aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorJung-uk Kim <jkim@FreeBSD.org>2018-08-14 16:18:14 +0000
committerJung-uk Kim <jkim@FreeBSD.org>2018-08-14 16:18:14 +0000
commit43a67e02da9068b94df1c07fc6f0d70bafd9263b (patch)
treeded01a82a7afcee0e7b8a379adbe42bd68ae3ce5
parent02be298e504b8554caca6dc85af450e1ea44d19d (diff)
downloadsrc-43a67e02da9068b94df1c07fc6f0d70bafd9263b.tar.gz
src-43a67e02da9068b94df1c07fc6f0d70bafd9263b.zip
Import OpenSSL 1.0.2p.vendor/openssl/1.0.2p
Notes
Notes: svn path=/vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/; revision=337764 svn path=/vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.2p/; revision=337765; tag=vendor/openssl/1.0.2p
-rw-r--r--CHANGES58
-rw-r--r--CONTRIBUTING50
-rwxr-xr-xConfigure12
-rw-r--r--FREEBSD-upgrade16
-rw-r--r--Makefile2
-rw-r--r--NEWS5
-rw-r--r--README4
-rw-r--r--apps/apps.c5
-rw-r--r--apps/asn1pars.c8
-rw-r--r--apps/ca.c5
-rw-r--r--apps/ocsp.c3
-rw-r--r--apps/passwd.c6
-rw-r--r--apps/s_apps.h7
-rw-r--r--apps/s_client.c4
-rw-r--r--apps/s_server.c35
-rw-r--r--apps/s_socket.c75
-rw-r--r--apps/verify.c1
-rw-r--r--crypto/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/a_bool.c24
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/a_object.c21
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/a_strex.c27
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c14
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/asn1.h8
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c3
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/bio/bss_log.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/bio/bss_mem.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/Makefile71
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/armv4-mont.pl15
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/ia64-mont.pl18
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/mips-mont.pl12
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/parisc-mont.pl28
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/ppc-mont.pl13
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont.pl41
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/s390x-mont.pl14
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/sparct4-mont.pl24
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/sparcv9-mont.pl13
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/via-mont.pl13
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/vis3-mont.pl16
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.pl20
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl83
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl19
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn.h106
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_div.c1
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_exp.c69
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c34
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h3
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_lib.c57
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_mod.c69
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_mont.c58
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c10
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn_int.h15
-rw-r--r--crypto/conf/conf_api.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/dh/dh_key.c7
-rw-r--r--crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/dsa/dsa.h9
-rw-r--r--crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c3
-rw-r--r--crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c13
-rw-r--r--crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c73
-rw-r--r--crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c12
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c22
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/ec_lib.c10
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c23
-rw-r--r--crypto/ecdsa/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c11
-rw-r--r--crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c32
-rw-r--r--crypto/engine/eng_lib.c8
-rw-r--r--crypto/engine/tb_asnmth.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/o_time.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/opensslv.h6
-rw-r--r--crypto/pem/pem.h3
-rw-r--r--crypto/pem/pem_lib.c59
-rw-r--r--crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/pkcs12/p12_asn.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c41
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c41
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c62
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c8
-rw-r--r--crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl2
-rw-r--r--crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c8
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509/x509_lu.c16
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c147
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c27
-rw-r--r--doc/apps/cms.pod14
-rw-r--r--doc/apps/config.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/apps/genpkey.pod139
-rw-r--r--doc/apps/s_client.pod8
-rw-r--r--doc/crypto/BIO_s_fd.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/crypto/BN_add.pod4
-rw-r--r--doc/crypto/BN_bn2bin.pod4
-rw-r--r--doc/crypto/BN_generate_prime.pod12
-rw-r--r--doc/crypto/CMS_encrypt.pod5
-rw-r--r--doc/crypto/CMS_get0_SignerInfos.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/crypto/CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/crypto/DSA_do_sign.pod4
-rw-r--r--doc/crypto/DSA_sign.pod4
-rw-r--r--doc/crypto/OBJ_nid2obj.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/crypto/SMIME_read_PKCS7.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/crypto/ecdsa.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/crypto/pem.pod93
-rw-r--r--doc/fingerprints.txt67
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/X509_cmp_time.pod39
-rw-r--r--doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_certificate.pod7
-rw-r--r--doc/ssl/SSL_get_ciphers.pod19
-rw-r--r--doc/ssl/SSL_get_session.pod5
-rw-r--r--doc/ssl/SSL_get_version.pod6
-rw-r--r--doc/ssl/ssl.pod2
-rw-r--r--ssl/d1_both.c5
-rw-r--r--ssl/s3_lib.c12
-rw-r--r--ssl/s3_srvr.c26
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl.h7
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl_lib.c31
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl_locl.h4
-rw-r--r--ssl/t1_lib.c5
-rw-r--r--ssl/t1_trce.c16
-rwxr-xr-xutil/domd17
124 files changed, 1527 insertions, 954 deletions
diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index cc142508b9a4..1c78e2a365e8 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -7,6 +7,64 @@
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commits/ and pick the appropriate
release branch.
+ Changes between 1.0.2o and 1.0.2p [14 Aug 2018]
+
+ *) Client DoS due to large DH parameter
+
+ During key agreement in a TLS handshake using a DH(E) based ciphersuite a
+ malicious server can send a very large prime value to the client. This will
+ cause the client to spend an unreasonably long period of time generating a
+ key for this prime resulting in a hang until the client has finished. This
+ could be exploited in a Denial Of Service attack.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 5th June 2018 by Guido Vranken
+ (CVE-2018-0732)
+ [Guido Vranken]
+
+ *) Cache timing vulnerability in RSA Key Generation
+
+ The OpenSSL RSA Key generation algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to
+ a cache timing side channel attack. An attacker with sufficient access to
+ mount cache timing attacks during the RSA key generation process could
+ recover the private key.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 4th April 2018 by Alejandro Cabrera
+ Aldaya, Billy Brumley, Cesar Pereida Garcia and Luis Manuel Alvarez Tapia.
+ (CVE-2018-0737)
+ [Billy Brumley]
+
+ *) Make EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() a bit stricter about its input. A NULL pem_str
+ parameter is no longer accepted, as it leads to a corrupt table. NULL
+ pem_str is reserved for alias entries only.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Revert blinding in ECDSA sign and instead make problematic addition
+ length-invariant. Switch even to fixed-length Montgomery multiplication.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Change generating and checking of primes so that the error rate of not
+ being prime depends on the intended use based on the size of the input.
+ For larger primes this will result in more rounds of Miller-Rabin.
+ The maximal error rate for primes with more than 1080 bits is lowered
+ to 2^-128.
+ [Kurt Roeckx, Annie Yousar]
+
+ *) Increase the number of Miller-Rabin rounds for DSA key generating to 64.
+ [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+ *) Add blinding to ECDSA and DSA signatures to protect against side channel
+ attacks discovered by Keegan Ryan (NCC Group).
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) When unlocking a pass phrase protected PEM file or PKCS#8 container, we
+ now allow empty (zero character) pass phrases.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Certificate time validation (X509_cmp_time) enforces stricter
+ compliance with RFC 5280. Fractional seconds and timezone offsets
+ are no longer allowed.
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
Changes between 1.0.2n and 1.0.2o [27 Mar 2018]
*) Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition could exceed the stack
diff --git a/CONTRIBUTING b/CONTRIBUTING
index f734d77ba76b..efcb0b84488d 100644
--- a/CONTRIBUTING
+++ b/CONTRIBUTING
@@ -1,26 +1,26 @@
-HOW TO CONTRIBUTE PATCHES TO OpenSSL
-------------------------------------
+HOW TO CONTRIBUTE TO OpenSSL
+----------------------------
(Please visit https://www.openssl.org/community/getting-started.html for
other ideas about how to contribute.)
-Development is coordinated on the openssl-dev mailing list (see the
-above link or https://mta.openssl.org for information on subscribing).
-If you are unsure as to whether a feature will be useful for the general
-OpenSSL community you might want to discuss it on the openssl-dev mailing
-list first. Someone may be already working on the same thing or there
-may be a good reason as to why that feature isn't implemented.
+Development is done on GitHub, https://github.com/openssl/openssl.
-To submit a patch, make a pull request on GitHub. If you think the patch
-could use feedback from the community, please start a thread on openssl-dev
-to discuss it.
+To request new features or report bugs, please open an issue on GitHub
-Having addressed the following items before the PR will help make the
-acceptance and review process faster:
+To submit a patch, please open a pull request on GitHub. If you are thinking
+of making a large contribution, open an issue for it before starting work,
+to get comments from the community. Someone may be already working on
+the same thing or there may be reasons why that feature isn't implemented.
- 1. Anything other than trivial contributions will require a contributor
- licensing agreement, giving us permission to use your code. See
- https://www.openssl.org/policies/cla.html for details.
+To make it easier to review and accept your pull request, please follow these
+guidelines:
+
+ 1. Anything other than a trivial contribution requires a Contributor
+ License Agreement (CLA), giving us permission to use your code. See
+ https://www.openssl.org/policies/cla.html for details. If your
+ contribution is too small to require a CLA, put "CLA: trivial" on a
+ line by itself in your commit message body.
2. All source files should start with the following text (with
appropriate comment characters at the start of each line and the
@@ -34,21 +34,21 @@ acceptance and review process faster:
https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
3. Patches should be as current as possible; expect to have to rebase
- often. We do not accept merge commits; You will be asked to remove
- them before a patch is considered acceptable.
+ often. We do not accept merge commits, you will have to remove them
+ (usually by rebasing) before it will be acceptable.
4. Patches should follow our coding style (see
- https://www.openssl.org/policies/codingstyle.html) and compile without
- warnings. Where gcc or clang is availble you should use the
+ https://www.openssl.org/policies/codingstyle.html) and compile
+ without warnings. Where gcc or clang is available you should use the
--strict-warnings Configure option. OpenSSL compiles on many varied
- platforms: try to ensure you only use portable features.
- Clean builds via Travis and AppVeyor are expected, and done whenever
- a PR is created or updated.
+ platforms: try to ensure you only use portable features. Clean builds
+ via Travis and AppVeyor are required, and they are started automatically
+ whenever a PR is created or updated.
5. When at all possible, patches should include tests. These can
either be added to an existing test, or completely new. Please see
test/README for information on the test framework.
6. New features or changed functionality must include
- documentation. Please look at the "pod" files in doc/apps, doc/crypto
- and doc/ssl for examples of our style.
+ documentation. Please look at the "pod" files in doc for
+ examples of our style.
diff --git a/Configure b/Configure
index 744b493b96f6..c7066dc97c58 100755
--- a/Configure
+++ b/Configure
@@ -1173,6 +1173,7 @@ foreach (sort (keys %disabled))
$depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_$ALGO";
}
}
+ if (/^comp$/) { $zlib = 0; }
}
print "\n";
@@ -1671,6 +1672,13 @@ while (<PIPE>) {
}
close(PIPE);
+# Xcode did not handle $cc -M before clang support
+my $cc_as_makedepend = 0;
+if ($predefined{__GNUC__} >= 3 && !(defined($predefined{__APPLE_CC__})
+ && !defined($predefined{__clang__}))) {
+ $cc_as_makedepend = 1;
+}
+
if ($strict_warnings)
{
my $wopt;
@@ -1730,14 +1738,14 @@ while (<IN>)
s/^NM=\s*/NM= \$\(CROSS_COMPILE\)/;
s/^RANLIB=\s*/RANLIB= \$\(CROSS_COMPILE\)/;
s/^RC=\s*/RC= \$\(CROSS_COMPILE\)/;
- s/^MAKEDEPPROG=.*$/MAKEDEPPROG= \$\(CROSS_COMPILE\)$cc/ if $predefined{__GNUC__} >= 3;
+ s/^MAKEDEPPROG=.*$/MAKEDEPPROG= \$\(CROSS_COMPILE\)$cc/ if $cc_as_makedepend;
}
else {
s/^CC=.*$/CC= $cc/;
s/^AR=\s*ar/AR= $ar/;
s/^RANLIB=.*/RANLIB= $ranlib/;
s/^RC=.*/RC= $windres/;
- s/^MAKEDEPPROG=.*$/MAKEDEPPROG= $cc/ if $predefined{__GNUC__} >= 3;
+ s/^MAKEDEPPROG=.*$/MAKEDEPPROG= $cc/ if $cc_as_makedepend;
}
s/^CFLAG=.*$/CFLAG= $cflags/;
s/^DEPFLAG=.*$/DEPFLAG=$depflags/;
diff --git a/FREEBSD-upgrade b/FREEBSD-upgrade
index fb8fda8e0479..bedaf99d87cc 100644
--- a/FREEBSD-upgrade
+++ b/FREEBSD-upgrade
@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ First, read http://wiki.freebsd.org/SubversionPrimer/VendorImports
# Xlist
setenv XLIST /FreeBSD/work/openssl/svn-FREEBSD-files/FREEBSD-Xlist
setenv FSVN "svn+ssh://repo.freebsd.org/base"
-setenv OSSLVER 1.0.2o
-# OSSLTAG format: v1_0_2o
+setenv OSSLVER 1.0.2p
+# OSSLTAG format: v1_0_2p
###setenv OSSLTAG v`echo ${OSSLVER} | tr . _`
@@ -21,10 +21,10 @@ fetch http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-${OSSLVER}.tar.gz \
http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-${OSSLVER}.tar.gz.asc
gpg --verify openssl-${OSSLVER}.tar.gz.asc openssl-${OSSLVER}.tar.gz
-svn co $FSVN/vendor-crypto/openssl/dist dist
+svn co $FSVN/vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2 dist-1.0.2
tar -x -X $XLIST -f openssl-${OSSLVER}.tar.gz
-cd dist
+cd dist-1.0.2
svn list -R | egrep -v -e '/$' -e '^FREEBSD-(Xlist|upgrade)$' | sort >../old
cd ../openssl-${OSSLVER}
find . -type f -or -type l | cut -c 3- | sort >../new
@@ -35,21 +35,21 @@ comm -23 old new
# See that files to add makes sense
comm -13 old new
-tar -cf - -C openssl-${OSSLVER} . | tar -xf - -C dist
-cd dist
+tar -cf - -C openssl-${OSSLVER} . | tar -xf - -C dist-1.0.2
+cd dist-1.0.2
comm -23 ../old ../new | xargs svn rm
# Make sure to remove empty directories
comm -13 ../old ../new | xargs svn --parents add
svn stat
svn ci
-svn cp ^/vendor-crypto/openssl/dist ^/vendor-crypto/openssl/$OSSLVER
+svn cp ^/vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2 ^/vendor-crypto/openssl/$OSSLVER
# Merge to head
mkdir ../head
cd ../head
svn co $FSVN/head/crypto/openssl crypto/openssl
-svn merge ^/vendor-crypto/openssl/dist crypto/openssl
+svn merge ^/vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2 crypto/openssl
# Resolve conflicts manually
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index d28f6fac188f..978f833033e5 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
## Makefile for OpenSSL
##
-VERSION=1.0.2o
+VERSION=1.0.2p
MAJOR=1
MINOR=0.2
SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0
diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index 5080f79a6cbf..93d1a52779b6 100644
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -5,6 +5,11 @@
This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2o and OpenSSL 1.0.2p [14 Aug 2018]
+
+ o Client DoS due to large DH parameter (CVE-2018-0732)
+ o Cache timing vulnerability in RSA Key Generation (CVE-2018-0737)
+
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2n and OpenSSL 1.0.2o [27 Mar 2018]
o Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition could exceed the
diff --git a/README b/README
index a0fce3f5f974..15df936bc9e9 100644
--- a/README
+++ b/README
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- OpenSSL 1.0.2o 27 Mar 2018
+ OpenSSL 1.0.2p 14 Aug 2018
- Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project
+ Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project
Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
All rights reserved.
diff --git a/apps/apps.c b/apps/apps.c
index c5a515229556..fc1bae078df1 100644
--- a/apps/apps.c
+++ b/apps/apps.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -1359,7 +1359,8 @@ int set_name_ex(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg)
};
if (set_multi_opts(flags, arg, ex_tbl) == 0)
return 0;
- if ((*flags & XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK) == 0)
+ if (*flags != XN_FLAG_COMPAT
+ && (*flags & XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK) == 0)
*flags |= XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC;
return 1;
}
diff --git a/apps/asn1pars.c b/apps/asn1pars.c
index 0a6b990b503d..5b0def76de49 100644
--- a/apps/asn1pars.c
+++ b/apps/asn1pars.c
@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
ASN1_TYPE *atmp;
int typ;
j = atoi(sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(osk, i));
- if (j == 0) {
+ if (j <= 0 || j >= tmplen) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "'%s' is an invalid number\n",
sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(osk, i));
continue;
@@ -327,14 +327,14 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
num = tmplen;
}
- if (offset >= num) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error: offset too large\n");
+ if (offset < 0 || offset >= num) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error: offset out of range\n");
goto end;
}
num -= offset;
- if ((length == 0) || ((long)length > num))
+ if (length == 0 || length > (unsigned int)num)
length = (unsigned int)num;
if (derout) {
if (BIO_write(derout, str + offset, length) != (int)length) {
diff --git a/apps/ca.c b/apps/ca.c
index 4f9de5492148..31e87738d56c 100644
--- a/apps/ca.c
+++ b/apps/ca.c
@@ -1176,10 +1176,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
if (j > 0) {
total_done++;
BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
- if (!BN_add_word(serial, 1))
+ if (!BN_add_word(serial, 1)) {
+ X509_free(x);
goto err;
+ }
if (!sk_X509_push(cert_sk, x)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
+ X509_free(x);
goto err;
}
}
diff --git a/apps/ocsp.c b/apps/ocsp.c
index 654eebcbfc15..678e9932fdbf 100644
--- a/apps/ocsp.c
+++ b/apps/ocsp.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
* 2000.
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -787,7 +787,6 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
OCSP_response_status_str(i), i);
if (ignore_err)
goto redo_accept;
- ret = 0;
goto end;
}
diff --git a/apps/passwd.c b/apps/passwd.c
index 56e10ad3d8f1..718f0e0124dd 100644
--- a/apps/passwd.c
+++ b/apps/passwd.c
@@ -306,9 +306,9 @@ static char *md5crypt(const char *passwd, const char *magic, const char *salt)
out_buf[0] = '$';
out_buf[1] = 0;
assert(strlen(magic) <= 4); /* "1" or "apr1" */
- strncat(out_buf, magic, 4);
- strncat(out_buf, "$", 1);
- strncat(out_buf, salt, 8);
+ BUF_strlcat(out_buf, magic, sizeof(out_buf));
+ BUF_strlcat(out_buf, "$", sizeof(out_buf));
+ BUF_strlcat(out_buf, salt, sizeof(out_buf));
assert(strlen(out_buf) <= 6 + 8); /* "$apr1$..salt.." */
salt_out = out_buf + 2 + strlen(magic);
salt_len = strlen(salt_out);
diff --git a/apps/s_apps.h b/apps/s_apps.h
index 5ba1e1d6d86d..cbb61baf77d6 100644
--- a/apps/s_apps.h
+++ b/apps/s_apps.h
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -152,9 +152,8 @@ typedef fd_mask fd_set;
#define PROTOCOL "tcp"
int do_server(int port, int type, int *ret,
- int (*cb) (char *hostname, int s, int stype,
- unsigned char *context), unsigned char *context,
- int naccept);
+ int (*cb) (int s, int stype, unsigned char *context),
+ unsigned char *context, int naccept);
#ifdef HEADER_X509_H
int MS_CALLBACK verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
#endif
diff --git a/apps/s_client.c b/apps/s_client.c
index c85566855fef..b455d9012d80 100644
--- a/apps/s_client.c
+++ b/apps/s_client.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -prexit - print session information even on connection failure\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -showcerts - show all certificates in the chain\n");
+ " -showcerts - Show all certificates sent by the server\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err, " -debug - extra output\n");
#ifdef WATT32
BIO_printf(bio_err, " -wdebug - WATT-32 tcp debugging\n");
diff --git a/apps/s_server.c b/apps/s_server.c
index 83918fb6d39a..ce7a1d64b639 100644
--- a/apps/s_server.c
+++ b/apps/s_server.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -209,9 +209,9 @@ typedef unsigned int u_int;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
static RSA MS_CALLBACK *tmp_rsa_cb(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength);
#endif
-static int sv_body(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context);
-static int www_body(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context);
-static int rev_body(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context);
+static int sv_body(int s, int stype, unsigned char *context);
+static int www_body(int s, int stype, unsigned char *context);
+static int rev_body(int s, int stype, unsigned char *context);
static void close_accept_socket(void);
static void sv_usage(void);
static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *s);
@@ -1087,11 +1087,14 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
char *chCApath = NULL, *chCAfile = NULL;
char *vfyCApath = NULL, *vfyCAfile = NULL;
unsigned char *context = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
char *dhfile = NULL;
+ int no_dhe = 0;
+#endif
int badop = 0;
int ret = 1;
int build_chain = 0;
- int no_tmp_rsa = 0, no_dhe = 0, no_ecdhe = 0, nocert = 0;
+ int no_tmp_rsa = 0, no_ecdhe = 0, nocert = 0;
int state = 0;
const SSL_METHOD *meth = NULL;
int socket_type = SOCK_STREAM;
@@ -1239,11 +1242,15 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
if (--argc < 1)
goto bad;
s_chain_file = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dhparam") == 0) {
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dhparam") == 0) {
if (--argc < 1)
goto bad;
dhfile = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dcertform") == 0) {
+ }
+#endif
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dcertform") == 0) {
if (--argc < 1)
goto bad;
s_dcert_format = str2fmt(*(++argv));
@@ -1390,9 +1397,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
verify_quiet = 1;
} else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_tmp_rsa") == 0) {
no_tmp_rsa = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_dhe") == 0) {
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_dhe") == 0) {
no_dhe = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_ecdhe") == 0) {
+ }
+#endif
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_ecdhe") == 0) {
no_ecdhe = 1;
} else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_resume_ephemeral") == 0) {
no_resume_ephemeral = 1;
@@ -2165,7 +2176,7 @@ static void print_stats(BIO *bio, SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx)
SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ssl_ctx));
}
-static int sv_body(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context)
+static int sv_body(int s, int stype, unsigned char *context)
{
char *buf = NULL;
fd_set readfds;
@@ -2780,7 +2791,7 @@ static int load_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *file)
}
#endif
-static int www_body(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context)
+static int www_body(int s, int stype, unsigned char *context)
{
char *buf = NULL;
int ret = 1;
@@ -3183,7 +3194,7 @@ static int www_body(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context)
return (ret);
}
-static int rev_body(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context)
+static int rev_body(int s, int stype, unsigned char *context)
{
char *buf = NULL;
int i;
diff --git a/apps/s_socket.c b/apps/s_socket.c
index 83624ca84f15..b3848dd1563d 100644
--- a/apps/s_socket.c
+++ b/apps/s_socket.c
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ static int ssl_sock_init(void);
static int init_client_ip(int *sock, unsigned char ip[4], int port, int type);
static int init_server(int *sock, int port, int type);
static int init_server_long(int *sock, int port, char *ip, int type);
-static int do_accept(int acc_sock, int *sock, char **host);
+static int do_accept(int acc_sock, int *sock);
static int host_ip(char *str, unsigned char ip[4]);
# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16
@@ -290,12 +290,10 @@ static int init_client_ip(int *sock, unsigned char ip[4], int port, int type)
}
int do_server(int port, int type, int *ret,
- int (*cb) (char *hostname, int s, int stype,
- unsigned char *context), unsigned char *context,
- int naccept)
+ int (*cb) (int s, int stype, unsigned char *context),
+ unsigned char *context, int naccept)
{
int sock;
- char *name = NULL;
int accept_socket = 0;
int i;
@@ -308,15 +306,13 @@ int do_server(int port, int type, int *ret,
}
for (;;) {
if (type == SOCK_STREAM) {
- if (do_accept(accept_socket, &sock, &name) == 0) {
+ if (do_accept(accept_socket, &sock) == 0) {
SHUTDOWN(accept_socket);
return (0);
}
} else
sock = accept_socket;
- i = (*cb) (name, sock, type, context);
- if (name != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(name);
+ i = (*cb) (sock, type, context);
if (type == SOCK_STREAM)
SHUTDOWN2(sock);
if (naccept != -1)
@@ -386,30 +382,24 @@ static int init_server(int *sock, int port, int type)
return (init_server_long(sock, port, NULL, type));
}
-static int do_accept(int acc_sock, int *sock, char **host)
+static int do_accept(int acc_sock, int *sock)
{
int ret;
- struct hostent *h1, *h2;
- static struct sockaddr_in from;
- int len;
-/* struct linger ling; */
if (!ssl_sock_init())
- return (0);
+ return 0;
# ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
redoit:
# endif
- memset((char *)&from, 0, sizeof(from));
- len = sizeof(from);
/*
* Note: under VMS with SOCKETSHR the fourth parameter is currently of
* type (int *) whereas under other systems it is (void *) if you don't
* have a cast it will choke the compiler: if you do have a cast then you
* can either go for (int *) or (void *).
*/
- ret = accept(acc_sock, (struct sockaddr *)&from, (void *)&len);
+ ret = accept(acc_sock, NULL, NULL);
if (ret == INVALID_SOCKET) {
# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) && !defined(NETWARE_BSDSOCK))
int i;
@@ -425,56 +415,11 @@ static int do_accept(int acc_sock, int *sock, char **host)
fprintf(stderr, "errno=%d ", errno);
perror("accept");
# endif
- return (0);
+ return 0;
}
-/*-
- ling.l_onoff=1;
- ling.l_linger=0;
- i=setsockopt(ret,SOL_SOCKET,SO_LINGER,(char *)&ling,sizeof(ling));
- if (i < 0) { perror("linger"); return(0); }
- i=0;
- i=setsockopt(ret,SOL_SOCKET,SO_KEEPALIVE,(char *)&i,sizeof(i));
- if (i < 0) { perror("keepalive"); return(0); }
-*/
-
- if (host == NULL)
- goto end;
-# ifndef BIT_FIELD_LIMITS
- /* I should use WSAAsyncGetHostByName() under windows */
- h1 = gethostbyaddr((char *)&from.sin_addr.s_addr,
- sizeof(from.sin_addr.s_addr), AF_INET);
-# else
- h1 = gethostbyaddr((char *)&from.sin_addr,
- sizeof(struct in_addr), AF_INET);
-# endif
- if (h1 == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad gethostbyaddr\n");
- *host = NULL;
- /* return(0); */
- } else {
- if ((*host = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(h1->h_name) + 1)) == NULL) {
- perror("OPENSSL_malloc");
- closesocket(ret);
- return (0);
- }
- BUF_strlcpy(*host, h1->h_name, strlen(h1->h_name) + 1);
-
- h2 = GetHostByName(*host);
- if (h2 == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "gethostbyname failure\n");
- closesocket(ret);
- return (0);
- }
- if (h2->h_addrtype != AF_INET) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "gethostbyname addr is not AF_INET\n");
- closesocket(ret);
- return (0);
- }
- }
- end:
*sock = ret;
- return (1);
+ return 1;
}
int extract_host_port(char *str, char **host_ptr, unsigned char *ip,
diff --git a/apps/verify.c b/apps/verify.c
index c4bd1975764c..180ccf495c2f 100644
--- a/apps/verify.c
+++ b/apps/verify.c
@@ -277,6 +277,7 @@ static int check(X509_STORE *ctx, char *file,
X509_STORE_set_flags(ctx, vflags);
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(csc, ctx, x, uchain)) {
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc);
goto end;
}
if (tchain)
diff --git a/crypto/Makefile b/crypto/Makefile
index 7869996a9c07..ad1b9f018b1b 100644
--- a/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/Makefile
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ SRC= $(LIBSRC)
EXHEADER= crypto.h opensslv.h opensslconf.h ebcdic.h symhacks.h \
ossl_typ.h
HEADER= cryptlib.h buildinf.h md32_common.h o_time.h o_str.h o_dir.h \
- constant_time_locl.h $(EXHEADER)
+ constant_time_locl.h bn_int.h $(EXHEADER)
ALL= $(GENERAL) $(SRC) $(HEADER)
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_bool.c b/crypto/asn1/a_bool.c
index 1b85bc9e61cd..3bf676eb6fb5 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_bool.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_bool.c
@@ -63,17 +63,31 @@
int i2d_ASN1_BOOLEAN(int a, unsigned char **pp)
{
int r;
- unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char *p, *allocated = NULL;
r = ASN1_object_size(0, 1, V_ASN1_BOOLEAN);
if (pp == NULL)
return (r);
- p = *pp;
+
+ if (*pp == NULL) {
+ if ((p = allocated = OPENSSL_malloc(r)) == NULL) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_BOOLEAN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ p = *pp;
+ }
ASN1_put_object(&p, 0, 1, V_ASN1_BOOLEAN, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL);
- *(p++) = (unsigned char)a;
- *pp = p;
- return (r);
+ *p = (unsigned char)a;
+
+
+ /*
+ * If a new buffer was allocated, just return it back.
+ * If not, return the incremented buffer pointer.
+ */
+ *pp = allocated != NULL ? allocated : p + 1;
+ return r;
}
int d2i_ASN1_BOOLEAN(int *a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_object.c b/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
index ad6b12a53667..ce05cf4c4b9f 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@
int i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT *a, unsigned char **pp)
{
- unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char *p, *allocated = NULL;
int objsize;
if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL))
@@ -76,13 +76,24 @@ int i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT *a, unsigned char **pp)
if (pp == NULL || objsize == -1)
return objsize;
- p = *pp;
+ if (*pp == NULL) {
+ if ((p = allocated = OPENSSL_malloc(objsize)) == NULL) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_OBJECT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ p = *pp;
+ }
+
ASN1_put_object(&p, 0, a->length, V_ASN1_OBJECT, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL);
memcpy(p, a->data, a->length);
- p += a->length;
- *pp = p;
- return (objsize);
+ /*
+ * If a new buffer was allocated, just return it back.
+ * If not, return the incremented buffer pointer.
+ */
+ *pp = allocated != NULL ? allocated : p + a->length;
+ return objsize;
}
int a2d_ASN1_OBJECT(unsigned char *out, int olen, const char *buf, int num)
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c b/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c
index 95f041620735..11b21c2af7b8 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
* 2000.
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -194,18 +194,38 @@ static int do_buf(unsigned char *buf, int buflen,
int type, unsigned char flags, char *quotes, char_io *io_ch,
void *arg)
{
- int i, outlen, len;
+ int i, outlen, len, charwidth;
unsigned char orflags, *p, *q;
unsigned long c;
p = buf;
q = buf + buflen;
outlen = 0;
+ charwidth = type & BUF_TYPE_WIDTH_MASK;
+
+ switch (charwidth) {
+ case 4:
+ if (buflen & 3) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_DO_BUF, ASN1_R_INVALID_UNIVERSALSTRING_LENGTH);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ if (buflen & 1) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_DO_BUF, ASN1_R_INVALID_BMPSTRING_LENGTH);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
while (p != q) {
if (p == buf && flags & ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253)
orflags = CHARTYPE_FIRST_ESC_2253;
else
orflags = 0;
- switch (type & BUF_TYPE_WIDTH_MASK) {
+
+ switch (charwidth) {
case 4:
c = ((unsigned long)*p++) << 24;
c |= ((unsigned long)*p++) << 16;
@@ -226,6 +246,7 @@ static int do_buf(unsigned char *buf, int buflen,
i = UTF8_getc(p, buflen, &c);
if (i < 0)
return -1; /* Invalid UTF8String */
+ buflen -= i;
p += i;
break;
default:
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c b/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c
index 43ddebba33a6..cc8f9a8243e7 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
* 2006.
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -305,6 +305,18 @@ EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_new(int id, int flags,
} else
ameth->info = NULL;
+ /*
+ * One of the following must be true:
+ *
+ * pem_str == NULL AND ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS is set
+ * pem_str != NULL AND ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS is clear
+ *
+ * Anything else is an error and may lead to a corrupt ASN1 method table
+ */
+ if (!((pem_str == NULL && (flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS) != 0)
+ || (pem_str != NULL && (flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS) == 0)))
+ goto err;
+
if (pem_str) {
ameth->pem_str = BUF_strdup(pem_str);
if (!ameth->pem_str)
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/asn1.h b/crypto/asn1/asn1.h
index 35a2b2aa0238..36e79d5ecd2d 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/asn1.h
+++ b/crypto/asn1/asn1.h
@@ -1164,6 +1164,7 @@ int SMIME_text(BIO *in, BIO *out);
* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
* made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
*/
+
void ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void);
/* Error codes for the ASN1 functions. */
@@ -1264,7 +1265,10 @@ void ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void);
# define ASN1_F_D2I_X509 156
# define ASN1_F_D2I_X509_CINF 157
# define ASN1_F_D2I_X509_PKEY 159
+# define ASN1_F_DO_BUF 221
# define ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_BIO_STREAM 211
+# define ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_BOOLEAN 223
+# define ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_OBJECT 222
# define ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_SET 188
# define ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_TIME 160
# define ASN1_F_I2D_DSA_PUBKEY 161
@@ -1414,7 +1418,7 @@ void ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void);
# define ASN1_R_WRONG_TAG 168
# define ASN1_R_WRONG_TYPE 169
-#ifdef __cplusplus
+# ifdef __cplusplus
}
-#endif
+# endif
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c b/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
index cfc1512f9d07..9e273dcf5f23 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
@@ -166,7 +166,10 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA ASN1_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_X509), "D2I_X509"},
{ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_X509_CINF), "D2I_X509_CINF"},
{ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_X509_PKEY), "d2i_X509_PKEY"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_DO_BUF), "DO_BUF"},
{ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_BIO_STREAM), "i2d_ASN1_bio_stream"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_BOOLEAN), "i2d_ASN1_BOOLEAN"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_OBJECT), "i2d_ASN1_OBJECT"},
{ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_SET), "i2d_ASN1_SET"},
{ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_TIME), "I2D_ASN1_TIME"},
{ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_DSA_PUBKEY), "i2d_DSA_PUBKEY"},
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c b/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c
index 081a9d534f8a..1824b2fc80f7 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
* 2000.
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2000-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -588,6 +588,8 @@ int asn1_ex_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cout, int *putype,
otmp = (ASN1_OBJECT *)*pval;
cont = otmp->data;
len = otmp->length;
+ if (cont == NULL || len == 0)
+ return -1;
break;
case V_ASN1_NULL:
diff --git a/crypto/bio/bss_log.c b/crypto/bio/bss_log.c
index 1283a525b446..1b063fc2813d 100644
--- a/crypto/bio/bss_log.c
+++ b/crypto/bio/bss_log.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* crypto/bio/bss_log.c */
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static int MS_CALLBACK slg_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
if ((buf = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(inl + 1)) == NULL) {
return (0);
}
- strncpy(buf, in, inl);
+ memcpy(buf, in, inl);
buf[inl] = '\0';
i = 0;
diff --git a/crypto/bio/bss_mem.c b/crypto/bio/bss_mem.c
index b0394a960da1..6ccb8e27886d 100644
--- a/crypto/bio/bss_mem.c
+++ b/crypto/bio/bss_mem.c
@@ -188,6 +188,8 @@ static int mem_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
}
BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+ if (inl == 0)
+ return 0;
blen = bm->length;
if (BUF_MEM_grow_clean(bm, blen + inl) != (blen + inl))
goto end;
diff --git a/crypto/bn/Makefile b/crypto/bn/Makefile
index 20e8ef0a28d7..9fc4447cfcfd 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/bn/Makefile
@@ -197,21 +197,24 @@ bn_add.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
bn_add.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
bn_add.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
bn_add.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-bn_add.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_add.c bn_lcl.h
+bn_add.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_add.c
+bn_add.o: bn_lcl.h
bn_asm.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
bn_asm.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
bn_asm.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
bn_asm.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
bn_asm.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
bn_asm.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-bn_asm.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_asm.c bn_lcl.h
+bn_asm.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_asm.c
+bn_asm.o: bn_lcl.h
bn_blind.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
bn_blind.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
bn_blind.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
bn_blind.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
bn_blind.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
bn_blind.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-bn_blind.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_blind.c bn_lcl.h
+bn_blind.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h
+bn_blind.o: bn_blind.c bn_lcl.h
bn_const.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
bn_const.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
bn_const.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
@@ -223,7 +226,8 @@ bn_ctx.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
bn_ctx.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
bn_ctx.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
bn_ctx.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-bn_ctx.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_ctx.c bn_lcl.h
+bn_ctx.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_ctx.c
+bn_ctx.o: bn_lcl.h
bn_depr.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
bn_depr.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
bn_depr.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
@@ -231,14 +235,15 @@ bn_depr.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
bn_depr.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
bn_depr.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
bn_depr.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-bn_depr.o: ../cryptlib.h bn_depr.c bn_lcl.h
+bn_depr.o: ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_depr.c bn_lcl.h
bn_div.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
bn_div.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
bn_div.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
bn_div.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
bn_div.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
bn_div.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-bn_div.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_div.c bn_lcl.h
+bn_div.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_div.c
+bn_div.o: bn_lcl.h
bn_err.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
bn_err.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
bn_err.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
@@ -252,7 +257,7 @@ bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../constant_time_locl.h
+bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../constant_time_locl.h
bn_exp.o: ../cryptlib.h bn_exp.c bn_lcl.h rsaz_exp.h
bn_exp2.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
bn_exp2.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
@@ -260,70 +265,80 @@ bn_exp2.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
bn_exp2.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
bn_exp2.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
bn_exp2.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-bn_exp2.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_exp2.c bn_lcl.h
+bn_exp2.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_exp2.c
+bn_exp2.o: bn_lcl.h
bn_gcd.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
bn_gcd.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
bn_gcd.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
bn_gcd.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
bn_gcd.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
bn_gcd.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-bn_gcd.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_gcd.c bn_lcl.h
+bn_gcd.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_gcd.c
+bn_gcd.o: bn_lcl.h
bn_gf2m.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
bn_gf2m.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
bn_gf2m.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
bn_gf2m.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
bn_gf2m.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
bn_gf2m.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-bn_gf2m.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_gf2m.c bn_lcl.h
+bn_gf2m.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_gf2m.c
+bn_gf2m.o: bn_lcl.h
bn_kron.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
bn_kron.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
bn_kron.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
bn_kron.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
bn_kron.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
bn_kron.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-bn_kron.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_kron.c bn_lcl.h
+bn_kron.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_kron.c
+bn_kron.o: bn_lcl.h
bn_lib.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
bn_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
bn_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
bn_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
bn_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
bn_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-bn_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h bn_lib.c
+bn_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h
+bn_lib.o: bn_lib.c
bn_mod.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
bn_mod.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
bn_mod.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
bn_mod.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
bn_mod.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
bn_mod.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-bn_mod.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h bn_mod.c
+bn_mod.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h
+bn_mod.o: bn_mod.c
bn_mont.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
bn_mont.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
bn_mont.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
bn_mont.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
bn_mont.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
bn_mont.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-bn_mont.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h bn_mont.c
+bn_mont.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h
+bn_mont.o: bn_mont.c
bn_mpi.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
bn_mpi.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
bn_mpi.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
bn_mpi.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
bn_mpi.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
bn_mpi.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-bn_mpi.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h bn_mpi.c
+bn_mpi.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h
+bn_mpi.o: bn_mpi.c
bn_mul.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
bn_mul.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
bn_mul.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
bn_mul.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
bn_mul.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
bn_mul.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-bn_mul.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h bn_mul.c
+bn_mul.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h
+bn_mul.o: bn_mul.c
bn_nist.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
bn_nist.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
bn_nist.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
bn_nist.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
bn_nist.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
bn_nist.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-bn_nist.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h bn_nist.c
+bn_nist.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h
+bn_nist.o: bn_nist.c
bn_prime.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
bn_prime.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
bn_prime.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
@@ -331,14 +346,15 @@ bn_prime.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
bn_prime.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
bn_prime.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
bn_prime.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-bn_prime.o: ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h bn_prime.c bn_prime.h
+bn_prime.o: ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h bn_prime.c bn_prime.h
bn_print.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
bn_print.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
bn_print.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
bn_print.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
bn_print.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
bn_print.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-bn_print.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h bn_print.c
+bn_print.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h
+bn_print.o: bn_print.c
bn_rand.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
bn_rand.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
bn_rand.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
@@ -346,42 +362,47 @@ bn_rand.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
bn_rand.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
bn_rand.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
bn_rand.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-bn_rand.o: ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h bn_rand.c
+bn_rand.o: ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h bn_rand.c
bn_recp.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
bn_recp.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
bn_recp.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
bn_recp.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
bn_recp.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
bn_recp.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-bn_recp.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h bn_recp.c
+bn_recp.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h
+bn_recp.o: bn_recp.c
bn_shift.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
bn_shift.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
bn_shift.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
bn_shift.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
bn_shift.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
bn_shift.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-bn_shift.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h bn_shift.c
+bn_shift.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h
+bn_shift.o: bn_shift.c
bn_sqr.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
bn_sqr.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
bn_sqr.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
bn_sqr.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
bn_sqr.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
bn_sqr.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-bn_sqr.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h bn_sqr.c
+bn_sqr.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h
+bn_sqr.o: bn_sqr.c
bn_sqrt.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
bn_sqrt.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
bn_sqrt.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
bn_sqrt.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
bn_sqrt.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
bn_sqrt.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-bn_sqrt.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h bn_sqrt.c
+bn_sqrt.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h
+bn_sqrt.o: bn_sqrt.c
bn_word.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
bn_word.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
bn_word.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
bn_word.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
bn_word.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
bn_word.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-bn_word.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h bn_word.c
+bn_word.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h
+bn_word.o: bn_word.c
bn_x931p.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
bn_x931p.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
bn_x931p.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-mont.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-mont.pl
index 1d330e9f8aa3..8961180c0095 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-mont.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-mont.pl
@@ -216,14 +216,15 @@ bn_mul_mont:
mov $tp,sp @ "rewind" $tp
sub $rp,$rp,$aj @ "rewind" $rp
- and $ap,$tp,$nhi
- bic $np,$rp,$nhi
- orr $ap,$ap,$np @ ap=borrow?tp:rp
-
-.Lcopy: ldr $tj,[$ap],#4 @ copy or in-place refresh
+.Lcopy: ldr $tj,[$tp] @ conditional copy
+ ldr $aj,[$rp]
str sp,[$tp],#4 @ zap tp
- str $tj,[$rp],#4
- cmp $tp,$num
+#ifdef __thumb2__
+ it cc
+#endif
+ movcc $aj,$tj
+ str $aj,[$rp],#4
+ teq $tp,$num @ preserve carry
bne .Lcopy
add sp,$num,#4 @ skip over tp[num+1]
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/ia64-mont.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/ia64-mont.pl
index e258658428a3..7dae817ddd98 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/ia64-mont.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/ia64-mont.pl
@@ -332,19 +332,19 @@ bn_mul_mont_general:
{ .mmb; sub rptr=rptr,len // rewind
sub tptr=tptr,len
clrrrb.pr };;
-{ .mmi; and aptr=tptr,topbit
- andcm bptr=rptr,topbit
+{ .mmi; mov aptr=rptr
+ mov bptr=tptr
mov pr.rot=1<<16 };;
-{ .mii; or nptr=aptr,bptr
+{ .mii; cmp.eq p0,p6=topbit,r0
mov ar.lc=lc
- mov ar.ec=3 };;
+ mov ar.ec=2 };;
.Lcopy_ctop:
-{ .mmb; (p16) ld8 n[0]=[nptr],8
- (p18) st8 [tptr]=r0,8
- (p16) nop.b 0 }
-{ .mmb; (p16) nop.m 0
- (p18) st8 [rptr]=n[2],8
+{ .mmi; (p16) ld8 a[0]=[aptr],8
+ (p16) ld8 t[0]=[bptr],8
+ (p6) mov a[1]=t[1] };; // (p17)
+{ .mmb; (p17) st8 [rptr]=a[1],8
+ (p17) st8 [tptr]=r0,8
br.ctop.sptk .Lcopy_ctop };;
.Lcopy_cend:
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/mips-mont.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/mips-mont.pl
index a33cdf411121..9b80e84140d7 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/mips-mont.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/mips-mont.pl
@@ -377,15 +377,13 @@ $code.=<<___;
$PTR_SUB $rp,$num # restore rp
not $hi1,$hi0
- and $ap,$hi0,$sp
- and $bp,$hi1,$rp
- or $ap,$ap,$bp # ap=borrow?tp:rp
-
-.align 4
-.Lcopy: $LD $aj,($ap)
- $PTR_ADD $ap,$BNSZ
+.Lcopy: $LD $nj,($tp) # conditional move
+ $LD $aj,($rp)
$ST $zero,($tp)
$PTR_ADD $tp,$BNSZ
+ and $nj,$hi0
+ and $aj,$hi1
+ or $aj,$nj
sltu $at,$tp,$tj
$ST $aj,($rp)
bnez $at,.Lcopy
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/parisc-mont.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/parisc-mont.pl
index c02ef6f01466..53e179d18804 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/parisc-mont.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/parisc-mont.pl
@@ -510,7 +510,6 @@ L\$sub
stws,ma $hi1,4($rp)
subb $ti0,%r0,$hi1
- ldo -4($tp),$tp
___
$code.=<<___ if ($BN_SZ==8);
ldd,ma 8($tp),$ti0
@@ -525,21 +524,19 @@ L\$sub
extrd,u $ti0,31,32,$ti0 ; carry in flipped word order
sub,db $ti0,%r0,$hi1
- ldo -8($tp),$tp
___
$code.=<<___;
- and $tp,$hi1,$ap
- andcm $rp,$hi1,$bp
- or $ap,$bp,$np
-
+ ldo `$LOCALS+32`($fp),$tp
sub $rp,$arrsz,$rp ; rewind rp
subi 0,$arrsz,$idx
- ldo `$LOCALS+32`($fp),$tp
L\$copy
- ldd $idx($np),$hi0
+ ldd 0($tp),$ti0
+ ldd 0($rp),$hi0
std,ma %r0,8($tp)
- addib,<> 8,$idx,.-8 ; L\$copy
- std,ma $hi0,8($rp)
+ comiclr,= 0,$hi1,%r0
+ copy $ti0,$hi0
+ addib,<> 8,$idx,L\$copy
+ std,ma $hi0,8($rp)
___
if ($BN_SZ==4) { # PA-RISC 1.1 code-path
@@ -849,17 +846,16 @@ L\$sub_pa11
stws,ma $hi1,4($rp)
subb $ti0,%r0,$hi1
- ldo -4($tp),$tp
- and $tp,$hi1,$ap
- andcm $rp,$hi1,$bp
- or $ap,$bp,$np
+ ldo `$LOCALS+32`($fp),$tp
sub $rp,$arrsz,$rp ; rewind rp
subi 0,$arrsz,$idx
- ldo `$LOCALS+32`($fp),$tp
L\$copy_pa11
- ldwx $idx($np),$hi0
+ ldw 0($tp),$ti0
+ ldw 0($rp),$hi0
stws,ma %r0,4($tp)
+ comiclr,= 0,$hi1,%r0
+ copy $ti0,$hi0
addib,<> 4,$idx,L\$copy_pa11
stws,ma $hi0,4($rp)
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/ppc-mont.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/ppc-mont.pl
index 6930a3acebd2..ac3b4a4c9bca 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/ppc-mont.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/ppc-mont.pl
@@ -294,15 +294,16 @@ Lsub: $LDX $tj,$tp,$j
li $j,0
mtctr $num
subfe $ovf,$j,$ovf ; handle upmost overflow bit
- and $ap,$tp,$ovf
- andc $np,$rp,$ovf
- or $ap,$ap,$np ; ap=borrow?tp:rp
.align 4
-Lcopy: ; copy or in-place refresh
- $LDX $tj,$ap,$j
- $STX $tj,$rp,$j
+Lcopy: ; conditional copy
+ $LDX $tj,$tp,$j
+ $LDX $aj,$rp,$j
+ and $tj,$tj,$ovf
+ andc $aj,$aj,$ovf
$STX $j,$tp,$j ; zap at once
+ or $aj,$aj,$tj
+ $STX $aj,$rp,$j
addi $j,$j,$BNSZ
bdnz Lcopy
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont.pl
index 595fc6d31f60..6cf99c5db330 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont.pl
@@ -1494,16 +1494,14 @@ Lsub: ldx $t0,$tp,$i
li $i,0
subfe $ovf,$i,$ovf ; handle upmost overflow bit
- and $ap,$tp,$ovf
- andc $np,$rp,$ovf
- or $ap,$ap,$np ; ap=borrow?tp:rp
- addi $t7,$ap,8
mtctr $j
.align 4
-Lcopy: ; copy or in-place refresh
- ldx $t0,$ap,$i
- ldx $t1,$t7,$i
+Lcopy: ; conditional copy
+ ldx $t0,$tp,$i
+ ldx $t1,$t4,$i
+ ldx $t2,$rp,$i
+ ldx $t3,$t6,$i
std $i,8($nap_d) ; zap nap_d
std $i,16($nap_d)
std $i,24($nap_d)
@@ -1512,6 +1510,12 @@ Lcopy: ; copy or in-place refresh
std $i,48($nap_d)
std $i,56($nap_d)
stdu $i,64($nap_d)
+ and $t0,$t0,$ovf
+ and $t1,$t1,$ovf
+ andc $t2,$t2,$ovf
+ andc $t3,$t3,$ovf
+ or $t0,$t0,$t2
+ or $t1,$t1,$t3
stdx $t0,$rp,$i
stdx $t1,$t6,$i
stdx $i,$tp,$i ; zap tp at once
@@ -1554,20 +1558,21 @@ Lsub: lwz $t0,12($tp) ; load tp[j..j+3] in 64-bit word order
li $i,0
subfe $ovf,$i,$ovf ; handle upmost overflow bit
- addi $tp,$sp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER+4`
+ addi $ap,$sp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER+4`
subf $rp,$num,$rp ; rewind rp
- and $ap,$tp,$ovf
- andc $np,$rp,$ovf
- or $ap,$ap,$np ; ap=borrow?tp:rp
addi $tp,$sp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER`
mtctr $j
.align 4
-Lcopy: ; copy or in-place refresh
+Lcopy: ; conditional copy
lwz $t0,4($ap)
lwz $t1,8($ap)
lwz $t2,12($ap)
lwzu $t3,16($ap)
+ lwz $t4,4($rp)
+ lwz $t5,8($rp)
+ lwz $t6,12($rp)
+ lwz $t7,16($rp)
std $i,8($nap_d) ; zap nap_d
std $i,16($nap_d)
std $i,24($nap_d)
@@ -1576,6 +1581,18 @@ Lcopy: ; copy or in-place refresh
std $i,48($nap_d)
std $i,56($nap_d)
stdu $i,64($nap_d)
+ and $t0,$t0,$ovf
+ and $t1,$t1,$ovf
+ and $t2,$t2,$ovf
+ and $t3,$t3,$ovf
+ andc $t4,$t4,$ovf
+ andc $t5,$t5,$ovf
+ andc $t6,$t6,$ovf
+ andc $t7,$t7,$ovf
+ or $t0,$t0,$t4
+ or $t1,$t1,$t5
+ or $t2,$t2,$t6
+ or $t3,$t3,$t7
stw $t0,4($rp)
stw $t1,8($rp)
stw $t2,12($rp)
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl
index 2b3f8b0e21ec..d4124a8f6389 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$addx = ($1>=11);
}
-if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10
$avx = ($ver>=3.0) + ($ver>=3.01);
$addx = ($ver>=3.03);
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-mont.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-mont.pl
index 9fd64e81eef3..46188ebb7e5b 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-mont.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-mont.pl
@@ -245,16 +245,16 @@ $code.=<<___;
brct $count,.Lsub
lghi $ahi,0
slbgr $AHI,$ahi # handle upmost carry
-
- ngr $ap,$AHI
- lghi $np,-1
- xgr $np,$AHI
- ngr $np,$rp
- ogr $ap,$np # ap=borrow?tp:rp
+ lghi $NHI,-1
+ xgr $NHI,$AHI
la $j,0(%r0)
lgr $count,$num
-.Lcopy: lg $alo,0($j,$ap) # copy or in-place refresh
+.Lcopy: lg $ahi,$stdframe($j,$sp) # conditional copy
+ lg $alo,0($j,$rp)
+ ngr $ahi,$AHI
+ ngr $alo,$NHI
+ ogr $alo,$ahi
_dswap $alo
stg $j,$stdframe($j,$sp) # zap tp
stg $alo,0($j,$rp)
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/sparct4-mont.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/sparct4-mont.pl
index 71b45002a42f..cac60f997874 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/sparct4-mont.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/sparct4-mont.pl
@@ -878,19 +878,17 @@ $code.=<<___;
sub $tp, $num, $tp
sub $rp, $num, $rp
- subc $ovf, %g0, $ovf ! handle upmost overflow bit
- and $tp, $ovf, $ap
- andn $rp, $ovf, $np
- or $np, $ap, $ap ! ap=borrow?tp:rp
+ subccc $ovf, %g0, $ovf ! handle upmost overflow bit
ba .Lcopy
sub $num, 8, $cnt
.align 16
-.Lcopy: ! copy or in-place refresh
- ldx [$ap+0], $t2
- add $ap, 8, $ap
+.Lcopy: ! conditional copy
+ ldx [$tp], $tj
+ ldx [$rp+0], $t2
stx %g0, [$tp] ! zap
add $tp, 8, $tp
+ movcs %icc, $tj, $t2
stx $t2, [$rp+0]
add $rp, 8, $rp
brnz $cnt, .Lcopy
@@ -1126,19 +1124,17 @@ $code.=<<___;
sub $tp, $num, $tp
sub $rp, $num, $rp
- subc $ovf, %g0, $ovf ! handle upmost overflow bit
- and $tp, $ovf, $ap
- andn $rp, $ovf, $np
- or $np, $ap, $ap ! ap=borrow?tp:rp
+ subccc $ovf, %g0, $ovf ! handle upmost overflow bit
ba .Lcopy_g5
sub $num, 8, $cnt
.align 16
-.Lcopy_g5: ! copy or in-place refresh
- ldx [$ap+0], $t2
- add $ap, 8, $ap
+.Lcopy_g5: ! conditional copy
+ ldx [$tp], $tj
+ ldx [$rp+0], $t2
stx %g0, [$tp] ! zap
add $tp, 8, $tp
+ movcs %icc, $tj, $t2
stx $t2, [$rp+0]
add $rp, 8, $rp
brnz $cnt, .Lcopy_g5
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/sparcv9-mont.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/sparcv9-mont.pl
index d8662878006e..2043ab04af16 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/sparcv9-mont.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/sparcv9-mont.pl
@@ -255,7 +255,6 @@ $fname:
.Ltail:
add $np,$num,$np
add $rp,$num,$rp
- mov $tp,$ap
sub %g0,$num,%o7 ! k=-num
ba .Lsub
subcc %g0,%g0,%g0 ! clear %icc.c
@@ -268,15 +267,14 @@ $fname:
add %o7,4,%o7
brnz %o7,.Lsub
st %o1,[$i]
- subc $car2,0,$car2 ! handle upmost overflow bit
- and $tp,$car2,$ap
- andn $rp,$car2,$np
- or $ap,$np,$ap
+ subccc $car2,0,$car2 ! handle upmost overflow bit
sub %g0,$num,%o7
.Lcopy:
- ld [$ap+%o7],%o0 ! copy or in-place refresh
+ ld [$tp+%o7],%o1 ! conditional copy
+ ld [$rp+%o7],%o0
st %g0,[$tp+%o7] ! zap tp
+ movcs %icc,%o1,%o0
st %o0,[$rp+%o7]
add %o7,4,%o7
brnz %o7,.Lcopy
@@ -485,6 +483,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
mulx $npj,$mul1,$acc1
add $tpj,$car1,$car1
ld [$np+$j],$npj ! np[j]
+ srlx $car1,32,$tmp0
+ and $car1,$mask,$car1
+ add $tmp0,$sbit,$sbit
add $acc0,$car1,$car1
ld [$tp+8],$tpj ! tp[j]
add $acc1,$car1,$car1
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/via-mont.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/via-mont.pl
index c046a514c873..917942136fcf 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/via-mont.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/via-mont.pl
@@ -203,18 +203,15 @@ $sp=&DWP(28,"esp");
&mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"esi","edx",4)); # upmost overflow bit
&sbb ("eax",0);
- &and ("esi","eax");
- &not ("eax");
- &mov ("ebp","edi");
- &and ("ebp","eax");
- &or ("esi","ebp"); # tp=carry?tp:rp
&mov ("ecx","edx"); # num
- &xor ("edx","edx"); # i=0
+ &mov ("edx",0); # i=0
&set_label("copy",8);
- &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"esi","edx",4));
- &mov (&DWP(64,"esp","edx",4),"ecx"); # zap tp
+ &mov ("ebx",&DWP(0,"esi","edx",4));
+ &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"edi","edx",4));
+ &mov (&DWP(0,"esi","edx",4),"ecx"); # zap tp
+ &cmovc ("eax","ebx");
&mov (&DWP(0,"edi","edx",4),"eax");
&lea ("edx",&DWP(1,"edx")); # i++
&loop (&label("copy"));
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/vis3-mont.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/vis3-mont.pl
index 263ac02b6f45..002c00c2abc6 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/vis3-mont.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/vis3-mont.pl
@@ -299,23 +299,23 @@ $code.=<<___;
sub $anp, $num, $anp
sub $rp, $num, $rp
- subc $ovf, %g0, $ovf ! handle upmost overflow bit
- and $tp, $ovf, $ap
- andn $rp, $ovf, $np
- or $np, $ap, $ap ! ap=borrow?tp:rp
+ subccc $ovf, %g0, $ovf ! handle upmost overflow bit
ba .Lcopy
sub $num, 8, $cnt
.align 16
-.Lcopy: ! copy or in-place refresh
- ld [$ap+0], $t2
- ld [$ap+4], $t3
- add $ap, 8, $ap
+.Lcopy: ! conditional copy
+ ld [$tp+0], $t0
+ ld [$tp+4], $t1
+ ld [$rp+0], $t2
+ ld [$rp+4], $t3
stx %g0, [$tp] ! zap
add $tp, 8, $tp
stx %g0, [$anp] ! zap
stx %g0, [$anp+8]
add $anp, 16, $anp
+ movcs %icc, $t0, $t2
+ movcs %icc, $t1, $t3
st $t3, [$rp+0] ! flip order
st $t2, [$rp+4]
add $rp, 8, $rp
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.pl
index 1c4003efc20a..d72eb00132b0 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.pl
@@ -592,16 +592,18 @@ $sbit=$num;
&jge (&label("sub"));
&sbb ("eax",0); # handle upmost overflow bit
- &and ($tp,"eax");
- &not ("eax");
- &mov ($np,$rp);
- &and ($np,"eax");
- &or ($tp,$np); # tp=carry?tp:rp
-
-&set_label("copy",16); # copy or in-place refresh
- &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,$tp,$num,4));
- &mov (&DWP(0,$rp,$num,4),"eax"); # rp[i]=tp[i]
+ &mov ("edx",-1);
+ &xor ("edx","eax");
+ &jmp (&label("copy"));
+
+&set_label("copy",16); # conditional copy
+ &mov ($tp,&DWP($frame,"esp",$num,4));
+ &mov ($np,&DWP(0,$rp,$num,4));
&mov (&DWP($frame,"esp",$num,4),$j); # zap temporary vector
+ &and ($tp,"eax");
+ &and ($np,"edx");
+ &or ($np,$tp);
+ &mov (&DWP(0,$rp,$num,4),$np);
&dec ($num);
&jge (&label("copy"));
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl
index 80492d8e6381..2074fd802446 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl
@@ -293,30 +293,30 @@ $code.=<<___;
xor $i,$i # i=0 and clear CF!
mov (%rsp),%rax # tp[0]
- lea (%rsp),$ap # borrow ap for tp
mov $num,$j # j=num
- jmp .Lsub
+
.align 16
.Lsub: sbb ($np,$i,8),%rax
mov %rax,($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i]
- mov 8($ap,$i,8),%rax # tp[i+1]
+ mov 8(%rsp,$i,8),%rax # tp[i+1]
lea 1($i),$i # i++
dec $j # doesnn't affect CF!
jnz .Lsub
sbb \$0,%rax # handle upmost overflow bit
+ mov \$-1,%rbx
+ xor %rax,%rbx # not %rax
xor $i,$i
- and %rax,$ap
- not %rax
- mov $rp,$np
- and %rax,$np
mov $num,$j # j=num
- or $np,$ap # ap=borrow?tp:rp
-.align 16
-.Lcopy: # copy or in-place refresh
- mov ($ap,$i,8),%rax
- mov $i,(%rsp,$i,8) # zap temporary vector
- mov %rax,($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i]
+
+.Lcopy: # conditional copy
+ mov ($rp,$i,8),%rcx
+ mov (%rsp,$i,8),%rdx
+ and %rbx,%rcx
+ and %rax,%rdx
+ mov $num,(%rsp,$i,8) # zap temporary vector
+ or %rcx,%rdx
+ mov %rdx,($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i]
lea 1($i),$i
sub \$1,$j
jnz .Lcopy
@@ -686,10 +686,10 @@ ___
my @ri=("%rax","%rdx",$m0,$m1);
$code.=<<___;
mov 16(%rsp,$num,8),$rp # restore $rp
+ lea -4($num),$j
mov 0(%rsp),@ri[0] # tp[0]
- pxor %xmm0,%xmm0
mov 8(%rsp),@ri[1] # tp[1]
- shr \$2,$num # num/=4
+ shr \$2,$j # j=num/4-1
lea (%rsp),$ap # borrow ap for tp
xor $i,$i # i=0 and clear CF!
@@ -697,9 +697,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
mov 16($ap),@ri[2] # tp[2]
mov 24($ap),@ri[3] # tp[3]
sbb 8($np),@ri[1]
- lea -1($num),$j # j=num/4-1
- jmp .Lsub4x
-.align 16
+
.Lsub4x:
mov @ri[0],0($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i]
mov @ri[1],8($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i]
@@ -726,34 +724,35 @@ $code.=<<___;
sbb \$0,@ri[0] # handle upmost overflow bit
mov @ri[3],24($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i]
- xor $i,$i # i=0
- and @ri[0],$ap
- not @ri[0]
- mov $rp,$np
- and @ri[0],$np
- lea -1($num),$j
- or $np,$ap # ap=borrow?tp:rp
-
- movdqu ($ap),%xmm1
- movdqa %xmm0,(%rsp)
- movdqu %xmm1,($rp)
+ pxor %xmm0,%xmm0
+ movq @ri[0],%xmm4
+ pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm5
+ pshufd \$0,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ mov $num,$j
+ pxor %xmm4,%xmm5
+ shr \$2,$j # j=num/4
+ xor %eax,%eax # i=0
+
jmp .Lcopy4x
.align 16
-.Lcopy4x: # copy or in-place refresh
- movdqu 16($ap,$i),%xmm2
- movdqu 32($ap,$i),%xmm1
- movdqa %xmm0,16(%rsp,$i)
- movdqu %xmm2,16($rp,$i)
- movdqa %xmm0,32(%rsp,$i)
- movdqu %xmm1,32($rp,$i)
- lea 32($i),$i
+.Lcopy4x: # conditional copy
+ movdqa (%rsp,%rax),%xmm1
+ movdqu ($rp,%rax),%xmm2
+ pand %xmm4,%xmm1
+ pand %xmm5,%xmm2
+ movdqa 16(%rsp,%rax),%xmm3
+ movdqa %xmm0,(%rsp,%rax)
+ por %xmm2,%xmm1
+ movdqu 16($rp,%rax),%xmm2
+ movdqu %xmm1,($rp,%rax)
+ pand %xmm4,%xmm3
+ pand %xmm5,%xmm2
+ movdqa %xmm0,16(%rsp,%rax)
+ por %xmm2,%xmm3
+ movdqu %xmm3,16($rp,%rax)
+ lea 32(%rax),%rax
dec $j
jnz .Lcopy4x
-
- shl \$2,$num
- movdqu 16($ap,$i),%xmm2
- movdqa %xmm0,16(%rsp,$i)
- movdqu %xmm2,16($rp,$i)
___
}
$code.=<<___;
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
index 42178e455a98..f8ff822ba298 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
@@ -405,18 +405,19 @@ $code.=<<___;
jnz .Lsub
sbb \$0,%rax # handle upmost overflow bit
+ mov \$-1,%rbx
+ xor %rax,%rbx
xor $i,$i
- and %rax,$ap
- not %rax
- mov $rp,$np
- and %rax,$np
mov $num,$j # j=num
- or $np,$ap # ap=borrow?tp:rp
-.align 16
-.Lcopy: # copy or in-place refresh
- mov ($ap,$i,8),%rax
+
+.Lcopy: # conditional copy
+ mov ($rp,$i,8),%rcx
+ mov (%rsp,$i,8),%rdx
+ and %rbx,%rcx
+ and %rax,%rdx
mov $i,(%rsp,$i,8) # zap temporary vector
- mov %rax,($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i]
+ or %rcx,%rdx
+ mov %rdx,($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i]
lea 1($i),$i
sub \$1,$j
jnz .Lcopy
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn.h b/crypto/bn/bn.h
index 633d1b1f6013..d4b9f27bb39d 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn.h
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn.h
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -375,25 +375,76 @@ int BN_GENCB_call(BN_GENCB *cb, int a, int b);
* on the size of the number */
/*
- * number of Miller-Rabin iterations for an error rate of less than 2^-80 for
- * random 'b'-bit input, b >= 100 (taken from table 4.4 in the Handbook of
- * Applied Cryptography [Menezes, van Oorschot, Vanstone; CRC Press 1996];
- * original paper: Damgaard, Landrock, Pomerance: Average case error
- * estimates for the strong probable prime test. -- Math. Comp. 61 (1993)
- * 177-194)
+ * BN_prime_checks_for_size() returns the number of Miller-Rabin iterations
+ * that will be done for checking that a random number is probably prime. The
+ * error rate for accepting a composite number as prime depends on the size of
+ * the prime |b|. The error rates used are for calculating an RSA key with 2 primes,
+ * and so the level is what you would expect for a key of double the size of the
+ * prime.
+ *
+ * This table is generated using the algorithm of FIPS PUB 186-4
+ * Digital Signature Standard (DSS), section F.1, page 117.
+ * (https://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4)
+ *
+ * The following magma script was used to generate the output:
+ * securitybits:=125;
+ * k:=1024;
+ * for t:=1 to 65 do
+ * for M:=3 to Floor(2*Sqrt(k-1)-1) do
+ * S:=0;
+ * // Sum over m
+ * for m:=3 to M do
+ * s:=0;
+ * // Sum over j
+ * for j:=2 to m do
+ * s+:=(RealField(32)!2)^-(j+(k-1)/j);
+ * end for;
+ * S+:=2^(m-(m-1)*t)*s;
+ * end for;
+ * A:=2^(k-2-M*t);
+ * B:=8*(Pi(RealField(32))^2-6)/3*2^(k-2)*S;
+ * pkt:=2.00743*Log(2)*k*2^-k*(A+B);
+ * seclevel:=Floor(-Log(2,pkt));
+ * if seclevel ge securitybits then
+ * printf "k: %5o, security: %o bits (t: %o, M: %o)\n",k,seclevel,t,M;
+ * break;
+ * end if;
+ * end for;
+ * if seclevel ge securitybits then break; end if;
+ * end for;
+ *
+ * It can be run online at:
+ * http://magma.maths.usyd.edu.au/calc
+ *
+ * And will output:
+ * k: 1024, security: 129 bits (t: 6, M: 23)
+ *
+ * k is the number of bits of the prime, securitybits is the level we want to
+ * reach.
+ *
+ * prime length | RSA key size | # MR tests | security level
+ * -------------+--------------|------------+---------------
+ * (b) >= 6394 | >= 12788 | 3 | 256 bit
+ * (b) >= 3747 | >= 7494 | 3 | 192 bit
+ * (b) >= 1345 | >= 2690 | 4 | 128 bit
+ * (b) >= 1080 | >= 2160 | 5 | 128 bit
+ * (b) >= 852 | >= 1704 | 5 | 112 bit
+ * (b) >= 476 | >= 952 | 5 | 80 bit
+ * (b) >= 400 | >= 800 | 6 | 80 bit
+ * (b) >= 347 | >= 694 | 7 | 80 bit
+ * (b) >= 308 | >= 616 | 8 | 80 bit
+ * (b) >= 55 | >= 110 | 27 | 64 bit
+ * (b) >= 6 | >= 12 | 34 | 64 bit
*/
-# define BN_prime_checks_for_size(b) ((b) >= 1300 ? 2 : \
- (b) >= 850 ? 3 : \
- (b) >= 650 ? 4 : \
- (b) >= 550 ? 5 : \
- (b) >= 450 ? 6 : \
- (b) >= 400 ? 7 : \
- (b) >= 350 ? 8 : \
- (b) >= 300 ? 9 : \
- (b) >= 250 ? 12 : \
- (b) >= 200 ? 15 : \
- (b) >= 150 ? 18 : \
- /* b >= 100 */ 27)
+
+# define BN_prime_checks_for_size(b) ((b) >= 3747 ? 3 : \
+ (b) >= 1345 ? 4 : \
+ (b) >= 476 ? 5 : \
+ (b) >= 400 ? 6 : \
+ (b) >= 347 ? 7 : \
+ (b) >= 308 ? 8 : \
+ (b) >= 55 ? 27 : \
+ /* b >= 6 */ 34)
# define BN_num_bytes(a) ((BN_num_bits(a)+7)/8)
@@ -773,6 +824,16 @@ BIGNUM *bn_dup_expand(const BIGNUM *a, int words); /* unused */
/* We only need assert() when debugging */
# include <assert.h>
+/*
+ * The new BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP flag marks vectors that were not treated with
+ * bn_correct_top, in other words such vectors are permitted to have zeros
+ * in most significant limbs. Such vectors are used internally to achieve
+ * execution time invariance for critical operations with private keys.
+ * It's BN_DEBUG-only flag, because user application is not supposed to
+ * observe it anyway. Moreover, optimizing compiler would actually remove
+ * all operations manipulating the bit in question in non-BN_DEBUG build.
+ */
+# define BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP 0x10000
# ifdef BN_DEBUG_RAND
/* To avoid "make update" cvs wars due to BN_DEBUG, use some tricks */
# ifndef RAND_pseudo_bytes
@@ -805,8 +866,10 @@ int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
do { \
const BIGNUM *_bnum2 = (a); \
if (_bnum2 != NULL) { \
- assert((_bnum2->top == 0) || \
- (_bnum2->d[_bnum2->top - 1] != 0)); \
+ int _top = _bnum2->top; \
+ assert((_top == 0) || \
+ (_bnum2->flags & BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP) || \
+ (_bnum2->d[_top - 1] != 0)); \
bn_pollute(_bnum2); \
} \
} while(0)
@@ -824,6 +887,7 @@ int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
# else /* !BN_DEBUG */
+# define BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP 0
# define bn_pollute(a)
# define bn_check_top(a)
# define bn_fix_top(a) bn_correct_top(a)
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_div.c b/crypto/bn/bn_div.c
index bc37671cf138..460d8b7396fc 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_div.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_div.c
@@ -290,6 +290,7 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num, const BIGNUM *divisor,
wnum.neg = 0;
wnum.d = &(snum->d[loop]);
wnum.top = div_n;
+ wnum.flags = BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA;
/*
* only needed when BN_ucmp messes up the values between top and max
*/
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c b/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
index 40115fc72052..36b7ba69ade7 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
@@ -290,8 +290,8 @@ int BN_mod_exp_recp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
bits = BN_num_bits(p);
if (bits == 0) {
- /* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
- if (BN_is_one(m)) {
+ /* x**0 mod 1, or x**0 mod -1 is still zero. */
+ if (BN_abs_is_word(m, 1)) {
ret = 1;
BN_zero(r);
} else {
@@ -432,8 +432,8 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
}
bits = BN_num_bits(p);
if (bits == 0) {
- /* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
- if (BN_is_one(m)) {
+ /* x**0 mod 1, or x**0 mod -1 is still zero. */
+ if (BN_abs_is_word(m, 1)) {
ret = 1;
BN_zero(rr);
} else {
@@ -473,17 +473,17 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
ret = 1;
goto err;
}
- if (!BN_to_montgomery(val[0], aa, mont, ctx))
+ if (!bn_to_mont_fixed_top(val[0], aa, mont, ctx))
goto err; /* 1 */
window = BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size(bits);
if (window > 1) {
- if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(d, val[0], val[0], mont, ctx))
+ if (!bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(d, val[0], val[0], mont, ctx))
goto err; /* 2 */
j = 1 << (window - 1);
for (i = 1; i < j; i++) {
if (((val[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) ||
- !BN_mod_mul_montgomery(val[i], val[i - 1], d, mont, ctx))
+ !bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(val[i], val[i - 1], d, mont, ctx))
goto err;
}
}
@@ -505,19 +505,15 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
for (i = 1; i < j; i++)
r->d[i] = (~m->d[i]) & BN_MASK2;
r->top = j;
- /*
- * Upper words will be zero if the corresponding words of 'm' were
- * 0xfff[...], so decrement r->top accordingly.
- */
- bn_correct_top(r);
+ r->flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP;
} else
#endif
- if (!BN_to_montgomery(r, BN_value_one(), mont, ctx))
+ if (!bn_to_mont_fixed_top(r, BN_value_one(), mont, ctx))
goto err;
for (;;) {
if (BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart) == 0) {
if (!start) {
- if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, r, mont, ctx))
+ if (!bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(r, r, r, mont, ctx))
goto err;
}
if (wstart == 0)
@@ -548,12 +544,12 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
/* add the 'bytes above' */
if (!start)
for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
- if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, r, mont, ctx))
+ if (!bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(r, r, r, mont, ctx))
goto err;
}
/* wvalue will be an odd number < 2^window */
- if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, val[wvalue >> 1], mont, ctx))
+ if (!bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(r, r, val[wvalue >> 1], mont, ctx))
goto err;
/* move the 'window' down further */
@@ -563,6 +559,11 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
if (wstart < 0)
break;
}
+ /*
+ * Done with zero-padded intermediate BIGNUMs. Final BN_from_montgomery
+ * removes padding [if any] and makes return value suitable for public
+ * API consumer.
+ */
#if defined(SPARC_T4_MONT)
if (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] & (SPARCV9_VIS3 | SPARCV9_PREFER_FPU)) {
j = mont->N.top; /* borrow j */
@@ -681,7 +682,7 @@ static int MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF(BIGNUM *b, int top,
}
b->top = top;
- bn_correct_top(b);
+ b->flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP;
return 1;
}
@@ -733,8 +734,8 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
*/
bits = p->top * BN_BITS2;
if (bits == 0) {
- /* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
- if (BN_is_one(m)) {
+ /* x**0 mod 1, or x**0 mod -1 is still zero. */
+ if (BN_abs_is_word(m, 1)) {
ret = 1;
BN_zero(rr);
} else {
@@ -852,16 +853,16 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
tmp.top = top;
} else
#endif
- if (!BN_to_montgomery(&tmp, BN_value_one(), mont, ctx))
+ if (!bn_to_mont_fixed_top(&tmp, BN_value_one(), mont, ctx))
goto err;
/* prepare a^1 in Montgomery domain */
if (a->neg || BN_ucmp(a, m) >= 0) {
if (!BN_mod(&am, a, m, ctx))
goto err;
- if (!BN_to_montgomery(&am, &am, mont, ctx))
+ if (!bn_to_mont_fixed_top(&am, &am, mont, ctx))
goto err;
- } else if (!BN_to_montgomery(&am, a, mont, ctx))
+ } else if (!bn_to_mont_fixed_top(&am, a, mont, ctx))
goto err;
#if defined(SPARC_T4_MONT)
@@ -1128,14 +1129,14 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
* performance advantage of sqr over mul).
*/
if (window > 1) {
- if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &am, &am, mont, ctx))
+ if (!bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(&tmp, &am, &am, mont, ctx))
goto err;
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, 2,
window))
goto err;
for (i = 3; i < numPowers; i++) {
/* Calculate a^i = a^(i-1) * a */
- if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &am, &tmp, mont, ctx))
+ if (!bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(&tmp, &am, &tmp, mont, ctx))
goto err;
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, i,
window))
@@ -1159,7 +1160,7 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
/* Scan the window, squaring the result as we go */
for (i = 0; i < window; i++, bits--) {
- if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &tmp, &tmp, mont, ctx))
+ if (!bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(&tmp, &tmp, &tmp, mont, ctx))
goto err;
wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits);
}
@@ -1172,12 +1173,16 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
goto err;
/* Multiply the result into the intermediate result */
- if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &tmp, &am, mont, ctx))
+ if (!bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(&tmp, &tmp, &am, mont, ctx))
goto err;
}
}
- /* Convert the final result from montgomery to standard format */
+ /*
+ * Done with zero-padded intermediate BIGNUMs. Final BN_from_montgomery
+ * removes padding [if any] and makes return value suitable for public
+ * API consumer.
+ */
#if defined(SPARC_T4_MONT)
if (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] & (SPARCV9_VIS3 | SPARCV9_PREFER_FPU)) {
am.d[0] = 1; /* borrow am */
@@ -1247,8 +1252,8 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_word(BIGNUM *rr, BN_ULONG a, const BIGNUM *p,
bits = BN_num_bits(p);
if (bits == 0) {
- /* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
- if (BN_is_one(m)) {
+ /* x**0 mod 1, or x**0 mod -1 is still zero. */
+ if (BN_abs_is_word(m, 1)) {
ret = 1;
BN_zero(rr);
} else {
@@ -1369,9 +1374,9 @@ int BN_mod_exp_simple(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
}
bits = BN_num_bits(p);
- if (bits == 0) {
- /* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
- if (BN_is_one(m)) {
+ if (bits == 0) {
+ /* x**0 mod 1, or x**0 mod -1 is still zero. */
+ if (BN_abs_is_word(m, 1)) {
ret = 1;
BN_zero(r);
} else {
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c b/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
index 2c61da11093f..1d8a271c0281 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -103,30 +103,32 @@
*/
# define MAX_ITERATIONS 50
-static const BN_ULONG SQR_tb[16] = { 0, 1, 4, 5, 16, 17, 20, 21,
- 64, 65, 68, 69, 80, 81, 84, 85
-};
+# define SQR_nibble(w) ((((w) & 8) << 3) \
+ | (((w) & 4) << 2) \
+ | (((w) & 2) << 1) \
+ | ((w) & 1))
+
/* Platform-specific macros to accelerate squaring. */
# if defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG)
# define SQR1(w) \
- SQR_tb[(w) >> 60 & 0xF] << 56 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 56 & 0xF] << 48 | \
- SQR_tb[(w) >> 52 & 0xF] << 40 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 48 & 0xF] << 32 | \
- SQR_tb[(w) >> 44 & 0xF] << 24 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 40 & 0xF] << 16 | \
- SQR_tb[(w) >> 36 & 0xF] << 8 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 32 & 0xF]
+ SQR_nibble((w) >> 60) << 56 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 56) << 48 | \
+ SQR_nibble((w) >> 52) << 40 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 48) << 32 | \
+ SQR_nibble((w) >> 44) << 24 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 40) << 16 | \
+ SQR_nibble((w) >> 36) << 8 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 32)
# define SQR0(w) \
- SQR_tb[(w) >> 28 & 0xF] << 56 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 24 & 0xF] << 48 | \
- SQR_tb[(w) >> 20 & 0xF] << 40 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 16 & 0xF] << 32 | \
- SQR_tb[(w) >> 12 & 0xF] << 24 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 8 & 0xF] << 16 | \
- SQR_tb[(w) >> 4 & 0xF] << 8 | SQR_tb[(w) & 0xF]
+ SQR_nibble((w) >> 28) << 56 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 24) << 48 | \
+ SQR_nibble((w) >> 20) << 40 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 16) << 32 | \
+ SQR_nibble((w) >> 12) << 24 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 8) << 16 | \
+ SQR_nibble((w) >> 4) << 8 | SQR_nibble((w) )
# endif
# ifdef THIRTY_TWO_BIT
# define SQR1(w) \
- SQR_tb[(w) >> 28 & 0xF] << 24 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 24 & 0xF] << 16 | \
- SQR_tb[(w) >> 20 & 0xF] << 8 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 16 & 0xF]
+ SQR_nibble((w) >> 28) << 24 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 24) << 16 | \
+ SQR_nibble((w) >> 20) << 8 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 16)
# define SQR0(w) \
- SQR_tb[(w) >> 12 & 0xF] << 24 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 8 & 0xF] << 16 | \
- SQR_tb[(w) >> 4 & 0xF] << 8 | SQR_tb[(w) & 0xF]
+ SQR_nibble((w) >> 12) << 24 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 8) << 16 | \
+ SQR_nibble((w) >> 4) << 8 | SQR_nibble((w) )
# endif
# if !defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_GF2m)
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h b/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h
index 00f4f09945b3..6f7335b7a5c3 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@
# define HEADER_BN_LCL_H
# include <openssl/bn.h>
+# include "bn_int.h"
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c b/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
index 27b9bdbc3c28..03bd8cd183a6 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
@@ -263,8 +263,6 @@ static BN_ULONG *bn_expand_internal(const BIGNUM *b, int words)
const BN_ULONG *B;
int i;
- bn_check_top(b);
-
if (words > (INT_MAX / (4 * BN_BITS2))) {
BNerr(BN_F_BN_EXPAND_INTERNAL, BN_R_BIGNUM_TOO_LONG);
return NULL;
@@ -398,8 +396,6 @@ BIGNUM *bn_dup_expand(const BIGNUM *b, int words)
BIGNUM *bn_expand2(BIGNUM *b, int words)
{
- bn_check_top(b);
-
if (words > b->dmax) {
BN_ULONG *a = bn_expand_internal(b, words);
if (!a)
@@ -433,7 +429,6 @@ BIGNUM *bn_expand2(BIGNUM *b, int words)
assert(A == &(b->d[b->dmax]));
}
#endif
- bn_check_top(b);
return b;
}
@@ -497,12 +492,18 @@ BIGNUM *BN_copy(BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b)
memcpy(a->d, b->d, sizeof(b->d[0]) * b->top);
#endif
- a->top = b->top;
a->neg = b->neg;
+ a->top = b->top;
+ a->flags |= b->flags & BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP;
bn_check_top(a);
return (a);
}
+#define FLAGS_DATA(flags) ((flags) & (BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA \
+ | BN_FLG_CONSTTIME \
+ | BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP))
+#define FLAGS_STRUCT(flags) ((flags) & (BN_FLG_MALLOCED))
+
void BN_swap(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b)
{
int flags_old_a, flags_old_b;
@@ -530,10 +531,8 @@ void BN_swap(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b)
b->dmax = tmp_dmax;
b->neg = tmp_neg;
- a->flags =
- (flags_old_a & BN_FLG_MALLOCED) | (flags_old_b & BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA);
- b->flags =
- (flags_old_b & BN_FLG_MALLOCED) | (flags_old_a & BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA);
+ a->flags = FLAGS_STRUCT(flags_old_a) | FLAGS_DATA(flags_old_b);
+ b->flags = FLAGS_STRUCT(flags_old_b) | FLAGS_DATA(flags_old_a);
bn_check_top(a);
bn_check_top(b);
}
@@ -545,6 +544,7 @@ void BN_clear(BIGNUM *a)
OPENSSL_cleanse(a->d, a->dmax * sizeof(a->d[0]));
a->top = 0;
a->neg = 0;
+ a->flags &= ~BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP;
}
BN_ULONG BN_get_word(const BIGNUM *a)
@@ -565,6 +565,7 @@ int BN_set_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w)
a->neg = 0;
a->d[0] = w;
a->top = (w ? 1 : 0);
+ a->flags &= ~BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP;
bn_check_top(a);
return (1);
}
@@ -613,6 +614,41 @@ BIGNUM *BN_bin2bn(const unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret)
}
/* ignore negative */
+static int bn2binpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen)
+{
+ int n;
+ size_t i, inc, lasti, j;
+ BN_ULONG l;
+
+ n = BN_num_bytes(a);
+ if (tolen == -1)
+ tolen = n;
+ else if (tolen < n)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (n == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(to, tolen);
+ return tolen;
+ }
+
+ lasti = n - 1;
+ for (i = 0, inc = 1, j = tolen; j > 0;) {
+ l = a->d[i / BN_BYTES];
+ to[--j] = (unsigned char)(l >> (8 * (i % BN_BYTES)) & (0 - inc));
+ inc = (i - lasti) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1);
+ i += inc; /* stay on top limb */
+ }
+
+ return tolen;
+}
+
+int bn_bn2binpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen)
+{
+ if (tolen < 0)
+ return -1;
+ return bn2binpad(a, to, tolen);
+}
+
int BN_bn2bin(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to)
{
int n, i;
@@ -711,6 +747,7 @@ int BN_set_bit(BIGNUM *a, int n)
for (k = a->top; k < i + 1; k++)
a->d[k] = 0;
a->top = i + 1;
+ a->flags &= ~BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP;
}
a->d[i] |= (((BN_ULONG)1) << j);
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_mod.c b/crypto/bn/bn_mod.c
index ffbce890cf28..43da462d93b0 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_mod.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_mod.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
* for the OpenSSL project.
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -149,18 +149,73 @@ int BN_mod_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m,
/*
* BN_mod_add variant that may be used if both a and b are non-negative and
- * less than m
+ * less than m. The original algorithm was
+ *
+ * if (!BN_uadd(r, a, b))
+ * return 0;
+ * if (BN_ucmp(r, m) >= 0)
+ * return BN_usub(r, r, m);
+ *
+ * which is replaced with addition, subtracting modulus, and conditional
+ * move depending on whether or not subtraction borrowed.
*/
-int BN_mod_add_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
- const BIGNUM *m)
+int bn_mod_add_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+ const BIGNUM *m)
{
- if (!BN_uadd(r, a, b))
+ size_t i, ai, bi, mtop = m->top;
+ BN_ULONG storage[1024 / BN_BITS2];
+ BN_ULONG carry, temp, mask, *rp, *tp = storage;
+ const BN_ULONG *ap, *bp;
+
+ if (bn_wexpand(r, m->top) == NULL)
return 0;
- if (BN_ucmp(r, m) >= 0)
- return BN_usub(r, r, m);
+
+ if (mtop > sizeof(storage) / sizeof(storage[0])
+ && (tp = OPENSSL_malloc(mtop * sizeof(BN_ULONG))) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ ap = a->d != NULL ? a->d : tp;
+ bp = b->d != NULL ? b->d : tp;
+
+ for (i = 0, ai = 0, bi = 0, carry = 0; i < mtop;) {
+ mask = (BN_ULONG)0 - ((i - a->top) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1));
+ temp = ((ap[ai] & mask) + carry) & BN_MASK2;
+ carry = (temp < carry);
+
+ mask = (BN_ULONG)0 - ((i - b->top) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1));
+ tp[i] = ((bp[bi] & mask) + temp) & BN_MASK2;
+ carry += (tp[i] < temp);
+
+ i++;
+ ai += (i - a->dmax) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1);
+ bi += (i - b->dmax) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1);
+ }
+ rp = r->d;
+ carry -= bn_sub_words(rp, tp, m->d, mtop);
+ for (i = 0; i < mtop; i++) {
+ rp[i] = (carry & tp[i]) | (~carry & rp[i]);
+ ((volatile BN_ULONG *)tp)[i] = 0;
+ }
+ r->top = mtop;
+ r->neg = 0;
+
+ if (tp != storage)
+ OPENSSL_free(tp);
+
return 1;
}
+int BN_mod_add_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+ const BIGNUM *m)
+{
+ int ret = bn_mod_add_fixed_top(r, a, b, m);
+
+ if (ret)
+ bn_correct_top(r);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
int BN_mod_sub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m,
BN_CTX *ctx)
{
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c b/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
index c1703650ef1e..d41434a14390 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
@@ -123,12 +123,23 @@
#define MONT_WORD /* use the faster word-based algorithm */
#ifdef MONT_WORD
-static int BN_from_montgomery_word(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *r, BN_MONT_CTX *mont);
+static int bn_from_montgomery_word(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *r, BN_MONT_CTX *mont);
#endif
int BN_mod_mul_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
+ int ret = bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(r, a, b, mont, ctx);
+
+ bn_correct_top(r);
+ bn_check_top(r);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+ BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
BIGNUM *tmp;
int ret = 0;
#if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT) && defined(MONT_WORD)
@@ -140,8 +151,8 @@ int BN_mod_mul_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
if (bn_mul_mont(r->d, a->d, b->d, mont->N.d, mont->n0, num)) {
r->neg = a->neg ^ b->neg;
r->top = num;
- bn_correct_top(r);
- return (1);
+ r->flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP;
+ return 1;
}
}
#endif
@@ -161,13 +172,12 @@ int BN_mod_mul_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
}
/* reduce from aRR to aR */
#ifdef MONT_WORD
- if (!BN_from_montgomery_word(r, tmp, mont))
+ if (!bn_from_montgomery_word(r, tmp, mont))
goto err;
#else
if (!BN_from_montgomery(r, tmp, mont, ctx))
goto err;
#endif
- bn_check_top(r);
ret = 1;
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
@@ -175,7 +185,7 @@ int BN_mod_mul_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
}
#ifdef MONT_WORD
-static int BN_from_montgomery_word(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *r, BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
+static int bn_from_montgomery_word(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *r, BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
{
BIGNUM *n;
BN_ULONG *ap, *np, *rp, n0, v, carry;
@@ -205,6 +215,7 @@ static int BN_from_montgomery_word(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *r, BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
# endif
r->top = max;
+ r->flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP;
n0 = mont->n0[0];
/*
@@ -223,6 +234,7 @@ static int BN_from_montgomery_word(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *r, BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
if (bn_wexpand(ret, nl) == NULL)
return (0);
ret->top = nl;
+ ret->flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP;
ret->neg = r->neg;
rp = ret->d;
@@ -233,20 +245,16 @@ static int BN_from_montgomery_word(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *r, BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
*/
ap = &(r->d[nl]);
+ carry -= bn_sub_words(rp, ap, np, nl);
/*
- * |v| is one if |ap| - |np| underflowed or zero if it did not. Note |v|
- * cannot be -1. That would imply the subtraction did not fit in |nl| words,
- * and we know at most one subtraction is needed.
+ * |carry| is -1 if |ap| - |np| underflowed or zero if it did not. Note
+ * |carry| cannot be 1. That would imply the subtraction did not fit in
+ * |nl| words, and we know at most one subtraction is needed.
*/
- v = bn_sub_words(rp, ap, np, nl) - carry;
- v = 0 - v;
for (i = 0; i < nl; i++) {
- rp[i] = (v & ap[i]) | (~v & rp[i]);
+ rp[i] = (carry & ap[i]) | (~carry & rp[i]);
ap[i] = 0;
}
- bn_correct_top(r);
- bn_correct_top(ret);
- bn_check_top(ret);
return (1);
}
@@ -260,8 +268,11 @@ int BN_from_montgomery(BIGNUM *ret, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
BIGNUM *t;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- if ((t = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) && BN_copy(t, a))
- retn = BN_from_montgomery_word(ret, t, mont);
+ if ((t = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) && BN_copy(t, a)) {
+ retn = bn_from_montgomery_word(ret, t, mont);
+ bn_correct_top(ret);
+ bn_check_top(ret);
+ }
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
#else /* !MONT_WORD */
BIGNUM *t1, *t2;
@@ -299,6 +310,12 @@ int BN_from_montgomery(BIGNUM *ret, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
return (retn);
}
+int bn_to_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
+ BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(r, a, &(mont->RR), mont, ctx);
+}
+
BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_new(void)
{
BN_MONT_CTX *ret;
@@ -335,7 +352,7 @@ void BN_MONT_CTX_free(BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
int BN_MONT_CTX_set(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
- int ret = 0;
+ int i, ret = 0;
BIGNUM *Ri, *R;
if (BN_is_zero(mod))
@@ -466,6 +483,11 @@ int BN_MONT_CTX_set(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx)
if (!BN_mod(&(mont->RR), &(mont->RR), &(mont->N), ctx))
goto err;
+ for (i = mont->RR.top, ret = mont->N.top; i < ret; i++)
+ mont->RR.d[i] = 0;
+ mont->RR.top = ret;
+ mont->RR.flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP;
+
ret = 1;
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c b/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c
index 256d26e8dbec..5e692971c948 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c
@@ -135,14 +135,8 @@ int BN_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx)
}
rr->neg = 0;
- /*
- * If the most-significant half of the top word of 'a' is zero, then the
- * square of 'a' will max-1 words.
- */
- if (a->d[al - 1] == (a->d[al - 1] & BN_MASK2l))
- rr->top = max - 1;
- else
- rr->top = max;
+ rr->top = max;
+ bn_correct_top(rr);
if (r != rr && BN_copy(r, rr) == NULL)
goto err;
diff --git a/crypto/bn_int.h b/crypto/bn_int.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9c42d6f35dc3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/bn_int.h
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+/*
+ * Some BIGNUM functions assume most significant limb to be non-zero, which
+ * is customarily arranged by bn_correct_top. Output from below functions
+ * is not processed with bn_correct_top, and for this reason it may not be
+ * returned out of public API. It may only be passed internally into other
+ * functions known to support non-minimal or zero-padded BIGNUMs.
+ */
+int bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+ BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int bn_to_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
+ BN_CTX *ctx);
+int bn_mod_add_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+ const BIGNUM *m);
+
+int bn_bn2binpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen);
diff --git a/crypto/conf/conf_api.c b/crypto/conf/conf_api.c
index 4cf7553376e6..60c9440120e8 100644
--- a/crypto/conf/conf_api.c
+++ b/crypto/conf/conf_api.c
@@ -290,6 +290,8 @@ CONF_VALUE *_CONF_new_section(CONF *conf, const char *section)
vv = lh_CONF_VALUE_insert(conf->data, v);
OPENSSL_assert(vv == NULL);
+ if (lh_CONF_VALUE_error(conf->data) > 0)
+ goto err;
ok = 1;
err:
if (!ok) {
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
index 387558f1467c..f235e0d682b1 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
@@ -130,10 +130,15 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
int ok = 0;
int generate_new_key = 0;
unsigned l;
- BN_CTX *ctx;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
+ if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ DHerr(DH_F_GENERATE_KEY, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c b/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
index 6452482c87d2..162753af071d 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
* 2006.
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ static int pkey_dh_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key,
return ret;
}
#endif
- return 1;
+ return 0;
}
const EVP_PKEY_METHOD dh_pkey_meth = {
diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa.h b/crypto/dsa/dsa.h
index 545358fd02b2..3e6984eabdf8 100644
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa.h
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa.h
@@ -249,10 +249,12 @@ int DSAparams_print_fp(FILE *fp, const DSA *x);
int DSA_print_fp(FILE *bp, const DSA *x, int off);
# endif
-# define DSS_prime_checks 50
+# define DSS_prime_checks 64
/*
- * Primality test according to FIPS PUB 186[-1], Appendix 2.1: 50 rounds of
- * Rabin-Miller
+ * Primality test according to FIPS PUB 186-4, Appendix C.3. Since we only
+ * have one value here we set the number of checks to 64 which is the 128 bit
+ * security level that is the highest level and valid for creating a 3072 bit
+ * DSA key.
*/
# define DSA_is_prime(n, callback, cb_arg) \
BN_is_prime(n, DSS_prime_checks, callback, NULL, cb_arg)
@@ -307,6 +309,7 @@ void ERR_load_DSA_strings(void);
# define DSA_F_I2D_DSA_SIG 111
# define DSA_F_OLD_DSA_PRIV_DECODE 122
# define DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_CTRL 120
+# define DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_CTRL_STR 127
# define DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_KEYGEN 121
# define DSA_F_SIG_CB 114
diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c
index f5ddc66b8a73..7e507faa36c8 100644
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c */
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2013 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA DSA_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_I2D_DSA_SIG), "i2d_DSA_SIG"},
{ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_OLD_DSA_PRIV_DECODE), "OLD_DSA_PRIV_DECODE"},
{ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_CTRL), "PKEY_DSA_CTRL"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_CTRL_STR), "PKEY_DSA_CTRL_STR"},
{ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_KEYGEN), "PKEY_DSA_KEYGEN"},
{ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_SIG_CB), "SIG_CB"},
{0, NULL}
diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
index 21af2e159fb2..db52a38a1882 100644
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
@@ -146,9 +146,16 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits,
/* invalid q size */
return 0;
- if (evpmd == NULL)
- /* use SHA1 as default */
- evpmd = EVP_sha1();
+ if (evpmd == NULL) {
+ if (qsize == SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+ evpmd = EVP_sha1();
+ else if (qsize == SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+ evpmd = EVP_sha224();
+ else
+ evpmd = EVP_sha256();
+ } else {
+ qsize = EVP_MD_size(evpmd);
+ }
if (bits < 512)
bits = 512;
diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
index aa10dd12f6f8..2dcfedeeee7e 100644
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
@@ -133,17 +133,13 @@ const DSA_METHOD *DSA_OpenSSL(void)
static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
{
BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
- BIGNUM m;
- BIGNUM xr;
+ BIGNUM *m, *blind, *blindm, *tmp;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
int reason = ERR_R_BN_LIB;
DSA_SIG *ret = NULL;
int noredo = 0;
- BN_init(&m);
- BN_init(&xr);
-
- if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
+ if (dsa->p == NULL || dsa->q == NULL || dsa->g == NULL) {
reason = DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS;
goto err;
}
@@ -154,6 +150,13 @@ static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
+ m = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ blind = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ blindm = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (tmp == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
redo:
if ((dsa->kinv == NULL) || (dsa->r == NULL)) {
if (!DSA_sign_setup(dsa, ctx, &kinv, &r))
@@ -173,20 +176,52 @@ static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
* 4.2
*/
dlen = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q);
- if (BN_bin2bn(dgst, dlen, &m) == NULL)
+ if (BN_bin2bn(dgst, dlen, m) == NULL)
goto err;
- /* Compute s = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q */
- if (!BN_mod_mul(&xr, dsa->priv_key, r, dsa->q, ctx))
- goto err; /* s = xr */
- if (!BN_add(s, &xr, &m))
- goto err; /* s = m + xr */
- if (BN_cmp(s, dsa->q) > 0)
- if (!BN_sub(s, s, dsa->q))
+ /*
+ * The normal signature calculation is:
+ *
+ * s := k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod q
+ *
+ * We will blind this to protect against side channel attacks
+ *
+ * s := blind^-1 * k^-1 * (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod q
+ */
+
+ /* Generate a blinding value */
+ do {
+ if (!BN_rand(blind, BN_num_bits(dsa->q) - 1, -1, 0))
goto err;
+ } while (BN_is_zero(blind));
+ BN_set_flags(blind, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ BN_set_flags(blindm, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ BN_set_flags(tmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+ /* tmp := blind * priv_key * r mod q */
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, blind, dsa->priv_key, dsa->q, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, tmp, r, dsa->q, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* blindm := blind * m mod q */
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(blindm, blind, m, dsa->q, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* s : = (blind * priv_key * r) + (blind * m) mod q */
+ if (!BN_mod_add_quick(s, tmp, blindm, dsa->q))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* s := s * k^-1 mod q */
if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, kinv, dsa->q, ctx))
goto err;
+ /* s:= s * blind^-1 mod q */
+ if (BN_mod_inverse(blind, blind, dsa->q, ctx) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, blind, dsa->q, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
/*
* Redo if r or s is zero as required by FIPS 186-3: this is very
* unlikely.
@@ -210,13 +245,9 @@ static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
BN_free(r);
BN_free(s);
}
- if (ctx != NULL)
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- BN_clear_free(&m);
- BN_clear_free(&xr);
- if (kinv != NULL) /* dsa->kinv is NULL now if we used it */
- BN_clear_free(kinv);
- return (ret);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ BN_clear_free(kinv);
+ return ret;
}
static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c
index 78724839b524..7f00e97036f2 100644
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
* 2006.
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -230,10 +230,16 @@ static int pkey_dsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_Q_BITS, qbits,
NULL);
}
- if (!strcmp(type, "dsa_paramgen_md")) {
+ if (strcmp(type, "dsa_paramgen_md") == 0) {
+ const EVP_MD *md = EVP_get_digestbyname(value);
+
+ if (md == NULL) {
+ DSAerr(DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_CTRL_STR, DSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_MD, 0,
- (void *)EVP_get_digestbyname(value));
+ (void *)md);
}
return -2;
}
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c b/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c
index 2c41c6e7a9f1..aa5f3056af77 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
* 2006.
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -143,19 +143,19 @@ static int eckey_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
static EC_KEY *eckey_type2param(int ptype, void *pval)
{
EC_KEY *eckey = NULL;
+ EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
+
if (ptype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
- ASN1_STRING *pstr = pval;
- const unsigned char *pm = NULL;
- int pmlen;
- pm = pstr->data;
- pmlen = pstr->length;
- if (!(eckey = d2i_ECParameters(NULL, &pm, pmlen))) {
+ const ASN1_STRING *pstr = pval;
+ const unsigned char *pm = pstr->data;
+ int pmlen = pstr->length;
+
+ if ((eckey = d2i_ECParameters(NULL, &pm, pmlen)) == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_TYPE2PARAM, EC_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto ecerr;
}
} else if (ptype == V_ASN1_OBJECT) {
- ASN1_OBJECT *poid = pval;
- EC_GROUP *group;
+ const ASN1_OBJECT *poid = pval;
/*
* type == V_ASN1_OBJECT => the parameters are given by an asn1 OID
@@ -179,8 +179,8 @@ static EC_KEY *eckey_type2param(int ptype, void *pval)
return eckey;
ecerr:
- if (eckey)
- EC_KEY_free(eckey);
+ EC_KEY_free(eckey);
+ EC_GROUP_free(group);
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
index 3241aa51d9f4..933745248d8d 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
* Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project.
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2003 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -319,12 +319,16 @@ int EC_GROUP_set_generator(EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *generator,
BN_zero(&group->cofactor);
/*
- * We ignore the return value because some groups have an order with
+ * Some groups have an order with
* factors of two, which makes the Montgomery setup fail.
* |group->mont_data| will be NULL in this case.
*/
- ec_precompute_mont_data(group);
+ if (BN_is_odd(&group->order)) {
+ return ec_precompute_mont_data(group);
+ }
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->mont_data);
+ group->mont_data = NULL;
return 1;
}
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c
index 9a53a39a25b9..0579cac3a96e 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c
@@ -1118,23 +1118,32 @@ static int ecp_nistz256_set_from_affine(EC_POINT *out, const EC_GROUP *group,
const P256_POINT_AFFINE *in,
BN_CTX *ctx)
{
- BIGNUM x, y;
- BN_ULONG d_x[P256_LIMBS], d_y[P256_LIMBS];
+ BIGNUM x, y, z;
int ret = 0;
- memcpy(d_x, in->X, sizeof(d_x));
- x.d = d_x;
+ /*
+ * |const| qualifier omission is compensated by BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
+ * flag, which effectively means "read-only data".
+ */
+ x.d = (BN_ULONG *)in->X;
x.dmax = x.top = P256_LIMBS;
x.neg = 0;
x.flags = BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA;
- memcpy(d_y, in->Y, sizeof(d_y));
- y.d = d_y;
+ y.d = (BN_ULONG *)in->Y;
y.dmax = y.top = P256_LIMBS;
y.neg = 0;
y.flags = BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA;
- ret = EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, out, &x, &y, ctx);
+ z.d = (BN_ULONG *)ONE;
+ z.dmax = z.top = P256_LIMBS;
+ z.neg = 0;
+ z.flags = BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA;
+
+ if ((ret = (BN_copy(&out->X, &x) != NULL))
+ && (ret = (BN_copy(&out->Y, &y) != NULL))
+ && (ret = (BN_copy(&out->Z, &z) != NULL)))
+ out->Z_is_one = 1;
return ret;
}
diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa/Makefile b/crypto/ecdsa/Makefile
index 4ce00e8f9308..2875dddd4910 100644
--- a/crypto/ecdsa/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/ecdsa/Makefile
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ ecs_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
ecs_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
ecs_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
ecs_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-ecs_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ecs_locl.h ecs_ossl.c
+ecs_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ecs_locl.h ecs_ossl.c
ecs_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
ecs_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
ecs_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c b/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c
index 0f301f86d9ea..4350afbf04b7 100644
--- a/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c
+++ b/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
* Written by Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project.
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2000-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ int restore_rand(void)
return 1;
}
-static int fbytes_counter = 0;
+static int fbytes_counter = 0, use_fake = 0;
static const char *numbers[8] = {
"651056770906015076056810763456358567190100156695615665659",
"6140507067065001063065065565667405560006161556565665656654",
@@ -158,6 +158,11 @@ int fbytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
int ret;
BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
+ if (use_fake == 0)
+ return old_rand->bytes(buf, num);
+
+ use_fake = 0;
+
if (fbytes_counter >= 8)
return 0;
tmp = BN_new();
@@ -199,11 +204,13 @@ int x9_62_test_internal(BIO *out, int nid, const char *r_in, const char *s_in)
/* create the key */
if ((key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid)) == NULL)
goto x962_int_err;
+ use_fake = 1;
if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(key))
goto x962_int_err;
BIO_printf(out, ".");
(void)BIO_flush(out);
/* create the signature */
+ use_fake = 1;
signature = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, 20, key);
if (signature == NULL)
goto x962_int_err;
diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c b/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c
index 16d4f59b9ba9..63c18273fd87 100644
--- a/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c
+++ b/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
* Written by Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "bn_int.h"
static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
@@ -251,13 +252,14 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
EC_KEY *eckey)
{
int ok = 0, i;
- BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *s, *m = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *order = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *s, *m = NULL, *order = NULL;
const BIGNUM *ckinv;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
const EC_GROUP *group;
ECDSA_SIG *ret;
ECDSA_DATA *ecdsa;
const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+ BN_MONT_CTX *mont_data;
ecdsa = ecdsa_check(eckey);
group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey);
@@ -276,7 +278,7 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
s = ret->s;
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL || (order = BN_new()) == NULL ||
- (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL || (m = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ (m = BN_new()) == NULL) {
ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
@@ -285,6 +287,8 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
+ mont_data = EC_GROUP_get_mont_data(group);
+
i = BN_num_bits(order);
/*
* Need to truncate digest if it is too long: first truncate whole bytes.
@@ -315,15 +319,27 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
}
}
- if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, priv_key, ret->r, order, ctx)) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ /*
+ * With only one multiplicant being in Montgomery domain
+ * multiplication yields real result without post-conversion.
+ * Also note that all operations but last are performed with
+ * zero-padded vectors. Last operation, BN_mod_mul_montgomery
+ * below, returns user-visible value with removed zero padding.
+ */
+ if (!bn_to_mont_fixed_top(s, ret->r, mont_data, ctx)
+ || !bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(s, s, priv_key, mont_data, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
- if (!BN_mod_add_quick(s, tmp, m, order)) {
+ if (!bn_mod_add_fixed_top(s, s, m, order)) {
ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
- if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, ckinv, order, ctx)) {
+ /*
+ * |s| can still be larger than modulus, because |m| can be. In
+ * such case we count on Montgomery reduction to tie it up.
+ */
+ if (!bn_to_mont_fixed_top(s, s, mont_data, ctx)
+ || !BN_mod_mul_montgomery(s, s, ckinv, mont_data, ctx)) {
ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
@@ -353,8 +369,6 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
if (m)
BN_clear_free(m);
- if (tmp)
- BN_clear_free(tmp);
if (order)
BN_free(order);
if (kinv)
diff --git a/crypto/engine/eng_lib.c b/crypto/engine/eng_lib.c
index dc2abd28ec6a..e605b978ead4 100644
--- a/crypto/engine/eng_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/engine/eng_lib.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
* 2000.
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -188,8 +188,10 @@ void engine_cleanup_add_last(ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB *cb)
if (!int_cleanup_check(1))
return;
item = int_cleanup_item(cb);
- if (item)
- sk_ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM_push(cleanup_stack, item);
+ if (item != NULL) {
+ if (sk_ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM_push(cleanup_stack, item) <= 0)
+ OPENSSL_free(item);
+ }
}
/* The API function that performs all cleanup */
diff --git a/crypto/engine/tb_asnmth.c b/crypto/engine/tb_asnmth.c
index a1a9b88c43c8..04cb466eb3e8 100644
--- a/crypto/engine/tb_asnmth.c
+++ b/crypto/engine/tb_asnmth.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ static void look_str_cb(int nid, STACK_OF(ENGINE) *sk, ENGINE *def, void *arg)
ENGINE *e = sk_ENGINE_value(sk, i);
EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
e->pkey_asn1_meths(e, &ameth, NULL, nid);
- if (((int)strlen(ameth->pem_str) == lk->len) &&
+ if (ameth != NULL && ((int)strlen(ameth->pem_str) == lk->len) &&
!strncasecmp(ameth->pem_str, lk->str, lk->len)) {
lk->e = e;
lk->ameth = ameth;
diff --git a/crypto/o_time.c b/crypto/o_time.c
index 61927439eaf5..a763b2ce202d 100644
--- a/crypto/o_time.c
+++ b/crypto/o_time.c
@@ -109,6 +109,10 @@ struct tm *OPENSSL_gmtime(const time_t *timer, struct tm *result)
if (gmtime_r(timer, result) == NULL)
return NULL;
ts = result;
+#elif defined (OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER >= 1400
+ if (gmtime_s(result, timer))
+ return NULL;
+ ts = result;
#elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(VMS_GMTIME_OK)
ts = gmtime(timer);
if (ts == NULL)
diff --git a/crypto/opensslv.h b/crypto/opensslv.h
index 77f124e2cb3c..76a7b009d463 100644
--- a/crypto/opensslv.h
+++ b/crypto/opensslv.h
@@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ extern "C" {
* (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
* major minor fix final patch/beta)
*/
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x100020ffL
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000210fL
# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2o-fips 27 Mar 2018"
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2p-fips 14 Aug 2018"
# else
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2o 27 Mar 2018"
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2p 14 Aug 2018"
# endif
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
diff --git a/crypto/pem/pem.h b/crypto/pem/pem.h
index aac72fb21eda..9c1d939a919e 100644
--- a/crypto/pem/pem.h
+++ b/crypto/pem/pem.h
@@ -442,7 +442,8 @@ void PEM_SignUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *d, unsigned int cnt);
int PEM_SignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret,
unsigned int *siglen, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
-int PEM_def_callback(char *buf, int num, int w, void *key);
+/* The default pem_password_cb that's used internally */
+int PEM_def_callback(char *buf, int num, int rwflag, void *userdata);
void PEM_proc_type(char *buf, int type);
void PEM_dek_info(char *buf, const char *type, int len, char *str);
diff --git a/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c b/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
index 4d5f053e4680..4ccc676ed74e 100644
--- a/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
@@ -82,51 +82,39 @@ static int load_iv(char **fromp, unsigned char *to, int num);
static int check_pem(const char *nm, const char *name);
int pem_check_suffix(const char *pem_str, const char *suffix);
-int PEM_def_callback(char *buf, int num, int w, void *key)
+int PEM_def_callback(char *buf, int num, int rwflag, void *userdata)
{
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
- /*
- * We should not ever call the default callback routine from windows.
- */
- PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_DEF_CALLBACK, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
- return (-1);
-#else
- int i, j;
+ int i, min_len;
const char *prompt;
- if (key) {
- i = strlen(key);
+
+ /* We assume that the user passes a default password as userdata */
+ if (userdata) {
+ i = strlen(userdata);
i = (i > num) ? num : i;
- memcpy(buf, key, i);
- return (i);
+ memcpy(buf, userdata, i);
+ return i;
}
prompt = EVP_get_pw_prompt();
if (prompt == NULL)
prompt = "Enter PEM pass phrase:";
- for (;;) {
- /*
- * We assume that w == 0 means decryption,
- * while w == 1 means encryption
- */
- int min_len = w ? MIN_LENGTH : 0;
+ /*
+ * rwflag == 0 means decryption
+ * rwflag == 1 means encryption
+ *
+ * We assume that for encryption, we want a minimum length, while for
+ * decryption, we cannot know any minimum length, so we assume zero.
+ */
+ min_len = rwflag ? MIN_LENGTH : 0;
- i = EVP_read_pw_string_min(buf, min_len, num, prompt, w);
- if (i != 0) {
- PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_DEF_CALLBACK, PEM_R_PROBLEMS_GETTING_PASSWORD);
- memset(buf, 0, (unsigned int)num);
- return (-1);
- }
- j = strlen(buf);
- if (min_len && j < min_len) {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "phrase is too short, needs to be at least %d chars\n",
- min_len);
- } else
- break;
+ i = EVP_read_pw_string_min(buf, min_len, num, prompt, rwflag);
+ if (i != 0) {
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_DEF_CALLBACK, PEM_R_PROBLEMS_GETTING_PASSWORD);
+ memset(buf, 0, (unsigned int)num);
+ return -1;
}
- return (j);
-#endif
+ return strlen(buf);
}
void PEM_proc_type(char *buf, int type)
@@ -459,7 +447,7 @@ int PEM_do_header(EVP_CIPHER_INFO *cipher, unsigned char *data, long *plen,
klen = PEM_def_callback(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u);
else
klen = callback(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u);
- if (klen <= 0) {
+ if (klen < 0) {
PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_DO_HEADER, PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ);
return (0);
}
@@ -499,6 +487,7 @@ int PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO(char *header, EVP_CIPHER_INFO *cipher)
char **header_pp = &header;
cipher->cipher = NULL;
+ memset(cipher->iv, 0, sizeof(cipher->iv));
if ((header == NULL) || (*header == '\0') || (*header == '\n'))
return (1);
if (strncmp(header, "Proc-Type: ", 11) != 0) {
diff --git a/crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c b/crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c
index daf210fde0f9..ae18d26043ef 100644
--- a/crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c
+++ b/crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb,
klen = cb(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u);
else
klen = PEM_def_callback(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u);
- if (klen <= 0) {
+ if (klen < 0) {
PEMerr(PEM_F_D2I_PKCS8PRIVATEKEY_BIO, PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ);
X509_SIG_free(p8);
return NULL;
diff --git a/crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c b/crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c
index e8b3a1b92c8d..a189cd274c32 100644
--- a/crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c
+++ b/crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb,
klen = cb(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u);
else
klen = PEM_def_callback(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u);
- if (klen <= 0) {
+ if (klen < 0) {
PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO_PRIVATEKEY, PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ);
X509_SIG_free(p8);
goto err;
diff --git a/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c b/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c
index 1ce5a1e319c5..f376f594b12d 100644
--- a/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c
+++ b/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
* 2005.
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2005-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ static EVP_PKEY *do_PVK_body(const unsigned char **in,
inlen = cb(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u);
else
inlen = PEM_def_callback(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u);
- if (inlen <= 0) {
+ if (inlen < 0) {
PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ);
goto err;
}
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_asn.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_asn.c
index 370ddbd6e77e..78c7f40350d0 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_asn.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_asn.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
* 1999.
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ ASN1_ADB_TEMPLATE(safebag_default) = ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.other, ASN1_
ASN1_ADB(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) = {
ADB_ENTRY(NID_keyBag, ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.keybag, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, 0)),
ADB_ENTRY(NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag, ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.shkeybag, X509_SIG, 0)),
- ADB_ENTRY(NID_safeContentsBag, ASN1_EXP_SET_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.safes, PKCS12_SAFEBAG, 0)),
+ ADB_ENTRY(NID_safeContentsBag, ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.safes, PKCS12_SAFEBAG, 0)),
ADB_ENTRY(NID_certBag, ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.bag, PKCS12_BAGS, 0)),
ADB_ENTRY(NID_crlBag, ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.bag, PKCS12_BAGS, 0)),
ADB_ENTRY(NID_secretBag, ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.bag, PKCS12_BAGS, 0))
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/Makefile b/crypto/rsa/Makefile
index e292e84db3c9..6be73ed187f0 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/rsa/Makefile
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h
rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h rsa_eay.c
+rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h rsa_eay.c
rsa_err.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
rsa_err.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
rsa_err.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
index b147fff8bd60..7ba24e362c56 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "bn_int.h"
#ifndef RSA_NULL
@@ -156,7 +157,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
BIGNUM *f, *ret;
- int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1;
+ int i, num = 0, r = -1;
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
@@ -232,15 +233,10 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
goto err;
/*
- * put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the
- * modulus
+ * BN_bn2binpad puts in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than
+ * the length of the modulus.
*/
- j = BN_num_bytes(ret);
- i = BN_bn2bin(ret, &(to[num - j]));
- for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++)
- to[k] = 0;
-
- r = num;
+ r = bn_bn2binpad(ret, to, num);
err:
if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
@@ -349,7 +345,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res;
- int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1;
+ int i, num = 0, r = -1;
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
int local_blinding = 0;
@@ -459,15 +455,10 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
res = ret;
/*
- * put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the
- * modulus
+ * BN_bn2binpad puts in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than
+ * the length of the modulus.
*/
- j = BN_num_bytes(res);
- i = BN_bn2bin(res, &(to[num - j]));
- for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++)
- to[k] = 0;
-
- r = num;
+ r = bn_bn2binpad(res, to, num);
err:
if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
@@ -485,7 +476,6 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
{
BIGNUM *f, *ret;
int j, num = 0, r = -1;
- unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
int local_blinding = 0;
@@ -576,8 +566,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
goto err;
- p = buf;
- j = BN_bn2bin(ret, p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
+ j = bn_bn2binpad(ret, buf, num);
switch (padding) {
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
@@ -592,7 +581,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, buf, j, num);
break;
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
- r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, j, num);
+ memcpy(to, buf, (r = j));
break;
default:
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
@@ -619,7 +608,6 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
{
BIGNUM *f, *ret;
int i, num = 0, r = -1;
- unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
@@ -684,8 +672,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret))
goto err;
- p = buf;
- i = BN_bn2bin(ret, p);
+ i = bn_bn2binpad(ret, buf, num);
switch (padding) {
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
@@ -695,7 +682,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
r = RSA_padding_check_X931(to, num, buf, i, num);
break;
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
- r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, i, num);
+ memcpy(to, buf, (r = i));
break;
default:
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
index 9ca5dfefb707..42b89a8dfaa0 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
@@ -156,6 +156,8 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
if (BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value) == NULL)
goto err;
+ BN_set_flags(rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ BN_set_flags(rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
BN_set_flags(r2, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
/* generate p and q */
for (;;) {
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
index 9a01b4afc11f..3fb8f6b33d4b 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
int plen, const EVP_MD *md,
const EVP_MD *mgf1md)
{
- int i, dblen, mlen = -1, one_index = 0, msg_index;
+ int i, dblen = 0, mlen = -1, one_index = 0, msg_index;
unsigned int good, found_one_byte;
const unsigned char *maskedseed, *maskeddb;
/*
@@ -153,32 +153,41 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
dblen = num - mdlen - 1;
db = OPENSSL_malloc(dblen);
- em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
- if (db == NULL || em == NULL) {
+ if (db == NULL) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto cleanup;
}
- /*
- * Always do this zero-padding copy (even when num == flen) to avoid
- * leaking that information. The copy still leaks some side-channel
- * information, but it's impossible to have a fixed memory access
- * pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of |from|.
- *
- * TODO(emilia): Consider porting BN_bn2bin_padded from BoringSSL.
- */
- memset(em, 0, num);
- memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen);
+ if (flen != num) {
+ em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if (em == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
+ * BN_bn2binpad, but if it doesn't, we do this zero-padding copy
+ * to avoid leaking that information. The copy still leaks some
+ * side-channel information, but it's impossible to have a fixed
+ * memory access pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of
+ * |from|.
+ */
+ memset(em, 0, num);
+ memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen);
+ from = em;
+ }
/*
* The first byte must be zero, however we must not leak if this is
* true. See James H. Manger, "A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA
* Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [...]", CRYPTO 2001).
*/
- good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
+ good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]);
- maskedseed = em + 1;
- maskeddb = em + 1 + mdlen;
+ maskedseed = from + 1;
+ maskeddb = from + 1 + mdlen;
if (PKCS1_MGF1(seed, mdlen, maskeddb, dblen, mgf1md))
goto cleanup;
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
index 50397c335a5a..5d7882a3bfcf 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
@@ -98,6 +98,27 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
const unsigned char *p;
p = from;
+
+ /*
+ * The format is
+ * 00 || 01 || PS || 00 || D
+ * PS - padding string, at least 8 bytes of FF
+ * D - data.
+ */
+
+ if (num < 11)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* Accept inputs with and without the leading 0-byte. */
+ if (num == flen) {
+ if ((*p++) != 0x00) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
+ RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ flen--;
+ }
+
if ((num != (flen + 1)) || (*(p++) != 01)) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_01);
@@ -203,28 +224,31 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
if (num < 11)
goto err;
- em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
- if (em == NULL) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return -1;
+ if (flen != num) {
+ em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if (em == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
+ * BN_bn2binpad, but if it doesn't, we do this zero-padding copy
+ * to avoid leaking that information. The copy still leaks some
+ * side-channel information, but it's impossible to have a fixed
+ * memory access pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of
+ * |from|.
+ */
+ memset(em, 0, num);
+ memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen);
+ from = em;
}
- memset(em, 0, num);
- /*
- * Always do this zero-padding copy (even when num == flen) to avoid
- * leaking that information. The copy still leaks some side-channel
- * information, but it's impossible to have a fixed memory access
- * pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of |from|.
- *
- * TODO(emilia): Consider porting BN_bn2bin_padded from BoringSSL.
- */
- memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen);
- good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
- good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2);
+ good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]);
+ good &= constant_time_eq(from[1], 2);
found_zero_byte = 0;
for (i = 2; i < num; i++) {
- unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]);
+ unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(from[i]);
zero_index =
constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0, i,
zero_index);
@@ -232,7 +256,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
}
/*
- * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|.
+ * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |from|.
* If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
* also fails.
*/
@@ -261,7 +285,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
goto err;
}
- memcpy(to, em + msg_index, mlen);
+ memcpy(to, from + msg_index, mlen);
err:
if (em != NULL) {
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
index 82ca8324dfbc..b7fff43530f2 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ int RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
return 0;
}
#endif
- if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER) && rsa->meth->rsa_sign) {
+ if ((rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER) && rsa->meth->rsa_sign) {
return rsa->meth->rsa_sign(type, m, m_len, sigret, siglen, rsa);
}
/* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ int RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa)
{
- if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER) && rsa->meth->rsa_verify) {
+ if ((rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER) && rsa->meth->rsa_verify) {
return rsa->meth->rsa_verify(dtype, m, m_len, sigbuf, siglen, rsa);
}
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c
index 746e01f64a9d..831f75aaf434 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c
@@ -112,6 +112,14 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL);
return (-1);
}
+ /* Accept even zero-padded input */
+ if (flen == num) {
+ if (*(p++) != 0) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ flen--;
+ }
if ((num != (flen + 1)) || (*(p++) != 02)) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02);
return (-1);
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl
index e0b5d83b6201..e29c33a9e3cb 100644
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ $ymm=1 if ($xmm && !$ymm && $ARGV[0] eq "win32" &&
`ml 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./ &&
$1>=10); # first version supporting AVX
-$ymm=1 if ($xmm && !$ymm && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/ &&
+$ymm=1 if ($xmm && !$ymm && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/ &&
$2>=3.0); # first version supporting AVX
$shaext=$xmm; ### set to zero if compiling for 1.0.1
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl
index e9077143817c..1c3fb0063606 100755
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ if ($xmm && !$avx && $ARGV[0] eq "win32" &&
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
}
-if ($xmm && !$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+if ($xmm && !$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
}
diff --git a/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c b/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c
index 8a43590319fa..1ad0cfc5b873 100644
--- a/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c
+++ b/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
* OpenSSL project 2001.
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -567,17 +567,13 @@ static int echo_console(UI *ui)
{
#if defined(TTY_set) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
memcpy(&(tty_new), &(tty_orig), sizeof(tty_orig));
- tty_new.TTY_FLAGS |= ECHO;
-#endif
-
-#if defined(TTY_set) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
if (is_a_tty && (TTY_set(fileno(tty_in), &tty_new) == -1))
return 0;
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
if (is_a_tty) {
tty_new[0] = tty_orig[0];
- tty_new[1] = tty_orig[1] & ~TT$M_NOECHO;
+ tty_new[1] = tty_orig[1];
tty_new[2] = tty_orig[2];
status = sys$qiow(0, channel, IO$_SETMODE, &iosb, 0, 0, tty_new, 12,
0, 0, 0, 0);
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c b/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
index 49c71b91280e..2d82f8fa8b2a 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
- if (ret)
+ if (ret != 0 || a->canon_enclen == 0)
return ret;
return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c b/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c
index b7424809fdbb..3d18ea90beb6 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c
@@ -311,7 +311,11 @@ int X509_STORE_get_by_subject(X509_STORE_CTX *vs, int type, X509_NAME *name,
X509_OBJECT stmp, *tmp;
int i, j;
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+
tmp = X509_OBJECT_retrieve_by_subject(ctx->objs, type, name);
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
@@ -506,6 +510,10 @@ STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_get1_certs(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm)
STACK_OF(X509) *sk;
X509 *x;
X509_OBJECT *obj;
+
+ if (ctx->ctx == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
sk = sk_X509_new_null();
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
idx = x509_object_idx_cnt(ctx->ctx->objs, X509_LU_X509, nm, &cnt);
@@ -551,6 +559,11 @@ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *X509_STORE_get1_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm)
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk;
X509_CRL *x;
X509_OBJECT *obj, xobj;
+
+
+ if (ctx->ctx == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
sk = sk_X509_CRL_new_null();
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
@@ -651,6 +664,9 @@ int X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
}
X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
+ if (ctx->ctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
/* Else find index of first cert accepted by 'check_issued' */
ret = 0;
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index b1472018baf7..869460d7cdba 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
+#include <ctype.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <errno.h>
@@ -1937,119 +1938,67 @@ int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
{
- char *str;
- ASN1_TIME atm;
- long offset;
- char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p;
- int i, j, remaining;
+ static const size_t utctime_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
+ static const size_t generalizedtime_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
+ ASN1_TIME *asn1_cmp_time = NULL;
+ int i, day, sec, ret = 0;
- p = buff1;
- remaining = ctm->length;
- str = (char *)ctm->data;
/*
- * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the
- * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
+ * Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC5280.
+ * In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
* UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
* GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
+ *
+ * We do NOT currently enforce the following RFC 5280 requirement:
+ * "CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate
+ * validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity
+ * dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime."
*/
- if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
- /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
- int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
- int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
- if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
+ switch (ctm->type) {
+ case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
+ if (ctm->length != (int)(utctime_length))
return 0;
- memcpy(p, str, 10);
- p += 10;
- str += 10;
- remaining -= 10;
- } else {
- /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */
- int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
- int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
- if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
+ break;
+ case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
+ if (ctm->length != (int)(generalizedtime_length))
return 0;
- memcpy(p, str, 12);
- p += 12;
- str += 12;
- remaining -= 12;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
}
- if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) {
- *(p++) = '0';
- *(p++) = '0';
- } else {
- /* SS (seconds) */
- if (remaining < 2)
+ /**
+ * Verify the format: the ASN.1 functions we use below allow a more
+ * flexible format than what's mandated by RFC 5280.
+ * Digit and date ranges will be verified in the conversion methods.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < ctm->length - 1; i++) {
+ if (!isdigit(ctm->data[i]))
return 0;
- *(p++) = *(str++);
- *(p++) = *(str++);
- remaining -= 2;
- /*
- * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds...
- * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden.
- * Can we just kill them altogether?
- */
- if (remaining && *str == '.') {
- str++;
- remaining--;
- for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) {
- if (*str < '0' || *str > '9')
- break;
- }
- }
-
}
- *(p++) = 'Z';
- *(p++) = '\0';
-
- /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
- if (!remaining)
+ if (ctm->data[ctm->length - 1] != 'Z')
return 0;
- if (*str == 'Z') {
- if (remaining != 1)
- return 0;
- offset = 0;
- } else {
- /* (+-)HHMM */
- if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
- return 0;
- /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */
- if (remaining != 5)
- return 0;
- if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' ||
- str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9')
- return 0;
- offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60;
- offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0');
- if (*str == '-')
- offset = -offset;
- }
- atm.type = ctm->type;
- atm.flags = 0;
- atm.length = sizeof(buff2);
- atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2;
- if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL)
- return 0;
+ /*
+ * There is ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t but no
+ * ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_cmp_time_t or ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t,
+ * so we go through ASN.1
+ */
+ asn1_cmp_time = X509_time_adj(NULL, 0, cmp_time);
+ if (asn1_cmp_time == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, ctm, asn1_cmp_time))
+ goto err;
- if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
- i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0');
- if (i < 50)
- i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
- j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0');
- if (j < 50)
- j += 100;
-
- if (i < j)
- return -1;
- if (i > j)
- return 1;
- }
- i = strcmp(buff1, buff2);
- if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
- return -1;
- else
- return i;
+ /*
+ * X509_cmp_time comparison is <=.
+ * The return value 0 is reserved for errors.
+ */
+ ret = (day >= 0 && sec >= 0) ? -1 : 1;
+
+ err:
+ ASN1_TIME_free(asn1_cmp_time);
+ return ret;
}
ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
index 96e629a9301f..7080a51c4c5b 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
* 2001.
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -128,11 +128,10 @@ int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca)
{
int idx;
const X509_PURPOSE *pt;
- if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) {
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- }
+
+ x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
+
+ /* Return if side-effect only call */
if (id == -1)
return 1;
idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
@@ -399,8 +398,16 @@ static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
X509_EXTENSION *ex;
int i;
+
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)
return;
+
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) {
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ return;
+ }
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL);
#endif
@@ -536,6 +543,7 @@ static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
}
}
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET;
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
}
/*-
@@ -578,11 +586,7 @@ static int check_ca(const X509 *x)
int X509_check_ca(X509 *x)
{
- if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) {
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- }
+ x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
return check_ca(x);
}
@@ -796,6 +800,7 @@ int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject)
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer),
X509_get_issuer_name(subject)))
return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH;
+
x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer);
x509v3_cache_extensions(subject);
diff --git a/doc/apps/cms.pod b/doc/apps/cms.pod
index 4a7783d47a4e..dd6ae6e11ec1 100644
--- a/doc/apps/cms.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/cms.pod
@@ -335,6 +335,9 @@ When encrypting a message this option may be used multiple times to specify
each recipient. This form B<must> be used if customised parameters are
required (for example to specify RSA-OAEP).
+Only certificates carrying RSA, Diffie-Hellman or EC keys are supported by this
+option.
+
=item B<-keyid>
use subject key identifier to identify certificates instead of issuer name and
@@ -648,17 +651,14 @@ No revocation checking is done on the signer's certificate.
=head1 HISTORY
The use of multiple B<-signer> options and the B<-resign> command were first
-added in OpenSSL 1.0.0
-
-The B<keyopt> option was first added in OpenSSL 1.1.0
+added in OpenSSL 1.0.0.
-The use of B<-recip> to specify the recipient when encrypting mail was first
-added to OpenSSL 1.1.0
+The B<keyopt> option was first added in OpenSSL 1.0.2.
-Support for RSA-OAEP and RSA-PSS was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+Support for RSA-OAEP and RSA-PSS was first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2.
The use of non-RSA keys with B<-encrypt> and B<-decrypt> was first added
-to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+to OpenSSL 1.0.2.
The -no_alt_chains options was first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2b.
diff --git a/doc/apps/config.pod b/doc/apps/config.pod
index 3f607d3b5fc8..b1300a99f7a2 100644
--- a/doc/apps/config.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/config.pod
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ started or end of file is reached. A section name can consist of
alphanumeric characters and underscores.
The first section of a configuration file is special and is referred
-to as the B<default> section this is usually unnamed and is from the
+to as the B<default> section. This section is usually unnamed and spans from the
start of file until the first named section. When a name is being looked up
it is first looked up in a named section (if any) and then the
default section.
diff --git a/doc/apps/genpkey.pod b/doc/apps/genpkey.pod
index 4d09fc0937c5..2e2440056fdd 100644
--- a/doc/apps/genpkey.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/genpkey.pod
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ B<openssl> B<genpkey>
[B<-out filename>]
[B<-outform PEM|DER>]
[B<-pass arg>]
-[B<-cipher>]
+[B<-I<cipher>>]
[B<-engine id>]
[B<-paramfile file>]
[B<-algorithm alg>]
@@ -34,21 +34,21 @@ used.
=item B<-outform DER|PEM>
-This specifies the output format DER or PEM.
+This specifies the output format DER or PEM. The default format is PEM.
=item B<-pass arg>
-the output file password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
-see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>.
+The output file password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
+see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)>.
-=item B<-cipher>
+=item B<-I<cipher>>
This option encrypts the private key with the supplied cipher. Any algorithm
name accepted by EVP_get_cipherbyname() is acceptable such as B<des3>.
=item B<-engine id>
-specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<genpkey>
+Specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<genpkey>
to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
for all available algorithms. If used this option should precede all other
@@ -56,20 +56,33 @@ options.
=item B<-algorithm alg>
-public key algorithm to use such as RSA, DSA or DH. If used this option must
+Public key algorithm to use such as RSA, DSA or DH. If used this option must
precede any B<-pkeyopt> options. The options B<-paramfile> and B<-algorithm>
-are mutually exclusive.
+are mutually exclusive. Engines may add algorithms in addition to the standard
+built-in ones.
+
+Valid built-in algorithm names for private key generation are RSA and EC.
+
+Valid built-in algorithm names for parameter generation (see the B<-genparam>
+option) are DH, DSA and EC.
+
+Note that the algorithm name X9.42 DH may be used as a synonym for the DH
+algorithm. These are identical and do not indicate the type of parameters that
+will be generated. Use the B<dh_paramgen_type> option to indicate whether PKCS#3
+or X9.42 DH parameters are required. See L<DH Parameter Generation Options>
+below for more details.
=item B<-pkeyopt opt:value>
-set the public key algorithm option B<opt> to B<value>. The precise set of
+Set the public key algorithm option B<opt> to B<value>. The precise set of
options supported depends on the public key algorithm used and its
-implementation. See B<KEY GENERATION OPTIONS> below for more details.
+implementation. See L<KEY GENERATION OPTIONS> and
+L<PARAMETER GENERATION OPTIONS> below for more details.
=item B<-genparam>
-generate a set of parameters instead of a private key. If used this option must
-precede and B<-algorithm>, B<-paramfile> or B<-pkeyopt> options.
+Generate a set of parameters instead of a private key. If used this option must
+precede any B<-algorithm>, B<-paramfile> or B<-pkeyopt> options.
=item B<-paramfile filename>
@@ -92,7 +105,7 @@ The options supported by each algorith and indeed each implementation of an
algorithm can vary. The options for the OpenSSL implementations are detailed
below.
-=head1 RSA KEY GENERATION OPTIONS
+=head2 RSA Key Generation Options
=over 4
@@ -107,48 +120,92 @@ hexadecimal value if preceded by B<0x>. Default value is 65537.
=back
-=head1 DSA PARAMETER GENERATION OPTIONS
+=head2 EC Key Generation Options
+
+The EC key generation options can also be used for parameter generation.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<ec_paramgen_curve:curve>
+
+The EC curve to use. OpenSSL supports NIST curve names such as "P-256".
+
+=item B<ec_param_enc:encoding>
+
+The encoding to use for parameters. The "encoding" parameter must be either
+"named_curve" or "explicit". The default value is "named_curve".
+
+=back
+
+=head1 PARAMETER GENERATION OPTIONS
+
+The options supported by each algorithm and indeed each implementation of an
+algorithm can vary. The options for the OpenSSL implementations are detailed
+below.
+
+=head2 DSA Parameter Generation Options
=over 4
=item B<dsa_paramgen_bits:numbits>
-The number of bits in the generated parameters. If not specified 1024 is used.
+The number of bits in the generated prime. If not specified 1024 is used.
+
+=item B<dsa_paramgen_q_bits:numbits>
+
+The number of bits in the q parameter. Must be one of 160, 224 or 256. If not
+specified 160 is used.
+
+=item B<dsa_paramgen_md:digest>
+
+The digest to use during parameter generation. Must be one of B<sha1>, B<sha224>
+or B<sha256>. If set, then the number of bits in B<q> will match the output size
+of the specified digest and the B<dsa_paramgen_q_bits> parameter will be
+ignored. If not set, then a digest will be used that gives an output matching
+the number of bits in B<q>, i.e. B<sha1> if q length is 160, B<sha224> if it 224
+or B<sha256> if it is 256.
=back
-=head1 DH PARAMETER GENERATION OPTIONS
+=head2 DH Parameter Generation Options
=over 4
=item B<dh_paramgen_prime_len:numbits>
-The number of bits in the prime parameter B<p>.
+The number of bits in the prime parameter B<p>. The default is 1024.
+
+=item B<dh_paramgen_subprime_len:numbits>
+
+The number of bits in the sub prime parameter B<q>. The default is 256 if the
+prime is at least 2048 bits long or 160 otherwise. Only relevant if used in
+conjunction with the B<dh_paramgen_type> option to generate X9.42 DH parameters.
=item B<dh_paramgen_generator:value>
-The value to use for the generator B<g>.
+The value to use for the generator B<g>. The default is 2.
+
+=item B<dh_paramgen_type:value>
+
+The type of DH parameters to generate. Use 0 for PKCS#3 DH and 1 for X9.42 DH.
+The default is 0.
=item B<dh_rfc5114:num>
-If this option is set then the appropriate RFC5114 parameters are used
+If this option is set, then the appropriate RFC5114 parameters are used
instead of generating new parameters. The value B<num> can take the
values 1, 2 or 3 corresponding to RFC5114 DH parameters consisting of
1024 bit group with 160 bit subgroup, 2048 bit group with 224 bit subgroup
and 2048 bit group with 256 bit subgroup as mentioned in RFC5114 sections
-2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 respectively.
+2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 respectively. If present this overrides all other DH parameter
+options.
=back
-=head1 EC PARAMETER GENERATION OPTIONS
-
-=over 4
-
-=item B<ec_paramgen_curve:curve>
-
-the EC curve to use.
+=head2 EC Parameter Generation Options
-=back
+The EC parameter generation options are the same as for key generation. See
+L<EC Key Generation Options> above.
=head1 GOST2001 KEY GENERATION AND PARAMETER OPTIONS
@@ -179,8 +236,6 @@ numeric OID. Following parameter sets are supported:
=back
-
-
=head1 NOTES
The use of the genpkey program is encouraged over the algorithm specific
@@ -202,19 +257,25 @@ Generate a 2048 bit RSA key using 3 as the public exponent:
openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -out key.pem -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:2048 \
-pkeyopt rsa_keygen_pubexp:3
-Generate 1024 bit DSA parameters:
+Generate 2048 bit DSA parameters:
openssl genpkey -genparam -algorithm DSA -out dsap.pem \
- -pkeyopt dsa_paramgen_bits:1024
+ -pkeyopt dsa_paramgen_bits:2048
Generate DSA key from parameters:
openssl genpkey -paramfile dsap.pem -out dsakey.pem
-Generate 1024 bit DH parameters:
+Generate 2048 bit DH parameters:
openssl genpkey -genparam -algorithm DH -out dhp.pem \
- -pkeyopt dh_paramgen_prime_len:1024
+ -pkeyopt dh_paramgen_prime_len:2048
+
+Generate 2048 bit X9.42 DH parameters:
+
+ openssl genpkey -genparam -algorithm DH -out dhpx.pem \
+ -pkeyopt dh_paramgen_prime_len:2048 \
+ -pkeyopt dh_paramgen_type:1
Output RFC5114 2048 bit DH parameters with 224 bit subgroup:
@@ -224,6 +285,16 @@ Generate DH key from parameters:
openssl genpkey -paramfile dhp.pem -out dhkey.pem
+Generate EC key directly:
+
+ openssl genpkey -algorithm EC -out eckey.pem \
+ -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:P-384 \
+ -pkeyopt ec_param_enc:named_curve
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The ability to use NIST curve names, and to generate an EC key directly,
+were added in OpenSSL 1.0.2.
=cut
diff --git a/doc/apps/s_client.pod b/doc/apps/s_client.pod
index d2cad29d218b..77cc0718ec4a 100644
--- a/doc/apps/s_client.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/s_client.pod
@@ -141,8 +141,9 @@ pauses 1 second between each read and write call.
=item B<-showcerts>
-display the whole server certificate chain: normally only the server
-certificate itself is displayed.
+Displays the server certificate list as sent by the server: it only consists of
+certificates the server has sent (in the order the server has sent them). It is
+B<not> a verified chain.
=item B<-prexit>
@@ -354,7 +355,8 @@ a client certificate. Therefor merely including a client certificate
on the command line is no guarantee that the certificate works.
If there are problems verifying a server certificate then the
-B<-showcerts> option can be used to show the whole chain.
+B<-showcerts> option can be used to show all the certificates sent by the
+server.
Since the SSLv23 client hello cannot include compression methods or extensions
these will only be supported if its use is disabled, for example by using the
diff --git a/doc/crypto/BIO_s_fd.pod b/doc/crypto/BIO_s_fd.pod
index b1de1d101549..2830134a682f 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/BIO_s_fd.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/BIO_s_fd.pod
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ BIO_s_fd() returns the file descriptor BIO method.
BIO_reset() returns zero for success and -1 if an error occurred.
BIO_seek() and BIO_tell() return the current file position or -1
-is an error occurred. These values reflect the underlying lseek()
+if an error occurred. These values reflect the underlying lseek()
behaviour.
BIO_set_fd() always returns 1.
diff --git a/doc/crypto/BN_add.pod b/doc/crypto/BN_add.pod
index 88c7a799eea5..02e548641663 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/BN_add.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/BN_add.pod
@@ -91,7 +91,9 @@ BN_exp() raises I<a> to the I<p>-th power and places the result in I<r>
BN_mul().
BN_mod_exp() computes I<a> to the I<p>-th power modulo I<m> (C<r=a^p %
-m>). This function uses less time and space than BN_exp().
+m>). This function uses less time and space than BN_exp(). Do not call this
+function when B<m> is even and any of the parameters have the
+B<BN_FLG_CONSTTIME> flag set.
BN_gcd() computes the greatest common divisor of I<a> and I<b> and
places the result in I<r>. I<r> may be the same B<BIGNUM> as I<a> or
diff --git a/doc/crypto/BN_bn2bin.pod b/doc/crypto/BN_bn2bin.pod
index f6bb484f902f..075aec37fac2 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/BN_bn2bin.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/BN_bn2bin.pod
@@ -39,8 +39,8 @@ numbers, the string is prefaced with a leading '-'. The string must be
freed later using OPENSSL_free().
BN_hex2bn() converts the string B<str> containing a hexadecimal number
-to a B<BIGNUM> and stores it in **B<bn>. If *B<bn> is NULL, a new
-B<BIGNUM> is created. If B<bn> is NULL, it only computes the number's
+to a B<BIGNUM> and stores it in **B<a>. If *B<a> is NULL, a new
+B<BIGNUM> is created. If B<a> is NULL, it only computes the number's
length in hexadecimal digits. If the string starts with '-', the
number is negative.
A "negative zero" is converted to zero.
diff --git a/doc/crypto/BN_generate_prime.pod b/doc/crypto/BN_generate_prime.pod
index bf1b5308adab..003d12394045 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/BN_generate_prime.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/BN_generate_prime.pod
@@ -90,7 +90,17 @@ If B<do_trial_division == 0>, this test is skipped.
Both BN_is_prime_ex() and BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex() perform a Miller-Rabin
probabilistic primality test with B<nchecks> iterations. If
B<nchecks == BN_prime_checks>, a number of iterations is used that
-yields a false positive rate of at most 2^-80 for random input.
+yields a false positive rate of at most 2^-64 for random input.
+The error rate depends on the size of the prime and goes down for bigger primes.
+The rate is 2^-80 starting at 308 bits, 2^-112 at 852 bits, 2^-128 at 1080 bits,
+2^-192 at 3747 bits and 2^-256 at 6394 bits.
+
+When the source of the prime is not random or not trusted, the number
+of checks needs to be much higher to reach the same level of assurance:
+It should equal half of the targeted security level in bits (rounded up to the
+next integer if necessary).
+For instance, to reach the 128 bit security level, B<nchecks> should be set to
+64.
If B<cb> is not B<NULL>, B<BN_GENCB_call(cb, 1, j)> is called
after the j-th iteration (j = 0, 1, ...). B<ctx> is a
diff --git a/doc/crypto/CMS_encrypt.pod b/doc/crypto/CMS_encrypt.pod
index 1ee5b275ec82..88e44d44534a 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/CMS_encrypt.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/CMS_encrypt.pod
@@ -18,9 +18,8 @@ B<cipher> is the symmetric cipher to use. B<flags> is an optional set of flags.
=head1 NOTES
-Only certificates carrying RSA keys are supported so the recipient certificates
-supplied to this function must all contain RSA public keys, though they do not
-have to be signed using the RSA algorithm.
+Only certificates carrying RSA, Diffie-Hellman or EC keys are supported by this
+function.
EVP_des_ede3_cbc() (triple DES) is the algorithm of choice for S/MIME use
because most clients will support it.
diff --git a/doc/crypto/CMS_get0_SignerInfos.pod b/doc/crypto/CMS_get0_SignerInfos.pod
index b46c0e07ab3d..69fde8106247 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/CMS_get0_SignerInfos.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/CMS_get0_SignerInfos.pod
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ CMS_SignerInfo_set1_signer_cert().
Once all signer certificates have been set CMS_verify() can be used.
-Although CMS_get0_SignerInfos() can return NULL is an error occur B<or> if
+Although CMS_get0_SignerInfos() can return NULL if an error occurs B<or> if
there are no signers this is not a problem in practice because the only
error which can occur is if the B<cms> structure is not of type signedData
due to application error.
diff --git a/doc/crypto/CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest.pod b/doc/crypto/CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest.pod
index f546376a1e68..7a483ecd5a57 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest.pod
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ CMS_verify().
CMS_ReceiptRequest_create0() returns a signed receipt request structure or
NULL if an error occurred.
-CMS_add1_ReceiptRequest() returns 1 for success or 0 is an error occurred.
+CMS_add1_ReceiptRequest() returns 1 for success or 0 if an error occurred.
CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest() returns 1 is a signed receipt request is found and
decoded. It returns 0 if a signed receipt request is not present and -1 if
diff --git a/doc/crypto/DSA_do_sign.pod b/doc/crypto/DSA_do_sign.pod
index 5dfc733b20e2..340d19524f81 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/DSA_do_sign.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/DSA_do_sign.pod
@@ -20,8 +20,8 @@ digest B<dgst> using the private key B<dsa> and returns it in a
newly allocated B<DSA_SIG> structure.
L<DSA_sign_setup(3)|DSA_sign_setup(3)> may be used to precompute part
-of the signing operation in case signature generation is
-time-critical.
+of the signing operation for each signature in case signature generation
+is time-critical.
DSA_do_verify() verifies that the signature B<sig> matches a given
message digest B<dgst> of size B<len>. B<dsa> is the signer's public
diff --git a/doc/crypto/DSA_sign.pod b/doc/crypto/DSA_sign.pod
index 97389e8ec885..cd45ec542b21 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/DSA_sign.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/DSA_sign.pod
@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ in newly allocated B<BIGNUM>s at *B<kinvp> and *B<rp>, after freeing
the old ones unless *B<kinvp> and *B<rp> are NULL. These values may
be passed to DSA_sign() in B<dsa-E<gt>kinv> and B<dsa-E<gt>r>.
B<ctx> is a pre-allocated B<BN_CTX> or NULL.
+The precomputed values from DSA_sign_setup() B<MUST NOT be used> for
+more than one signature: using the same B<dsa-E<gt>kinv> and
+B<dsa-E<gt>r> pair twice under the same private key on different
+plaintexts will result in permanently exposing the DSA private key.
DSA_verify() verifies that the signature B<sigbuf> of size B<siglen>
matches a given message digest B<dgst> of size B<len>.
diff --git a/doc/crypto/OBJ_nid2obj.pod b/doc/crypto/OBJ_nid2obj.pod
index b8d289673dee..c870bd45637d 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/OBJ_nid2obj.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/OBJ_nid2obj.pod
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ constants.
OBJ_nid2obj(), OBJ_nid2ln() and OBJ_nid2sn() convert the NID B<n> to
an ASN1_OBJECT structure, its long name and its short name respectively,
-or B<NULL> is an error occurred.
+or B<NULL> if an error occurred.
OBJ_obj2nid(), OBJ_ln2nid(), OBJ_sn2nid() return the corresponding NID
for the object B<o>, the long name <ln> or the short name <sn> respectively
diff --git a/doc/crypto/SMIME_read_PKCS7.pod b/doc/crypto/SMIME_read_PKCS7.pod
index 9d4671594180..7cdca1e73f8a 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/SMIME_read_PKCS7.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/SMIME_read_PKCS7.pod
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ streaming single pass option should be available.
=head1 RETURN VALUES
SMIME_read_PKCS7() returns a valid B<PKCS7> structure or B<NULL>
-is an error occurred. The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3).
+if an error occurred. The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3).
=head1 SEE ALSO
diff --git a/doc/crypto/ecdsa.pod b/doc/crypto/ecdsa.pod
index 46c071b73308..5708d90674b7 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/ecdsa.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/ecdsa.pod
@@ -112,6 +112,8 @@ using the public key B<eckey>.
=head1 RETURN VALUES
+ECDSA_SIG_new() returns NULL if the allocation fails.
+
ECDSA_size() returns the maximum length signature or 0 on error.
ECDSA_sign_setup() and ECDSA_sign() return 1 if successful or 0
diff --git a/doc/crypto/pem.pod b/doc/crypto/pem.pod
index 763eb6f53392..de9ecca648f8 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/pem.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/pem.pod
@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ for it twice) if B<rwflag> is 1. The B<u> parameter has the same
value as the B<u> parameter passed to the PEM routine. It allows
arbitrary data to be passed to the callback by the application
(for example a window handle in a GUI application). The callback
-B<must> return the number of characters in the passphrase or 0 if
+B<must> return the number of characters in the passphrase or -1 if
an error occurred.
=head1 EXAMPLES
@@ -354,84 +354,77 @@ Read a certificate in PEM format from a BIO:
X509 *x;
x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bp, NULL, 0, NULL);
- if (x == NULL)
- {
- /* Error */
- }
+ if (x == NULL) {
+ /* Error */
+ }
Alternative method:
X509 *x = NULL;
- if (!PEM_read_bio_X509(bp, &x, 0, NULL))
- {
- /* Error */
- }
+ if (!PEM_read_bio_X509(bp, &x, 0, NULL)) {
+ /* Error */
+ }
Write a certificate to a BIO:
- if (!PEM_write_bio_X509(bp, x))
- {
- /* Error */
- }
+ if (!PEM_write_bio_X509(bp, x)) {
+ /* Error */
+ }
Write an unencrypted private key to a FILE pointer:
- if (!PEM_write_PrivateKey(fp, key, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, NULL))
- {
- /* Error */
- }
+ if (!PEM_write_PrivateKey(fp, key, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, NULL)) {
+ /* Error */
+ }
Write a private key (using traditional format) to a BIO using
triple DES encryption, the pass phrase is prompted for:
- if (!PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(bp, key, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, 0, 0, NULL))
- {
- /* Error */
- }
+ if (!PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(bp, key, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, 0, 0, NULL)) {
+ /* Error */
+ }
Write a private key (using PKCS#8 format) to a BIO using triple
DES encryption, using the pass phrase "hello":
- if (!PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey(bp, key, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, 0, 0, "hello"))
- {
- /* Error */
- }
+ if (!PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey(bp, key, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, 0, 0, "hello")) {
+ /* Error */
+ }
Read a private key from a BIO using the pass phrase "hello":
key = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bp, NULL, 0, "hello");
- if (key == NULL)
- {
- /* Error */
- }
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ /* Error */
+ }
Read a private key from a BIO using a pass phrase callback:
key = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bp, NULL, pass_cb, "My Private Key");
- if (key == NULL)
- {
- /* Error */
- }
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ /* Error */
+ }
Skeleton pass phrase callback:
- int pass_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *u);
- {
- int len;
- char *tmp;
- /* We'd probably do something else if 'rwflag' is 1 */
- printf("Enter pass phrase for \"%s\"\n", u);
-
- /* get pass phrase, length 'len' into 'tmp' */
- tmp = "hello";
- len = strlen(tmp);
-
- if (len <= 0) return 0;
- /* if too long, truncate */
- if (len > size) len = size;
- memcpy(buf, tmp, len);
- return len;
- }
+ int pass_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *u)
+ {
+
+ /* We'd probably do something else if 'rwflag' is 1 */
+ printf("Enter pass phrase for \"%s\"\n", u);
+
+ /* get pass phrase, length 'len' into 'tmp' */
+ char *tmp = "hello";
+ if (tmp == NULL) /* An error occurred */
+ return -1;
+
+ size_t len = strlen(tmp);
+
+ if (len > size)
+ len = size;
+ memcpy(buf, tmp, len);
+ return len;
+ }
=head1 NOTES
diff --git a/doc/fingerprints.txt b/doc/fingerprints.txt
index 373e90d0a1e7..2cb74aec2778 100644
--- a/doc/fingerprints.txt
+++ b/doc/fingerprints.txt
@@ -1,63 +1,24 @@
- Fingerprints
+Fingerprints for Signing Releases
-OpenSSL releases are signed with PGP/GnuPG keys. You can find the
-signatures in separate files in the same location you find the
-distributions themselves. The normal file name is the same as the
-distribution file, with '.asc' added. For example, the signature for
-the distribution of OpenSSL 1.0.1h, openssl-1.0.1h.tar.gz, is found in
-the file openssl-1.0.1h.tar.gz.asc.
+OpenSSL releases are signed with PGP/GnuPG keys. This file contains
+the fingerprints of team members who are "authorized" to sign the
+next release.
+
+The signature is a detached cleartxt signature, with the same name
+as the release but with ".asc" appended. For example, release
+1.0.1h can be found in openssl-1.0.1h.tar.gz with the signature
+in the file named openssl-1.0.1h.tar.gz.asc.
The following is the list of fingerprints for the keys that are
currently in use to sign OpenSSL distributions:
-pub 1024D/F709453B 2003-10-20
- Key fingerprint = C4CA B749 C34F 7F4C C04F DAC9 A7AF 9E78 F709 453B
-uid Richard Levitte <richard@levitte.org>
+pub 4096R/7DF9EE8C 2014-10-04
+ Key fingerprint = 7953 AC1F BC3D C8B3 B292 393E D5E9 E43F 7DF9 EE8C
+uid Richard Levitte <richard@opensslfoundation.com>
uid Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
-uid Richard Levitte <levitte@lp.se>
-
-pub 2048R/F295C759 1998-12-13
- Key fingerprint = D0 5D 8C 61 6E 27 E6 60 41 EC B1 B8 D5 7E E5 97
-uid Dr S N Henson <shenson@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk>
-
-pub 4096R/FA40E9E2 2005-03-19
- Key fingerprint = 6260 5AA4 334A F9F0 DDE5 D349 D357 7507 FA40 E9E2
-uid Dr Stephen Henson <shenson@opensslfoundation.com>
-uid Dr Stephen Henson <shenson@drh-consultancy.co.uk>
-uid Dr Stephen N Henson <steve@openssl.org>
-sub 4096R/8811F530 2005-03-19
-
-pub 1024R/49A563D9 1997-02-24
- Key fingerprint = 7B 79 19 FA 71 6B 87 25 0E 77 21 E5 52 D9 83 BF
-uid Mark Cox <mjc@redhat.com>
-uid Mark Cox <mark@awe.com>
-uid Mark Cox <mjc@apache.org>
-
-pub 1024R/9C58A66D 1997-04-03
- Key fingerprint = 13 D0 B8 9D 37 30 C3 ED AC 9C 24 7D 45 8C 17 67
-uid jaenicke@openssl.org
-uid Lutz Jaenicke <Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE>
-
-pub 1024D/2118CF83 1998-07-13
- Key fingerprint = 7656 55DE 62E3 96FF 2587 EB6C 4F6D E156 2118 CF83
-uid Ben Laurie <ben@thebunker.net>
-uid Ben Laurie <ben@cryptix.org>
-uid Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk>
-sub 4096g/1F5143E7 1998-07-13
-
-pub 1024R/5A6A9B85 1994-03-22
- Key fingerprint = C7 AC 7E AD 56 6A 65 EC F6 16 66 83 7E 86 68 28
-uid Bodo Moeller <2005@bmoeller.de>
-uid Bodo Moeller <2003@bmoeller.de>
-uid Bodo Moeller <2004@bmoeller.de>
-uid Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org>
-uid Bodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org>
-uid Bodo Moeller <bm@ulf.mali.sub.org>
-uid Bodo Moeller <3moeller@informatik.uni-hamburg.de>
-uid Bodo Moeller <Bodo_Moeller@public.uni-hamburg.de>
-uid Bodo Moeller <3moeller@rzdspc5.informatik.uni-hamburg.de>
+uid Richard Levitte <richard@openssl.com>
pub 2048R/0E604491 2013-04-30
Key fingerprint = 8657 ABB2 60F0 56B1 E519 0839 D9C4 D26D 0E60 4491
+uid Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
uid Matt Caswell <frodo@baggins.org>
-
diff --git a/doc/man3/X509_cmp_time.pod b/doc/man3/X509_cmp_time.pod
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5bf51114511a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/man3/X509_cmp_time.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_cmp_time - X509 time functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *asn1_time, time_t *cmp_time);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+X509_cmp_time() compares the ASN1_TIME in B<asn1_time> with the time in
+<cmp_time>.
+
+B<asn1_time> must satisfy the ASN1_TIME format mandated by RFC 5280, i.e.,
+its format must be either YYMMDDHHMMSSZ or YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ.
+
+If B<cmp_time> is NULL the current time is used.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+Unlike many standard comparison functions, X509_cmp_time returns 0 on error.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+X509_cmp_time() returns -1 if B<asn1_time> is earlier than, or equal to,
+B<cmp_time>, and 1 otherwise. It returns 0 on error.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2017-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_certificate.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_certificate.pod
index 80321b8580e3..800423e7de74 100644
--- a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_certificate.pod
+++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_certificate.pod
@@ -142,6 +142,13 @@ L<SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(3)|SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(3)>.
of view, it however does not make sense as the data in the certificate
is considered public anyway.)
+All of the functions to set a new certificate will replace any existing
+certificate of the same type that has already been set. Similarly all of the
+functions to set a new private key will replace any private key that has already
+been set. Applications should call L<SSL_CTX_check_private_key(3)> or
+L<SSL_check_private_key(3)> as appropriate after loading a new certificate and
+private key to confirm that the certificate and key match.
+
=head1 RETURN VALUES
On success, the functions return 1.
diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_get_ciphers.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_ciphers.pod
index aecadd9138f0..7697d2791715 100644
--- a/doc/ssl/SSL_get_ciphers.pod
+++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_ciphers.pod
@@ -2,7 +2,10 @@
=head1 NAME
-SSL_get_ciphers, SSL_get_cipher_list - get list of available SSL_CIPHERs
+SSL_get_ciphers,
+SSL_get_cipher_list,
+SSL_get_shared_ciphers
+- get list of available SSL_CIPHERs
=head1 SYNOPSIS
@@ -10,6 +13,7 @@ SSL_get_ciphers, SSL_get_cipher_list - get list of available SSL_CIPHERs
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *ssl);
const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *ssl, int priority);
+ char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int size);
=head1 DESCRIPTION
@@ -22,6 +26,19 @@ listed for B<ssl> with B<priority>. If B<ssl> is NULL, no ciphers are
available, or there are less ciphers than B<priority> available, NULL
is returned.
+SSL_get_shared_ciphers() creates a colon separated and NUL terminated list of
+SSL_CIPHER names that are available in both the client and the server. B<buf> is
+the buffer that should be populated with the list of names and B<size> is the
+size of that buffer. A pointer to B<buf> is returned on success or NULL on
+error. If the supplied buffer is not large enough to contain the complete list
+of names then a truncated list of names will be returned. Note that just because
+a ciphersuite is available (i.e. it is configured in the cipher list) and shared
+by both the client and the server it does not mean that it is enabled (for
+example some ciphers may not be usable by a server if there is not a suitable
+certificate configured). This function will return available shared ciphersuites
+whether or not they are enabled. This is a server side function only and must
+only be called after the completion of the initial handshake.
+
=head1 NOTES
The details of the ciphers obtained by SSL_get_ciphers() can be obtained using
diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_get_session.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_session.pod
index 0c41caa922ab..921d31696c33 100644
--- a/doc/ssl/SSL_get_session.pod
+++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_session.pod
@@ -28,6 +28,11 @@ count of the B<SSL_SESSION> is incremented by one.
The ssl session contains all information required to re-establish the
connection without a new handshake.
+A session will be automatically removed from the session cache and marked as
+non-resumable if the connection is not closed down cleanly, e.g. if a fatal
+error occurs on the connection or L<SSL_shutdown(3)> is not called prior to
+L<SSL_free(3)>.
+
SSL_get0_session() returns a pointer to the actual session. As the
reference counter is not incremented, the pointer is only valid while
the connection is in use. If L<SSL_clear(3)|SSL_clear(3)> or
diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_get_version.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_version.pod
index 9ae6f2550858..f0c696c90c17 100644
--- a/doc/ssl/SSL_get_version.pod
+++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_version.pod
@@ -13,7 +13,9 @@ SSL_get_version - get the protocol version of a connection.
=head1 DESCRIPTION
SSL_get_version() returns the name of the protocol used for the
-connection B<ssl>.
+connection B<ssl>. It should only be called after the initial handshake has been
+completed. Prior to that the results returned from this function may be
+unreliable.
=head1 RETURN VALUES
@@ -43,7 +45,7 @@ The connection uses the TLSv1.2 protocol.
=item unknown
-This indicates that no version has been set (no connection established).
+This indicates an unknown protocol version.
=back
diff --git a/doc/ssl/ssl.pod b/doc/ssl/ssl.pod
index 70cca178a204..5408d61b3176 100644
--- a/doc/ssl/ssl.pod
+++ b/doc/ssl/ssl.pod
@@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ connection defined in the B<SSL> structure.
=item SSL_SESSION *B<SSL_get_session>(const SSL *ssl);
-=item char *B<SSL_get_shared_ciphers>(const SSL *ssl, char *buf, int len);
+=item char *B<SSL_get_shared_ciphers>(const SSL *ssl, char *buf, int size);
=item int B<SSL_get_shutdown>(const SSL *ssl);
diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
index e6bc761e8bf2..8888beddc0ac 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
* (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -656,7 +656,8 @@ static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok)
al = dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s, &frag->msg_header, max);
- if (al == 0) { /* no alert */
+ /* al will be 0 if no alert */
+ if (al == 0 && frag->msg_header.frag_len > 0) {
unsigned char *p =
(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
memcpy(&p[frag->msg_header.frag_off], frag->fragment,
diff --git a/ssl/s3_lib.c b/ssl/s3_lib.c
index 7e27dae35b0c..10c6db683b6e 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_lib.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -4228,8 +4228,13 @@ int ssl3_get_req_cert_type(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
int have_ecdsa_sign = 0;
#endif
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
int nostrict = 1;
+#endif
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_GOST) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || \
+ !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
unsigned long alg_k;
+#endif
/* If we have custom certificate types set, use them */
if (s->cert->ctypes) {
@@ -4238,8 +4243,10 @@ int ssl3_get_req_cert_type(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
}
/* get configured sigalgs */
siglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sig);
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
nostrict = 0;
+#endif
for (i = 0; i < siglen; i += 2, sig += 2) {
switch (sig[1]) {
case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
@@ -4257,7 +4264,10 @@ int ssl3_get_req_cert_type(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
}
}
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_GOST) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || \
+ !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION) {
diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index 96d973cd02bb..70340181bf99 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -1959,11 +1959,12 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
+ size_t len = strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+
/* copy PSK identity hint */
- s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
- strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
- strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
- p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ s2n(len, p);
+ memcpy(p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, len);
+ p += len;
}
#endif
@@ -2090,6 +2091,11 @@ int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
const unsigned char *psigs;
nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
+ if (nl > SSL_MAX_2_BYTE_LEN) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
s2n(nl, p);
memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
p += nl;
@@ -2106,6 +2112,11 @@ int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
+ if (j > SSL_MAX_2_BYTE_LEN) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
(buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
@@ -2127,6 +2138,11 @@ int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
n += j;
nl += j;
}
+ if (nl > SSL_MAX_2_BYTE_LEN) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
}
}
/* else no CA names */
diff --git a/ssl/ssl.h b/ssl/ssl.h
index 3cf96a239bab..4bc1f4e60b8b 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl.h
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ struct ssl_session_st {
const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
unsigned long cipher_id; /* when ASN.1 loaded, this needs to be used
* to load the 'cipher' structure */
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers; /* shared ciphers? */
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers; /* ciphers offered by the client */
CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; /* application specific data */
/*
* These are used to make removal of session-ids more efficient and to
@@ -2149,7 +2149,7 @@ int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s);
int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s);
int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s);
const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s, int n);
-char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int len);
+char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int size);
int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s);
int SSL_pending(const SSL *s);
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
@@ -2954,6 +2954,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
# define SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_NYV 294
# define SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_SKEW 295
# define SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH 159
+# define SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 404
# define SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT 160
# define SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG 274
# define SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS 161
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index 3a6c1b14d4a5..aa0cbdb98720 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -1404,28 +1404,37 @@ int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s, const char *str)
}
/* works well for SSLv2, not so good for SSLv3 */
-char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int len)
+char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int size)
{
char *p;
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clntsk, *srvrsk;
SSL_CIPHER *c;
int i;
- if ((s->session == NULL) || (s->session->ciphers == NULL) || (len < 2))
- return (NULL);
+ if (!s->server
+ || s->session == NULL
+ || s->session->ciphers == NULL
+ || size < 2)
+ return NULL;
p = buf;
- sk = s->session->ciphers;
+ clntsk = s->session->ciphers;
+ srvrsk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
+ if (clntsk == NULL || srvrsk == NULL)
+ return NULL;
- if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
+ if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clntsk) == 0 || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(srvrsk) == 0)
return NULL;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clntsk); i++) {
int n;
- c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
+ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(clntsk, i);
+ if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(srvrsk, c) < 0)
+ continue;
+
n = strlen(c->name);
- if (n + 1 > len) {
+ if (n + 1 > size) {
if (p != buf)
--p;
*p = '\0';
@@ -1434,7 +1443,7 @@ char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int len)
strcpy(p, c->name);
p += n;
*(p++) = ':';
- len -= n + 1;
+ size -= n + 1;
}
p[-1] = '\0';
return (buf);
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
index aeffc0063471..43789ad757d5 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -259,6 +259,8 @@
c[1]=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
c[2]=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)),c+=3)
+# define SSL_MAX_2_BYTE_LEN (0xffff)
+
/* LOCAL STUFF */
# define SSL_DECRYPT 0
diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 75c2f4154dfe..8cb8816f9b13 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -2408,8 +2408,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
goto err;
if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
goto err;
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
-
+ } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && !s->hit) {
if (size < 5)
goto err;
@@ -3166,7 +3165,7 @@ int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
goto err;
}
} else
diff --git a/ssl/t1_trce.c b/ssl/t1_trce.c
index dc62df8f94cf..3e6194a5356c 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_trce.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_trce.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
* project.
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2012 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2012-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -645,6 +645,8 @@ static int ssl_print_extensions(BIO *bio, int indent, int server,
BIO_puts(bio, "No Extensions\n");
return 1;
}
+ if (msglen < 2)
+ return 0;
extslen = (msg[0] << 8) | msg[1];
if (extslen != msglen - 2)
return 0;
@@ -1021,6 +1023,8 @@ static int ssl_print_cert_request(BIO *bio, int indent, SSL *s,
msglen -= xlen + 2;
skip_sig:
+ if (msglen < 2)
+ return 0;
xlen = (msg[0] << 8) | msg[1];
BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80);
if (msglen < xlen + 2)
@@ -1209,7 +1213,15 @@ void SSL_trace(int write_p, int version, int content_type,
switch (content_type) {
case SSL3_RT_HEADER:
{
- int hvers = msg[1] << 8 | msg[2];
+ int hvers;
+
+ /* avoid overlapping with length at the end of buffer */
+ if (msglen < (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl) ? 13 : 5)) {
+ BIO_puts(bio, write_p ? "Sent" : "Received");
+ ssl_print_hex(bio, 0, " too short message", msg, msglen);
+ break;
+ }
+ hvers = msg[1] << 8 | msg[2];
BIO_puts(bio, write_p ? "Sent" : "Received");
BIO_printf(bio, " Record\nHeader:\n Version = %s (0x%x)\n",
ssl_trace_str(hvers, ssl_version_tbl), hvers);
diff --git a/util/domd b/util/domd
index 5a92559c9b7a..6eb019ea1672 100755
--- a/util/domd
+++ b/util/domd
@@ -6,7 +6,11 @@ TOP=$1
shift
if [ "$1" = "-MD" ]; then
shift
- MAKEDEPEND=$1
+ MAKEDEPEND=""
+ while [ "$1" != "--" ]; do
+ MAKEDEPEND="$MAKEDEPEND $1"
+ shift
+ done
shift
fi
if [ "$MAKEDEPEND" = "" ]; then MAKEDEPEND=makedepend; fi
@@ -16,8 +20,11 @@ mv Makefile Makefile.save
cp Makefile.save Makefile
# fake the presence of Kerberos
touch $TOP/krb5.h
-if ${MAKEDEPEND} --version 2>&1 | grep "clang" > /dev/null ||
- echo $MAKEDEPEND | grep "gcc" > /dev/null; then
+if expr "$MAKEDEPEND" : ".*makedepend" > /dev/null; then
+ ${MAKEDEPEND} -D OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND $@ && \
+ ${PERL} $TOP/util/clean-depend.pl < Makefile > Makefile.new
+ RC=$?
+else
args=""
while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
if [ "$1" != "--" ]; then args="$args $1"; fi
@@ -29,10 +36,6 @@ if ${MAKEDEPEND} --version 2>&1 | grep "clang" > /dev/null ||
${PERL} $TOP/util/clean-depend.pl < Makefile.tmp > Makefile.new
RC=$?
rm -f Makefile.tmp
-else
- ${MAKEDEPEND} -D OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND $@ && \
- ${PERL} $TOP/util/clean-depend.pl < Makefile > Makefile.new
- RC=$?
fi
if cmp -s Makefile.save Makefile.new; then
mv Makefile.save Makefile