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authorXin LI <delphij@FreeBSD.org>2013-03-21 22:24:54 +0000
committerXin LI <delphij@FreeBSD.org>2013-03-21 22:24:54 +0000
commitba41f50577c8e3dd55fc4ca3950a7124fd3231db (patch)
treee20adadf0620400d399941b2695c191bed6a4bfe
parent1e086defa5742bfee714119793aa1a068b17702d (diff)
downloadsrc-ba41f50577c8e3dd55fc4ca3950a7124fd3231db.tar.gz
src-ba41f50577c8e3dd55fc4ca3950a7124fd3231db.zip
- Integrate OpenSSL revisions
fb092ef4fca897344daf7189526f5f26be6487ce, a93cc7c57333f4538cbcdedd2e961a5a38caa52d, and 76c61a5d1adb92388f39e585e4af860a20feb9bb. This removes the newly added orig_len field of SSL3_RECORD and restored ABI. Approved by: benl
Notes
Notes: svn path=/vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/; revision=248595
-rw-r--r--ssl/d1_pkt.c14
-rw-r--r--ssl/s3_cbc.c21
-rw-r--r--ssl/s3_enc.c10
-rw-r--r--ssl/s3_pkt.c12
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl3.h4
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl_locl.h2
-rw-r--r--ssl/t1_enc.c10
7 files changed, 39 insertions, 34 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
index 3f0f9836981f..9db44c95f9bd 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -330,8 +330,8 @@ dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
int i,al;
int enc_err;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
- SSL3_RECORD *rr;
- unsigned int mac_size;
+ SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+ unsigned int mac_size, orig_len;
unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
/* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
rr->data=rr->input;
- rr->orig_len=rr->length;
+ orig_len=rr->length;
enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
/* enc_err is:
@@ -399,10 +399,10 @@ printf("\n");
* therefore we can safely process the record in a different
* amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
*/
- if (rr->orig_len < mac_size ||
+ if (orig_len < mac_size ||
/* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
- rr->orig_len < mac_size+1))
+ orig_len < mac_size+1))
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
@@ -417,12 +417,12 @@ printf("\n");
* without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
* */
mac = mac_tmp;
- ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
+ ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
rr->length -= mac_size;
}
else
{
- /* In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len|
+ /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
* equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
* enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
rr->length -= mac_size;
diff --git a/ssl/s3_cbc.c b/ssl/s3_cbc.c
index 2ab7bfb60a56..28722e14f868 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_cbc.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_cbc.c
@@ -116,7 +116,9 @@ int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, padding_length+overhead);
/* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */
good &= constant_time_ge(block_size, padding_length+1);
- rec->length -= good & (padding_length+1);
+ padding_length = good & (padding_length+1);
+ rec->length -= padding_length;
+ rec->type |= padding_length<<8; /* kludge: pass padding length */
return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1));
}
@@ -202,7 +204,9 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
good <<= sizeof(good)*8-1;
good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(good);
- rec->length -= good & (padding_length+1);
+ padding_length = good & (padding_length+1);
+ rec->length -= padding_length;
+ rec->type |= padding_length<<8; /* kludge: pass padding length */
/* We can always safely skip the explicit IV. We check at the beginning
* of this function that the record has at least enough space for the
@@ -217,7 +221,6 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
rec->data += block_size;
rec->input += block_size;
rec->length -= block_size;
- rec->orig_len -= block_size;
}
return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1));
@@ -245,7 +248,7 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
*/
void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out,
const SSL3_RECORD *rec,
- unsigned md_size)
+ unsigned md_size,unsigned orig_len)
{
#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
unsigned char rotated_mac_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
@@ -264,7 +267,7 @@ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out,
unsigned div_spoiler;
unsigned rotate_offset;
- OPENSSL_assert(rec->orig_len >= md_size);
+ OPENSSL_assert(orig_len >= md_size);
OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
@@ -272,8 +275,8 @@ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out,
#endif
/* This information is public so it's safe to branch based on it. */
- if (rec->orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1)
- scan_start = rec->orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1);
+ if (orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1)
+ scan_start = orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1);
/* div_spoiler contains a multiple of md_size that is used to cause the
* modulo operation to be constant time. Without this, the time varies
* based on the amount of padding when running on Intel chips at least.
@@ -286,9 +289,9 @@ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out,
rotate_offset = (div_spoiler + mac_start - scan_start) % md_size;
memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size);
- for (i = scan_start; i < rec->orig_len;)
+ for (i = scan_start; i < orig_len;)
{
- for (j = 0; j < md_size && i < rec->orig_len; i++, j++)
+ for (j = 0; j < md_size && i < orig_len; i++, j++)
{
unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge(i, mac_start);
unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge(i, mac_end);
diff --git a/ssl/s3_enc.c b/ssl/s3_enc.c
index 170953ca8d6a..5d8f8ae52a15 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_enc.c
@@ -504,8 +504,6 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send)
EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
- rec->orig_len = rec->length;
-
if (s->read_hash != NULL)
mac_size = EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
@@ -587,7 +585,7 @@ int ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
const EVP_MD *hash;
unsigned char *p,rec_char;
- size_t md_size;
+ size_t md_size, orig_len;
int npad;
if (send)
@@ -608,6 +606,10 @@ int ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
md_size=EVP_MD_size(hash);
npad=(48/md_size)*md_size;
+ /* kludge: ssl3_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */
+ orig_len = rec->length+md_size+((unsigned int)rec->type>>8);
+ rec->type &= 0xff;
+
if (!send &&
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash))
@@ -639,7 +641,7 @@ int ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
hash,
md, &md_size,
header, rec->input,
- rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len,
+ rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
mac_sec, md_size,
1 /* is SSLv3 */);
}
diff --git a/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
index 6d0a2ee0cac6..707738be94c4 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
short version;
- unsigned mac_size;
+ unsigned mac_size, orig_len;
size_t extra;
rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ again:
/* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
rr->data=rr->input;
- rr->orig_len=rr->length;
+ orig_len=rr->length;
enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
/* enc_err is:
@@ -387,10 +387,10 @@ printf("\n");
* therefore we can safely process the record in a different
* amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
*/
- if (rr->orig_len < mac_size ||
+ if (orig_len < mac_size ||
/* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
- rr->orig_len < mac_size+1))
+ orig_len < mac_size+1))
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
@@ -405,12 +405,12 @@ printf("\n");
* without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
* */
mac = mac_tmp;
- ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
+ ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
rr->length -= mac_size;
}
else
{
- /* In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len|
+ /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
* equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
* enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
rr->length -= mac_size;
diff --git a/ssl/ssl3.h b/ssl/ssl3.h
index 7709effe3ece..b9a85effa005 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl3.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl3.h
@@ -304,10 +304,6 @@ typedef struct ssl3_record_st
/*r */ unsigned char *comp; /* only used with decompression - malloc()ed */
/*r */ unsigned long epoch; /* epoch number, needed by DTLS1 */
/*r */ PQ_64BIT seq_num; /* sequence number, needed by DTLS1 */
-/*rw*/ unsigned int orig_len; /* How many bytes were available before padding
- was removed? This is used to implement the
- MAC check in constant time for CBC records.
- */
} SSL3_RECORD;
typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
index 57e92323fcc5..d4b642c5aafb 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
@@ -1015,7 +1015,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,
/* s3_cbc.c */
void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out,
const SSL3_RECORD *rec,
- unsigned md_size);
+ unsigned md_size,unsigned orig_len);
int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
SSL3_RECORD *rec,
unsigned block_size,
diff --git a/ssl/t1_enc.c b/ssl/t1_enc.c
index e75a66ba9d5a..323d3847d4ad 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
SSL3_RECORD *rec;
unsigned char *mac_sec,*seq;
const EVP_MD *hash;
- size_t md_size;
+ size_t md_size, orig_len;
int i;
HMAC_CTX hmac;
unsigned char header[13];
@@ -727,6 +727,10 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
else
memcpy(header, seq, 8);
+ /* kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */
+ orig_len = rec->length+md_size+((unsigned int)rec->type>>8);
+ rec->type &= 0xff;
+
header[8]=rec->type;
header[9]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8);
header[10]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version);
@@ -745,7 +749,7 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
hash,
md, &md_size,
header, rec->input,
- rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len,
+ rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
EVP_MD_size(ssl->read_hash),
0 /* not SSLv3 */);
@@ -764,7 +768,7 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
ssl->enc_read_ctx,
hash,
&hmac, rec->input,
- rec->length, rec->orig_len);
+ rec->length, orig_len);
#endif
}