 += carry7 >> 25; h7 -= carry7 & kTop39Bits;
-
- carry0 = h0 + (1 << 25); h1 += carry0 >> 26; h0 -= carry0 & kTop38Bits;
- carry2 = h2 + (1 << 25); h3 += carry2 >> 26; h2 -= carry2 & kTop38Bits;
- carry4 = h4 + (1 << 25); h5 += carry4 >> 26; h4 -= carry4 & kTop38Bits;
- carry6 = h6 + (1 << 25); h7 += carry6 >> 26; h6 -= carry6 & kTop38Bits;
- carry8 = h8 + (1 << 25); h9 += carry8 >> 26; h8 -= carry8 & kTop38Bits;
-
- h[0] = (int32_t)h0;
- h[1] = (int32_t)h1;
- h[2] = (int32_t)h2;
- h[3] = (int32_t)h3;
- h[4] = (int32_t)h4;
- h[5] = (int32_t)h5;
- h[6] = (int32_t)h6;
- h[7] = (int32_t)h7;
- h[8] = (int32_t)h8;
- h[9] = (int32_t)h9;
+static void fe_frombytes(fe h, const uint8_t *s)
+{
+ /* Ignores top bit of h. */
+ int64_t h0 = load_4(s);
+ int64_t h1 = load_3(s + 4) << 6;
+ int64_t h2 = load_3(s + 7) << 5;
+ int64_t h3 = load_3(s + 10) << 3;
+ int64_t h4 = load_3(s + 13) << 2;
+ int64_t h5 = load_4(s + 16);
+ int64_t h6 = load_3(s + 20) << 7;
+ int64_t h7 = load_3(s + 23) << 5;
+ int64_t h8 = load_3(s + 26) << 4;
+ int64_t h9 = (load_3(s + 29) & 0x7fffff) << 2;
+ int64_t carry0;
+ int64_t carry1;
+ int64_t carry2;
+ int64_t carry3;
+ int64_t carry4;
+ int64_t carry5;
+ int64_t carry6;
+ int64_t carry7;
+ int64_t carry8;
+ int64_t carry9;
+
+ carry9 = h9 + (1 << 24); h0 += (carry9 >> 25) * 19; h9 -= carry9 & kTop39Bits;
+ carry1 = h1 + (1 << 24); h2 += carry1 >> 25; h1 -= carry1 & kTop39Bits;
+ carry3 = h3 + (1 << 24); h4 += carry3 >> 25; h3 -= carry3 & kTop39Bits;
+ carry5 = h5 + (1 << 24); h6 += carry5 >> 25; h5 -= carry5 & kTop39Bits;
+ carry7 = h7 + (1 << 24); h8 += carry7 >> 25; h7 -= carry7 & kTop39Bits;
+
+ carry0 = h0 + (1 << 25); h1 += carry0 >> 26; h0 -= carry0 & kTop38Bits;
+ carry2 = h2 + (1 << 25); h3 += carry2 >> 26; h2 -= carry2 & kTop38Bits;
+ carry4 = h4 + (1 << 25); h5 += carry4 >> 26; h4 -= carry4 & kTop38Bits;
+ carry6 = h6 + (1 << 25); h7 += carry6 >> 26; h6 -= carry6 & kTop38Bits;
+ carry8 = h8 + (1 << 25); h9 += carry8 >> 26; h8 -= carry8 & kTop38Bits;
+
+ h[0] = (int32_t)h0;
+ h[1] = (int32_t)h1;
+ h[2] = (int32_t)h2;
+ h[3] = (int32_t)h3;
+ h[4] = (int32_t)h4;
+ h[5] = (int32_t)h5;
+ h[6] = (int32_t)h6;
+ h[7] = (int32_t)h7;
+ h[8] = (int32_t)h8;
+ h[9] = (int32_t)h9;
}
-/* Preconditions:
- * |h| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc.
+/*
+ * Preconditions:
+ * |h| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc.
*
* Write p=2^255-19; q=floor(h/p).
* Basic claim: q = floor(2^(-255)(h + 19 2^(-25)h9 + 2^(-1))).
@@ -848,102 +856,112 @@ static void fe_frombytes(fe h, const uint8_t *s) {
* Then 0<x<2^255 so floor(2^(-255)x) = 0 so floor(q+2^(-255)x) = q.
*
* Have q+2^(-255)x = 2^(-255)(h + 19 2^(-25) h9 + 2^(-1))
- * so floor(2^(-255)(h + 19 2^(-25) h9 + 2^(-1))) = q. */
-static void fe_tobytes(uint8_t *s, const fe h) {
- int32_t h0 = h[0];
- int32_t h1 = h[1];
- int32_t h2 = h[2];
- int32_t h3 = h[3];
- int32_t h4 = h[4];
- int32_t h5 = h[5];
- int32_t h6 = h[6];
- int32_t h7 = h[7];
- int32_t h8 = h[8];
- int32_t h9 = h[9];
- int32_t q;
-
- q = (19 * h9 + (((int32_t) 1) << 24)) >> 25;
- q = (h0 + q) >> 26;
- q = (h1 + q) >> 25;
- q = (h2 + q) >> 26;
- q = (h3 + q) >> 25;
- q = (h4 + q) >> 26;
- q = (h5 + q) >> 25;
- q = (h6 + q) >> 26;
- q = (h7 + q) >> 25;
- q = (h8 + q) >> 26;
- q = (h9 + q) >> 25;
-
- /* Goal: Output h-(2^255-19)q, which is between 0 and 2^255-20. */
- h0 += 19 * q;
- /* Goal: Output h-2^255 q, which is between 0 and 2^255-20. */
-
- h1 += h0 >> 26; h0 &= kBottom26Bits;
- h2 += h1 >> 25; h1 &= kBottom25Bits;
- h3 += h2 >> 26; h2 &= kBottom26Bits;
- h4 += h3 >> 25; h3 &= kBottom25Bits;
- h5 += h4 >> 26; h4 &= kBottom26Bits;
- h6 += h5 >> 25; h5 &= kBottom25Bits;
- h7 += h6 >> 26; h6 &= kBottom26Bits;
- h8 += h7 >> 25; h7 &= kBottom25Bits;
- h9 += h8 >> 26; h8 &= kBottom26Bits;
- h9 &= kBottom25Bits;
- /* h10 = carry9 */
-
- /* Goal: Output h0+...+2^255 h10-2^255 q, which is between 0 and 2^255-20.
- * Have h0+...+2^230 h9 between 0 and 2^255-1;
- * evidently 2^255 h10-2^255 q = 0.
- * Goal: Output h0+...+2^230 h9. */
-
- s[0] = (uint8_t)(h0 >> 0);
- s[1] = (uint8_t)(h0 >> 8);
- s[2] = (uint8_t)(h0 >> 16);
- s[3] = (uint8_t)((h0 >> 24) | ((uint32_t)(h1) << 2));
- s[4] = (uint8_t)(h1 >> 6);
- s[5] = (uint8_t)(h1 >> 14);
- s[6] = (uint8_t)((h1 >> 22) | ((uint32_t)(h2) << 3));
- s[7] = (uint8_t)(h2 >> 5);
- s[8] = (uint8_t)(h2 >> 13);
- s[9] = (uint8_t)((h2 >> 21) | ((uint32_t)(h3) << 5));
- s[10] = (uint8_t)(h3 >> 3);
- s[11] = (uint8_t)(h3 >> 11);
- s[12] = (uint8_t)((h3 >> 19) | ((uint32_t)(h4) << 6));
- s[13] = (uint8_t)(h4 >> 2);
- s[14] = (uint8_t)(h4 >> 10);
- s[15] = (uint8_t)(h4 >> 18);
- s[16] = (uint8_t)(h5 >> 0);
- s[17] = (uint8_t)(h5 >> 8);
- s[18] = (uint8_t)(h5 >> 16);
- s[19] = (uint8_t)((h5 >> 24) | ((uint32_t)(h6) << 1));
- s[20] = (uint8_t)(h6 >> 7);
- s[21] = (uint8_t)(h6 >> 15);
- s[22] = (uint8_t)((h6 >> 23) | ((uint32_t)(h7) << 3));
- s[23] = (uint8_t)(h7 >> 5);
- s[24] = (uint8_t)(h7 >> 13);
- s[25] = (uint8_t)((h7 >> 21) | ((uint32_t)(h8) << 4));
- s[26] = (uint8_t)(h8 >> 4);
- s[27] = (uint8_t)(h8 >> 12);
- s[28] = (uint8_t)((h8 >> 20) | ((uint32_t)(h9) << 6));
- s[29] = (uint8_t)(h9 >> 2);
- s[30] = (uint8_t)(h9 >> 10);
- s[31] = (uint8_t)(h9 >> 18);
+ * so floor(2^(-255)(h + 19 2^(-25) h9 + 2^(-1))) = q.
+ */
+static void fe_tobytes(uint8_t *s, const fe h)
+{
+ int32_t h0 = h[0];
+ int32_t h1 = h[1];
+ int32_t h2 = h[2];
+ int32_t h3 = h[3];
+ int32_t h4 = h[4];
+ int32_t h5 = h[5];
+ int32_t h6 = h[6];
+ int32_t h7 = h[7];
+ int32_t h8 = h[8];
+ int32_t h9 = h[9];
+ int32_t q;
+
+ q = (19 * h9 + (((int32_t) 1) << 24)) >> 25;
+ q = (h0 + q) >> 26;
+ q = (h1 + q) >> 25;
+ q = (h2 + q) >> 26;
+ q = (h3 + q) >> 25;
+ q = (h4 + q) >> 26;
+ q = (h5 + q) >> 25;
+ q = (h6 + q) >> 26;
+ q = (h7 + q) >> 25;
+ q = (h8 + q) >> 26;
+ q = (h9 + q) >> 25;
+
+ /* Goal: Output h-(2^255-19)q, which is between 0 and 2^255-20. */
+ h0 += 19 * q;
+ /* Goal: Output h-2^255 q, which is between 0 and 2^255-20. */
+
+ h1 += h0 >> 26; h0 &= kBottom26Bits;
+ h2 += h1 >> 25; h1 &= kBottom25Bits;
+ h3 += h2 >> 26; h2 &= kBottom26Bits;
+ h4 += h3 >> 25; h3 &= kBottom25Bits;
+ h5 += h4 >> 26; h4 &= kBottom26Bits;
+ h6 += h5 >> 25; h5 &= kBottom25Bits;
+ h7 += h6 >> 26; h6 &= kBottom26Bits;
+ h8 += h7 >> 25; h7 &= kBottom25Bits;
+ h9 += h8 >> 26; h8 &= kBottom26Bits;
+ h9 &= kBottom25Bits;
+ /* h10 = carry9 */
+
+ /*
+ * Goal: Output h0+...+2^255 h10-2^255 q, which is between 0 and 2^255-20.
+ * Have h0+...+2^230 h9 between 0 and 2^255-1;
+ * evidently 2^255 h10-2^255 q = 0.
+ * Goal: Output h0+...+2^230 h9.
+ */
+ s[ 0] = (uint8_t) (h0 >> 0);
+ s[ 1] = (uint8_t) (h0 >> 8);
+ s[ 2] = (uint8_t) (h0 >> 16);
+ s[ 3] = (uint8_t)((h0 >> 24) | ((uint32_t)(h1) << 2));
+ s[ 4] = (uint8_t) (h1 >> 6);
+ s[ 5] = (uint8_t) (h1 >> 14);
+ s[ 6] = (uint8_t)((h1 >> 22) | ((uint32_t)(h2) << 3));
+ s[ 7] = (uint8_t) (h2 >> 5);
+ s[ 8] = (uint8_t) (h2 >> 13);
+ s[ 9] = (uint8_t)((h2 >> 21) | ((uint32_t)(h3) << 5));
+ s[10] = (uint8_t) (h3 >> 3);
+ s[11] = (uint8_t) (h3 >> 11);
+ s[12] = (uint8_t)((h3 >> 19) | ((uint32_t)(h4) << 6));
+ s[13] = (uint8_t) (h4 >> 2);
+ s[14] = (uint8_t) (h4 >> 10);
+ s[15] = (uint8_t) (h4 >> 18);
+ s[16] = (uint8_t) (h5 >> 0);
+ s[17] = (uint8_t) (h5 >> 8);
+ s[18] = (uint8_t) (h5 >> 16);
+ s[19] = (uint8_t)((h5 >> 24) | ((uint32_t)(h6) << 1));
+ s[20] = (uint8_t) (h6 >> 7);
+ s[21] = (uint8_t) (h6 >> 15);
+ s[22] = (uint8_t)((h6 >> 23) | ((uint32_t)(h7) << 3));
+ s[23] = (uint8_t) (h7 >> 5);
+ s[24] = (uint8_t) (h7 >> 13);
+ s[25] = (uint8_t)((h7 >> 21) | ((uint32_t)(h8) << 4));
+ s[26] = (uint8_t) (h8 >> 4);
+ s[27] = (uint8_t) (h8 >> 12);
+ s[28] = (uint8_t)((h8 >> 20) | ((uint32_t)(h9) << 6));
+ s[29] = (uint8_t) (h9 >> 2);
+ s[30] = (uint8_t) (h9 >> 10);
+ s[31] = (uint8_t) (h9 >> 18);
}
/* h = f */
-static void fe_copy(fe h, const fe f) {
- memmove(h, f, sizeof(int32_t) * 10);
+static void fe_copy(fe h, const fe f)
+{
+ memmove(h, f, sizeof(int32_t) * 10);
}
/* h = 0 */
-static void fe_0(fe h) { memset(h, 0, sizeof(int32_t) * 10); }
+static void fe_0(fe h)
+{
+ memset(h, 0, sizeof(int32_t) * 10);
+}
/* h = 1 */
-static void fe_1(fe h) {
- memset(h, 0, sizeof(int32_t) * 10);
- h[0] = 1;
+static void fe_1(fe h)
+{
+ memset(h, 0, sizeof(int32_t) * 10);
+ h[0] = 1;
}
-/* h = f + g
+/*
+ * h = f + g
+ *
* Can overlap h with f or g.
*
* Preconditions:
@@ -951,15 +969,20 @@ static void fe_1(fe h) {
* |g| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc.
*
* Postconditions:
- * |h| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc. */
-static void fe_add(fe h, const fe f, const fe g) {
- unsigned i;
- for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
- h[i] = f[i] + g[i];
- }
+ * |h| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc.
+ */
+static void fe_add(fe h, const fe f, const fe g)
+{
+ unsigned i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
+ h[i] = f[i] + g[i];
+ }
}
-/* h = f - g
+/*
+ * h = f - g
+ *
* Can overlap h with f or g.
*
* Preconditions:
@@ -967,15 +990,20 @@ static void fe_add(fe h, const fe f, const fe g) {
* |g| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc.
*
* Postconditions:
- * |h| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc. */
-static void fe_sub(fe h, const fe f, const fe g) {
- unsigned i;
- for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
- h[i] = f[i] - g[i];
- }
+ * |h| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc.
+ */
+static void fe_sub(fe h, const fe f, const fe g)
+{
+ unsigned i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
+ h[i] = f[i] - g[i];
+ }
}
-/* h = f * g
+/*
+ * h = f * g
+ *
* Can overlap h with f or g.
*
* Preconditions:
@@ -1001,224 +1029,228 @@ static void fe_sub(fe h, const fe f, const fe g) {
* 10 of them are 2-way parallelizable and vectorizable.
* Can get away with 11 carries, but then data flow is much deeper.
*
- * With tighter constraints on inputs can squeeze carries into int32. */
-static void fe_mul(fe h, const fe f, const fe g) {
- int32_t f0 = f[0];
- int32_t f1 = f[1];
- int32_t f2 = f[2];
- int32_t f3 = f[3];
- int32_t f4 = f[4];
- int32_t f5 = f[5];
- int32_t f6 = f[6];
- int32_t f7 = f[7];
- int32_t f8 = f[8];
- int32_t f9 = f[9];
- int32_t g0 = g[0];
- int32_t g1 = g[1];
- int32_t g2 = g[2];
- int32_t g3 = g[3];
- int32_t g4 = g[4];
- int32_t g5 = g[5];
- int32_t g6 = g[6];
- int32_t g7 = g[7];
- int32_t g8 = g[8];
- int32_t g9 = g[9];
- int32_t g1_19 = 19 * g1; /* 1.959375*2^29 */
- int32_t g2_19 = 19 * g2; /* 1.959375*2^30; still ok */
- int32_t g3_19 = 19 * g3;
- int32_t g4_19 = 19 * g4;
- int32_t g5_19 = 19 * g5;
- int32_t g6_19 = 19 * g6;
- int32_t g7_19 = 19 * g7;
- int32_t g8_19 = 19 * g8;
- int32_t g9_19 = 19 * g9;
- int32_t f1_2 = 2 * f1;
- int32_t f3_2 = 2 * f3;
- int32_t f5_2 = 2 * f5;
- int32_t f7_2 = 2 * f7;
- int32_t f9_2 = 2 * f9;
- int64_t f0g0 = f0 * (int64_t) g0;
- int64_t f0g1 = f0 * (int64_t) g1;
- int64_t f0g2 = f0 * (int64_t) g2;
- int64_t f0g3 = f0 * (int64_t) g3;
- int64_t f0g4 = f0 * (int64_t) g4;
- int64_t f0g5 = f0 * (int64_t) g5;
- int64_t f0g6 = f0 * (int64_t) g6;
- int64_t f0g7 = f0 * (int64_t) g7;
- int64_t f0g8 = f0 * (int64_t) g8;
- int64_t f0g9 = f0 * (int64_t) g9;
- int64_t f1g0 = f1 * (int64_t) g0;
- int64_t f1g1_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) g1;
- int64_t f1g2 = f1 * (int64_t) g2;
- int64_t f1g3_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) g3;
- int64_t f1g4 = f1 * (int64_t) g4;
- int64_t f1g5_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) g5;
- int64_t f1g6 = f1 * (int64_t) g6;
- int64_t f1g7_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) g7;
- int64_t f1g8 = f1 * (int64_t) g8;
- int64_t f1g9_38 = f1_2 * (int64_t) g9_19;
- int64_t f2g0 = f2 * (int64_t) g0;
- int64_t f2g1 = f2 * (int64_t) g1;
- int64_t f2g2 = f2 * (int64_t) g2;
- int64_t f2g3 = f2 * (int64_t) g3;
- int64_t f2g4 = f2 * (int64_t) g4;
- int64_t f2g5 = f2 * (int64_t) g5;
- int64_t f2g6 = f2 * (int64_t) g6;
- int64_t f2g7 = f2 * (int64_t) g7;
- int64_t f2g8_19 = f2 * (int64_t) g8_19;
- int64_t f2g9_19 = f2 * (int64_t) g9_19;
- int64_t f3g0 = f3 * (int64_t) g0;
- int64_t f3g1_2 = f3_2 * (int64_t) g1;
- int64_t f3g2 = f3 * (int64_t) g2;
- int64_t f3g3_2 = f3_2 * (int64_t) g3;
- int64_t f3g4 = f3 * (int64_t) g4;
- int64_t f3g5_2 = f3_2 * (int64_t) g5;
- int64_t f3g6 = f3 * (int64_t) g6;
- int64_t f3g7_38 = f3_2 * (int64_t) g7_19;
- int64_t f3g8_19 = f3 * (int64_t) g8_19;
- int64_t f3g9_38 = f3_2 * (int64_t) g9_19;
- int64_t f4g0 = f4 * (int64_t) g0;
- int64_t f4g1 = f4 * (int64_t) g1;
- int64_t f4g2 = f4 * (int64_t) g2;
- int64_t f4g3 = f4 * (int64_t) g3;
- int64_t f4g4 = f4 * (int64_t) g4;
- int64_t f4g5 = f4 * (int64_t) g5;
- int64_t f4g6_19 = f4 * (int64_t) g6_19;
- int64_t f4g7_19 = f4 * (int64_t) g7_19;
- int64_t f4g8_19 = f4 * (int64_t) g8_19;
- int64_t f4g9_19 = f4 * (int64_t) g9_19;
- int64_t f5g0 = f5 * (int64_t) g0;
- int64_t f5g1_2 = f5_2 * (int64_t) g1;
- int64_t f5g2 = f5 * (int64_t) g2;
- int64_t f5g3_2 = f5_2 * (int64_t) g3;
- int64_t f5g4 = f5 * (int64_t) g4;
- int64_t f5g5_38 = f5_2 * (int64_t) g5_19;
- int64_t f5g6_19 = f5 * (int64_t) g6_19;
- int64_t f5g7_38 = f5_2 * (int64_t) g7_19;
- int64_t f5g8_19 = f5 * (int64_t) g8_19;
- int64_t f5g9_38 = f5_2 * (int64_t) g9_19;
- int64_t f6g0 = f6 * (int64_t) g0;
- int64_t f6g1 = f6 * (int64_t) g1;
- int64_t f6g2 = f6 * (int64_t) g2;
- int64_t f6g3 = f6 * (int64_t) g3;
- int64_t f6g4_19 = f6 * (int64_t) g4_19;
- int64_t f6g5_19 = f6 * (int64_t) g5_19;
- int64_t f6g6_19 = f6 * (int64_t) g6_19;
- int64_t f6g7_19 = f6 * (int64_t) g7_19;
- int64_t f6g8_19 = f6 * (int64_t) g8_19;
- int64_t f6g9_19 = f6 * (int64_t) g9_19;
- int64_t f7g0 = f7 * (int64_t) g0;
- int64_t f7g1_2 = f7_2 * (int64_t) g1;
- int64_t f7g2 = f7 * (int64_t) g2;
- int64_t f7g3_38 = f7_2 * (int64_t) g3_19;
- int64_t f7g4_19 = f7 * (int64_t) g4_19;
- int64_t f7g5_38 = f7_2 * (int64_t) g5_19;
- int64_t f7g6_19 = f7 * (int64_t) g6_19;
- int64_t f7g7_38 = f7_2 * (int64_t) g7_19;
- int64_t f7g8_19 = f7 * (int64_t) g8_19;
- int64_t f7g9_38 = f7_2 * (int64_t) g9_19;
- int64_t f8g0 = f8 * (int64_t) g0;
- int64_t f8g1 = f8 * (int64_t) g1;
- int64_t f8g2_19 = f8 * (int64_t) g2_19;
- int64_t f8g3_19 = f8 * (int64_t) g3_19;
- int64_t f8g4_19 = f8 * (int64_t) g4_19;
- int64_t f8g5_19 = f8 * (int64_t) g5_19;
- int64_t f8g6_19 = f8 * (int64_t) g6_19;
- int64_t f8g7_19 = f8 * (int64_t) g7_19;
- int64_t f8g8_19 = f8 * (int64_t) g8_19;
- int64_t f8g9_19 = f8 * (int64_t) g9_19;
- int64_t f9g0 = f9 * (int64_t) g0;
- int64_t f9g1_38 = f9_2 * (int64_t) g1_19;
- int64_t f9g2_19 = f9 * (int64_t) g2_19;
- int64_t f9g3_38 = f9_2 * (int64_t) g3_19;
- int64_t f9g4_19 = f9 * (int64_t) g4_19;
- int64_t f9g5_38 = f9_2 * (int64_t) g5_19;
- int64_t f9g6_19 = f9 * (int64_t) g6_19;
- int64_t f9g7_38 = f9_2 * (int64_t) g7_19;
- int64_t f9g8_19 = f9 * (int64_t) g8_19;
- int64_t f9g9_38 = f9_2 * (int64_t) g9_19;
- int64_t h0 = f0g0+f1g9_38+f2g8_19+f3g7_38+f4g6_19+f5g5_38+f6g4_19+f7g3_38+f8g2_19+f9g1_38;
- int64_t h1 = f0g1+f1g0 +f2g9_19+f3g8_19+f4g7_19+f5g6_19+f6g5_19+f7g4_19+f8g3_19+f9g2_19;
- int64_t h2 = f0g2+f1g1_2 +f2g0 +f3g9_38+f4g8_19+f5g7_38+f6g6_19+f7g5_38+f8g4_19+f9g3_38;
- int64_t h3 = f0g3+f1g2 +f2g1 +f3g0 +f4g9_19+f5g8_19+f6g7_19+f7g6_19+f8g5_19+f9g4_19;
- int64_t h4 = f0g4+f1g3_2 +f2g2 +f3g1_2 +f4g0 +f5g9_38+f6g8_19+f7g7_38+f8g6_19+f9g5_38;
- int64_t h5 = f0g5+f1g4 +f2g3 +f3g2 +f4g1 +f5g0 +f6g9_19+f7g8_19+f8g7_19+f9g6_19;
- int64_t h6 = f0g6+f1g5_2 +f2g4 +f3g3_2 +f4g2 +f5g1_2 +f6g0 +f7g9_38+f8g8_19+f9g7_38;
- int64_t h7 = f0g7+f1g6 +f2g5 +f3g4 +f4g3 +f5g2 +f6g1 +f7g0 +f8g9_19+f9g8_19;
- int64_t h8 = f0g8+f1g7_2 +f2g6 +f3g5_2 +f4g4 +f5g3_2 +f6g2 +f7g1_2 +f8g0 +f9g9_38;
- int64_t h9 = f0g9+f1g8 +f2g7 +f3g6 +f4g5 +f5g4 +f6g3 +f7g2 +f8g1 +f9g0 ;
- int64_t carry0;
- int64_t carry1;
- int64_t carry2;
- int64_t carry3;
- int64_t carry4;
- int64_t carry5;
- int64_t carry6;
- int64_t carry7;
- int64_t carry8;
- int64_t carry9;
-
- /* |h0| <= (1.65*1.65*2^52*(1+19+19+19+19)+1.65*1.65*2^50*(38+38+38+38+38))
- * i.e. |h0| <= 1.4*2^60; narrower ranges for h2, h4, h6, h8
- * |h1| <= (1.65*1.65*2^51*(1+1+19+19+19+19+19+19+19+19))
- * i.e. |h1| <= 1.7*2^59; narrower ranges for h3, h5, h7, h9 */
-
- carry0 = h0 + (1 << 25); h1 += carry0 >> 26; h0 -= carry0 & kTop38Bits;
- carry4 = h4 + (1 << 25); h5 += carry4 >> 26; h4 -= carry4 & kTop38Bits;
- /* |h0| <= 2^25 */
- /* |h4| <= 2^25 */
- /* |h1| <= 1.71*2^59 */
- /* |h5| <= 1.71*2^59 */
-
- carry1 = h1 + (1 << 24); h2 += carry1 >> 25; h1 -= carry1 & kTop39Bits;
- carry5 = h5 + (1 << 24); h6 += carry5 >> 25; h5 -= carry5 & kTop39Bits;
- /* |h1| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 */
- /* |h5| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 */
- /* |h2| <= 1.41*2^60 */
- /* |h6| <= 1.41*2^60 */
-
- carry2 = h2 + (1 << 25); h3 += carry2 >> 26; h2 -= carry2 & kTop38Bits;
- carry6 = h6 + (1 << 25); h7 += carry6 >> 26; h6 -= carry6 & kTop38Bits;
- /* |h2| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged */
- /* |h6| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged */
- /* |h3| <= 1.71*2^59 */
- /* |h7| <= 1.71*2^59 */
-
- carry3 = h3 + (1 << 24); h4 += carry3 >> 25; h3 -= carry3 & kTop39Bits;
- carry7 = h7 + (1 << 24); h8 += carry7 >> 25; h7 -= carry7 & kTop39Bits;
- /* |h3| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 unchanged */
- /* |h7| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 unchanged */
- /* |h4| <= 1.72*2^34 */
- /* |h8| <= 1.41*2^60 */
-
- carry4 = h4 + (1 << 25); h5 += carry4 >> 26; h4 -= carry4 & kTop38Bits;
- carry8 = h8 + (1 << 25); h9 += carry8 >> 26; h8 -= carry8 & kTop38Bits;
- /* |h4| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged */
- /* |h8| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged */
- /* |h5| <= 1.01*2^24 */
- /* |h9| <= 1.71*2^59 */
-
- carry9 = h9 + (1 << 24); h0 += (carry9 >> 25) * 19; h9 -= carry9 & kTop39Bits;
- /* |h9| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 unchanged */
- /* |h0| <= 1.1*2^39 */
-
- carry0 = h0 + (1 << 25); h1 += carry0 >> 26; h0 -= carry0 & kTop38Bits;
- /* |h0| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged */
- /* |h1| <= 1.01*2^24 */
-
- h[0] = (int32_t)h0;
- h[1] = (int32_t)h1;
- h[2] = (int32_t)h2;
- h[3] = (int32_t)h3;
- h[4] = (int32_t)h4;
- h[5] = (int32_t)h5;
- h[6] = (int32_t)h6;
- h[7] = (int32_t)h7;
- h[8] = (int32_t)h8;
- h[9] = (int32_t)h9;
+ * With tighter constraints on inputs can squeeze carries into int32.
+ */
+static void fe_mul(fe h, const fe f, const fe g)
+{
+ int32_t f0 = f[0];
+ int32_t f1 = f[1];
+ int32_t f2 = f[2];
+ int32_t f3 = f[3];
+ int32_t f4 = f[4];
+ int32_t f5 = f[5];
+ int32_t f6 = f[6];
+ int32_t f7 = f[7];
+ int32_t f8 = f[8];
+ int32_t f9 = f[9];
+ int32_t g0 = g[0];
+ int32_t g1 = g[1];
+ int32_t g2 = g[2];
+ int32_t g3 = g[3];
+ int32_t g4 = g[4];
+ int32_t g5 = g[5];
+ int32_t g6 = g[6];
+ int32_t g7 = g[7];
+ int32_t g8 = g[8];
+ int32_t g9 = g[9];
+ int32_t g1_19 = 19 * g1; /* 1.959375*2^29 */
+ int32_t g2_19 = 19 * g2; /* 1.959375*2^30; still ok */
+ int32_t g3_19 = 19 * g3;
+ int32_t g4_19 = 19 * g4;
+ int32_t g5_19 = 19 * g5;
+ int32_t g6_19 = 19 * g6;
+ int32_t g7_19 = 19 * g7;
+ int32_t g8_19 = 19 * g8;
+ int32_t g9_19 = 19 * g9;
+ int32_t f1_2 = 2 * f1;
+ int32_t f3_2 = 2 * f3;
+ int32_t f5_2 = 2 * f5;
+ int32_t f7_2 = 2 * f7;
+ int32_t f9_2 = 2 * f9;
+ int64_t f0g0 = f0 * (int64_t) g0;
+ int64_t f0g1 = f0 * (int64_t) g1;
+ int64_t f0g2 = f0 * (int64_t) g2;
+ int64_t f0g3 = f0 * (int64_t) g3;
+ int64_t f0g4 = f0 * (int64_t) g4;
+ int64_t f0g5 = f0 * (int64_t) g5;
+ int64_t f0g6 = f0 * (int64_t) g6;
+ int64_t f0g7 = f0 * (int64_t) g7;
+ int64_t f0g8 = f0 * (int64_t) g8;
+ int64_t f0g9 = f0 * (int64_t) g9;
+ int64_t f1g0 = f1 * (int64_t) g0;
+ int64_t f1g1_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) g1;
+ int64_t f1g2 = f1 * (int64_t) g2;
+ int64_t f1g3_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) g3;
+ int64_t f1g4 = f1 * (int64_t) g4;
+ int64_t f1g5_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) g5;
+ int64_t f1g6 = f1 * (int64_t) g6;
+ int64_t f1g7_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) g7;
+ int64_t f1g8 = f1 * (int64_t) g8;
+ int64_t f1g9_38 = f1_2 * (int64_t) g9_19;
+ int64_t f2g0 = f2 * (int64_t) g0;
+ int64_t f2g1 = f2 * (int64_t) g1;
+ int64_t f2g2 = f2 * (int64_t) g2;
+ int64_t f2g3 = f2 * (int64_t) g3;
+ int64_t f2g4 = f2 * (int64_t) g4;
+ int64_t f2g5 = f2 * (int64_t) g5;
+ int64_t f2g6 = f2 * (int64_t) g6;
+ int64_t f2g7 = f2 * (int64_t) g7;
+ int64_t f2g8_19 = f2 * (int64_t) g8_19;
+ int64_t f2g9_19 = f2 * (int64_t) g9_19;
+ int64_t f3g0 = f3 * (int64_t) g0;
+ int64_t f3g1_2 = f3_2 * (int64_t) g1;
+ int64_t f3g2 = f3 * (int64_t) g2;
+ int64_t f3g3_2 = f3_2 * (int64_t) g3;
+ int64_t f3g4 = f3 * (int64_t) g4;
+ int64_t f3g5_2 = f3_2 * (int64_t) g5;
+ int64_t f3g6 = f3 * (int64_t) g6;
+ int64_t f3g7_38 = f3_2 * (int64_t) g7_19;
+ int64_t f3g8_19 = f3 * (int64_t) g8_19;
+ int64_t f3g9_38 = f3_2 * (int64_t) g9_19;
+ int64_t f4g0 = f4 * (int64_t) g0;
+ int64_t f4g1 = f4 * (int64_t) g1;
+ int64_t f4g2 = f4 * (int64_t) g2;
+ int64_t f4g3 = f4 * (int64_t) g3;
+ int64_t f4g4 = f4 * (int64_t) g4;
+ int64_t f4g5 = f4 * (int64_t) g5;
+ int64_t f4g6_19 = f4 * (int64_t) g6_19;
+ int64_t f4g7_19 = f4 * (int64_t) g7_19;
+ int64_t f4g8_19 = f4 * (int64_t) g8_19;
+ int64_t f4g9_19 = f4 * (int64_t) g9_19;
+ int64_t f5g0 = f5 * (int64_t) g0;
+ int64_t f5g1_2 = f5_2 * (int64_t) g1;
+ int64_t f5g2 = f5 * (int64_t) g2;
+ int64_t f5g3_2 = f5_2 * (int64_t) g3;
+ int64_t f5g4 = f5 * (int64_t) g4;
+ int64_t f5g5_38 = f5_2 * (int64_t) g5_19;
+ int64_t f5g6_19 = f5 * (int64_t) g6_19;
+ int64_t f5g7_38 = f5_2 * (int64_t) g7_19;
+ int64_t f5g8_19 = f5 * (int64_t) g8_19;
+ int64_t f5g9_38 = f5_2 * (int64_t) g9_19;
+ int64_t f6g0 = f6 * (int64_t) g0;
+ int64_t f6g1 = f6 * (int64_t) g1;
+ int64_t f6g2 = f6 * (int64_t) g2;
+ int64_t f6g3 = f6 * (int64_t) g3;
+ int64_t f6g4_19 = f6 * (int64_t) g4_19;
+ int64_t f6g5_19 = f6 * (int64_t) g5_19;
+ int64_t f6g6_19 = f6 * (int64_t) g6_19;
+ int64_t f6g7_19 = f6 * (int64_t) g7_19;
+ int64_t f6g8_19 = f6 * (int64_t) g8_19;
+ int64_t f6g9_19 = f6 * (int64_t) g9_19;
+ int64_t f7g0 = f7 * (int64_t) g0;
+ int64_t f7g1_2 = f7_2 * (int64_t) g1;
+ int64_t f7g2 = f7 * (int64_t) g2;
+ int64_t f7g3_38 = f7_2 * (int64_t) g3_19;
+ int64_t f7g4_19 = f7 * (int64_t) g4_19;
+ int64_t f7g5_38 = f7_2 * (int64_t) g5_19;
+ int64_t f7g6_19 = f7 * (int64_t) g6_19;
+ int64_t f7g7_38 = f7_2 * (int64_t) g7_19;
+ int64_t f7g8_19 = f7 * (int64_t) g8_19;
+ int64_t f7g9_38 = f7_2 * (int64_t) g9_19;
+ int64_t f8g0 = f8 * (int64_t) g0;
+ int64_t f8g1 = f8 * (int64_t) g1;
+ int64_t f8g2_19 = f8 * (int64_t) g2_19;
+ int64_t f8g3_19 = f8 * (int64_t) g3_19;
+ int64_t f8g4_19 = f8 * (int64_t) g4_19;
+ int64_t f8g5_19 = f8 * (int64_t) g5_19;
+ int64_t f8g6_19 = f8 * (int64_t) g6_19;
+ int64_t f8g7_19 = f8 * (int64_t) g7_19;
+ int64_t f8g8_19 = f8 * (int64_t) g8_19;
+ int64_t f8g9_19 = f8 * (int64_t) g9_19;
+ int64_t f9g0 = f9 * (int64_t) g0;
+ int64_t f9g1_38 = f9_2 * (int64_t) g1_19;
+ int64_t f9g2_19 = f9 * (int64_t) g2_19;
+ int64_t f9g3_38 = f9_2 * (int64_t) g3_19;
+ int64_t f9g4_19 = f9 * (int64_t) g4_19;
+ int64_t f9g5_38 = f9_2 * (int64_t) g5_19;
+ int64_t f9g6_19 = f9 * (int64_t) g6_19;
+ int64_t f9g7_38 = f9_2 * (int64_t) g7_19;
+ int64_t f9g8_19 = f9 * (int64_t) g8_19;
+ int64_t f9g9_38 = f9_2 * (int64_t) g9_19;
+ int64_t h0 = f0g0 + f1g9_38 + f2g8_19 + f3g7_38 + f4g6_19 + f5g5_38 + f6g4_19 + f7g3_38 + f8g2_19 + f9g1_38;
+ int64_t h1 = f0g1 + f1g0 + f2g9_19 + f3g8_19 + f4g7_19 + f5g6_19 + f6g5_19 + f7g4_19 + f8g3_19 + f9g2_19;
+ int64_t h2 = f0g2 + f1g1_2 + f2g0 + f3g9_38 + f4g8_19 + f5g7_38 + f6g6_19 + f7g5_38 + f8g4_19 + f9g3_38;
+ int64_t h3 = f0g3 + f1g2 + f2g1 + f3g0 + f4g9_19 + f5g8_19 + f6g7_19 + f7g6_19 + f8g5_19 + f9g4_19;
+ int64_t h4 = f0g4 + f1g3_2 + f2g2 + f3g1_2 + f4g0 + f5g9_38 + f6g8_19 + f7g7_38 + f8g6_19 + f9g5_38;
+ int64_t h5 = f0g5 + f1g4 + f2g3 + f3g2 + f4g1 + f5g0 + f6g9_19 + f7g8_19 + f8g7_19 + f9g6_19;
+ int64_t h6 = f0g6 + f1g5_2 + f2g4 + f3g3_2 + f4g2 + f5g1_2 + f6g0 + f7g9_38 + f8g8_19 + f9g7_38;
+ int64_t h7 = f0g7 + f1g6 + f2g5 + f3g4 + f4g3 + f5g2 + f6g1 + f7g0 + f8g9_19 + f9g8_19;
+ int64_t h8 = f0g8 + f1g7_2 + f2g6 + f3g5_2 + f4g4 + f5g3_2 + f6g2 + f7g1_2 + f8g0 + f9g9_38;
+ int64_t h9 = f0g9 + f1g8 + f2g7 + f3g6 + f4g5 + f5g4 + f6g3 + f7g2 + f8g1 + f9g0 ;
+ int64_t carry0;
+ int64_t carry1;
+ int64_t carry2;
+ int64_t carry3;
+ int64_t carry4;
+ int64_t carry5;
+ int64_t carry6;
+ int64_t carry7;
+ int64_t carry8;
+ int64_t carry9;
+
+ /* |h0| <= (1.65*1.65*2^52*(1+19+19+19+19)+1.65*1.65*2^50*(38+38+38+38+38))
+ * i.e. |h0| <= 1.4*2^60; narrower ranges for h2, h4, h6, h8
+ * |h1| <= (1.65*1.65*2^51*(1+1+19+19+19+19+19+19+19+19))
+ * i.e. |h1| <= 1.7*2^59; narrower ranges for h3, h5, h7, h9 */
+
+ carry0 = h0 + (1 << 25); h1 += carry0 >> 26; h0 -= carry0 & kTop38Bits;
+ carry4 = h4 + (1 << 25); h5 += carry4 >> 26; h4 -= carry4 & kTop38Bits;
+ /* |h0| <= 2^25 */
+ /* |h4| <= 2^25 */
+ /* |h1| <= 1.71*2^59 */
+ /* |h5| <= 1.71*2^59 */
+
+ carry1 = h1 + (1 << 24); h2 += carry1 >> 25; h1 -= carry1 & kTop39Bits;
+ carry5 = h5 + (1 << 24); h6 += carry5 >> 25; h5 -= carry5 & kTop39Bits;
+ /* |h1| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 */
+ /* |h5| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 */
+ /* |h2| <= 1.41*2^60 */
+ /* |h6| <= 1.41*2^60 */
+
+ carry2 = h2 + (1 << 25); h3 += carry2 >> 26; h2 -= carry2 & kTop38Bits;
+ carry6 = h6 + (1 << 25); h7 += carry6 >> 26; h6 -= carry6 & kTop38Bits;
+ /* |h2| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged */
+ /* |h6| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged */
+ /* |h3| <= 1.71*2^59 */
+ /* |h7| <= 1.71*2^59 */
+
+ carry3 = h3 + (1 << 24); h4 += carry3 >> 25; h3 -= carry3 & kTop39Bits;
+ carry7 = h7 + (1 << 24); h8 += carry7 >> 25; h7 -= carry7 & kTop39Bits;
+ /* |h3| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 unchanged */
+ /* |h7| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 unchanged */
+ /* |h4| <= 1.72*2^34 */
+ /* |h8| <= 1.41*2^60 */
+
+ carry4 = h4 + (1 << 25); h5 += carry4 >> 26; h4 -= carry4 & kTop38Bits;
+ carry8 = h8 + (1 << 25); h9 += carry8 >> 26; h8 -= carry8 & kTop38Bits;
+ /* |h4| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged */
+ /* |h8| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged */
+ /* |h5| <= 1.01*2^24 */
+ /* |h9| <= 1.71*2^59 */
+
+ carry9 = h9 + (1 << 24); h0 += (carry9 >> 25) * 19; h9 -= carry9 & kTop39Bits;
+ /* |h9| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 unchanged */
+ /* |h0| <= 1.1*2^39 */
+
+ carry0 = h0 + (1 << 25); h1 += carry0 >> 26; h0 -= carry0 & kTop38Bits;
+ /* |h0| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged */
+ /* |h1| <= 1.01*2^24 */
+
+ h[0] = (int32_t)h0;
+ h[1] = (int32_t)h1;
+ h[2] = (int32_t)h2;
+ h[3] = (int32_t)h3;
+ h[4] = (int32_t)h4;
+ h[5] = (int32_t)h5;
+ h[6] = (int32_t)h6;
+ h[7] = (int32_t)h7;
+ h[8] = (int32_t)h8;
+ h[9] = (int32_t)h9;
}
-/* h = f * f
+/*
+ * h = f * f
+ *
* Can overlap h with f.
*
* Preconditions:
@@ -1227,286 +1259,307 @@ static void fe_mul(fe h, const fe f, const fe g) {
* Postconditions:
* |h| bounded by 1.01*2^25,1.01*2^24,1.01*2^25,1.01*2^24,etc.
*
- * See fe_mul.c for discussion of implementation strategy. */
-static void fe_sq(fe h, const fe f) {
- int32_t f0 = f[0];
- int32_t f1 = f[1];
- int32_t f2 = f[2];
- int32_t f3 = f[3];
- int32_t f4 = f[4];
- int32_t f5 = f[5];
- int32_t f6 = f[6];
- int32_t f7 = f[7];
- int32_t f8 = f[8];
- int32_t f9 = f[9];
- int32_t f0_2 = 2 * f0;
- int32_t f1_2 = 2 * f1;
- int32_t f2_2 = 2 * f2;
- int32_t f3_2 = 2 * f3;
- int32_t f4_2 = 2 * f4;
- int32_t f5_2 = 2 * f5;
- int32_t f6_2 = 2 * f6;
- int32_t f7_2 = 2 * f7;
- int32_t f5_38 = 38 * f5; /* 1.959375*2^30 */
- int32_t f6_19 = 19 * f6; /* 1.959375*2^30 */
- int32_t f7_38 = 38 * f7; /* 1.959375*2^30 */
- int32_t f8_19 = 19 * f8; /* 1.959375*2^30 */
- int32_t f9_38 = 38 * f9; /* 1.959375*2^30 */
- int64_t f0f0 = f0 * (int64_t) f0;
- int64_t f0f1_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f1;
- int64_t f0f2_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f2;
- int64_t f0f3_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f3;
- int64_t f0f4_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f4;
- int64_t f0f5_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f5;
- int64_t f0f6_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f6;
- int64_t f0f7_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f7;
- int64_t f0f8_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f8;
- int64_t f0f9_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f9;
- int64_t f1f1_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f1;
- int64_t f1f2_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f2;
- int64_t f1f3_4 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f3_2;
- int64_t f1f4_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f4;
- int64_t f1f5_4 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f5_2;
- int64_t f1f6_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f6;
- int64_t f1f7_4 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f7_2;
- int64_t f1f8_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f8;
- int64_t f1f9_76 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f9_38;
- int64_t f2f2 = f2 * (int64_t) f2;
- int64_t f2f3_2 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f3;
- int64_t f2f4_2 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f4;
- int64_t f2f5_2 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f5;
- int64_t f2f6_2 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f6;
- int64_t f2f7_2 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f7;
- int64_t f2f8_38 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f8_19;
- int64_t f2f9_38 = f2 * (int64_t) f9_38;
- int64_t f3f3_2 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f3;
- int64_t f3f4_2 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f4;
- int64_t f3f5_4 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f5_2;
- int64_t f3f6_2 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f6;
- int64_t f3f7_76 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f7_38;
- int64_t f3f8_38 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f8_19;
- int64_t f3f9_76 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f9_38;
- int64_t f4f4 = f4 * (int64_t) f4;
- int64_t f4f5_2 = f4_2 * (int64_t) f5;
- int64_t f4f6_38 = f4_2 * (int64_t) f6_19;
- int64_t f4f7_38 = f4 * (int64_t) f7_38;
- int64_t f4f8_38 = f4_2 * (int64_t) f8_19;
- int64_t f4f9_38 = f4 * (int64_t) f9_38;
- int64_t f5f5_38 = f5 * (int64_t) f5_38;
- int64_t f5f6_38 = f5_2 * (int64_t) f6_19;
- int64_t f5f7_76 = f5_2 * (int64_t) f7_38;
- int64_t f5f8_38 = f5_2 * (int64_t) f8_19;
- int64_t f5f9_76 = f5_2 * (int64_t) f9_38;
- int64_t f6f6_19 = f6 * (int64_t) f6_19;
- int64_t f6f7_38 = f6 * (int64_t) f7_38;
- int64_t f6f8_38 = f6_2 * (int64_t) f8_19;
- int64_t f6f9_38 = f6 * (int64_t) f9_38;
- int64_t f7f7_38 = f7 * (int64_t) f7_38;
- int64_t f7f8_38 = f7_2 * (int64_t) f8_19;
- int64_t f7f9_76 = f7_2 * (int64_t) f9_38;
- int64_t f8f8_19 = f8 * (int64_t) f8_19;
- int64_t f8f9_38 = f8 * (int64_t) f9_38;
- int64_t f9f9_38 = f9 * (int64_t) f9_38;
- int64_t h0 = f0f0 +f1f9_76+f2f8_38+f3f7_76+f4f6_38+f5f5_38;
- int64_t h1 = f0f1_2+f2f9_38+f3f8_38+f4f7_38+f5f6_38;
- int64_t h2 = f0f2_2+f1f1_2 +f3f9_76+f4f8_38+f5f7_76+f6f6_19;
- int64_t h3 = f0f3_2+f1f2_2 +f4f9_38+f5f8_38+f6f7_38;
- int64_t h4 = f0f4_2+f1f3_4 +f2f2 +f5f9_76+f6f8_38+f7f7_38;
- int64_t h5 = f0f5_2+f1f4_2 +f2f3_2 +f6f9_38+f7f8_38;
- int64_t h6 = f0f6_2+f1f5_4 +f2f4_2 +f3f3_2 +f7f9_76+f8f8_19;
- int64_t h7 = f0f7_2+f1f6_2 +f2f5_2 +f3f4_2 +f8f9_38;
- int64_t h8 = f0f8_2+f1f7_4 +f2f6_2 +f3f5_4 +f4f4 +f9f9_38;
- int64_t h9 = f0f9_2+f1f8_2 +f2f7_2 +f3f6_2 +f4f5_2;
- int64_t carry0;
- int64_t carry1;
- int64_t carry2;
- int64_t carry3;
- int64_t carry4;
- int64_t carry5;
- int64_t carry6;
- int64_t carry7;
- int64_t carry8;
- int64_t carry9;
-
- carry0 = h0 + (1 << 25); h1 += carry0 >> 26; h0 -= carry0 & kTop38Bits;
- carry4 = h4 + (1 << 25); h5 += carry4 >> 26; h4 -= carry4 & kTop38Bits;
-
- carry1 = h1 + (1 << 24); h2 += carry1 >> 25; h1 -= carry1 & kTop39Bits;
- carry5 = h5 + (1 << 24); h6 += carry5 >> 25; h5 -= carry5 & kTop39Bits;
-
- carry2 = h2 + (1 << 25); h3 += carry2 >> 26; h2 -= carry2 & kTop38Bits;
- carry6 = h6 + (1 << 25); h7 += carry6 >> 26; h6 -= carry6 & kTop38Bits;
-
- carry3 = h3 + (1 << 24); h4 += carry3 >> 25; h3 -= carry3 & kTop39Bits;
- carry7 = h7 + (1 << 24); h8 += carry7 >> 25; h7 -= carry7 & kTop39Bits;
-
- carry4 = h4 + (1 << 25); h5 += carry4 >> 26; h4 -= carry4 & kTop38Bits;
- carry8 = h8 + (1 << 25); h9 += carry8 >> 26; h8 -= carry8 & kTop38Bits;
-
- carry9 = h9 + (1 << 24); h0 += (carry9 >> 25) * 19; h9 -= carry9 & kTop39Bits;
-
- carry0 = h0 + (1 << 25); h1 += carry0 >> 26; h0 -= carry0 & kTop38Bits;
-
- h[0] = (int32_t)h0;
- h[1] = (int32_t)h1;
- h[2] = (int32_t)h2;
- h[3] = (int32_t)h3;
- h[4] = (int32_t)h4;
- h[5] = (int32_t)h5;
- h[6] = (int32_t)h6;
- h[7] = (int32_t)h7;
- h[8] = (int32_t)h8;
- h[9] = (int32_t)h9;
+ * See fe_mul.c for discussion of implementation strategy.
+ */
+static void fe_sq(fe h, const fe f)
+{
+ int32_t f0 = f[0];
+ int32_t f1 = f[1];
+ int32_t f2 = f[2];
+ int32_t f3 = f[3];
+ int32_t f4 = f[4];
+ int32_t f5 = f[5];
+ int32_t f6 = f[6];
+ int32_t f7 = f[7];
+ int32_t f8 = f[8];
+ int32_t f9 = f[9];
+ int32_t f0_2 = 2 * f0;
+ int32_t f1_2 = 2 * f1;
+ int32_t f2_2 = 2 * f2;
+ int32_t f3_2 = 2 * f3;
+ int32_t f4_2 = 2 * f4;
+ int32_t f5_2 = 2 * f5;
+ int32_t f6_2 = 2 * f6;
+ int32_t f7_2 = 2 * f7;
+ int32_t f5_38 = 38 * f5; /* 1.959375*2^30 */
+ int32_t f6_19 = 19 * f6; /* 1.959375*2^30 */
+ int32_t f7_38 = 38 * f7; /* 1.959375*2^30 */
+ int32_t f8_19 = 19 * f8; /* 1.959375*2^30 */
+ int32_t f9_38 = 38 * f9; /* 1.959375*2^30 */
+ int64_t f0f0 = f0 * (int64_t) f0;
+ int64_t f0f1_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f1;
+ int64_t f0f2_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f2;
+ int64_t f0f3_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f3;
+ int64_t f0f4_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f4;
+ int64_t f0f5_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f5;
+ int64_t f0f6_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f6;
+ int64_t f0f7_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f7;
+ int64_t f0f8_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f8;
+ int64_t f0f9_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f9;
+ int64_t f1f1_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f1;
+ int64_t f1f2_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f2;
+ int64_t f1f3_4 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f3_2;
+ int64_t f1f4_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f4;
+ int64_t f1f5_4 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f5_2;
+ int64_t f1f6_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f6;
+ int64_t f1f7_4 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f7_2;
+ int64_t f1f8_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f8;
+ int64_t f1f9_76 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f9_38;
+ int64_t f2f2 = f2 * (int64_t) f2;
+ int64_t f2f3_2 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f3;
+ int64_t f2f4_2 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f4;
+ int64_t f2f5_2 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f5;
+ int64_t f2f6_2 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f6;
+ int64_t f2f7_2 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f7;
+ int64_t f2f8_38 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f8_19;
+ int64_t f2f9_38 = f2 * (int64_t) f9_38;
+ int64_t f3f3_2 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f3;
+ int64_t f3f4_2 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f4;
+ int64_t f3f5_4 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f5_2;
+ int64_t f3f6_2 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f6;
+ int64_t f3f7_76 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f7_38;
+ int64_t f3f8_38 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f8_19;
+ int64_t f3f9_76 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f9_38;
+ int64_t f4f4 = f4 * (int64_t) f4;
+ int64_t f4f5_2 = f4_2 * (int64_t) f5;
+ int64_t f4f6_38 = f4_2 * (int64_t) f6_19;
+ int64_t f4f7_38 = f4 * (int64_t) f7_38;
+ int64_t f4f8_38 = f4_2 * (int64_t) f8_19;
+ int64_t f4f9_38 = f4 * (int64_t) f9_38;
+ int64_t f5f5_38 = f5 * (int64_t) f5_38;
+ int64_t f5f6_38 = f5_2 * (int64_t) f6_19;
+ int64_t f5f7_76 = f5_2 * (int64_t) f7_38;
+ int64_t f5f8_38 = f5_2 * (int64_t) f8_19;
+ int64_t f5f9_76 = f5_2 * (int64_t) f9_38;
+ int64_t f6f6_19 = f6 * (int64_t) f6_19;
+ int64_t f6f7_38 = f6 * (int64_t) f7_38;
+ int64_t f6f8_38 = f6_2 * (int64_t) f8_19;
+ int64_t f6f9_38 = f6 * (int64_t) f9_38;
+ int64_t f7f7_38 = f7 * (int64_t) f7_38;
+ int64_t f7f8_38 = f7_2 * (int64_t) f8_19;
+ int64_t f7f9_76 = f7_2 * (int64_t) f9_38;
+ int64_t f8f8_19 = f8 * (int64_t) f8_19;
+ int64_t f8f9_38 = f8 * (int64_t) f9_38;
+ int64_t f9f9_38 = f9 * (int64_t) f9_38;
+ int64_t h0 = f0f0 + f1f9_76 + f2f8_38 + f3f7_76 + f4f6_38 + f5f5_38;
+ int64_t h1 = f0f1_2 + f2f9_38 + f3f8_38 + f4f7_38 + f5f6_38;
+ int64_t h2 = f0f2_2 + f1f1_2 + f3f9_76 + f4f8_38 + f5f7_76 + f6f6_19;
+ int64_t h3 = f0f3_2 + f1f2_2 + f4f9_38 + f5f8_38 + f6f7_38;
+ int64_t h4 = f0f4_2 + f1f3_4 + f2f2 + f5f9_76 + f6f8_38 + f7f7_38;
+ int64_t h5 = f0f5_2 + f1f4_2 + f2f3_2 + f6f9_38 + f7f8_38;
+ int64_t h6 = f0f6_2 + f1f5_4 + f2f4_2 + f3f3_2 + f7f9_76 + f8f8_19;
+ int64_t h7 = f0f7_2 + f1f6_2 + f2f5_2 + f3f4_2 + f8f9_38;
+ int64_t h8 = f0f8_2 + f1f7_4 + f2f6_2 + f3f5_4 + f4f4 + f9f9_38;
+ int64_t h9 = f0f9_2 + f1f8_2 + f2f7_2 + f3f6_2 + f4f5_2;
+ int64_t carry0;
+ int64_t carry1;
+ int64_t carry2;
+ int64_t carry3;
+ int64_t carry4;
+ int64_t carry5;
+ int64_t carry6;
+ int64_t carry7;
+ int64_t carry8;
+ int64_t carry9;
+
+ carry0 = h0 + (1 << 25); h1 += carry0 >> 26; h0 -= carry0 & kTop38Bits;
+ carry4 = h4 + (1 << 25); h5 += carry4 >> 26; h4 -= carry4 & kTop38Bits;
+
+ carry1 = h1 + (1 << 24); h2 += carry1 >> 25; h1 -= carry1 & kTop39Bits;
+ carry5 = h5 + (1 << 24); h6 += carry5 >> 25; h5 -= carry5 & kTop39Bits;
+
+ carry2 = h2 + (1 << 25); h3 += carry2 >> 26; h2 -= carry2 & kTop38Bits;
+ carry6 = h6 + (1 << 25); h7 += carry6 >> 26; h6 -= carry6 & kTop38Bits;
+
+ carry3 = h3 + (1 << 24); h4 += carry3 >> 25; h3 -= carry3 & kTop39Bits;
+ carry7 = h7 + (1 << 24); h8 += carry7 >> 25; h7 -= carry7 & kTop39Bits;
+
+ carry4 = h4 + (1 << 25); h5 += carry4 >> 26; h4 -= carry4 & kTop38Bits;
+ carry8 = h8 + (1 << 25); h9 += carry8 >> 26; h8 -= carry8 & kTop38Bits;
+
+ carry9 = h9 + (1 << 24); h0 += (carry9 >> 25) * 19; h9 -= carry9 & kTop39Bits;
+
+ carry0 = h0 + (1 << 25); h1 += carry0 >> 26; h0 -= carry0 & kTop38Bits;
+
+ h[0] = (int32_t)h0;
+ h[1] = (int32_t)h1;
+ h[2] = (int32_t)h2;
+ h[3] = (int32_t)h3;
+ h[4] = (int32_t)h4;
+ h[5] = (int32_t)h5;
+ h[6] = (int32_t)h6;
+ h[7] = (int32_t)h7;
+ h[8] = (int32_t)h8;
+ h[9] = (int32_t)h9;
}
-static void fe_invert(fe out, const fe z) {
- fe t0;
- fe t1;
- fe t2;
- fe t3;
- int i;
+static void fe_invert(fe out, const fe z)
+{
+ fe t0;
+ fe t1;
+ fe t2;
+ fe t3;
+ int i;
- /*
- * Compute z ** -1 = z ** (2 ** 255 - 19 - 2) with the exponent as
- * 2 ** 255 - 21 = (2 ** 5) * (2 ** 250 - 1) + 11.
- */
+ /*
+ * Compute z ** -1 = z ** (2 ** 255 - 19 - 2) with the exponent as
+ * 2 ** 255 - 21 = (2 ** 5) * (2 ** 250 - 1) + 11.
+ */
- /* t0 = z ** 2 */
- fe_sq(t0, z);
+ /* t0 = z ** 2 */
+ fe_sq(t0, z);
- /* t1 = t0 ** (2 ** 2) = z ** 8 */
- fe_sq(t1, t0);
- fe_sq(t1, t1);
+ /* t1 = t0 ** (2 ** 2) = z ** 8 */
+ fe_sq(t1, t0);
+ fe_sq(t1, t1);
- /* t1 = z * t1 = z ** 9 */
- fe_mul(t1, z, t1);
- /* t0 = t0 * t1 = z ** 11 -- stash t0 away for the end. */
- fe_mul(t0, t0, t1);
+ /* t1 = z * t1 = z ** 9 */
+ fe_mul(t1, z, t1);
+ /* t0 = t0 * t1 = z ** 11 -- stash t0 away for the end. */
+ fe_mul(t0, t0, t1);
- /* t2 = t0 ** 2 = z ** 22 */
- fe_sq(t2, t0);
+ /* t2 = t0 ** 2 = z ** 22 */
+ fe_sq(t2, t0);
- /* t1 = t1 * t2 = z ** (2 ** 5 - 1) */
- fe_mul(t1, t1, t2);
+ /* t1 = t1 * t2 = z ** (2 ** 5 - 1) */
+ fe_mul(t1, t1, t2);
- /* t2 = t1 ** (2 ** 5) = z ** ((2 ** 5) * (2 ** 5 - 1)) */
- fe_sq(t2, t1);
- for (i = 1; i < 5; ++i) {
- fe_sq(t2, t2);
- }
+ /* t2 = t1 ** (2 ** 5) = z ** ((2 ** 5) * (2 ** 5 - 1)) */
+ fe_sq(t2, t1);
+ for (i = 1; i < 5; ++i) {
+ fe_sq(t2, t2);
+ }
- /* t1 = t1 * t2 = z ** ((2 ** 5 + 1) * (2 ** 5 - 1)) = z ** (2 ** 10 - 1) */
- fe_mul(t1, t2, t1);
+ /* t1 = t1 * t2 = z ** ((2 ** 5 + 1) * (2 ** 5 - 1)) = z ** (2 ** 10 - 1) */
+ fe_mul(t1, t2, t1);
- /* Continuing similarly... */
+ /* Continuing similarly... */
- /* t2 = z ** (2 ** 20 - 1) */
- fe_sq(t2, t1);
- for (i = 1; i < 10; ++i) {
- fe_sq(t2, t2);
- }
- fe_mul(t2, t2, t1);
-
- /* t2 = z ** (2 ** 40 - 1) */
- fe_sq(t3, t2);
- for (i = 1; i < 20; ++i) {
- fe_sq(t3, t3);
- }
- fe_mul(t2, t3, t2);
-
- /* t2 = z ** (2 ** 10) * (2 ** 40 - 1) */
- for (i = 0; i < 10; ++i) {
- fe_sq(t2, t2);
- }
- /* t1 = z ** (2 ** 50 - 1) */
- fe_mul(t1, t2, t1);
+ /* t2 = z ** (2 ** 20 - 1) */
+ fe_sq(t2, t1);
+ for (i = 1; i < 10; ++i) {
+ fe_sq(t2, t2);
+ }
+ fe_mul(t2, t2, t1);
- /* t2 = z ** (2 ** 100 - 1) */
- fe_sq(t2, t1);
- for (i = 1; i < 50; ++i) {
- fe_sq(t2, t2);
- }
- fe_mul(t2, t2, t1);
-
- /* t2 = z ** (2 ** 200 - 1) */
- fe_sq(t3, t2);
- for (i = 1; i < 100; ++i) {
- fe_sq(t3, t3);
- }
- fe_mul(t2, t3, t2);
-
- /* t2 = z ** ((2 ** 50) * (2 ** 200 - 1) */
- fe_sq(t2, t2);
- for (i = 1; i < 50; ++i) {
+ /* t2 = z ** (2 ** 40 - 1) */
+ fe_sq(t3, t2);
+ for (i = 1; i < 20; ++i) {
+ fe_sq(t3, t3);
+ }
+ fe_mul(t2, t3, t2);
+
+ /* t2 = z ** (2 ** 10) * (2 ** 40 - 1) */
+ for (i = 0; i < 10; ++i) {
+ fe_sq(t2, t2);
+ }
+ /* t1 = z ** (2 ** 50 - 1) */
+ fe_mul(t1, t2, t1);
+
+ /* t2 = z ** (2 ** 100 - 1) */
+ fe_sq(t2, t1);
+ for (i = 1; i < 50; ++i) {
+ fe_sq(t2, t2);
+ }
+ fe_mul(t2, t2, t1);
+
+ /* t2 = z ** (2 ** 200 - 1) */
+ fe_sq(t3, t2);
+ for (i = 1; i < 100; ++i) {
+ fe_sq(t3, t3);
+ }
+ fe_mul(t2, t3, t2);
+
+ /* t2 = z ** ((2 ** 50) * (2 ** 200 - 1) */
fe_sq(t2, t2);
- }
+ for (i = 1; i < 50; ++i) {
+ fe_sq(t2, t2);
+ }
- /* t1 = z ** (2 ** 250 - 1) */
- fe_mul(t1, t2, t1);
+ /* t1 = z ** (2 ** 250 - 1) */
+ fe_mul(t1, t2, t1);
- /* t1 = z ** ((2 ** 5) * (2 ** 250 - 1)) */
- fe_sq(t1, t1);
- for (i = 1; i < 5; ++i) {
+ /* t1 = z ** ((2 ** 5) * (2 ** 250 - 1)) */
fe_sq(t1, t1);
- }
+ for (i = 1; i < 5; ++i) {
+ fe_sq(t1, t1);
+ }
- /* Recall t0 = z ** 11; out = z ** (2 ** 255 - 21) */
- fe_mul(out, t1, t0);
+ /* Recall t0 = z ** 11; out = z ** (2 ** 255 - 21) */
+ fe_mul(out, t1, t0);
}
-/* h = -f
+/*
+ * h = -f
*
* Preconditions:
* |f| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc.
*
* Postconditions:
- * |h| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc. */
-static void fe_neg(fe h, const fe f) {
- unsigned i;
- for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
- h[i] = -f[i];
- }
+ * |h| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc.
+ */
+static void fe_neg(fe h, const fe f)
+{
+ unsigned i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
+ h[i] = -f[i];
+ }
}
-/* Replace (f,g) with (g,g) if b == 1;
+/*
+ * Replace (f,g) with (g,g) if b == 1;
* replace (f,g) with (f,g) if b == 0.
*
- * Preconditions: b in {0,1}. */
-static void fe_cmov(fe f, const fe g, unsigned b) {
- size_t i;
- b = 0-b;
- for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
- int32_t x = f[i] ^ g[i];
- x &= b;
- f[i] ^= x;
- }
+ * Preconditions: b in {0,1}.
+ */
+static void fe_cmov(fe f, const fe g, unsigned b)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ b = 0-b;
+ for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
+ int32_t x = f[i] ^ g[i];
+ x &= b;
+ f[i] ^= x;
+ }
}
-/* return 0 if f == 0
+/*
+ * return 0 if f == 0
* return 1 if f != 0
*
* Preconditions:
- * |f| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc. */
-static int fe_isnonzero(const fe f) {
- uint8_t s[32];
- static const uint8_t zero[32] = {0};
- fe_tobytes(s, f);
+ * |f| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc.
+ */
+static int fe_isnonzero(const fe f)
+{
+ uint8_t s[32];
+ static const uint8_t zero[32] = {0};
- return CRYPTO_memcmp(s, zero, sizeof(zero)) != 0;
+ fe_tobytes(s, f);
+
+ return CRYPTO_memcmp(s, zero, sizeof(zero)) != 0;
}
-/* return 1 if f is in {1,3,5,...,q-2}
+/*
+ * return 1 if f is in {1,3,5,...,q-2}
* return 0 if f is in {0,2,4,...,q-1}
*
* Preconditions:
- * |f| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc. */
-static int fe_isnegative(const fe f) {
- uint8_t s[32];
- fe_tobytes(s, f);
- return s[0] & 1;
+ * |f| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc.
+ */
+static int fe_isnegative(const fe f)
+{
+ uint8_t s[32];
+
+ fe_tobytes(s, f);
+ return s[0] & 1;
}
-/* h = 2 * f * f
+/*
+ * h = 2 * f * f
+ *
* Can overlap h with f.
*
* Preconditions:
@@ -1515,208 +1568,212 @@ static int fe_isnegative(const fe f) {
* Postconditions:
* |h| bounded by 1.01*2^25,1.01*2^24,1.01*2^25,1.01*2^24,etc.
*
- * See fe_mul.c for discussion of implementation strategy. */
-static void fe_sq2(fe h, const fe f) {
- int32_t f0 = f[0];
- int32_t f1 = f[1];
- int32_t f2 = f[2];
- int32_t f3 = f[3];
- int32_t f4 = f[4];
- int32_t f5 = f[5];
- int32_t f6 = f[6];
- int32_t f7 = f[7];
- int32_t f8 = f[8];
- int32_t f9 = f[9];
- int32_t f0_2 = 2 * f0;
- int32_t f1_2 = 2 * f1;
- int32_t f2_2 = 2 * f2;
- int32_t f3_2 = 2 * f3;
- int32_t f4_2 = 2 * f4;
- int32_t f5_2 = 2 * f5;
- int32_t f6_2 = 2 * f6;
- int32_t f7_2 = 2 * f7;
- int32_t f5_38 = 38 * f5; /* 1.959375*2^30 */
- int32_t f6_19 = 19 * f6; /* 1.959375*2^30 */
- int32_t f7_38 = 38 * f7; /* 1.959375*2^30 */
- int32_t f8_19 = 19 * f8; /* 1.959375*2^30 */
- int32_t f9_38 = 38 * f9; /* 1.959375*2^30 */
- int64_t f0f0 = f0 * (int64_t) f0;
- int64_t f0f1_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f1;
- int64_t f0f2_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f2;
- int64_t f0f3_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f3;
- int64_t f0f4_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f4;
- int64_t f0f5_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f5;
- int64_t f0f6_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f6;
- int64_t f0f7_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f7;
- int64_t f0f8_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f8;
- int64_t f0f9_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f9;
- int64_t f1f1_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f1;
- int64_t f1f2_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f2;
- int64_t f1f3_4 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f3_2;
- int64_t f1f4_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f4;
- int64_t f1f5_4 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f5_2;
- int64_t f1f6_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f6;
- int64_t f1f7_4 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f7_2;
- int64_t f1f8_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f8;
- int64_t f1f9_76 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f9_38;
- int64_t f2f2 = f2 * (int64_t) f2;
- int64_t f2f3_2 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f3;
- int64_t f2f4_2 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f4;
- int64_t f2f5_2 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f5;
- int64_t f2f6_2 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f6;
- int64_t f2f7_2 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f7;
- int64_t f2f8_38 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f8_19;
- int64_t f2f9_38 = f2 * (int64_t) f9_38;
- int64_t f3f3_2 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f3;
- int64_t f3f4_2 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f4;
- int64_t f3f5_4 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f5_2;
- int64_t f3f6_2 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f6;
- int64_t f3f7_76 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f7_38;
- int64_t f3f8_38 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f8_19;
- int64_t f3f9_76 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f9_38;
- int64_t f4f4 = f4 * (int64_t) f4;
- int64_t f4f5_2 = f4_2 * (int64_t) f5;
- int64_t f4f6_38 = f4_2 * (int64_t) f6_19;
- int64_t f4f7_38 = f4 * (int64_t) f7_38;
- int64_t f4f8_38 = f4_2 * (int64_t) f8_19;
- int64_t f4f9_38 = f4 * (int64_t) f9_38;
- int64_t f5f5_38 = f5 * (int64_t) f5_38;
- int64_t f5f6_38 = f5_2 * (int64_t) f6_19;
- int64_t f5f7_76 = f5_2 * (int64_t) f7_38;
- int64_t f5f8_38 = f5_2 * (int64_t) f8_19;
- int64_t f5f9_76 = f5_2 * (int64_t) f9_38;
- int64_t f6f6_19 = f6 * (int64_t) f6_19;
- int64_t f6f7_38 = f6 * (int64_t) f7_38;
- int64_t f6f8_38 = f6_2 * (int64_t) f8_19;
- int64_t f6f9_38 = f6 * (int64_t) f9_38;
- int64_t f7f7_38 = f7 * (int64_t) f7_38;
- int64_t f7f8_38 = f7_2 * (int64_t) f8_19;
- int64_t f7f9_76 = f7_2 * (int64_t) f9_38;
- int64_t f8f8_19 = f8 * (int64_t) f8_19;
- int64_t f8f9_38 = f8 * (int64_t) f9_38;
- int64_t f9f9_38 = f9 * (int64_t) f9_38;
- int64_t h0 = f0f0 +f1f9_76+f2f8_38+f3f7_76+f4f6_38+f5f5_38;
- int64_t h1 = f0f1_2+f2f9_38+f3f8_38+f4f7_38+f5f6_38;
- int64_t h2 = f0f2_2+f1f1_2 +f3f9_76+f4f8_38+f5f7_76+f6f6_19;
- int64_t h3 = f0f3_2+f1f2_2 +f4f9_38+f5f8_38+f6f7_38;
- int64_t h4 = f0f4_2+f1f3_4 +f2f2 +f5f9_76+f6f8_38+f7f7_38;
- int64_t h5 = f0f5_2+f1f4_2 +f2f3_2 +f6f9_38+f7f8_38;
- int64_t h6 = f0f6_2+f1f5_4 +f2f4_2 +f3f3_2 +f7f9_76+f8f8_19;
- int64_t h7 = f0f7_2+f1f6_2 +f2f5_2 +f3f4_2 +f8f9_38;
- int64_t h8 = f0f8_2+f1f7_4 +f2f6_2 +f3f5_4 +f4f4 +f9f9_38;
- int64_t h9 = f0f9_2+f1f8_2 +f2f7_2 +f3f6_2 +f4f5_2;
- int64_t carry0;
- int64_t carry1;
- int64_t carry2;
- int64_t carry3;
- int64_t carry4;
- int64_t carry5;
- int64_t carry6;
- int64_t carry7;
- int64_t carry8;
- int64_t carry9;
-
- h0 += h0;
- h1 += h1;
- h2 += h2;
- h3 += h3;
- h4 += h4;
- h5 += h5;
- h6 += h6;
- h7 += h7;
- h8 += h8;
- h9 += h9;
-
- carry0 = h0 + (1 << 25); h1 += carry0 >> 26; h0 -= carry0 & kTop38Bits;
- carry4 = h4 + (1 << 25); h5 += carry4 >> 26; h4 -= carry4 & kTop38Bits;
-
- carry1 = h1 + (1 << 24); h2 += carry1 >> 25; h1 -= carry1 & kTop39Bits;
- carry5 = h5 + (1 << 24); h6 += carry5 >> 25; h5 -= carry5 & kTop39Bits;
-
- carry2 = h2 + (1 << 25); h3 += carry2 >> 26; h2 -= carry2 & kTop38Bits;
- carry6 = h6 + (1 << 25); h7 += carry6 >> 26; h6 -= carry6 & kTop38Bits;
-
- carry3 = h3 + (1 << 24); h4 += carry3 >> 25; h3 -= carry3 & kTop39Bits;
- carry7 = h7 + (1 << 24); h8 += carry7 >> 25; h7 -= carry7 & kTop39Bits;
-
- carry4 = h4 + (1 << 25); h5 += carry4 >> 26; h4 -= carry4 & kTop38Bits;
- carry8 = h8 + (1 << 25); h9 += carry8 >> 26; h8 -= carry8 & kTop38Bits;
-
- carry9 = h9 + (1 << 24); h0 += (carry9 >> 25) * 19; h9 -= carry9 & kTop39Bits;
-
- carry0 = h0 + (1 << 25); h1 += carry0 >> 26; h0 -= carry0 & kTop38Bits;
-
- h[0] = (int32_t)h0;
- h[1] = (int32_t)h1;
- h[2] = (int32_t)h2;
- h[3] = (int32_t)h3;
- h[4] = (int32_t)h4;
- h[5] = (int32_t)h5;
- h[6] = (int32_t)h6;
- h[7] = (int32_t)h7;
- h[8] = (int32_t)h8;
- h[9] = (int32_t)h9;
+ * See fe_mul.c for discussion of implementation strategy.
+ */
+static void fe_sq2(fe h, const fe f)
+{
+ int32_t f0 = f[0];
+ int32_t f1 = f[1];
+ int32_t f2 = f[2];
+ int32_t f3 = f[3];
+ int32_t f4 = f[4];
+ int32_t f5 = f[5];
+ int32_t f6 = f[6];
+ int32_t f7 = f[7];
+ int32_t f8 = f[8];
+ int32_t f9 = f[9];
+ int32_t f0_2 = 2 * f0;
+ int32_t f1_2 = 2 * f1;
+ int32_t f2_2 = 2 * f2;
+ int32_t f3_2 = 2 * f3;
+ int32_t f4_2 = 2 * f4;
+ int32_t f5_2 = 2 * f5;
+ int32_t f6_2 = 2 * f6;
+ int32_t f7_2 = 2 * f7;
+ int32_t f5_38 = 38 * f5; /* 1.959375*2^30 */
+ int32_t f6_19 = 19 * f6; /* 1.959375*2^30 */
+ int32_t f7_38 = 38 * f7; /* 1.959375*2^30 */
+ int32_t f8_19 = 19 * f8; /* 1.959375*2^30 */
+ int32_t f9_38 = 38 * f9; /* 1.959375*2^30 */
+ int64_t f0f0 = f0 * (int64_t) f0;
+ int64_t f0f1_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f1;
+ int64_t f0f2_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f2;
+ int64_t f0f3_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f3;
+ int64_t f0f4_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f4;
+ int64_t f0f5_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f5;
+ int64_t f0f6_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f6;
+ int64_t f0f7_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f7;
+ int64_t f0f8_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f8;
+ int64_t f0f9_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f9;
+ int64_t f1f1_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f1;
+ int64_t f1f2_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f2;
+ int64_t f1f3_4 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f3_2;
+ int64_t f1f4_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f4;
+ int64_t f1f5_4 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f5_2;
+ int64_t f1f6_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f6;
+ int64_t f1f7_4 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f7_2;
+ int64_t f1f8_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f8;
+ int64_t f1f9_76 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f9_38;
+ int64_t f2f2 = f2 * (int64_t) f2;
+ int64_t f2f3_2 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f3;
+ int64_t f2f4_2 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f4;
+ int64_t f2f5_2 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f5;
+ int64_t f2f6_2 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f6;
+ int64_t f2f7_2 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f7;
+ int64_t f2f8_38 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f8_19;
+ int64_t f2f9_38 = f2 * (int64_t) f9_38;
+ int64_t f3f3_2 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f3;
+ int64_t f3f4_2 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f4;
+ int64_t f3f5_4 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f5_2;
+ int64_t f3f6_2 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f6;
+ int64_t f3f7_76 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f7_38;
+ int64_t f3f8_38 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f8_19;
+ int64_t f3f9_76 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f9_38;
+ int64_t f4f4 = f4 * (int64_t) f4;
+ int64_t f4f5_2 = f4_2 * (int64_t) f5;
+ int64_t f4f6_38 = f4_2 * (int64_t) f6_19;
+ int64_t f4f7_38 = f4 * (int64_t) f7_38;
+ int64_t f4f8_38 = f4_2 * (int64_t) f8_19;
+ int64_t f4f9_38 = f4 * (int64_t) f9_38;
+ int64_t f5f5_38 = f5 * (int64_t) f5_38;
+ int64_t f5f6_38 = f5_2 * (int64_t) f6_19;
+ int64_t f5f7_76 = f5_2 * (int64_t) f7_38;
+ int64_t f5f8_38 = f5_2 * (int64_t) f8_19;
+ int64_t f5f9_76 = f5_2 * (int64_t) f9_38;
+ int64_t f6f6_19 = f6 * (int64_t) f6_19;
+ int64_t f6f7_38 = f6 * (int64_t) f7_38;
+ int64_t f6f8_38 = f6_2 * (int64_t) f8_19;
+ int64_t f6f9_38 = f6 * (int64_t) f9_38;
+ int64_t f7f7_38 = f7 * (int64_t) f7_38;
+ int64_t f7f8_38 = f7_2 * (int64_t) f8_19;
+ int64_t f7f9_76 = f7_2 * (int64_t) f9_38;
+ int64_t f8f8_19 = f8 * (int64_t) f8_19;
+ int64_t f8f9_38 = f8 * (int64_t) f9_38;
+ int64_t f9f9_38 = f9 * (int64_t) f9_38;
+ int64_t h0 = f0f0 + f1f9_76 + f2f8_38 + f3f7_76 + f4f6_38 + f5f5_38;
+ int64_t h1 = f0f1_2 + f2f9_38 + f3f8_38 + f4f7_38 + f5f6_38;
+ int64_t h2 = f0f2_2 + f1f1_2 + f3f9_76 + f4f8_38 + f5f7_76 + f6f6_19;
+ int64_t h3 = f0f3_2 + f1f2_2 + f4f9_38 + f5f8_38 + f6f7_38;
+ int64_t h4 = f0f4_2 + f1f3_4 + f2f2 + f5f9_76 + f6f8_38 + f7f7_38;
+ int64_t h5 = f0f5_2 + f1f4_2 + f2f3_2 + f6f9_38 + f7f8_38;
+ int64_t h6 = f0f6_2 + f1f5_4 + f2f4_2 + f3f3_2 + f7f9_76 + f8f8_19;
+ int64_t h7 = f0f7_2 + f1f6_2 + f2f5_2 + f3f4_2 + f8f9_38;
+ int64_t h8 = f0f8_2 + f1f7_4 + f2f6_2 + f3f5_4 + f4f4 + f9f9_38;
+ int64_t h9 = f0f9_2 + f1f8_2 + f2f7_2 + f3f6_2 + f4f5_2;
+ int64_t carry0;
+ int64_t carry1;
+ int64_t carry2;
+ int64_t carry3;
+ int64_t carry4;
+ int64_t carry5;
+ int64_t carry6;
+ int64_t carry7;
+ int64_t carry8;
+ int64_t carry9;
+
+ h0 += h0;
+ h1 += h1;
+ h2 += h2;
+ h3 += h3;
+ h4 += h4;
+ h5 += h5;
+ h6 += h6;
+ h7 += h7;
+ h8 += h8;
+ h9 += h9;
+
+ carry0 = h0 + (1 << 25); h1 += carry0 >> 26; h0 -= carry0 & kTop38Bits;
+ carry4 = h4 + (1 << 25); h5 += carry4 >> 26; h4 -= carry4 & kTop38Bits;
+
+ carry1 = h1 + (1 << 24); h2 += carry1 >> 25; h1 -= carry1 & kTop39Bits;
+ carry5 = h5 + (1 << 24); h6 += carry5 >> 25; h5 -= carry5 & kTop39Bits;
+
+ carry2 = h2 + (1 << 25); h3 += carry2 >> 26; h2 -= carry2 & kTop38Bits;
+ carry6 = h6 + (1 << 25); h7 += carry6 >> 26; h6 -= carry6 & kTop38Bits;
+
+ carry3 = h3 + (1 << 24); h4 += carry3 >> 25; h3 -= carry3 & kTop39Bits;
+ carry7 = h7 + (1 << 24); h8 += carry7 >> 25; h7 -= carry7 & kTop39Bits;
+
+ carry4 = h4 + (1 << 25); h5 += carry4 >> 26; h4 -= carry4 & kTop38Bits;
+ carry8 = h8 + (1 << 25); h9 += carry8 >> 26; h8 -= carry8 & kTop38Bits;
+
+ carry9 = h9 + (1 << 24); h0 += (carry9 >> 25) * 19; h9 -= carry9 & kTop39Bits;
+
+ carry0 = h0 + (1 << 25); h1 += carry0 >> 26; h0 -= carry0 & kTop38Bits;
+
+ h[0] = (int32_t)h0;
+ h[1] = (int32_t)h1;
+ h[2] = (int32_t)h2;
+ h[3] = (int32_t)h3;
+ h[4] = (int32_t)h4;
+ h[5] = (int32_t)h5;
+ h[6] = (int32_t)h6;
+ h[7] = (int32_t)h7;
+ h[8] = (int32_t)h8;
+ h[9] = (int32_t)h9;
}
-static void fe_pow22523(fe out, const fe z) {
- fe t0;
- fe t1;
- fe t2;
- int i;
+static void fe_pow22523(fe out, const fe z)
+{
+ fe t0;
+ fe t1;
+ fe t2;
+ int i;
- fe_sq(t0, z);
- fe_sq(t1, t0);
- for (i = 1; i < 2; ++i) {
- fe_sq(t1, t1);
- }
- fe_mul(t1, z, t1);
- fe_mul(t0, t0, t1);
- fe_sq(t0, t0);
- fe_mul(t0, t1, t0);
- fe_sq(t1, t0);
- for (i = 1; i < 5; ++i) {
- fe_sq(t1, t1);
- }
- fe_mul(t0, t1, t0);
- fe_sq(t1, t0);
- for (i = 1; i < 10; ++i) {
- fe_sq(t1, t1);
- }
- fe_mul(t1, t1, t0);
- fe_sq(t2, t1);
- for (i = 1; i < 20; ++i) {
- fe_sq(t2, t2);
- }
- fe_mul(t1, t2, t1);
- fe_sq(t1, t1);
- for (i = 1; i < 10; ++i) {
- fe_sq(t1, t1);
- }
- fe_mul(t0, t1, t0);
- fe_sq(t1, t0);
- for (i = 1; i < 50; ++i) {
+ fe_sq(t0, z);
+ fe_sq(t1, t0);
+ for (i = 1; i < 2; ++i) {
+ fe_sq(t1, t1);
+ }
+ fe_mul(t1, z, t1);
+ fe_mul(t0, t0, t1);
+ fe_sq(t0, t0);
+ fe_mul(t0, t1, t0);
+ fe_sq(t1, t0);
+ for (i = 1; i < 5; ++i) {
+ fe_sq(t1, t1);
+ }
+ fe_mul(t0, t1, t0);
+ fe_sq(t1, t0);
+ for (i = 1; i < 10; ++i) {
+ fe_sq(t1, t1);
+ }
+ fe_mul(t1, t1, t0);
+ fe_sq(t2, t1);
+ for (i = 1; i < 20; ++i) {
+ fe_sq(t2, t2);
+ }
+ fe_mul(t1, t2, t1);
fe_sq(t1, t1);
- }
- fe_mul(t1, t1, t0);
- fe_sq(t2, t1);
- for (i = 1; i < 100; ++i) {
- fe_sq(t2, t2);
- }
- fe_mul(t1, t2, t1);
- fe_sq(t1, t1);
- for (i = 1; i < 50; ++i) {
+ for (i = 1; i < 10; ++i) {
+ fe_sq(t1, t1);
+ }
+ fe_mul(t0, t1, t0);
+ fe_sq(t1, t0);
+ for (i = 1; i < 50; ++i) {
+ fe_sq(t1, t1);
+ }
+ fe_mul(t1, t1, t0);
+ fe_sq(t2, t1);
+ for (i = 1; i < 100; ++i) {
+ fe_sq(t2, t2);
+ }
+ fe_mul(t1, t2, t1);
fe_sq(t1, t1);
- }
- fe_mul(t0, t1, t0);
- fe_sq(t0, t0);
- for (i = 1; i < 2; ++i) {
+ for (i = 1; i < 50; ++i) {
+ fe_sq(t1, t1);
+ }
+ fe_mul(t0, t1, t0);
fe_sq(t0, t0);
- }
- fe_mul(out, t0, z);
+ for (i = 1; i < 2; ++i) {
+ fe_sq(t0, t0);
+ }
+ fe_mul(out, t0, z);
}
-/* ge means group element.
-
+/*
+ * ge means group element.
+ *
* Here the group is the set of pairs (x,y) of field elements (see fe.h)
* satisfying -x^2 + y^2 = 1 + d x^2y^2
* where d = -121665/121666.
@@ -1725,268 +1782,292 @@ static void fe_pow22523(fe out, const fe z) {
* ge_p2 (projective): (X:Y:Z) satisfying x=X/Z, y=Y/Z
* ge_p3 (extended): (X:Y:Z:T) satisfying x=X/Z, y=Y/Z, XY=ZT
* ge_p1p1 (completed): ((X:Z),(Y:T)) satisfying x=X/Z, y=Y/T
- * ge_precomp (Duif): (y+x,y-x,2dxy) */
-
+ * ge_precomp (Duif): (y+x,y-x,2dxy)
+ */
typedef struct {
- fe X;
- fe Y;
- fe Z;
+ fe X;
+ fe Y;
+ fe Z;
} ge_p2;
typedef struct {
- fe X;
- fe Y;
- fe Z;
- fe T;
+ fe X;
+ fe Y;
+ fe Z;
+ fe T;
} ge_p3;
typedef struct {
- fe X;
- fe Y;
- fe Z;
- fe T;
+ fe X;
+ fe Y;
+ fe Z;
+ fe T;
} ge_p1p1;
typedef struct {
- fe yplusx;
- fe yminusx;
- fe xy2d;
+ fe yplusx;
+ fe yminusx;
+ fe xy2d;
} ge_precomp;
typedef struct {
- fe YplusX;
- fe YminusX;
- fe Z;
- fe T2d;
+ fe YplusX;
+ fe YminusX;
+ fe Z;
+ fe T2d;
} ge_cached;
-static void ge_tobytes(uint8_t *s, const ge_p2 *h) {
- fe recip;
- fe x;
- fe y;
+static void ge_tobytes(uint8_t *s, const ge_p2 *h)
+{
+ fe recip;
+ fe x;
+ fe y;
+
+ fe_invert(recip, h->Z);
+ fe_mul(x, h->X, recip);
+ fe_mul(y, h->Y, recip);
+ fe_tobytes(s, y);
+ s[31] ^= fe_isnegative(x) << 7;
+}
- fe_invert(recip, h->Z);
- fe_mul(x, h->X, recip);
- fe_mul(y, h->Y, recip);
- fe_tobytes(s, y);
- s[31] ^= fe_isnegative(x) << 7;
+static void ge_p3_tobytes(uint8_t *s, const ge_p3 *h)
+{
+ fe recip;
+ fe x;
+ fe y;
+
+ fe_invert(recip, h->Z);
+ fe_mul(x, h->X, recip);
+ fe_mul(y, h->Y, recip);
+ fe_tobytes(s, y);
+ s[31] ^= fe_isnegative(x) << 7;
}
-static void ge_p3_tobytes(uint8_t *s, const ge_p3 *h) {
- fe recip;
- fe x;
- fe y;
+static const fe d = {
+ -10913610, 13857413, -15372611, 6949391, 114729,
+ -8787816, -6275908, -3247719, -18696448, -12055116
+};
- fe_invert(recip, h->Z);
- fe_mul(x, h->X, recip);
- fe_mul(y, h->Y, recip);
- fe_tobytes(s, y);
- s[31] ^= fe_isnegative(x) << 7;
-}
+static const fe sqrtm1 = {
+ -32595792, -7943725, 9377950, 3500415, 12389472,
+ -272473, -25146209, -2005654, 326686, 11406482
+};
-static const fe d = {-10913610, 13857413, -15372611, 6949391, 114729,
- -8787816, -6275908, -3247719, -18696448, -12055116};
-
-static const fe sqrtm1 = {-32595792, -7943725, 9377950, 3500415, 12389472,
- -272473, -25146209, -2005654, 326686, 11406482};
-
-static int ge_frombytes_vartime(ge_p3 *h, const uint8_t *s) {
- fe u;
- fe v;
- fe v3;
- fe vxx;
- fe check;
-
- fe_frombytes(h->Y, s);
- fe_1(h->Z);
- fe_sq(u, h->Y);
- fe_mul(v, u, d);
- fe_sub(u, u, h->Z); /* u = y^2-1 */
- fe_add(v, v, h->Z); /* v = dy^2+1 */
-
- fe_sq(v3, v);
- fe_mul(v3, v3, v); /* v3 = v^3 */
- fe_sq(h->X, v3);
- fe_mul(h->X, h->X, v);
- fe_mul(h->X, h->X, u); /* x = uv^7 */
-
- fe_pow22523(h->X, h->X); /* x = (uv^7)^((q-5)/8) */
- fe_mul(h->X, h->X, v3);
- fe_mul(h->X, h->X, u); /* x = uv^3(uv^7)^((q-5)/8) */
-
- fe_sq(vxx, h->X);
- fe_mul(vxx, vxx, v);
- fe_sub(check, vxx, u); /* vx^2-u */
- if (fe_isnonzero(check)) {
- fe_add(check, vxx, u); /* vx^2+u */
+static int ge_frombytes_vartime(ge_p3 *h, const uint8_t *s)
+{
+ fe u;
+ fe v;
+ fe v3;
+ fe vxx;
+ fe check;
+
+ fe_frombytes(h->Y, s);
+ fe_1(h->Z);
+ fe_sq(u, h->Y);
+ fe_mul(v, u, d);
+ fe_sub(u, u, h->Z); /* u = y^2-1 */
+ fe_add(v, v, h->Z); /* v = dy^2+1 */
+
+ fe_sq(v3, v);
+ fe_mul(v3, v3, v); /* v3 = v^3 */
+ fe_sq(h->X, v3);
+ fe_mul(h->X, h->X, v);
+ fe_mul(h->X, h->X, u); /* x = uv^7 */
+
+ fe_pow22523(h->X, h->X); /* x = (uv^7)^((q-5)/8) */
+ fe_mul(h->X, h->X, v3);
+ fe_mul(h->X, h->X, u); /* x = uv^3(uv^7)^((q-5)/8) */
+
+ fe_sq(vxx, h->X);
+ fe_mul(vxx, vxx, v);
+ fe_sub(check, vxx, u); /* vx^2-u */
if (fe_isnonzero(check)) {
- return -1;
+ fe_add(check, vxx, u); /* vx^2+u */
+ if (fe_isnonzero(check)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ fe_mul(h->X, h->X, sqrtm1);
}
- fe_mul(h->X, h->X, sqrtm1);
- }
- if (fe_isnegative(h->X) != (s[31] >> 7)) {
- fe_neg(h->X, h->X);
- }
+ if (fe_isnegative(h->X) != (s[31] >> 7)) {
+ fe_neg(h->X, h->X);
+ }
- fe_mul(h->T, h->X, h->Y);
- return 0;
+ fe_mul(h->T, h->X, h->Y);
+ return 0;
}
-static void ge_p2_0(ge_p2 *h) {
- fe_0(h->X);
- fe_1(h->Y);
- fe_1(h->Z);
+static void ge_p2_0(ge_p2 *h)
+{
+ fe_0(h->X);
+ fe_1(h->Y);
+ fe_1(h->Z);
}
-static void ge_p3_0(ge_p3 *h) {
- fe_0(h->X);
- fe_1(h->Y);
- fe_1(h->Z);
- fe_0(h->T);
+static void ge_p3_0(ge_p3 *h)
+{
+ fe_0(h->X);
+ fe_1(h->Y);
+ fe_1(h->Z);
+ fe_0(h->T);
}
-static void ge_precomp_0(ge_precomp *h) {
- fe_1(h->yplusx);
- fe_1(h->yminusx);
- fe_0(h->xy2d);
+static void ge_precomp_0(ge_precomp *h)
+{
+ fe_1(h->yplusx);
+ fe_1(h->yminusx);
+ fe_0(h->xy2d);
}
/* r = p */
-static void ge_p3_to_p2(ge_p2 *r, const ge_p3 *p) {
- fe_copy(r->X, p->X);
- fe_copy(r->Y, p->Y);
- fe_copy(r->Z, p->Z);
+static void ge_p3_to_p2(ge_p2 *r, const ge_p3 *p)
+{
+ fe_copy(r->X, p->X);
+ fe_copy(r->Y, p->Y);
+ fe_copy(r->Z, p->Z);
}
-static const fe d2 = {-21827239, -5839606, -30745221, 13898782, 229458,
- 15978800, -12551817, -6495438, 29715968, 9444199};
+static const fe d2 = {
+ -21827239, -5839606, -30745221, 13898782, 229458,
+ 15978800, -12551817, -6495438, 29715968, 9444199
+};
/* r = p */
-static void ge_p3_to_cached(ge_cached *r, const ge_p3 *p) {
- fe_add(r->YplusX, p->Y, p->X);
- fe_sub(r->YminusX, p->Y, p->X);
- fe_copy(r->Z, p->Z);
- fe_mul(r->T2d, p->T, d2);
+static void ge_p3_to_cached(ge_cached *r, const ge_p3 *p)
+{
+ fe_add(r->YplusX, p->Y, p->X);
+ fe_sub(r->YminusX, p->Y, p->X);
+ fe_copy(r->Z, p->Z);
+ fe_mul(r->T2d, p->T, d2);
}
/* r = p */
-static void ge_p1p1_to_p2(ge_p2 *r, const ge_p1p1 *p) {
- fe_mul(r->X, p->X, p->T);
- fe_mul(r->Y, p->Y, p->Z);
- fe_mul(r->Z, p->Z, p->T);
+static void ge_p1p1_to_p2(ge_p2 *r, const ge_p1p1 *p)
+{
+ fe_mul(r->X, p->X, p->T);
+ fe_mul(r->Y, p->Y, p->Z);
+ fe_mul(r->Z, p->Z, p->T);
}
/* r = p */
-static void ge_p1p1_to_p3(ge_p3 *r, const ge_p1p1 *p) {
- fe_mul(r->X, p->X, p->T);
- fe_mul(r->Y, p->Y, p->Z);
- fe_mul(r->Z, p->Z, p->T);
- fe_mul(r->T, p->X, p->Y);
+static void ge_p1p1_to_p3(ge_p3 *r, const ge_p1p1 *p)
+{
+ fe_mul(r->X, p->X, p->T);
+ fe_mul(r->Y, p->Y, p->Z);
+ fe_mul(r->Z, p->Z, p->T);
+ fe_mul(r->T, p->X, p->Y);
}
/* r = 2 * p */
-static void ge_p2_dbl(ge_p1p1 *r, const ge_p2 *p) {
- fe t0;
-
- fe_sq(r->X, p->X);
- fe_sq(r->Z, p->Y);
- fe_sq2(r->T, p->Z);
- fe_add(r->Y, p->X, p->Y);
- fe_sq(t0, r->Y);
- fe_add(r->Y, r->Z, r->X);
- fe_sub(r->Z, r->Z, r->X);
- fe_sub(r->X, t0, r->Y);
- fe_sub(r->T, r->T, r->Z);
+static void ge_p2_dbl(ge_p1p1 *r, const ge_p2 *p)
+{
+ fe t0;
+
+ fe_sq(r->X, p->X);
+ fe_sq(r->Z, p->Y);
+ fe_sq2(r->T, p->Z);
+ fe_add(r->Y, p->X, p->Y);
+ fe_sq(t0, r->Y);
+ fe_add(r->Y, r->Z, r->X);
+ fe_sub(r->Z, r->Z, r->X);
+ fe_sub(r->X, t0, r->Y);
+ fe_sub(r->T, r->T, r->Z);
}
/* r = 2 * p */
-static void ge_p3_dbl(ge_p1p1 *r, const ge_p3 *p) {
- ge_p2 q;
- ge_p3_to_p2(&q, p);
- ge_p2_dbl(r, &q);
+static void ge_p3_dbl(ge_p1p1 *r, const ge_p3 *p)
+{
+ ge_p2 q;
+ ge_p3_to_p2(&q, p);
+ ge_p2_dbl(r, &q);
}
/* r = p + q */
-static void ge_madd(ge_p1p1 *r, const ge_p3 *p, const ge_precomp *q) {
- fe t0;
-
- fe_add(r->X, p->Y, p->X);
- fe_sub(r->Y, p->Y, p->X);
- fe_mul(r->Z, r->X, q->yplusx);
- fe_mul(r->Y, r->Y, q->yminusx);
- fe_mul(r->T, q->xy2d, p->T);
- fe_add(t0, p->Z, p->Z);
- fe_sub(r->X, r->Z, r->Y);
- fe_add(r->Y, r->Z, r->Y);
- fe_add(r->Z, t0, r->T);
- fe_sub(r->T, t0, r->T);
+static void ge_madd(ge_p1p1 *r, const ge_p3 *p, const ge_precomp *q)
+{
+ fe t0;
+
+ fe_add(r->X, p->Y, p->X);
+ fe_sub(r->Y, p->Y, p->X);
+ fe_mul(r->Z, r->X, q->yplusx);
+ fe_mul(r->Y, r->Y, q->yminusx);
+ fe_mul(r->T, q->xy2d, p->T);
+ fe_add(t0, p->Z, p->Z);
+ fe_sub(r->X, r->Z, r->Y);
+ fe_add(r->Y, r->Z, r->Y);
+ fe_add(r->Z, t0, r->T);
+ fe_sub(r->T, t0, r->T);
}
/* r = p - q */
-static void ge_msub(ge_p1p1 *r, const ge_p3 *p, const ge_precomp *q) {
- fe t0;
-
- fe_add(r->X, p->Y, p->X);
- fe_sub(r->Y, p->Y, p->X);
- fe_mul(r->Z, r->X, q->yminusx);
- fe_mul(r->Y, r->Y, q->yplusx);
- fe_mul(r->T, q->xy2d, p->T);
- fe_add(t0, p->Z, p->Z);
- fe_sub(r->X, r->Z, r->Y);
- fe_add(r->Y, r->Z, r->Y);
- fe_sub(r->Z, t0, r->T);
- fe_add(r->T, t0, r->T);
+static void ge_msub(ge_p1p1 *r, const ge_p3 *p, const ge_precomp *q)
+{
+ fe t0;
+
+ fe_add(r->X, p->Y, p->X);
+ fe_sub(r->Y, p->Y, p->X);
+ fe_mul(r->Z, r->X, q->yminusx);
+ fe_mul(r->Y, r->Y, q->yplusx);
+ fe_mul(r->T, q->xy2d, p->T);
+ fe_add(t0, p->Z, p->Z);
+ fe_sub(r->X, r->Z, r->Y);
+ fe_add(r->Y, r->Z, r->Y);
+ fe_sub(r->Z, t0, r->T);
+ fe_add(r->T, t0, r->T);
}
/* r = p + q */
-static void ge_add(ge_p1p1 *r, const ge_p3 *p, const ge_cached *q) {
- fe t0;
-
- fe_add(r->X, p->Y, p->X);
- fe_sub(r->Y, p->Y, p->X);
- fe_mul(r->Z, r->X, q->YplusX);
- fe_mul(r->Y, r->Y, q->YminusX);
- fe_mul(r->T, q->T2d, p->T);
- fe_mul(r->X, p->Z, q->Z);
- fe_add(t0, r->X, r->X);
- fe_sub(r->X, r->Z, r->Y);
- fe_add(r->Y, r->Z, r->Y);
- fe_add(r->Z, t0, r->T);
- fe_sub(r->T, t0, r->T);
+static void ge_add(ge_p1p1 *r, const ge_p3 *p, const ge_cached *q)
+{
+ fe t0;
+
+ fe_add(r->X, p->Y, p->X);
+ fe_sub(r->Y, p->Y, p->X);
+ fe_mul(r->Z, r->X, q->YplusX);
+ fe_mul(r->Y, r->Y, q->YminusX);
+ fe_mul(r->T, q->T2d, p->T);
+ fe_mul(r->X, p->Z, q->Z);
+ fe_add(t0, r->X, r->X);
+ fe_sub(r->X, r->Z, r->Y);
+ fe_add(r->Y, r->Z, r->Y);
+ fe_add(r->Z, t0, r->T);
+ fe_sub(r->T, t0, r->T);
}
/* r = p - q */
-static void ge_sub(ge_p1p1 *r, const ge_p3 *p, const ge_cached *q) {
- fe t0;
-
- fe_add(r->X, p->Y, p->X);
- fe_sub(r->Y, p->Y, p->X);
- fe_mul(r->Z, r->X, q->YminusX);
- fe_mul(r->Y, r->Y, q->YplusX);
- fe_mul(r->T, q->T2d, p->T);
- fe_mul(r->X, p->Z, q->Z);
- fe_add(t0, r->X, r->X);
- fe_sub(r->X, r->Z, r->Y);
- fe_add(r->Y, r->Z, r->Y);
- fe_sub(r->Z, t0, r->T);
- fe_add(r->T, t0, r->T);
+static void ge_sub(ge_p1p1 *r, const ge_p3 *p, const ge_cached *q)
+{
+ fe t0;
+
+ fe_add(r->X, p->Y, p->X);
+ fe_sub(r->Y, p->Y, p->X);
+ fe_mul(r->Z, r->X, q->YminusX);
+ fe_mul(r->Y, r->Y, q->YplusX);
+ fe_mul(r->T, q->T2d, p->T);
+ fe_mul(r->X, p->Z, q->Z);
+ fe_add(t0, r->X, r->X);
+ fe_sub(r->X, r->Z, r->Y);
+ fe_add(r->Y, r->Z, r->Y);
+ fe_sub(r->Z, t0, r->T);
+ fe_add(r->T, t0, r->T);
}
-static uint8_t equal(signed char b, signed char c) {
- uint8_t ub = b;
- uint8_t uc = c;
- uint8_t x = ub ^ uc; /* 0: yes; 1..255: no */
- uint32_t y = x; /* 0: yes; 1..255: no */
- y -= 1; /* 4294967295: yes; 0..254: no */
- y >>= 31; /* 1: yes; 0: no */
- return y;
+static uint8_t equal(signed char b, signed char c)
+{
+ uint8_t ub = b;
+ uint8_t uc = c;
+ uint8_t x = ub ^ uc; /* 0: yes; 1..255: no */
+ uint32_t y = x; /* 0: yes; 1..255: no */
+ y -= 1; /* 4294967295: yes; 0..254: no */
+ y >>= 31; /* 1: yes; 0: no */
+ return y;
}
-static void cmov(ge_precomp *t, const ge_precomp *u, uint8_t b) {
- fe_cmov(t->yplusx, u->yplusx, b);
- fe_cmov(t->yminusx, u->yminusx, b);
- fe_cmov(t->xy2d, u->xy2d, b);
+static void cmov(ge_precomp *t, const ge_precomp *u, uint8_t b)
+{
+ fe_cmov(t->yplusx, u->yplusx, b);
+ fe_cmov(t->yminusx, u->yminusx, b);
+ fe_cmov(t->xy2d, u->xy2d, b);
}
/* k25519Precomp[i][j] = (j+1)*256^i*B */
@@ -4105,257 +4186,273 @@ static const ge_precomp k25519Precomp[32][8] = {
},
};
-static uint8_t negative(signed char b) {
- uint32_t x = b;
- x >>= 31; /* 1: yes; 0: no */
- return x;
+static uint8_t negative(signed char b)
+{
+ uint32_t x = b;
+
+ x >>= 31; /* 1: yes; 0: no */
+ return x;
}
-static void table_select(ge_precomp *t, int pos, signed char b) {
- ge_precomp minust;
- uint8_t bnegative = negative(b);
- uint8_t babs = b - ((uint8_t)((-bnegative) & b) << 1);
-
- ge_precomp_0(t);
- cmov(t, &k25519Precomp[pos][0], equal(babs, 1));
- cmov(t, &k25519Precomp[pos][1], equal(babs, 2));
- cmov(t, &k25519Precomp[pos][2], equal(babs, 3));
- cmov(t, &k25519Precomp[pos][3], equal(babs, 4));
- cmov(t, &k25519Precomp[pos][4], equal(babs, 5));
- cmov(t, &k25519Precomp[pos][5], equal(babs, 6));
- cmov(t, &k25519Precomp[pos][6], equal(babs, 7));
- cmov(t, &k25519Precomp[pos][7], equal(babs, 8));
- fe_copy(minust.yplusx, t->yminusx);
- fe_copy(minust.yminusx, t->yplusx);
- fe_neg(minust.xy2d, t->xy2d);
- cmov(t, &minust, bnegative);
+static void table_select(ge_precomp *t, int pos, signed char b)
+{
+ ge_precomp minust;
+ uint8_t bnegative = negative(b);
+ uint8_t babs = b - ((uint8_t)((-bnegative) & b) << 1);
+
+ ge_precomp_0(t);
+ cmov(t, &k25519Precomp[pos][0], equal(babs, 1));
+ cmov(t, &k25519Precomp[pos][1], equal(babs, 2));
+ cmov(t, &k25519Precomp[pos][2], equal(babs, 3));
+ cmov(t, &k25519Precomp[pos][3], equal(babs, 4));
+ cmov(t, &k25519Precomp[pos][4], equal(babs, 5));
+ cmov(t, &k25519Precomp[pos][5], equal(babs, 6));
+ cmov(t, &k25519Precomp[pos][6], equal(babs, 7));
+ cmov(t, &k25519Precomp[pos][7], equal(babs, 8));
+ fe_copy(minust.yplusx, t->yminusx);
+ fe_copy(minust.yminusx, t->yplusx);
+ fe_neg(minust.xy2d, t->xy2d);
+ cmov(t, &minust, bnegative);
}
-/* h = a * B
+/*
+ * h = a * B
+ *
* where a = a[0]+256*a[1]+...+256^31 a[31]
* B is the Ed25519 base point (x,4/5) with x positive.
*
* Preconditions:
- * a[31] <= 127 */
-static void ge_scalarmult_base(ge_p3 *h, const uint8_t *a) {
- signed char e[64];
- signed char carry;
- ge_p1p1 r;
- ge_p2 s;
- ge_precomp t;
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
- e[2 * i + 0] = (a[i] >> 0) & 15;
- e[2 * i + 1] = (a[i] >> 4) & 15;
- }
- /* each e[i] is between 0 and 15 */
- /* e[63] is between 0 and 7 */
-
- carry = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < 63; ++i) {
- e[i] += carry;
- carry = e[i] + 8;
- carry >>= 4;
- e[i] -= carry << 4;
- }
- e[63] += carry;
- /* each e[i] is between -8 and 8 */
-
- ge_p3_0(h);
- for (i = 1; i < 64; i += 2) {
- table_select(&t, i / 2, e[i]);
- ge_madd(&r, h, &t);
- ge_p1p1_to_p3(h, &r);
- }
-
- ge_p3_dbl(&r, h);
- ge_p1p1_to_p2(&s, &r);
- ge_p2_dbl(&r, &s);
- ge_p1p1_to_p2(&s, &r);
- ge_p2_dbl(&r, &s);
- ge_p1p1_to_p2(&s, &r);
- ge_p2_dbl(&r, &s);
- ge_p1p1_to_p3(h, &r);
-
- for (i = 0; i < 64; i += 2) {
- table_select(&t, i / 2, e[i]);
- ge_madd(&r, h, &t);
+ * a[31] <= 127
+ */
+static void ge_scalarmult_base(ge_p3 *h, const uint8_t *a)
+{
+ signed char e[64];
+ signed char carry;
+ ge_p1p1 r;
+ ge_p2 s;
+ ge_precomp t;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
+ e[2 * i + 0] = (a[i] >> 0) & 15;
+ e[2 * i + 1] = (a[i] >> 4) & 15;
+ }
+ /* each e[i] is between 0 and 15 */
+ /* e[63] is between 0 and 7 */
+
+ carry = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 63; ++i) {
+ e[i] += carry;
+ carry = e[i] + 8;
+ carry >>= 4;
+ e[i] -= carry << 4;
+ }
+ e[63] += carry;
+ /* each e[i] is between -8 and 8 */
+
+ ge_p3_0(h);
+ for (i = 1; i < 64; i += 2) {
+ table_select(&t, i / 2, e[i]);
+ ge_madd(&r, h, &t);
+ ge_p1p1_to_p3(h, &r);
+ }
+
+ ge_p3_dbl(&r, h);
+ ge_p1p1_to_p2(&s, &r);
+ ge_p2_dbl(&r, &s);
+ ge_p1p1_to_p2(&s, &r);
+ ge_p2_dbl(&r, &s);
+ ge_p1p1_to_p2(&s, &r);
+ ge_p2_dbl(&r, &s);
ge_p1p1_to_p3(h, &r);
- }
- OPENSSL_cleanse(e, sizeof(e));
+ for (i = 0; i < 64; i += 2) {
+ table_select(&t, i / 2, e[i]);
+ ge_madd(&r, h, &t);
+ ge_p1p1_to_p3(h, &r);
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(e, sizeof(e));
}
#if !defined(BASE_2_51_IMPLEMENTED)
-/* Replace (f,g) with (g,f) if b == 1;
+/*
+ * Replace (f,g) with (g,f) if b == 1;
* replace (f,g) with (f,g) if b == 0.
*
- * Preconditions: b in {0,1}. */
-static void fe_cswap(fe f, fe g, unsigned int b) {
- size_t i;
- b = 0-b;
- for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
- int32_t x = f[i] ^ g[i];
- x &= b;
- f[i] ^= x;
- g[i] ^= x;
- }
+ * Preconditions: b in {0,1}.
+ */
+static void fe_cswap(fe f, fe g, unsigned int b)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ b = 0-b;
+ for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
+ int32_t x = f[i] ^ g[i];
+ x &= b;
+ f[i] ^= x;
+ g[i] ^= x;
+ }
}
-/* h = f * 121666
+/*
+ * h = f * 121666
+ *
* Can overlap h with f.
*
* Preconditions:
* |f| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc.
*
* Postconditions:
- * |h| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc. */
-static void fe_mul121666(fe h, fe f) {
- int32_t f0 = f[0];
- int32_t f1 = f[1];
- int32_t f2 = f[2];
- int32_t f3 = f[3];
- int32_t f4 = f[4];
- int32_t f5 = f[5];
- int32_t f6 = f[6];
- int32_t f7 = f[7];
- int32_t f8 = f[8];
- int32_t f9 = f[9];
- int64_t h0 = f0 * (int64_t) 121666;
- int64_t h1 = f1 * (int64_t) 121666;
- int64_t h2 = f2 * (int64_t) 121666;
- int64_t h3 = f3 * (int64_t) 121666;
- int64_t h4 = f4 * (int64_t) 121666;
- int64_t h5 = f5 * (int64_t) 121666;
- int64_t h6 = f6 * (int64_t) 121666;
- int64_t h7 = f7 * (int64_t) 121666;
- int64_t h8 = f8 * (int64_t) 121666;
- int64_t h9 = f9 * (int64_t) 121666;
- int64_t carry0;
- int64_t carry1;
- int64_t carry2;
- int64_t carry3;
- int64_t carry4;
- int64_t carry5;
- int64_t carry6;
- int64_t carry7;
- int64_t carry8;
- int64_t carry9;
-
- carry9 = h9 + (1 << 24); h0 += (carry9 >> 25) * 19; h9 -= carry9 & kTop39Bits;
- carry1 = h1 + (1 << 24); h2 += carry1 >> 25; h1 -= carry1 & kTop39Bits;
- carry3 = h3 + (1 << 24); h4 += carry3 >> 25; h3 -= carry3 & kTop39Bits;
- carry5 = h5 + (1 << 24); h6 += carry5 >> 25; h5 -= carry5 & kTop39Bits;
- carry7 = h7 + (1 << 24); h8 += carry7 >> 25; h7 -= carry7 & kTop39Bits;
-
- carry0 = h0 + (1 << 25); h1 += carry0 >> 26; h0 -= carry0 & kTop38Bits;
- carry2 = h2 + (1 << 25); h3 += carry2 >> 26; h2 -= carry2 & kTop38Bits;
- carry4 = h4 + (1 << 25); h5 += carry4 >> 26; h4 -= carry4 & kTop38Bits;
- carry6 = h6 + (1 << 25); h7 += carry6 >> 26; h6 -= carry6 & kTop38Bits;
- carry8 = h8 + (1 << 25); h9 += carry8 >> 26; h8 -= carry8 & kTop38Bits;
-
- h[0] = (int32_t)h0;
- h[1] = (int32_t)h1;
- h[2] = (int32_t)h2;
- h[3] = (int32_t)h3;
- h[4] = (int32_t)h4;
- h[5] = (int32_t)h5;
- h[6] = (int32_t)h6;
- h[7] = (int32_t)h7;
- h[8] = (int32_t)h8;
- h[9] = (int32_t)h9;
+ * |h| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc.
+ */
+static void fe_mul121666(fe h, fe f)
+{
+ int32_t f0 = f[0];
+ int32_t f1 = f[1];
+ int32_t f2 = f[2];
+ int32_t f3 = f[3];
+ int32_t f4 = f[4];
+ int32_t f5 = f[5];
+ int32_t f6 = f[6];
+ int32_t f7 = f[7];
+ int32_t f8 = f[8];
+ int32_t f9 = f[9];
+ int64_t h0 = f0 * (int64_t) 121666;
+ int64_t h1 = f1 * (int64_t) 121666;
+ int64_t h2 = f2 * (int64_t) 121666;
+ int64_t h3 = f3 * (int64_t) 121666;
+ int64_t h4 = f4 * (int64_t) 121666;
+ int64_t h5 = f5 * (int64_t) 121666;
+ int64_t h6 = f6 * (int64_t) 121666;
+ int64_t h7 = f7 * (int64_t) 121666;
+ int64_t h8 = f8 * (int64_t) 121666;
+ int64_t h9 = f9 * (int64_t) 121666;
+ int64_t carry0;
+ int64_t carry1;
+ int64_t carry2;
+ int64_t carry3;
+ int64_t carry4;
+ int64_t carry5;
+ int64_t carry6;
+ int64_t carry7;
+ int64_t carry8;
+ int64_t carry9;
+
+ carry9 = h9 + (1 << 24); h0 += (carry9 >> 25) * 19; h9 -= carry9 & kTop39Bits;
+ carry1 = h1 + (1 << 24); h2 += carry1 >> 25; h1 -= carry1 & kTop39Bits;
+ carry3 = h3 + (1 << 24); h4 += carry3 >> 25; h3 -= carry3 & kTop39Bits;
+ carry5 = h5 + (1 << 24); h6 += carry5 >> 25; h5 -= carry5 & kTop39Bits;
+ carry7 = h7 + (1 << 24); h8 += carry7 >> 25; h7 -= carry7 & kTop39Bits;
+
+ carry0 = h0 + (1 << 25); h1 += carry0 >> 26; h0 -= carry0 & kTop38Bits;
+ carry2 = h2 + (1 << 25); h3 += carry2 >> 26; h2 -= carry2 & kTop38Bits;
+ carry4 = h4 + (1 << 25); h5 += carry4 >> 26; h4 -= carry4 & kTop38Bits;
+ carry6 = h6 + (1 << 25); h7 += carry6 >> 26; h6 -= carry6 & kTop38Bits;
+ carry8 = h8 + (1 << 25); h9 += carry8 >> 26; h8 -= carry8 & kTop38Bits;
+
+ h[0] = (int32_t)h0;
+ h[1] = (int32_t)h1;
+ h[2] = (int32_t)h2;
+ h[3] = (int32_t)h3;
+ h[4] = (int32_t)h4;
+ h[5] = (int32_t)h5;
+ h[6] = (int32_t)h6;
+ h[7] = (int32_t)h7;
+ h[8] = (int32_t)h8;
+ h[9] = (int32_t)h9;
}
static void x25519_scalar_mult_generic(uint8_t out[32],
const uint8_t scalar[32],
const uint8_t point[32]) {
- fe x1, x2, z2, x3, z3, tmp0, tmp1;
- uint8_t e[32];
- unsigned swap = 0;
- int pos;
-
- memcpy(e, scalar, 32);
- e[0] &= 248;
- e[31] &= 127;
- e[31] |= 64;
- fe_frombytes(x1, point);
- fe_1(x2);
- fe_0(z2);
- fe_copy(x3, x1);
- fe_1(z3);
-
- for (pos = 254; pos >= 0; --pos) {
- unsigned b = 1 & (e[pos / 8] >> (pos & 7));
- swap ^= b;
- fe_cswap(x2, x3, swap);
- fe_cswap(z2, z3, swap);
- swap = b;
- fe_sub(tmp0, x3, z3);
- fe_sub(tmp1, x2, z2);
- fe_add(x2, x2, z2);
- fe_add(z2, x3, z3);
- fe_mul(z3, tmp0, x2);
- fe_mul(z2, z2, tmp1);
- fe_sq(tmp0, tmp1);
- fe_sq(tmp1, x2);
- fe_add(x3, z3, z2);
- fe_sub(z2, z3, z2);
- fe_mul(x2, tmp1, tmp0);
- fe_sub(tmp1, tmp1, tmp0);
- fe_sq(z2, z2);
- fe_mul121666(z3, tmp1);
- fe_sq(x3, x3);
- fe_add(tmp0, tmp0, z3);
- fe_mul(z3, x1, z2);
- fe_mul(z2, tmp1, tmp0);
- }
-
- fe_invert(z2, z2);
- fe_mul(x2, x2, z2);
- fe_tobytes(out, x2);
-
- OPENSSL_cleanse(e, sizeof(e));
+ fe x1, x2, z2, x3, z3, tmp0, tmp1;
+ uint8_t e[32];
+ unsigned swap = 0;
+ int pos;
+
+ memcpy(e, scalar, 32);
+ e[0] &= 248;
+ e[31] &= 127;
+ e[31] |= 64;
+ fe_frombytes(x1, point);
+ fe_1(x2);
+ fe_0(z2);
+ fe_copy(x3, x1);
+ fe_1(z3);
+
+ for (pos = 254; pos >= 0; --pos) {
+ unsigned b = 1 & (e[pos / 8] >> (pos & 7));
+ swap ^= b;
+ fe_cswap(x2, x3, swap);
+ fe_cswap(z2, z3, swap);
+ swap = b;
+ fe_sub(tmp0, x3, z3);
+ fe_sub(tmp1, x2, z2);
+ fe_add(x2, x2, z2);
+ fe_add(z2, x3, z3);
+ fe_mul(z3, tmp0, x2);
+ fe_mul(z2, z2, tmp1);
+ fe_sq(tmp0, tmp1);
+ fe_sq(tmp1, x2);
+ fe_add(x3, z3, z2);
+ fe_sub(z2, z3, z2);
+ fe_mul(x2, tmp1, tmp0);
+ fe_sub(tmp1, tmp1, tmp0);
+ fe_sq(z2, z2);
+ fe_mul121666(z3, tmp1);
+ fe_sq(x3, x3);
+ fe_add(tmp0, tmp0, z3);
+ fe_mul(z3, x1, z2);
+ fe_mul(z2, tmp1, tmp0);
+ }
+
+ fe_invert(z2, z2);
+ fe_mul(x2, x2, z2);
+ fe_tobytes(out, x2);
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(e, sizeof(e));
}
static void x25519_scalar_mult(uint8_t out[32], const uint8_t scalar[32],
const uint8_t point[32]) {
- x25519_scalar_mult_generic(out, scalar, point);
+ x25519_scalar_mult_generic(out, scalar, point);
}
#endif
-static void slide(signed char *r, const uint8_t *a) {
- int i;
- int b;
- int k;
-
- for (i = 0; i < 256; ++i) {
- r[i] = 1 & (a[i >> 3] >> (i & 7));
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < 256; ++i) {
- if (r[i]) {
- for (b = 1; b <= 6 && i + b < 256; ++b) {
- if (r[i + b]) {
- if (r[i] + (r[i + b] << b) <= 15) {
- r[i] += r[i + b] << b;
- r[i + b] = 0;
- } else if (r[i] - (r[i + b] << b) >= -15) {
- r[i] -= r[i + b] << b;
- for (k = i + b; k < 256; ++k) {
- if (!r[k]) {
- r[k] = 1;
- break;
- }
- r[k] = 0;
+static void slide(signed char *r, const uint8_t *a)
+{
+ int i;
+ int b;
+ int k;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 256; ++i) {
+ r[i] = 1 & (a[i >> 3] >> (i & 7));
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 256; ++i) {
+ if (r[i]) {
+ for (b = 1; b <= 6 && i + b < 256; ++b) {
+ if (r[i + b]) {
+ if (r[i] + (r[i + b] << b) <= 15) {
+ r[i] += r[i + b] << b;
+ r[i + b] = 0;
+ } else if (r[i] - (r[i + b] << b) >= -15) {
+ r[i] -= r[i + b] << b;
+ for (k = i + b; k < 256; ++k) {
+ if (!r[k]) {
+ r[k] = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ r[k] = 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
}
- } else {
- break;
- }
}
- }
}
- }
}
static const ge_precomp Bi[8] = {
@@ -4425,1033 +4522,1075 @@ static const ge_precomp Bi[8] = {
},
};
-/* r = a * A + b * B
+/*
+ * r = a * A + b * B
+ *
* where a = a[0]+256*a[1]+...+256^31 a[31].
* and b = b[0]+256*b[1]+...+256^31 b[31].
- * B is the Ed25519 base point (x,4/5) with x positive. */
+ * B is the Ed25519 base point (x,4/5) with x positive.
+ */
static void ge_double_scalarmult_vartime(ge_p2 *r, const uint8_t *a,
- const ge_p3 *A, const uint8_t *b) {
- signed char aslide[256];
- signed char bslide[256];
- ge_cached Ai[8]; /* A,3A,5A,7A,9A,11A,13A,15A */
- ge_p1p1 t;
- ge_p3 u;
- ge_p3 A2;
- int i;
-
- slide(aslide, a);
- slide(bslide, b);
-
- ge_p3_to_cached(&Ai[0], A);
- ge_p3_dbl(&t, A);
- ge_p1p1_to_p3(&A2, &t);
- ge_add(&t, &A2, &Ai[0]);
- ge_p1p1_to_p3(&u, &t);
- ge_p3_to_cached(&Ai[1], &u);
- ge_add(&t, &A2, &Ai[1]);
- ge_p1p1_to_p3(&u, &t);
- ge_p3_to_cached(&Ai[2], &u);
- ge_add(&t, &A2, &Ai[2]);
- ge_p1p1_to_p3(&u, &t);
- ge_p3_to_cached(&Ai[3], &u);
- ge_add(&t, &A2, &Ai[3]);
- ge_p1p1_to_p3(&u, &t);
- ge_p3_to_cached(&Ai[4], &u);
- ge_add(&t, &A2, &Ai[4]);
- ge_p1p1_to_p3(&u, &t);
- ge_p3_to_cached(&Ai[5], &u);
- ge_add(&t, &A2, &Ai[5]);
- ge_p1p1_to_p3(&u, &t);
- ge_p3_to_cached(&Ai[6], &u);
- ge_add(&t, &A2, &Ai[6]);
- ge_p1p1_to_p3(&u, &t);
- ge_p3_to_cached(&Ai[7], &u);
-
- ge_p2_0(r);
-
- for (i = 255; i >= 0; --i) {
- if (aslide[i] || bslide[i]) {
- break;
+ const ge_p3 *A, const uint8_t *b)
+{
+ signed char aslide[256];
+ signed char bslide[256];
+ ge_cached Ai[8]; /* A,3A,5A,7A,9A,11A,13A,15A */
+ ge_p1p1 t;
+ ge_p3 u;
+ ge_p3 A2;
+ int i;
+
+ slide(aslide, a);
+ slide(bslide, b);
+
+ ge_p3_to_cached(&Ai[0], A);
+ ge_p3_dbl(&t, A);
+ ge_p1p1_to_p3(&A2, &t);
+ ge_add(&t, &A2, &Ai[0]);
+ ge_p1p1_to_p3(&u, &t);
+ ge_p3_to_cached(&Ai[1], &u);
+ ge_add(&t, &A2, &Ai[1]);
+ ge_p1p1_to_p3(&u, &t);
+ ge_p3_to_cached(&Ai[2], &u);
+ ge_add(&t, &A2, &Ai[2]);
+ ge_p1p1_to_p3(&u, &t);
+ ge_p3_to_cached(&Ai[3], &u);
+ ge_add(&t, &A2, &Ai[3]);
+ ge_p1p1_to_p3(&u, &t);
+ ge_p3_to_cached(&Ai[4], &u);
+ ge_add(&t, &A2, &Ai[4]);
+ ge_p1p1_to_p3(&u, &t);
+ ge_p3_to_cached(&Ai[5], &u);
+ ge_add(&t, &A2, &Ai[5]);
+ ge_p1p1_to_p3(&u, &t);
+ ge_p3_to_cached(&Ai[6], &u);
+ ge_add(&t, &A2, &Ai[6]);
+ ge_p1p1_to_p3(&u, &t);
+ ge_p3_to_cached(&Ai[7], &u);
+
+ ge_p2_0(r);
+
+ for (i = 255; i >= 0; --i) {
+ if (aslide[i] || bslide[i]) {
+ break;
+ }
}
- }
- for (; i >= 0; --i) {
- ge_p2_dbl(&t, r);
+ for (; i >= 0; --i) {
+ ge_p2_dbl(&t, r);
- if (aslide[i] > 0) {
- ge_p1p1_to_p3(&u, &t);
- ge_add(&t, &u, &Ai[aslide[i] / 2]);
- } else if (aslide[i] < 0) {
- ge_p1p1_to_p3(&u, &t);
- ge_sub(&t, &u, &Ai[(-aslide[i]) / 2]);
- }
+ if (aslide[i] > 0) {
+ ge_p1p1_to_p3(&u, &t);
+ ge_add(&t, &u, &Ai[aslide[i] / 2]);
+ } else if (aslide[i] < 0) {
+ ge_p1p1_to_p3(&u, &t);
+ ge_sub(&t, &u, &Ai[(-aslide[i]) / 2]);
+ }
- if (bslide[i] > 0) {
- ge_p1p1_to_p3(&u, &t);
- ge_madd(&t, &u, &Bi[bslide[i] / 2]);
- } else if (bslide[i] < 0) {
- ge_p1p1_to_p3(&u, &t);
- ge_msub(&t, &u, &Bi[(-bslide[i]) / 2]);
- }
+ if (bslide[i] > 0) {
+ ge_p1p1_to_p3(&u, &t);
+ ge_madd(&t, &u, &Bi[bslide[i] / 2]);
+ } else if (bslide[i] < 0) {
+ ge_p1p1_to_p3(&u, &t);
+ ge_msub(&t, &u, &Bi[(-bslide[i]) / 2]);
+ }
- ge_p1p1_to_p2(r, &t);
- }
+ ge_p1p1_to_p2(r, &t);
+ }
}
-/* The set of scalars is \Z/l
- * where l = 2^252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493. */
-
-/* Input:
+/*
+ * The set of scalars is \Z/l
+ * where l = 2^252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493.
+ *
+ * Input:
* s[0]+256*s[1]+...+256^63*s[63] = s
*
* Output:
* s[0]+256*s[1]+...+256^31*s[31] = s mod l
* where l = 2^252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493.
- * Overwrites s in place. */
-static void x25519_sc_reduce(uint8_t *s) {
- int64_t s0 = 2097151 & load_3(s);
- int64_t s1 = 2097151 & (load_4(s + 2) >> 5);
- int64_t s2 = 2097151 & (load_3(s + 5) >> 2);
- int64_t s3 = 2097151 & (load_4(s + 7) >> 7);
- int64_t s4 = 2097151 & (load_4(s + 10) >> 4);
- int64_t s5 = 2097151 & (load_3(s + 13) >> 1);
- int64_t s6 = 2097151 & (load_4(s + 15) >> 6);
- int64_t s7 = 2097151 & (load_3(s + 18) >> 3);
- int64_t s8 = 2097151 & load_3(s + 21);
- int64_t s9 = 2097151 & (load_4(s + 23) >> 5);
- int64_t s10 = 2097151 & (load_3(s + 26) >> 2);
- int64_t s11 = 2097151 & (load_4(s + 28) >> 7);
- int64_t s12 = 2097151 & (load_4(s + 31) >> 4);
- int64_t s13 = 2097151 & (load_3(s + 34) >> 1);
- int64_t s14 = 2097151 & (load_4(s + 36) >> 6);
- int64_t s15 = 2097151 & (load_3(s + 39) >> 3);
- int64_t s16 = 2097151 & load_3(s + 42);
- int64_t s17 = 2097151 & (load_4(s + 44) >> 5);
- int64_t s18 = 2097151 & (load_3(s + 47) >> 2);
- int64_t s19 = 2097151 & (load_4(s + 49) >> 7);
- int64_t s20 = 2097151 & (load_4(s + 52) >> 4);
- int64_t s21 = 2097151 & (load_3(s + 55) >> 1);
- int64_t s22 = 2097151 & (load_4(s + 57) >> 6);
- int64_t s23 = (load_4(s + 60) >> 3);
- int64_t carry0;
- int64_t carry1;
- int64_t carry2;
- int64_t carry3;
- int64_t carry4;
- int64_t carry5;
- int64_t carry6;
- int64_t carry7;
- int64_t carry8;
- int64_t carry9;
- int64_t carry10;
- int64_t carry11;
- int64_t carry12;
- int64_t carry13;
- int64_t carry14;
- int64_t carry15;
- int64_t carry16;
-
- s11 += s23 * 666643;
- s12 += s23 * 470296;
- s13 += s23 * 654183;
- s14 -= s23 * 997805;
- s15 += s23 * 136657;
- s16 -= s23 * 683901;
- s23 = 0;
-
- s10 += s22 * 666643;
- s11 += s22 * 470296;
- s12 += s22 * 654183;
- s13 -= s22 * 997805;
- s14 += s22 * 136657;
- s15 -= s22 * 683901;
- s22 = 0;
-
- s9 += s21 * 666643;
- s10 += s21 * 470296;
- s11 += s21 * 654183;
- s12 -= s21 * 997805;
- s13 += s21 * 136657;
- s14 -= s21 * 683901;
- s21 = 0;
-
- s8 += s20 * 666643;
- s9 += s20 * 470296;
- s10 += s20 * 654183;
- s11 -= s20 * 997805;
- s12 += s20 * 136657;
- s13 -= s20 * 683901;
- s20 = 0;
-
- s7 += s19 * 666643;
- s8 += s19 * 470296;
- s9 += s19 * 654183;
- s10 -= s19 * 997805;
- s11 += s19 * 136657;
- s12 -= s19 * 683901;
- s19 = 0;
-
- s6 += s18 * 666643;
- s7 += s18 * 470296;
- s8 += s18 * 654183;
- s9 -= s18 * 997805;
- s10 += s18 * 136657;
- s11 -= s18 * 683901;
- s18 = 0;
-
- carry6 = (s6 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s7 += carry6;
- s6 -= carry6 * (1 << 21);
- carry8 = (s8 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s9 += carry8;
- s8 -= carry8 * (1 << 21);
- carry10 = (s10 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s11 += carry10;
- s10 -= carry10 * (1 << 21);
- carry12 = (s12 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s13 += carry12;
- s12 -= carry12 * (1 << 21);
- carry14 = (s14 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s15 += carry14;
- s14 -= carry14 * (1 << 21);
- carry16 = (s16 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s17 += carry16;
- s16 -= carry16 * (1 << 21);
-
- carry7 = (s7 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s8 += carry7;
- s7 -= carry7 * (1 << 21);
- carry9 = (s9 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s10 += carry9;
- s9 -= carry9 * (1 << 21);
- carry11 = (s11 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s12 += carry11;
- s11 -= carry11 * (1 << 21);
- carry13 = (s13 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s14 += carry13;
- s13 -= carry13 * (1 << 21);
- carry15 = (s15 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s16 += carry15;
- s15 -= carry15 * (1 << 21);
-
- s5 += s17 * 666643;
- s6 += s17 * 470296;
- s7 += s17 * 654183;
- s8 -= s17 * 997805;
- s9 += s17 * 136657;
- s10 -= s17 * 683901;
- s17 = 0;
-
- s4 += s16 * 666643;
- s5 += s16 * 470296;
- s6 += s16 * 654183;
- s7 -= s16 * 997805;
- s8 += s16 * 136657;
- s9 -= s16 * 683901;
- s16 = 0;
-
- s3 += s15 * 666643;
- s4 += s15 * 470296;
- s5 += s15 * 654183;
- s6 -= s15 * 997805;
- s7 += s15 * 136657;
- s8 -= s15 * 683901;
- s15 = 0;
-
- s2 += s14 * 666643;
- s3 += s14 * 470296;
- s4 += s14 * 654183;
- s5 -= s14 * 997805;
- s6 += s14 * 136657;
- s7 -= s14 * 683901;
- s14 = 0;
-
- s1 += s13 * 666643;
- s2 += s13 * 470296;
- s3 += s13 * 654183;
- s4 -= s13 * 997805;
- s5 += s13 * 136657;
- s6 -= s13 * 683901;
- s13 = 0;
-
- s0 += s12 * 666643;
- s1 += s12 * 470296;
- s2 += s12 * 654183;
- s3 -= s12 * 997805;
- s4 += s12 * 136657;
- s5 -= s12 * 683901;
- s12 = 0;
-
- carry0 = (s0 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s1 += carry0;
- s0 -= carry0 * (1 << 21);
- carry2 = (s2 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s3 += carry2;
- s2 -= carry2 * (1 << 21);
- carry4 = (s4 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s5 += carry4;
- s4 -= carry4 * (1 << 21);
- carry6 = (s6 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s7 += carry6;
- s6 -= carry6 * (1 << 21);
- carry8 = (s8 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s9 += carry8;
- s8 -= carry8 * (1 << 21);
- carry10 = (s10 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s11 += carry10;
- s10 -= carry10 * (1 << 21);
-
- carry1 = (s1 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s2 += carry1;
- s1 -= carry1 * (1 << 21);
- carry3 = (s3 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s4 += carry3;
- s3 -= carry3 * (1 << 21);
- carry5 = (s5 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s6 += carry5;
- s5 -= carry5 * (1 << 21);
- carry7 = (s7 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s8 += carry7;
- s7 -= carry7 * (1 << 21);
- carry9 = (s9 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s10 += carry9;
- s9 -= carry9 * (1 << 21);
- carry11 = (s11 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s12 += carry11;
- s11 -= carry11 * (1 << 21);
-
- s0 += s12 * 666643;
- s1 += s12 * 470296;
- s2 += s12 * 654183;
- s3 -= s12 * 997805;
- s4 += s12 * 136657;
- s5 -= s12 * 683901;
- s12 = 0;
-
- carry0 = s0 >> 21;
- s1 += carry0;
- s0 -= carry0 * (1 << 21);
- carry1 = s1 >> 21;
- s2 += carry1;
- s1 -= carry1 * (1 << 21);
- carry2 = s2 >> 21;
- s3 += carry2;
- s2 -= carry2 * (1 << 21);
- carry3 = s3 >> 21;
- s4 += carry3;
- s3 -= carry3 * (1 << 21);
- carry4 = s4 >> 21;
- s5 += carry4;
- s4 -= carry4 * (1 << 21);
- carry5 = s5 >> 21;
- s6 += carry5;
- s5 -= carry5 * (1 << 21);
- carry6 = s6 >> 21;
- s7 += carry6;
- s6 -= carry6 * (1 << 21);
- carry7 = s7 >> 21;
- s8 += carry7;
- s7 -= carry7 * (1 << 21);
- carry8 = s8 >> 21;
- s9 += carry8;
- s8 -= carry8 * (1 << 21);
- carry9 = s9 >> 21;
- s10 += carry9;
- s9 -= carry9 * (1 << 21);
- carry10 = s10 >> 21;
- s11 += carry10;
- s10 -= carry10 * (1 << 21);
- carry11 = s11 >> 21;
- s12 += carry11;
- s11 -= carry11 * (1 << 21);
-
- s0 += s12 * 666643;
- s1 += s12 * 470296;
- s2 += s12 * 654183;
- s3 -= s12 * 997805;
- s4 += s12 * 136657;
- s5 -= s12 * 683901;
- s12 = 0;
-
- carry0 = s0 >> 21;
- s1 += carry0;
- s0 -= carry0 * (1 << 21);
- carry1 = s1 >> 21;
- s2 += carry1;
- s1 -= carry1 * (1 << 21);
- carry2 = s2 >> 21;
- s3 += carry2;
- s2 -= carry2 * (1 << 21);
- carry3 = s3 >> 21;
- s4 += carry3;
- s3 -= carry3 * (1 << 21);
- carry4 = s4 >> 21;
- s5 += carry4;
- s4 -= carry4 * (1 << 21);
- carry5 = s5 >> 21;
- s6 += carry5;
- s5 -= carry5 * (1 << 21);
- carry6 = s6 >> 21;
- s7 += carry6;
- s6 -= carry6 * (1 << 21);
- carry7 = s7 >> 21;
- s8 += carry7;
- s7 -= carry7 * (1 << 21);
- carry8 = s8 >> 21;
- s9 += carry8;
- s8 -= carry8 * (1 << 21);
- carry9 = s9 >> 21;
- s10 += carry9;
- s9 -= carry9 * (1 << 21);
- carry10 = s10 >> 21;
- s11 += carry10;
- s10 -= carry10 * (1 << 21);
-
- s[0] = (uint8_t)(s0 >> 0);
- s[1] = (uint8_t)(s0 >> 8);
- s[2] = (uint8_t)((s0 >> 16) | (s1 << 5));
- s[3] = (uint8_t)(s1 >> 3);
- s[4] = (uint8_t)(s1 >> 11);
- s[5] = (uint8_t)((s1 >> 19) | (s2 << 2));
- s[6] = (uint8_t)(s2 >> 6);
- s[7] = (uint8_t)((s2 >> 14) | (s3 << 7));
- s[8] = (uint8_t)(s3 >> 1);
- s[9] = (uint8_t)(s3 >> 9);
- s[10] = (uint8_t)((s3 >> 17) | (s4 << 4));
- s[11] = (uint8_t)(s4 >> 4);
- s[12] = (uint8_t)(s4 >> 12);
- s[13] = (uint8_t)((s4 >> 20) | (s5 << 1));
- s[14] = (uint8_t)(s5 >> 7);
- s[15] = (uint8_t)((s5 >> 15) | (s6 << 6));
- s[16] = (uint8_t)(s6 >> 2);
- s[17] = (uint8_t)(s6 >> 10);
- s[18] = (uint8_t)((s6 >> 18) | (s7 << 3));
- s[19] = (uint8_t)(s7 >> 5);
- s[20] = (uint8_t)(s7 >> 13);
- s[21] = (uint8_t)(s8 >> 0);
- s[22] = (uint8_t)(s8 >> 8);
- s[23] = (uint8_t)((s8 >> 16) | (s9 << 5));
- s[24] = (uint8_t)(s9 >> 3);
- s[25] = (uint8_t)(s9 >> 11);
- s[26] = (uint8_t)((s9 >> 19) | (s10 << 2));
- s[27] = (uint8_t)(s10 >> 6);
- s[28] = (uint8_t)((s10 >> 14) | (s11 << 7));
- s[29] = (uint8_t)(s11 >> 1);
- s[30] = (uint8_t)(s11 >> 9);
- s[31] = (uint8_t)(s11 >> 17);
+ * Overwrites s in place.
+*/
+static void x25519_sc_reduce(uint8_t *s)
+{
+ int64_t s0 = kBottom21Bits & load_3(s);
+ int64_t s1 = kBottom21Bits & (load_4(s + 2) >> 5);
+ int64_t s2 = kBottom21Bits & (load_3(s + 5) >> 2);
+ int64_t s3 = kBottom21Bits & (load_4(s + 7) >> 7);
+ int64_t s4 = kBottom21Bits & (load_4(s + 10) >> 4);
+ int64_t s5 = kBottom21Bits & (load_3(s + 13) >> 1);
+ int64_t s6 = kBottom21Bits & (load_4(s + 15) >> 6);
+ int64_t s7 = kBottom21Bits & (load_3(s + 18) >> 3);
+ int64_t s8 = kBottom21Bits & load_3(s + 21);
+ int64_t s9 = kBottom21Bits & (load_4(s + 23) >> 5);
+ int64_t s10 = kBottom21Bits & (load_3(s + 26) >> 2);
+ int64_t s11 = kBottom21Bits & (load_4(s + 28) >> 7);
+ int64_t s12 = kBottom21Bits & (load_4(s + 31) >> 4);
+ int64_t s13 = kBottom21Bits & (load_3(s + 34) >> 1);
+ int64_t s14 = kBottom21Bits & (load_4(s + 36) >> 6);
+ int64_t s15 = kBottom21Bits & (load_3(s + 39) >> 3);
+ int64_t s16 = kBottom21Bits & load_3(s + 42);
+ int64_t s17 = kBottom21Bits & (load_4(s + 44) >> 5);
+ int64_t s18 = kBottom21Bits & (load_3(s + 47) >> 2);
+ int64_t s19 = kBottom21Bits & (load_4(s + 49) >> 7);
+ int64_t s20 = kBottom21Bits & (load_4(s + 52) >> 4);
+ int64_t s21 = kBottom21Bits & (load_3(s + 55) >> 1);
+ int64_t s22 = kBottom21Bits & (load_4(s + 57) >> 6);
+ int64_t s23 = (load_4(s + 60) >> 3);
+ int64_t carry0;
+ int64_t carry1;
+ int64_t carry2;
+ int64_t carry3;
+ int64_t carry4;
+ int64_t carry5;
+ int64_t carry6;
+ int64_t carry7;
+ int64_t carry8;
+ int64_t carry9;
+ int64_t carry10;
+ int64_t carry11;
+ int64_t carry12;
+ int64_t carry13;
+ int64_t carry14;
+ int64_t carry15;
+ int64_t carry16;
+
+ s11 += s23 * 666643;
+ s12 += s23 * 470296;
+ s13 += s23 * 654183;
+ s14 -= s23 * 997805;
+ s15 += s23 * 136657;
+ s16 -= s23 * 683901;
+ s23 = 0;
+
+ s10 += s22 * 666643;
+ s11 += s22 * 470296;
+ s12 += s22 * 654183;
+ s13 -= s22 * 997805;
+ s14 += s22 * 136657;
+ s15 -= s22 * 683901;
+ s22 = 0;
+
+ s9 += s21 * 666643;
+ s10 += s21 * 470296;
+ s11 += s21 * 654183;
+ s12 -= s21 * 997805;
+ s13 += s21 * 136657;
+ s14 -= s21 * 683901;
+ s21 = 0;
+
+ s8 += s20 * 666643;
+ s9 += s20 * 470296;
+ s10 += s20 * 654183;
+ s11 -= s20 * 997805;
+ s12 += s20 * 136657;
+ s13 -= s20 * 683901;
+ s20 = 0;
+
+ s7 += s19 * 666643;
+ s8 += s19 * 470296;
+ s9 += s19 * 654183;
+ s10 -= s19 * 997805;
+ s11 += s19 * 136657;
+ s12 -= s19 * 683901;
+ s19 = 0;
+
+ s6 += s18 * 666643;
+ s7 += s18 * 470296;
+ s8 += s18 * 654183;
+ s9 -= s18 * 997805;
+ s10 += s18 * 136657;
+ s11 -= s18 * 683901;
+ s18 = 0;
+
+ carry6 = (s6 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s7 += carry6;
+ s6 -= carry6 * (1 << 21);
+ carry8 = (s8 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s9 += carry8;
+ s8 -= carry8 * (1 << 21);
+ carry10 = (s10 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s11 += carry10;
+ s10 -= carry10 * (1 << 21);
+ carry12 = (s12 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s13 += carry12;
+ s12 -= carry12 * (1 << 21);
+ carry14 = (s14 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s15 += carry14;
+ s14 -= carry14 * (1 << 21);
+ carry16 = (s16 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s17 += carry16;
+ s16 -= carry16 * (1 << 21);
+
+ carry7 = (s7 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s8 += carry7;
+ s7 -= carry7 * (1 << 21);
+ carry9 = (s9 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s10 += carry9;
+ s9 -= carry9 * (1 << 21);
+ carry11 = (s11 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s12 += carry11;
+ s11 -= carry11 * (1 << 21);
+ carry13 = (s13 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s14 += carry13;
+ s13 -= carry13 * (1 << 21);
+ carry15 = (s15 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s16 += carry15;
+ s15 -= carry15 * (1 << 21);
+
+ s5 += s17 * 666643;
+ s6 += s17 * 470296;
+ s7 += s17 * 654183;
+ s8 -= s17 * 997805;
+ s9 += s17 * 136657;
+ s10 -= s17 * 683901;
+ s17 = 0;
+
+ s4 += s16 * 666643;
+ s5 += s16 * 470296;
+ s6 += s16 * 654183;
+ s7 -= s16 * 997805;
+ s8 += s16 * 136657;
+ s9 -= s16 * 683901;
+ s16 = 0;
+
+ s3 += s15 * 666643;
+ s4 += s15 * 470296;
+ s5 += s15 * 654183;
+ s6 -= s15 * 997805;
+ s7 += s15 * 136657;
+ s8 -= s15 * 683901;
+ s15 = 0;
+
+ s2 += s14 * 666643;
+ s3 += s14 * 470296;
+ s4 += s14 * 654183;
+ s5 -= s14 * 997805;
+ s6 += s14 * 136657;
+ s7 -= s14 * 683901;
+ s14 = 0;
+
+ s1 += s13 * 666643;
+ s2 += s13 * 470296;
+ s3 += s13 * 654183;
+ s4 -= s13 * 997805;
+ s5 += s13 * 136657;
+ s6 -= s13 * 683901;
+ s13 = 0;
+
+ s0 += s12 * 666643;
+ s1 += s12 * 470296;
+ s2 += s12 * 654183;
+ s3 -= s12 * 997805;
+ s4 += s12 * 136657;
+ s5 -= s12 * 683901;
+ s12 = 0;
+
+ carry0 = (s0 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s1 += carry0;
+ s0 -= carry0 * (1 << 21);
+ carry2 = (s2 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s3 += carry2;
+ s2 -= carry2 * (1 << 21);
+ carry4 = (s4 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s5 += carry4;
+ s4 -= carry4 * (1 << 21);
+ carry6 = (s6 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s7 += carry6;
+ s6 -= carry6 * (1 << 21);
+ carry8 = (s8 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s9 += carry8;
+ s8 -= carry8 * (1 << 21);
+ carry10 = (s10 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s11 += carry10;
+ s10 -= carry10 * (1 << 21);
+
+ carry1 = (s1 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s2 += carry1;
+ s1 -= carry1 * (1 << 21);
+ carry3 = (s3 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s4 += carry3;
+ s3 -= carry3 * (1 << 21);
+ carry5 = (s5 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s6 += carry5;
+ s5 -= carry5 * (1 << 21);
+ carry7 = (s7 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s8 += carry7;
+ s7 -= carry7 * (1 << 21);
+ carry9 = (s9 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s10 += carry9;
+ s9 -= carry9 * (1 << 21);
+ carry11 = (s11 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s12 += carry11;
+ s11 -= carry11 * (1 << 21);
+
+ s0 += s12 * 666643;
+ s1 += s12 * 470296;
+ s2 += s12 * 654183;
+ s3 -= s12 * 997805;
+ s4 += s12 * 136657;
+ s5 -= s12 * 683901;
+ s12 = 0;
+
+ carry0 = s0 >> 21;
+ s1 += carry0;
+ s0 -= carry0 * (1 << 21);
+ carry1 = s1 >> 21;
+ s2 += carry1;
+ s1 -= carry1 * (1 << 21);
+ carry2 = s2 >> 21;
+ s3 += carry2;
+ s2 -= carry2 * (1 << 21);
+ carry3 = s3 >> 21;
+ s4 += carry3;
+ s3 -= carry3 * (1 << 21);
+ carry4 = s4 >> 21;
+ s5 += carry4;
+ s4 -= carry4 * (1 << 21);
+ carry5 = s5 >> 21;
+ s6 += carry5;
+ s5 -= carry5 * (1 << 21);
+ carry6 = s6 >> 21;
+ s7 += carry6;
+ s6 -= carry6 * (1 << 21);
+ carry7 = s7 >> 21;
+ s8 += carry7;
+ s7 -= carry7 * (1 << 21);
+ carry8 = s8 >> 21;
+ s9 += carry8;
+ s8 -= carry8 * (1 << 21);
+ carry9 = s9 >> 21;
+ s10 += carry9;
+ s9 -= carry9 * (1 << 21);
+ carry10 = s10 >> 21;
+ s11 += carry10;
+ s10 -= carry10 * (1 << 21);
+ carry11 = s11 >> 21;
+ s12 += carry11;
+ s11 -= carry11 * (1 << 21);
+
+ s0 += s12 * 666643;
+ s1 += s12 * 470296;
+ s2 += s12 * 654183;
+ s3 -= s12 * 997805;
+ s4 += s12 * 136657;
+ s5 -= s12 * 683901;
+ s12 = 0;
+
+ carry0 = s0 >> 21;
+ s1 += carry0;
+ s0 -= carry0 * (1 << 21);
+ carry1 = s1 >> 21;
+ s2 += carry1;
+ s1 -= carry1 * (1 << 21);
+ carry2 = s2 >> 21;
+ s3 += carry2;
+ s2 -= carry2 * (1 << 21);
+ carry3 = s3 >> 21;
+ s4 += carry3;
+ s3 -= carry3 * (1 << 21);
+ carry4 = s4 >> 21;
+ s5 += carry4;
+ s4 -= carry4 * (1 << 21);
+ carry5 = s5 >> 21;
+ s6 += carry5;
+ s5 -= carry5 * (1 << 21);
+ carry6 = s6 >> 21;
+ s7 += carry6;
+ s6 -= carry6 * (1 << 21);
+ carry7 = s7 >> 21;
+ s8 += carry7;
+ s7 -= carry7 * (1 << 21);
+ carry8 = s8 >> 21;
+ s9 += carry8;
+ s8 -= carry8 * (1 << 21);
+ carry9 = s9 >> 21;
+ s10 += carry9;
+ s9 -= carry9 * (1 << 21);
+ carry10 = s10 >> 21;
+ s11 += carry10;
+ s10 -= carry10 * (1 << 21);
+
+ s[ 0] = (uint8_t) (s0 >> 0);
+ s[ 1] = (uint8_t) (s0 >> 8);
+ s[ 2] = (uint8_t)((s0 >> 16) | (s1 << 5));
+ s[ 3] = (uint8_t) (s1 >> 3);
+ s[ 4] = (uint8_t) (s1 >> 11);
+ s[ 5] = (uint8_t)((s1 >> 19) | (s2 << 2));
+ s[ 6] = (uint8_t) (s2 >> 6);
+ s[ 7] = (uint8_t)((s2 >> 14) | (s3 << 7));
+ s[ 8] = (uint8_t) (s3 >> 1);
+ s[ 9] = (uint8_t) (s3 >> 9);
+ s[10] = (uint8_t)((s3 >> 17) | (s4 << 4));
+ s[11] = (uint8_t) (s4 >> 4);
+ s[12] = (uint8_t) (s4 >> 12);
+ s[13] = (uint8_t)((s4 >> 20) | (s5 << 1));
+ s[14] = (uint8_t) (s5 >> 7);
+ s[15] = (uint8_t)((s5 >> 15) | (s6 << 6));
+ s[16] = (uint8_t) (s6 >> 2);
+ s[17] = (uint8_t) (s6 >> 10);
+ s[18] = (uint8_t)((s6 >> 18) | (s7 << 3));
+ s[19] = (uint8_t) (s7 >> 5);
+ s[20] = (uint8_t) (s7 >> 13);
+ s[21] = (uint8_t) (s8 >> 0);
+ s[22] = (uint8_t) (s8 >> 8);
+ s[23] = (uint8_t)((s8 >> 16) | (s9 << 5));
+ s[24] = (uint8_t) (s9 >> 3);
+ s[25] = (uint8_t) (s9 >> 11);
+ s[26] = (uint8_t)((s9 >> 19) | (s10 << 2));
+ s[27] = (uint8_t) (s10 >> 6);
+ s[28] = (uint8_t)((s10 >> 14) | (s11 << 7));
+ s[29] = (uint8_t) (s11 >> 1);
+ s[30] = (uint8_t) (s11 >> 9);
+ s[31] = (uint8_t) (s11 >> 17);
}
-/* Input:
+/*
+ * Input:
* a[0]+256*a[1]+...+256^31*a[31] = a
* b[0]+256*b[1]+...+256^31*b[31] = b
* c[0]+256*c[1]+...+256^31*c[31] = c
*
* Output:
* s[0]+256*s[1]+...+256^31*s[31] = (ab+c) mod l
- * where l = 2^252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493. */
+ * where l = 2^252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493.
+ */
static void sc_muladd(uint8_t *s, const uint8_t *a, const uint8_t *b,
- const uint8_t *c) {
- int64_t a0 = 2097151 & load_3(a);
- int64_t a1 = 2097151 & (load_4(a + 2) >> 5);
- int64_t a2 = 2097151 & (load_3(a + 5) >> 2);
- int64_t a3 = 2097151 & (load_4(a + 7) >> 7);
- int64_t a4 = 2097151 & (load_4(a + 10) >> 4);
- int64_t a5 = 2097151 & (load_3(a + 13) >> 1);
- int64_t a6 = 2097151 & (load_4(a + 15) >> 6);
- int64_t a7 = 2097151 & (load_3(a + 18) >> 3);
- int64_t a8 = 2097151 & load_3(a + 21);
- int64_t a9 = 2097151 & (load_4(a + 23) >> 5);
- int64_t a10 = 2097151 & (load_3(a + 26) >> 2);
- int64_t a11 = (load_4(a + 28) >> 7);
- int64_t b0 = 2097151 & load_3(b);
- int64_t b1 = 2097151 & (load_4(b + 2) >> 5);
- int64_t b2 = 2097151 & (load_3(b + 5) >> 2);
- int64_t b3 = 2097151 & (load_4(b + 7) >> 7);
- int64_t b4 = 2097151 & (load_4(b + 10) >> 4);
- int64_t b5 = 2097151 & (load_3(b + 13) >> 1);
- int64_t b6 = 2097151 & (load_4(b + 15) >> 6);
- int64_t b7 = 2097151 & (load_3(b + 18) >> 3);
- int64_t b8 = 2097151 & load_3(b + 21);
- int64_t b9 = 2097151 & (load_4(b + 23) >> 5);
- int64_t b10 = 2097151 & (load_3(b + 26) >> 2);
- int64_t b11 = (load_4(b + 28) >> 7);
- int64_t c0 = 2097151 & load_3(c);
- int64_t c1 = 2097151 & (load_4(c + 2) >> 5);
- int64_t c2 = 2097151 & (load_3(c + 5) >> 2);
- int64_t c3 = 2097151 & (load_4(c + 7) >> 7);
- int64_t c4 = 2097151 & (load_4(c + 10) >> 4);
- int64_t c5 = 2097151 & (load_3(c + 13) >> 1);
- int64_t c6 = 2097151 & (load_4(c + 15) >> 6);
- int64_t c7 = 2097151 & (load_3(c + 18) >> 3);
- int64_t c8 = 2097151 & load_3(c + 21);
- int64_t c9 = 2097151 & (load_4(c + 23) >> 5);
- int64_t c10 = 2097151 & (load_3(c + 26) >> 2);
- int64_t c11 = (load_4(c + 28) >> 7);
- int64_t s0;
- int64_t s1;
- int64_t s2;
- int64_t s3;
- int64_t s4;
- int64_t s5;
- int64_t s6;
- int64_t s7;
- int64_t s8;
- int64_t s9;
- int64_t s10;
- int64_t s11;
- int64_t s12;
- int64_t s13;
- int64_t s14;
- int64_t s15;
- int64_t s16;
- int64_t s17;
- int64_t s18;
- int64_t s19;
- int64_t s20;
- int64_t s21;
- int64_t s22;
- int64_t s23;
- int64_t carry0;
- int64_t carry1;
- int64_t carry2;
- int64_t carry3;
- int64_t carry4;
- int64_t carry5;
- int64_t carry6;
- int64_t carry7;
- int64_t carry8;
- int64_t carry9;
- int64_t carry10;
- int64_t carry11;
- int64_t carry12;
- int64_t carry13;
- int64_t carry14;
- int64_t carry15;
- int64_t carry16;
- int64_t carry17;
- int64_t carry18;
- int64_t carry19;
- int64_t carry20;
- int64_t carry21;
- int64_t carry22;
-
- s0 = c0 + a0 * b0;
- s1 = c1 + a0 * b1 + a1 * b0;
- s2 = c2 + a0 * b2 + a1 * b1 + a2 * b0;
- s3 = c3 + a0 * b3 + a1 * b2 + a2 * b1 + a3 * b0;
- s4 = c4 + a0 * b4 + a1 * b3 + a2 * b2 + a3 * b1 + a4 * b0;
- s5 = c5 + a0 * b5 + a1 * b4 + a2 * b3 + a3 * b2 + a4 * b1 + a5 * b0;
- s6 = c6 + a0 * b6 + a1 * b5 + a2 * b4 + a3 * b3 + a4 * b2 + a5 * b1 + a6 * b0;
- s7 = c7 + a0 * b7 + a1 * b6 + a2 * b5 + a3 * b4 + a4 * b3 + a5 * b2 +
- a6 * b1 + a7 * b0;
- s8 = c8 + a0 * b8 + a1 * b7 + a2 * b6 + a3 * b5 + a4 * b4 + a5 * b3 +
- a6 * b2 + a7 * b1 + a8 * b0;
- s9 = c9 + a0 * b9 + a1 * b8 + a2 * b7 + a3 * b6 + a4 * b5 + a5 * b4 +
- a6 * b3 + a7 * b2 + a8 * b1 + a9 * b0;
- s10 = c10 + a0 * b10 + a1 * b9 + a2 * b8 + a3 * b7 + a4 * b6 + a5 * b5 +
- a6 * b4 + a7 * b3 + a8 * b2 + a9 * b1 + a10 * b0;
- s11 = c11 + a0 * b11 + a1 * b10 + a2 * b9 + a3 * b8 + a4 * b7 + a5 * b6 +
- a6 * b5 + a7 * b4 + a8 * b3 + a9 * b2 + a10 * b1 + a11 * b0;
- s12 = a1 * b11 + a2 * b10 + a3 * b9 + a4 * b8 + a5 * b7 + a6 * b6 + a7 * b5 +
- a8 * b4 + a9 * b3 + a10 * b2 + a11 * b1;
- s13 = a2 * b11 + a3 * b10 + a4 * b9 + a5 * b8 + a6 * b7 + a7 * b6 + a8 * b5 +
- a9 * b4 + a10 * b3 + a11 * b2;
- s14 = a3 * b11 + a4 * b10 + a5 * b9 + a6 * b8 + a7 * b7 + a8 * b6 + a9 * b5 +
- a10 * b4 + a11 * b3;
- s15 = a4 * b11 + a5 * b10 + a6 * b9 + a7 * b8 + a8 * b7 + a9 * b6 + a10 * b5 +
- a11 * b4;
- s16 = a5 * b11 + a6 * b10 + a7 * b9 + a8 * b8 + a9 * b7 + a10 * b6 + a11 * b5;
- s17 = a6 * b11 + a7 * b10 + a8 * b9 + a9 * b8 + a10 * b7 + a11 * b6;
- s18 = a7 * b11 + a8 * b10 + a9 * b9 + a10 * b8 + a11 * b7;
- s19 = a8 * b11 + a9 * b10 + a10 * b9 + a11 * b8;
- s20 = a9 * b11 + a10 * b10 + a11 * b9;
- s21 = a10 * b11 + a11 * b10;
- s22 = a11 * b11;
- s23 = 0;
-
- carry0 = (s0 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s1 += carry0;
- s0 -= carry0 * (1 << 21);
- carry2 = (s2 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s3 += carry2;
- s2 -= carry2 * (1 << 21);
- carry4 = (s4 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s5 += carry4;
- s4 -= carry4 * (1 << 21);
- carry6 = (s6 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s7 += carry6;
- s6 -= carry6 * (1 << 21);
- carry8 = (s8 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s9 += carry8;
- s8 -= carry8 * (1 << 21);
- carry10 = (s10 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s11 += carry10;
- s10 -= carry10 * (1 << 21);
- carry12 = (s12 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s13 += carry12;
- s12 -= carry12 * (1 << 21);
- carry14 = (s14 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s15 += carry14;
- s14 -= carry14 * (1 << 21);
- carry16 = (s16 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s17 += carry16;
- s16 -= carry16 * (1 << 21);
- carry18 = (s18 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s19 += carry18;
- s18 -= carry18 * (1 << 21);
- carry20 = (s20 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s21 += carry20;
- s20 -= carry20 * (1 << 21);
- carry22 = (s22 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s23 += carry22;
- s22 -= carry22 * (1 << 21);
-
- carry1 = (s1 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s2 += carry1;
- s1 -= carry1 * (1 << 21);
- carry3 = (s3 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s4 += carry3;
- s3 -= carry3 * (1 << 21);
- carry5 = (s5 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s6 += carry5;
- s5 -= carry5 * (1 << 21);
- carry7 = (s7 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s8 += carry7;
- s7 -= carry7 * (1 << 21);
- carry9 = (s9 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s10 += carry9;
- s9 -= carry9 * (1 << 21);
- carry11 = (s11 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s12 += carry11;
- s11 -= carry11 * (1 << 21);
- carry13 = (s13 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s14 += carry13;
- s13 -= carry13 * (1 << 21);
- carry15 = (s15 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s16 += carry15;
- s15 -= carry15 * (1 << 21);
- carry17 = (s17 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s18 += carry17;
- s17 -= carry17 * (1 << 21);
- carry19 = (s19 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s20 += carry19;
- s19 -= carry19 * (1 << 21);
- carry21 = (s21 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s22 += carry21;
- s21 -= carry21 * (1 << 21);
-
- s11 += s23 * 666643;
- s12 += s23 * 470296;
- s13 += s23 * 654183;
- s14 -= s23 * 997805;
- s15 += s23 * 136657;
- s16 -= s23 * 683901;
- s23 = 0;
-
- s10 += s22 * 666643;
- s11 += s22 * 470296;
- s12 += s22 * 654183;
- s13 -= s22 * 997805;
- s14 += s22 * 136657;
- s15 -= s22 * 683901;
- s22 = 0;
-
- s9 += s21 * 666643;
- s10 += s21 * 470296;
- s11 += s21 * 654183;
- s12 -= s21 * 997805;
- s13 += s21 * 136657;
- s14 -= s21 * 683901;
- s21 = 0;
-
- s8 += s20 * 666643;
- s9 += s20 * 470296;
- s10 += s20 * 654183;
- s11 -= s20 * 997805;
- s12 += s20 * 136657;
- s13 -= s20 * 683901;
- s20 = 0;
-
- s7 += s19 * 666643;
- s8 += s19 * 470296;
- s9 += s19 * 654183;
- s10 -= s19 * 997805;
- s11 += s19 * 136657;
- s12 -= s19 * 683901;
- s19 = 0;
-
- s6 += s18 * 666643;
- s7 += s18 * 470296;
- s8 += s18 * 654183;
- s9 -= s18 * 997805;
- s10 += s18 * 136657;
- s11 -= s18 * 683901;
- s18 = 0;
-
- carry6 = (s6 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s7 += carry6;
- s6 -= carry6 * (1 << 21);
- carry8 = (s8 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s9 += carry8;
- s8 -= carry8 * (1 << 21);
- carry10 = (s10 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s11 += carry10;
- s10 -= carry10 * (1 << 21);
- carry12 = (s12 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s13 += carry12;
- s12 -= carry12 * (1 << 21);
- carry14 = (s14 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s15 += carry14;
- s14 -= carry14 * (1 << 21);
- carry16 = (s16 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s17 += carry16;
- s16 -= carry16 * (1 << 21);
-
- carry7 = (s7 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s8 += carry7;
- s7 -= carry7 * (1 << 21);
- carry9 = (s9 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s10 += carry9;
- s9 -= carry9 * (1 << 21);
- carry11 = (s11 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s12 += carry11;
- s11 -= carry11 * (1 << 21);
- carry13 = (s13 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s14 += carry13;
- s13 -= carry13 * (1 << 21);
- carry15 = (s15 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s16 += carry15;
- s15 -= carry15 * (1 << 21);
-
- s5 += s17 * 666643;
- s6 += s17 * 470296;
- s7 += s17 * 654183;
- s8 -= s17 * 997805;
- s9 += s17 * 136657;
- s10 -= s17 * 683901;
- s17 = 0;
-
- s4 += s16 * 666643;
- s5 += s16 * 470296;
- s6 += s16 * 654183;
- s7 -= s16 * 997805;
- s8 += s16 * 136657;
- s9 -= s16 * 683901;
- s16 = 0;
-
- s3 += s15 * 666643;
- s4 += s15 * 470296;
- s5 += s15 * 654183;
- s6 -= s15 * 997805;
- s7 += s15 * 136657;
- s8 -= s15 * 683901;
- s15 = 0;
-
- s2 += s14 * 666643;
- s3 += s14 * 470296;
- s4 += s14 * 654183;
- s5 -= s14 * 997805;
- s6 += s14 * 136657;
- s7 -= s14 * 683901;
- s14 = 0;
-
- s1 += s13 * 666643;
- s2 += s13 * 470296;
- s3 += s13 * 654183;
- s4 -= s13 * 997805;
- s5 += s13 * 136657;
- s6 -= s13 * 683901;
- s13 = 0;
-
- s0 += s12 * 666643;
- s1 += s12 * 470296;
- s2 += s12 * 654183;
- s3 -= s12 * 997805;
- s4 += s12 * 136657;
- s5 -= s12 * 683901;
- s12 = 0;
-
- carry0 = (s0 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s1 += carry0;
- s0 -= carry0 * (1 << 21);
- carry2 = (s2 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s3 += carry2;
- s2 -= carry2 * (1 << 21);
- carry4 = (s4 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s5 += carry4;
- s4 -= carry4 * (1 << 21);
- carry6 = (s6 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s7 += carry6;
- s6 -= carry6 * (1 << 21);
- carry8 = (s8 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s9 += carry8;
- s8 -= carry8 * (1 << 21);
- carry10 = (s10 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s11 += carry10;
- s10 -= carry10 * (1 << 21);
-
- carry1 = (s1 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s2 += carry1;
- s1 -= carry1 * (1 << 21);
- carry3 = (s3 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s4 += carry3;
- s3 -= carry3 * (1 << 21);
- carry5 = (s5 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s6 += carry5;
- s5 -= carry5 * (1 << 21);
- carry7 = (s7 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s8 += carry7;
- s7 -= carry7 * (1 << 21);
- carry9 = (s9 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s10 += carry9;
- s9 -= carry9 * (1 << 21);
- carry11 = (s11 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
- s12 += carry11;
- s11 -= carry11 * (1 << 21);
-
- s0 += s12 * 666643;
- s1 += s12 * 470296;
- s2 += s12 * 654183;
- s3 -= s12 * 997805;
- s4 += s12 * 136657;
- s5 -= s12 * 683901;
- s12 = 0;
-
- carry0 = s0 >> 21;
- s1 += carry0;
- s0 -= carry0 * (1 << 21);
- carry1 = s1 >> 21;
- s2 += carry1;
- s1 -= carry1 * (1 << 21);
- carry2 = s2 >> 21;
- s3 += carry2;
- s2 -= carry2 * (1 << 21);
- carry3 = s3 >> 21;
- s4 += carry3;
- s3 -= carry3 * (1 << 21);
- carry4 = s4 >> 21;
- s5 += carry4;
- s4 -= carry4 * (1 << 21);
- carry5 = s5 >> 21;
- s6 += carry5;
- s5 -= carry5 * (1 << 21);
- carry6 = s6 >> 21;
- s7 += carry6;
- s6 -= carry6 * (1 << 21);
- carry7 = s7 >> 21;
- s8 += carry7;
- s7 -= carry7 * (1 << 21);
- carry8 = s8 >> 21;
- s9 += carry8;
- s8 -= carry8 * (1 << 21);
- carry9 = s9 >> 21;
- s10 += carry9;
- s9 -= carry9 * (1 << 21);
- carry10 = s10 >> 21;
- s11 += carry10;
- s10 -= carry10 * (1 << 21);
- carry11 = s11 >> 21;
- s12 += carry11;
- s11 -= carry11 * (1 << 21);
-
- s0 += s12 * 666643;
- s1 += s12 * 470296;
- s2 += s12 * 654183;
- s3 -= s12 * 997805;
- s4 += s12 * 136657;
- s5 -= s12 * 683901;
- s12 = 0;
-
- carry0 = s0 >> 21;
- s1 += carry0;
- s0 -= carry0 * (1 << 21);
- carry1 = s1 >> 21;
- s2 += carry1;
- s1 -= carry1 * (1 << 21);
- carry2 = s2 >> 21;
- s3 += carry2;
- s2 -= carry2 * (1 << 21);
- carry3 = s3 >> 21;
- s4 += carry3;
- s3 -= carry3 * (1 << 21);
- carry4 = s4 >> 21;
- s5 += carry4;
- s4 -= carry4 * (1 << 21);
- carry5 = s5 >> 21;
- s6 += carry5;
- s5 -= carry5 * (1 << 21);
- carry6 = s6 >> 21;
- s7 += carry6;
- s6 -= carry6 * (1 << 21);
- carry7 = s7 >> 21;
- s8 += carry7;
- s7 -= carry7 * (1 << 21);
- carry8 = s8 >> 21;
- s9 += carry8;
- s8 -= carry8 * (1 << 21);
- carry9 = s9 >> 21;
- s10 += carry9;
- s9 -= carry9 * (1 << 21);
- carry10 = s10 >> 21;
- s11 += carry10;
- s10 -= carry10 * (1 << 21);
-
- s[0] = (uint8_t)(s0 >> 0);
- s[1] = (uint8_t)(s0 >> 8);
- s[2] = (uint8_t)((s0 >> 16) | (s1 << 5));
- s[3] = (uint8_t)(s1 >> 3);
- s[4] = (uint8_t)(s1 >> 11);
- s[5] = (uint8_t)((s1 >> 19) | (s2 << 2));
- s[6] = (uint8_t)(s2 >> 6);
- s[7] = (uint8_t)((s2 >> 14) | (s3 << 7));
- s[8] = (uint8_t)(s3 >> 1);
- s[9] = (uint8_t)(s3 >> 9);
- s[10] = (uint8_t)((s3 >> 17) | (s4 << 4));
- s[11] = (uint8_t)(s4 >> 4);
- s[12] = (uint8_t)(s4 >> 12);
- s[13] = (uint8_t)((s4 >> 20) | (s5 << 1));
- s[14] = (uint8_t)(s5 >> 7);
- s[15] = (uint8_t)((s5 >> 15) | (s6 << 6));
- s[16] = (uint8_t)(s6 >> 2);
- s[17] = (uint8_t)(s6 >> 10);
- s[18] = (uint8_t)((s6 >> 18) | (s7 << 3));
- s[19] = (uint8_t)(s7 >> 5);
- s[20] = (uint8_t)(s7 >> 13);
- s[21] = (uint8_t)(s8 >> 0);
- s[22] = (uint8_t)(s8 >> 8);
- s[23] = (uint8_t)((s8 >> 16) | (s9 << 5));
- s[24] = (uint8_t)(s9 >> 3);
- s[25] = (uint8_t)(s9 >> 11);
- s[26] = (uint8_t)((s9 >> 19) | (s10 << 2));
- s[27] = (uint8_t)(s10 >> 6);
- s[28] = (uint8_t)((s10 >> 14) | (s11 << 7));
- s[29] = (uint8_t)(s11 >> 1);
- s[30] = (uint8_t)(s11 >> 9);
- s[31] = (uint8_t)(s11 >> 17);
+ const uint8_t *c)
+{
+ int64_t a0 = kBottom21Bits & load_3(a);
+ int64_t a1 = kBottom21Bits & (load_4(a + 2) >> 5);
+ int64_t a2 = kBottom21Bits & (load_3(a + 5) >> 2);
+ int64_t a3 = kBottom21Bits & (load_4(a + 7) >> 7);
+ int64_t a4 = kBottom21Bits & (load_4(a + 10) >> 4);
+ int64_t a5 = kBottom21Bits & (load_3(a + 13) >> 1);
+ int64_t a6 = kBottom21Bits & (load_4(a + 15) >> 6);
+ int64_t a7 = kBottom21Bits & (load_3(a + 18) >> 3);
+ int64_t a8 = kBottom21Bits & load_3(a + 21);
+ int64_t a9 = kBottom21Bits & (load_4(a + 23) >> 5);
+ int64_t a10 = kBottom21Bits & (load_3(a + 26) >> 2);
+ int64_t a11 = (load_4(a + 28) >> 7);
+ int64_t b0 = kBottom21Bits & load_3(b);
+ int64_t b1 = kBottom21Bits & (load_4(b + 2) >> 5);
+ int64_t b2 = kBottom21Bits & (load_3(b + 5) >> 2);
+ int64_t b3 = kBottom21Bits & (load_4(b + 7) >> 7);
+ int64_t b4 = kBottom21Bits & (load_4(b + 10) >> 4);
+ int64_t b5 = kBottom21Bits & (load_3(b + 13) >> 1);
+ int64_t b6 = kBottom21Bits & (load_4(b + 15) >> 6);
+ int64_t b7 = kBottom21Bits & (load_3(b + 18) >> 3);
+ int64_t b8 = kBottom21Bits & load_3(b + 21);
+ int64_t b9 = kBottom21Bits & (load_4(b + 23) >> 5);
+ int64_t b10 = kBottom21Bits & (load_3(b + 26) >> 2);
+ int64_t b11 = (load_4(b + 28) >> 7);
+ int64_t c0 = kBottom21Bits & load_3(c);
+ int64_t c1 = kBottom21Bits & (load_4(c + 2) >> 5);
+ int64_t c2 = kBottom21Bits & (load_3(c + 5) >> 2);
+ int64_t c3 = kBottom21Bits & (load_4(c + 7) >> 7);
+ int64_t c4 = kBottom21Bits & (load_4(c + 10) >> 4);
+ int64_t c5 = kBottom21Bits & (load_3(c + 13) >> 1);
+ int64_t c6 = kBottom21Bits & (load_4(c + 15) >> 6);
+ int64_t c7 = kBottom21Bits & (load_3(c + 18) >> 3);
+ int64_t c8 = kBottom21Bits & load_3(c + 21);
+ int64_t c9 = kBottom21Bits & (load_4(c + 23) >> 5);
+ int64_t c10 = kBottom21Bits & (load_3(c + 26) >> 2);
+ int64_t c11 = (load_4(c + 28) >> 7);
+ int64_t s0;
+ int64_t s1;
+ int64_t s2;
+ int64_t s3;
+ int64_t s4;
+ int64_t s5;
+ int64_t s6;
+ int64_t s7;
+ int64_t s8;
+ int64_t s9;
+ int64_t s10;
+ int64_t s11;
+ int64_t s12;
+ int64_t s13;
+ int64_t s14;
+ int64_t s15;
+ int64_t s16;
+ int64_t s17;
+ int64_t s18;
+ int64_t s19;
+ int64_t s20;
+ int64_t s21;
+ int64_t s22;
+ int64_t s23;
+ int64_t carry0;
+ int64_t carry1;
+ int64_t carry2;
+ int64_t carry3;
+ int64_t carry4;
+ int64_t carry5;
+ int64_t carry6;
+ int64_t carry7;
+ int64_t carry8;
+ int64_t carry9;
+ int64_t carry10;
+ int64_t carry11;
+ int64_t carry12;
+ int64_t carry13;
+ int64_t carry14;
+ int64_t carry15;
+ int64_t carry16;
+ int64_t carry17;
+ int64_t carry18;
+ int64_t carry19;
+ int64_t carry20;
+ int64_t carry21;
+ int64_t carry22;
+
+ s0 = c0 + a0 * b0;
+ s1 = c1 + a0 * b1 + a1 * b0;
+ s2 = c2 + a0 * b2 + a1 * b1 + a2 * b0;
+ s3 = c3 + a0 * b3 + a1 * b2 + a2 * b1 + a3 * b0;
+ s4 = c4 + a0 * b4 + a1 * b3 + a2 * b2 + a3 * b1 + a4 * b0;
+ s5 = c5 + a0 * b5 + a1 * b4 + a2 * b3 + a3 * b2 + a4 * b1 + a5 * b0;
+ s6 = c6 + a0 * b6 + a1 * b5 + a2 * b4 + a3 * b3 + a4 * b2 + a5 * b1 + a6 * b0;
+ s7 = c7 + a0 * b7 + a1 * b6 + a2 * b5 + a3 * b4 + a4 * b3 + a5 * b2 + a6 * b1 + a7 * b0;
+ s8 = c8 + a0 * b8 + a1 * b7 + a2 * b6 + a3 * b5 + a4 * b4 + a5 * b3 + a6 * b2 + a7 * b1 + a8 * b0;
+ s9 = c9 + a0 * b9 + a1 * b8 + a2 * b7 + a3 * b6 + a4 * b5 + a5 * b4 + a6 * b3 + a7 * b2 + a8 * b1 + a9 * b0;
+ s10 = c10 + a0 * b10 + a1 * b9 + a2 * b8 + a3 * b7 + a4 * b6 + a5 * b5 + a6 * b4 + a7 * b3 + a8 * b2 + a9 * b1 + a10 * b0;
+ s11 = c11 + a0 * b11 + a1 * b10 + a2 * b9 + a3 * b8 + a4 * b7 + a5 * b6 + a6 * b5 + a7 * b4 + a8 * b3 + a9 * b2 + a10 * b1 + a11 * b0;
+ s12 = a1 * b11 + a2 * b10 + a3 * b9 + a4 * b8 + a5 * b7 + a6 * b6 + a7 * b5 + a8 * b4 + a9 * b3 + a10 * b2 + a11 * b1;
+ s13 = a2 * b11 + a3 * b10 + a4 * b9 + a5 * b8 + a6 * b7 + a7 * b6 + a8 * b5 + a9 * b4 + a10 * b3 + a11 * b2;
+ s14 = a3 * b11 + a4 * b10 + a5 * b9 + a6 * b8 + a7 * b7 + a8 * b6 + a9 * b5 + a10 * b4 + a11 * b3;
+ s15 = a4 * b11 + a5 * b10 + a6 * b9 + a7 * b8 + a8 * b7 + a9 * b6 + a10 * b5 + a11 * b4;
+ s16 = a5 * b11 + a6 * b10 + a7 * b9 + a8 * b8 + a9 * b7 + a10 * b6 + a11 * b5;
+ s17 = a6 * b11 + a7 * b10 + a8 * b9 + a9 * b8 + a10 * b7 + a11 * b6;
+ s18 = a7 * b11 + a8 * b10 + a9 * b9 + a10 * b8 + a11 * b7;
+ s19 = a8 * b11 + a9 * b10 + a10 * b9 + a11 * b8;
+ s20 = a9 * b11 + a10 * b10 + a11 * b9;
+ s21 = a10 * b11 + a11 * b10;
+ s22 = a11 * b11;
+ s23 = 0;
+
+ carry0 = (s0 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s1 += carry0;
+ s0 -= carry0 * (1 << 21);
+ carry2 = (s2 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s3 += carry2;
+ s2 -= carry2 * (1 << 21);
+ carry4 = (s4 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s5 += carry4;
+ s4 -= carry4 * (1 << 21);
+ carry6 = (s6 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s7 += carry6;
+ s6 -= carry6 * (1 << 21);
+ carry8 = (s8 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s9 += carry8;
+ s8 -= carry8 * (1 << 21);
+ carry10 = (s10 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s11 += carry10;
+ s10 -= carry10 * (1 << 21);
+ carry12 = (s12 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s13 += carry12;
+ s12 -= carry12 * (1 << 21);
+ carry14 = (s14 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s15 += carry14;
+ s14 -= carry14 * (1 << 21);
+ carry16 = (s16 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s17 += carry16;
+ s16 -= carry16 * (1 << 21);
+ carry18 = (s18 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s19 += carry18;
+ s18 -= carry18 * (1 << 21);
+ carry20 = (s20 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s21 += carry20;
+ s20 -= carry20 * (1 << 21);
+ carry22 = (s22 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s23 += carry22;
+ s22 -= carry22 * (1 << 21);
+
+ carry1 = (s1 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s2 += carry1;
+ s1 -= carry1 * (1 << 21);
+ carry3 = (s3 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s4 += carry3;
+ s3 -= carry3 * (1 << 21);
+ carry5 = (s5 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s6 += carry5;
+ s5 -= carry5 * (1 << 21);
+ carry7 = (s7 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s8 += carry7;
+ s7 -= carry7 * (1 << 21);
+ carry9 = (s9 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s10 += carry9;
+ s9 -= carry9 * (1 << 21);
+ carry11 = (s11 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s12 += carry11;
+ s11 -= carry11 * (1 << 21);
+ carry13 = (s13 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s14 += carry13;
+ s13 -= carry13 * (1 << 21);
+ carry15 = (s15 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s16 += carry15;
+ s15 -= carry15 * (1 << 21);
+ carry17 = (s17 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s18 += carry17;
+ s17 -= carry17 * (1 << 21);
+ carry19 = (s19 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s20 += carry19;
+ s19 -= carry19 * (1 << 21);
+ carry21 = (s21 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s22 += carry21;
+ s21 -= carry21 * (1 << 21);
+
+ s11 += s23 * 666643;
+ s12 += s23 * 470296;
+ s13 += s23 * 654183;
+ s14 -= s23 * 997805;
+ s15 += s23 * 136657;
+ s16 -= s23 * 683901;
+ s23 = 0;
+
+ s10 += s22 * 666643;
+ s11 += s22 * 470296;
+ s12 += s22 * 654183;
+ s13 -= s22 * 997805;
+ s14 += s22 * 136657;
+ s15 -= s22 * 683901;
+ s22 = 0;
+
+ s9 += s21 * 666643;
+ s10 += s21 * 470296;
+ s11 += s21 * 654183;
+ s12 -= s21 * 997805;
+ s13 += s21 * 136657;
+ s14 -= s21 * 683901;
+ s21 = 0;
+
+ s8 += s20 * 666643;
+ s9 += s20 * 470296;
+ s10 += s20 * 654183;
+ s11 -= s20 * 997805;
+ s12 += s20 * 136657;
+ s13 -= s20 * 683901;
+ s20 = 0;
+
+ s7 += s19 * 666643;
+ s8 += s19 * 470296;
+ s9 += s19 * 654183;
+ s10 -= s19 * 997805;
+ s11 += s19 * 136657;
+ s12 -= s19 * 683901;
+ s19 = 0;
+
+ s6 += s18 * 666643;
+ s7 += s18 * 470296;
+ s8 += s18 * 654183;
+ s9 -= s18 * 997805;
+ s10 += s18 * 136657;
+ s11 -= s18 * 683901;
+ s18 = 0;
+
+ carry6 = (s6 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s7 += carry6;
+ s6 -= carry6 * (1 << 21);
+ carry8 = (s8 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s9 += carry8;
+ s8 -= carry8 * (1 << 21);
+ carry10 = (s10 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s11 += carry10;
+ s10 -= carry10 * (1 << 21);
+ carry12 = (s12 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s13 += carry12;
+ s12 -= carry12 * (1 << 21);
+ carry14 = (s14 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s15 += carry14;
+ s14 -= carry14 * (1 << 21);
+ carry16 = (s16 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s17 += carry16;
+ s16 -= carry16 * (1 << 21);
+
+ carry7 = (s7 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s8 += carry7;
+ s7 -= carry7 * (1 << 21);
+ carry9 = (s9 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s10 += carry9;
+ s9 -= carry9 * (1 << 21);
+ carry11 = (s11 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s12 += carry11;
+ s11 -= carry11 * (1 << 21);
+ carry13 = (s13 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s14 += carry13;
+ s13 -= carry13 * (1 << 21);
+ carry15 = (s15 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s16 += carry15;
+ s15 -= carry15 * (1 << 21);
+
+ s5 += s17 * 666643;
+ s6 += s17 * 470296;
+ s7 += s17 * 654183;
+ s8 -= s17 * 997805;
+ s9 += s17 * 136657;
+ s10 -= s17 * 683901;
+ s17 = 0;
+
+ s4 += s16 * 666643;
+ s5 += s16 * 470296;
+ s6 += s16 * 654183;
+ s7 -= s16 * 997805;
+ s8 += s16 * 136657;
+ s9 -= s16 * 683901;
+ s16 = 0;
+
+ s3 += s15 * 666643;
+ s4 += s15 * 470296;
+ s5 += s15 * 654183;
+ s6 -= s15 * 997805;
+ s7 += s15 * 136657;
+ s8 -= s15 * 683901;
+ s15 = 0;
+
+ s2 += s14 * 666643;
+ s3 += s14 * 470296;
+ s4 += s14 * 654183;
+ s5 -= s14 * 997805;
+ s6 += s14 * 136657;
+ s7 -= s14 * 683901;
+ s14 = 0;
+
+ s1 += s13 * 666643;
+ s2 += s13 * 470296;
+ s3 += s13 * 654183;
+ s4 -= s13 * 997805;
+ s5 += s13 * 136657;
+ s6 -= s13 * 683901;
+ s13 = 0;
+
+ s0 += s12 * 666643;
+ s1 += s12 * 470296;
+ s2 += s12 * 654183;
+ s3 -= s12 * 997805;
+ s4 += s12 * 136657;
+ s5 -= s12 * 683901;
+ s12 = 0;
+
+ carry0 = (s0 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s1 += carry0;
+ s0 -= carry0 * (1 << 21);
+ carry2 = (s2 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s3 += carry2;
+ s2 -= carry2 * (1 << 21);
+ carry4 = (s4 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s5 += carry4;
+ s4 -= carry4 * (1 << 21);
+ carry6 = (s6 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s7 += carry6;
+ s6 -= carry6 * (1 << 21);
+ carry8 = (s8 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s9 += carry8;
+ s8 -= carry8 * (1 << 21);
+ carry10 = (s10 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s11 += carry10;
+ s10 -= carry10 * (1 << 21);
+
+ carry1 = (s1 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s2 += carry1;
+ s1 -= carry1 * (1 << 21);
+ carry3 = (s3 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s4 += carry3;
+ s3 -= carry3 * (1 << 21);
+ carry5 = (s5 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s6 += carry5;
+ s5 -= carry5 * (1 << 21);
+ carry7 = (s7 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s8 += carry7;
+ s7 -= carry7 * (1 << 21);
+ carry9 = (s9 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s10 += carry9;
+ s9 -= carry9 * (1 << 21);
+ carry11 = (s11 + (1 << 20)) >> 21;
+ s12 += carry11;
+ s11 -= carry11 * (1 << 21);
+
+ s0 += s12 * 666643;
+ s1 += s12 * 470296;
+ s2 += s12 * 654183;
+ s3 -= s12 * 997805;
+ s4 += s12 * 136657;
+ s5 -= s12 * 683901;
+ s12 = 0;
+
+ carry0 = s0 >> 21;
+ s1 += carry0;
+ s0 -= carry0 * (1 << 21);
+ carry1 = s1 >> 21;
+ s2 += carry1;
+ s1 -= carry1 * (1 << 21);
+ carry2 = s2 >> 21;
+ s3 += carry2;
+ s2 -= carry2 * (1 << 21);
+ carry3 = s3 >> 21;
+ s4 += carry3;
+ s3 -= carry3 * (1 << 21);
+ carry4 = s4 >> 21;
+ s5 += carry4;
+ s4 -= carry4 * (1 << 21);
+ carry5 = s5 >> 21;
+ s6 += carry5;
+ s5 -= carry5 * (1 << 21);
+ carry6 = s6 >> 21;
+ s7 += carry6;
+ s6 -= carry6 * (1 << 21);
+ carry7 = s7 >> 21;
+ s8 += carry7;
+ s7 -= carry7 * (1 << 21);
+ carry8 = s8 >> 21;
+ s9 += carry8;
+ s8 -= carry8 * (1 << 21);
+ carry9 = s9 >> 21;
+ s10 += carry9;
+ s9 -= carry9 * (1 << 21);
+ carry10 = s10 >> 21;
+ s11 += carry10;
+ s10 -= carry10 * (1 << 21);
+ carry11 = s11 >> 21;
+ s12 += carry11;
+ s11 -= carry11 * (1 << 21);
+
+ s0 += s12 * 666643;
+ s1 += s12 * 470296;
+ s2 += s12 * 654183;
+ s3 -= s12 * 997805;
+ s4 += s12 * 136657;
+ s5 -= s12 * 683901;
+ s12 = 0;
+
+ carry0 = s0 >> 21;
+ s1 += carry0;
+ s0 -= carry0 * (1 << 21);
+ carry1 = s1 >> 21;
+ s2 += carry1;
+ s1 -= carry1 * (1 << 21);
+ carry2 = s2 >> 21;
+ s3 += carry2;
+ s2 -= carry2 * (1 << 21);
+ carry3 = s3 >> 21;
+ s4 += carry3;
+ s3 -= carry3 * (1 << 21);
+ carry4 = s4 >> 21;
+ s5 += carry4;
+ s4 -= carry4 * (1 << 21);
+ carry5 = s5 >> 21;
+ s6 += carry5;
+ s5 -= carry5 * (1 << 21);
+ carry6 = s6 >> 21;
+ s7 += carry6;
+ s6 -= carry6 * (1 << 21);
+ carry7 = s7 >> 21;
+ s8 += carry7;
+ s7 -= carry7 * (1 << 21);
+ carry8 = s8 >> 21;
+ s9 += carry8;
+ s8 -= carry8 * (1 << 21);
+ carry9 = s9 >> 21;
+ s10 += carry9;
+ s9 -= carry9 * (1 << 21);
+ carry10 = s10 >> 21;
+ s11 += carry10;
+ s10 -= carry10 * (1 << 21);
+
+ s[ 0] = (uint8_t) (s0 >> 0);
+ s[ 1] = (uint8_t) (s0 >> 8);
+ s[ 2] = (uint8_t)((s0 >> 16) | (s1 << 5));
+ s[ 3] = (uint8_t) (s1 >> 3);
+ s[ 4] = (uint8_t) (s1 >> 11);
+ s[ 5] = (uint8_t)((s1 >> 19) | (s2 << 2));
+ s[ 6] = (uint8_t) (s2 >> 6);
+ s[ 7] = (uint8_t)((s2 >> 14) | (s3 << 7));
+ s[ 8] = (uint8_t) (s3 >> 1);
+ s[ 9] = (uint8_t) (s3 >> 9);
+ s[10] = (uint8_t)((s3 >> 17) | (s4 << 4));
+ s[11] = (uint8_t) (s4 >> 4);
+ s[12] = (uint8_t) (s4 >> 12);
+ s[13] = (uint8_t)((s4 >> 20) | (s5 << 1));
+ s[14] = (uint8_t) (s5 >> 7);
+ s[15] = (uint8_t)((s5 >> 15) | (s6 << 6));
+ s[16] = (uint8_t) (s6 >> 2);
+ s[17] = (uint8_t) (s6 >> 10);
+ s[18] = (uint8_t)((s6 >> 18) | (s7 << 3));
+ s[19] = (uint8_t) (s7 >> 5);
+ s[20] = (uint8_t) (s7 >> 13);
+ s[21] = (uint8_t) (s8 >> 0);
+ s[22] = (uint8_t) (s8 >> 8);
+ s[23] = (uint8_t)((s8 >> 16) | (s9 << 5));
+ s[24] = (uint8_t) (s9 >> 3);
+ s[25] = (uint8_t) (s9 >> 11);
+ s[26] = (uint8_t)((s9 >> 19) | (s10 << 2));
+ s[27] = (uint8_t) (s10 >> 6);
+ s[28] = (uint8_t)((s10 >> 14) | (s11 << 7));
+ s[29] = (uint8_t) (s11 >> 1);
+ s[30] = (uint8_t) (s11 >> 9);
+ s[31] = (uint8_t) (s11 >> 17);
}
int ED25519_sign(uint8_t *out_sig, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
- const uint8_t public_key[32], const uint8_t private_key[32]) {
- uint8_t az[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- uint8_t nonce[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- ge_p3 R;
- uint8_t hram[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- SHA512_CTX hash_ctx;
-
- SHA512_Init(&hash_ctx);
- SHA512_Update(&hash_ctx, private_key, 32);
- SHA512_Final(az, &hash_ctx);
-
- az[0] &= 248;
- az[31] &= 63;
- az[31] |= 64;
-
- SHA512_Init(&hash_ctx);
- SHA512_Update(&hash_ctx, az + 32, 32);
- SHA512_Update(&hash_ctx, message, message_len);
- SHA512_Final(nonce, &hash_ctx);
-
- x25519_sc_reduce(nonce);
- ge_scalarmult_base(&R, nonce);
- ge_p3_tobytes(out_sig, &R);
-
- SHA512_Init(&hash_ctx);
- SHA512_Update(&hash_ctx, out_sig, 32);
- SHA512_Update(&hash_ctx, public_key, 32);
- SHA512_Update(&hash_ctx, message, message_len);
- SHA512_Final(hram, &hash_ctx);
-
- x25519_sc_reduce(hram);
- sc_muladd(out_sig + 32, hram, az, nonce);
-
- OPENSSL_cleanse(&hash_ctx, sizeof(hash_ctx));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(nonce, sizeof(nonce));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(az, sizeof(az));
-
- return 1;
+ const uint8_t public_key[32], const uint8_t private_key[32])
+{
+ uint8_t az[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ uint8_t nonce[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ ge_p3 R;
+ uint8_t hram[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ SHA512_CTX hash_ctx;
+
+ SHA512_Init(&hash_ctx);
+ SHA512_Update(&hash_ctx, private_key, 32);
+ SHA512_Final(az, &hash_ctx);
+
+ az[0] &= 248;
+ az[31] &= 63;
+ az[31] |= 64;
+
+ SHA512_Init(&hash_ctx);
+ SHA512_Update(&hash_ctx, az + 32, 32);
+ SHA512_Update(&hash_ctx, message, message_len);
+ SHA512_Final(nonce, &hash_ctx);
+
+ x25519_sc_reduce(nonce);
+ ge_scalarmult_base(&R, nonce);
+ ge_p3_tobytes(out_sig, &R);
+
+ SHA512_Init(&hash_ctx);
+ SHA512_Update(&hash_ctx, out_sig, 32);
+ SHA512_Update(&hash_ctx, public_key, 32);
+ SHA512_Update(&hash_ctx, message, message_len);
+ SHA512_Final(hram, &hash_ctx);
+
+ x25519_sc_reduce(hram);
+ sc_muladd(out_sig + 32, hram, az, nonce);
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(&hash_ctx, sizeof(hash_ctx));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(nonce, sizeof(nonce));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(az, sizeof(az));
+
+ return 1;
}
+static const char allzeroes[15];
+
int ED25519_verify(const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
- const uint8_t signature[64], const uint8_t public_key[32]) {
- ge_p3 A;
- uint8_t rcopy[32];
- uint8_t scopy[32];
- SHA512_CTX hash_ctx;
- ge_p2 R;
- uint8_t rcheck[32];
- uint8_t h[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-
- if ((signature[63] & 224) != 0 ||
- ge_frombytes_vartime(&A, public_key) != 0) {
- return 0;
- }
+ const uint8_t signature[64], const uint8_t public_key[32])
+{
+ int i;
+ ge_p3 A;
+ const uint8_t *r, *s;
+ SHA512_CTX hash_ctx;
+ ge_p2 R;
+ uint8_t rcheck[32];
+ uint8_t h[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ /* 27742317777372353535851937790883648493 in little endian format */
+ const uint8_t l_low[16] = {
+ 0xED, 0xD3, 0xF5, 0x5C, 0x1A, 0x63, 0x12, 0x58, 0xD6, 0x9C, 0xF7, 0xA2,
+ 0xDE, 0xF9, 0xDE, 0x14
+ };
+
+ r = signature;
+ s = signature + 32;
+
+ /*
+ * Check 0 <= s < L where L = 2^252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493
+ *
+ * If not the signature is publicly invalid. Since it's public we can do the
+ * check in variable time.
+ *
+ * First check the most significant byte
+ */
+ if (s[31] > 0x10)
+ return 0;
+ if (s[31] == 0x10) {
+ /*
+ * Most significant byte indicates a value close to 2^252 so check the
+ * rest
+ */
+ if (memcmp(s + 16, allzeroes, sizeof(allzeroes)) != 0)
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 15; i >= 0; i--) {
+ if (s[i] < l_low[i])
+ break;
+ if (s[i] > l_low[i])
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (i < 0)
+ return 0;
+ }
- fe_neg(A.X, A.X);
- fe_neg(A.T, A.T);
+ if (ge_frombytes_vartime(&A, public_key) != 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
- memcpy(rcopy, signature, 32);
- memcpy(scopy, signature + 32, 32);
+ fe_neg(A.X, A.X);
+ fe_neg(A.T, A.T);
- SHA512_Init(&hash_ctx);
- SHA512_Update(&hash_ctx, signature, 32);
- SHA512_Update(&hash_ctx, public_key, 32);
- SHA512_Update(&hash_ctx, message, message_len);
- SHA512_Final(h, &hash_ctx);
+ SHA512_Init(&hash_ctx);
+ SHA512_Update(&hash_ctx, r, 32);
+ SHA512_Update(&hash_ctx, public_key, 32);
+ SHA512_Update(&hash_ctx, message, message_len);
+ SHA512_Final(h, &hash_ctx);
- x25519_sc_reduce(h);
+ x25519_sc_reduce(h);
- ge_double_scalarmult_vartime(&R, h, &A, scopy);
+ ge_double_scalarmult_vartime(&R, h, &A, s);
- ge_tobytes(rcheck, &R);
+ ge_tobytes(rcheck, &R);
- return CRYPTO_memcmp(rcheck, rcopy, sizeof(rcheck)) == 0;
+ return CRYPTO_memcmp(rcheck, r, sizeof(rcheck)) == 0;
}
void ED25519_public_from_private(uint8_t out_public_key[32],
- const uint8_t private_key[32]) {
- uint8_t az[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- ge_p3 A;
+ const uint8_t private_key[32])
+{
+ uint8_t az[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ ge_p3 A;
- SHA512(private_key, 32, az);
+ SHA512(private_key, 32, az);
- az[0] &= 248;
- az[31] &= 63;
- az[31] |= 64;
+ az[0] &= 248;
+ az[31] &= 63;
+ az[31] |= 64;
- ge_scalarmult_base(&A, az);
- ge_p3_tobytes(out_public_key, &A);
+ ge_scalarmult_base(&A, az);
+ ge_p3_tobytes(out_public_key, &A);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(az, sizeof(az));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(az, sizeof(az));
}
int X25519(uint8_t out_shared_key[32], const uint8_t private_key[32],
- const uint8_t peer_public_value[32]) {
- static const uint8_t kZeros[32] = {0};
- x25519_scalar_mult(out_shared_key, private_key, peer_public_value);
- /* The all-zero output results when the input is a point of small order. */
- return CRYPTO_memcmp(kZeros, out_shared_key, 32) != 0;
+ const uint8_t peer_public_value[32])
+{
+ static const uint8_t kZeros[32] = {0};
+ x25519_scalar_mult(out_shared_key, private_key, peer_public_value);
+ /* The all-zero output results when the input is a point of small order. */
+ return CRYPTO_memcmp(kZeros, out_shared_key, 32) != 0;
}
void X25519_public_from_private(uint8_t out_public_value[32],
- const uint8_t private_key[32]) {
- uint8_t e[32];
- ge_p3 A;
- fe zplusy, zminusy, zminusy_inv;
-
- memcpy(e, private_key, 32);
- e[0] &= 248;
- e[31] &= 127;
- e[31] |= 64;
-
- ge_scalarmult_base(&A, e);
-
- /* We only need the u-coordinate of the curve25519 point. The map is
- * u=(y+1)/(1-y). Since y=Y/Z, this gives u=(Z+Y)/(Z-Y). */
- fe_add(zplusy, A.Z, A.Y);
- fe_sub(zminusy, A.Z, A.Y);
- fe_invert(zminusy_inv, zminusy);
- fe_mul(zplusy, zplusy, zminusy_inv);
- fe_tobytes(out_public_value, zplusy);
-
- OPENSSL_cleanse(e, sizeof(e));
+ const uint8_t private_key[32])
+{
+ uint8_t e[32];
+ ge_p3 A;
+ fe zplusy, zminusy, zminusy_inv;
+
+ memcpy(e, private_key, 32);
+ e[0] &= 248;
+ e[31] &= 127;
+ e[31] |= 64;
+
+ ge_scalarmult_base(&A, e);
+
+ /*
+ * We only need the u-coordinate of the curve25519 point.
+ * The map is u=(y+1)/(1-y). Since y=Y/Z, this gives
+ * u=(Z+Y)/(Z-Y).
+ */
+ fe_add(zplusy, A.Z, A.Y);
+ fe_sub(zminusy, A.Z, A.Y);
+ fe_invert(zminusy_inv, zminusy);
+ fe_mul(zplusy, zplusy, zminusy_inv);
+ fe_tobytes(out_public_value, zplusy);
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(e, sizeof(e));
}
diff --git a/crypto/ec/curve448/eddsa.c b/crypto/ec/curve448/eddsa.c
index 909413a535a8..b28f7dff9138 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/curve448/eddsa.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/curve448/eddsa.c
@@ -246,10 +246,36 @@ c448_error_t c448_ed448_verify(
uint8_t context_len)
{
curve448_point_t pk_point, r_point;
- c448_error_t error =
- curve448_point_decode_like_eddsa_and_mul_by_ratio(pk_point, pubkey);
+ c448_error_t error;
curve448_scalar_t challenge_scalar;
curve448_scalar_t response_scalar;
+ /* Order in little endian format */
+ static const uint8_t order[] = {
+ 0xF3, 0x44, 0x58, 0xAB, 0x92, 0xC2, 0x78, 0x23, 0x55, 0x8F, 0xC5, 0x8D,
+ 0x72, 0xC2, 0x6C, 0x21, 0x90, 0x36, 0xD6, 0xAE, 0x49, 0xDB, 0x4E, 0xC4,
+ 0xE9, 0x23, 0xCA, 0x7C, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x3F, 0x00
+ };
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Check that s (second 57 bytes of the sig) is less than the order. Both
+ * s and the order are in little-endian format. This can be done in
+ * variable time, since if this is not the case the signature if publicly
+ * invalid.
+ */
+ for (i = EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ if (signature[i + EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES] > order[i])
+ return C448_FAILURE;
+ if (signature[i + EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES] < order[i])
+ break;
+ }
+ if (i < 0)
+ return C448_FAILURE;
+
+ error =
+ curve448_point_decode_like_eddsa_and_mul_by_ratio(pk_point, pubkey);
if (C448_SUCCESS != error)
return error;
diff --git a/crypto/ec/curve448/point_448.h b/crypto/ec/curve448/point_448.h
index 0ef3b8714e26..399f91b9a1d9 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/curve448/point_448.h
+++ b/crypto/ec/curve448/point_448.h
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 2017-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2017-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2015-2016 Cryptography Research, Inc.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ void curve448_scalar_encode(unsigned char ser[C448_SCALAR_BYTES],
/*
* Add two scalars. |a|, |b| and |out| may alias each other.
- *
+ *
* a (in): One scalar.
* b (in): Another scalar.
* out (out): a+b.
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ void curve448_scalar_sub(curve448_scalar_t out,
/*
* Multiply two scalars. |a|, |b| and |out| may alias each other.
- *
+ *
* a (in): One scalar.
* b (in): Another scalar.
* out (out): a*b.
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ void curve448_scalar_mul(curve448_scalar_t out,
/*
* Halve a scalar. |a| and |out| may alias each other.
-*
+*
* a (in): A scalar.
* out (out): a/2.
*/
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ void curve448_scalar_halve(curve448_scalar_t out, const curve448_scalar_t a);
/*
* Copy a scalar. The scalars may alias each other, in which case this
* function does nothing.
- *
+ *
* a (in): A scalar.
* out (out): Will become a copy of a.
*/
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ static ossl_inline void curve448_point_copy(curve448_point_t a,
*
* a (in): A point.
* b (in): Another point.
- *
+ *
* Returns:
* C448_TRUE: The points are equal.
* C448_FALSE: The points are not equal.
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ void curve448_point_mul_by_ratio_and_encode_like_x448(
/*
* RFC 7748 Diffie-Hellman base point scalarmul. This function uses a different
* (non-Decaf) encoding.
- *
+ *
* out (out): The scaled point base*scalar
* scalar (in): The scalar to multiply by.
*/
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ void curve448_precomputed_scalarmul(curve448_point_t scaled,
* base2 (in): A second point to be scaled.
* scalar2 (in) A second scalar to multiply by.
*
- * Warning: This function takes variable time, and may leak the scalars used.
+ * Warning: This function takes variable time, and may leak the scalars used.
* It is designed for signature verification.
*/
void curve448_base_double_scalarmul_non_secret(curve448_point_t combo,
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c b/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c
index 87f7ce56911d..0a05a7aeea61 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 2002-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2002-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
@@ -810,7 +810,7 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_ladder_post(const EC_GROUP *group,
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t2, t2, t0, ctx)
|| !BN_GF2m_add(t1, t2, t1)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t2, p->X, t0, ctx)
- || !BN_GF2m_mod_inv(t2, t2, group->field, ctx)
+ || !group->meth->field_inv(group, t2, t2, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t1, t1, t2, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, r->X, r->Z, t2, ctx)
|| !BN_GF2m_add(t2, p->X, r->X)
@@ -889,6 +889,21 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
return ret;
}
+/*-
+ * Computes the multiplicative inverse of a in GF(2^m), storing the result in r.
+ * If a is zero (or equivalent), you'll get a EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT error.
+ * SCA hardening is with blinding: BN_GF2m_mod_inv does that.
+ */
+static int ec_GF2m_simple_field_inv(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r,
+ const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!(ret = BN_GF2m_mod_inv(r, a, group->field, ctx)))
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_FIELD_INV, EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT);
+ return ret;
+}
+
const EC_METHOD *EC_GF2m_simple_method(void)
{
static const EC_METHOD ret = {
@@ -929,6 +944,7 @@ const EC_METHOD *EC_GF2m_simple_method(void)
ec_GF2m_simple_field_mul,
ec_GF2m_simple_field_sqr,
ec_GF2m_simple_field_div,
+ ec_GF2m_simple_field_inv,
0, /* field_encode */
0, /* field_decode */
0, /* field_set_to_one */
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c b/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c
index a3164b5b2ed9..8b363e096bed 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c
@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ static int ec_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)
case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID:
*(int *)arg2 = NID_sha256;
- return 2;
+ return 1;
case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_SET1_TLS_ENCPT:
return EC_KEY_oct2key(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey), arg2, arg1, NULL);
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_err.c b/crypto/ec/ec_err.c
index 8f4911abec79..ce3493823218 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_err.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_err.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/*
* Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -66,6 +66,8 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA EC_str_functs[] = {
"ec_asn1_group2fieldid"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_F_EC_GF2M_MONTGOMERY_POINT_MULTIPLY, 0),
"ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_FIELD_INV, 0),
+ "ec_GF2m_simple_field_inv"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT, 0),
"ec_GF2m_simple_group_check_discriminant"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_GROUP_SET_CURVE, 0),
@@ -90,6 +92,8 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA EC_str_functs[] = {
"ec_GFp_mont_field_decode"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_ENCODE, 0),
"ec_GFp_mont_field_encode"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_INV, 0),
+ "ec_GFp_mont_field_inv"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_MUL, 0),
"ec_GFp_mont_field_mul"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_SET_TO_ONE, 0),
@@ -124,6 +128,8 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA EC_str_functs[] = {
"ec_GFp_nist_group_set_curve"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_BLIND_COORDINATES, 0),
"ec_GFp_simple_blind_coordinates"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_FIELD_INV, 0),
+ "ec_GFp_simple_field_inv"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT, 0),
"ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_SET_CURVE, 0),
@@ -287,6 +293,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA EC_str_reasons[] = {
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, 0, EC_R_BAD_SIGNATURE), "bad signature"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, 0, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE), "bignum out of range"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, 0, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL), "buffer too small"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, 0, EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT), "cannot invert"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, 0, EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE),
"coordinates out of range"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, 0, EC_R_CURVE_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_ECDH),
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h b/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
index e055ddab1c76..119255f1dc83 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2001-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include "internal/refcount.h"
#include "internal/ec_int.h"
-#include "curve448/curve448_lcl.h"
#if defined(__SUNPRO_C)
# if __SUNPRO_C >= 0x520
@@ -154,6 +153,13 @@ struct ec_method_st {
int (*field_sqr) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *);
int (*field_div) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *);
+ /*-
+ * 'field_inv' computes the multipicative inverse of a in the field,
+ * storing the result in r.
+ *
+ * If 'a' is zero (or equivalent), you'll get an EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT error.
+ */
+ int (*field_inv) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *);
/* e.g. to Montgomery */
int (*field_encode) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
BN_CTX *);
@@ -390,6 +396,8 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_field_mul(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *);
int ec_GFp_simple_field_sqr(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GFp_simple_field_inv(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+ BN_CTX *);
int ec_GFp_simple_blind_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p,
BN_CTX *ctx);
int ec_GFp_simple_ladder_pre(const EC_GROUP *group,
@@ -413,6 +421,8 @@ int ec_GFp_mont_field_mul(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *);
int ec_GFp_mont_field_sqr(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GFp_mont_field_inv(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+ BN_CTX *);
int ec_GFp_mont_field_encode(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
BN_CTX *);
int ec_GFp_mont_field_decode(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_mont.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_mont.c
index 36682e5cfbd1..252e66ef3791 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_mont.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_mont.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2001-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_mont_method(void)
ec_GFp_mont_field_mul,
ec_GFp_mont_field_sqr,
0 /* field_div */ ,
+ ec_GFp_mont_field_inv,
ec_GFp_mont_field_encode,
ec_GFp_mont_field_decode,
ec_GFp_mont_field_set_to_one,
@@ -206,6 +207,54 @@ int ec_GFp_mont_field_sqr(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
return BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, a, a, group->field_data1, ctx);
}
+/*-
+ * Computes the multiplicative inverse of a in GF(p), storing the result in r.
+ * If a is zero (or equivalent), you'll get a EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT error.
+ * We have a Mont structure, so SCA hardening is FLT inversion.
+ */
+int ec_GFp_mont_field_inv(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+ BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *e = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (group->field_data1 == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL && (ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_secure_new()) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ if ((e = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Inverse in constant time with Fermats Little Theorem */
+ if (!BN_set_word(e, 2))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_sub(e, group->field, e))
+ goto err;
+ /*-
+ * Exponent e is public.
+ * No need for scatter-gather or BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.
+ */
+ if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(r, a, e, group->field, ctx, group->field_data1))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* throw an error on zero */
+ if (BN_is_zero(r)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_INV, EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
int ec_GFp_mont_field_encode(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r,
const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nist.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nist.c
index f53de1a1638b..5eaa99d8402b 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nist.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nist.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2001-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nist_method(void)
ec_GFp_nist_field_mul,
ec_GFp_nist_field_sqr,
0 /* field_div */ ,
+ ec_GFp_simple_field_inv,
0 /* field_encode */ ,
0 /* field_decode */ ,
0, /* field_set_to_one */
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
index 555bf307dd03..025273a14440 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 2010-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2010-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -279,6 +279,7 @@ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp224_method(void)
ec_GFp_nist_field_mul,
ec_GFp_nist_field_sqr,
0 /* field_div */ ,
+ ec_GFp_simple_field_inv,
0 /* field_encode */ ,
0 /* field_decode */ ,
0, /* field_set_to_one */
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c
index c87a5e548d36..a21e5f78fc90 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 2011-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2011-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -1810,6 +1810,7 @@ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp256_method(void)
ec_GFp_nist_field_mul,
ec_GFp_nist_field_sqr,
0 /* field_div */ ,
+ ec_GFp_simple_field_inv,
0 /* field_encode */ ,
0 /* field_decode */ ,
0, /* field_set_to_one */
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
index 14f2feeb6999..2f47772a3477 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 2011-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2011-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -1647,6 +1647,7 @@ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp521_method(void)
ec_GFp_nist_field_mul,
ec_GFp_nist_field_sqr,
0 /* field_div */ ,
+ ec_GFp_simple_field_inv,
0 /* field_encode */ ,
0 /* field_decode */ ,
0, /* field_set_to_one */
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c
index b0564bdbd04c..aea6394169ce 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 2014-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2014-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2014, Intel Corporation. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2015, CloudFlare, Inc.
*
@@ -1677,6 +1677,7 @@ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistz256_method(void)
ec_GFp_mont_field_mul,
ec_GFp_mont_field_sqr,
0, /* field_div */
+ ec_GFp_mont_field_inv,
ec_GFp_mont_field_encode,
ec_GFp_mont_field_decode,
ec_GFp_mont_field_set_to_one,
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c
index d0c5557ff4dd..f6a6cedb0ae3 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2001-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_simple_method(void)
ec_GFp_simple_field_mul,
ec_GFp_simple_field_sqr,
0 /* field_div */ ,
+ ec_GFp_simple_field_inv,
0 /* field_encode */ ,
0 /* field_decode */ ,
0, /* field_set_to_one */
@@ -553,7 +554,7 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group,
}
}
} else {
- if (!BN_mod_inverse(Z_1, Z_, group->field, ctx)) {
+ if (!group->meth->field_inv(group, Z_1, Z_, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
@@ -1266,7 +1267,7 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num,
* points[i]->Z by its inverse.
*/
- if (!BN_mod_inverse(tmp, prod_Z[num - 1], group->field, ctx)) {
+ if (!group->meth->field_inv(group, tmp, prod_Z[num - 1], ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
@@ -1370,6 +1371,50 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_field_sqr(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
}
/*-
+ * Computes the multiplicative inverse of a in GF(p), storing the result in r.
+ * If a is zero (or equivalent), you'll get a EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT error.
+ * Since we don't have a Mont structure here, SCA hardening is with blinding.
+ */
+int ec_GFp_simple_field_inv(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+ BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *e = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL && (ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_secure_new()) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ if ((e = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ do {
+ if (!BN_priv_rand_range(e, group->field))
+ goto err;
+ } while (BN_is_zero(e));
+
+ /* r := a * e */
+ if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, r, a, e, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ /* r := 1/(a * e) */
+ if (!BN_mod_inverse(r, r, group->field, ctx)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_FIELD_INV, EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* r := e/(a * e) = 1/a */
+ if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, r, r, e, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*-
* Apply randomization of EC point projective coordinates:
*
* (X, Y ,Z ) = (lambda^2*X, lambda^3*Y, lambda*Z)
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecx_meth.c b/crypto/ec/ecx_meth.c
index b76bfdb6dc34..e4cac99e2d2a 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecx_meth.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecx_meth.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2006-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
#include "internal/evp_int.h"
#include "ec_lcl.h"
+#include "curve448/curve448_lcl.h"
#define X25519_BITS 253
#define X25519_SECURITY_BITS 128
diff --git a/crypto/engine/README b/crypto/engine/README
index 0050b9e50951..c7a5696ca14c 100644
--- a/crypto/engine/README
+++ b/crypto/engine/README
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ algorithm/mode pair are;
EVP_EncryptInit(&ctx, cipher, key, iv);
[ ... use EVP_EncryptUpdate() and EVP_EncryptFinal() ...]
-(ii) indirectly;
+(ii) indirectly;
OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers();
cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyname("des_cbc");
EVP_EncryptInit(&ctx, cipher, key, iv);
diff --git a/crypto/engine/eng_devcrypto.c b/crypto/engine/eng_devcrypto.c
index 4a0ba09a38be..717d7c27794f 100644
--- a/crypto/engine/eng_devcrypto.c
+++ b/crypto/engine/eng_devcrypto.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 2017-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2017-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
#include "internal/engine.h"
+/* #define ENGINE_DEVCRYPTO_DEBUG */
+
#ifdef CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MIN
# define CHECK_BSD_STYLE_MACROS
#endif
@@ -35,6 +37,15 @@
*/
static int cfd;
+static int clean_devcrypto_session(struct session_op *sess) {
+ if (ioctl(cfd, CIOCFSESSION, &sess->ses) < 0) {
+ SYSerr(SYS_F_IOCTL, errno);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memset(sess, 0, sizeof(struct session_op));
+ return 1;
+}
+
/******************************************************************************
*
* Ciphers
@@ -47,10 +58,12 @@ static int cfd;
struct cipher_ctx {
struct session_op sess;
-
- /* to pass from init to do_cipher */
- const unsigned char *iv;
int op; /* COP_ENCRYPT or COP_DECRYPT */
+ unsigned long mode; /* EVP_CIPH_*_MODE */
+
+ /* to handle ctr mode being a stream cipher */
+ unsigned char partial[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+ unsigned int blocksize, num;
};
static const struct cipher_data_st {
@@ -87,9 +100,9 @@ static const struct cipher_data_st {
{ NID_aes_256_xts, 16, 256 / 8 * 2, 16, EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE, CRYPTO_AES_XTS },
#endif
#if !defined(CHECK_BSD_STYLE_MACROS) || defined(CRYPTO_AES_ECB)
- { NID_aes_128_ecb, 16, 128 / 8, 16, EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, CRYPTO_AES_ECB },
- { NID_aes_192_ecb, 16, 192 / 8, 16, EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, CRYPTO_AES_ECB },
- { NID_aes_256_ecb, 16, 256 / 8, 16, EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, CRYPTO_AES_ECB },
+ { NID_aes_128_ecb, 16, 128 / 8, 0, EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, CRYPTO_AES_ECB },
+ { NID_aes_192_ecb, 16, 192 / 8, 0, EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, CRYPTO_AES_ECB },
+ { NID_aes_256_ecb, 16, 256 / 8, 0, EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, CRYPTO_AES_ECB },
#endif
#if 0 /* Not yet supported */
{ NID_aes_128_gcm, 16, 128 / 8, 16, EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE, CRYPTO_AES_GCM },
@@ -141,11 +154,17 @@ static int cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
const struct cipher_data_st *cipher_d =
get_cipher_data(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid(ctx));
- memset(&cipher_ctx->sess, 0, sizeof(cipher_ctx->sess));
+ /* cleanup a previous session */
+ if (cipher_ctx->sess.ses != 0 &&
+ clean_devcrypto_session(&cipher_ctx->sess) == 0)
+ return 0;
+
cipher_ctx->sess.cipher = cipher_d->devcryptoid;
cipher_ctx->sess.keylen = cipher_d->keylen;
cipher_ctx->sess.key = (void *)key;
cipher_ctx->op = enc ? COP_ENCRYPT : COP_DECRYPT;
+ cipher_ctx->mode = cipher_d->flags & EVP_CIPH_MODE;
+ cipher_ctx->blocksize = cipher_d->blocksize;
if (ioctl(cfd, CIOCGSESSION, &cipher_ctx->sess) < 0) {
SYSerr(SYS_F_IOCTL, errno);
return 0;
@@ -160,8 +179,11 @@ static int cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
struct cipher_ctx *cipher_ctx =
(struct cipher_ctx *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx);
struct crypt_op cryp;
+ unsigned char *iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx);
#if !defined(COP_FLAG_WRITE_IV)
unsigned char saved_iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ const unsigned char *ivptr;
+ size_t nblocks, ivlen;
#endif
memset(&cryp, 0, sizeof(cryp));
@@ -169,19 +191,28 @@ static int cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
cryp.len = inl;
cryp.src = (void *)in;
cryp.dst = (void *)out;
- cryp.iv = (void *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx);
+ cryp.iv = (void *)iv;
cryp.op = cipher_ctx->op;
#if !defined(COP_FLAG_WRITE_IV)
cryp.flags = 0;
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) > 0) {
- assert(inl >= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
- if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
- unsigned char *ivptr = in + inl - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
-
- memcpy(saved_iv, ivptr, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
+ ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
+ if (ivlen > 0)
+ switch (cipher_ctx->mode) {
+ case EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE:
+ assert(inl >= ivlen);
+ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
+ ivptr = in + inl - ivlen;
+ memcpy(saved_iv, ivptr, ivlen);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE:
+ break;
+
+ default: /* should not happen */
+ return 0;
}
- }
#else
cryp.flags = COP_FLAG_WRITE_IV;
#endif
@@ -192,32 +223,113 @@ static int cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
}
#if !defined(COP_FLAG_WRITE_IV)
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) > 0) {
- unsigned char *ivptr = saved_iv;
+ if (ivlen > 0)
+ switch (cipher_ctx->mode) {
+ case EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE:
+ assert(inl >= ivlen);
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx))
+ ivptr = out + inl - ivlen;
+ else
+ ivptr = saved_iv;
+
+ memcpy(iv, ivptr, ivlen);
+ break;
+
+ case EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE:
+ nblocks = (inl + cipher_ctx->blocksize - 1)
+ / cipher_ctx->blocksize;
+ do {
+ ivlen--;
+ nblocks += iv[ivlen];
+ iv[ivlen] = (uint8_t) nblocks;
+ nblocks >>= 8;
+ } while (ivlen);
+ break;
+
+ default: /* should not happen */
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return 1;
+}
- assert(inl >= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
- if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx))
- ivptr = out + inl - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
+static int ctr_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{
+ struct cipher_ctx *cipher_ctx =
+ (struct cipher_ctx *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx);
+ size_t nblocks, len;
- memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), ivptr,
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
+ /* initial partial block */
+ while (cipher_ctx->num && inl) {
+ (*out++) = *(in++) ^ cipher_ctx->partial[cipher_ctx->num];
+ --inl;
+ cipher_ctx->num = (cipher_ctx->num + 1) % cipher_ctx->blocksize;
+ }
+
+ /* full blocks */
+ if (inl > (unsigned int) cipher_ctx->blocksize) {
+ nblocks = inl/cipher_ctx->blocksize;
+ len = nblocks * cipher_ctx->blocksize;
+ if (cipher_do_cipher(ctx, out, in, len) < 1)
+ return 0;
+ inl -= len;
+ out += len;
+ in += len;
+ }
+
+ /* final partial block */
+ if (inl) {
+ memset(cipher_ctx->partial, 0, cipher_ctx->blocksize);
+ if (cipher_do_cipher(ctx, cipher_ctx->partial, cipher_ctx->partial,
+ cipher_ctx->blocksize) < 1)
+ return 0;
+ while (inl--) {
+ out[cipher_ctx->num] = in[cipher_ctx->num]
+ ^ cipher_ctx->partial[cipher_ctx->num];
+ cipher_ctx->num++;
+ }
}
-#endif
return 1;
}
-static int cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+static int cipher_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void* p2)
{
struct cipher_ctx *cipher_ctx =
(struct cipher_ctx *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *to_ctx = (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)p2;
+ struct cipher_ctx *to_cipher_ctx;
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case EVP_CTRL_COPY:
+ if (cipher_ctx == NULL)
+ return 1;
+ /* when copying the context, a new session needs to be initialized */
+ to_cipher_ctx =
+ (struct cipher_ctx *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(to_ctx);
+ memset(&to_cipher_ctx->sess, 0, sizeof(to_cipher_ctx->sess));
+ return cipher_init(to_ctx, cipher_ctx->sess.key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(ctx),
+ (cipher_ctx->op == COP_ENCRYPT));
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
+ memset(&cipher_ctx->sess, 0, sizeof(cipher_ctx->sess));
+ return 1;
- if (ioctl(cfd, CIOCFSESSION, &cipher_ctx->sess.ses) < 0) {
- SYSerr(SYS_F_IOCTL, errno);
- return 0;
+ default:
+ break;
}
- return 1;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ struct cipher_ctx *cipher_ctx =
+ (struct cipher_ctx *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx);
+
+ return clean_devcrypto_session(&cipher_ctx->sess);
}
/*
@@ -233,6 +345,7 @@ static void prepare_cipher_methods(void)
{
size_t i;
struct session_op sess;
+ unsigned long cipher_mode;
memset(&sess, 0, sizeof(sess));
sess.key = (void *)"01234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789";
@@ -250,18 +363,26 @@ static void prepare_cipher_methods(void)
|| ioctl(cfd, CIOCFSESSION, &sess.ses) < 0)
continue;
+ cipher_mode = cipher_data[i].flags & EVP_CIPH_MODE;
+
if ((known_cipher_methods[i] =
EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(cipher_data[i].nid,
- cipher_data[i].blocksize,
+ cipher_mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE ? 1 :
+ cipher_data[i].blocksize,
cipher_data[i].keylen)) == NULL
|| !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(known_cipher_methods[i],
cipher_data[i].ivlen)
|| !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(known_cipher_methods[i],
cipher_data[i].flags
+ | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY
+ | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT
| EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1)
|| !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(known_cipher_methods[i], cipher_init)
|| !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(known_cipher_methods[i],
+ cipher_mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE ?
+ ctr_do_cipher :
cipher_do_cipher)
+ || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_ctrl(known_cipher_methods[i], cipher_ctrl)
|| !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(known_cipher_methods[i],
cipher_cleanup)
|| !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(known_cipher_methods[i],
@@ -338,34 +459,36 @@ static int devcrypto_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
struct digest_ctx {
struct session_op sess;
- int init;
+ /* This signals that the init function was called, not that it succeeded. */
+ int init_called;
};
static const struct digest_data_st {
int nid;
+ int blocksize;
int digestlen;
int devcryptoid;
} digest_data[] = {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
- { NID_md5, 16, CRYPTO_MD5 },
+ { NID_md5, /* MD5_CBLOCK */ 64, 16, CRYPTO_MD5 },
#endif
- { NID_sha1, 20, CRYPTO_SHA1 },
+ { NID_sha1, SHA_CBLOCK, 20, CRYPTO_SHA1 },
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160
# if !defined(CHECK_BSD_STYLE_MACROS) || defined(CRYPTO_RIPEMD160)
- { NID_ripemd160, 20, CRYPTO_RIPEMD160 },
+ { NID_ripemd160, /* RIPEMD160_CBLOCK */ 64, 20, CRYPTO_RIPEMD160 },
# endif
#endif
#if !defined(CHECK_BSD_STYLE_MACROS) || defined(CRYPTO_SHA2_224)
- { NID_sha224, 224 / 8, CRYPTO_SHA2_224 },
+ { NID_sha224, SHA256_CBLOCK, 224 / 8, CRYPTO_SHA2_224 },
#endif
#if !defined(CHECK_BSD_STYLE_MACROS) || defined(CRYPTO_SHA2_256)
- { NID_sha256, 256 / 8, CRYPTO_SHA2_256 },
+ { NID_sha256, SHA256_CBLOCK, 256 / 8, CRYPTO_SHA2_256 },
#endif
#if !defined(CHECK_BSD_STYLE_MACROS) || defined(CRYPTO_SHA2_384)
- { NID_sha384, 384 / 8, CRYPTO_SHA2_384 },
+ { NID_sha384, SHA512_CBLOCK, 384 / 8, CRYPTO_SHA2_384 },
#endif
#if !defined(CHECK_BSD_STYLE_MACROS) || defined(CRYPTO_SHA2_512)
- { NID_sha512, 512 / 8, CRYPTO_SHA2_512 },
+ { NID_sha512, SHA512_CBLOCK, 512 / 8, CRYPTO_SHA2_512 },
#endif
};
@@ -403,7 +526,7 @@ static int digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
const struct digest_data_st *digest_d =
get_digest_data(EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx));
- digest_ctx->init = 1;
+ digest_ctx->init_called = 1;
memset(&digest_ctx->sess, 0, sizeof(digest_ctx->sess));
digest_ctx->sess.mac = digest_d->devcryptoid;
@@ -438,6 +561,9 @@ static int digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
if (count == 0)
return 1;
+ if (digest_ctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
if (digest_op(digest_ctx, data, count, NULL, COP_FLAG_UPDATE) < 0) {
SYSerr(SYS_F_IOCTL, errno);
return 0;
@@ -451,11 +577,9 @@ static int digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
struct digest_ctx *digest_ctx =
(struct digest_ctx *)EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx);
- if (digest_op(digest_ctx, NULL, 0, md, COP_FLAG_FINAL) < 0) {
- SYSerr(SYS_F_IOCTL, errno);
+ if (md == NULL || digest_ctx == NULL)
return 0;
- }
- if (ioctl(cfd, CIOCFSESSION, &digest_ctx->sess.ses) < 0) {
+ if (digest_op(digest_ctx, NULL, 0, md, COP_FLAG_FINAL) < 0) {
SYSerr(SYS_F_IOCTL, errno);
return 0;
}
@@ -471,14 +595,9 @@ static int digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from)
(struct digest_ctx *)EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(to);
struct cphash_op cphash;
- if (digest_from == NULL)
+ if (digest_from == NULL || digest_from->init_called != 1)
return 1;
- if (digest_from->init != 1) {
- SYSerr(SYS_F_IOCTL, EINVAL);
- return 0;
- }
-
if (!digest_init(to)) {
SYSerr(SYS_F_IOCTL, errno);
return 0;
@@ -495,7 +614,37 @@ static int digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from)
static int digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
{
- return 1;
+ struct digest_ctx *digest_ctx =
+ (struct digest_ctx *)EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx);
+
+ if (digest_ctx == NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ return clean_devcrypto_session(&digest_ctx->sess);
+}
+
+static int devcrypto_test_digest(size_t digest_data_index)
+{
+ struct session_op sess1, sess2;
+ struct cphash_op cphash;
+ int ret=0;
+
+ memset(&sess1, 0, sizeof(sess1));
+ memset(&sess2, 0, sizeof(sess2));
+ sess1.mac = digest_data[digest_data_index].devcryptoid;
+ if (ioctl(cfd, CIOCGSESSION, &sess1) < 0)
+ return 0;
+ /* Make sure the driver is capable of hash state copy */
+ sess2.mac = sess1.mac;
+ if (ioctl(cfd, CIOCGSESSION, &sess2) >= 0) {
+ cphash.src_ses = sess1.ses;
+ cphash.dst_ses = sess2.ses;
+ if (ioctl(cfd, CIOCCPHASH, &cphash) >= 0)
+ ret = 1;
+ ioctl(cfd, CIOCFSESSION, &sess2.ses);
+ }
+ ioctl(cfd, CIOCFSESSION, &sess1.ses);
+ return ret;
}
/*
@@ -510,24 +659,20 @@ static EVP_MD *known_digest_methods[OSSL_NELEM(digest_data)] = { NULL, };
static void prepare_digest_methods(void)
{
size_t i;
- struct session_op sess;
-
- memset(&sess, 0, sizeof(sess));
for (i = 0, known_digest_nids_amount = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(digest_data);
i++) {
/*
- * Check that the algo is really availably by trying to open and close
- * a session.
+ * Check that the algo is usable
*/
- sess.mac = digest_data[i].devcryptoid;
- if (ioctl(cfd, CIOCGSESSION, &sess) < 0
- || ioctl(cfd, CIOCFSESSION, &sess.ses) < 0)
+ if (!devcrypto_test_digest(i))
continue;
if ((known_digest_methods[i] = EVP_MD_meth_new(digest_data[i].nid,
NID_undef)) == NULL
+ || !EVP_MD_meth_set_input_blocksize(known_digest_methods[i],
+ digest_data[i].blocksize)
|| !EVP_MD_meth_set_result_size(known_digest_methods[i],
digest_data[i].digestlen)
|| !EVP_MD_meth_set_init(known_digest_methods[i], digest_init)
@@ -615,15 +760,13 @@ void engine_load_devcrypto_int()
ENGINE *e = NULL;
if ((cfd = open("/dev/crypto", O_RDWR, 0)) < 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Could not open /dev/crypto: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+#ifndef ENGINE_DEVCRYPTO_DEBUG
+ if (errno != ENOENT)
+#endif
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not open /dev/crypto: %s\n", strerror(errno));
return;
}
- prepare_cipher_methods();
-#ifdef IMPLEMENT_DIGEST
- prepare_digest_methods();
-#endif
-
if ((e = ENGINE_new()) == NULL
|| !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, devcrypto_unload)) {
ENGINE_free(e);
@@ -636,6 +779,11 @@ void engine_load_devcrypto_int()
return;
}
+ prepare_cipher_methods();
+#ifdef IMPLEMENT_DIGEST
+ prepare_digest_methods();
+#endif
+
if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, "devcrypto")
|| !ENGINE_set_name(e, "/dev/crypto engine")
diff --git a/crypto/engine/eng_lib.c b/crypto/engine/eng_lib.c
index 3ef3aae28a21..d7f2026fac54 100644
--- a/crypto/engine/eng_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/engine/eng_lib.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2001-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ static int int_cleanup_check(int create)
static ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM *int_cleanup_item(ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB *cb)
{
ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM *item;
-
+
if ((item = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*item))) == NULL) {
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_INT_CLEANUP_ITEM, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
diff --git a/crypto/err/err.c b/crypto/err/err.c
index 03cbd738e193..c737b2a9c3e6 100644
--- a/crypto/err/err.c
+++ b/crypto/err/err.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
#include "internal/thread_once.h"
+#include "internal/ctype.h"
+#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
+#include "e_os.h"
static int err_load_strings(const ERR_STRING_DATA *str);
@@ -181,8 +184,9 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA *int_err_get_item(const ERR_STRING_DATA *d)
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+/* A measurement on Linux 2018-11-21 showed about 3.5kib */
+# define SPACE_SYS_STR_REASONS 4 * 1024
# define NUM_SYS_STR_REASONS 127
-# define LEN_SYS_STR_REASON 32
static ERR_STRING_DATA SYS_str_reasons[NUM_SYS_STR_REASONS + 1];
/*
@@ -198,9 +202,12 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SYS_str_reasons[NUM_SYS_STR_REASONS + 1];
static void build_SYS_str_reasons(void)
{
/* OPENSSL_malloc cannot be used here, use static storage instead */
- static char strerror_tab[NUM_SYS_STR_REASONS][LEN_SYS_STR_REASON];
+ static char strerror_pool[SPACE_SYS_STR_REASONS];
+ char *cur = strerror_pool;
+ size_t cnt = 0;
static int init = 1;
int i;
+ int saveerrno = get_last_sys_error();
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(err_string_lock);
if (!init) {
@@ -213,9 +220,26 @@ static void build_SYS_str_reasons(void)
str->error = ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SYS, 0, i);
if (str->string == NULL) {
- char (*dest)[LEN_SYS_STR_REASON] = &(strerror_tab[i - 1]);
- if (openssl_strerror_r(i, *dest, sizeof(*dest)))
- str->string = *dest;
+ if (openssl_strerror_r(i, cur, sizeof(strerror_pool) - cnt)) {
+ size_t l = strlen(cur);
+
+ str->string = cur;
+ cnt += l;
+ if (cnt > sizeof(strerror_pool))
+ cnt = sizeof(strerror_pool);
+ cur += l;
+
+ /*
+ * VMS has an unusual quirk of adding spaces at the end of
+ * some (most? all?) messages. Lets trim them off.
+ */
+ while (ossl_isspace(cur[-1])) {
+ cur--;
+ cnt--;
+ }
+ *cur++ = '\0';
+ cnt++;
+ }
}
if (str->string == NULL)
str->string = "unknown";
@@ -229,6 +253,8 @@ static void build_SYS_str_reasons(void)
init = 0;
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(err_string_lock);
+ /* openssl_strerror_r could change errno, but we want to preserve it */
+ set_sys_error(saveerrno);
err_load_strings(SYS_str_reasons);
}
#endif
@@ -671,6 +697,7 @@ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(err_do_init)
ERR_STATE *ERR_get_state(void)
{
ERR_STATE *state;
+ int saveerrno = get_last_sys_error();
if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_BASE_ONLY, NULL))
return NULL;
@@ -702,6 +729,7 @@ ERR_STATE *ERR_get_state(void)
OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CRYPTO_STRINGS, NULL);
}
+ set_sys_error(saveerrno);
return state;
}
@@ -711,6 +739,20 @@ ERR_STATE *ERR_get_state(void)
*/
int err_shelve_state(void **state)
{
+ int saveerrno = get_last_sys_error();
+
+ /*
+ * Note, at present our only caller is OPENSSL_init_crypto(), indirectly
+ * via ossl_init_load_crypto_nodelete(), by which point the requested
+ * "base" initialization has already been performed, so the below call is a
+ * NOOP, that re-enters OPENSSL_init_crypto() only to quickly return.
+ *
+ * If are no other valid callers of this function, the call below can be
+ * removed, avoiding the re-entry into OPENSSL_init_crypto(). If there are
+ * potential uses that are not from inside OPENSSL_init_crypto(), then this
+ * call is needed, but some care is required to make sure that the re-entry
+ * remains a NOOP.
+ */
if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_BASE_ONLY, NULL))
return 0;
@@ -721,6 +763,7 @@ int err_shelve_state(void **state)
if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&err_thread_local, (ERR_STATE*)-1))
return 0;
+ set_sys_error(saveerrno);
return 1;
}
@@ -747,20 +790,31 @@ int ERR_get_next_error_library(void)
return ret;
}
-void ERR_set_error_data(char *data, int flags)
+static int err_set_error_data_int(char *data, int flags)
{
ERR_STATE *es;
int i;
es = ERR_get_state();
if (es == NULL)
- return;
+ return 0;
i = es->top;
err_clear_data(es, i);
es->err_data[i] = data;
es->err_data_flags[i] = flags;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void ERR_set_error_data(char *data, int flags)
+{
+ /*
+ * This function is void so we cannot propagate the error return. Since it
+ * is also in the public API we can't change the return type.
+ */
+ err_set_error_data_int(data, flags);
}
void ERR_add_error_data(int num, ...)
@@ -800,7 +854,8 @@ void ERR_add_error_vdata(int num, va_list args)
}
OPENSSL_strlcat(str, a, (size_t)s + 1);
}
- ERR_set_error_data(str, ERR_TXT_MALLOCED | ERR_TXT_STRING);
+ if (!err_set_error_data_int(str, ERR_TXT_MALLOCED | ERR_TXT_STRING))
+ OPENSSL_free(str);
}
int ERR_set_mark(void)
@@ -857,3 +912,42 @@ int ERR_clear_last_mark(void)
es->err_flags[top] &= ~ERR_FLAG_MARK;
return 1;
}
+
+#ifdef UINTPTR_T
+# undef UINTPTR_T
+#endif
+/*
+ * uintptr_t is the answer, but unfortunately C89, current "least common
+ * denominator" doesn't define it. Most legacy platforms typedef it anyway,
+ * so that attempt to fill the gaps means that one would have to identify
+ * that track these gaps, which would be undesirable. Macro it is...
+ */
+#if defined(__VMS) && __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE==64
+/*
+ * But we can't use size_t on VMS, because it adheres to sizeof(size_t)==4
+ * even in 64-bit builds, which means that it won't work as mask.
+ */
+# define UINTPTR_T unsigned long long
+#else
+# define UINTPTR_T size_t
+#endif
+
+void err_clear_last_constant_time(int clear)
+{
+ ERR_STATE *es;
+ int top;
+
+ es = ERR_get_state();
+ if (es == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ top = es->top;
+
+ es->err_flags[top] &= ~(0 - clear);
+ es->err_buffer[top] &= ~(0UL - clear);
+ es->err_file[top] = (const char *)((UINTPTR_T)es->err_file[top] &
+ ~((UINTPTR_T)0 - clear));
+ es->err_line[top] |= 0 - clear;
+
+ es->top = (top + ERR_NUM_ERRORS - clear) % ERR_NUM_ERRORS;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
index 5003d8735a4d..feff1dccded7 100644
--- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
+++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# Copyright 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+# Copyright 1999-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
#
# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -519,6 +519,7 @@ EC_F_ECX_PUB_ENCODE:268:ecx_pub_encode
EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE:153:ec_asn1_group2curve
EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID:154:ec_asn1_group2fieldid
EC_F_EC_GF2M_MONTGOMERY_POINT_MULTIPLY:208:ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply
+EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_FIELD_INV:296:ec_GF2m_simple_field_inv
EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT:159:\
ec_GF2m_simple_group_check_discriminant
EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_GROUP_SET_CURVE:195:ec_GF2m_simple_group_set_curve
@@ -535,6 +536,7 @@ EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES:164:\
ec_GF2m_simple_set_compressed_coordinates
EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_DECODE:133:ec_GFp_mont_field_decode
EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_ENCODE:134:ec_GFp_mont_field_encode
+EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_INV:297:ec_GFp_mont_field_inv
EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_MUL:131:ec_GFp_mont_field_mul
EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_SET_TO_ONE:209:ec_GFp_mont_field_set_to_one
EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_SQR:132:ec_GFp_mont_field_sqr
@@ -555,6 +557,7 @@ EC_F_EC_GFP_NIST_FIELD_MUL:200:ec_GFp_nist_field_mul
EC_F_EC_GFP_NIST_FIELD_SQR:201:ec_GFp_nist_field_sqr
EC_F_EC_GFP_NIST_GROUP_SET_CURVE:202:ec_GFp_nist_group_set_curve
EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_BLIND_COORDINATES:287:ec_GFp_simple_blind_coordinates
+EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_FIELD_INV:298:ec_GFp_simple_field_inv
EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT:165:\
ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant
EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_SET_CURVE:166:ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve
@@ -737,6 +740,7 @@ EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX:101:EVP_DecryptFinal_ex
EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE:166:EVP_DecryptUpdate
EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTFINALXOF:174:EVP_DigestFinalXOF
EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX:128:EVP_DigestInit_ex
+EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTDECRYPTUPDATE:219:evp_EncryptDecryptUpdate
EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX:127:EVP_EncryptFinal_ex
EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTUPDATE:167:EVP_EncryptUpdate
EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX:110:EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex
@@ -2115,6 +2119,7 @@ EC_R_ASN1_ERROR:115:asn1 error
EC_R_BAD_SIGNATURE:156:bad signature
EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE:144:bignum out of range
EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:100:buffer too small
+EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT:165:cannot invert
EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE:146:coordinates out of range
EC_R_CURVE_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_ECDH:160:curve does not support ecdh
EC_R_CURVE_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_SIGNING:159:curve does not support signing
@@ -2722,6 +2727,8 @@ SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM:358:can't find SRP server param
SSL_R_MISSING_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXTENSION:209:missing supported groups extension
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY:171:missing tmp dh key
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY:311:missing tmp ecdh key
+SSL_R_MIXED_HANDSHAKE_AND_NON_HANDSHAKE_DATA:293:\
+ mixed handshake and non handshake data
SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY:182:not on record boundary
SSL_R_NOT_REPLACING_CERTIFICATE:289:not replacing certificate
SSL_R_NOT_SERVER:284:not server
diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c b/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
index 38633410cd1a..05dd791b6cb0 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
@@ -294,8 +294,9 @@ int is_partially_overlapping(const void *ptr1, const void *ptr2, int len)
return overlapped;
}
-int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
- const unsigned char *in, int inl)
+static int evp_EncryptDecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+ unsigned char *out, int *outl,
+ const unsigned char *in, int inl)
{
int i, j, bl, cmpl = inl;
@@ -307,7 +308,7 @@ int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) {
/* If block size > 1 then the cipher will have to do this check */
if (bl == 1 && is_partially_overlapping(out, in, cmpl)) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTUPDATE, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING);
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTDECRYPTUPDATE, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING);
return 0;
}
@@ -324,7 +325,7 @@ int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
return inl == 0;
}
if (is_partially_overlapping(out + ctx->buf_len, in, cmpl)) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTUPDATE, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING);
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTDECRYPTUPDATE, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING);
return 0;
}
@@ -371,6 +372,19 @@ int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
return 1;
}
+
+int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
+ const unsigned char *in, int inl)
+{
+ /* Prevent accidental use of decryption context when encrypting */
+ if (!ctx->encrypt) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTUPDATE, EVP_R_INVALID_OPERATION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return evp_EncryptDecryptUpdate(ctx, out, outl, in, inl);
+}
+
int EVP_EncryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
{
int ret;
@@ -383,6 +397,12 @@ int EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
int n, ret;
unsigned int i, b, bl;
+ /* Prevent accidental use of decryption context when encrypting */
+ if (!ctx->encrypt) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX, EVP_R_INVALID_OPERATION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) {
ret = ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, NULL, 0);
if (ret < 0)
@@ -426,6 +446,12 @@ int EVP_DecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
int fix_len, cmpl = inl;
unsigned int b;
+ /* Prevent accidental use of encryption context when decrypting */
+ if (ctx->encrypt) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE, EVP_R_INVALID_OPERATION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
b = ctx->cipher->block_size;
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_LENGTH_BITS))
@@ -452,7 +478,7 @@ int EVP_DecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
}
if (ctx->flags & EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING)
- return EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, outl, in, inl);
+ return evp_EncryptDecryptUpdate(ctx, out, outl, in, inl);
OPENSSL_assert(b <= sizeof(ctx->final));
@@ -469,7 +495,7 @@ int EVP_DecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
} else
fix_len = 0;
- if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, outl, in, inl))
+ if (!evp_EncryptDecryptUpdate(ctx, out, outl, in, inl))
return 0;
/*
@@ -500,6 +526,13 @@ int EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
{
int i, n;
unsigned int b;
+
+ /* Prevent accidental use of encryption context when decrypting */
+ if (ctx->encrypt) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX, EVP_R_INVALID_OPERATION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
*outl = 0;
if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) {
diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_err.c b/crypto/evp/evp_err.c
index 3e14a7b50949..60df27cbc20a 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/evp_err.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp_err.c
@@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE, 0), "EVP_DecryptUpdate"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTFINALXOF, 0), "EVP_DigestFinalXOF"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX, 0), "EVP_DigestInit_ex"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTDECRYPTUPDATE, 0),
+ "evp_EncryptDecryptUpdate"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX, 0),
"EVP_EncryptFinal_ex"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTUPDATE, 0), "EVP_EncryptUpdate"},
diff --git a/crypto/evp/p_lib.c b/crypto/evp/p_lib.c
index 9429be97e3f9..148df90f84b1 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/p_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/p_lib.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ int EVP_PKEY_security_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
return pkey->ameth->pkey_security_bits(pkey);
}
-int EVP_PKEY_size(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+int EVP_PKEY_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
if (pkey && pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->pkey_size)
return pkey->ameth->pkey_size(pkey);
diff --git a/crypto/include/internal/bn_int.h b/crypto/include/internal/bn_int.h
index cffe5cfc1650..30be7efe14d8 100644
--- a/crypto/include/internal/bn_int.h
+++ b/crypto/include/internal/bn_int.h
@@ -65,7 +65,10 @@ int bn_set_words(BIGNUM *a, const BN_ULONG *words, int num_words);
* is customarily arranged by bn_correct_top. Output from below functions
* is not processed with bn_correct_top, and for this reason it may not be
* returned out of public API. It may only be passed internally into other
- * functions known to support non-minimal or zero-padded BIGNUMs.
+ * functions known to support non-minimal or zero-padded BIGNUMs. Even
+ * though the goal is to facilitate constant-time-ness, not each subroutine
+ * is constant-time by itself. They all have pre-conditions, consult source
+ * code...
*/
int bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx);
@@ -79,5 +82,9 @@ int bn_mod_sub_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
const BIGNUM *m);
int bn_mul_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
int bn_sqr_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int bn_lshift_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n);
+int bn_rshift_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n);
+int bn_div_fixed_top(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m,
+ const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx);
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/init.c b/crypto/init.c
index 209d1a483dae..b9a7334a7ed7 100644
--- a/crypto/init.c
+++ b/crypto/init.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -100,10 +100,6 @@ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_base)
return 0;
if ((init_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI
- if (atexit(OPENSSL_cleanup) != 0)
- goto err;
-#endif
OPENSSL_cpuid_setup();
destructor_key.value = key;
@@ -121,13 +117,53 @@ err:
return 0;
}
+static CRYPTO_ONCE register_atexit = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI) && defined(_WIN32)
+static int win32atexit(void)
+{
+ OPENSSL_cleanup();
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_register_atexit)
+{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_register_atexit()\n");
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI
+# ifdef _WIN32
+ /* We use _onexit() in preference because it gets called on DLL unload */
+ if (_onexit(win32atexit) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+# else
+ if (atexit(OPENSSL_cleanup) != 0)
+ return 0;
+# endif
+#endif
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC_ALT(ossl_init_no_register_atexit,
+ ossl_init_register_atexit)
+{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_no_register_atexit ok!\n");
+#endif
+ /* Do nothing in this case */
+ return 1;
+}
+
static CRYPTO_ONCE load_crypto_nodelete = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_load_crypto_nodelete)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_load_crypto_nodelete()\n");
#endif
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSO) && !defined(OPENSSL_USE_NODELETE)
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSO) \
+ && !defined(OPENSSL_USE_NODELETE) \
+ && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_PINSHARED)
# ifdef DSO_WIN32
{
HMODULE handle = NULL;
@@ -177,12 +213,6 @@ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_load_crypto_nodelete)
static CRYPTO_ONCE load_crypto_strings = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
static int load_crypto_strings_inited = 0;
-DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_no_load_crypto_strings)
-{
- /* Do nothing in this case */
- return 1;
-}
-
DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_load_crypto_strings)
{
int ret = 1;
@@ -201,6 +231,13 @@ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_load_crypto_strings)
return ret;
}
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC_ALT(ossl_init_no_load_crypto_strings,
+ ossl_init_load_crypto_strings)
+{
+ /* Do nothing in this case */
+ return 1;
+}
+
static CRYPTO_ONCE add_all_ciphers = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_add_all_ciphers)
{
@@ -218,6 +255,13 @@ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_add_all_ciphers)
return 1;
}
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC_ALT(ossl_init_no_add_all_ciphers,
+ ossl_init_add_all_ciphers)
+{
+ /* Do nothing */
+ return 1;
+}
+
static CRYPTO_ONCE add_all_digests = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_add_all_digests)
{
@@ -235,7 +279,8 @@ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_add_all_digests)
return 1;
}
-DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_no_add_algs)
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC_ALT(ossl_init_no_add_all_digests,
+ ossl_init_add_all_digests)
{
/* Do nothing */
return 1;
@@ -243,19 +288,14 @@ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_no_add_algs)
static CRYPTO_ONCE config = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
static int config_inited = 0;
-static const char *appname;
+static const OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *conf_settings = NULL;
DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_config)
{
-#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr,
- "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_config: openssl_config(%s)\n",
- appname == NULL ? "NULL" : appname);
-#endif
- openssl_config_int(appname);
+ int ret = openssl_config_int(conf_settings);
config_inited = 1;
- return 1;
+ return ret;
}
-DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_no_config)
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC_ALT(ossl_init_no_config, ossl_init_config)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr,
@@ -586,17 +626,43 @@ int OPENSSL_init_crypto(uint64_t opts, const OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings)
return 0;
}
+ /*
+ * When the caller specifies OPENSSL_INIT_BASE_ONLY, that should be the
+ * *only* option specified. With that option we return immediately after
+ * doing the requested limited initialization. Note that
+ * err_shelve_state() called by us via ossl_init_load_crypto_nodelete()
+ * re-enters OPENSSL_init_crypto() with OPENSSL_INIT_BASE_ONLY, but with
+ * base already initialized this is a harmless NOOP.
+ *
+ * If we remain the only caller of err_shelve_state() the recursion should
+ * perhaps be removed, but if in doubt, it can be left in place.
+ */
if (!RUN_ONCE(&base, ossl_init_base))
return 0;
+ if (opts & OPENSSL_INIT_BASE_ONLY)
+ return 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Now we don't always set up exit handlers, the INIT_BASE_ONLY calls
+ * should not have the side-effect of setting up exit handlers, and
+ * therefore, this code block is below the INIT_BASE_ONLY-conditioned early
+ * return above.
+ */
+ if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_NO_ATEXIT) != 0) {
+ if (!RUN_ONCE_ALT(&register_atexit, ossl_init_no_register_atexit,
+ ossl_init_register_atexit))
+ return 0;
+ } else if (!RUN_ONCE(&register_atexit, ossl_init_register_atexit)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (!(opts & OPENSSL_INIT_BASE_ONLY)
- && !RUN_ONCE(&load_crypto_nodelete,
- ossl_init_load_crypto_nodelete))
+ if (!RUN_ONCE(&load_crypto_nodelete, ossl_init_load_crypto_nodelete))
return 0;
if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_NO_LOAD_CRYPTO_STRINGS)
- && !RUN_ONCE(&load_crypto_strings,
- ossl_init_no_load_crypto_strings))
+ && !RUN_ONCE_ALT(&load_crypto_strings,
+ ossl_init_no_load_crypto_strings,
+ ossl_init_load_crypto_strings))
return 0;
if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CRYPTO_STRINGS)
@@ -604,7 +670,8 @@ int OPENSSL_init_crypto(uint64_t opts, const OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings)
return 0;
if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_NO_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS)
- && !RUN_ONCE(&add_all_ciphers, ossl_init_no_add_algs))
+ && !RUN_ONCE_ALT(&add_all_ciphers, ossl_init_no_add_all_ciphers,
+ ossl_init_add_all_ciphers))
return 0;
if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS)
@@ -612,7 +679,8 @@ int OPENSSL_init_crypto(uint64_t opts, const OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings)
return 0;
if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_NO_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS)
- && !RUN_ONCE(&add_all_digests, ossl_init_no_add_algs))
+ && !RUN_ONCE_ALT(&add_all_digests, ossl_init_no_add_all_digests,
+ ossl_init_add_all_digests))
return 0;
if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS)
@@ -624,14 +692,15 @@ int OPENSSL_init_crypto(uint64_t opts, const OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings)
return 0;
if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_NO_LOAD_CONFIG)
- && !RUN_ONCE(&config, ossl_init_no_config))
+ && !RUN_ONCE_ALT(&config, ossl_init_no_config, ossl_init_config))
return 0;
if (opts & OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG) {
int ret;
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(init_lock);
- appname = (settings == NULL) ? NULL : settings->appname;
+ conf_settings = settings;
ret = RUN_ONCE(&config, ossl_init_config);
+ conf_settings = NULL;
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(init_lock);
if (!ret)
return 0;
@@ -695,7 +764,9 @@ int OPENSSL_atexit(void (*handler)(void))
{
OPENSSL_INIT_STOP *newhand;
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSO) && !defined(OPENSSL_USE_NODELETE)
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSO) \
+ && !defined(OPENSSL_USE_NODELETE)\
+ && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_PINSHARED)
{
union {
void *sym;
diff --git a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl
index afc30c3e72a4..30158aa076da 100755
--- a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#! /usr/bin/env perl
-# Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+# Copyright 2010-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
#
# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -529,6 +529,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type gcm_init_clmul,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
gcm_init_clmul:
+.cfi_startproc
.L_init_clmul:
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
@@ -598,6 +599,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($win64);
___
$code.=<<___;
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size gcm_init_clmul,.-gcm_init_clmul
___
}
@@ -609,6 +611,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type gcm_gmult_clmul,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
gcm_gmult_clmul:
+.cfi_startproc
.L_gmult_clmul:
movdqu ($Xip),$Xi
movdqa .Lbswap_mask(%rip),$T3
@@ -645,6 +648,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
pshufb $T3,$Xi
movdqu $Xi,($Xip)
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size gcm_gmult_clmul,.-gcm_gmult_clmul
___
}
@@ -658,6 +662,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type gcm_ghash_clmul,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
gcm_ghash_clmul:
+.cfi_startproc
.L_ghash_clmul:
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
@@ -1005,6 +1010,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($win64);
___
$code.=<<___;
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size gcm_ghash_clmul,.-gcm_ghash_clmul
___
}
@@ -1014,6 +1020,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type gcm_init_avx,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
gcm_init_avx:
+.cfi_startproc
___
if ($avx) {
my ($Htbl,$Xip)=@_4args;
@@ -1142,6 +1149,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($win64);
___
$code.=<<___;
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size gcm_init_avx,.-gcm_init_avx
___
} else {
@@ -1156,7 +1164,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type gcm_gmult_avx,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
gcm_gmult_avx:
+.cfi_startproc
jmp .L_gmult_clmul
+.cfi_endproc
.size gcm_gmult_avx,.-gcm_gmult_avx
___
@@ -1165,6 +1175,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type gcm_ghash_avx,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
gcm_ghash_avx:
+.cfi_startproc
___
if ($avx) {
my ($Xip,$Htbl,$inp,$len)=@_4args;
@@ -1577,6 +1588,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($win64);
___
$code.=<<___;
ret
+.cfi_endproc
.size gcm_ghash_avx,.-gcm_ghash_avx
___
} else {
diff --git a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h
index e931f7f516ca..9ab1a14b9e32 100644
--- a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h
+++ b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
* WARNING: do not edit!
* Generated by crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl
*
- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
diff --git a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl
index e80900d09d26..e5d38147eccf 100644
--- a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl
+++ b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#! /usr/bin/env perl
-# Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+# Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
#
# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/crypto/objects/obj_xref.h b/crypto/objects/obj_xref.h
index 9606e57d6191..9144d569dcd0 100644
--- a/crypto/objects/obj_xref.h
+++ b/crypto/objects/obj_xref.h
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
* WARNING: do not edit!
* Generated by objxref.pl
*
- * Copyright 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/crypto/objects/objects.pl b/crypto/objects/objects.pl
index 8f9b67f95991..d7d1962c9999 100644
--- a/crypto/objects/objects.pl
+++ b/crypto/objects/objects.pl
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#! /usr/bin/env perl
-# Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+# Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
#
# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/crypto/objects/objxref.pl b/crypto/objects/objxref.pl
index 0ec63f067e3c..ce76cadae31c 100755
--- a/crypto/objects/objxref.pl
+++ b/crypto/objects/objxref.pl
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#! /usr/bin/env perl
-# Copyright 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+# Copyright 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
#
# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/crypto/pem/pem_info.c b/crypto/pem/pem_info.c
index a45fe83001b3..f90cb4465096 100644
--- a/crypto/pem/pem_info.c
+++ b/crypto/pem/pem_info.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ int PEM_X509_INFO_write_bio(BIO *bp, X509_INFO *xi, EVP_CIPHER *enc,
goto err;
}
- /* Create the right magic header stuff */
+ /* Create the right magic header stuff */
buf[0] = '\0';
PEM_proc_type(buf, PEM_TYPE_ENCRYPTED);
PEM_dek_info(buf, objstr, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc),
diff --git a/crypto/perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl b/crypto/perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl
index f8380f2e9cfa..29a0eacfd532 100755
--- a/crypto/perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl
+++ b/crypto/perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#! /usr/bin/env perl
-# Copyright 2005-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+# Copyright 2005-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
#
# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -541,6 +541,7 @@ my %globals;
);
my ($cfa_reg, $cfa_rsp);
+ my @cfa_stack;
# [us]leb128 format is variable-length integer representation base
# 2^128, with most significant bit of each byte being 0 denoting
@@ -648,7 +649,13 @@ my %globals;
# why it starts with -8. Recall that CFA is top of caller's
# stack...
/startproc/ && do { ($cfa_reg, $cfa_rsp) = ("%rsp", -8); last; };
- /endproc/ && do { ($cfa_reg, $cfa_rsp) = ("%rsp", 0); last; };
+ /endproc/ && do { ($cfa_reg, $cfa_rsp) = ("%rsp", 0);
+ # .cfi_remember_state directives that are not
+ # matched with .cfi_restore_state are
+ # unnecessary.
+ die "unpaired .cfi_remember_state" if (@cfa_stack);
+ last;
+ };
/def_cfa_register/
&& do { $cfa_reg = $$line; last; };
/def_cfa_offset/
@@ -688,6 +695,14 @@ my %globals;
cfa_expression($$line)));
last;
};
+ /remember_state/
+ && do { push @cfa_stack, [$cfa_reg, $cfa_rsp];
+ last;
+ };
+ /restore_state/
+ && do { ($cfa_reg, $cfa_rsp) = @{pop @cfa_stack};
+ last;
+ };
}
$self->{value} = ".cfi_$dir\t$$line" if ($dir);
diff --git a/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-armv8.pl b/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-armv8.pl
index ac06457b6530..6c6c9bb05be0 100755
--- a/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-armv8.pl
+++ b/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-armv8.pl
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#! /usr/bin/env perl
-# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+# Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
#
# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -291,6 +291,7 @@ poly1305_blocks_neon:
cbz $is_base2_26,poly1305_blocks
.Lblocks_neon:
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-80]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -859,6 +860,7 @@ poly1305_blocks_neon:
st1 {$ACC4}[0],[$ctx]
.Lno_data_neon:
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ldr x29,[sp],#80
ret
.size poly1305_blocks_neon,.-poly1305_blocks_neon
diff --git a/crypto/ppc_arch.h b/crypto/ppc_arch.h
index 65cf96fc1fe8..72bd7468745c 100644
--- a/crypto/ppc_arch.h
+++ b/crypto/ppc_arch.h
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2014-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -22,5 +22,7 @@ extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ppccap_P;
# define PPC_CRYPTO207 (1<<2)
# define PPC_FPU (1<<3)
# define PPC_MADD300 (1<<4)
+# define PPC_MFTB (1<<5)
+# define PPC_MFSPR268 (1<<6)
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/ppccap.c b/crypto/ppccap.c
index 8b7d765c3aa2..afb9e31b0028 100644
--- a/crypto/ppccap.c
+++ b/crypto/ppccap.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 2009-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2009-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -168,16 +168,50 @@ void OPENSSL_altivec_probe(void);
void OPENSSL_crypto207_probe(void);
void OPENSSL_madd300_probe(void);
-/*
- * Use a weak reference to getauxval() so we can use it if it is available
- * but don't break the build if it is not. Note that this is *link-time*
- * feature detection, not *run-time*. In other words if we link with
- * symbol present, it's expected to be present even at run-time.
- */
-#if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && defined(__ELF__)
-extern unsigned long getauxval(unsigned long type) __attribute__ ((weak));
-#else
-static unsigned long (*getauxval) (unsigned long) = NULL;
+long OPENSSL_rdtsc_mftb(void);
+long OPENSSL_rdtsc_mfspr268(void);
+
+uint32_t OPENSSL_rdtsc(void)
+{
+ if (OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_MFTB)
+ return OPENSSL_rdtsc_mftb();
+ else if (OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_MFSPR268)
+ return OPENSSL_rdtsc_mfspr268();
+ else
+ return 0;
+}
+
+size_t OPENSSL_instrument_bus_mftb(unsigned int *, size_t);
+size_t OPENSSL_instrument_bus_mfspr268(unsigned int *, size_t);
+
+size_t OPENSSL_instrument_bus(unsigned int *out, size_t cnt)
+{
+ if (OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_MFTB)
+ return OPENSSL_instrument_bus_mftb(out, cnt);
+ else if (OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_MFSPR268)
+ return OPENSSL_instrument_bus_mfspr268(out, cnt);
+ else
+ return 0;
+}
+
+size_t OPENSSL_instrument_bus2_mftb(unsigned int *, size_t, size_t);
+size_t OPENSSL_instrument_bus2_mfspr268(unsigned int *, size_t, size_t);
+
+size_t OPENSSL_instrument_bus2(unsigned int *out, size_t cnt, size_t max)
+{
+ if (OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_MFTB)
+ return OPENSSL_instrument_bus2_mftb(out, cnt, max);
+ else if (OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_MFSPR268)
+ return OPENSSL_instrument_bus2_mfspr268(out, cnt, max);
+ else
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#if defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ)
+# if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 16)
+# include <sys/auxv.h>
+# define OSSL_IMPLEMENT_GETAUXVAL
+# endif
#endif
/* I wish <sys/auxv.h> was universally available */
@@ -277,7 +311,8 @@ void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void)
}
#endif
- if (getauxval != NULL) {
+#ifdef OSSL_IMPLEMENT_GETAUXVAL
+ {
unsigned long hwcap = getauxval(HWCAP);
if (hwcap & HWCAP_FPU) {
@@ -304,9 +339,8 @@ void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void)
if (hwcap & HWCAP_ARCH_3_00) {
OPENSSL_ppccap_P |= PPC_MADD300;
}
-
- return;
}
+#endif
sigfillset(&all_masked);
sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGILL);
@@ -325,15 +359,16 @@ void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void)
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &ill_act.sa_mask, &oset);
sigaction(SIGILL, &ill_act, &ill_oact);
+#ifndef OSSL_IMPLEMENT_GETAUXVAL
if (sigsetjmp(ill_jmp,1) == 0) {
OPENSSL_fpu_probe();
OPENSSL_ppccap_P |= PPC_FPU;
if (sizeof(size_t) == 4) {
-#ifdef __linux
+# ifdef __linux
struct utsname uts;
if (uname(&uts) == 0 && strcmp(uts.machine, "ppc64") == 0)
-#endif
+# endif
if (sigsetjmp(ill_jmp, 1) == 0) {
OPENSSL_ppc64_probe();
OPENSSL_ppccap_P |= PPC_FPU64;
@@ -358,6 +393,15 @@ void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void)
OPENSSL_madd300_probe();
OPENSSL_ppccap_P |= PPC_MADD300;
}
+#endif
+
+ if (sigsetjmp(ill_jmp, 1) == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_rdtsc_mftb();
+ OPENSSL_ppccap_P |= PPC_MFTB;
+ } else if (sigsetjmp(ill_jmp, 1) == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_rdtsc_mfspr268();
+ OPENSSL_ppccap_P |= PPC_MFSPR268;
+ }
sigaction(SIGILL, &ill_oact, NULL);
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL);
diff --git a/crypto/ppccpuid.pl b/crypto/ppccpuid.pl
index 9d1cada4dc4c..a38445fd3c52 100755
--- a/crypto/ppccpuid.pl
+++ b/crypto/ppccpuid.pl
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#! /usr/bin/env perl
-# Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+# Copyright 2007-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
#
# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -124,26 +124,23 @@ Ladd: lwarx r5,0,r3
.long 0
.size .OPENSSL_atomic_add,.-.OPENSSL_atomic_add
-.globl .OPENSSL_rdtsc
+.globl .OPENSSL_rdtsc_mftb
.align 4
-.OPENSSL_rdtsc:
-___
-$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/);
- mftb r3
-___
-$code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /64/);
-Loop_rdtsc:
- mftbu r5
+.OPENSSL_rdtsc_mftb:
mftb r3
- mftbu r4
- cmplw r4,r5
- bne Loop_rdtsc
-___
-$code.=<<___;
blr
.long 0
.byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
-.size .OPENSSL_rdtsc,.-.OPENSSL_rdtsc
+.size .OPENSSL_rdtsc_mftb,.-.OPENSSL_rdtsc_mftb
+
+.globl .OPENSSL_rdtsc_mfspr268
+.align 4
+.OPENSSL_rdtsc_mfspr268:
+ mfspr r3,268
+ blr
+ .long 0
+ .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+.size .OPENSSL_rdtsc_mfspr268,.-.OPENSSL_rdtsc_mfspr268
.globl .OPENSSL_cleanse
.align 4
@@ -210,9 +207,9 @@ my ($tick,$lasttick)=("r6","r7");
my ($diff,$lastdiff)=("r8","r9");
$code.=<<___;
-.globl .OPENSSL_instrument_bus
+.globl .OPENSSL_instrument_bus_mftb
.align 4
-.OPENSSL_instrument_bus:
+.OPENSSL_instrument_bus_mftb:
mtctr $cnt
mftb $lasttick # collect 1st tick
@@ -240,11 +237,11 @@ Loop: mftb $tick
.long 0
.byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,2,0
.long 0
-.size .OPENSSL_instrument_bus,.-.OPENSSL_instrument_bus
+.size .OPENSSL_instrument_bus_mftb,.-.OPENSSL_instrument_bus_mftb
-.globl .OPENSSL_instrument_bus2
+.globl .OPENSSL_instrument_bus2_mftb
.align 4
-.OPENSSL_instrument_bus2:
+.OPENSSL_instrument_bus2_mftb:
mr r0,$cnt
slwi $cnt,$cnt,2
@@ -292,7 +289,91 @@ Ldone2:
.long 0
.byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,3,0
.long 0
-.size .OPENSSL_instrument_bus2,.-.OPENSSL_instrument_bus2
+.size .OPENSSL_instrument_bus2_mftb,.-.OPENSSL_instrument_bus2_mftb
+
+.globl .OPENSSL_instrument_bus_mfspr268
+.align 4
+.OPENSSL_instrument_bus_mfspr268:
+ mtctr $cnt
+
+ mfspr $lasttick,268 # collect 1st tick
+ li $diff,0
+
+ dcbf 0,$out # flush cache line
+ lwarx $tick,0,$out # load and lock
+ add $tick,$tick,$diff
+ stwcx. $tick,0,$out
+ stwx $tick,0,$out
+
+Loop3: mfspr $tick,268
+ sub $diff,$tick,$lasttick
+ mr $lasttick,$tick
+ dcbf 0,$out # flush cache line
+ lwarx $tick,0,$out # load and lock
+ add $tick,$tick,$diff
+ stwcx. $tick,0,$out
+ stwx $tick,0,$out
+ addi $out,$out,4 # ++$out
+ bdnz Loop3
+
+ mr r3,$cnt
+ blr
+ .long 0
+ .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,2,0
+ .long 0
+.size .OPENSSL_instrument_bus_mfspr268,.-.OPENSSL_instrument_bus_mfspr268
+
+.globl .OPENSSL_instrument_bus2_mfspr268
+.align 4
+.OPENSSL_instrument_bus2_mfspr268:
+ mr r0,$cnt
+ slwi $cnt,$cnt,2
+
+ mfspr $lasttick,268 # collect 1st tick
+ li $diff,0
+
+ dcbf 0,$out # flush cache line
+ lwarx $tick,0,$out # load and lock
+ add $tick,$tick,$diff
+ stwcx. $tick,0,$out
+ stwx $tick,0,$out
+
+ mfspr $tick,268 # collect 1st diff
+ sub $diff,$tick,$lasttick
+ mr $lasttick,$tick
+ mr $lastdiff,$diff
+Loop4:
+ dcbf 0,$out # flush cache line
+ lwarx $tick,0,$out # load and lock
+ add $tick,$tick,$diff
+ stwcx. $tick,0,$out
+ stwx $tick,0,$out
+
+ addic. $max,$max,-1
+ beq Ldone4
+
+ mfspr $tick,268
+ sub $diff,$tick,$lasttick
+ mr $lasttick,$tick
+ cmplw 7,$diff,$lastdiff
+ mr $lastdiff,$diff
+
+ mfcr $tick # pull cr
+ not $tick,$tick # flip bits
+ rlwinm $tick,$tick,1,29,29 # isolate flipped eq bit and scale
+
+ sub. $cnt,$cnt,$tick # conditional --$cnt
+ add $out,$out,$tick # conditional ++$out
+ bne Loop4
+
+Ldone4:
+ srwi $cnt,$cnt,2
+ sub r3,r0,$cnt
+ blr
+ .long 0
+ .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,3,0
+ .long 0
+.size .OPENSSL_instrument_bus2_mfspr268,.-.OPENSSL_instrument_bus2_mfspr268
___
}
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c b/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
index 9d8ffdd53796..9cbc9ade77fa 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -93,6 +93,27 @@ static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void);
# error "UEFI and VXWorks only support seeding NONE"
#endif
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
+/* empty implementation */
+int rand_pool_init(void)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void rand_pool_cleanup(void)
+{
+}
+
+void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
+{
+}
+
+size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
+{
+ return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
+}
+#endif
+
#if !(defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) \
|| defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) \
|| defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI))
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
index a6595aec0542..75debb3e0a9d 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ static int rsa_param_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
*pstr = NULL;
/* If RSA it's just NULL type */
- if (pkey->ameth->pkey_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+ if (pkey->ameth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
*pstrtype = V_ASN1_NULL;
return 1;
}
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ static int rsa_param_decode(RSA *rsa, const X509_ALGOR *alg)
int algptype;
X509_ALGOR_get0(&algoid, &algptype, &algp, alg);
- if (OBJ_obj2nid(algoid) == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ if (OBJ_obj2nid(algoid) != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
return 1;
if (algptype == V_ASN1_UNDEF)
return 1;
@@ -109,7 +109,10 @@ static int rsa_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey)
RSA_free(rsa);
return 0;
}
- EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, pkey->ameth->pkey_id, rsa);
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, pkey->ameth->pkey_id, rsa)) {
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ return 0;
+ }
return 1;
}
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
index f13c6fc9e506..689e6dc22292 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
const EVP_MD *mgf1md)
{
int i, dblen = 0, mlen = -1, one_index = 0, msg_index;
- unsigned int good, found_one_byte;
+ unsigned int good = 0, found_one_byte, mask;
const unsigned char *maskedseed, *maskeddb;
/*
* |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes: em =
@@ -147,8 +147,11 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
* the ciphertext, see PKCS #1 v2.2, section 7.1.2.
* This does not leak any side-channel information.
*/
- if (num < flen || num < 2 * mdlen + 2)
- goto decoding_err;
+ if (num < flen || num < 2 * mdlen + 2) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
+ RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
dblen = num - mdlen - 1;
db = OPENSSL_malloc(dblen);
@@ -157,25 +160,26 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
goto cleanup;
}
- if (flen != num) {
- em = OPENSSL_zalloc(num);
- if (em == NULL) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto cleanup;
- }
+ em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if (em == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
- /*
- * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
- * BN_bn2binpad, but if it doesn't, we do this zero-padding copy
- * to avoid leaking that information. The copy still leaks some
- * side-channel information, but it's impossible to have a fixed
- * memory access pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of
- * |from|.
- */
- memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen);
- from = em;
+ /*
+ * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
+ * BN_bn2binpad. Trouble is that since we can't read out of |from|'s
+ * bounds, it's impossible to have an invariant memory access pattern
+ * in case |from| was not zero-padded in advance.
+ */
+ for (from += flen, em += num, i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+ mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(flen);
+ flen -= 1 & mask;
+ from -= 1 & mask;
+ *--em = *from & mask;
}
+ from = em;
/*
* The first byte must be zero, however we must not leak if this is
@@ -222,32 +226,48 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
* so plaintext-awareness ensures timing side-channels are no longer a
* concern.
*/
- if (!good)
- goto decoding_err;
-
msg_index = one_index + 1;
mlen = dblen - msg_index;
- if (tlen < mlen) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
- mlen = -1;
- } else {
- memcpy(to, db + msg_index, mlen);
- goto cleanup;
+ /*
+ * For good measure, do this check in constant tine as well.
+ */
+ good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen);
+
+ /*
+ * Even though we can't fake result's length, we can pretend copying
+ * |tlen| bytes where |mlen| bytes would be real. Last |tlen| of |dblen|
+ * bytes are viewed as circular buffer with start at |tlen|-|mlen'|,
+ * where |mlen'| is "saturated" |mlen| value. Deducing information
+ * about failure or |mlen| would take attacker's ability to observe
+ * memory access pattern with byte granularity *as it occurs*. It
+ * should be noted that failure is indistinguishable from normal
+ * operation if |tlen| is fixed by protocol.
+ */
+ tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(dblen, tlen), dblen, tlen);
+ msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, dblen - tlen);
+ mlen = dblen - msg_index;
+ for (from = db + msg_index, mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
+ unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(i, mlen);
+
+ from -= dblen & equals; /* if (i == dblen) rewind */
+ mask &= mask ^ equals; /* if (i == dblen) mask = 0 */
+ to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, from[i], to[i]);
}
- decoding_err:
/*
* To avoid chosen ciphertext attacks, the error message should not
* reveal which kind of decoding error happened.
*/
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
+ err_clear_last_constant_time(1 & good);
cleanup:
OPENSSL_cleanse(seed, sizeof(seed));
OPENSSL_clear_free(db, dblen);
OPENSSL_clear_free(em, num);
- return mlen;
+
+ return constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, -1);
}
int PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len,
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
index 2b1b006c2801..465134257fcc 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "internal/bn_int.h"
#include "rsa_locl.h"
+#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
static int rsa_ossl_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
@@ -286,6 +287,11 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
goto err;
}
+ if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, rsa->lock,
+ rsa->n, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) {
blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
if (blinding == NULL) {
@@ -318,13 +324,6 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
}
BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, rsa->lock,
- rsa->n, ctx)) {
- BN_free(d);
- goto err;
- }
-
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_n)) {
BN_free(d);
@@ -481,8 +480,8 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
goto err;
}
- if (r < 0)
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+ err_clear_last_constant_time(r >= 0);
err:
if (ctx != NULL)
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
index d07c0d6f852b..062690741809 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
@@ -158,10 +158,10 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
int i;
/* |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes */
unsigned char *em = NULL;
- unsigned int good, found_zero_byte;
+ unsigned int good, found_zero_byte, mask;
int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1;
- if (tlen < 0 || flen < 0)
+ if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0)
return -1;
/*
@@ -169,39 +169,41 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
* section 7.2.2.
*/
- if (flen > num)
- goto err;
-
- if (num < 11)
- goto err;
+ if (flen > num || num < 11) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2,
+ RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
- if (flen != num) {
- em = OPENSSL_zalloc(num);
- if (em == NULL) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return -1;
- }
- /*
- * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
- * BN_bn2binpad, but if it doesn't, we do this zero-padding copy
- * to avoid leaking that information. The copy still leaks some
- * side-channel information, but it's impossible to have a fixed
- * memory access pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of
- * |from|.
- */
- memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen);
- from = em;
+ em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if (em == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
+ * BN_bn2binpad. Trouble is that since we can't read out of |from|'s
+ * bounds, it's impossible to have an invariant memory access pattern
+ * in case |from| was not zero-padded in advance.
+ */
+ for (from += flen, em += num, i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+ mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(flen);
+ flen -= 1 & mask;
+ from -= 1 & mask;
+ *--em = *from & mask;
}
+ from = em;
good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]);
good &= constant_time_eq(from[1], 2);
+ /* scan over padding data */
found_zero_byte = 0;
for (i = 2; i < num; i++) {
unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(from[i]);
- zero_index =
- constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0, i,
- zero_index);
+
+ zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0,
+ i, zero_index);
found_zero_byte |= equals0;
}
@@ -210,7 +212,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
* If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
* also fails.
*/
- good &= constant_time_ge((unsigned int)(zero_index), 2 + 8);
+ good &= constant_time_ge(zero_index, 2 + 8);
/*
* Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte
@@ -220,27 +222,34 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
mlen = num - msg_index;
/*
- * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well; it could
- * leak something if |tlen| was assuming valid padding.
+ * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well.
*/
- good &= constant_time_ge((unsigned int)(tlen), (unsigned int)(mlen));
+ good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen);
/*
- * We can't continue in constant-time because we need to copy the result
- * and we cannot fake its length. This unavoidably leaks timing
- * information at the API boundary.
+ * Even though we can't fake result's length, we can pretend copying
+ * |tlen| bytes where |mlen| bytes would be real. Last |tlen| of |num|
+ * bytes are viewed as circular buffer with start at |tlen|-|mlen'|,
+ * where |mlen'| is "saturated" |mlen| value. Deducing information
+ * about failure or |mlen| would take attacker's ability to observe
+ * memory access pattern with byte granularity *as it occurs*. It
+ * should be noted that failure is indistinguishable from normal
+ * operation if |tlen| is fixed by protocol.
*/
- if (!good) {
- mlen = -1;
- goto err;
- }
+ tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num, tlen), num, tlen);
+ msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, num - tlen);
+ mlen = num - msg_index;
+ for (from += msg_index, mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
+ unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(i, mlen);
- memcpy(to, from + msg_index, mlen);
+ from -= tlen & equals; /* if (i == mlen) rewind */
+ mask &= mask ^ equals; /* if (i == mlen) mask = 0 */
+ to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, from[i], to[i]);
+ }
- err:
OPENSSL_clear_free(em, num);
- if (mlen == -1)
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2,
- RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR);
- return mlen;
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR);
+ err_clear_last_constant_time(1 & good);
+
+ return constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, -1);
}
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c
index 286d0a42de0f..c5654595fb2f 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
const unsigned char *from, int flen)
@@ -52,57 +53,115 @@ int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
return 1;
}
+/*
+ * Copy of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2 with a twist that rejects padding
+ * if nul delimiter is preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes. It also
+ * preserves error code reporting for backward compatibility.
+ */
int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num)
{
- int i, j, k;
- const unsigned char *p;
+ int i;
+ /* |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes */
+ unsigned char *em = NULL;
+ unsigned int good, found_zero_byte, mask, threes_in_row;
+ int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1, err;
- p = from;
if (flen < 10) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL);
return -1;
}
- /* Accept even zero-padded input */
- if (flen == num) {
- if (*(p++) != 0) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02);
- return -1;
- }
- flen--;
- }
- if ((num != (flen + 1)) || (*(p++) != 02)) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02);
- return -1;
- }
- /* scan over padding data */
- j = flen - 1; /* one for type */
- for (i = 0; i < j; i++)
- if (*(p++) == 0)
- break;
-
- if ((i == j) || (i < 8)) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23,
- RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
+ em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if (em == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
- for (k = -9; k < -1; k++) {
- if (p[k] != 0x03)
- break;
+ /*
+ * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
+ * BN_bn2binpad. Trouble is that since we can't read out of |from|'s
+ * bounds, it's impossible to have an invariant memory access pattern
+ * in case |from| was not zero-padded in advance.
+ */
+ for (from += flen, em += num, i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+ mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(flen);
+ flen -= 1 & mask;
+ from -= 1 & mask;
+ *--em = *from & mask;
}
- if (k == -1) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK);
- return -1;
+ from = em;
+
+ good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]);
+ good &= constant_time_eq(from[1], 2);
+ err = constant_time_select_int(good, 0, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02);
+ mask = ~good;
+
+ /* scan over padding data */
+ found_zero_byte = 0;
+ threes_in_row = 0;
+ for (i = 2; i < num; i++) {
+ unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(from[i]);
+
+ zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0,
+ i, zero_index);
+ found_zero_byte |= equals0;
+
+ threes_in_row += 1 & ~found_zero_byte;
+ threes_in_row &= found_zero_byte | constant_time_eq(from[i], 3);
}
- i++; /* Skip over the '\0' */
- j -= i;
- if (j > tlen) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
- return -1;
+ /*
+ * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |from|.
+ * If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
+ * also fails.
+ */
+ good &= constant_time_ge(zero_index, 2 + 8);
+ err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err,
+ RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
+ mask = ~good;
+
+ good &= constant_time_lt(threes_in_row, 8);
+ err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err,
+ RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK);
+ mask = ~good;
+
+ /*
+ * Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte
+ * but in this case we also do not copy the message out.
+ */
+ msg_index = zero_index + 1;
+ mlen = num - msg_index;
+
+ /*
+ * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well.
+ */
+ good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen);
+ err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+
+ /*
+ * Even though we can't fake result's length, we can pretend copying
+ * |tlen| bytes where |mlen| bytes would be real. Last |tlen| of |num|
+ * bytes are viewed as circular buffer with start at |tlen|-|mlen'|,
+ * where |mlen'| is "saturated" |mlen| value. Deducing information
+ * about failure or |mlen| would take attacker's ability to observe
+ * memory access pattern with byte granularity *as it occurs*. It
+ * should be noted that failure is indistinguishable from normal
+ * operation if |tlen| is fixed by protocol.
+ */
+ tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num, tlen), num, tlen);
+ msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, num - tlen);
+ mlen = num - msg_index;
+ for (from += msg_index, mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
+ unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(i, mlen);
+
+ from -= tlen & equals; /* if (i == mlen) rewind */
+ mask &= mask ^ equals; /* if (i == mlen) mask = 0 */
+ to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, from[i], to[i]);
}
- memcpy(to, p, (unsigned int)j);
- return j;
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(em, num);
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, err);
+ err_clear_last_constant_time(1 & good);
+
+ return constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, -1);
}
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_x931g.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_x931g.c
index 3563670a12ac..15e40e8d1dd7 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_x931g.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_x931g.c
@@ -128,6 +128,8 @@ int RSA_X931_derive_ex(RSA *rsa, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *p2, BIGNUM *q1,
/* calculate inverse of q mod p */
rsa->iqmp = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, rsa->q, rsa->p, ctx2);
+ if (rsa->iqmp == NULL)
+ goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/keccak1600-armv8.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/keccak1600-armv8.pl
index 704ab4a7e45a..a3117bd7506d 100755
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/keccak1600-armv8.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/keccak1600-armv8.pl
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#!/usr/bin/env perl
-# Copyright 2017-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+# Copyright 2017-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
#
# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.align 5
KeccakF1600_int:
adr $C[2],iotas
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp $C[2],x30,[sp,#16] // 32 bytes on top are mine
b .Loop
.align 4
@@ -292,12 +293,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
bne .Loop
ldr x30,[sp,#24]
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ret
.size KeccakF1600_int,.-KeccakF1600_int
.type KeccakF1600,%function
.align 5
KeccakF1600:
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-128]!
add x29,sp,#0
stp x19,x20,[sp,#16]
@@ -347,6 +350,7 @@ KeccakF1600:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#128
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ret
.size KeccakF1600,.-KeccakF1600
@@ -354,6 +358,7 @@ KeccakF1600:
.type SHA3_absorb,%function
.align 5
SHA3_absorb:
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-128]!
add x29,sp,#0
stp x19,x20,[sp,#16]
@@ -451,6 +456,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#128
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ret
.size SHA3_absorb,.-SHA3_absorb
___
@@ -461,6 +467,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type SHA3_squeeze,%function
.align 5
SHA3_squeeze:
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-48]!
add x29,sp,#0
stp x19,x20,[sp,#16]
@@ -523,6 +530,7 @@ SHA3_squeeze:
ldp x19,x20,[sp,#16]
ldp x21,x22,[sp,#32]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#48
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ret
.size SHA3_squeeze,.-SHA3_squeeze
___
@@ -649,6 +657,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type KeccakF1600_cext,%function
.align 5
KeccakF1600_cext:
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-80]!
add x29,sp,#0
stp d8,d9,[sp,#16] // per ABI requirement
@@ -681,6 +690,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
ldp d12,d13,[sp,#48]
ldp d14,d15,[sp,#64]
ldr x29,[sp],#80
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ret
.size KeccakF1600_cext,.-KeccakF1600_cext
___
@@ -693,6 +703,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type SHA3_absorb_cext,%function
.align 5
SHA3_absorb_cext:
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-80]!
add x29,sp,#0
stp d8,d9,[sp,#16] // per ABI requirement
@@ -764,6 +775,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
ldp d12,d13,[sp,#48]
ldp d14,d15,[sp,#64]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#80
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ret
.size SHA3_absorb_cext,.-SHA3_absorb_cext
___
@@ -775,6 +787,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type SHA3_squeeze_cext,%function
.align 5
SHA3_squeeze_cext:
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
mov x9,$ctx
@@ -830,6 +843,7 @@ SHA3_squeeze_cext:
.Lsqueeze_done_ce:
ldr x29,[sp],#16
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ret
.size SHA3_squeeze_cext,.-SHA3_squeeze_cext
___
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-armv8.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-armv8.pl
index ac84ebb52e4f..01ffe9f98c3e 100755
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-armv8.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-armv8.pl
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#! /usr/bin/env perl
-# Copyright 2014-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+# Copyright 2014-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
#
# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -219,6 +219,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($SZ==8);
___
$code.=<<___;
#endif
+ .inst 0xd503233f // paciasp
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-128]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -280,6 +281,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#128
+ .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp
ret
.size $func,.-$func
diff --git a/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c b/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c
index b97d630d3753..ca20f6d09798 100644
--- a/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 2004-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2004-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2004, EdelKey Project. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ static BIGNUM *srp_Calc_xy(const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, const BIGNUM *N)
unsigned char *tmp = NULL;
int numN = BN_num_bytes(N);
BIGNUM *res = NULL;
+
if (x != N && BN_ucmp(x, N) >= 0)
return NULL;
if (y != N && BN_ucmp(y, N) >= 0)
@@ -139,7 +140,8 @@ BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_x(const BIGNUM *s, const char *user, const char *pass)
|| !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctxt, dig, NULL)
|| !EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctxt, EVP_sha1(), NULL))
goto err;
- BN_bn2bin(s, cs);
+ if (BN_bn2bin(s, cs) < 0)
+ goto err;
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctxt, cs, BN_num_bytes(s)))
goto err;
diff --git a/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c b/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
index 17b35c00f9da..eb279dd4187a 100644
--- a/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 2004-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2004-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2004, EdelKey Project. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ void SRP_user_pwd_free(SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd)
static SRP_user_pwd *SRP_user_pwd_new(void)
{
SRP_user_pwd *ret;
-
+
if ((ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) {
/* SRPerr(SRP_F_SRP_USER_PWD_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); */ /*ckerr_ignore*/
return NULL;
@@ -598,10 +598,14 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
if ((len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), N)) <= 0)
goto err;
N_bn_alloc = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL);
+ if (N_bn_alloc == NULL)
+ goto err;
N_bn = N_bn_alloc;
if ((len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp) ,g)) <= 0)
goto err;
g_bn_alloc = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL);
+ if (g_bn_alloc == NULL)
+ goto err;
g_bn = g_bn_alloc;
defgNid = "*";
} else {
@@ -623,15 +627,19 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
goto err;
s = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, len, NULL);
}
+ if (s == NULL)
+ goto err;
if (!SRP_create_verifier_BN(user, pass, &s, &v, N_bn, g_bn))
goto err;
- BN_bn2bin(v, tmp);
+ if (BN_bn2bin(v, tmp) < 0)
+ goto err;
vfsize = BN_num_bytes(v) * 2;
if (((vf = OPENSSL_malloc(vfsize)) == NULL))
goto err;
- t_tob64(vf, tmp, BN_num_bytes(v));
+ if (!t_tob64(vf, tmp, BN_num_bytes(v)))
+ goto err;
if (*salt == NULL) {
char *tmp_salt;
@@ -639,7 +647,10 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
if ((tmp_salt = OPENSSL_malloc(SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN * 2)) == NULL) {
goto err;
}
- t_tob64(tmp_salt, tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN);
+ if (!t_tob64(tmp_salt, tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(tmp_salt);
+ goto err;
+ }
*salt = tmp_salt;
}
@@ -686,11 +697,15 @@ int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
goto err;
salttmp = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL);
+ if (salttmp == NULL)
+ goto err;
} else {
salttmp = *salt;
}
x = SRP_Calc_x(salttmp, user, pass);
+ if (x == NULL)
+ goto err;
*verifier = BN_new();
if (*verifier == NULL)
diff --git a/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c b/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c
index 6b996134df49..5ca418d24870 100644
--- a/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c
+++ b/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2001-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -101,6 +101,12 @@
# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
+# undef TERMIOS
+# undef TERMIO
+# undef SGTTY
+# endif
+
# ifdef TERMIOS
# include <termios.h>
# define TTY_STRUCT struct termios
diff --git a/crypto/uid.c b/crypto/uid.c
index f7ae2610b360..b2b096446fb4 100644
--- a/crypto/uid.c
+++ b/crypto/uid.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2001-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -34,12 +34,13 @@ int OPENSSL_issetugid(void)
# if defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ)
# if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 16)
# include <sys/auxv.h>
+# define OSSL_IMPLEMENT_GETAUXVAL
# endif
# endif
int OPENSSL_issetugid(void)
{
-# ifdef AT_SECURE
+# ifdef OSSL_IMPLEMENT_GETAUXVAL
return getauxval(AT_SECURE) != 0;
# else
return getuid() != geteuid() || getgid() != getegid();
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index 61e81922b4da..4ced716e3646 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -3232,12 +3232,19 @@ static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert);
int level = ctx->param->auth_level;
+ /*
+ * At security level zero, return without checking for a supported public
+ * key type. Some engines support key types not understood outside the
+ * engine, and we only need to understand the key when enforcing a security
+ * floor.
+ */
+ if (level <= 0)
+ return 1;
+
/* Unsupported or malformed keys are not secure */
if (pkey == NULL)
return 0;
- if (level <= 0)
- return 1;
if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS)
level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS;
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x_crl.c b/crypto/x509/x_crl.c
index 10733b58bca2..12ab3cca42c0 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x_crl.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x_crl.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -158,6 +158,18 @@ static int crl_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
int idx;
switch (operation) {
+ case ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE:
+ if (crl->meth->crl_free) {
+ if (!crl->meth->crl_free(crl))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(crl->akid);
+ ISSUING_DIST_POINT_free(crl->idp);
+ ASN1_INTEGER_free(crl->crl_number);
+ ASN1_INTEGER_free(crl->base_crl_number);
+ sk_GENERAL_NAMES_pop_free(crl->issuers, GENERAL_NAMES_free);
+ /* fall thru */
+
case ASN1_OP_NEW_POST:
crl->idp = NULL;
crl->akid = NULL;
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c b/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c
index d050b0b4b3e2..1c87b8268eb5 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ static int pubkey_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
/* Attempt to decode public key and cache in pubkey structure. */
X509_PUBKEY *pubkey = (X509_PUBKEY *)*pval;
EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey->pkey);
+ pubkey->pkey = NULL;
/*
* Opportunistically decode the key but remove any non fatal errors
* from the queue. Subsequent explicit attempts to decode/use the key
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x_x509.c b/crypto/x509/x_x509.c
index 4c04f12c9494..afe59c46c518 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x_x509.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x_x509.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -40,12 +40,35 @@ static int x509_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
switch (operation) {
+ case ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE:
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509, ret, &ret->ex_data);
+ X509_CERT_AUX_free(ret->aux);
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ret->skid);
+ AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(ret->akid);
+ CRL_DIST_POINTS_free(ret->crldp);
+ policy_cache_free(ret->policy_cache);
+ GENERAL_NAMES_free(ret->altname);
+ NAME_CONSTRAINTS_free(ret->nc);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+ sk_IPAddressFamily_pop_free(ret->rfc3779_addr, IPAddressFamily_free);
+ ASIdentifiers_free(ret->rfc3779_asid);
+#endif
+
+ /* fall thru */
+
case ASN1_OP_NEW_POST:
+ ret->ex_cached = 0;
+ ret->ex_kusage = 0;
+ ret->ex_xkusage = 0;
+ ret->ex_nscert = 0;
ret->ex_flags = 0;
ret->ex_pathlen = -1;
ret->ex_pcpathlen = -1;
ret->skid = NULL;
ret->akid = NULL;
+ ret->policy_cache = NULL;
+ ret->altname = NULL;
+ ret->nc = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
ret->rfc3779_addr = NULL;
ret->rfc3779_asid = NULL;
diff --git a/doc/HOWTO/certificates.txt b/doc/HOWTO/certificates.txt
index c2efdca8dc1a..cfd2bdabb130 100644
--- a/doc/HOWTO/certificates.txt
+++ b/doc/HOWTO/certificates.txt
@@ -106,5 +106,5 @@ some applications, you don't even have to do that.
By now, you have your certificate and your private key and can start
using applications that depend on it.
---
+--
Richard Levitte
diff --git a/doc/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt b/doc/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt
index 18b3e0340f1d..2936cd6e518b 100644
--- a/doc/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt
+++ b/doc/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt
@@ -315,5 +315,5 @@ certificates checked properly, using the code above:
SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(s_ctx, my_X509_verify_cert, &needed_rights);
---
+--
Richard Levitte
diff --git a/doc/fingerprints.txt b/doc/fingerprints.txt
index 2cb74aec2778..51e76c8f71b9 100644
--- a/doc/fingerprints.txt
+++ b/doc/fingerprints.txt
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ uid Richard Levitte <richard@opensslfoundation.com>
uid Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
uid Richard Levitte <richard@openssl.com>
-pub 2048R/0E604491 2013-04-30
+pub 2048R/0E604491 2013-04-30
Key fingerprint = 8657 ABB2 60F0 56B1 E519 0839 D9C4 D26D 0E60 4491
uid Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
uid Matt Caswell <frodo@baggins.org>
diff --git a/doc/man1/ca.pod b/doc/man1/ca.pod
index e998eabf8358..7385a00941ea 100644
--- a/doc/man1/ca.pod
+++ b/doc/man1/ca.pod
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ The section of the configuration file containing certificate extensions
to be added when a certificate is issued (defaults to B<x509_extensions>
unless the B<-extfile> option is used). If no extension section is
present then, a V1 certificate is created. If the extension section
-is present (even if it is empty), then a V3 certificate is created. See the:w
+is present (even if it is empty), then a V3 certificate is created. See the
L<x509v3_config(5)> manual page for details of the
extension section format.
@@ -475,7 +475,7 @@ the B<-selfsign> command line option.
Note that it is valid in some circumstances for certificates to be created
without any subject. In the case where there are multiple certificates without
-subjects this does not count as a duplicate.
+subjects this does not count as a duplicate.
=item B<serial>
@@ -753,7 +753,7 @@ L<config(5)>, L<x509v3_config(5)>
=head1 COPYRIGHT
-Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/doc/man1/ciphers.pod b/doc/man1/ciphers.pod
index 3aea982384ec..faf9e538146a 100644
--- a/doc/man1/ciphers.pod
+++ b/doc/man1/ciphers.pod
@@ -762,7 +762,7 @@ The B<-V> option for the B<ciphers> command was added in OpenSSL 1.0.0.
The B<-stdname> is only available if OpenSSL is built with tracing enabled
(B<enable-ssl-trace> argument to Configure) before OpenSSL 1.1.1.
-The B<-convert> was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+The B<-convert> option was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man1/cms.pod b/doc/man1/cms.pod
index 60ee3b505e1e..72cd9b5d4e9e 100644
--- a/doc/man1/cms.pod
+++ b/doc/man1/cms.pod
@@ -724,14 +724,14 @@ No revocation checking is done on the signer's certificate.
The use of multiple B<-signer> options and the B<-resign> command were first
added in OpenSSL 1.0.0.
-The B<keyopt> option was first added in OpenSSL 1.0.2.
+The B<keyopt> option was added in OpenSSL 1.0.2.
-Support for RSA-OAEP and RSA-PSS was first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2.
+Support for RSA-OAEP and RSA-PSS was added in OpenSSL 1.0.2.
-The use of non-RSA keys with B<-encrypt> and B<-decrypt> was first added
-to OpenSSL 1.0.2.
+The use of non-RSA keys with B<-encrypt> and B<-decrypt>
+was added in OpenSSL 1.0.2.
-The -no_alt_chains options was first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2b.
+The -no_alt_chains option was added in OpenSSL 1.0.2b.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man1/dgst.pod b/doc/man1/dgst.pod
index 47e163b17001..66a6697eb10e 100644
--- a/doc/man1/dgst.pod
+++ b/doc/man1/dgst.pod
@@ -230,12 +230,12 @@ prior to verification.
=head1 HISTORY
-The default digest was changed from MD5 to SHA256 in OpenSSL 1.1.0
-The FIPS-related options were removed in OpenSSL 1.1.0
+The default digest was changed from MD5 to SHA256 in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+The FIPS-related options were removed in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
-Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/doc/man1/ec.pod b/doc/man1/ec.pod
index 0b836603cab1..4d368e20ae19 100644
--- a/doc/man1/ec.pod
+++ b/doc/man1/ec.pod
@@ -101,10 +101,6 @@ Prints out the public, private key components and parameters.
This option prevents output of the encoded version of the key.
-=item B<-modulus>
-
-This option prints out the value of the public key component of the key.
-
=item B<-pubin>
By default, a private key is read from the input file. With this option a
@@ -197,7 +193,7 @@ L<ecparam(1)>, L<dsa(1)>, L<rsa(1)>
=head1 COPYRIGHT
-Copyright 2003-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+Copyright 2003-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/doc/man1/enc.pod b/doc/man1/enc.pod
index 2136a9497849..a3e0b03b2000 100644
--- a/doc/man1/enc.pod
+++ b/doc/man1/enc.pod
@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ certain parameters. So if, for example, you want to use RC2 with a
=head1 HISTORY
-The default digest was changed from MD5 to SHA256 in Openssl 1.1.0.
+The default digest was changed from MD5 to SHA256 in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man1/genpkey.pod b/doc/man1/genpkey.pod
index fa62973abdd9..202e531c7e07 100644
--- a/doc/man1/genpkey.pod
+++ b/doc/man1/genpkey.pod
@@ -319,9 +319,9 @@ Generate an ED448 private key:
=head1 HISTORY
The ability to use NIST curve names, and to generate an EC key directly,
-were added in OpenSSL 1.0.2. The ability to generate X25519 keys was added in
-OpenSSL 1.1.0. The ability to generate X448, ED25519 and ED448 keys was added in
-OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+were added in OpenSSL 1.0.2.
+The ability to generate X25519 keys was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+The ability to generate X448, ED25519 and ED448 keys was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man1/ocsp.pod b/doc/man1/ocsp.pod
index c9feef8f0e47..736055b1b669 100644
--- a/doc/man1/ocsp.pod
+++ b/doc/man1/ocsp.pod
@@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ to a second file.
=head1 HISTORY
-The -no_alt_chains options was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+The -no_alt_chains option was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man1/pkcs12.pod b/doc/man1/pkcs12.pod
index 3389e595fed7..6f890c120f3c 100644
--- a/doc/man1/pkcs12.pod
+++ b/doc/man1/pkcs12.pod
@@ -154,7 +154,8 @@ Don't attempt to verify the integrity MAC before reading the file.
Prompt for separate integrity and encryption passwords: most software
always assumes these are the same so this option will render such
-PKCS#12 files unreadable.
+PKCS#12 files unreadable. Cannot be used in combination with the options
+-password, -passin (if importing) or -passout (if exporting).
=back
@@ -381,7 +382,7 @@ L<pkcs8(1)>
=head1 COPYRIGHT
-Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/doc/man1/pkcs8.pod b/doc/man1/pkcs8.pod
index 9c923b87c939..b079885d2fc7 100644
--- a/doc/man1/pkcs8.pod
+++ b/doc/man1/pkcs8.pod
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ L<gendsa(1)>
=head1 HISTORY
-The B<-iter> option was added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+The B<-iter> option was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man1/req.pod b/doc/man1/req.pod
index c76d63d6fd81..a9b5b1690a5c 100644
--- a/doc/man1/req.pod
+++ b/doc/man1/req.pod
@@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ The actual permitted field names are any object identifier short or
long names. These are compiled into OpenSSL and include the usual
values such as commonName, countryName, localityName, organizationName,
organizationalUnitName, stateOrProvinceName. Additionally emailAddress
-is include as well as name, surname, givenName initials and dnQualifier.
+is included as well as name, surname, givenName, initials, and dnQualifier.
Additional object identifiers can be defined with the B<oid_file> or
B<oid_section> options in the configuration file. Any additional fields
diff --git a/doc/man1/s_client.pod b/doc/man1/s_client.pod
index fa5cb0a92da1..81d516ace146 100644
--- a/doc/man1/s_client.pod
+++ b/doc/man1/s_client.pod
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ B<openssl> B<s_client>
[B<-dtls1>]
[B<-dtls1_2>]
[B<-sctp>]
+[B<-sctp_label_bug>]
[B<-fallback_scsv>]
[B<-async>]
[B<-max_send_frag>]
@@ -190,14 +191,17 @@ Use IPv6 only.
=item B<-servername name>
Set the TLS SNI (Server Name Indication) extension in the ClientHello message to
-the given value. If both this option and the B<-noservername> are not given, the
-TLS SNI extension is still set to the hostname provided to the B<-connect> option,
-or "localhost" if B<-connect> has not been supplied. This is default since OpenSSL
-1.1.1.
+the given value.
+If B<-servername> is not provided, the TLS SNI extension will be populated with
+the name given to B<-connect> if it follows a DNS name format. If B<-connect> is
+not provided either, the SNI is set to "localhost".
+This is the default since OpenSSL 1.1.1.
-Even though SNI name should normally be a DNS name and not an IP address, this
-option will not make the distinction when parsing B<-connect> and will send
-IP address if one passed.
+Even though SNI should normally be a DNS name and not an IP address, if
+B<-servername> is provided then that name will be sent, regardless of whether
+it is a DNS name or not.
+
+This option cannot be used in conjuction with B<-noservername>.
=item B<-noservername>
@@ -489,6 +493,14 @@ Use SCTP for the transport protocol instead of UDP in DTLS. Must be used in
conjunction with B<-dtls>, B<-dtls1> or B<-dtls1_2>. This option is only
available where OpenSSL has support for SCTP enabled.
+=item B<-sctp_label_bug>
+
+Use the incorrect behaviour of older OpenSSL implementations when computing
+endpoint-pair shared secrets for DTLS/SCTP. This allows communication with
+older broken implementations but breaks interoperability with correct
+implementations. Must be used in conjunction with B<-sctp>. This option is only
+available where OpenSSL has support for SCTP enabled.
+
=item B<-fallback_scsv>
Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello.
@@ -811,12 +823,12 @@ L<SSL_CTX_set_max_pipelines(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-The B<-no_alt_chains> option was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+The B<-no_alt_chains> option was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
The B<-name> option was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
-Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/doc/man1/s_server.pod b/doc/man1/s_server.pod
index f4c4eda35313..c4c014fdc18b 100644
--- a/doc/man1/s_server.pod
+++ b/doc/man1/s_server.pod
@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ B<openssl> B<s_server>
[B<-no_comp>]
[B<-comp>]
[B<-no_ticket>]
+[B<-num_tickets>]
[B<-serverpref>]
[B<-legacy_renegotiation>]
[B<-no_renegotiation>]
@@ -172,6 +173,7 @@ B<openssl> B<s_server>
[B<-dtls1>]
[B<-dtls1_2>]
[B<-sctp>]
+[B<-sctp_label_bug>]
[B<-no_dhe>]
[B<-nextprotoneg val>]
[B<-use_srtp val>]
@@ -558,7 +560,14 @@ OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=item B<-no_ticket>
-Disable RFC4507bis session ticket support.
+Disable RFC4507bis session ticket support. This option has no effect if TLSv1.3
+is negotiated. See B<-num_tickets>.
+
+=item B<-num_tickets>
+
+Control the number of tickets that will be sent to the client after a full
+handshake in TLSv1.3. The default number of tickets is 2. This option does not
+affect the number of tickets sent after a resumption handshake.
=item B<-serverpref>
@@ -677,6 +686,14 @@ Use SCTP for the transport protocol instead of UDP in DTLS. Must be used in
conjunction with B<-dtls>, B<-dtls1> or B<-dtls1_2>. This option is only
available where OpenSSL has support for SCTP enabled.
+=item B<-sctp_label_bug>
+
+Use the incorrect behaviour of older OpenSSL implementations when computing
+endpoint-pair shared secrets for DTLS/SCTP. This allows communication with
+older broken implementations but breaks interoperability with correct
+implementations. Must be used in conjunction with B<-sctp>. This option is only
+available where OpenSSL has support for SCTP enabled.
+
=item B<-no_dhe>
If this option is set then no DH parameters will be loaded effectively
@@ -817,18 +834,18 @@ unknown cipher suites a client says it supports.
L<SSL_CONF_cmd(3)>, L<sess_id(1)>, L<s_client(1)>, L<ciphers(1)>
L<SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(3)>,
L<SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment(3)>,
-L<SSL_CTX_set_max_pipelines(3)>
+L<SSL_CTX_set_max_pipelines(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-The -no_alt_chains option was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+The -no_alt_chains option was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
-The -allow-no-dhe-kex and -prioritize_chacha options were first added to
-OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+The
+-allow-no-dhe-kex and -prioritize_chacha options were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
-Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/doc/man1/smime.pod b/doc/man1/smime.pod
index 0acdd08254a5..7f224fdc5e9d 100644
--- a/doc/man1/smime.pod
+++ b/doc/man1/smime.pod
@@ -510,7 +510,7 @@ structures may cause parsing errors.
The use of multiple B<-signer> options and the B<-resign> command were first
added in OpenSSL 1.0.0
-The -no_alt_chains options was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+The -no_alt_chains option was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man1/storeutl.pod b/doc/man1/storeutl.pod
index 083f0282469e..a8d82bfb612b 100644
--- a/doc/man1/storeutl.pod
+++ b/doc/man1/storeutl.pod
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ L<openssl(1)>
=head1 HISTORY
-B<openssl> B<storeutl> was added to OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+The B<openssl> B<storeutl> app was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man1/verify.pod b/doc/man1/verify.pod
index b67890af3c34..63ba850b915d 100644
--- a/doc/man1/verify.pod
+++ b/doc/man1/verify.pod
@@ -762,7 +762,7 @@ L<x509(1)>
=head1 HISTORY
-The B<-show_chain> option was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+The B<-show_chain> option was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
The B<-issuer_checks> option is deprecated as of OpenSSL 1.1.0 and
is silently ignored.
diff --git a/doc/man1/x509.pod b/doc/man1/x509.pod
index 547da5da2368..7878753414da 100644
--- a/doc/man1/x509.pod
+++ b/doc/man1/x509.pod
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ options. See the B<TEXT OPTIONS> section for more information.
=item B<-noout>
-This option prevents output of the encoded version of the request.
+This option prevents output of the encoded version of the certificate.
=item B<-pubkey>
@@ -925,7 +925,7 @@ the old form must have their links rebuilt using B<c_rehash> or similar.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
-Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/doc/man3/ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64.pod b/doc/man3/ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64.pod
index d0a6a3c810a1..9b73290742d4 100644
--- a/doc/man3/ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64.pod
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ L<ERR_get_error(3)>
ASN1_INTEGER_set_int64(), ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64(),
ASN1_ENUMERATED_set_int64() and ASN1_ENUMERATED_get_int64()
-were added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new.pod b/doc/man3/ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new.pod
index 204280210e04..e4d809c08fd1 100644
--- a/doc/man3/ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new.pod
@@ -127,10 +127,10 @@ L<crypto(7)>, L<ASYNC_start_job(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new, ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free, ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_set_wait_fd,
-ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_fd, ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds,
-ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_changed_fds, ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_clear_fd were first added to
-OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new(), ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(), ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_set_wait_fd(),
+ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_fd(), ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(),
+ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_changed_fds() and ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_clear_fd()
+were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/ASYNC_start_job.pod b/doc/man3/ASYNC_start_job.pod
index 21b77a96b95e..9bd1044b266a 100644
--- a/doc/man3/ASYNC_start_job.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/ASYNC_start_job.pod
@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ L<crypto(7)>, L<ERR_print_errors(3)>
ASYNC_init_thread, ASYNC_cleanup_thread,
ASYNC_start_job, ASYNC_pause_job, ASYNC_get_current_job, ASYNC_get_wait_ctx(),
ASYNC_block_pause(), ASYNC_unblock_pause() and ASYNC_is_capable() were first
-added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/BIO_new_CMS.pod b/doc/man3/BIO_new_CMS.pod
index b06c224f7180..f8d4c3bde6ee 100644
--- a/doc/man3/BIO_new_CMS.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/BIO_new_CMS.pod
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ L<CMS_encrypt(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-BIO_new_CMS() was added to OpenSSL 1.0.0
+The BIO_new_CMS() function was added in OpenSSL 1.0.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/BN_generate_prime.pod b/doc/man3/BN_generate_prime.pod
index b505841832ec..b6e9145106be 100644
--- a/doc/man3/BN_generate_prime.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/BN_generate_prime.pod
@@ -197,8 +197,8 @@ L<RSA_generate_key(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<RAND_bytes(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-BN_GENCB_new(), BN_GENCB_free(),
-and BN_GENCB_get_arg() were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0
+The BN_GENCB_new(), BN_GENCB_free(),
+and BN_GENCB_get_arg() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/BN_rand.pod b/doc/man3/BN_rand.pod
index eb0a6b13862f..90b50ffc311e 100644
--- a/doc/man3/BN_rand.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/BN_rand.pod
@@ -73,7 +73,8 @@ a future release.
=item *
-BN_priv_rand() and BN_priv_rand_range() were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+The
+BN_priv_rand() and BN_priv_rand_range() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=back
diff --git a/doc/man3/BN_security_bits.pod b/doc/man3/BN_security_bits.pod
index 1aed85a71a9c..f6e5857a4eed 100644
--- a/doc/man3/BN_security_bits.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/BN_security_bits.pod
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ function. The symmetric algorithms are not covered neither.
=head1 HISTORY
-BN_security_bits() was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+The BN_security_bits() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 SEE ALSO
diff --git a/doc/man3/BUF_MEM_new.pod b/doc/man3/BUF_MEM_new.pod
index 61922502a3f1..0c68f3776f7c 100644
--- a/doc/man3/BUF_MEM_new.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/BUF_MEM_new.pod
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ L<CRYPTO_secure_malloc(3)>.
=head1 HISTORY
-BUF_MEM_new_ex() was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+The BUF_MEM_new_ex() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/CMS_get0_type.pod b/doc/man3/CMS_get0_type.pod
index cad8d3f66280..bc38a09bdcbc 100644
--- a/doc/man3/CMS_get0_type.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/CMS_get0_type.pod
@@ -16,11 +16,12 @@ CMS_get0_type, CMS_set1_eContentType, CMS_get0_eContentType, CMS_get0_content -
=head1 DESCRIPTION
CMS_get0_type() returns the content type of a CMS_ContentInfo structure as
-and ASN1_OBJECT pointer. An application can then decide how to process the
+an ASN1_OBJECT pointer. An application can then decide how to process the
CMS_ContentInfo structure based on this value.
CMS_set1_eContentType() sets the embedded content type of a CMS_ContentInfo
-structure. It should be called with CMS functions with the B<CMS_PARTIAL>
+structure. It should be called with CMS functions (such as L<CMS_sign>, L<CMS_encrypt>)
+with the B<CMS_PARTIAL>
flag and B<before> the structure is finalised, otherwise the results are
undefined.
@@ -60,7 +61,7 @@ embedded content as it is normally set by higher level functions.
=head1 RETURN VALUES
-CMS_get0_type() and CMS_get0_eContentType() return and ASN1_OBJECT structure.
+CMS_get0_type() and CMS_get0_eContentType() return an ASN1_OBJECT structure.
CMS_set1_eContentType() returns 1 for success or 0 if an error occurred. The
error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3).
@@ -71,7 +72,7 @@ L<ERR_get_error(3)>
=head1 COPYRIGHT
-Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+Copyright 2008-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/doc/man3/CONF_modules_load_file.pod b/doc/man3/CONF_modules_load_file.pod
index ecf294a2c60d..485cf797b12e 100644
--- a/doc/man3/CONF_modules_load_file.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/CONF_modules_load_file.pod
@@ -28,13 +28,21 @@ reads configuration information from B<cnf>.
The following B<flags> are currently recognized:
-B<CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_ERRORS> if set errors returned by individual
+If B<CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_ERRORS> is set errors returned by individual
configuration modules are ignored. If not set the first module error is
considered fatal and no further modules are loaded.
Normally any modules errors will add error information to the error queue. If
B<CONF_MFLAGS_SILENT> is set no error information is added.
+If B<CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_RETURN_CODES> is set the function unconditionally
+returns success.
+This is used by default in L<OPENSSL_init_crypto(3)> to ignore any errors in
+the default system-wide configuration file, as having all OpenSSL applications
+fail to start when there are potentially minor issues in the file is too risky.
+Applications calling B<CONF_modules_load_file> explicitly should not generally
+set this flag.
+
If B<CONF_MFLAGS_NO_DSO> is set configuration module loading from DSOs is
disabled.
@@ -126,7 +134,7 @@ L<config(5)>, L<OPENSSL_config(3)>
=head1 COPYRIGHT
-Copyright 2004-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+Copyright 2004-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/doc/man3/CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index.pod b/doc/man3/CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index.pod
index 4d5a2b93a082..b2d33ef90d9e 100644
--- a/doc/man3/CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index.pod
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ to avoid likely double-free crashes.
The function B<CRYPTO_free_ex_data> is used to free all exdata attached
to a structure. The appropriate type-specific routine must be used.
The B<class_index> identifies the structure type, the B<obj> is
-be the pointer to the actual structure, and B<r> is a pointer to the
+a pointer to the actual structure, and B<r> is a pointer to the
structure's exdata field.
=head2 Callback Functions
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ dup_func() should return 0 for failure and 1 for success.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
-Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+Copyright 2015-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/doc/man3/CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id.pod b/doc/man3/CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id.pod
index 36063b62e858..86696a559462 100644
--- a/doc/man3/CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id.pod
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ L<CTLOG_STORE_new(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-This function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+The CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/DH_size.pod b/doc/man3/DH_size.pod
index 3b65d7ea6d6b..3cbdbc67da1c 100644
--- a/doc/man3/DH_size.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/DH_size.pod
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ L<BN_num_bits(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-DH_bits() was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+The DH_bits() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/DTLS_get_data_mtu.pod b/doc/man3/DTLS_get_data_mtu.pod
index ab7147217ac1..81b945f134a6 100644
--- a/doc/man3/DTLS_get_data_mtu.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/DTLS_get_data_mtu.pod
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ Returns the maximum data payload size on success, or 0 on failure.
=head1 HISTORY
-This function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1
+The DTLS_get_data_mtu() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/DTLS_set_timer_cb.pod b/doc/man3/DTLS_set_timer_cb.pod
index 6e1347213e6f..c5154dca3570 100644
--- a/doc/man3/DTLS_set_timer_cb.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/DTLS_set_timer_cb.pod
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Returns void.
=head1 HISTORY
-This function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1
+The DTLS_set_timer_cb() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/DTLSv1_listen.pod b/doc/man3/DTLSv1_listen.pod
index 858e39316105..76be40b68f10 100644
--- a/doc/man3/DTLSv1_listen.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/DTLSv1_listen.pod
@@ -117,10 +117,10 @@ L<ssl(7)>, L<bio(7)>
=head1 HISTORY
-SSL_stateless() was first added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+The SSL_stateless() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
-DTLSv1_listen() return codes were clarified in OpenSSL 1.1.0. The type of "peer"
-also changed in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+The DTLSv1_listen() return codes were clarified in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+The type of "peer" also changed in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/EC_GROUP_copy.pod b/doc/man3/EC_GROUP_copy.pod
index ee20f9526adc..7bf350062375 100644
--- a/doc/man3/EC_GROUP_copy.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/EC_GROUP_copy.pod
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ named curve form is used and the parameters must have a corresponding
named curve NID set. If asn1_flags is B<OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE> the
parameters are explicitly encoded. The functions EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag and
EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag get and set the status of the asn1_flag for the curve.
-Note: B<OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE> was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0, for
+Note: B<OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE> was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0, for
previous versions of OpenSSL the value 0 must be used instead. Before OpenSSL
1.1.0 the default form was to use explicit parameters (meaning that
applications would have to explicitly set the named curve form) in OpenSSL
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ and EC_GROUP_get_degree return the order, cofactor, curve name (NID), ASN1 flag,
specified curve respectively. If there is no curve name associated with a curve then EC_GROUP_get_curve_name will return 0.
EC_GROUP_get0_order() returns an internal pointer to the group order.
-EC_GROUP_get_order_bits() returns the number of bits in the group order.
+EC_GROUP_order_bits() returns the number of bits in the group order.
EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor() returns an internal pointer to the group cofactor.
EC_GROUP_get0_seed returns a pointer to the seed that was used to generate the parameter b, or NULL if the seed is not
diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_DigestInit.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_DigestInit.pod
index 5ecbcc5e8992..37bc10d38056 100644
--- a/doc/man3/EVP_DigestInit.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/EVP_DigestInit.pod
@@ -369,15 +369,15 @@ L<EVP_whirlpool(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-EVP_MD_CTX_create() and EVP_MD_CTX_destroy() were renamed to
-EVP_MD_CTX_new() and EVP_MD_CTX_free() in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+The EVP_MD_CTX_create() and EVP_MD_CTX_destroy() functions were renamed to
+EVP_MD_CTX_new() and EVP_MD_CTX_free() in OpenSSL 1.1.0, respectively.
The link between digests and signing algorithms was fixed in OpenSSL 1.0 and
later, so now EVP_sha1() can be used with RSA and DSA.
-EVP_dss1() was removed in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+The EVP_dss1() function was removed in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
-EVP_MD_CTX_set_pkey_ctx() was added in 1.1.1.
+The EVP_MD_CTX_set_pkey_ctx() function was added in 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_DigestSignInit.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_DigestSignInit.pod
index 773de87efac4..7b74a23cbcf2 100644
--- a/doc/man3/EVP_DigestSignInit.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/EVP_DigestSignInit.pod
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ L<SHA1(3)>, L<dgst(1)>
=head1 HISTORY
EVP_DigestSignInit(), EVP_DigestSignUpdate() and EVP_DigestSignFinal()
-were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+were added in OpenSSL 1.0.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_DigestVerifyInit.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_DigestVerifyInit.pod
index e93ac2ef0810..98a0987a3aaa 100644
--- a/doc/man3/EVP_DigestVerifyInit.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/EVP_DigestVerifyInit.pod
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ L<SHA1(3)>, L<dgst(1)>
=head1 HISTORY
EVP_DigestVerifyInit(), EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate() and EVP_DigestVerifyFinal()
-were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+were added in OpenSSL 1.0.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_EncryptInit.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_EncryptInit.pod
index 5fdbc33ac10f..b43a3e5468ca 100644
--- a/doc/man3/EVP_EncryptInit.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/EVP_EncryptInit.pod
@@ -632,7 +632,7 @@ L<EVP_sm4(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-Support for OCB mode was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0
+Support for OCB mode was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
B<EVP_CIPHER_CTX> was made opaque in OpenSSL 1.1.0. As a result,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset() appeared and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup()
diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
index 4982e9205305..75fad0f70ce0 100644
--- a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ B<param_enc> when generating EC parameters or an EC key. The encoding can be
B<OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE> for explicit parameters (the default in versions
of OpenSSL before 1.1.0) or B<OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE> to use named curve form.
For maximum compatibility the named curve form should be used. Note: the
-B<OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE> value was only added to OpenSSL 1.1.0; previous
+B<OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE> value was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0; previous
versions should use 0 instead.
=head2 ECDH parameters
@@ -439,8 +439,9 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_keygen(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
+The
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_id(), EVP_PKEY_CTX_get1_id() and EVP_PKEY_CTX_get1_id_len()
-macros were added in 1.1.1, other functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+macros were added in 1.1.1, other functions were added in OpenSSL 1.0.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_new.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_new.pod
index eff94cd94364..f01fc9752297 100644
--- a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_new.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_new.pod
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_new(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.0.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_asn1_get_count.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_asn1_get_count.pod
index 9ad2daed4f5b..cd99e4d75786 100644
--- a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_asn1_get_count.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_asn1_get_count.pod
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ engine that implements it.
EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info() returns the public key ID, base public key
ID (both NIDs), any flags, the method description and PEM type string
-associated with the public key ASN.1 method B<*ameth>.
+associated with the public key ASN.1 method B<*ameth>.
EVP_PKEY_asn1_count(), EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0(), EVP_PKEY_asn1_find() and
EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str() are not thread safe, but as long as all
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_asn1_new(3)>, L<EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0(3)>
=head1 COPYRIGHT
-Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+Copyright 2017-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod
index 2a691a61773b..2e3d266541a6 100644
--- a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.0.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_derive.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_derive.pod
index 8cd0b54740d4..a74065e31f3b 100644
--- a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_derive.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_derive.pod
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
=head1 HISTORY
-These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.0.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_encrypt.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_encrypt.pod
index 4e9a34e740f3..371891046473 100644
--- a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_encrypt.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_encrypt.pod
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.0.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid.pod
index da76677044c2..ed52e9696c9f 100644
--- a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid.pod
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
=head1 HISTORY
-This function was first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+This function was added in OpenSSL 1.0.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_keygen.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_keygen.pod
index 0b86eaaaa3db..83cebe7ce2f4 100644
--- a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_keygen.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_keygen.pod
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.0.0.
EVP_PKEY_check(), EVP_PKEY_public_check() and EVP_PKEY_param_check() were added
in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_new.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_new.pod
index a3532a359632..ebe20986dba1 100644
--- a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_new.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_new.pod
@@ -114,12 +114,15 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY>
=head1 HISTORY
-EVP_PKEY_new() and EVP_PKEY_free() exist in all versions of OpenSSL.
+The
+EVP_PKEY_new() and EVP_PKEY_free() functions exist in all versions of OpenSSL.
-EVP_PKEY_up_ref() was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+The EVP_PKEY_up_ref() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+The
EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(), EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key(),
EVP_PKEY_new_CMAC_key(), EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key() and
-EVP_PKEY_get_raw_public_key() were first added to OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+EVP_PKEY_get_raw_public_key() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_print_private.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_print_private.pod
index 3ebd086a1c19..e0750c7eedbb 100644
--- a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_print_private.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_print_private.pod
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_keygen(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.0.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_sign.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_sign.pod
index bdebf0b9241f..1672831ff015 100644
--- a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_sign.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_sign.pod
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.0.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_verify.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_verify.pod
index 57d7f8cf86f8..cdbb80b99df8 100644
--- a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_verify.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_verify.pod
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.0.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_verify_recover.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_verify_recover.pod
index 85d76f84ac37..251360656167 100644
--- a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_verify_recover.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_verify_recover.pod
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.0.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_SignInit.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_SignInit.pod
index 12e67f8cbf86..86fec82fb007 100644
--- a/doc/man3/EVP_SignInit.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/EVP_SignInit.pod
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ functions
void EVP_SignInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type);
- int EVP_PKEY_size(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+ int EVP_PKEY_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey);
int EVP_PKEY_security_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey);
=head1 DESCRIPTION
diff --git a/doc/man3/HMAC.pod b/doc/man3/HMAC.pod
index c480a9c9ebef..65386a7baa31 100644
--- a/doc/man3/HMAC.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/HMAC.pod
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ because reuse of an existing key with a different digest is not supported.
HMAC_Init() initializes a B<HMAC_CTX> structure to use the hash
function B<evp_md> and the key B<key> which is B<key_len> bytes
-long.
+long.
HMAC_Update() can be called repeatedly with chunks of the message to
be authenticated (B<len> bytes at B<data>).
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ OpenSSL before version 1.0.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
-Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/doc/man3/OPENSSL_init_crypto.pod b/doc/man3/OPENSSL_init_crypto.pod
index a259539f0552..c7823e32d6df 100644
--- a/doc/man3/OPENSSL_init_crypto.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/OPENSSL_init_crypto.pod
@@ -2,10 +2,11 @@
=head1 NAME
-OPENSSL_INIT_new, OPENSSL_INIT_set_config_appname, OPENSSL_INIT_free,
-OPENSSL_init_crypto, OPENSSL_cleanup,
-OPENSSL_atexit, OPENSSL_thread_stop - OpenSSL
-initialisation and deinitialisation functions
+OPENSSL_INIT_new, OPENSSL_INIT_set_config_filename,
+OPENSSL_INIT_set_config_appname, OPENSSL_INIT_set_config_file_flags,
+OPENSSL_INIT_free, OPENSSL_init_crypto, OPENSSL_cleanup, OPENSSL_atexit,
+OPENSSL_thread_stop - OpenSSL initialisation
+and deinitialisation functions
=head1 SYNOPSIS
@@ -17,6 +18,10 @@ initialisation and deinitialisation functions
void OPENSSL_thread_stop(void);
OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *OPENSSL_INIT_new(void);
+ int OPENSSL_INIT_set_config_filename(OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *init,
+ const char* filename);
+ int OPENSSL_INIT_set_config_file_flags(OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *init,
+ unsigned long flags);
int OPENSSL_INIT_set_config_appname(OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *init,
const char* name);
void OPENSSL_INIT_free(OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *init);
@@ -33,7 +38,7 @@ As of version 1.1.0 OpenSSL will automatically allocate all resources that it
needs so no explicit initialisation is required. Similarly it will also
automatically deinitialise as required.
-However, there way be situations when explicit initialisation is desirable or
+However, there may be situations when explicit initialisation is desirable or
needed, for example when some non-default initialisation is required. The
function OPENSSL_init_crypto() can be used for this purpose for
libcrypto (see also L<OPENSSL_init_ssl(3)> for the libssl
@@ -96,7 +101,7 @@ B<OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS> will be ignored.
With this option an OpenSSL configuration file will be automatically loaded and
used by calling OPENSSL_config(). This is not a default option for libcrypto.
-From OpenSSL 1.1.1 this is a default option for libssl (see
+As of OpenSSL 1.1.1 this is a default option for libssl (see
L<OPENSSL_init_ssl(3)> for further details about libssl initialisation). See the
description of OPENSSL_INIT_new(), below.
@@ -157,6 +162,13 @@ engines. This not a default option.
With this option the library will register its fork handlers.
See OPENSSL_fork_prepare(3) for details.
+=item OPENSSL_INIT_NO_ATEXIT
+
+By default OpenSSL will attempt to clean itself up when the process exits via an
+"atexit" handler. Using this option suppresses that behaviour. This means that
+the application will have to clean up OpenSSL explicitly using
+OPENSSL_cleanup().
+
=back
Multiple options may be combined together in a single call to
@@ -196,12 +208,22 @@ the library when the thread exits. This should only be called directly if
resources should be freed at an earlier time, or under the circumstances
described in the NOTES section below.
-The B<OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG> flag will load a default configuration
-file. For optional configuration file settings, an B<OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS>
-must be created and used.
-The routines OPENSSL_init_new() and OPENSSL_INIT_set_config_appname() can
-be used to allocate the object and set the application name, and then the
-object can be released with OPENSSL_INIT_free() when done.
+The B<OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG> flag will load a configuration file, as with
+L<CONF_modules_load_file(3)> with NULL filename and application name and the
+B<CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE>, B<CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_RETURN_CODES> and
+B<CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION> flags.
+The filename, application name, and flags can be customized by providing a
+non-null B<OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS> object.
+The object can be allocated via B<OPENSSL_init_new()>.
+The B<OPENSSL_INIT_set_config_filename()> function can be used to specify a
+non-default filename, which is copied and need not refer to persistent storage.
+Similarly, OPENSSL_INIT_set_config_appname() can be used to specify a
+non-default application name.
+Finally, OPENSSL_INIT_set_file_flags can be used to specify non-default flags.
+If the B<CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_RETURN_CODES> flag is not included, any errors in
+the configuration file will cause an error return from B<OPENSSL_init_crypto>
+or indirectly L<OPENSSL_init_ssl(3)>.
+The object can be released with OPENSSL_INIT_free() when done.
=head1 NOTES
@@ -242,7 +264,7 @@ and OPENSSL_INIT_free() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
-Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/doc/man3/OPENSSL_malloc.pod b/doc/man3/OPENSSL_malloc.pod
index 049a12556ae7..2d678c951f0a 100644
--- a/doc/man3/OPENSSL_malloc.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/OPENSSL_malloc.pod
@@ -90,10 +90,8 @@ generally macro's that add the standard C B<__FILE__> and B<__LINE__>
parameters and call a lower-level B<CRYPTO_xxx> API.
Some functions do not add those parameters, but exist for consistency.
-OPENSSL_malloc_init() sets the lower-level memory allocation functions
-to their default implementation.
-It is generally not necessary to call this, except perhaps in certain
-shared-library situations.
+OPENSSL_malloc_init() does nothing and does not need to be called. It is
+included for compatibility with older versions of OpenSSL.
OPENSSL_malloc(), OPENSSL_realloc(), and OPENSSL_free() are like the
C malloc(), realloc(), and free() functions.
@@ -247,7 +245,7 @@ only, say, the malloc() implementation is outright dangerous.>
=head1 COPYRIGHT
-Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/doc/man3/OPENSSL_secure_malloc.pod b/doc/man3/OPENSSL_secure_malloc.pod
index 5a01c8246933..6c395383513b 100644
--- a/doc/man3/OPENSSL_secure_malloc.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/OPENSSL_secure_malloc.pod
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ L<BN_new(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-OPENSSL_secure_clear_free() was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0g.
+The OPENSSL_secure_clear_free() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0g.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/OSSL_STORE_INFO.pod b/doc/man3/OSSL_STORE_INFO.pod
index 20d41ac534e7..4c68986c56b2 100644
--- a/doc/man3/OSSL_STORE_INFO.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/OSSL_STORE_INFO.pod
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ OSSL_STORE_INFO_get0_CERT(), OSSL_STORE_INFO_get0_CRL(),
OSSL_STORE_INFO_type_string(), OSSL_STORE_INFO_free(), OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_NAME(),
OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_PARAMS(), OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_PKEY(),
OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_CERT() and OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_CRL()
-were added to OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/OSSL_STORE_LOADER.pod b/doc/man3/OSSL_STORE_LOADER.pod
index 87c135a1275b..150375411452 100644
--- a/doc/man3/OSSL_STORE_LOADER.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/OSSL_STORE_LOADER.pod
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ OSSL_STORE_LOADER_set_eof(), OSSL_STORE_LOADER_set_close(),
OSSL_STORE_LOADER_free(), OSSL_STORE_register_loader(),
OSSL_STORE_unregister_loader(), OSSL_STORE_open_fn(), OSSL_STORE_ctrl_fn(),
OSSL_STORE_load_fn(), OSSL_STORE_eof_fn() and OSSL_STORE_close_fn()
-were added to OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/OSSL_STORE_SEARCH.pod b/doc/man3/OSSL_STORE_SEARCH.pod
index 6d36a190ae5a..0c2dd2bc24c5 100644
--- a/doc/man3/OSSL_STORE_SEARCH.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/OSSL_STORE_SEARCH.pod
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ OSSL_STORE_SEARCH_get0_name(),
OSSL_STORE_SEARCH_get0_serial(),
OSSL_STORE_SEARCH_get0_bytes(),
and OSSL_STORE_SEARCH_get0_string()
-were added to OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/OSSL_STORE_expect.pod b/doc/man3/OSSL_STORE_expect.pod
index e3f06b55be71..154472a76b51 100644
--- a/doc/man3/OSSL_STORE_expect.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/OSSL_STORE_expect.pod
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ L<OSSL_STORE_load(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
OSSL_STORE_expect(), OSSL_STORE_supports_search() and OSSL_STORE_find()
-were added to OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/OSSL_STORE_open.pod b/doc/man3/OSSL_STORE_open.pod
index b1467f4100a7..1e8ebf7ce1ce 100644
--- a/doc/man3/OSSL_STORE_open.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/OSSL_STORE_open.pod
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ L<passphrase-encoding(7)>
OSSL_STORE_CTX(), OSSL_STORE_post_process_info_fn(), OSSL_STORE_open(),
OSSL_STORE_ctrl(), OSSL_STORE_load(), OSSL_STORE_eof() and OSSL_STORE_close()
-were added to OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/PEM_read_bio_ex.pod b/doc/man3/PEM_read_bio_ex.pod
index e171bff2453a..a16b0ede5a9c 100644
--- a/doc/man3/PEM_read_bio_ex.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/PEM_read_bio_ex.pod
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ L<PEM(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-PEM_read_bio_ex() was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+The PEM_read_bio_ex() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream.pod b/doc/man3/PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream.pod
index c73fafd44bdc..bc3ee167e0c4 100644
--- a/doc/man3/PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream.pod
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ L<i2d_CMS_bio_stream(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream() was added to OpenSSL 1.0.0
+The PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream() function was added in OpenSSL 1.0.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/PEM_write_bio_PKCS7_stream.pod b/doc/man3/PEM_write_bio_PKCS7_stream.pod
index 77f97aaa2bbc..32b7ef2ef754 100644
--- a/doc/man3/PEM_write_bio_PKCS7_stream.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/PEM_write_bio_PKCS7_stream.pod
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ L<i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-PEM_write_bio_PKCS7_stream() was added to OpenSSL 1.0.0
+The PEM_write_bio_PKCS7_stream() function was added in OpenSSL 1.0.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/PKCS12_parse.pod b/doc/man3/PKCS12_parse.pod
index 747a36f5ed04..208644c019bf 100644
--- a/doc/man3/PKCS12_parse.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/PKCS12_parse.pod
@@ -8,7 +8,8 @@ PKCS12_parse - parse a PKCS#12 structure
#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
-int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca);
+ int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,
+ STACK_OF(X509) **ca);
=head1 DESCRIPTION
diff --git a/doc/man3/PKCS7_sign.pod b/doc/man3/PKCS7_sign.pod
index c1df5f19a070..6fd54777d1f1 100644
--- a/doc/man3/PKCS7_sign.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/PKCS7_sign.pod
@@ -108,9 +108,9 @@ L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<PKCS7_verify(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
The B<PKCS7_PARTIAL> flag, and the ability for B<certs>, B<signcert>,
-and B<pkey> parameters to be B<NULL> to be was added in OpenSSL 1.0.0
+and B<pkey> parameters to be B<NULL> were added in OpenSSL 1.0.0.
-The B<PKCS7_STREAM> flag was added in OpenSSL 1.0.0
+The B<PKCS7_STREAM> flag was added in OpenSSL 1.0.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/PKCS7_sign_add_signer.pod b/doc/man3/PKCS7_sign_add_signer.pod
index 2bc6c40bd2ea..d4a27a2f6194 100644
--- a/doc/man3/PKCS7_sign_add_signer.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/PKCS7_sign_add_signer.pod
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ L<PKCS7_final(3)>,
=head1 HISTORY
-PPKCS7_sign_add_signer() was added to OpenSSL 1.0.0
+The PPKCS7_sign_add_signer() function was added in OpenSSL 1.0.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/RAND_bytes.pod b/doc/man3/RAND_bytes.pod
index fca1ad6961de..f257e050065f 100644
--- a/doc/man3/RAND_bytes.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/RAND_bytes.pod
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ RAND_pseudo_bytes() was deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0; use RAND_bytes() instead.
=item *
-RAND_priv_bytes() was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+The RAND_priv_bytes() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=back
diff --git a/doc/man3/RIPEMD160_Init.pod b/doc/man3/RIPEMD160_Init.pod
index 77ac4fbc122f..d3cdf930d88e 100644
--- a/doc/man3/RIPEMD160_Init.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/RIPEMD160_Init.pod
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ RIPEMD-160 hash function
unsigned char *md);
int RIPEMD160_Init(RIPEMD160_CTX *c);
- int RIPEMD160_Update(RIPEMD_CTX *c, const void *data, unsigned long len);
+ int RIPEMD160_Update(RIPEMD160_CTX *c, const void *data, unsigned long len);
int RIPEMD160_Final(unsigned char *md, RIPEMD160_CTX *c);
=head1 DESCRIPTION
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ L<EVP_DigestInit(3)>
=head1 COPYRIGHT
-Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/doc/man3/RSA_get0_key.pod b/doc/man3/RSA_get0_key.pod
index cb7d0f66db10..358c2de256f9 100644
--- a/doc/man3/RSA_get0_key.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/RSA_get0_key.pod
@@ -157,6 +157,7 @@ L<RSA_new(3)>, L<RSA_size(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
+The
RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(), RSA_get0_multi_prime_factors(),
RSA_get0_multi_prime_crt_params(), RSA_set0_multi_prime_params(),
and RSA_get_version() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
diff --git a/doc/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod b/doc/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod
index 93911cac97d6..9ea2634c0346 100644
--- a/doc/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod
@@ -110,7 +110,12 @@ L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
The RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() padding check leaks timing
information which can potentially be used to mount a Bleichenbacher
padding oracle attack. This is an inherent weakness in the PKCS #1
-v1.5 padding design. Prefer PKCS1_OAEP padding.
+v1.5 padding design. Prefer PKCS1_OAEP padding. Otherwise it can
+be recommended to pass zero-padded B<f>, so that B<fl> equals to
+B<rsa_len>, and if fixed by protocol, B<tlen> being set to the
+expected length. In such case leakage would be minimal, it would
+take attacker's ability to observe memory access pattern with byte
+granilarity as it occurs, post-factum timing analysis won't do.
=head1 SEE ALSO
diff --git a/doc/man3/RSA_size.pod b/doc/man3/RSA_size.pod
index 022620078a7c..99498650866f 100644
--- a/doc/man3/RSA_size.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/RSA_size.pod
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ L<BN_num_bits(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-RSA_bits() was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+The RSA_bits() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CIPHER_get_name.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CIPHER_get_name.pod
index af59b58946cc..4c12c5ed20d0 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CIPHER_get_name.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CIPHER_get_name.pod
@@ -179,19 +179,19 @@ protocol-specific ID.
=head1 HISTORY
-SSL_CIPHER_get_version() was updated to always return the correct protocol
-string in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+The SSL_CIPHER_get_version() function was updated to always return the
+correct protocol string in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
-SSL_CIPHER_description() was changed to return B<NULL> on error,
+The SSL_CIPHER_description() function was changed to return B<NULL> on error,
rather than a fixed string, in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
-SSL_CIPHER_get_handshake_digest() was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+The SSL_CIPHER_get_handshake_digest() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
-SSL_CIPHER_standard_name() was globally available in OpenSSL 1.1.1. Before
-OpenSSL 1.1.1, tracing (B<enable-ssl-trace> argument to Configure) was
+The SSL_CIPHER_standard_name() function was globally available in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+ Before OpenSSL 1.1.1, tracing (B<enable-ssl-trace> argument to Configure) was
required to enable this function.
-OPENSSL_cipher_name() was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+The OPENSSL_cipher_name() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 SEE ALSO
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_COMP_add_compression_method.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_COMP_add_compression_method.pod
index 1dc8eb149947..76c036e5ce44 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_COMP_add_compression_method.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_COMP_add_compression_method.pod
@@ -91,9 +91,8 @@ L<ssl(7)>
=head1 HISTORY
-SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods() was deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0;
-do not use it.
-SSL_COMP_get0_name() and SSL_comp_get_id() were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0d.
+The SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods() function was deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+The SSL_COMP_get0_name() and SSL_comp_get_id() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0d.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_CTX_new.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_CTX_new.pod
index 79f0bbc7dd5f..df5492f79ba8 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_CTX_new.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_CTX_new.pod
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ L<SSL_CONF_cmd_argv(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2
+These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.0.2.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix.pod
index d98647025470..b2eff5bf519f 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix.pod
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ L<SSL_CONF_cmd_argv(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2
+These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.0.2.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags.pod
index 766d984626a9..d6f6ff589758 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags.pod
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ L<SSL_CONF_cmd_argv(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2
+These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.0.2.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx.pod
index 7e4120f7ce57..3b001d1686f4 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx.pod
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ L<SSL_CONF_cmd_argv(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2
+These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.0.2.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod
index b399bcf4990c..a74e7284f9de 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod
@@ -308,11 +308,6 @@ Attempts to pad TLSv1.3 records so that they are a multiple of B<value> in
length on send. A B<value> of 0 or 1 turns off padding. Otherwise, the
B<value> must be >1 or <=16384.
-=item B<NoRenegotiation>
-
-Disables all attempts at renegotiation in TLSv1.2 and earlier, same as setting
-B<SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION>.
-
=item B<SignatureAlgorithms>
This sets the supported signature algorithms for TLSv1.2 and TLSv1.3.
@@ -456,6 +451,9 @@ Only used by servers.
B<NoResumptionOnRenegotiation>: set
B<SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION> flag. Only used by servers.
+B<NoRenegotiation>: disables all attempts at renegotiation in TLSv1.2 and
+earlier, same as setting B<SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION>.
+
B<UnsafeLegacyRenegotiation>: permits the use of unsafe legacy renegotiation.
Equivalent to B<SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION>.
@@ -670,12 +668,12 @@ L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-SSL_CONF_cmd() was first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2
+The SSL_CONF_cmd() function was added in OpenSSL 1.0.2.
-B<SSL_OP_NO_SSL2> doesn't have effect since 1.1.0, but the macro is retained
-for backwards compatibility.
+The B<SSL_OP_NO_SSL2> option doesn't have effect since 1.1.0, but the macro
+is retained for backwards compatibility.
-B<SSL_CONF_TYPE_NONE> was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0. In earlier versions of
+The B<SSL_CONF_TYPE_NONE> was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. In earlier versions of
OpenSSL passing a command which didn't take an argument would return
B<SSL_CONF_TYPE_UNKNOWN>.
@@ -685,7 +683,7 @@ B<AllowNoDHEKEX> and B<PrioritizeChaCha> were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
-Copyright 2012-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+Copyright 2012-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd_argv.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd_argv.pod
index 567fa5a5084f..130814803d86 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd_argv.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd_argv.pod
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ L<SSL_CONF_cmd(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2
+These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.0.2.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert.pod
index 24730024f857..8fe8a7d5e18e 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert.pod
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ L<SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2.
+These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.0.2.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_config.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_config.pod
index 5b2aed76c283..90d86746cec1 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_config.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_config.pod
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ L<CONF_modules_load_file(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-SSL_CTX_config() and SSL_config() were first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0
+The SSL_CTX_config() and SSL_config() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_dane_enable.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_dane_enable.pod
index d767bb296e83..d1b3c1aad7d3 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_dane_enable.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_dane_enable.pod
@@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_free(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_get0_param.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_get0_param.pod
index 6b9373745880..8b99dc330ad9 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_get0_param.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_get0_param.pod
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ L<X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2.
+These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.0.2.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set0_CA_list.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set0_CA_list.pod
index d7ed89775b2e..b483f83b7182 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set0_CA_list.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set0_CA_list.pod
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ set CA names using the "client CA list" functions and then get them using the
used on the server side then the "client CA list" functions take precedence.
Typically, on the server side, the "client CA list " functions should be used in
preference. As noted above in most cases it is not necessary to set CA names on
-the client side.
+the client side.
SSL_CTX_set0_CA_list() sets the list of CAs to be sent to the peer to
B<name_list>. Ownership of B<name_list> is transferred to B<ctx> and
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)>
=head1 COPYRIGHT
-Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_curves.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_curves.pod
index 7dca0e0161d9..6c3d4fc9e912 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_curves.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_curves.pod
@@ -97,8 +97,8 @@ L<SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-The curve functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2. The equivalent group
-functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+The curve functions were added in OpenSSL 1.0.2. The equivalent group
+functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store.pod
index bfe8b70af902..b42f2a499f13 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store.pod
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ L<SSL_build_cert_chain(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2.
+These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.0.2.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_list_file.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_list_file.pod
index 275831ab1550..5fb0feb45183 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_list_file.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_list_file.pod
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ See L<CTLOG_STORE_new(3)> for the file format.
=head1 NOTES
These functions will not clear the existing CT log list - it will be appended
-to. To replace the existing list, use L<SSL_CTX_set0_ctlog_store> first.
+to. To replace the existing list, use L<SSL_CTX_set0_ctlog_store> first.
If an error occurs whilst parsing a particular log entry in the file, that log
entry will be skipped.
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ L<CTLOG_STORE_new(3)>
=head1 COPYRIGHT
-Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb.pod
index c7bdc9b92a04..999a70c8c366 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb.pod
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ truncated.
SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb(), SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata(),
SSL_set_default_passwd_cb() and SSL_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata() were
-first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0
+added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 SEE ALSO
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_info_callback.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_info_callback.pod
index f01ca66fce7c..01b03f9a59ae 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_info_callback.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_info_callback.pod
@@ -92,17 +92,13 @@ Callback has been called due to an alert being sent or received.
=item SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
-Callback has been called because a new handshake is started. In TLSv1.3 this is
-also used for the start of post-handshake message exchanges such as for the
-exchange of session tickets, or for key updates. It also occurs when resuming a
-handshake following a pause to handle early data.
+Callback has been called because a new handshake is started. It also occurs when
+resuming a handshake following a pause to handle early data.
-=item SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE 0x20
+=item SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
-Callback has been called because a handshake is finished. In TLSv1.3 this is
-also used at the end of an exchange of post-handshake messages such as for
-session tickets or key updates. It also occurs if the handshake is paused to
-allow the exchange of early data.
+Callback has been called because a handshake is finished. It also occurs if the
+handshake is paused to allow the exchange of early data.
=back
@@ -160,7 +156,7 @@ L<SSL_alert_type_string(3)>
=head1 COPYRIGHT
-Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+Copyright 2001-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod
index 8f8edcf05420..387d1ec1ef04 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod
@@ -105,6 +105,15 @@ Enable asynchronous processing. TLS I/O operations may indicate a retry with
SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC with this mode set if an asynchronous capable engine is
used to perform cryptographic operations. See L<SSL_get_error(3)>.
+=item SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG
+
+Older versions of OpenSSL had a bug in the computation of the label length
+used for computing the endpoint-pair shared secret. The bug was that the
+terminating zero was included in the length of the label. Setting this option
+enables this behaviour to allow interoperability with such broken
+implementations. Please note that setting this option breaks interoperability
+with correct implementations. This option only applies to DTLS over SCTP.
+
=back
All modes are off by default except for SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY which is on by
@@ -124,11 +133,11 @@ L<SSL_write(3)>, L<SSL_get_error(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-SSL_MODE_ASYNC was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+SSL_MODE_ASYNC was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
-Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+Copyright 2001-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback.pod
index bbc78b64b9c5..8cf77cc553a1 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback.pod
@@ -128,8 +128,7 @@ L<ssl(7)>, L<SSL_new(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-The pseudo content type B<SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE> was added in OpenSSL
-1.1.1.
+The pseudo content type B<SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE> was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_num_tickets.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_num_tickets.pod
index b6b0e3ebee74..ad13ed15f406 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_num_tickets.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_num_tickets.pod
@@ -20,10 +20,10 @@ SSL_CTX_get_num_tickets
=head1 DESCRIPTION
SSL_CTX_set_num_tickets() and SSL_set_num_tickets() can be called for a server
-application and set the number of session tickets that will be sent to the
-client after a full handshake. Set the desired value (which could be 0) in the
-B<num_tickets> argument. Typically these functions should be called before the
-start of the handshake.
+application and set the number of TLSv1.3 session tickets that will be sent to
+the client after a full handshake. Set the desired value (which could be 0) in
+the B<num_tickets> argument. Typically these functions should be called before
+the start of the handshake.
The default number of tickets is 2; the default number of tickets sent following
a resumption handshake is 1 but this cannot be changed using these functions.
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod
index ae5ca1bd5d23..2d840b62cb24 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod
@@ -361,10 +361,10 @@ L<dhparam(1)>
=head1 HISTORY
The attempt to always try to use secure renegotiation was added in
-Openssl 0.9.8m.
+OpenSSL 0.9.8m.
-B<SSL_OP_PRIORITIZE_CHACHA> and B<SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION> were added in
-OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+The B<SSL_OP_PRIORITIZE_CHACHA> and B<SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION> options
+were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_record_padding_callback.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_record_padding_callback.pod
index d0b2e30f2571..13e56f0c57f6 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_record_padding_callback.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_record_padding_callback.pod
@@ -19,10 +19,10 @@ SSL_set_block_padding - install callback to specify TLS 1.3 record padding
void SSL_set_record_padding_callback(SSL *ssl, size_t (*cb)(SSL *s, int type, size_t len, void *arg));
void SSL_CTX_set_record_padding_callback_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg);
- void *SSL_CTX_get_record_padding_callback_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+ void *SSL_CTX_get_record_padding_callback_arg(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
void SSL_set_record_padding_callback_arg(SSL *ssl, void *arg);
- void *SSL_get_record_padding_callback_arg(SSL *ssl);
+ void *SSL_get_record_padding_callback_arg(const SSL *ssl);
int SSL_CTX_set_block_padding(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t block_size);
int SSL_set_block_padding(SSL *ssl, size_t block_size);
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ The record padding API was added for TLS 1.3 support in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
-Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+Copyright 2017-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod
index 8baaaffec5c8..0cb6c1f52a22 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ data pointer or NULL if the ex data is not set.
=head1 HISTORY
-These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0
+These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_session_ticket_cb.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_session_ticket_cb.pod
index 8f98c6f1c99e..f3dfb62c231c 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_session_ticket_cb.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_session_ticket_cb.pod
@@ -177,8 +177,8 @@ L<SSL_get_session(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-SSL_CTX_set_session_ticket_cb(), SSSL_SESSION_set1_ticket_appdata() and
-SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_appdata() were added to OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+The SSL_CTX_set_session_ticket_cb(), SSSL_SESSION_set1_ticket_appdata()
+and SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_appdata() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment.pod
index ef5e7cda35a2..877b4aecd949 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment.pod
@@ -169,8 +169,8 @@ SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment(), SSL_set_split_send_fragment(),
SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len() and SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len()
functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
-SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(), SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length()
-and SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length() were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+The SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(), SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length()
+and SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 SEE ALSO
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version.pod
index 901c057f453a..6c132756f2ca 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version.pod
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version, SSL_set_ssl_method, SSL_get_ssl_method
int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *method);
int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method);
- const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *ssl);
+ const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(const SSL *ssl);
=head1 DESCRIPTION
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ L<SSL_set_connect_state(3)>
=head1 COPYRIGHT
-Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb.pod
index d6c04eced8ce..cb40a9dbcbcb 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb.pod
@@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ side if the client requested OCSP stapling. Otherwise -1 is returned.
=head1 HISTORY
-SSL_get_tlsext_status_type(), SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_type() and
-SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_type() were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+The SSL_get_tlsext_status_type(), SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_type()
+and SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_type() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb.pod
index 9b448db664e1..7a4bb3427027 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb.pod
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ ticket information or it starts a full TLS handshake to create a new session
ticket.
Before the callback function is started I<ctx> and I<hctx> have been
-initialised with EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init and HMAC_CTX_init respectively.
+initialised with L<EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(3)> and L<HMAC_CTX_reset(3)> respectively.
For new sessions tickets, when the client doesn't present a session ticket, or
an attempted retrieval of the ticket failed, or a renew option was indicated,
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_free.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_free.pod
index 87a1cab1b462..9a3bf3ec988e 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_free.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_free.pod
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ L<d2i_SSL_SESSION(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-SSL_SESSION_dup() was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+The SSL_SESSION_dup() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher.pod
index 60f66a2d2b9d..5ef754c4a841 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher.pod
@@ -43,8 +43,8 @@ L<SSL_CTX_set_psk_use_session_callback(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher() was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
-SSL_SESSION_set_cipher() was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+The SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+The SSL_SESSION_set_cipher() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_get0_hostname.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_get0_hostname.pod
index c35c89279520..989c997882ca 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_get0_hostname.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_get0_hostname.pod
@@ -59,8 +59,8 @@ L<SSL_SESSION_free(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-SSL_SESSION_set1_hostname(), SSL_SESSION_get0_alpn_selected() and
-SSL_SESSION_set1_alpn_selected() were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+The SSL_SESSION_set1_hostname(), SSL_SESSION_get0_alpn_selected() and
+SSL_SESSION_set1_alpn_selected() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context.pod
index 69619a72b434..99b21bd126e9 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context.pod
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ L<SSL_set_session_id_context(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context() was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0
+The SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version.pod
index 84c9ac173b5c..961ed3e923c7 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version.pod
@@ -41,8 +41,8 @@ L<SSL_CTX_set_psk_use_session_callback(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version() was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
-SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version() was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+The SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+The SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_has_ticket.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_has_ticket.pod
index 7197382369de..6fb41b75cb60 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_has_ticket.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_has_ticket.pod
@@ -44,8 +44,8 @@ L<SSL_SESSION_free(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-SSL_SESSION_has_ticket, SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_lifetime_hint and
-SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+The SSL_SESSION_has_ticket(), SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_lifetime_hint()
+and SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_is_resumable.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_is_resumable.pod
index 729479a99b48..8e47eee09ac7 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_is_resumable.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_is_resumable.pod
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ L<SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-SSL_SESSION_is_resumable() was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.1
+The SSL_SESSION_is_resumable() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_set1_id.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_set1_id.pod
index f0b131d6a1f6..deafdf1ea579 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_set1_id.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_SESSION_set1_id.pod
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ L<ssl(7)>
=head1 HISTORY
-SSL_SESSION_set1_id() was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0
+The SSL_SESSION_set1_id() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_export_keying_material.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_export_keying_material.pod
index abebf911fc32..c6b9229cbf16 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_export_keying_material.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_export_keying_material.pod
@@ -59,7 +59,8 @@ B<label> and should be B<llen> bytes long. Typically this will be a value from
the IANA Exporter Label Registry
(L<https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#exporter-labels>).
Alternatively labels beginning with "EXPERIMENTAL" are permitted by the standard
-to be used without registration.
+to be used without registration. TLSv1.3 imposes a maximum label length of
+249 bytes.
Note that this function is only defined for TLSv1.0 and above, and DTLSv1.0 and
above. Attempting to use it in SSLv3 will result in an error.
@@ -72,7 +73,7 @@ SSL_export_keying_material_early() returns 0 on failure or 1 on success.
=head1 HISTORY
-SSL_export_keying_material_early() was first added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+The SSL_export_keying_material_early() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_extension_supported.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_extension_supported.pod
index 51ff6beeb513..df23ac6551ba 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_extension_supported.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_extension_supported.pod
@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ internally by OpenSSL and 0 otherwise.
=head1 HISTORY
-The function SSL_CTX_add_custom_ext() was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+The SSL_CTX_add_custom_ext() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_get_all_async_fds.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_get_all_async_fds.pod
index fd4515db5561..5b17f091e353 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_get_all_async_fds.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_get_all_async_fds.pod
@@ -73,8 +73,8 @@ L<SSL_get_error(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_set_mode(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-SSL_waiting_for_async(), SSL_get_all_async_fds() and SSL_get_changed_async_fds()
-were first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+The SSL_waiting_for_async(), SSL_get_all_async_fds()
+and SSL_get_changed_async_fds() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_get_error.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_get_error.pod
index b3ab50568731..5a7a4b7058ef 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_get_error.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_get_error.pod
@@ -138,17 +138,20 @@ Details depend on the application.
=item SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
-Some non-recoverable I/O error occurred.
-The OpenSSL error queue may contain more information on the error.
-For socket I/O on Unix systems, consult B<errno> for details.
+Some non-recoverable, fatal I/O error occurred. The OpenSSL error queue may
+contain more information on the error. For socket I/O on Unix systems, consult
+B<errno> for details. If this error occurs then no further I/O operations should
+be performed on the connection and SSL_shutdown() must not be called.
This value can also be returned for other errors, check the error queue for
details.
=item SSL_ERROR_SSL
-A failure in the SSL library occurred, usually a protocol error. The
-OpenSSL error queue contains more information on the error.
+A non-recoverable, fatal error in the SSL library occurred, usually a protocol
+error. The OpenSSL error queue contains more information on the error. If this
+error occurs then no further I/O operations should be performed on the
+connection and SSL_shutdown() must not be called.
=back
@@ -158,8 +161,8 @@ L<ssl(7)>
=head1 HISTORY
-SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
-SSL_ERROR_WANT_CLIENT_HELLO_CB was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+The SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC error code was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+The SSL_ERROR_WANT_CLIENT_HELLO_CB error code was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_get_version.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_get_version.pod
index b0aaba3a59d7..5507ff3f3de9 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_get_version.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_get_version.pod
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ L<ssl(7)>
=head1 HISTORY
-SSL_is_dtls() was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+The SSL_is_dtls() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_key_update.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_key_update.pod
index 7772b70bc69e..068ace597836 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_key_update.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_key_update.pod
@@ -14,11 +14,11 @@ SSL_renegotiate_pending
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
int SSL_key_update(SSL *s, int updatetype);
- int SSL_get_key_update_type(SSL *s);
+ int SSL_get_key_update_type(const SSL *s);
int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s);
int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s);
- int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s);
+ int SSL_renegotiate_pending(const SSL *s);
=head1 DESCRIPTION
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
-Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+Copyright 2017-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_read.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_read.pod
index e671b8eb794a..1410a0228c30 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_read.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_read.pod
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ You should instead call SSL_get_error() to find out if it's retryable.
=head1 HISTORY
-SSL_read_ex() and SSL_peek_ex() were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+The SSL_read_ex() and SSL_peek_ex() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 SEE ALSO
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_read_early_data.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_read_early_data.pod
index 9769aa72e4a0..c51fe1359dc3 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_read_early_data.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_read_early_data.pod
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ the server.
A client uses the function SSL_write_early_data() to send early data. This
function is similar to the L<SSL_write_ex(3)> function, but with the following
differences. See L<SSL_write_ex(3)> for information on how to write bytes to
-the underlying connection, and how to handle any errors that may arise. This
+the underlying connection, and how to handle any errors that may arise. This
page describes the differences between SSL_write_early_data() and
L<SSL_write_ex(3)>.
@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ All of the functions described above were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
-Copyright 2017-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+Copyright 2017-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_set1_host.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_set1_host.pod
index 3ca3c6b0136b..a2c9f133eed3 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_set1_host.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_set1_host.pod
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ L<SSL_dane_enable(3)>.
=head1 HISTORY
-These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_shutdown.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_shutdown.pod
index 0a3d6d370d8b..551fff6308b6 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_shutdown.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_shutdown.pod
@@ -22,6 +22,10 @@ Whether the operation succeeds or not, the SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN flag is set and
a currently open session is considered closed and good and will be kept in the
session cache for further reuse.
+Note that SSL_shutdown() must not be called if a previous fatal error has
+occurred on a connection i.e. if SSL_get_error() has returned SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
+or SSL_ERROR_SSL.
+
The shutdown procedure consists of two steps: sending of the close_notify
shutdown alert, and reception of the peer's close_notify shutdown alert.
The order of those two steps depends on the application.
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_want.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_want.pod
index ef4b2183e08d..6840ccbfb626 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_want.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_want.pod
@@ -101,7 +101,8 @@ L<ssl(7)>, L<SSL_get_error(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-SSL_want_client_hello_cb() and SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+The SSL_want_client_hello_cb() function and the SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB return value
+were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_write.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_write.pod
index 4dffd1fefc8a..3956f1def387 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_write.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_write.pod
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ You should instead call SSL_get_error() to find out if it's retryable.
=head1 HISTORY
-SSL_write_ex() was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+The SSL_write_ex() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 SEE ALSO
diff --git a/doc/man3/UI_create_method.pod b/doc/man3/UI_create_method.pod
index aefd41dac396..a01e1012dcf9 100644
--- a/doc/man3/UI_create_method.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/UI_create_method.pod
@@ -205,9 +205,8 @@ L<UI(3)>, L<CRYPTO_get_ex_data(3)>, L<UI_STRING(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-UI_method_set_data_duplicator(), UI_method_get_data_duplicator() and
-UI_method_get_data_destructor()
-were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+The UI_method_set_data_duplicator(), UI_method_get_data_duplicator()
+and UI_method_get_data_destructor() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/UI_new.pod b/doc/man3/UI_new.pod
index dd1b80ec635d..3042b13f1f1a 100644
--- a/doc/man3/UI_new.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/UI_new.pod
@@ -233,14 +233,13 @@ UI_process() returns 0 on success or a negative value on error.
UI_ctrl() returns a mask on success or -1 on error.
-UI_get_default_method(), UI_get_method(), UI_Openssl(), UI_null() and
+UI_get_default_method(), UI_get_method(), UI_OpenSSL(), UI_null() and
UI_set_method() return either a valid B<UI_METHOD> structure or NULL
respectively.
=head1 HISTORY
-UI_dup_user_data()
-was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+The UI_dup_user_data() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object.pod b/doc/man3/X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object.pod
index 5de1b88b9945..74f1a96d07ef 100644
--- a/doc/man3/X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object.pod
@@ -51,9 +51,6 @@ X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object() and X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data() can be
used to examine an B<X509_NAME_ENTRY> function as returned by
X509_NAME_get_entry() for example.
-X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt(), X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID(),
-and X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ() create and return an
-
X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt(), X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ(),
X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID() and X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_data()
are seldom used in practice because B<X509_NAME_ENTRY> structures
diff --git a/doc/man3/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod b/doc/man3/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod
index 2828ed75d2a9..472db508bc4e 100644
--- a/doc/man3/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod
@@ -159,8 +159,8 @@ L<X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls() was first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0
-X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted() was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0
+The X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls() function was added in OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+The X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb.pod b/doc/man3/X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb.pod
index 5688ab79a77e..647ed2f17401 100644
--- a/doc/man3/X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb.pod
@@ -192,12 +192,13 @@ L<X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
+The
X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(),
X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(), X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(),
X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl(), X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(),
X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(), X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(),
X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(), X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls()
-and X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup() were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+and X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/X509_STORE_new.pod b/doc/man3/X509_STORE_new.pod
index f7a5c81416b3..b3bc96e20b59 100644
--- a/doc/man3/X509_STORE_new.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/X509_STORE_new.pod
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ L<X509_STORE_get0_param(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
The X509_STORE_up_ref(), X509_STORE_lock() and X509_STORE_unlock()
-functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0
+functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func.pod b/doc/man3/X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func.pod
index 12a464674191..d16881edd83d 100644
--- a/doc/man3/X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func.pod
@@ -237,8 +237,9 @@ L<CMS_verify(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-X509_STORE_set_verify_cb() was added to OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+The X509_STORE_set_verify_cb() function was added in OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+The functions
X509_STORE_set_verify_cb(), X509_STORE_get_verify_cb(),
X509_STORE_set_verify(), X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(),
X509_STORE_set_get_issuer(), X509_STORE_get_get_issuer(),
@@ -250,8 +251,8 @@ X509_STORE_set_cert_crl(), X509_STORE_get_cert_crl(),
X509_STORE_set_check_policy(), X509_STORE_get_check_policy(),
X509_STORE_set_lookup_certs(), X509_STORE_get_lookup_certs(),
X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls(), X509_STORE_get_lookup_crls(),
-X509_STORE_set_cleanup() and X509_STORE_get_cleanup() were added in
-OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+X509_STORE_set_cleanup() and X509_STORE_get_cleanup()
+were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod b/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
index 9b64e0a915a2..f45467cacecc 100644
--- a/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
@@ -368,11 +368,11 @@ L<x509(1)>
=head1 HISTORY
-The B<X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS> flag was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0
-The flag B<X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK> was deprecated in
-OpenSSL 1.1.0, and has no effect.
+The B<X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS> flag was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+The flag B<X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK> was deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0
+and has no effect.
-X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_hostflags() was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0i.
+The X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_hostflags() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0i.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/X509_get0_signature.pod b/doc/man3/X509_get0_signature.pod
index f63c5a5b689e..4133bc37a9af 100644
--- a/doc/man3/X509_get0_signature.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/X509_get0_signature.pod
@@ -109,12 +109,14 @@ L<X509_verify_cert(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-X509_get0_signature() and X509_get_signature_nid() were first added to
-OpenSSL 1.0.2.
+The
+X509_get0_signature() and X509_get_signature_nid() functions were
+added in OpenSSL 1.0.2.
+The
X509_REQ_get0_signature(), X509_REQ_get_signature_nid(),
-X509_CRL_get0_signature() and X509_CRL_get_signature_nid() were first added
-to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+X509_CRL_get0_signature() and X509_CRL_get_signature_nid() were
+added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/X509_get_serialNumber.pod b/doc/man3/X509_get_serialNumber.pod
index 2e81c623969e..684adb7578b9 100644
--- a/doc/man3/X509_get_serialNumber.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/X509_get_serialNumber.pod
@@ -56,8 +56,9 @@ L<X509_verify_cert(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-X509_get_serialNumber() and X509_set_serialNumber() are available in
-all versions of OpenSSL. X509_get0_serialNumber() was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+The X509_get_serialNumber() and X509_set_serialNumber() functions are
+available in all versions of OpenSSL.
+The X509_get0_serialNumber() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/X509_get_subject_name.pod b/doc/man3/X509_get_subject_name.pod
index 2107c1d0905e..7c4a499225ec 100644
--- a/doc/man3/X509_get_subject_name.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/X509_get_subject_name.pod
@@ -53,8 +53,8 @@ and X509_CRL_set_issuer_name() return 1 for success and 0 for failure.
X509_REQ_get_subject_name() is a function in OpenSSL 1.1.0 and a macro in
earlier versions.
-X509_CRL_get_issuer() is a function in OpenSSL 1.1.0. It was first added
-to OpenSSL 1.0.0 as a macro.
+X509_CRL_get_issuer() is a function in OpenSSL 1.1.0. It was previously
+added in OpenSSL 1.0.0 as a macro.
=head1 SEE ALSO
diff --git a/doc/man3/X509_sign.pod b/doc/man3/X509_sign.pod
index 994fd438811a..8794c57e8d57 100644
--- a/doc/man3/X509_sign.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/X509_sign.pod
@@ -81,11 +81,11 @@ L<X509_verify_cert(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-X509_sign(), X509_REQ_sign() and X509_CRL_sign() are available in all
-versions of OpenSSL.
+The X509_sign(), X509_REQ_sign() and X509_CRL_sign() functions are
+available in all versions of OpenSSL.
-X509_sign_ctx(), X509_REQ_sign_ctx() and X509_CRL_sign_ctx() were first added
-to OpenSSL 1.0.1.
+The X509_sign_ctx(), X509_REQ_sign_ctx()
+and X509_CRL_sign_ctx() functions were added OpenSSL 1.0.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/d2i_PrivateKey.pod b/doc/man3/d2i_PrivateKey.pod
index 13415d5488e8..4e3f20f8b324 100644
--- a/doc/man3/d2i_PrivateKey.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/d2i_PrivateKey.pod
@@ -50,15 +50,19 @@ If the B<*a> is not NULL when calling d2i_PrivateKey() or d2i_AutoPrivateKey()
(i.e. an existing structure is being reused) and the key format is PKCS#8
then B<*a> will be freed and replaced on a successful call.
+To decode a key with type B<EVP_PKEY_EC>, d2i_PublicKey() requires B<*a> to be
+a non-NULL EVP_PKEY structure assigned an EC_KEY structure referencing the proper
+EC_GROUP.
+
=head1 RETURN VALUES
-d2i_PrivateKey() and d2i_AutoPrivateKey() return a valid B<EVP_KEY> structure
-or B<NULL> if an error occurs. The error code can be obtained by calling
-L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+The d2i_PrivateKey(), d2i_AutoPrivateKey(), d2i_PrivateKey_bio(), d2i_PrivateKey_fp(),
+and d2i_PublicKey() functions return a valid B<EVP_KEY> structure or B<NULL> if an
+error occurs. The error code can be obtained by calling L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
-i2d_PrivateKey() returns the number of bytes successfully encoded or a
-negative value if an error occurs. The error code can be obtained by calling
-L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+i2d_PrivateKey() and i2d_PublicKey() return the number of bytes successfully
+encoded or a negative value if an error occurs. The error code can be obtained
+by calling L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
=head1 SEE ALSO
@@ -67,7 +71,7 @@ L<d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio(3)>
=head1 COPYRIGHT
-Copyright 2017-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+Copyright 2017-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/doc/man3/i2d_CMS_bio_stream.pod b/doc/man3/i2d_CMS_bio_stream.pod
index ece7a4800eee..dd2bd213f1e1 100644
--- a/doc/man3/i2d_CMS_bio_stream.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/i2d_CMS_bio_stream.pod
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ L<PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-i2d_CMS_bio_stream() was added to OpenSSL 1.0.0
+The i2d_CMS_bio_stream() function was added in OpenSSL 1.0.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man3/i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream.pod b/doc/man3/i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream.pod
index b42940a83cfa..a33aa08f2d32 100644
--- a/doc/man3/i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream.pod
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ L<PEM_write_bio_PKCS7_stream(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream() was added to OpenSSL 1.0.0
+The i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream() function was added in OpenSSL 1.0.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man5/config.pod b/doc/man5/config.pod
index 3e110b03135b..992fdfccf917 100644
--- a/doc/man5/config.pod
+++ b/doc/man5/config.pod
@@ -42,6 +42,13 @@ working directory so unless the configuration file containing the
B<.include> directive is application specific the inclusion will not
work as expected.
+There can be optional B<=> character and whitespace characters between
+B<.include> directive and the path which can be useful in cases the
+configuration file needs to be loaded by old OpenSSL versions which do
+not support the B<.include> syntax. They would bail out with error
+if the B<=> character is not present but with it they just ignore
+the include.
+
Each section in a configuration file consists of a number of name and
value pairs of the form B<name=value>
@@ -419,7 +426,7 @@ L<x509(1)>, L<req(1)>, L<ca(1)>
=head1 COPYRIGHT
-Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/doc/man7/ct.pod b/doc/man7/ct.pod
index 355204d2a632..9f82c0ba44be 100644
--- a/doc/man7/ct.pod
+++ b/doc/man7/ct.pod
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@