aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorJung-uk Kim <jkim@FreeBSD.org>2016-05-03 18:00:27 +0000
committerJung-uk Kim <jkim@FreeBSD.org>2016-05-03 18:00:27 +0000
commit57f1256b1a087adbdf8e5c080dd9ed7975de939a (patch)
tree2dd85c58056a364765d9ae59d6a1774d41f88523
parent9aeed18ad799c20d3accf6e1535817538dc983f6 (diff)
downloadsrc-57f1256b1a087adbdf8e5c080dd9ed7975de939a.tar.gz
src-57f1256b1a087adbdf8e5c080dd9ed7975de939a.zip
Import OpenSSL 1.0.2h.vendor/openssl/1.0.2h
Notes
Notes: svn path=/vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/; revision=298991 svn path=/vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.2h/; revision=298992; tag=vendor/openssl/1.0.2h
-rw-r--r--CHANGES97
-rw-r--r--FREEBSD-upgrade4
-rw-r--r--Makefile2
-rw-r--r--NEWS13
-rw-r--r--README2
-rw-r--r--apps/pkcs7.c12
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/aes/asm/aes-ppc.pl4
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/aes/asm/aes-s390x.pl29
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/a_bytes.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c36
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/a_type.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c18
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c17
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/t_x509.c3
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/x_name.c11
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/x_x509.c16
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/ppc-mont.pl10
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/asm/ppc.pl10
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont.pl12
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.pl15
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl42
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl61
-rw-r--r--crypto/comp/comp.h4
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/Makefile13
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/digest.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c3
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c3
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/encode.c12
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/evp_enc.c2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/modes/asm/ghash-s390x.pl4
-rw-r--r--crypto/opensslv.h6
-rw-r--r--crypto/pem/pem_lib.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c7
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl2
-rw-r--r--crypto/s390xcpuid.S44
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/sha/asm/sha1-ppc.pl6
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/sha/asm/sha1-s390x.pl7
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/sha/asm/sha512-ppc.pl8
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/sha/asm/sha512-s390x.pl7
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509/x509.h1
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509/x509_err.c1
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509/x509_obj.c26
-rw-r--r--doc/apps/ciphers.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/apps/ocsp.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/crypto/EVP_EncodeInit.pod127
-rw-r--r--doc/crypto/evp.pod5
-rw-r--r--doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod126
-rw-r--r--doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo.pod8
-rw-r--r--ssl/d1_both.c2
-rw-r--r--ssl/s2_lib.c16
-rw-r--r--ssl/s2_meth.c14
-rw-r--r--ssl/s3_clnt.c2
-rw-r--r--ssl/s3_lib.c88
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl.h4
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl_cert.c11
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl_ciph.c16
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl_lib.c17
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl_locl.h7
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl_rsa.c28
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssltest.c181
-rw-r--r--ssl/t1_lib.c94
-rwxr-xr-xutil/libeay.num18
-rwxr-xr-xutil/mk1mf.pl9
-rwxr-xr-xutil/mkdef.pl6
-rwxr-xr-xutil/shlib_wrap.sh9
-rwxr-xr-xutil/ssleay.num6
68 files changed, 1119 insertions, 265 deletions
diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 7578f7eb7ace..4a557652d5a5 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -2,6 +2,103 @@
OpenSSL CHANGES
_______________
+ Changes between 1.0.2g and 1.0.2h [3 May 2016]
+
+ *) Prevent padding oracle in AES-NI CBC MAC check
+
+ A MITM attacker can use a padding oracle attack to decrypt traffic
+ when the connection uses an AES CBC cipher and the server support
+ AES-NI.
+
+ This issue was introduced as part of the fix for Lucky 13 padding
+ attack (CVE-2013-0169). The padding check was rewritten to be in
+ constant time by making sure that always the same bytes are read and
+ compared against either the MAC or padding bytes. But it no longer
+ checked that there was enough data to have both the MAC and padding
+ bytes.
+
+ This issue was reported by Juraj Somorovsky using TLS-Attacker.
+ (CVE-2016-2107)
+ [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+ *) Fix EVP_EncodeUpdate overflow
+
+ An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncodeUpdate() function which is used for
+ Base64 encoding of binary data. If an attacker is able to supply very large
+ amounts of input data then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap
+ corruption.
+
+ Internally to OpenSSL the EVP_EncodeUpdate() function is primarly used by
+ the PEM_write_bio* family of functions. These are mainly used within the
+ OpenSSL command line applications, so any application which processes data
+ from an untrusted source and outputs it as a PEM file should be considered
+ vulnerable to this issue. User applications that call these APIs directly
+ with large amounts of untrusted data may also be vulnerable.
+
+ This issue was reported by Guido Vranken.
+ (CVE-2016-2105)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Fix EVP_EncryptUpdate overflow
+
+ An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncryptUpdate() function. If an attacker
+ is able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate() with a partial block then a length check can overflow
+ resulting in a heap corruption. Following an analysis of all OpenSSL
+ internal usage of the EVP_EncryptUpdate() function all usage is one of two
+ forms. The first form is where the EVP_EncryptUpdate() call is known to be
+ the first called function after an EVP_EncryptInit(), and therefore that
+ specific call must be safe. The second form is where the length passed to
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate() can be seen from the code to be some small value and
+ therefore there is no possibility of an overflow. Since all instances are
+ one of these two forms, it is believed that there can be no overflows in
+ internal code due to this problem. It should be noted that
+ EVP_DecryptUpdate() can call EVP_EncryptUpdate() in certain code paths.
+ Also EVP_CipherUpdate() is a synonym for EVP_EncryptUpdate(). All instances
+ of these calls have also been analysed too and it is believed there are no
+ instances in internal usage where an overflow could occur.
+
+ This issue was reported by Guido Vranken.
+ (CVE-2016-2106)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Prevent ASN.1 BIO excessive memory allocation
+
+ When ASN.1 data is read from a BIO using functions such as d2i_CMS_bio()
+ a short invalid encoding can casuse allocation of large amounts of memory
+ potentially consuming excessive resources or exhausting memory.
+
+ Any application parsing untrusted data through d2i BIO functions is
+ affected. The memory based functions such as d2i_X509() are *not* affected.
+ Since the memory based functions are used by the TLS library, TLS
+ applications are not affected.
+
+ This issue was reported by Brian Carpenter.
+ (CVE-2016-2109)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) EBCDIC overread
+
+ ASN1 Strings that are over 1024 bytes can cause an overread in applications
+ using the X509_NAME_oneline() function on EBCDIC systems. This could result
+ in arbitrary stack data being returned in the buffer.
+
+ This issue was reported by Guido Vranken.
+ (CVE-2016-2176)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Modify behavior of ALPN to invoke callback after SNI/servername
+ callback, such that updates to the SSL_CTX affect ALPN.
+ [Todd Short]
+
+ *) Remove LOW from the DEFAULT cipher list. This removes singles DES from the
+ default.
+ [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+ *) Only remove the SSLv2 methods with the no-ssl2-method option. When the
+ methods are enabled and ssl2 is disabled the methods return NULL.
+ [Kurt Roeckx]
+
Changes between 1.0.2f and 1.0.2g [1 Mar 2016]
* Disable weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up in default builds of OpenSSL.
diff --git a/FREEBSD-upgrade b/FREEBSD-upgrade
index 2c12105b0bdb..27e7e15c4876 100644
--- a/FREEBSD-upgrade
+++ b/FREEBSD-upgrade
@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ First, read http://wiki.freebsd.org/SubversionPrimer/VendorImports
# Xlist
setenv XLIST /FreeBSD/work/openssl/svn-FREEBSD-files/FREEBSD-Xlist
setenv FSVN "svn+ssh://repo.freebsd.org/base"
-setenv OSSLVER 1.0.2f
-# OSSLTAG format: v1_0_2f
+setenv OSSLVER 1.0.2h
+# OSSLTAG format: v1_0_2h
###setenv OSSLTAG v`echo ${OSSLVER} | tr . _`
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 190d064d89ef..a26a24ff1757 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
## Makefile for OpenSSL
##
-VERSION=1.0.2g
+VERSION=1.0.2h
MAJOR=1
MINOR=0.2
SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0
diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index 33242c83624d..6c85116fc87d 100644
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -5,6 +5,19 @@
This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2g and OpenSSL 1.0.2h [3 May 2016]
+
+ o Prevent padding oracle in AES-NI CBC MAC check (CVE-2016-2107)
+ o Fix EVP_EncodeUpdate overflow (CVE-2016-2105)
+ o Fix EVP_EncryptUpdate overflow (CVE-2016-2106)
+ o Prevent ASN.1 BIO excessive memory allocation (CVE-2016-2109)
+ o EBCDIC overread (CVE-2016-2176)
+ o Modify behavior of ALPN to invoke callback after SNI/servername
+ callback, such that updates to the SSL_CTX affect ALPN.
+ o Remove LOW from the DEFAULT cipher list. This removes singles DES from
+ the default.
+ o Only remove the SSLv2 methods with the no-ssl2-method option.
+
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2f and OpenSSL 1.0.2g [1 Mar 2016]
o Disable weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up in default builds of OpenSSL.
diff --git a/README b/README
index 2077b04eb271..b880eec2d479 100644
--- a/README
+++ b/README
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
- OpenSSL 1.0.2g 1 Mar 2016
+ OpenSSL 1.0.2h 3 May 2016
Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project
Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
diff --git a/apps/pkcs7.c b/apps/pkcs7.c
index 643507f216a0..b67763318397 100644
--- a/apps/pkcs7.c
+++ b/apps/pkcs7.c
@@ -235,12 +235,16 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
switch (i) {
case NID_pkcs7_signed:
- certs = p7->d.sign->cert;
- crls = p7->d.sign->crl;
+ if (p7->d.sign != NULL) {
+ certs = p7->d.sign->cert;
+ crls = p7->d.sign->crl;
+ }
break;
case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped:
- certs = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->cert;
- crls = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->crl;
+ if (p7->d.signed_and_enveloped != NULL) {
+ certs = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->cert;
+ crls = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->crl;
+ }
break;
default:
break;
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aes-ppc.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aes-ppc.pl
index 7a99fc3d0452..5b83016efa98 100755
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aes-ppc.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aes-ppc.pl
@@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ Lenc_loop:
xor $s2,$t2,$acc14
xor $s3,$t3,$acc15
addi $key,$key,16
- bdnz- Lenc_loop
+ bdnz Lenc_loop
addi $Tbl2,$Tbl0,2048
nop
@@ -1068,7 +1068,7 @@ Ldec_loop:
xor $s2,$t2,$acc14
xor $s3,$t3,$acc15
addi $key,$key,16
- bdnz- Ldec_loop
+ bdnz Ldec_loop
addi $Tbl2,$Tbl0,2048
nop
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aes-s390x.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aes-s390x.pl
index e75dcd0315e5..76ca8e52198a 100755
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aes-s390x.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aes-s390x.pl
@@ -818,13 +818,9 @@ $code.=<<___ if (!$softonly);
tmhl %r0,0x4000 # check for message-security assist
jz .Lekey_internal
- lghi %r0,0 # query capability vector
- la %r1,16($sp)
- .long 0xb92f0042 # kmc %r4,%r2
-
- llihh %r1,0x8000
- srlg %r1,%r1,0(%r5)
- ng %r1,16($sp)
+ llihh %r0,0x8000
+ srlg %r0,%r0,0(%r5)
+ ng %r0,48(%r1) # check kmc capability vector
jz .Lekey_internal
lmg %r0,%r1,0($inp) # just copy 128 bits...
@@ -1444,13 +1440,10 @@ $code.=<<___ if (0); ######### kmctr code was measured to be ~12% slower
llgfr $s0,%r0
lgr $s1,%r1
- lghi %r0,0
- la %r1,16($sp)
- .long 0xb92d2042 # kmctr %r4,%r2,%r2
-
+ larl %r1,OPENSSL_s390xcap_P
llihh %r0,0x8000 # check if kmctr supports the function code
srlg %r0,%r0,0($s0)
- ng %r0,16($sp)
+ ng %r0,64(%r1) # check kmctr capability vector
lgr %r0,$s0
lgr %r1,$s1
jz .Lctr32_km_loop
@@ -1597,12 +1590,10 @@ $code.=<<___ if(1);
llgfr $s0,%r0 # put aside the function code
lghi $s1,0x7f
nr $s1,%r0
- lghi %r0,0 # query capability vector
- la %r1,$tweak-16($sp)
- .long 0xb92e0042 # km %r4,%r2
- llihh %r1,0x8000
- srlg %r1,%r1,32($s1) # check for 32+function code
- ng %r1,$tweak-16($sp)
+ larl %r1,OPENSSL_s390xcap_P
+ llihh %r0,0x8000
+ srlg %r0,%r0,32($s1) # check for 32+function code
+ ng %r0,32(%r1) # check km capability vector
lgr %r0,$s0 # restore the function code
la %r1,0($key1) # restore $key1
jz .Lxts_km_vanilla
@@ -2229,7 +2220,7 @@ ___
}
$code.=<<___;
.string "AES for s390x, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
-.comm OPENSSL_s390xcap_P,16,8
+.comm OPENSSL_s390xcap_P,80,8
___
$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_bytes.c b/crypto/asn1/a_bytes.c
index 12715a72809d..385b53986a29 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_bytes.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_bytes.c
@@ -200,13 +200,13 @@ ASN1_STRING *d2i_ASN1_bytes(ASN1_STRING **a, const unsigned char **pp,
} else {
if (len != 0) {
if ((ret->length < len) || (ret->data == NULL)) {
- if (ret->data != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(ret->data);
s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((int)len + 1);
if (s == NULL) {
i = ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE;
goto err;
}
+ if (ret->data != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(ret->data);
} else
s = ret->data;
memcpy(s, p, (int)len);
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c b/crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c
index a1864b42c977..51b6f245ab10 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c
@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ void *ASN1_item_d2i_fp(const ASN1_ITEM *it, FILE *in, void *x)
#endif
#define HEADER_SIZE 8
+#define ASN1_CHUNK_INITIAL_SIZE (16 * 1024)
static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
{
BUF_MEM *b;
@@ -217,29 +218,44 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
/* suck in c.slen bytes of data */
want = c.slen;
if (want > (len - off)) {
+ size_t chunk_max = ASN1_CHUNK_INITIAL_SIZE;
+
want -= (len - off);
if (want > INT_MAX /* BIO_read takes an int length */ ||
len + want < len) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b, len + want)) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
while (want > 0) {
- i = BIO_read(in, &(b->data[len]), want);
- if (i <= 0) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,
- ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA);
+ /*
+ * Read content in chunks of increasing size
+ * so we can return an error for EOF without
+ * having to allocate the entire content length
+ * in one go.
+ */
+ size_t chunk = want > chunk_max ? chunk_max : want;
+
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b, len + chunk)) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
+ want -= chunk;
+ while (chunk > 0) {
+ i = BIO_read(in, &(b->data[len]), chunk);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,
+ ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA);
+ goto err;
+ }
/*
* This can't overflow because |len+want| didn't
* overflow.
*/
- len += i;
- want -= i;
+ len += i;
+ chunk -= i;
+ }
+ if (chunk_max < INT_MAX/2)
+ chunk_max *= 2;
}
}
if (off + c.slen < off) {
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_type.c b/crypto/asn1/a_type.c
index af795306b5bf..bb166e8568b5 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_type.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_type.c
@@ -126,9 +126,7 @@ int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b)
result = 0; /* They do not have content. */
break;
case V_ASN1_INTEGER:
- case V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER:
case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED:
- case V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED:
case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING:
case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:
case V_ASN1_SEQUENCE:
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c b/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c
index 0b61fc930967..874b1af8b09a 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
#include <openssl/asn1_mac.h>
static int asn1_get_length(const unsigned char **pp, int *inf, long *rl,
- int max);
+ long max);
static void asn1_put_length(unsigned char **pp, int length);
const char ASN1_version[] = "ASN.1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ int ASN1_get_object(const unsigned char **pp, long *plength, int *ptag,
}
*ptag = tag;
*pclass = xclass;
- if (!asn1_get_length(&p, &inf, plength, (int)max))
+ if (!asn1_get_length(&p, &inf, plength, max))
goto err;
if (inf && !(ret & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED))
@@ -159,14 +159,14 @@ int ASN1_get_object(const unsigned char **pp, long *plength, int *ptag,
}
static int asn1_get_length(const unsigned char **pp, int *inf, long *rl,
- int max)
+ long max)
{
const unsigned char *p = *pp;
unsigned long ret = 0;
- unsigned int i;
+ unsigned long i;
if (max-- < 1)
- return (0);
+ return 0;
if (*p == 0x80) {
*inf = 1;
ret = 0;
@@ -175,15 +175,11 @@ static int asn1_get_length(const unsigned char **pp, int *inf, long *rl,
*inf = 0;
i = *p & 0x7f;
if (*(p++) & 0x80) {
- if (i > sizeof(long))
+ if (i > sizeof(ret) || max < (long)i)
return 0;
- if (max-- == 0)
- return (0);
while (i-- > 0) {
ret <<= 8L;
ret |= *(p++);
- if (max-- == 0)
- return (0);
}
} else
ret = i;
@@ -192,7 +188,7 @@ static int asn1_get_length(const unsigned char **pp, int *inf, long *rl,
return 0;
*pp = p;
*rl = (long)ret;
- return (1);
+ return 1;
}
/*
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c b/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c
index 0ca985a2be1e..e85e3398b6bb 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c
@@ -173,6 +173,8 @@ static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
if (!asn1_print_info(bp, tag, xclass, j, (indent) ? depth : 0))
goto end;
if (j & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED) {
+ const unsigned char *sp;
+
ep = p + len;
if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
goto end;
@@ -182,6 +184,7 @@ static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
goto end;
}
if ((j == 0x21) && (len == 0)) {
+ sp = p;
for (;;) {
r = asn1_parse2(bp, &p, (long)(tot - p),
offset + (p - *pp), depth + 1,
@@ -190,19 +193,25 @@ static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
ret = 0;
goto end;
}
- if ((r == 2) || (p >= tot))
+ if ((r == 2) || (p >= tot)) {
+ len = p - sp;
break;
+ }
}
- } else
+ } else {
+ long tmp = len;
+
while (p < ep) {
- r = asn1_parse2(bp, &p, (long)len,
- offset + (p - *pp), depth + 1,
+ sp = p;
+ r = asn1_parse2(bp, &p, tmp, offset + (p - *pp), depth + 1,
indent, dump);
if (r == 0) {
ret = 0;
goto end;
}
+ tmp -= p - sp;
}
+ }
} else if (xclass != 0) {
p += len;
if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/t_x509.c b/crypto/asn1/t_x509.c
index 8aab55130c95..8888396f8434 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/t_x509.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/t_x509.c
@@ -140,7 +140,8 @@ int X509_print_ex(BIO *bp, X509 *x, unsigned long nmflags,
goto err;
bs = X509_get_serialNumber(x);
- if (bs->length <= (int)sizeof(long)) {
+ if (bs->length < (int)sizeof(long)
+ || (bs->length == sizeof(long) && (bs->data[0] & 0x80) == 0)) {
l = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs);
if (bs->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) {
l = -l;
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c b/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
index 5a507967c894..6bdcd5c542ca 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
@@ -901,9 +901,7 @@ int asn1_ex_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
break;
case V_ASN1_INTEGER:
- case V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER:
case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED:
- case V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED:
tint = (ASN1_INTEGER **)pval;
if (!c2i_ASN1_INTEGER(tint, &cont, len))
goto err;
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c b/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c
index f04a6892a8d9..f7f83e56a981 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c
@@ -611,9 +611,7 @@ int asn1_ex_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cout, int *putype,
break;
case V_ASN1_INTEGER:
- case V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER:
case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED:
- case V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED:
/*
* These are all have the same content format as ASN1_INTEGER
*/
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/x_name.c b/crypto/asn1/x_name.c
index 737c426f2dea..a858c2993b90 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/x_name.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/x_name.c
@@ -66,6 +66,13 @@
typedef STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY;
DECLARE_STACK_OF(STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY)
+/*
+ * Maximum length of X509_NAME: much larger than anything we should
+ * ever see in practice.
+ */
+
+#define X509_NAME_MAX (1024 * 1024)
+
static int x509_name_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
const unsigned char **in, long len,
const ASN1_ITEM *it,
@@ -192,6 +199,10 @@ static int x509_name_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
int i, j, ret;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *entries;
X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry;
+ if (len > X509_NAME_MAX) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_X509_NAME_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+ return 0;
+ }
q = p;
/* Get internal representation of Name */
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c b/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c
index e2cac836943d..e31e1e750d9d 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c
@@ -201,10 +201,20 @@ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
int i2d_X509_AUX(X509 *a, unsigned char **pp)
{
- int length;
+ int length, tmplen;
+ unsigned char *start = pp != NULL ? *pp : NULL;
length = i2d_X509(a, pp);
- if (a)
- length += i2d_X509_CERT_AUX(a->aux, pp);
+ if (length < 0 || a == NULL)
+ return length;
+
+ tmplen = i2d_X509_CERT_AUX(a->aux, pp);
+ if (tmplen < 0) {
+ if (start != NULL)
+ *pp = start;
+ return tmplen;
+ }
+ length += tmplen;
+
return length;
}
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/ppc-mont.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/ppc-mont.pl
index da69c6aaaf6a..6930a3acebd2 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/ppc-mont.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/ppc-mont.pl
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ L1st:
addi $j,$j,$BNSZ ; j++
addi $tp,$tp,$BNSZ ; tp++
- bdnz- L1st
+ bdnz L1st
;L1st
addc $lo0,$alo,$hi0
addze $hi0,$ahi
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ Linner:
addze $hi1,$hi1
$ST $lo1,0($tp) ; tp[j-1]
addi $tp,$tp,$BNSZ ; tp++
- bdnz- Linner
+ bdnz Linner
;Linner
$LD $tj,$BNSZ($tp) ; tp[j]
addc $lo0,$alo,$hi0
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ Linner:
slwi $tj,$num,`log($BNSZ)/log(2)`
$UCMP $i,$tj
addi $i,$i,$BNSZ
- ble- Louter
+ ble Louter
addi $num,$num,2 ; restore $num
subfc $j,$j,$j ; j=0 and "clear" XER[CA]
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ Lsub: $LDX $tj,$tp,$j
subfe $aj,$nj,$tj ; tp[j]-np[j]
$STX $aj,$rp,$j
addi $j,$j,$BNSZ
- bdnz- Lsub
+ bdnz Lsub
li $j,0
mtctr $num
@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ Lcopy: ; copy or in-place refresh
$STX $tj,$rp,$j
$STX $j,$tp,$j ; zap at once
addi $j,$j,$BNSZ
- bdnz- Lcopy
+ bdnz Lcopy
$POP $tj,0($sp)
li r3,1
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/ppc.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/ppc.pl
index 04df1fe5cc65..446d8ba9492b 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/ppc.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/ppc.pl
@@ -1556,7 +1556,7 @@ Lppcasm_sub_mainloop:
# if carry = 1 this is r7-r8. Else it
# is r7-r8 -1 as we need.
$STU r6,$BNSZ(r3)
- bdnz- Lppcasm_sub_mainloop
+ bdnz Lppcasm_sub_mainloop
Lppcasm_sub_adios:
subfze r3,r0 # if carry bit is set then r3 = 0 else -1
andi. r3,r3,1 # keep only last bit.
@@ -1603,7 +1603,7 @@ Lppcasm_add_mainloop:
$LDU r8,$BNSZ(r5)
adde r8,r7,r8
$STU r8,$BNSZ(r3)
- bdnz- Lppcasm_add_mainloop
+ bdnz Lppcasm_add_mainloop
Lppcasm_add_adios:
addze r3,r0 #return carry bit.
blr
@@ -1762,7 +1762,7 @@ Lppcasm_sqr_mainloop:
$UMULH r8,r6,r6
$STU r7,$BNSZ(r3)
$STU r8,$BNSZ(r3)
- bdnz- Lppcasm_sqr_mainloop
+ bdnz Lppcasm_sqr_mainloop
Lppcasm_sqr_adios:
blr
.long 0
@@ -1827,7 +1827,7 @@ Lppcasm_mw_LOOP:
addi r3,r3,`4*$BNSZ`
addi r4,r4,`4*$BNSZ`
- bdnz- Lppcasm_mw_LOOP
+ bdnz Lppcasm_mw_LOOP
Lppcasm_mw_REM:
andi. r5,r5,0x3
@@ -1951,7 +1951,7 @@ Lppcasm_maw_mainloop:
$ST r11,`3*$BNSZ`(r3)
addi r3,r3,`4*$BNSZ`
addi r4,r4,`4*$BNSZ`
- bdnz- Lppcasm_maw_mainloop
+ bdnz Lppcasm_maw_mainloop
Lppcasm_maw_leftover:
andi. r5,r5,0x3
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont.pl
index 9e3c12d788e5..595fc6d31f60 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont.pl
@@ -734,7 +734,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
___
}
$code.=<<___;
- bdnz- L1st
+ bdnz L1st
fctid $dota,$dota
fctid $dotb,$dotb
@@ -1280,7 +1280,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
___
}
$code.=<<___;
- bdnz- Linner
+ bdnz Linner
fctid $dota,$dota
fctid $dotb,$dotb
@@ -1490,7 +1490,7 @@ Lsub: ldx $t0,$tp,$i
stdx $t0,$rp,$i
stdx $t2,$t6,$i
addi $i,$i,16
- bdnz- Lsub
+ bdnz Lsub
li $i,0
subfe $ovf,$i,$ovf ; handle upmost overflow bit
@@ -1517,7 +1517,7 @@ Lcopy: ; copy or in-place refresh
stdx $i,$tp,$i ; zap tp at once
stdx $i,$t4,$i
addi $i,$i,16
- bdnz- Lcopy
+ bdnz Lcopy
___
$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4);
subf $np,$num,$np ; rewind np
@@ -1550,7 +1550,7 @@ Lsub: lwz $t0,12($tp) ; load tp[j..j+3] in 64-bit word order
stw $t5,8($rp)
stw $t6,12($rp)
stwu $t7,16($rp)
- bdnz- Lsub
+ bdnz Lsub
li $i,0
subfe $ovf,$i,$ovf ; handle upmost overflow bit
@@ -1582,7 +1582,7 @@ Lcopy: ; copy or in-place refresh
stwu $t3,16($rp)
std $i,8($tp) ; zap tp at once
stdu $i,16($tp)
- bdnz- Lcopy
+ bdnz Lcopy
___
$code.=<<___;
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.pl
index e8f6b050842e..89f4de61e896 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.pl
@@ -85,6 +85,21 @@ $frame=32; # size of above frame rounded up to 16n
&and ("esp",-64); # align to cache line
+ # Some OSes, *cough*-dows, insist on stack being "wired" to
+ # physical memory in strictly sequential manner, i.e. if stack
+ # allocation spans two pages, then reference to farmost one can
+ # be punishable by SEGV. But page walking can do good even on
+ # other OSes, because it guarantees that villain thread hits
+ # the guard page before it can make damage to innocent one...
+ &mov ("eax","ebp");
+ &sub ("eax","esp");
+ &and ("eax",-4096);
+&set_label("page_walk");
+ &mov ("edx",&DWP(0,"esp","eax"));
+ &sub ("eax",4096);
+ &data_byte(0x2e);
+ &jnc (&label("page_walk"));
+
################################# load argument block...
&mov ("eax",&DWP(0*4,"esi"));# BN_ULONG *rp
&mov ("ebx",&DWP(1*4,"esi"));# const BN_ULONG *ap
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl
index 29ba1224e36b..8fb6c994e1ef 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl
@@ -130,6 +130,20 @@ $code.=<<___;
mov %r11,8(%rsp,$num,8) # tp[num+1]=%rsp
.Lmul_body:
+ # Some OSes, *cough*-dows, insist on stack being "wired" to
+ # physical memory in strictly sequential manner, i.e. if stack
+ # allocation spans two pages, then reference to farmost one can
+ # be punishable by SEGV. But page walking can do good even on
+ # other OSes, because it guarantees that villain thread hits
+ # the guard page before it can make damage to innocent one...
+ sub %rsp,%r11
+ and \$-4096,%r11
+.Lmul_page_walk:
+ mov (%rsp,%r11),%r10
+ sub \$4096,%r11
+ .byte 0x66,0x2e # predict non-taken
+ jnc .Lmul_page_walk
+
mov $bp,%r12 # reassign $bp
___
$bp="%r12";
@@ -342,6 +356,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
mov %r11,8(%rsp,$num,8) # tp[num+1]=%rsp
.Lmul4x_body:
+ sub %rsp,%r11
+ and \$-4096,%r11
+.Lmul4x_page_walk:
+ mov (%rsp,%r11),%r10
+ sub \$4096,%r11
+ .byte 0x2e # predict non-taken
+ jnc .Lmul4x_page_walk
+
mov $rp,16(%rsp,$num,8) # tp[num+2]=$rp
mov %rdx,%r12 # reassign $bp
___
@@ -795,6 +817,15 @@ bn_sqr8x_mont:
sub %r11,%rsp
.Lsqr8x_sp_done:
and \$-64,%rsp
+ mov %rax,%r11
+ sub %rsp,%r11
+ and \$-4096,%r11
+.Lsqr8x_page_walk:
+ mov (%rsp,%r11),%r10
+ sub \$4096,%r11
+ .byte 0x2e # predict non-taken
+ jnc .Lsqr8x_page_walk
+
mov $num,%r10
neg $num
@@ -932,8 +963,17 @@ bn_mulx4x_mont:
sub $num,%r10 # -$num
mov ($n0),$n0 # *n0
lea -72(%rsp,%r10),%rsp # alloca(frame+$num+8)
- lea ($bp,$num),%r10
and \$-128,%rsp
+ mov %rax,%r11
+ sub %rsp,%r11
+ and \$-4096,%r11
+.Lmulx4x_page_walk:
+ mov (%rsp,%r11),%r10
+ sub \$4096,%r11
+ .byte 0x66,0x2e # predict non-taken
+ jnc .Lmulx4x_page_walk
+
+ lea ($bp,$num),%r10
##############################################################
# Stack layout
# +0 num
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
index 2e8c9db32cbc..938e17081803 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
@@ -115,6 +115,20 @@ $code.=<<___;
mov %rax,8(%rsp,$num,8) # tp[num+1]=%rsp
.Lmul_body:
+ # Some OSes, *cough*-dows, insist on stack being "wired" to
+ # physical memory in strictly sequential manner, i.e. if stack
+ # allocation spans two pages, then reference to farmost one can
+ # be punishable by SEGV. But page walking can do good even on
+ # other OSes, because it guarantees that villain thread hits
+ # the guard page before it can make damage to innocent one...
+ sub %rsp,%rax
+ and \$-4096,%rax
+.Lmul_page_walk:
+ mov (%rsp,%rax),%r11
+ sub \$4096,%rax
+ .byte 0x2e # predict non-taken
+ jnc .Lmul_page_walk
+
lea 128($bp),%r12 # reassign $bp (+size optimization)
___
$bp="%r12";
@@ -469,6 +483,15 @@ $code.=<<___;
sub %r11,%rsp
.Lmul4xsp_done:
and \$-64,%rsp
+ mov %rax,%r11
+ sub %rsp,%r11
+ and \$-4096,%r11
+.Lmul4x_page_walk:
+ mov (%rsp,%r11),%r10
+ sub \$4096,%r11
+ .byte 0x2e # predict non-taken
+ jnc .Lmul4x_page_walk
+
neg $num
mov %rax,40(%rsp)
@@ -1058,6 +1081,15 @@ $code.=<<___;
sub %r11,%rsp
.Lpwr_sp_done:
and \$-64,%rsp
+ mov %rax,%r11
+ sub %rsp,%r11
+ and \$-4096,%r11
+.Lpwr_page_walk:
+ mov (%rsp,%r11),%r10
+ sub \$4096,%r11
+ .byte 0x2e # predict non-taken
+ jnc .Lpwr_page_walk
+
mov $num,%r10
neg $num
@@ -2028,7 +2060,16 @@ bn_from_mont8x:
sub %r11,%rsp
.Lfrom_sp_done:
and \$-64,%rsp
- mov $num,%r10
+ mov %rax,%r11
+ sub %rsp,%r11
+ and \$-4096,%r11
+.Lfrom_page_walk:
+ mov (%rsp,%r11),%r10
+ sub \$4096,%r11
+ .byte 0x2e # predict non-taken
+ jnc .Lfrom_page_walk
+
+ mov $num,%r10
neg $num
##############################################################
@@ -2173,6 +2214,15 @@ bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5:
sub %r11,%rsp
.Lmulx4xsp_done:
and \$-64,%rsp # ensure alignment
+ mov %rax,%r11
+ sub %rsp,%r11
+ and \$-4096,%r11
+.Lmulx4x_page_walk:
+ mov (%rsp,%r11),%r10
+ sub \$4096,%r11
+ .byte 0x2e # predict non-taken
+ jnc .Lmulx4x_page_walk
+
##############################################################
# Stack layout
# +0 -num
@@ -2619,6 +2669,15 @@ bn_powerx5:
sub %r11,%rsp
.Lpwrx_sp_done:
and \$-64,%rsp
+ mov %rax,%r11
+ sub %rsp,%r11
+ and \$-4096,%r11
+.Lpwrx_page_walk:
+ mov (%rsp,%r11),%r10
+ sub \$4096,%r11
+ .byte 0x2e # predict non-taken
+ jnc .Lpwrx_page_walk
+
mov $num,%r10
neg $num
diff --git a/crypto/comp/comp.h b/crypto/comp/comp.h
index 406c428aaeed..60a073404e92 100644
--- a/crypto/comp/comp.h
+++ b/crypto/comp/comp.h
@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@
# include <openssl/crypto.h>
+# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+# error COMP is disabled.
+# endif
+
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/evp/Makefile b/crypto/evp/Makefile
index aaaad986e0e8..fa138d0b1014 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/evp/Makefile
@@ -199,8 +199,8 @@ e_aes.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
e_aes.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
e_aes.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
e_aes.o: ../modes/modes_lcl.h e_aes.c evp_locl.h
-e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/aes.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
-e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h
+e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/aes.h
+e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h
@@ -214,9 +214,9 @@ e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h
e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h
e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../modes/modes_lcl.h
-e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o: e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
-e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.o: ../../include/openssl/aes.h
+e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../constant_time_locl.h
+e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o: ../modes/modes_lcl.h e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
+e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/aes.h
e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h
e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
@@ -232,7 +232,8 @@ e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h
e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h
e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../modes/modes_lcl.h
+e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.o: ../constant_time_locl.h ../modes/modes_lcl.h
e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.o: e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c
e_bf.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
e_bf.o: ../../include/openssl/blowfish.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
diff --git a/crypto/evp/digest.c b/crypto/evp/digest.c
index f2643f32486a..5b642b23fc1c 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/digest.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/digest.c
@@ -212,8 +212,10 @@ int EVP_DigestInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *impl)
}
#endif
if (ctx->digest != type) {
- if (ctx->digest && ctx->digest->ctx_size)
+ if (ctx->digest && ctx->digest->ctx_size) {
OPENSSL_free(ctx->md_data);
+ ctx->md_data = NULL;
+ }
ctx->digest = type;
if (!(ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NO_INIT) && type->ctx_size) {
ctx->update = type->update;
diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c b/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
index 8330964ee16b..6dfd590a4a2c 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
# include <openssl/sha.h>
# include <openssl/rand.h>
# include "modes_lcl.h"
+# include "constant_time_locl.h"
# ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER
# define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER 0x200000
@@ -578,6 +579,8 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
maxpad |= (255 - maxpad) >> (sizeof(maxpad) * 8 - 8);
maxpad &= 255;
+ ret &= constant_time_ge(maxpad, pad);
+
inp_len = len - (SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + pad + 1);
mask = (0 - ((inp_len - len) >> (sizeof(inp_len) * 8 - 1)));
inp_len &= mask;
diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c b/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c
index 37800213c764..46c9d033895b 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
# include <openssl/sha.h>
# include <openssl/rand.h>
# include "modes_lcl.h"
+# include "constant_time_locl.h"
# ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER
# define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER 0x200000
@@ -589,6 +590,8 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha256_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
maxpad |= (255 - maxpad) >> (sizeof(maxpad) * 8 - 8);
maxpad &= 255;
+ ret &= constant_time_ge(maxpad, pad);
+
inp_len = len - (SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + pad + 1);
mask = (0 - ((inp_len - len) >> (sizeof(inp_len) * 8 - 1)));
inp_len &= mask;
diff --git a/crypto/evp/encode.c b/crypto/evp/encode.c
index c6abc4ae8e47..c6c775e0a0cd 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/encode.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/encode.c
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
*/
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <limits.h>
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/evp.h>
@@ -151,13 +152,13 @@ void EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
const unsigned char *in, int inl)
{
int i, j;
- unsigned int total = 0;
+ size_t total = 0;
*outl = 0;
if (inl <= 0)
return;
OPENSSL_assert(ctx->length <= (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
- if ((ctx->num + inl) < ctx->length) {
+ if (ctx->length - ctx->num > inl) {
memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[ctx->num]), in, inl);
ctx->num += inl;
return;
@@ -174,7 +175,7 @@ void EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
*out = '\0';
total = j + 1;
}
- while (inl >= ctx->length) {
+ while (inl >= ctx->length && total <= INT_MAX) {
j = EVP_EncodeBlock(out, in, ctx->length);
in += ctx->length;
inl -= ctx->length;
@@ -183,6 +184,11 @@ void EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
*out = '\0';
total += j + 1;
}
+ if (total > INT_MAX) {
+ /* Too much output data! */
+ *outl = 0;
+ return;
+ }
if (inl != 0)
memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[0]), in, inl);
ctx->num = inl;
diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c b/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
index 65f0e0244dce..7d7be245b021 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
bl = ctx->cipher->block_size;
OPENSSL_assert(bl <= (int)sizeof(ctx->buf));
if (i != 0) {
- if (i + inl < bl) {
+ if (bl - i > inl) {
memcpy(&(ctx->buf[i]), in, inl);
ctx->buf_len += inl;
*outl = 0;
diff --git a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-s390x.pl b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-s390x.pl
index 39096b423ad8..be7d55f74876 100755
--- a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-s390x.pl
+++ b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-s390x.pl
@@ -85,9 +85,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if(!$softonly && 0); # hardware is slow for single block...
tmhl %r0,0x4000 # check for message-security-assist
jz .Lsoft_gmult
lghi %r0,0
- la %r1,16($sp)
- .long 0xb93e0004 # kimd %r0,%r4
- lg %r1,24($sp)
+ lg %r1,24(%r1) # load second word of kimd capabilities vector
tmhh %r1,0x4000 # check for function 65
jz .Lsoft_gmult
stg %r0,16($sp) # arrange 16 bytes of zero input
diff --git a/crypto/opensslv.h b/crypto/opensslv.h
index 4334fd15cd87..13fe440231cd 100644
--- a/crypto/opensslv.h
+++ b/crypto/opensslv.h
@@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ extern "C" {
* (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
* major minor fix final patch/beta)
*/
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000207fL
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000208fL
# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2g-fips 1 Mar 2016"
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2h-fips 3 May 2016"
# else
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2g 1 Mar 2016"
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2h 3 May 2016"
# endif
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
diff --git a/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c b/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
index a29821aab2eb..fe881d664171 100644
--- a/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ int PEM_ASN1_write_bio(i2d_of_void *i2d, const char *name, BIO *bp,
if (enc != NULL) {
objstr = OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_CIPHER_nid(enc));
- if (objstr == NULL) {
+ if (objstr == NULL || EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc) == 0) {
PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_WRITE_BIO, PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
goto err;
}
diff --git a/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c b/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c
index 82d45273ed16..61864468f6d4 100644
--- a/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c
+++ b/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c
@@ -131,6 +131,10 @@ static int read_lebn(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int nbyte, BIGNUM **r)
# define MS_PVKMAGIC 0xb0b5f11eL
/* Salt length for PVK files */
# define PVK_SALTLEN 0x10
+/* Maximum length in PVK header */
+# define PVK_MAX_KEYLEN 102400
+/* Maximum salt length */
+# define PVK_MAX_SALTLEN 10240
static EVP_PKEY *b2i_rsa(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length,
unsigned int bitlen, int ispub);
@@ -644,6 +648,9 @@ static int do_PVK_header(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length,
*psaltlen = read_ledword(&p);
*pkeylen = read_ledword(&p);
+ if (*pkeylen > PVK_MAX_KEYLEN || *psaltlen > PVK_MAX_SALTLEN)
+ return 0;
+
if (is_encrypted && !*psaltlen) {
PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_INCONSISTENT_HEADER);
return 0;
diff --git a/crypto/perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl b/crypto/perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl
index ee04221c7e1d..7a3dd04b0f9d 100755
--- a/crypto/perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl
+++ b/crypto/perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl
@@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ my %globals;
sub out {
my $self = shift;
+ $self->{value} =~ s/\b(0b[0-1]+)/oct($1)/eig;
if ($gas) {
# Solaris /usr/ccs/bin/as can't handle multiplications
# in $self->{value}
@@ -205,7 +206,6 @@ my %globals;
}
sprintf "\$%s",$self->{value};
} else {
- $self->{value} =~ s/(0b[0-1]+)/oct($1)/eig;
$self->{value} =~ s/0x([0-9a-f]+)/0$1h/ig if ($masm);
sprintf "%s",$self->{value};
}
diff --git a/crypto/s390xcpuid.S b/crypto/s390xcpuid.S
index 06815347e6a3..d91d5bc4b64b 100644
--- a/crypto/s390xcpuid.S
+++ b/crypto/s390xcpuid.S
@@ -5,14 +5,46 @@
.align 16
OPENSSL_s390x_facilities:
lghi %r0,0
- larl %r2,OPENSSL_s390xcap_P
- stg %r0,8(%r2)
- .long 0xb2b02000 # stfle 0(%r2)
+ larl %r4,OPENSSL_s390xcap_P
+ stg %r0,8(%r4) # wipe capability vectors
+ stg %r0,16(%r4)
+ stg %r0,24(%r4)
+ stg %r0,32(%r4)
+ stg %r0,40(%r4)
+ stg %r0,48(%r4)
+ stg %r0,56(%r4)
+ stg %r0,64(%r4)
+ stg %r0,72(%r4)
+
+ .long 0xb2b04000 # stfle 0(%r4)
brc 8,.Ldone
lghi %r0,1
- .long 0xb2b02000 # stfle 0(%r2)
+ .long 0xb2b04000 # stfle 0(%r4)
.Ldone:
- lg %r2,0(%r2)
+ lmg %r2,%r3,0(%r4)
+ tmhl %r2,0x4000 # check for message-security-assist
+ jz .Lret
+
+ lghi %r0,0 # query kimd capabilities
+ la %r1,16(%r4)
+ .long 0xb93e0002 # kimd %r0,%r2
+
+ lghi %r0,0 # query km capability vector
+ la %r1,32(%r4)
+ .long 0xb92e0042 # km %r4,%r2
+
+ lghi %r0,0 # query kmc capability vector
+ la %r1,48(%r4)
+ .long 0xb92f0042 # kmc %r4,%r2
+
+ tmhh %r3,0x0004 # check for message-security-assist-4
+ jz .Lret
+
+ lghi %r0,0 # query kmctr capability vector
+ la %r1,64(%r4)
+ .long 0xb92d2042 # kmctr %r4,%r2,%r2
+
+.Lret:
br %r14
.size OPENSSL_s390x_facilities,.-OPENSSL_s390x_facilities
@@ -96,4 +128,4 @@ OPENSSL_cleanse:
.section .init
brasl %r14,OPENSSL_cpuid_setup
-.comm OPENSSL_s390xcap_P,16,8
+.comm OPENSSL_s390xcap_P,80,8
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-ppc.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-ppc.pl
index df5989610c4c..ab655021ccd6 100755
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-ppc.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-ppc.pl
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ Lunaligned:
srwi. $t1,$t1,6 ; t1/=64
beq Lcross_page
$UCMP $num,$t1
- ble- Laligned ; didn't cross the page boundary
+ ble Laligned ; didn't cross the page boundary
mtctr $t1
subfc $num,$t1,$num
bl Lsha1_block_private
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ Lmemcpy:
bl Lsha1_block_private
$POP $inp,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18`($sp)
addic. $num,$num,-1
- bne- Lunaligned
+ bne Lunaligned
Ldone:
$POP r0,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp)
@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
stw r20,16($ctx)
mr $E,r20
addi $inp,$inp,`16*4`
- bdnz- Lsha1_block_private
+ bdnz Lsha1_block_private
blr
.long 0
.byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-s390x.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-s390x.pl
index 9193dda45eff..d5cf1640a120 100755
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-s390x.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-s390x.pl
@@ -167,10 +167,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($kimdfunc);
lg %r0,0(%r1)
tmhl %r0,0x4000 # check for message-security assist
jz .Lsoftware
- lghi %r0,0
- la %r1,`2*$SIZE_T`($sp)
- .long 0xb93e0002 # kimd %r0,%r2
- lg %r0,`2*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+ lg %r0,16(%r1) # check kimd capabilities
tmhh %r0,`0x8000>>$kimdfunc`
jz .Lsoftware
lghi %r0,$kimdfunc
@@ -237,7 +234,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
br %r14
.size sha1_block_data_order,.-sha1_block_data_order
.string "SHA1 block transform for s390x, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
-.comm OPENSSL_s390xcap_P,16,8
+.comm OPENSSL_s390xcap_P,80,8
___
$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-ppc.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-ppc.pl
index 734f3c1ca0f0..17fdc6e8e5a9 100755
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-ppc.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-ppc.pl
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ Lunaligned:
andi. $t1,$t1,`4096-16*$SZ` ; distance to closest page boundary
beq Lcross_page
$UCMP $num,$t1
- ble- Laligned ; didn't cross the page boundary
+ ble Laligned ; didn't cross the page boundary
subfc $num,$t1,$num
add $t1,$inp,$t1
$PUSH $num,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*25`($sp) ; save real remaining num
@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
$POP $inp,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*26`($sp) ; restore real inp
$POP $num,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*25`($sp) ; restore real num
addic. $num,$num,`-16*$SZ` ; num--
- bne- Lunaligned
+ bne Lunaligned
Ldone:
$POP r0,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp)
@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ for(;$i<32;$i++) {
unshift(@V,pop(@V));
}
$code.=<<___;
- bdnz- Lrounds
+ bdnz Lrounds
$POP $ctx,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*22`($sp)
$POP $inp,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*23`($sp) ; inp pointer
@@ -644,7 +644,7 @@ for(;$i<32;$i++) {
($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3) = ($a2,$a3,$a0,$a1);
}
$code.=<<___;
- bdnz- Lrounds
+ bdnz Lrounds
$POP $ctx,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*22`($sp)
$POP $inp,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*23`($sp) ; inp pointer
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-s390x.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-s390x.pl
index 079a3fc78ab4..9c10e4e9ee74 100755
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-s390x.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-s390x.pl
@@ -240,10 +240,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($kimdfunc);
lg %r0,0(%r1)
tmhl %r0,0x4000 # check for message-security assist
jz .Lsoftware
- lghi %r0,0
- la %r1,`2*$SIZE_T`($sp)
- .long 0xb93e0002 # kimd %r0,%r2
- lg %r0,`2*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+ lg %r0,16(%r1) # check kimd capabilities
tmhh %r0,`0x8000>>$kimdfunc`
jz .Lsoftware
lghi %r0,$kimdfunc
@@ -311,7 +308,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
br %r14
.size $Func,.-$Func
.string "SHA${label} block transform for s390x, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
-.comm OPENSSL_s390xcap_P,16,8
+.comm OPENSSL_s390xcap_P,80,8
___
$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509.h b/crypto/x509/x509.h
index 99337b849a52..fc613ce63526 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509.h
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509.h
@@ -1305,6 +1305,7 @@ void ERR_load_X509_strings(void);
# define X509_R_LOADING_CERT_DIR 103
# define X509_R_LOADING_DEFAULTS 104
# define X509_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED 124
+# define X509_R_NAME_TOO_LONG 134
# define X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER 132
# define X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY 105
# define X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER 130
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_err.c b/crypto/x509/x509_err.c
index 43cde18e49a7..1e779fefd9c1 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_err.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_err.c
@@ -151,6 +151,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA X509_str_reasons[] = {
{ERR_REASON(X509_R_LOADING_CERT_DIR), "loading cert dir"},
{ERR_REASON(X509_R_LOADING_DEFAULTS), "loading defaults"},
{ERR_REASON(X509_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED), "method not supported"},
+ {ERR_REASON(X509_R_NAME_TOO_LONG), "name too long"},
{ERR_REASON(X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER), "newer crl not newer"},
{ERR_REASON(X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY),
"no cert set for us to verify"},
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_obj.c b/crypto/x509/x509_obj.c
index d317f3af25c0..3de3ac720411 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_obj.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_obj.c
@@ -63,6 +63,13 @@
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+/*
+ * Limit to ensure we don't overflow: much greater than
+ * anything enountered in practice.
+ */
+
+#define NAME_ONELINE_MAX (1024 * 1024)
+
char *X509_NAME_oneline(X509_NAME *a, char *buf, int len)
{
X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne;
@@ -86,6 +93,8 @@ char *X509_NAME_oneline(X509_NAME *a, char *buf, int len)
goto err;
b->data[0] = '\0';
len = 200;
+ } else if (len == 0) {
+ return NULL;
}
if (a == NULL) {
if (b) {
@@ -110,6 +119,10 @@ char *X509_NAME_oneline(X509_NAME *a, char *buf, int len)
type = ne->value->type;
num = ne->value->length;
+ if (num > NAME_ONELINE_MAX) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_ONELINE, X509_R_NAME_TOO_LONG);
+ goto end;
+ }
q = ne->value->data;
#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING ||
@@ -117,8 +130,9 @@ char *X509_NAME_oneline(X509_NAME *a, char *buf, int len)
type == V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING ||
type == V_ASN1_TELETEXSTRING ||
type == V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING || type == V_ASN1_IA5STRING) {
- ascii2ebcdic(ebcdic_buf, q, (num > sizeof ebcdic_buf)
- ? sizeof ebcdic_buf : num);
+ if (num > (int)sizeof(ebcdic_buf))
+ num = sizeof(ebcdic_buf);
+ ascii2ebcdic(ebcdic_buf, q, num);
q = ebcdic_buf;
}
#endif
@@ -154,6 +168,10 @@ char *X509_NAME_oneline(X509_NAME *a, char *buf, int len)
lold = l;
l += 1 + l1 + 1 + l2;
+ if (l > NAME_ONELINE_MAX) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_ONELINE, X509_R_NAME_TOO_LONG);
+ goto end;
+ }
if (b != NULL) {
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(b, l + 1))
goto err;
@@ -206,7 +224,7 @@ char *X509_NAME_oneline(X509_NAME *a, char *buf, int len)
return (p);
err:
X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_ONELINE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- if (b != NULL)
- BUF_MEM_free(b);
+ end:
+ BUF_MEM_free(b);
return (NULL);
}
diff --git a/doc/apps/ciphers.pod b/doc/apps/ciphers.pod
index 9643b4d48ca8..9224557255ed 100644
--- a/doc/apps/ciphers.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/ciphers.pod
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ The following is a list of all permitted cipher strings and their meanings.
The default cipher list.
This is determined at compile time and is normally
-B<ALL:!EXPORT:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2>.
+B<ALL:!EXPORT:!LOW:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2>.
When used, this must be the first cipherstring specified.
=item B<COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT>
diff --git a/doc/apps/ocsp.pod b/doc/apps/ocsp.pod
index 4639502a0fb1..9833f0813ef1 100644
--- a/doc/apps/ocsp.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/ocsp.pod
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ B<openssl> B<ocsp>
[B<-path>]
[B<-CApath dir>]
[B<-CAfile file>]
-[B<-no_alt_chains>]]
+[B<-no_alt_chains>]
[B<-VAfile file>]
[B<-validity_period n>]
[B<-status_age n>]
diff --git a/doc/crypto/EVP_EncodeInit.pod b/doc/crypto/EVP_EncodeInit.pod
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c6f12674f632
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/crypto/EVP_EncodeInit.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_EncodeInit, EVP_EncodeUpdate, EVP_EncodeFinal, EVP_EncodeBlock,
+EVP_DecodeInit, EVP_DecodeUpdate, EVP_DecodeFinal, EVP_DecodeBlock - EVP base 64
+encode/decode routines
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ void EVP_EncodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx);
+ void EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
+ const unsigned char *in, int inl);
+ void EVP_EncodeFinal(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl);
+ int EVP_EncodeBlock(unsigned char *t, const unsigned char *f, int n);
+
+ void EVP_DecodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx);
+ int EVP_DecodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
+ const unsigned char *in, int inl);
+ int EVP_DecodeFinal(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned
+ char *out, int *outl);
+ int EVP_DecodeBlock(unsigned char *t, const unsigned char *f, int n);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The EVP encode routines provide a high level interface to base 64 encoding and
+decoding. Base 64 encoding converts binary data into a printable form that uses
+the characters A-Z, a-z, 0-9, "+" and "/" to represent the data. For every 3
+bytes of binary data provided 4 bytes of base 64 encoded data will be produced
+plus some occasional newlines (see below). If the input data length is not a
+multiple of 3 then the output data will be padded at the end using the "="
+character.
+
+Encoding of binary data is performed in blocks of 48 input bytes (or less for
+the final block). For each 48 byte input block encoded 64 bytes of base 64 data
+is output plus an additional newline character (i.e. 65 bytes in total). The
+final block (which may be less than 48 bytes) will output 4 bytes for every 3
+bytes of input. If the data length is not divisible by 3 then a full 4 bytes is
+still output for the final 1 or 2 bytes of input. Similarly a newline character
+will also be output.
+
+EVP_EncodeInit() initialises B<ctx> for the start of a new encoding operation.
+
+EVP_EncodeUpdate() encode B<inl> bytes of data found in the buffer pointed to by
+B<in>. The output is stored in the buffer B<out> and the number of bytes output
+is stored in B<*outl>. It is the caller's responsibility to ensure that the
+buffer at B<out> is sufficiently large to accommodate the output data. Only full
+blocks of data (48 bytes) will be immediately processed and output by this
+function. Any remainder is held in the B<ctx> object and will be processed by a
+subsequent call to EVP_EncodeUpdate() or EVP_EncodeFinal(). To calculate the
+required size of the output buffer add together the value of B<inl> with the
+amount of unprocessed data held in B<ctx> and divide the result by 48 (ignore
+any remainder). This gives the number of blocks of data that will be processed.
+Ensure the output buffer contains 65 bytes of storage for each block, plus an
+additional byte for a NUL terminator. EVP_EncodeUpdate() may be called
+repeatedly to process large amounts of input data. In the event of an error
+EVP_EncodeUpdate() will set B<*outl> to 0.
+
+EVP_EncodeFinal() must be called at the end of an encoding operation. It will
+process any partial block of data remaining in the B<ctx> object. The output
+data will be stored in B<out> and the length of the data written will be stored
+in B<*outl>. It is the caller's responsibility to ensure that B<out> is
+sufficiently large to accommodate the output data which will never be more than
+65 bytes plus an additional NUL terminator (i.e. 66 bytes in total).
+
+EVP_EncodeBlock() encodes a full block of input data in B<f> and of length
+B<dlen> and stores it in B<t>. For every 3 bytes of input provided 4 bytes of
+output data will be produced. If B<dlen> is not divisible by 3 then the block is
+encoded as a final block of data and the output is padded such that it is always
+divisible by 4. Additionally a NUL terminator character will be added. For
+example if 16 bytes of input data is provided then 24 bytes of encoded data is
+created plus 1 byte for a NUL terminator (i.e. 25 bytes in total). The length of
+the data generated I<without> the NUL terminator is returned from the function.
+
+EVP_DecodeInit() initialises B<ctx> for the start of a new decoding operation.
+
+EVP_DecodeUpdate() decodes B<inl> characters of data found in the buffer pointed
+to by B<in>. The output is stored in the buffer B<out> and the number of bytes
+output is stored in B<*outl>. It is the caller's responsibility to ensure that
+the buffer at B<out> is sufficiently large to accommodate the output data. This
+function will attempt to decode as much data as possible in 4 byte chunks. Any
+whitespace, newline or carriage return characters are ignored. Any partial chunk
+of unprocessed data (1, 2 or 3 bytes) that remains at the end will be held in
+the B<ctx> object and processed by a subsequent call to EVP_DecodeUpdate(). If
+any illegal base 64 characters are encountered or if the base 64 padding
+character "=" is encountered in the middle of the data then the function returns
+-1 to indicate an error. A return value of 0 or 1 indicates successful
+processing of the data. A return value of 0 additionally indicates that the last
+input data characters processed included the base 64 padding character "=" and
+therefore no more non-padding character data is expected to be processed. For
+every 4 valid base 64 bytes processed (ignoring whitespace, carriage returns and
+line feeds), 3 bytes of binary output data will be produced (or less at the end
+of the data where the padding character "=" has been used).
+
+EVP_DecodeFinal() must be called at the end of a decoding operation. If there
+is any unprocessed data still in B<ctx> then the input data must not have been
+a multiple of 4 and therefore an error has occurred. The function will return -1
+in this case. Otherwise the function returns 1 on success.
+
+EVP_DecodeBlock() will decode the block of B<n> characters of base 64 data
+contained in B<f> and store the result in B<t>. Any leading whitespace will be
+trimmed as will any trailing whitespace, newlines, carriage returns or EOF
+characters. After such trimming the length of the data in B<f> must be divisbile
+by 4. For every 4 input bytes exactly 3 output bytes will be produced. The
+output will be padded with 0 bits if necessary to ensure that the output is
+always 3 bytes for every 4 input bytes. This function will return the length of
+the data decoded or -1 on error.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+EVP_EncodeBlock() returns the number of bytes encoded excluding the NUL
+terminator.
+
+EVP_DecodeUpdate() returns -1 on error and 0 or 1 on success. If 0 is returned
+then no more non-padding base 64 characters are expected.
+
+EVP_DecodeFinal() returns -1 on error or 1 on success.
+
+EVP_DecodeBlock() returns the length of the data decoded or -1 on error.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<evp(3)>
+
+=cut
diff --git a/doc/crypto/evp.pod b/doc/crypto/evp.pod
index 29fab9fd5173..303cd95a70d1 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/evp.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/evp.pod
@@ -61,6 +61,10 @@ based encryption. Careful selection of the parameters will provide a PKCS#5 PBKD
implementation. However, new applications should not typically use this (preferring, for example,
PBKDF2 from PCKS#5).
+The L<B<EVP_Encode>I<...>|EVP_EncodeInit(3)> and
+L<B<EVP_Decode>I<...>|EVP_EncodeInit(3)> functions implement base 64 encoding
+and decoding.
+
Algorithms are loaded with L<OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(3)|OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(3)>.
All the symmetric algorithms (ciphers), digests and asymmetric algorithms
@@ -86,6 +90,7 @@ L<EVP_SealInit(3)|EVP_SealInit(3)>,
L<EVP_DigestSignInit(3)|EVP_DigestSignInit(3)>,
L<EVP_SignInit(3)|EVP_SignInit(3)>,
L<EVP_VerifyInit(3)|EVP_VerifyInit(3)>,
+L<EVP_EncodeInit(3)>,
L<EVP_PKEY_new(3)|EVP_PKEY_new(3)>,
L<EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(3)|EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(3)>,
L<EVP_PKEY_keygen(3)|EVP_PKEY_keygen(3)>,
diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..80ba8ab9c499
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos, SSL_set_alpn_protos, SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb,
+SSL_select_next_proto, SSL_get0_alpn_selected - handle application layer
+protocol negotiation (ALPN)
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *protos,
+ unsigned protos_len);
+ int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *protos,
+ unsigned protos_len);
+ void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+ const unsigned char **out,
+ unsigned char *outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned int inlen,
+ void *arg), void *arg);
+ int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
+ const unsigned char *server,
+ unsigned int server_len,
+ const unsigned char *client,
+ unsigned int client_len)
+ void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **data,
+ unsigned int *len);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos() and SSL_set_alpn_protos() are used by the client to
+set the list of protocols available to be negotiated. The B<protos> must be in
+protocol-list format, described below. The length of B<protos> is specified in
+B<protos_len>.
+
+SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb() sets the application callback B<cb> used by a
+server to select which protocol to use for the incoming connection. When B<cb>
+is NULL, ALPN is not used. The B<arg> value is a pointer which is passed to
+the application callback.
+
+B<cb> is the application defined callback. The B<in>, B<inlen> parameters are a
+vector in protocol-list format. The value of the B<out>, B<outlen> vector
+should be set to the value of a single protocol selected from the B<in>,
+B<inlen> vector. The B<arg> parameter is the pointer set via
+SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb().
+
+SSL_select_next_proto() is a helper function used to select protocols. It
+implements the standard protocol selection. It is expected that this function
+is called from the application callback B<cb>. The protocol data in B<server>,
+B<server_len> and B<client>, B<client_len> must be in the protocol-list format
+described below. The first item in the B<server>, B<server_len> list that
+matches an item in the B<client>, B<client_len> list is selected, and returned
+in B<out>, B<outlen>. The B<out> value will point into either B<server> or
+B<client>, so it should be copied immediately. If no match is found, the first
+item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in B<out>, B<outlen>. This
+function can also be used in the NPN callback.
+
+SSL_get0_alpn_selected() returns a pointer to the selected protocol in B<data>
+with length B<len>. It is not NUL-terminated. B<data> is set to NULL and B<len>
+is set to 0 if no protocol has been selected. B<data> must not be freed.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The protocol-lists must be in wire-format, which is defined as a vector of
+non-empty, 8-bit length-prefixed, byte strings. The length-prefix byte is not
+included in the length. Each string is limited to 255 bytes. A byte-string
+length of 0 is invalid. A truncated byte-string is invalid. The length of the
+vector is not in the vector itself, but in a separate variable.
+
+Example:
+
+ unsigned char vector[] = {
+ 6, 's', 'p', 'd', 'y', '/', '1',
+ 8, 'h', 't', 't', 'p', '/', '1', '.', '1'
+ };
+ unsigned int length = sizeof(vector);
+
+The ALPN callback is executed after the servername callback; as that servername
+callback may update the SSL_CTX, and subsequently, the ALPN callback.
+
+If there is no ALPN proposed in the ClientHello, the ALPN callback is not
+invoked.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos() and SSL_set_alpn_protos() return 0 on success, and
+non-0 on failure. WARNING: these functions reverse the return value convention.
+
+SSL_select_next_proto() returns one of the following:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED
+
+A match was found and is returned in B<out>, B<outlen>.
+
+=item OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP
+
+No match was found. The first item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in
+B<out>, B<outlen>.
+
+=back
+
+The ALPN select callback B<cb>, must return one of the following:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
+
+ALPN protocol selected.
+
+=item SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
+
+ALPN protocol not selected.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(3)>
+
+=cut
diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo.pod
index 318e052e2b25..caeb28de765b 100644
--- a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo.pod
+++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo.pod
@@ -30,6 +30,14 @@ must consist of a 2-byte Extension Type, a 2-byte length, and then length
bytes of extension_data. Each PEM extension name must begin with the phrase
"BEGIN SERVERINFO FOR ".
+If more than one certificate (RSA/DSA) is installed using
+SSL_CTX_use_certificate(), the serverinfo extension will be loaded into the
+last certificate installed. If e.g. the last item was a RSA certificate, the
+loaded serverinfo extension data will be loaded for that certificate. To
+use the serverinfo extension for multiple certificates,
+SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo() needs to be called multiple times, once B<after>
+each time a certificate is loaded.
+
=head1 NOTES
=head1 RETURN VALUES
diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
index d1fc716d5c5c..5d26c949265f 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -1459,6 +1459,8 @@ int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
* plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
*/
buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length);
+ if (buffer == NULL)
+ return -1;
bp = buffer;
/* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
diff --git a/ssl/s2_lib.c b/ssl/s2_lib.c
index a8036b357f0e..88e67f083a1b 100644
--- a/ssl/s2_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/s2_lib.c
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL const SSL_CIPHER ssl2_ciphers[] = {
SSL_RC4,
SSL_MD5,
SSL_SSLV2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
0,
128,
128,
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL const SSL_CIPHER ssl2_ciphers[] = {
SSL_RC4,
SSL_MD5,
SSL_SSLV2,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL2_CF_5_BYTE_ENC,
40,
128,
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL const SSL_CIPHER ssl2_ciphers[] = {
SSL_RC2,
SSL_MD5,
SSL_SSLV2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
0,
128,
128,
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL const SSL_CIPHER ssl2_ciphers[] = {
SSL_RC2,
SSL_MD5,
SSL_SSLV2,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL2_CF_5_BYTE_ENC,
40,
128,
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL const SSL_CIPHER ssl2_ciphers[] = {
SSL_IDEA,
SSL_MD5,
SSL_SSLV2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
0,
128,
128,
@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL const SSL_CIPHER ssl2_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_MD5,
SSL_SSLV2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
0,
56,
56,
@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL const SSL_CIPHER ssl2_ciphers[] = {
SSL_3DES,
SSL_MD5,
SSL_SSLV2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
0,
112,
168,
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL const SSL_CIPHER ssl2_ciphers[] = {
SSL_RC4,
SSL_MD5,
SSL_SSLV2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
SSL2_CF_8_BYTE_ENC,
64,
64,
diff --git a/ssl/s2_meth.c b/ssl/s2_meth.c
index b312f1726612..73885b7ecff8 100644
--- a/ssl/s2_meth.c
+++ b/ssl/s2_meth.c
@@ -57,7 +57,8 @@
*/
#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2_METHOD
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
# include <stdio.h>
# include <openssl/objects.h>
@@ -72,7 +73,16 @@ static const SSL_METHOD *ssl2_get_method(int ver)
IMPLEMENT_ssl2_meth_func(SSLv2_method,
ssl2_accept, ssl2_connect, ssl2_get_method)
-#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 */
+
+# else /* !OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 */
+
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_method(void) { return NULL; }
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_client_method(void) { return NULL; }
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_server_method(void) { return NULL; }
+
+# endif
+
+#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_SSL2_METHOD */
# if PEDANTIC
static void *dummy = &dummy;
diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index 04cc9f54a92d..19dc8648b952 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -2199,6 +2199,7 @@ int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
+ xn = NULL;
p += l;
nc += l + 2;
@@ -2222,6 +2223,7 @@ int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
err:
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
done:
+ X509_NAME_free(xn);
if (ca_sk != NULL)
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
return (ret);
diff --git a/ssl/s3_lib.c b/ssl/s3_lib.c
index 4aac3b279280..872e636af9e1 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_lib.c
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_RC4,
SSL_MD5,
SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
40,
128,
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_RC2,
SSL_MD5,
SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
40,
128,
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
40,
56,
@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
56,
56,
@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
40,
56,
@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
56,
56,
@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
40,
56,
@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
56,
56,
@@ -452,7 +452,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
40,
56,
@@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
56,
56,
@@ -504,7 +504,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
40,
56,
@@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
56,
56,
@@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_RC4,
SSL_MD5,
SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
40,
128,
@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_RC4,
SSL_MD5,
SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
128,
128,
@@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
40,
128,
@@ -608,7 +608,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
56,
56,
@@ -625,7 +625,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_3DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
112,
168,
@@ -695,7 +695,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
56,
56,
@@ -761,7 +761,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_MD5,
SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
56,
56,
@@ -827,7 +827,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
40,
56,
@@ -845,7 +845,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_RC2,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
40,
128,
@@ -863,7 +863,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_RC4,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
40,
128,
@@ -881,7 +881,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_MD5,
SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
40,
56,
@@ -899,7 +899,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_RC2,
SSL_MD5,
SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
40,
128,
@@ -917,7 +917,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_RC4,
SSL_MD5,
SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
40,
128,
@@ -1011,7 +1011,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_AES128,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
128,
128,
@@ -1106,7 +1106,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_AES256,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
256,
256,
@@ -1302,7 +1302,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_CAMELLIA128,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
128,
128,
@@ -1322,7 +1322,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_RC4,
SSL_MD5,
SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
56,
128,
@@ -1338,7 +1338,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_RC2,
SSL_MD5,
SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
56,
128,
@@ -1356,7 +1356,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
56,
56,
@@ -1374,7 +1374,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
56,
56,
@@ -1392,7 +1392,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_RC4,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
56,
128,
@@ -1410,7 +1410,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_RC4,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
56,
128,
@@ -1525,7 +1525,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_AES128,
SSL_SHA256,
SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
128,
128,
@@ -1541,7 +1541,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_AES256,
SSL_SHA256,
SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
256,
256,
@@ -1694,7 +1694,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_CAMELLIA256,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
256,
256,
@@ -1860,7 +1860,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_SEED,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
128,
128,
@@ -2040,7 +2040,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_AES128GCM,
SSL_AEAD,
SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
128,
128,
@@ -2056,7 +2056,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_AES256GCM,
SSL_AEAD,
SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
256,
256,
@@ -2424,7 +2424,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_RC4,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
128,
128,
@@ -2440,7 +2440,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_3DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
112,
168,
@@ -2456,7 +2456,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_AES128,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
128,
128,
@@ -2472,7 +2472,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_AES256,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
256,
256,
diff --git a/ssl/ssl.h b/ssl/ssl.h
index 04d4007eeb8e..5ef56faa5099 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl.h
@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ extern "C" {
* The following cipher list is used by default. It also is substituted when
* an application-defined cipher list string starts with 'DEFAULT'.
*/
-# define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST "ALL:!EXPORT:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2"
+# define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST "ALL:!EXPORT:!LOW:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2"
/*
* As of OpenSSL 1.0.0, ssl_create_cipher_list() in ssl/ssl_ciph.c always
* starts with a reasonable order, and all we have to do for DEFAULT is
@@ -2345,7 +2345,7 @@ const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s);
/* This sets the 'default' SSL version that SSL_new() will create */
int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth);
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2_METHOD
const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_method(void); /* SSLv2 */
const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_server_method(void); /* SSLv2 */
const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_client_method(void); /* SSLv2 */
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_cert.c b/ssl/ssl_cert.c
index a73f866cb9a7..f48ebaecc067 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_cert.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_cert.c
@@ -504,6 +504,8 @@ void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
custom_exts_free(&c->cli_ext);
custom_exts_free(&c->srv_ext);
+ if (c->alpn_proposed)
+ OPENSSL_free(c->alpn_proposed);
#endif
OPENSSL_free(c);
}
@@ -1057,13 +1059,18 @@ static int ssl_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x)
unsigned char *p;
n = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, (int)(n + (*l) + 3))) {
+ if (n < 0 || !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, (int)(n + (*l) + 3))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
return 0;
}
p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]);
l2n3(n, p);
- i2d_X509(x, &p);
+ n = i2d_X509(x, &p);
+ if (n < 0) {
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
*l += n + 3;
return 1;
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
index 6957bda78509..302464e643ea 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
@@ -235,8 +235,7 @@ static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[] = {
* "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" (does *not* include ciphersuites not found in
* ALL!)
*/
- {0, SSL_TXT_CMPDEF, 0, 0, SSL_aNULL, ~SSL_eNULL, 0, ~SSL_SSLV2,
- SSL_EXP_MASK, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_CMPDEF, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT, 0, 0, 0},
/*
* key exchange aliases (some of those using only a single bit here
@@ -1030,10 +1029,6 @@ static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(unsigned long cipher_id,
if (cipher_id && cipher_id != cp->id)
continue;
#endif
- if (algo_strength == SSL_EXP_MASK && SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cp))
- goto ok;
- if (alg_ssl == ~SSL_SSLV2 && cp->algorithm_ssl == SSL_SSLV2)
- goto ok;
if (alg_mkey && !(alg_mkey & cp->algorithm_mkey))
continue;
if (alg_auth && !(alg_auth & cp->algorithm_auth))
@@ -1050,10 +1045,11 @@ static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(unsigned long cipher_id,
if ((algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK)
&& !(algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK & cp->algo_strength))
continue;
+ if ((algo_strength & SSL_NOT_DEFAULT)
+ && !(cp->algo_strength & SSL_NOT_DEFAULT))
+ continue;
}
- ok:
-
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Action = %d\n", rule);
#endif
@@ -1337,6 +1333,10 @@ static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK;
}
+ if (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_NOT_DEFAULT) {
+ algo_strength |= SSL_NOT_DEFAULT;
+ }
+
if (ca_list[j]->valid) {
/*
* explicit ciphersuite found; its protocol version does not
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index f1279bbf9103..fd94325bb3a4 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -244,7 +244,16 @@ int SSL_clear(SSL *s)
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
s->first_packet = 0;
-
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (s->cert != NULL) {
+ if (s->cert->alpn_proposed) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->cert->alpn_proposed);
+ s->cert->alpn_proposed = NULL;
+ }
+ s->cert->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
+ s->cert->alpn_sent = 0;
+ }
+#endif
#if 1
/*
* Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if so, revert
@@ -3174,6 +3183,12 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx)
ssl->cert->ciphers_rawlen = ocert->ciphers_rawlen;
ocert->ciphers_raw = NULL;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ ssl->cert->alpn_proposed = ocert->alpn_proposed;
+ ssl->cert->alpn_proposed_len = ocert->alpn_proposed_len;
+ ocert->alpn_proposed = NULL;
+ ssl->cert->alpn_sent = ocert->alpn_sent;
+#endif
ssl_cert_free(ocert);
}
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
index a8e4efceba5f..747e718a52bf 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
@@ -436,8 +436,9 @@
# define SSL_MEDIUM 0x00000040L
# define SSL_HIGH 0x00000080L
# define SSL_FIPS 0x00000100L
+# define SSL_NOT_DEFAULT 0x00000200L
-/* we have used 000001ff - 23 bits left to go */
+/* we have used 000003ff - 22 bits left to go */
/*-
* Macros to check the export status and cipher strength for export ciphers.
@@ -687,6 +688,10 @@ typedef struct cert_st {
custom_ext_methods cli_ext;
custom_ext_methods srv_ext;
int references; /* >1 only if SSL_copy_session_id is used */
+ /* non-optimal, but here due to compatibility */
+ unsigned char *alpn_proposed; /* server */
+ unsigned int alpn_proposed_len;
+ int alpn_sent; /* client */
} CERT;
typedef struct sess_cert_st {
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_rsa.c b/ssl/ssl_rsa.c
index b0f75c913f91..82022470bfd7 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_rsa.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_rsa.c
@@ -841,7 +841,7 @@ static int serverinfo_srv_add_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
return 0; /* No extension found, don't send extension */
return 1; /* Send extension */
}
- return -1; /* No serverinfo data found, don't send
+ return 0; /* No serverinfo data found, don't send
* extension */
}
@@ -870,12 +870,26 @@ static int serverinfo_process_buffer(const unsigned char *serverinfo,
/* Register callbacks for extensions */
ext_type = (serverinfo[0] << 8) + serverinfo[1];
- if (ctx && !SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(ctx, ext_type,
- serverinfo_srv_add_cb,
- NULL, NULL,
- serverinfo_srv_parse_cb,
- NULL))
- return 0;
+ if (ctx) {
+ int have_ext_cbs = 0;
+ size_t i;
+ custom_ext_methods *exts = &ctx->cert->srv_ext;
+ custom_ext_method *meth = exts->meths;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < exts->meths_count; i++, meth++) {
+ if (ext_type == meth->ext_type) {
+ have_ext_cbs = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!have_ext_cbs && !SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(ctx, ext_type,
+ serverinfo_srv_add_cb,
+ NULL, NULL,
+ serverinfo_srv_parse_cb,
+ NULL))
+ return 0;
+ }
serverinfo += 2;
serverinfo_length -= 2;
diff --git a/ssl/ssltest.c b/ssl/ssltest.c
index aaf6c6bd896d..1db84ad5f9aa 100644
--- a/ssl/ssltest.c
+++ b/ssl/ssltest.c
@@ -217,6 +217,9 @@
# define TEST_CLIENT_CERT "../apps/client.pem"
#endif
+static SSL_CTX *s_ctx = NULL;
+static SSL_CTX *s_ctx2 = NULL;
+
/*
* There is really no standard for this, so let's assign some tentative
* numbers. In any case, these numbers are only for this test
@@ -300,9 +303,51 @@ static BIO *bio_err = NULL;
static BIO *bio_stdout = NULL;
static const char *alpn_client;
-static const char *alpn_server;
+static char *alpn_server;
+static char *alpn_server2;
static const char *alpn_expected;
static unsigned char *alpn_selected;
+static const char *sn_client;
+static const char *sn_server1;
+static const char *sn_server2;
+static int sn_expect = 0;
+
+static int servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
+{
+ const char *servername = SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name);
+ if (sn_server2 == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "Servername 2 is NULL\n");
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+ }
+
+ if (servername != NULL) {
+ if (s_ctx2 != NULL && sn_server2 != NULL &&
+ !strcasecmp(servername, sn_server2)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "Switching server context.\n");
+ SSL_set_SSL_CTX(s, s_ctx2);
+ }
+ }
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+}
+static int verify_servername(SSL *client, SSL *server)
+{
+ /* just need to see if sn_context is what we expect */
+ SSL_CTX* ctx = SSL_get_SSL_CTX(server);
+ if (sn_expect == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (sn_expect == 1 && ctx == s_ctx)
+ return 0;
+ if (sn_expect == 2 && ctx == s_ctx2)
+ return 0;
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "Servername: expected context %d\n", sn_expect);
+ if (ctx == s_ctx2)
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "Servername: context is 2\n");
+ else if (ctx == s_ctx)
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "Servername: context is 1\n");
+ else
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "Servername: context is unknown\n");
+ return -1;
+}
/*-
* next_protos_parse parses a comma separated list of strings into a string
@@ -350,11 +395,12 @@ static int cb_server_alpn(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out,
{
unsigned char *protos;
unsigned short protos_len;
+ char* alpn_str = arg;
- protos = next_protos_parse(&protos_len, alpn_server);
+ protos = next_protos_parse(&protos_len, alpn_str);
if (protos == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "failed to parser ALPN server protocol string: %s\n",
- alpn_server);
+ alpn_str);
abort();
}
@@ -417,8 +463,17 @@ static int verify_alpn(SSL *client, SSL *server)
BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "', server: '");
BIO_write(bio_stdout, server_proto, server_proto_len);
BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "'\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "ALPN configured: client: '%s', server: '%s'\n",
- alpn_client, alpn_server);
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "ALPN configured: client: '%s', server: ",
+ alpn_client);
+ if (SSL_get_SSL_CTX(server) == s_ctx2) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "'%s'\n",
+ alpn_server2);
+ } else if (SSL_get_SSL_CTX(server) == s_ctx){
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "'%s'\n",
+ alpn_server);
+ } else {
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "unknown\n");
+ }
return -1;
}
@@ -756,8 +811,15 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
" -custom_ext - try various custom extension callbacks\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -alpn_client <string> - have client side offer ALPN\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -alpn_server <string> - have server side offer ALPN\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -alpn_server1 <string> - alias for -alpn_server\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -alpn_server2 <string> - have server side context 2 offer ALPN\n");
fprintf(stderr,
" -alpn_expected <string> - the ALPN protocol that should be negotiated\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -sn_client <string> - have client request this servername\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -sn_server1 <string> - have server context 1 respond to this servername\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -sn_server2 <string> - have server context 2 respond to this servername\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -sn_expect1 - expected server 1\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -sn_expect2 - expected server 2\n");
}
static void print_details(SSL *c_ssl, const char *prefix)
@@ -896,7 +958,6 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
char *named_curve = NULL;
#endif
- SSL_CTX *s_ctx = NULL;
SSL_CTX *c_ctx = NULL;
const SSL_METHOD *meth = NULL;
SSL *c_ssl, *s_ssl;
@@ -1151,14 +1212,35 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
if (--argc < 1)
goto bad;
alpn_client = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-alpn_server") == 0) {
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-alpn_server") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(*argv, "-alpn_server1") == 0) {
if (--argc < 1)
goto bad;
alpn_server = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-alpn_server2") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ alpn_server2 = *(++argv);
} else if (strcmp(*argv, "-alpn_expected") == 0) {
if (--argc < 1)
goto bad;
alpn_expected = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-sn_client") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ sn_client = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-sn_server1") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ sn_server1 = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-sn_server2") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ sn_server2 = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-sn_expect1") == 0) {
+ sn_expect = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-sn_expect2") == 0) {
+ sn_expect = 2;
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "unknown option %s\n", *argv);
badop = 1;
@@ -1304,7 +1386,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
c_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth);
s_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth);
- if ((c_ctx == NULL) || (s_ctx == NULL)) {
+ s_ctx2 = SSL_CTX_new(meth); /* no SSL_CTX_dup! */
+ if ((c_ctx == NULL) || (s_ctx == NULL) || (s_ctx2 == NULL)) {
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
@@ -1312,7 +1395,9 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
if (cipher != NULL) {
SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(c_ctx, cipher);
SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(s_ctx, cipher);
+ SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(s_ctx2, cipher);
}
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (!no_dhe) {
if (dhe1024dsa) {
@@ -1320,12 +1405,14 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
* use SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE to avoid small subgroup attacks
*/
SSL_CTX_set_options(s_ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(s_ctx2, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
dh = get_dh1024dsa();
} else if (dhe512)
dh = get_dh512();
else
dh = get_dh1024();
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(s_ctx, dh);
+ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(s_ctx2, dh);
DH_free(dh);
}
#else
@@ -1353,7 +1440,9 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
}
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(s_ctx, ecdh);
+ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(s_ctx2, ecdh);
SSL_CTX_set_options(s_ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE);
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(s_ctx2, SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE);
EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
}
#else
@@ -1362,15 +1451,18 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(s_ctx, tmp_rsa_cb);
+ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(s_ctx2, tmp_rsa_cb);
#endif
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(c_ctx, opaque_prf_input_cb);
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s_ctx, opaque_prf_input_cb);
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s_ctx2, opaque_prf_input_cb);
/* or &co2 or NULL */
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg(c_ctx, &co1);
/* or &so2 or NULL */
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg(s_ctx, &so1);
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg(s_ctx2, &so1);
#endif
if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(s_ctx, server_cert, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)) {
@@ -1383,6 +1475,16 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
goto end;
}
+ if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(s_ctx2, server_cert, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ } else if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(s_ctx2,
+ (server_key ? server_key :
+ server_cert),
+ SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
if (client_auth) {
SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(c_ctx, client_cert, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(c_ctx,
@@ -1392,6 +1494,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
if ((!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(s_ctx, CAfile, CApath)) ||
(!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(s_ctx)) ||
+ (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(s_ctx2, CAfile, CApath)) ||
+ (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(s_ctx2)) ||
(!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(c_ctx, CAfile, CApath)) ||
(!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(c_ctx))) {
/* fprintf(stderr,"SSL_load_verify_locations\n"); */
@@ -1406,6 +1510,11 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
verify_callback);
SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(s_ctx, app_verify_callback,
&app_verify_arg);
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(s_ctx2,
+ SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT,
+ verify_callback);
+ SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(s_ctx2, app_verify_callback,
+ &app_verify_arg);
}
if (server_auth) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "server authentication\n");
@@ -1418,6 +1527,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
int session_id_context = 0;
SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(s_ctx, (void *)&session_id_context,
sizeof session_id_context);
+ SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(s_ctx2, (void *)&session_id_context,
+ sizeof session_id_context);
}
/* Use PSK only if PSK key is given */
@@ -1436,6 +1547,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(c_ctx, psk_client_callback);
SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(s_ctx, psk_server_callback);
+ SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(s_ctx2, psk_server_callback);
if (debug)
BIO_printf(bio_err, "setting PSK identity hint to s_ctx\n");
if (!SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(s_ctx, "ctx server identity_hint")) {
@@ -1443,6 +1555,11 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
+ if (!SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(s_ctx2, "ctx server identity_hint")) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting PSK identity hint to s_ctx2\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
#endif
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
@@ -1461,8 +1578,11 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
if (srp_server_arg.expected_user != NULL) {
SSL_CTX_set_verify(s_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, verify_callback);
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(s_ctx2, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, verify_callback);
SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(s_ctx, &srp_server_arg);
+ SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(s_ctx2, &srp_server_arg);
SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(s_ctx, ssl_srp_server_param_cb);
+ SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(s_ctx2, ssl_srp_server_param_cb);
}
#endif
@@ -1475,11 +1595,16 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
NULL, NULL, NULL,
serverinfo_cli_parse_cb, NULL);
- if (serverinfo_file)
+ if (serverinfo_file) {
if (!SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file(s_ctx, serverinfo_file)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "missing serverinfo file\n");
goto end;
}
+ if (!SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file(s_ctx2, serverinfo_file)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "missing serverinfo file\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
if (custom_ext) {
SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext(c_ctx, CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_0,
@@ -1515,10 +1640,29 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
custom_ext_3_srv_add_cb,
NULL, NULL,
custom_ext_3_srv_parse_cb, NULL);
+
+ SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(s_ctx2, CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_0,
+ custom_ext_0_srv_add_cb,
+ NULL, NULL,
+ custom_ext_0_srv_parse_cb, NULL);
+ SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(s_ctx2, CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_1,
+ custom_ext_1_srv_add_cb,
+ NULL, NULL,
+ custom_ext_1_srv_parse_cb, NULL);
+ SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(s_ctx2, CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_2,
+ custom_ext_2_srv_add_cb,
+ NULL, NULL,
+ custom_ext_2_srv_parse_cb, NULL);
+ SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(s_ctx2, CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_3,
+ custom_ext_3_srv_add_cb,
+ NULL, NULL,
+ custom_ext_3_srv_parse_cb, NULL);
}
if (alpn_server)
- SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(s_ctx, cb_server_alpn, NULL);
+ SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(s_ctx, cb_server_alpn, alpn_server);
+ if (alpn_server2)
+ SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(s_ctx2, cb_server_alpn, alpn_server2);
if (alpn_client) {
unsigned short alpn_len;
@@ -1532,9 +1676,15 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
OPENSSL_free(alpn);
}
+ if (sn_server1 || sn_server2)
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(s_ctx, servername_cb);
+
c_ssl = SSL_new(c_ctx);
s_ssl = SSL_new(s_ctx);
+ if (sn_client)
+ SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(c_ssl, sn_client);
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
if (c_ssl && c_ssl->kssl_ctx) {
char localhost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 2];
@@ -1588,12 +1738,19 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
#endif
}
+ if (verify_alpn(c_ssl, s_ssl) < 0)
+ ret = 1;
+ if (verify_servername(c_ssl, s_ssl) < 0)
+ ret = 1;
+
SSL_free(s_ssl);
SSL_free(c_ssl);
end:
if (s_ctx != NULL)
SSL_CTX_free(s_ctx);
+ if (s_ctx2 != NULL)
+ SSL_CTX_free(s_ctx2);
if (c_ctx != NULL)
SSL_CTX_free(c_ctx);
@@ -1961,10 +2118,6 @@ int doit_biopair(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long count,
ret = 1;
goto err;
}
- if (verify_alpn(c_ssl, s_ssl) < 0) {
- ret = 1;
- goto err;
- }
if (custom_ext_error) {
ret = 1;
diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index d9ba99d73584..dd5bd0050d89 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -1539,6 +1539,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
+ s->cert->alpn_sent = 1;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
@@ -1906,7 +1907,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
/*
- * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
+ * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to save the ALPN extension in a
* ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
* and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
* alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
@@ -1917,12 +1918,6 @@ static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
{
unsigned i;
unsigned proto_len;
- const unsigned char *selected;
- unsigned char selected_len;
- int r;
-
- if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
- return 0;
if (data_len < 2)
goto parse_error;
@@ -1953,19 +1948,15 @@ static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
i += proto_len;
}
- r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
- s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
- if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
- if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
- s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
- if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return -1;
- }
- memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
- s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
+ if (s->cert->alpn_proposed != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->cert->alpn_proposed);
+ s->cert->alpn_proposed = OPENSSL_malloc(data_len);
+ if (s->cert->alpn_proposed == NULL) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return -1;
}
+ memcpy(s->cert->alpn_proposed, data, data_len);
+ s->cert->alpn_proposed_len = data_len;
return 0;
parse_error:
@@ -1973,6 +1964,43 @@ static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
return -1;
}
+/*
+ * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
+ * ret: a pointer to the TLSEXT return value: SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_*
+ * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
+ * returns 1 on success, 0 on failure: al/ret set only on failure
+ */
+static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *ret, int *al)
+{
+ const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
+ unsigned char selected_len = 0;
+
+ if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->cert->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
+ int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
+ s->cert->alpn_proposed,
+ s->cert->alpn_proposed_len,
+ s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
+
+ if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+ s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
+ if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ *ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
+ s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+# endif
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
unsigned char *limit, int *al)
{
@@ -1992,6 +2020,12 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
}
+ s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
+ if (s->cert->alpn_proposed) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->cert->alpn_proposed);
+ s->cert->alpn_proposed = NULL;
+ }
+ s->cert->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
@@ -2359,8 +2393,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
- s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
- s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
+ s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
/*-
* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
* renegotiation.
@@ -2383,13 +2416,9 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
# endif
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
- s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
+ s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
return 0;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
-# endif
}
/* session ticket processed earlier */
@@ -2698,7 +2727,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
unsigned len;
/* We must have requested it. */
- if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
+ if (!s->cert->alpn_sent) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
return 0;
}
@@ -2863,6 +2892,7 @@ int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
}
# endif
+ s->cert->alpn_sent = 0;
return 1;
}
@@ -3066,6 +3096,10 @@ int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
} else
s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+ if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, &ret, &al)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
err:
switch (ret) {
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
@@ -3415,8 +3449,10 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
- if (!sdec || EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
+ if (sdec == NULL
+ || EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(sdec);
return -1;
}
if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
@@ -3856,6 +3892,8 @@ int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
* plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
*/
buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
+ if (buffer == NULL)
+ return -1;
bp = buffer;
/* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
diff --git a/util/libeay.num b/util/libeay.num
index e5b3c6ea841c..2094ab364c8e 100755
--- a/util/libeay.num
+++ b/util/libeay.num
@@ -1065,8 +1065,8 @@ d2i_ASN1_BMPSTRING 1092 EXIST::FUNCTION:
i2d_ASN1_BMPSTRING 1093 EXIST::FUNCTION:
BIO_f_ber 1094 NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
BN_init 1095 EXIST::FUNCTION:
-COMP_CTX_new 1096 EXIST::FUNCTION:
-COMP_CTX_free 1097 EXIST::FUNCTION:
+COMP_CTX_new 1096 EXIST::FUNCTION:COMP
+COMP_CTX_free 1097 EXIST::FUNCTION:COMP
COMP_CTX_compress_block 1098 NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
COMP_CTX_expand_block 1099 NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index 1100 EXIST::FUNCTION:
@@ -1113,10 +1113,10 @@ PKCS7_digest_from_attributes 1140 EXIST::FUNCTION:
PKCS7_get_attribute 1141 EXIST::FUNCTION:
PKCS7_get_issuer_and_serial 1142 EXIST::FUNCTION:
PKCS7_get_signed_attribute 1143 EXIST::FUNCTION:
-COMP_compress_block 1144 EXIST::FUNCTION:
-COMP_expand_block 1145 EXIST::FUNCTION:
-COMP_rle 1146 EXIST::FUNCTION:
-COMP_zlib 1147 EXIST::FUNCTION:
+COMP_compress_block 1144 EXIST::FUNCTION:COMP
+COMP_expand_block 1145 EXIST::FUNCTION:COMP
+COMP_rle 1146 EXIST::FUNCTION:COMP
+COMP_zlib 1147 EXIST::FUNCTION:COMP
ms_time_diff 1148 NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
ms_time_new 1149 NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
ms_time_free 1150 NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
@@ -1945,7 +1945,7 @@ ENGINE_get_ctrl_function 2521 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
ENGINE_set_ctrl_function 2522 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
BN_pseudo_rand_range 2523 EXIST::FUNCTION:
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb 2524 EXIST::FUNCTION:
-ERR_load_COMP_strings 2525 EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ERR_load_COMP_strings 2525 EXIST::FUNCTION:COMP
PKCS12_item_decrypt_d2i 2526 EXIST::FUNCTION:
ASN1_UTF8STRING_it 2527 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
ASN1_UTF8STRING_it 2527 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
@@ -3545,8 +3545,8 @@ X509at_get0_data_by_OBJ 3931 EXIST::FUNCTION:
ASN1_TYPE_set1 3932 EXIST::FUNCTION:
ASN1_STRING_set0 3933 EXIST::FUNCTION:
i2d_X509_ALGORS 3934 EXIST::FUNCTION:
-BIO_f_zlib 3935 EXIST:ZLIB:FUNCTION:
-COMP_zlib_cleanup 3936 EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BIO_f_zlib 3935 EXIST:ZLIB:FUNCTION:COMP
+COMP_zlib_cleanup 3936 EXIST::FUNCTION:COMP
d2i_X509_ALGORS 3937 EXIST::FUNCTION:
CMS_ReceiptRequest_free 3938 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
PEM_write_CMS 3939 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION:CMS
diff --git a/util/mk1mf.pl b/util/mk1mf.pl
index 2629a1c5dd64..128a405efc35 100755
--- a/util/mk1mf.pl
+++ b/util/mk1mf.pl
@@ -291,8 +291,9 @@ $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_FIPS" if $fips;
$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE" if $no_jpake;
$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_EC2M" if $no_ec2m;
$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS" if $no_weak_ssl;
-$cflags.= " -DZLIB" if $zlib_opt;
-$cflags.= " -DZLIB_SHARED" if $zlib_opt == 2;
+$cflags.=" -DZLIB" if $zlib_opt;
+$cflags.=" -DZLIB_SHARED" if $zlib_opt == 2;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_COMP" if $no_comp;
if ($no_static_engine)
{
@@ -850,6 +851,7 @@ sub var_add
return("") if $no_gost && $dir =~ /\/ccgost/;
return("") if $no_cms && $dir =~ /\/cms/;
return("") if $no_jpake && $dir =~ /\/jpake/;
+ return("") if $no_comp && $dir =~ /\/comp/;
if ($no_des && $dir =~ /\/des/)
{
if ($val =~ /read_pwd/)
@@ -1198,6 +1200,7 @@ sub read_options
"nw-mwasm" => \$nw_mwasm,
"gaswin" => \$gaswin,
"no-ssl2" => \$no_ssl2,
+ "no-ssl2-method" => 0,
"no-ssl3" => \$no_ssl3,
"no-ssl3-method" => 0,
"no-tlsext" => \$no_tlsext,
@@ -1242,6 +1245,7 @@ sub read_options
"no-unit-test" => 0,
"no-libunbound" => 0,
"no-multiblock" => 0,
+ "no-comp" => \$no_comp,
"fips" => \$fips
);
@@ -1259,7 +1263,6 @@ sub read_options
}
}
}
- elsif (/^no-comp$/) { $xcflags = "-DOPENSSL_NO_COMP $xcflags"; }
elsif (/^enable-zlib$/) { $zlib_opt = 1 if $zlib_opt == 0 }
elsif (/^enable-zlib-dynamic$/)
{
diff --git a/util/mkdef.pl b/util/mkdef.pl
index c57c7f748eda..b9b159a00c80 100755
--- a/util/mkdef.pl
+++ b/util/mkdef.pl
@@ -107,6 +107,8 @@ my @known_algorithms = ( "RC2", "RC4", "RC5", "IDEA", "DES", "BF",
"CAPIENG",
# SSL v2
"SSL2",
+ # SSL v2 method
+ "SSL2_METHOD",
# SSL v3 method
"SSL3_METHOD",
# JPAKE
@@ -145,7 +147,7 @@ my $no_fp_api; my $no_static_engine=1; my $no_gmp; my $no_deprecated;
my $no_rfc3779; my $no_psk; my $no_tlsext; my $no_cms; my $no_capieng;
my $no_jpake; my $no_srp; my $no_ssl2; my $no_ec2m; my $no_nistp_gcc;
my $no_nextprotoneg; my $no_sctp; my $no_srtp; my $no_ssl_trace;
-my $no_unit_test; my $no_ssl3_method;
+my $no_unit_test; my $no_ssl3_method; my $no_ssl2_method;
my $fips;
@@ -240,6 +242,7 @@ foreach (@ARGV, split(/ /, $options))
elsif (/^no-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128$/) { $no_nistp_gcc=1; }
elsif (/^no-nextprotoneg$/) { $no_nextprotoneg=1; }
elsif (/^no-ssl2$/) { $no_ssl2=1; }
+ elsif (/^no-ssl2-method$/) { $no_ssl2_method=1; }
elsif (/^no-ssl3-method$/) { $no_ssl3_method=1; }
elsif (/^no-ssl-trace$/) { $no_ssl_trace=1; }
elsif (/^no-capieng$/) { $no_capieng=1; }
@@ -1215,6 +1218,7 @@ sub is_valid
if ($keyword eq "EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128" && $no_nistp_gcc)
{ return 0; }
if ($keyword eq "SSL2" && $no_ssl2) { return 0; }
+ if ($keyword eq "SSL2_METHOD" && $no_ssl2_method) { return 0; }
if ($keyword eq "SSL3_METHOD" && $no_ssl3_method) { return 0; }
if ($keyword eq "SSL_TRACE" && $no_ssl_trace) { return 0; }
if ($keyword eq "CAPIENG" && $no_capieng) { return 0; }
diff --git a/util/shlib_wrap.sh b/util/shlib_wrap.sh
index 8775cb5411e1..de111e9a3f55 100755
--- a/util/shlib_wrap.sh
+++ b/util/shlib_wrap.sh
@@ -27,6 +27,15 @@ SunOS|IRIX*)
LD_PRELOAD_64="$LIBCRYPTOSO $LIBSSLSO"; export LD_PRELOAD_64
preload_var=LD_PRELOAD_64
;;
+ *ELF\ 32*SPARC*|*ELF\ 32*80386*)
+ # We only need to change LD_PRELOAD_32 and LD_LIBRARY_PATH_32
+ # on a multi-arch system. Otherwise, trust the fallbacks.
+ if [ -f /lib/64/ld.so.1 ]; then
+ [ -n "$LD_LIBRARY_PATH_32" ] && rld_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH_32
+ LD_PRELOAD_32="$LIBCRYPTOSO $LIBSSLSO"; export LD_PRELOAD_32
+ preload_var=LD_PRELOAD_32
+ fi
+ ;;
# Why are newly built .so's preloaded anyway? Because run-time
# .so lookup path embedded into application takes precedence
# over LD_LIBRARY_PATH and as result application ends up linking
diff --git a/util/ssleay.num b/util/ssleay.num
index 5a8991350c50..5760bc42a251 100755
--- a/util/ssleay.num
+++ b/util/ssleay.num
@@ -98,9 +98,9 @@ SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms 109 NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
SSLv23_client_method 110 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
SSLv23_method 111 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
SSLv23_server_method 112 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
-SSLv2_client_method 113 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA,SSL2
-SSLv2_method 114 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA,SSL2
-SSLv2_server_method 115 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA,SSL2
+SSLv2_client_method 113 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA,SSL2_METHOD
+SSLv2_method 114 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA,SSL2_METHOD
+SSLv2_server_method 115 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA,SSL2_METHOD
SSLv3_client_method 116 EXIST::FUNCTION:SSL3_METHOD
SSLv3_method 117 EXIST::FUNCTION:SSL3_METHOD
SSLv3_server_method 118 EXIST::FUNCTION:SSL3_METHOD