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authorChris D. Faulhaber <jedgar@FreeBSD.org>2003-03-20 20:41:45 +0000
committerChris D. Faulhaber <jedgar@FreeBSD.org>2003-03-20 20:41:45 +0000
commit8786792504af176f14878c00d689a1a17bfac4bd (patch)
tree3f2e33322135a3ee9ccd9a40a9b0e0502741df68
parentfceca8a37790004b7d28e0ba02bd2d47101a818f (diff)
downloadsrc-8786792504af176f14878c00d689a1a17bfac4bd.tar.gz
src-8786792504af176f14878c00d689a1a17bfac4bd.zip
Import of PKCS #1 security fix.
Notes
Notes: svn path=/vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/; revision=112439
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c25
1 files changed, 12 insertions, 13 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index 7643877a212f..df4003237298 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -1447,7 +1447,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
+ /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
}
if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
@@ -1463,30 +1463,29 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
(p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
- goto f_err;
+ /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
+
+ /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
+ * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
+ * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
+ * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
+ * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
+ * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
+ * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
+ p[0] = (char)(int) "CAN-2003-0131 patch 2003-03-19";
}
}
if (al != -1)
{
-#if 0
- goto f_err;
-#else
/* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
* against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
- * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1).
- * But note that due to length and protocol version checking, the
- * attack is impractical anyway (see section 5 in D. Bleichenbacher:
- * "Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA
- * Encryption Standard PKCS #1", CRYPTO '98, LNCS 1462, pp. 1-12).
- */
+ * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
ERR_clear_error();
i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2); /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
-#endif
}
s->session->master_key_length=