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authorJung-uk Kim <jkim@FreeBSD.org>2014-01-22 19:27:13 +0000
committerJung-uk Kim <jkim@FreeBSD.org>2014-01-22 19:27:13 +0000
commit2dc7f78169ea4545102b8d9b0604f785cdc798f5 (patch)
tree916b5f4a06b1f51b6af3e4437ab74e3d27e9cdd9
parentcbbee3a581d0bbf1b738c0805da55a438c265a20 (diff)
downloadsrc-2dc7f78169ea4545102b8d9b0604f785cdc798f5.tar.gz
src-2dc7f78169ea4545102b8d9b0604f785cdc798f5.zip
Import OpenSSL 1.0.1f.vendor/openssl/1.0.1f
Approved by: so (delphij), benl (silence)
Notes
Notes: svn path=/vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/; revision=261035 svn path=/vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1f/; revision=261036; tag=vendor/openssl/1.0.1f
-rw-r--r--CHANGES163
-rwxr-xr-xConfigure2
-rw-r--r--FREEBSD-Xlist4
-rw-r--r--FREEBSD-upgrade4
-rw-r--r--Makefile5
-rw-r--r--Makefile.org3
-rw-r--r--NEWS184
-rw-r--r--README2
-rw-r--r--apps/Makefile17
-rw-r--r--apps/apps.h2
-rw-r--r--apps/openssl.c1
-rw-r--r--apps/pkcs12.c9
-rwxr-xr-xconfig2
-rw-r--r--crypto/Makefile4
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/aes/asm/aes-parisc.pl3
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/aes/asm/bsaes-x86_64.pl73
-rw-r--r--crypto/armcap.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/a_int.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c6
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/Makefile4
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/mips-mont.pl2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/mips.pl44
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/parisc-mont.pl4
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl3
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl4
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_nist.c55
-rw-r--r--crypto/buffer/buffer.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/buffer/buffer.h2
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c6
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/ec_lib.c10
-rw-r--r--crypto/engine/eng_rdrand.c1
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/digest.c7
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/e_aes.c16
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c5
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/e_des3.c6
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c40
-rw-r--r--crypto/modes/Makefile5
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/modes/asm/ghash-parisc.pl1
-rw-r--r--crypto/modes/cbc128.c25
-rw-r--r--crypto/modes/ccm128.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/modes/cts128.c28
-rw-r--r--crypto/modes/gcm128.c104
-rw-r--r--crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h9
-rw-r--r--crypto/opensslv.h6
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/pariscid.pl41
-rw-r--r--crypto/pem/pem_info.c1
-rw-r--r--crypto/pkcs12/p12_crt.c7
-rw-r--r--crypto/rand/md_rand.c22
-rw-r--r--crypto/rand/rand.h1
-rw-r--r--crypto/rand/rand_err.c1
-rw-r--r--crypto/rand/rand_lib.c8
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/rc4/asm/rc4-parisc.pl3
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c8
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c6
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/sha/Makefile4
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/sha/asm/sha1-parisc.pl3
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl4
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/sha/asm/sha512-mips.pl2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/sha/asm/sha512-parisc.pl2
-rw-r--r--crypto/sha/sha512.c9
-rw-r--r--crypto/srp/srp_grps.h816
-rw-r--r--crypto/srp/srp_lib.c18
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c11
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509/x_all.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/x86cpuid.pl2
-rw-r--r--doc/apps/rsa.pod15
-rw-r--r--doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/crypto/ecdsa.pod10
-rw-r--r--doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod8
-rw-r--r--doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod5
-rw-r--r--doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod4
-rw-r--r--doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod10
-rw-r--r--doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod10
-rw-r--r--doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod10
-rw-r--r--doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod10
-rw-r--r--engines/ccgost/gost89.h4
-rw-r--r--ssl/d1_both.c7
-rw-r--r--ssl/d1_clnt.c36
-rw-r--r--ssl/d1_lib.c1
-rw-r--r--ssl/d1_pkt.c7
-rw-r--r--ssl/d1_srvr.c29
-rw-r--r--ssl/s23_clnt.c29
-rw-r--r--ssl/s3_both.c2
-rw-r--r--ssl/s3_clnt.c7
-rw-r--r--ssl/s3_lib.c18
-rw-r--r--ssl/s3_pkt.c10
-rw-r--r--ssl/s3_srvr.c16
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl.h11
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl3.h9
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl_lib.c8
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl_locl.h1
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssltest.c8
-rw-r--r--ssl/t1_enc.c11
-rw-r--r--ssl/t1_lib.c104
-rwxr-xr-xutil/shlib_wrap.sh6
98 files changed, 1453 insertions, 813 deletions
diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index ca82ad295d5c..9302f586a31d 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -2,9 +2,31 @@
OpenSSL CHANGES
_______________
+ Changes between 1.0.1e and 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014]
+
+ *) Fix for TLS record tampering bug. A carefully crafted invalid
+ handshake could crash OpenSSL with a NULL pointer exception.
+ Thanks to Anton Johansson for reporting this issues.
+ (CVE-2013-4353)
+
+ *) Keep original DTLS digest and encryption contexts in retransmission
+ structures so we can use the previous session parameters if they need
+ to be resent. (CVE-2013-6450)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add option SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) which
+ avoids preferring ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be
+ Safari on OS X. Safari on OS X 10.8..10.8.3 advertises support for
+ several ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers, but fails to negotiate them. The bug
+ is fixed in OS X 10.8.4, but Apple have ruled out both hot fixing
+ 10.8..10.8.3 and forcing users to upgrade to 10.8.4 or newer.
+ [Rob Stradling, Adam Langley]
+
Changes between 1.0.1d and 1.0.1e [11 Feb 2013]
- *)
+ *) Correct fix for CVE-2013-0169. The original didn't work on AES-NI
+ supporting platforms or when small records were transferred.
+ [Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
Changes between 1.0.1c and 1.0.1d [5 Feb 2013]
@@ -404,6 +426,63 @@
Add command line options to s_client/s_server.
[Steve Henson]
+ Changes between 1.0.0j and 1.0.0k [5 Feb 2013]
+
+ *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
+
+ This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by
+ Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
+ at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/
+
+ Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+ Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+ (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
+ Emilia Käsper for the initial patch.
+ (CVE-2013-0169)
+ [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
+ This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
+ the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
+ so it returns the certificate actually sent.
+ See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
+ (This is a backport)
+ [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
+
+ *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0i and 1.0.0j [10 May 2012]
+
+ [NB: OpenSSL 1.0.0i and later 1.0.0 patch levels were released after
+ OpenSSL 1.0.1.]
+
+ *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
+ to fix DoS attack.
+
+ Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
+ fuzzing as a service testing platform.
+ (CVE-2012-2333)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
+ Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.0i [19 Apr 2012]
+
+ *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
+ BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
+ in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
+
+ Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
+ issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
+ (CVE-2012-2110)
+ [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
+
Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012]
*) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
@@ -1394,6 +1473,86 @@
*) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default.
[NTT]
+ Changes between 0.9.8x and 0.9.8y [5 Feb 2013]
+
+ *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
+
+ This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by
+ Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
+ at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/
+
+ Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+ Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+ (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
+ Emilia Käsper for the initial patch.
+ (CVE-2013-0169)
+ [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
+ This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
+ the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
+ so it returns the certificate actually sent.
+ See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
+ (This is a backport)
+ [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
+
+ *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8w and 0.9.8x [10 May 2012]
+
+ *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
+ to fix DoS attack.
+
+ Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
+ fuzzing as a service testing platform.
+ (CVE-2012-2333)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
+ Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8v and 0.9.8w [23 Apr 2012]
+
+ *) The fix for CVE-2012-2110 did not take into account that the
+ 'len' argument to BUF_MEM_grow and BUF_MEM_grow_clean is an
+ int in OpenSSL 0.9.8, making it still vulnerable. Fix by
+ rejecting negative len parameter. (CVE-2012-2131)
+ [Tomas Hoger <thoger@redhat.com>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8u and 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012]
+
+ *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
+ BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
+ in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
+
+ Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
+ issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
+ (CVE-2012-2110)
+ [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8t and 0.9.8u [12 Mar 2012]
+
+ *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
+ in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for
+ content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack
+ needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The
+ old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the
+ CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where
+ an MMA defence is not necessary.
+ Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering
+ this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a
+ client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to
+ Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering this bug.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
Changes between 0.9.8s and 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012]
*) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109.
@@ -1401,7 +1560,7 @@
Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
[Antonio Martin]
-
+
Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012]
*) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension
diff --git a/Configure b/Configure
index 9c803dc0663d..daff8e679686 100755
--- a/Configure
+++ b/Configure
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ my %table=(
"debug-ben-no-opt", "gcc: -Wall -Wmissing-prototypes -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -Werror -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -Wall -g3::(unknown)::::::",
"debug-ben-strict", "gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DCONST_STRICT -O2 -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-qual -Wwrite-strings -pipe::(unknown)::::::",
"debug-rse","cc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -pipe -O -g -ggdb3 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}",
-"debug-bodo", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCONF_DEBUG -DBIO_PAIR_DEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
+"debug-bodo", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -Wno-error=overlength-strings -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCONF_DEBUG -DBIO_PAIR_DEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"debug-ulf", "gcc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -march=i486 -Wall -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -g -Wformat -Wshadow -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations:::CYGWIN32:::${no_asm}:win32:cygwin-shared:::.dll",
"debug-steve64", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -Wno-overlength-strings -g::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-steve32", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m32 -DL_ENDIAN -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -g -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-rdynamic -ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
diff --git a/FREEBSD-Xlist b/FREEBSD-Xlist
index 5157919b1516..8020b316f2f0 100644
--- a/FREEBSD-Xlist
+++ b/FREEBSD-Xlist
@@ -1,11 +1,15 @@
+openssl-*/*.bak
openssl-*/*.com
openssl-*/*.doxy
openssl-*/*.mak
+openssl-*/*.save
openssl-*/*.spec
openssl-*/*/*.bat
openssl-*/*/*.com
+openssl-*/*/*.save
openssl-*/*/*/*.bat
openssl-*/*/*/*.com
+openssl-*/*/*/*.save
openssl-*/INSTALL.DJGPP
openssl-*/INSTALL.MacOS
openssl-*/INSTALL.NW
diff --git a/FREEBSD-upgrade b/FREEBSD-upgrade
index 1aa5b7021eee..85976a4a9732 100644
--- a/FREEBSD-upgrade
+++ b/FREEBSD-upgrade
@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ First, read http://wiki.freebsd.org/SubversionPrimer/VendorImports
# Xlist
setenv XLIST /FreeBSD/work/openssl/svn-FREEBSD-files/FREEBSD-Xlist
setenv FSVN "svn+ssh://svn.freebsd.org/base"
-setenv OSSLVER 1.0.1e
-# OSSLTAG format: v1_0_1e
+setenv OSSLVER 1.0.1f
+# OSSLTAG format: v1_0_1f
###setenv OSSLTAG v`echo ${OSSLVER} | tr . _`
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 54e3541613ac..0709da035f30 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
## Makefile for OpenSSL
##
-VERSION=1.0.1e
+VERSION=1.0.1f
MAJOR=1
MINOR=0.1
SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0
@@ -304,7 +304,8 @@ libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT): libcrypto.a fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT)
FIPSLD_CC="$(CC)"; CC=$(FIPSDIR)/bin/fipsld; \
export CC FIPSLD_CC FIPSLD_LIBCRYPTO; \
fi; \
- $(MAKE) -e SHLIBDIRS=crypto build-shared; \
+ $(MAKE) -e SHLIBDIRS=crypto CC=$${CC:-$(CC)} build-shared; \
+ touch -c fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT); \
else \
echo "There's no support for shared libraries on this platform" >&2; \
exit 1; \
diff --git a/Makefile.org b/Makefile.org
index 2db31ead6fa9..a9e27273d341 100644
--- a/Makefile.org
+++ b/Makefile.org
@@ -302,7 +302,8 @@ libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT): libcrypto.a fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT)
FIPSLD_CC="$(CC)"; CC=$(FIPSDIR)/bin/fipsld; \
export CC FIPSLD_CC FIPSLD_LIBCRYPTO; \
fi; \
- $(MAKE) -e SHLIBDIRS=crypto build-shared; \
+ $(MAKE) -e SHLIBDIRS=crypto CC=$${CC:-$(CC)} build-shared; \
+ touch -c fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT); \
else \
echo "There's no support for shared libraries on this platform" >&2; \
exit 1; \
diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index 0269f2277fce..909fea96cf74 100644
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -5,11 +5,17 @@
This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1d and OpenSSL 1.0.1e:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1e and OpenSSL 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014]
+
+ o Fix for TLS record tampering bug CVE-2013-4353
+ o Fix for TLS version checking bug CVE-2013-6449
+ o Fix for DTLS retransmission bug CVE-2013-6450
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1d and OpenSSL 1.0.1e [11 Feb 2013]:
o Corrected fix for CVE-2013-0169
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1c and OpenSSL 1.0.1d:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1c and OpenSSL 1.0.1d [4 Feb 2013]:
o Fix renegotiation in TLS 1.1, 1.2 by using the correct TLS version.
o Include the fips configuration module.
@@ -17,24 +23,24 @@
o Fix for SSL/TLS/DTLS CBC plaintext recovery attack CVE-2013-0169
o Fix for TLS AESNI record handling flaw CVE-2012-2686
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1b and OpenSSL 1.0.1c:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1b and OpenSSL 1.0.1c [10 May 2012]:
o Fix TLS/DTLS record length checking bug CVE-2012-2333
o Don't attempt to use non-FIPS composite ciphers in FIPS mode.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1a and OpenSSL 1.0.1b:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1a and OpenSSL 1.0.1b [26 Apr 2012]:
o Fix compilation error on non-x86 platforms.
o Make FIPS capable OpenSSL ciphers work in non-FIPS mode.
o Fix SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 clash with SSL_OP_ALL in OpenSSL 1.0.0
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1 and OpenSSL 1.0.1a:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1 and OpenSSL 1.0.1a [19 Apr 2012]:
o Fix for ASN1 overflow bug CVE-2012-2110
o Workarounds for some servers that hang on long client hellos.
o Fix SEGV in AES code.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0h and OpenSSL 1.0.1:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0h and OpenSSL 1.0.1 [14 Mar 2012]:
o TLS/DTLS heartbeat support.
o SCTP support.
@@ -47,17 +53,30 @@
o Preliminary FIPS capability for unvalidated 2.0 FIPS module.
o SRP support.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0g and OpenSSL 1.0.0h:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0j and OpenSSL 1.0.0k [5 Feb 2013]:
+
+ o Fix for SSL/TLS/DTLS CBC plaintext recovery attack CVE-2013-0169
+ o Fix OCSP bad key DoS attack CVE-2013-0166
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0i and OpenSSL 1.0.0j [10 May 2012]:
+
+ o Fix DTLS record length checking bug CVE-2012-2333
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0h and OpenSSL 1.0.0i [19 Apr 2012]:
+
+ o Fix for ASN1 overflow bug CVE-2012-2110
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0g and OpenSSL 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012]:
o Fix for CMS/PKCS#7 MMA CVE-2012-0884
o Corrected fix for CVE-2011-4619
o Various DTLS fixes.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0f and OpenSSL 1.0.0g:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0f and OpenSSL 1.0.0g [18 Jan 2012]:
o Fix for DTLS DoS issue CVE-2012-0050
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0e and OpenSSL 1.0.0f:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0e and OpenSSL 1.0.0f [4 Jan 2012]:
o Fix for DTLS plaintext recovery attack CVE-2011-4108
o Clear block padding bytes of SSL 3.0 records CVE-2011-4576
@@ -65,7 +84,7 @@
o Check parameters are not NULL in GOST ENGINE CVE-2012-0027
o Check for malformed RFC3779 data CVE-2011-4577
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0d and OpenSSL 1.0.0e:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0d and OpenSSL 1.0.0e [6 Sep 2011]:
o Fix for CRL vulnerability issue CVE-2011-3207
o Fix for ECDH crashes CVE-2011-3210
@@ -73,11 +92,11 @@
o Support ECDH ciphersuites for certificates using SHA2 algorithms.
o Various DTLS fixes.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0c and OpenSSL 1.0.0d:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0c and OpenSSL 1.0.0d [8 Feb 2011]:
o Fix for security issue CVE-2011-0014
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0b and OpenSSL 1.0.0c:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0b and OpenSSL 1.0.0c [2 Dec 2010]:
o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-4180
o Fix for CVE-2010-4252
@@ -85,18 +104,18 @@
o Fix various platform compilation issues.
o Corrected fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0a and OpenSSL 1.0.0b:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0a and OpenSSL 1.0.0b [16 Nov 2010]:
o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864.
o Fix for CVE-2010-2939
o Fix WIN32 build system for GOST ENGINE.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0 and OpenSSL 1.0.0a:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0 and OpenSSL 1.0.0a [1 Jun 2010]:
o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-1633.
o GOST MAC and CFB fixes.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8n and OpenSSL 1.0.0:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8n and OpenSSL 1.0.0 [29 Mar 2010]:
o RFC3280 path validation: sufficient to process PKITS tests.
o Integrated support for PVK files and keyblobs.
@@ -119,20 +138,55 @@
o Opaque PRF Input TLS extension support.
o Updated time routines to avoid OS limitations.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8q and OpenSSL 0.9.8r:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8x and OpenSSL 0.9.8y [5 Feb 2013]:
+
+ o Fix for SSL/TLS/DTLS CBC plaintext recovery attack CVE-2013-0169
+ o Fix OCSP bad key DoS attack CVE-2013-0166
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8w and OpenSSL 0.9.8x [10 May 2012]:
+
+ o Fix DTLS record length checking bug CVE-2012-2333
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8v and OpenSSL 0.9.8w [23 Apr 2012]:
+
+ o Fix for CVE-2012-2131 (corrected fix for 0.9.8 and CVE-2012-2110)
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8u and OpenSSL 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012]:
+
+ o Fix for ASN1 overflow bug CVE-2012-2110
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8t and OpenSSL 0.9.8u [12 Mar 2012]:
+
+ o Fix for CMS/PKCS#7 MMA CVE-2012-0884
+ o Corrected fix for CVE-2011-4619
+ o Various DTLS fixes.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8s and OpenSSL 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012]:
+
+ o Fix for DTLS DoS issue CVE-2012-0050
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8r and OpenSSL 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012]:
+
+ o Fix for DTLS plaintext recovery attack CVE-2011-4108
+ o Fix policy check double free error CVE-2011-4109
+ o Clear block padding bytes of SSL 3.0 records CVE-2011-4576
+ o Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS CVE-2011-4619
+ o Check for malformed RFC3779 data CVE-2011-4577
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8q and OpenSSL 0.9.8r [8 Feb 2011]:
o Fix for security issue CVE-2011-0014
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8p and OpenSSL 0.9.8q:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8p and OpenSSL 0.9.8q [2 Dec 2010]:
o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-4180
o Fix for CVE-2010-4252
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8o and OpenSSL 0.9.8p:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8o and OpenSSL 0.9.8p [16 Nov 2010]:
o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8n and OpenSSL 0.9.8o:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8n and OpenSSL 0.9.8o [1 Jun 2010]:
o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-0742.
o Various DTLS fixes.
@@ -140,12 +194,12 @@
o Fix for no-rc4 compilation.
o Chil ENGINE unload workaround.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8m and OpenSSL 0.9.8n:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8m and OpenSSL 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010]:
o CFB cipher definition fixes.
o Fix security issues CVE-2010-0740 and CVE-2010-0433.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8l and OpenSSL 0.9.8m:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8l and OpenSSL 0.9.8m [25 Feb 2010]:
o Cipher definition fixes.
o Workaround for slow RAND_poll() on some WIN32 versions.
@@ -157,33 +211,33 @@
o Ticket and SNI coexistence fixes.
o Many fixes to DTLS handling.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8k and OpenSSL 0.9.8l:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8k and OpenSSL 0.9.8l [5 Nov 2009]:
o Temporary work around for CVE-2009-3555: disable renegotiation.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8j and OpenSSL 0.9.8k:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8j and OpenSSL 0.9.8k [25 Mar 2009]:
o Fix various build issues.
o Fix security issues (CVE-2009-0590, CVE-2009-0591, CVE-2009-0789)
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8i and OpenSSL 0.9.8j:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8i and OpenSSL 0.9.8j [7 Jan 2009]:
o Fix security issue (CVE-2008-5077)
o Merge FIPS 140-2 branch code.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8g and OpenSSL 0.9.8h:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8g and OpenSSL 0.9.8h [28 May 2008]:
o CryptoAPI ENGINE support.
o Various precautionary measures.
o Fix for bugs affecting certificate request creation.
o Support for local machine keyset attribute in PKCS#12 files.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8f and OpenSSL 0.9.8g:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8f and OpenSSL 0.9.8g [19 Oct 2007]:
o Backport of CMS functionality to 0.9.8.
o Fixes for bugs introduced with 0.9.8f.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8e and OpenSSL 0.9.8f:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8e and OpenSSL 0.9.8f [11 Oct 2007]:
o Add gcc 4.2 support.
o Add support for AES and SSE2 assembly lanugauge optimization
@@ -194,23 +248,23 @@
o RFC4507bis support.
o TLS Extensions support.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8d and OpenSSL 0.9.8e:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8d and OpenSSL 0.9.8e [23 Feb 2007]:
o Various ciphersuite selection fixes.
o RFC3779 support.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8c and OpenSSL 0.9.8d:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8c and OpenSSL 0.9.8d [28 Sep 2006]:
o Introduce limits to prevent malicious key DoS (CVE-2006-2940)
o Fix security issues (CVE-2006-2937, CVE-2006-3737, CVE-2006-4343)
o Changes to ciphersuite selection algorithm
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8b and OpenSSL 0.9.8c:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8b and OpenSSL 0.9.8c [5 Sep 2006]:
o Fix Daniel Bleichenbacher forged signature attack, CVE-2006-4339
o New cipher Camellia
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8a and OpenSSL 0.9.8b:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8a and OpenSSL 0.9.8b [4 May 2006]:
o Cipher string fixes.
o Fixes for VC++ 2005.
@@ -220,12 +274,12 @@
o Built in dynamic engine compilation support on Win32.
o Fixes auto dynamic engine loading in Win32.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8 and OpenSSL 0.9.8a:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8 and OpenSSL 0.9.8a [11 Oct 2005]:
o Fix potential SSL 2.0 rollback, CVE-2005-2969
o Extended Windows CE support
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.8:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.8 [5 Jul 2005]:
o Major work on the BIGNUM library for higher efficiency and to
make operations more streamlined and less contradictory. This
@@ -299,36 +353,36 @@
o Added initial support for Win64.
o Added alternate pkg-config files.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7l and OpenSSL 0.9.7m:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7l and OpenSSL 0.9.7m [23 Feb 2007]:
o FIPS 1.1.1 module linking.
o Various ciphersuite selection fixes.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7k and OpenSSL 0.9.7l:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7k and OpenSSL 0.9.7l [28 Sep 2006]:
o Introduce limits to prevent malicious key DoS (CVE-2006-2940)
o Fix security issues (CVE-2006-2937, CVE-2006-3737, CVE-2006-4343)
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7j and OpenSSL 0.9.7k:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7j and OpenSSL 0.9.7k [5 Sep 2006]:
o Fix Daniel Bleichenbacher forged signature attack, CVE-2006-4339
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7i and OpenSSL 0.9.7j:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7i and OpenSSL 0.9.7j [4 May 2006]:
o Visual C++ 2005 fixes.
o Update Windows build system for FIPS.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7h and OpenSSL 0.9.7i:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7h and OpenSSL 0.9.7i [14 Oct 2005]:
o Give EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE it's old value, except for a FIPS build.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.7h:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.7h [11 Oct 2005]:
o Fix SSL 2.0 Rollback, CVE-2005-2969
o Allow use of fixed-length exponent on DSA signing
o Default fixed-window RSA, DSA, DH private-key operations
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7f and OpenSSL 0.9.7g:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7f and OpenSSL 0.9.7g [11 Apr 2005]:
o More compilation issues fixed.
o Adaptation to more modern Kerberos API.
@@ -337,7 +391,7 @@
o More constification.
o Added processing of proxy certificates (RFC 3820).
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7e and OpenSSL 0.9.7f:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7e and OpenSSL 0.9.7f [22 Mar 2005]:
o Several compilation issues fixed.
o Many memory allocation failure checks added.
@@ -345,12 +399,12 @@
o Mandatory basic checks on certificates.
o Performance improvements.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7d and OpenSSL 0.9.7e:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7d and OpenSSL 0.9.7e [25 Oct 2004]:
o Fix race condition in CRL checking code.
o Fixes to PKCS#7 (S/MIME) code.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7c and OpenSSL 0.9.7d:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7c and OpenSSL 0.9.7d [17 Mar 2004]:
o Security: Fix Kerberos ciphersuite SSL/TLS handshaking bug
o Security: Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec()
@@ -358,14 +412,14 @@
o Multiple X509 verification fixes
o Speed up HMAC and other operations
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7b and OpenSSL 0.9.7c:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7b and OpenSSL 0.9.7c [30 Sep 2003]:
o Security: fix various ASN1 parsing bugs.
o New -ignore_err option to OCSP utility.
o Various interop and bug fixes in S/MIME code.
o SSL/TLS protocol fix for unrequested client certificates.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7a and OpenSSL 0.9.7b:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7a and OpenSSL 0.9.7b [10 Apr 2003]:
o Security: counter the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of
Bleichbacher's attack
@@ -376,7 +430,7 @@
o ASN.1: treat domainComponent correctly.
o Documentation: fixes and additions.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7 and OpenSSL 0.9.7a:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7 and OpenSSL 0.9.7a [19 Feb 2003]:
o Security: Important security related bugfixes.
o Enhanced compatibility with MIT Kerberos.
@@ -387,7 +441,7 @@
o SSL/TLS: now handles manual certificate chain building.
o SSL/TLS: certain session ID malfunctions corrected.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.7:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.7 [30 Dec 2002]:
o New library section OCSP.
o Complete rewrite of ASN1 code.
@@ -433,23 +487,23 @@
o SSL/TLS: add callback to retrieve SSL/TLS messages.
o SSL/TLS: support AES cipher suites (RFC3268).
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6j and OpenSSL 0.9.6k:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6j and OpenSSL 0.9.6k [30 Sep 2003]:
o Security: fix various ASN1 parsing bugs.
o SSL/TLS protocol fix for unrequested client certificates.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6i and OpenSSL 0.9.6j:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6i and OpenSSL 0.9.6j [10 Apr 2003]:
o Security: counter the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of
Bleichbacher's attack
o Security: make RSA blinding default.
o Build: shared library support fixes.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6h and OpenSSL 0.9.6i:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6h and OpenSSL 0.9.6i [19 Feb 2003]:
o Important security related bugfixes.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6g and OpenSSL 0.9.6h:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6g and OpenSSL 0.9.6h [5 Dec 2002]:
o New configuration targets for Tandem OSS and A/UX.
o New OIDs for Microsoft attributes.
@@ -463,25 +517,25 @@
o Fixes for smaller building problems.
o Updates of manuals, FAQ and other instructive documents.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6f and OpenSSL 0.9.6g:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6f and OpenSSL 0.9.6g [9 Aug 2002]:
o Important building fixes on Unix.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6e and OpenSSL 0.9.6f:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6e and OpenSSL 0.9.6f [8 Aug 2002]:
o Various important bugfixes.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6d and OpenSSL 0.9.6e:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6d and OpenSSL 0.9.6e [30 Jul 2002]:
o Important security related bugfixes.
o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6c and OpenSSL 0.9.6d:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6c and OpenSSL 0.9.6d [9 May 2002]:
o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes.
o Fix DH parameter generation for 'non-standard' generators.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6b and OpenSSL 0.9.6c:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6b and OpenSSL 0.9.6c [21 Dec 2001]:
o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes.
o BIGNUM library fixes.
@@ -494,7 +548,7 @@
Broadcom and Cryptographic Appliance's keyserver
[in 0.9.6c-engine release].
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6a and OpenSSL 0.9.6b:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6a and OpenSSL 0.9.6b [9 Jul 2001]:
o Security fix: PRNG improvements.
o Security fix: RSA OAEP check.
@@ -511,7 +565,7 @@
o Increase default size for BIO buffering filter.
o Compatibility fixes in some scripts.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.6a:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.6a [5 Apr 2001]:
o Security fix: change behavior of OpenSSL to avoid using
environment variables when running as root.
@@ -536,7 +590,7 @@
o New function BN_rand_range().
o Add "-rand" option to openssl s_client and s_server.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5a and OpenSSL 0.9.6:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5a and OpenSSL 0.9.6 [10 Oct 2000]:
o Some documentation for BIO and SSL libraries.
o Enhanced chain verification using key identifiers.
@@ -551,7 +605,7 @@
[1] The support for external crypto devices is currently a separate
distribution. See the file README.ENGINE.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5 and OpenSSL 0.9.5a:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5 and OpenSSL 0.9.5a [1 Apr 2000]:
o Bug fixes for Win32, SuSE Linux, NeXTSTEP and FreeBSD 2.2.8
o Shared library support for HPUX and Solaris-gcc
@@ -560,7 +614,7 @@
o New 'rand' application
o New way to check for existence of algorithms from scripts
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.4 and OpenSSL 0.9.5:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.4 and OpenSSL 0.9.5 [25 May 2000]:
o S/MIME support in new 'smime' command
o Documentation for the OpenSSL command line application
@@ -596,7 +650,7 @@
o Enhanced support for Alpha Linux
o Experimental MacOS support
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.3 and OpenSSL 0.9.4:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.3 and OpenSSL 0.9.4 [9 Aug 1999]:
o Transparent support for PKCS#8 format private keys: these are used
by several software packages and are more secure than the standard
@@ -607,7 +661,7 @@
o New pipe-like BIO that allows using the SSL library when actual I/O
must be handled by the application (BIO pair)
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.2b and OpenSSL 0.9.3:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.2b and OpenSSL 0.9.3 [24 May 1999]:
o Lots of enhancements and cleanups to the Configuration mechanism
o RSA OEAP related fixes
o Added `openssl ca -revoke' option for revoking a certificate
@@ -621,7 +675,7 @@
o Sparc assembler bignum implementation, optimized hash functions
o Option to disable selected ciphers
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.1c and OpenSSL 0.9.2b:
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.1c and OpenSSL 0.9.2b [22 Mar 1999]:
o Fixed a security hole related to session resumption
o Fixed RSA encryption routines for the p < q case
o "ALL" in cipher lists now means "everything except NULL ciphers"
@@ -643,7 +697,7 @@
o Lots of memory leak fixes.
o Lots of bug fixes.
- Major changes between SSLeay 0.9.0b and OpenSSL 0.9.1c:
+ Major changes between SSLeay 0.9.0b and OpenSSL 0.9.1c [23 Dec 1998]:
o Integration of the popular NO_RSA/NO_DSA patches
o Initial support for compression inside the SSL record layer
o Added BIO proxy and filtering functionality
diff --git a/README b/README
index ad2d90f0d1dd..05b670c5d9fc 100644
--- a/README
+++ b/README
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
- OpenSSL 1.0.1e 11 Feb 2013
+ OpenSSL 1.0.1f 6 Jan 2014
Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
diff --git a/apps/Makefile b/apps/Makefile
index 95f499e33054..72657ea65873 100644
--- a/apps/Makefile
+++ b/apps/Makefile
@@ -577,14 +577,15 @@ openssl.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-openssl.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-openssl.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
-openssl.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-openssl.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-openssl.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-openssl.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/txt_db.h
-openssl.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
-openssl.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h openssl.c progs.h s_apps.h
+openssl.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
+openssl.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+openssl.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+openssl.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+openssl.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+openssl.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+openssl.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+openssl.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h
+openssl.o: openssl.c progs.h s_apps.h
passwd.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
passwd.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
passwd.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/des.h
diff --git a/apps/apps.h b/apps/apps.h
index c1ca99da12e8..3aeb46c4e299 100644
--- a/apps/apps.h
+++ b/apps/apps.h
@@ -188,6 +188,7 @@ extern BIO *bio_err;
do { CONF_modules_unload(1); destroy_ui_method(); \
OBJ_cleanup(); EVP_cleanup(); ENGINE_cleanup(); \
CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(); ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL); \
+ RAND_cleanup(); \
ERR_free_strings(); zlib_cleanup();} while(0)
# else
# define apps_startup() \
@@ -198,6 +199,7 @@ extern BIO *bio_err;
do { CONF_modules_unload(1); destroy_ui_method(); \
OBJ_cleanup(); EVP_cleanup(); \
CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(); ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL); \
+ RAND_cleanup(); \
ERR_free_strings(); zlib_cleanup(); } while(0)
# endif
#endif
diff --git a/apps/openssl.c b/apps/openssl.c
index 1c880d90ba1d..71e1e48ece40 100644
--- a/apps/openssl.c
+++ b/apps/openssl.c
@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@
#include "apps.h"
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/lhash.h>
#include <openssl/conf.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
diff --git a/apps/pkcs12.c b/apps/pkcs12.c
index b54c6f84a4a0..4d62a7b8cabd 100644
--- a/apps/pkcs12.c
+++ b/apps/pkcs12.c
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
int maciter = PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER;
int twopass = 0;
int keytype = 0;
- int cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC;
+ int cert_pbe;
int key_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
int ret = 1;
int macver = 1;
@@ -130,6 +130,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
apps_startup();
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (FIPS_mode())
+ cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
+ else
+#endif
+ cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC;
+
enc = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
if (bio_err == NULL ) bio_err = BIO_new_fp (stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
diff --git a/config b/config
index 88b9bc69da4c..41fa2a6b8296 100755
--- a/config
+++ b/config
@@ -739,7 +739,7 @@ case "$GUESSOS" in
libc=/usr/lib/libc.so
else # OpenBSD
# ld searches for highest libc.so.* and so do we
- libc=`(ls /usr/lib/libc.so.* | tail -1) 2>/dev/null`
+ libc=`(ls /usr/lib/libc.so.* /lib/libc.so.* | tail -1) 2>/dev/null`
fi
case "`(file -L $libc) 2>/dev/null`" in
*ELF*) OUT="BSD-x86-elf" ;;
diff --git a/crypto/Makefile b/crypto/Makefile
index 947dd5d44ec5..a90809b2b833 100644
--- a/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/Makefile
@@ -77,7 +77,9 @@ ia64cpuid.s: ia64cpuid.S; $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -E ia64cpuid.S > $@
ppccpuid.s: ppccpuid.pl; $(PERL) ppccpuid.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
pariscid.s: pariscid.pl; $(PERL) pariscid.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
alphacpuid.s: alphacpuid.pl
- $(PERL) $< | $(CC) -E - | tee $@ > /dev/null
+ (preproc=/tmp/$$$$.$@; trap "rm $$preproc" INT; \
+ $(PERL) alphacpuid.pl > $$preproc && \
+ $(CC) -E $$preproc > $@ && rm $$preproc)
testapps:
[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || ( if echo $(SDIRS) | fgrep ' des '; \
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aes-parisc.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aes-parisc.pl
index c36b6a22705c..714dcfbbe3b7 100755
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aes-parisc.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aes-parisc.pl
@@ -1015,7 +1015,8 @@ foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
$SIZE_T==4 ? sprintf("extru%s,%d,8,",$1,31-$2)
: sprintf("extrd,u%s,%d,8,",$1,63-$2)/e;
- s/,\*/,/ if ($SIZE_T==4);
+ s/,\*/,/ if ($SIZE_T==4);
+ s/\bbv\b(.*\(%r2\))/bve$1/ if ($SIZE_T==8);
print $_,"\n";
}
close STDOUT;
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-x86_64.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-x86_64.pl
index ceb02b50ddb6..41b90f08443f 100755
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-x86_64.pl
@@ -83,9 +83,9 @@
# Add decryption procedure. Performance in CPU cycles spent to decrypt
# one byte out of 4096-byte buffer with 128-bit key is:
#
-# Core 2 11.0
-# Nehalem 9.16
-# Atom 20.9
+# Core 2 9.83
+# Nehalem 7.74
+# Atom 19.0
#
# November 2011.
#
@@ -456,6 +456,7 @@ sub MixColumns {
# modified to emit output in order suitable for feeding back to aesenc[last]
my @x=@_[0..7];
my @t=@_[8..15];
+my $inv=@_[16]; # optional
$code.=<<___;
pshufd \$0x93, @x[0], @t[0] # x0 <<< 32
pshufd \$0x93, @x[1], @t[1]
@@ -497,7 +498,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
pxor @t[4], @t[0]
pshufd \$0x4E, @x[2], @x[6]
pxor @t[5], @t[1]
-
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!$inv);
pxor @t[3], @x[4]
pxor @t[7], @x[5]
pxor @t[6], @x[3]
@@ -505,9 +507,20 @@ $code.=<<___;
pxor @t[2], @x[6]
movdqa @t[1], @x[7]
___
+$code.=<<___ if ($inv);
+ pxor @x[4], @t[3]
+ pxor @t[7], @x[5]
+ pxor @x[3], @t[6]
+ movdqa @t[0], @x[3]
+ pxor @t[2], @x[6]
+ movdqa @t[6], @x[2]
+ movdqa @t[1], @x[7]
+ movdqa @x[6], @x[4]
+ movdqa @t[3], @x[6]
+___
}
-sub InvMixColumns {
+sub InvMixColumns_orig {
my @x=@_[0..7];
my @t=@_[8..15];
@@ -661,6 +674,54 @@ $code.=<<___;
___
}
+sub InvMixColumns {
+my @x=@_[0..7];
+my @t=@_[8..15];
+
+# Thanks to Jussi Kivilinna for providing pointer to
+#
+# | 0e 0b 0d 09 | | 02 03 01 01 | | 05 00 04 00 |
+# | 09 0e 0b 0d | = | 01 02 03 01 | x | 00 05 00 04 |
+# | 0d 09 0e 0b | | 01 01 02 03 | | 04 00 05 00 |
+# | 0b 0d 09 0e | | 03 01 01 02 | | 00 04 00 05 |
+
+$code.=<<___;
+ # multiplication by 0x05-0x00-0x04-0x00
+ pshufd \$0x4E, @x[0], @t[0]
+ pshufd \$0x4E, @x[6], @t[6]
+ pxor @x[0], @t[0]
+ pshufd \$0x4E, @x[7], @t[7]
+ pxor @x[6], @t[6]
+ pshufd \$0x4E, @x[1], @t[1]
+ pxor @x[7], @t[7]
+ pshufd \$0x4E, @x[2], @t[2]
+ pxor @x[1], @t[1]
+ pshufd \$0x4E, @x[3], @t[3]
+ pxor @x[2], @t[2]
+ pxor @t[6], @x[0]
+ pxor @t[6], @x[1]
+ pshufd \$0x4E, @x[4], @t[4]
+ pxor @x[3], @t[3]
+ pxor @t[0], @x[2]
+ pxor @t[1], @x[3]
+ pshufd \$0x4E, @x[5], @t[5]
+ pxor @x[4], @t[4]
+ pxor @t[7], @x[1]
+ pxor @t[2], @x[4]
+ pxor @x[5], @t[5]
+
+ pxor @t[7], @x[2]
+ pxor @t[6], @x[3]
+ pxor @t[6], @x[4]
+ pxor @t[3], @x[5]
+ pxor @t[4], @x[6]
+ pxor @t[7], @x[4]
+ pxor @t[7], @x[5]
+ pxor @t[5], @x[7]
+___
+ &MixColumns (@x,@t,1); # flipped 2<->3 and 4<->6
+}
+
sub aesenc { # not used
my @b=@_[0..7];
my @t=@_[8..15];
@@ -2028,6 +2089,8 @@ ___
# const unsigned char iv[16]);
#
my ($twmask,$twres,$twtmp)=@XMM[13..15];
+$arg6=~s/d$//;
+
$code.=<<___;
.globl bsaes_xts_encrypt
.type bsaes_xts_encrypt,\@abi-omnipotent
diff --git a/crypto/armcap.c b/crypto/armcap.c
index 5258d2fbddfa..9abaf396e53e 100644
--- a/crypto/armcap.c
+++ b/crypto/armcap.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ unsigned int _armv7_tick(void);
unsigned int OPENSSL_rdtsc(void)
{
- if (OPENSSL_armcap_P|ARMV7_TICK)
+ if (OPENSSL_armcap_P & ARMV7_TICK)
return _armv7_tick();
else
return 0;
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_int.c b/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
index ad0d2506f632..297c45a9ff12 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ int i2c_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER *a, unsigned char **pp)
int pad=0,ret,i,neg;
unsigned char *p,*n,pb=0;
- if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL)) return(0);
+ if (a == NULL) return(0);
neg=a->type & V_ASN1_NEG;
if (a->length == 0)
ret=1;
diff --git a/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c b/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
index 8990909971ca..54c012c47d7b 100644
--- a/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
+++ b/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
@@ -906,8 +906,8 @@ BIO *BIO_new_dgram_sctp(int fd, int close_flag)
memset(authchunks, 0, sizeof(sockopt_len));
ret = getsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_LOCAL_AUTH_CHUNKS, authchunks, &sockopt_len);
OPENSSL_assert(ret >= 0);
-
- for (p = (unsigned char*) authchunks + sizeof(sctp_assoc_t);
+
+ for (p = (unsigned char*) authchunks->gauth_chunks;
p < (unsigned char*) authchunks + sockopt_len;
p += sizeof(uint8_t))
{
@@ -1197,7 +1197,7 @@ static int dgram_sctp_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
ii = getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_PEER_AUTH_CHUNKS, authchunks, &optlen);
OPENSSL_assert(ii >= 0);
- for (p = (unsigned char*) authchunks + sizeof(sctp_assoc_t);
+ for (p = (unsigned char*) authchunks->gauth_chunks;
p < (unsigned char*) authchunks + optlen;
p += sizeof(uint8_t))
{
diff --git a/crypto/bn/Makefile b/crypto/bn/Makefile
index 672773454cfd..6dd136be5d6b 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/bn/Makefile
@@ -125,7 +125,9 @@ ppc-mont.s: asm/ppc-mont.pl;$(PERL) asm/ppc-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
ppc64-mont.s: asm/ppc64-mont.pl;$(PERL) asm/ppc64-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
alpha-mont.s: asm/alpha-mont.pl
- $(PERL) $< | $(CC) -E - | tee $@ > /dev/null
+ (preproc=/tmp/$$$$.$@; trap "rm $$preproc" INT; \
+ $(PERL) asm/alpha-mont.pl > $$preproc && \
+ $(CC) -E $$preproc > $@ && rm $$preproc)
# GNU make "catch all"
%-mont.s: asm/%-mont.pl; $(PERL) $< $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/mips-mont.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/mips-mont.pl
index b944a12b8e29..caae04ed3a86 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/mips-mont.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/mips-mont.pl
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
bnez $at,1f
li $t0,0
slt $at,$num,17 # on in-order CPU
- bnezl $at,bn_mul_mont_internal
+ bnez $at,bn_mul_mont_internal
nop
1: jr $ra
li $a0,0
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/mips.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/mips.pl
index 38b51645f067..d2f3ef7bbf2c 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/mips.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/mips.pl
@@ -140,10 +140,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
.set reorder
li $minus4,-4
and $ta0,$a2,$minus4
- $LD $t0,0($a1)
beqz $ta0,.L_bn_mul_add_words_tail
.L_bn_mul_add_words_loop:
+ $LD $t0,0($a1)
$MULTU $t0,$a3
$LD $t1,0($a0)
$LD $t2,$BNSZ($a1)
@@ -200,10 +200,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
$ADDU $v0,$ta2
sltu $at,$ta3,$at
$ST $ta3,-$BNSZ($a0)
- $ADDU $v0,$at
.set noreorder
- bgtzl $ta0,.L_bn_mul_add_words_loop
- $LD $t0,0($a1)
+ bgtz $ta0,.L_bn_mul_add_words_loop
+ $ADDU $v0,$at
beqz $a2,.L_bn_mul_add_words_return
nop
@@ -300,10 +299,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
.set reorder
li $minus4,-4
and $ta0,$a2,$minus4
- $LD $t0,0($a1)
beqz $ta0,.L_bn_mul_words_tail
.L_bn_mul_words_loop:
+ $LD $t0,0($a1)
$MULTU $t0,$a3
$LD $t2,$BNSZ($a1)
$LD $ta0,2*$BNSZ($a1)
@@ -341,10 +340,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
$ADDU $v0,$at
sltu $ta3,$v0,$at
$ST $v0,-$BNSZ($a0)
- $ADDU $v0,$ta3,$ta2
.set noreorder
- bgtzl $ta0,.L_bn_mul_words_loop
- $LD $t0,0($a1)
+ bgtz $ta0,.L_bn_mul_words_loop
+ $ADDU $v0,$ta3,$ta2
beqz $a2,.L_bn_mul_words_return
nop
@@ -429,10 +427,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
.set reorder
li $minus4,-4
and $ta0,$a2,$minus4
- $LD $t0,0($a1)
beqz $ta0,.L_bn_sqr_words_tail
.L_bn_sqr_words_loop:
+ $LD $t0,0($a1)
$MULTU $t0,$t0
$LD $t2,$BNSZ($a1)
$LD $ta0,2*$BNSZ($a1)
@@ -463,11 +461,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
mflo $ta3
mfhi $ta2
$ST $ta3,-2*$BNSZ($a0)
- $ST $ta2,-$BNSZ($a0)
.set noreorder
- bgtzl $ta0,.L_bn_sqr_words_loop
- $LD $t0,0($a1)
+ bgtz $ta0,.L_bn_sqr_words_loop
+ $ST $ta2,-$BNSZ($a0)
beqz $a2,.L_bn_sqr_words_return
nop
@@ -547,10 +544,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
.set reorder
li $minus4,-4
and $at,$a3,$minus4
- $LD $t0,0($a1)
beqz $at,.L_bn_add_words_tail
.L_bn_add_words_loop:
+ $LD $t0,0($a1)
$LD $ta0,0($a2)
subu $a3,4
$LD $t1,$BNSZ($a1)
@@ -589,11 +586,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
$ADDU $t3,$ta3,$v0
sltu $v0,$t3,$ta3
$ST $t3,-$BNSZ($a0)
- $ADDU $v0,$t9
.set noreorder
- bgtzl $at,.L_bn_add_words_loop
- $LD $t0,0($a1)
+ bgtz $at,.L_bn_add_words_loop
+ $ADDU $v0,$t9
beqz $a3,.L_bn_add_words_return
nop
@@ -679,10 +675,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
.set reorder
li $minus4,-4
and $at,$a3,$minus4
- $LD $t0,0($a1)
beqz $at,.L_bn_sub_words_tail
.L_bn_sub_words_loop:
+ $LD $t0,0($a1)
$LD $ta0,0($a2)
subu $a3,4
$LD $t1,$BNSZ($a1)
@@ -722,11 +718,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
$SUBU $t3,$ta3,$v0
sgtu $v0,$t3,$ta3
$ST $t3,-$BNSZ($a0)
- $ADDU $v0,$t9
.set noreorder
- bgtzl $at,.L_bn_sub_words_loop
- $LD $t0,0($a1)
+ bgtz $at,.L_bn_sub_words_loop
+ $ADDU $v0,$t9
beqz $a3,.L_bn_sub_words_return
nop
@@ -840,8 +835,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
sltu $ta0,$a1,$a2
or $t8,$ta0
.set noreorder
- beqzl $at,.L_bn_div_3_words_inner_loop
+ beqz $at,.L_bn_div_3_words_inner_loop
$SUBU $v0,1
+ $ADDU $v0,1
.set reorder
.L_bn_div_3_words_inner_loop_done:
.set noreorder
@@ -902,7 +898,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
and $t2,$a0
$SRL $at,$a1,$t1
.set noreorder
- bnezl $t2,.+8
+ beqz $t2,.+12
+ nop
break 6 # signal overflow
.set reorder
$SLL $a0,$t9
@@ -917,7 +914,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
$SRL $DH,$a2,4*$BNSZ # bits
sgeu $at,$a0,$a2
.set noreorder
- bnezl $at,.+8
+ beqz $at,.+12
+ nop
$SUBU $a0,$a2
.set reorder
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/parisc-mont.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/parisc-mont.pl
index 4a766a87fb2e..c02ef6f01466 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/parisc-mont.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/parisc-mont.pl
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
# of arithmetic operations, most notably multiplications. It requires
# more memory references, most notably to tp[num], but this doesn't
# seem to exhaust memory port capacity. And indeed, dedicated PA-RISC
-# 2.0 code path, provides virtually same performance as pa-risc2[W].s:
+# 2.0 code path provides virtually same performance as pa-risc2[W].s:
# it's ~10% better for shortest key length and ~10% worse for longest
# one.
#
@@ -988,6 +988,8 @@ foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
# assemble 2.0 instructions in 32-bit mode...
s/^\s+([a-z]+)([\S]*)\s+([\S]*)/&assemble($1,$2,$3)/e if ($BN_SZ==4);
+ s/\bbv\b/bve/gm if ($SIZE_T==8);
+
print $_,"\n";
}
close STDOUT;
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl
index a30d4ef02958..226c66c35e35 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl
@@ -31,7 +31,8 @@ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
-open STDOUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
($lo,$hi)=("%rax","%rdx"); $a=$lo;
($i0,$i1)=("%rsi","%rdi");
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
index 8f8dc5a59798..dae0fe245318 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
@@ -901,8 +901,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
jnz .Lgather
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
- movaps %xmm6,(%rsp)
- movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
+ movaps (%rsp),%xmm6
+ movaps 0x10(%rsp),%xmm7
lea 0x28(%rsp),%rsp
___
$code.=<<___;
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_nist.c b/crypto/bn/bn_nist.c
index 43caee477031..e22968d4a33b 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_nist.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_nist.c
@@ -286,26 +286,25 @@ const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_521(void)
}
-static void nist_cp_bn_0(BN_ULONG *buf, BN_ULONG *a, int top, int max)
+static void nist_cp_bn_0(BN_ULONG *dst, const BN_ULONG *src, int top, int max)
{
int i;
- BN_ULONG *_tmp1 = (buf), *_tmp2 = (a);
#ifdef BN_DEBUG
OPENSSL_assert(top <= max);
#endif
- for (i = (top); i != 0; i--)
- *_tmp1++ = *_tmp2++;
- for (i = (max) - (top); i != 0; i--)
- *_tmp1++ = (BN_ULONG) 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < top; i++)
+ dst[i] = src[i];
+ for (; i < max; i++)
+ dst[i] = 0;
}
-static void nist_cp_bn(BN_ULONG *buf, BN_ULONG *a, int top)
+static void nist_cp_bn(BN_ULONG *dst, const BN_ULONG *src, int top)
{
int i;
- BN_ULONG *_tmp1 = (buf), *_tmp2 = (a);
- for (i = (top); i != 0; i--)
- *_tmp1++ = *_tmp2++;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < top; i++)
+ dst[i] = src[i];
}
#if BN_BITS2 == 64
@@ -451,8 +450,9 @@ int BN_nist_mod_192(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
*/
mask = 0-(PTR_SIZE_INT)bn_sub_words(c_d,r_d,_nist_p_192[0],BN_NIST_192_TOP);
mask &= 0-(PTR_SIZE_INT)carry;
+ res = c_d;
res = (BN_ULONG *)
- (((PTR_SIZE_INT)c_d&~mask) | ((PTR_SIZE_INT)r_d&mask));
+ (((PTR_SIZE_INT)res&~mask) | ((PTR_SIZE_INT)r_d&mask));
nist_cp_bn(r_d, res, BN_NIST_192_TOP);
r->top = BN_NIST_192_TOP;
bn_correct_top(r);
@@ -479,8 +479,11 @@ int BN_nist_mod_224(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
int top = a->top, i;
int carry;
BN_ULONG *r_d, *a_d = a->d;
- BN_ULONG buf[BN_NIST_224_TOP],
- c_d[BN_NIST_224_TOP],
+ union {
+ BN_ULONG bn[BN_NIST_224_TOP];
+ unsigned int ui[BN_NIST_224_TOP*sizeof(BN_ULONG)/sizeof(unsigned int)];
+ } buf;
+ BN_ULONG c_d[BN_NIST_224_TOP],
*res;
PTR_SIZE_INT mask;
union { bn_addsub_f f; PTR_SIZE_INT p; } u;
@@ -519,18 +522,18 @@ int BN_nist_mod_224(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
/* copy upper 256 bits of 448 bit number ... */
nist_cp_bn_0(c_d, a_d + (BN_NIST_224_TOP-1), top - (BN_NIST_224_TOP-1), BN_NIST_224_TOP);
/* ... and right shift by 32 to obtain upper 224 bits */
- nist_set_224(buf, c_d, 14, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8);
+ nist_set_224(buf.bn, c_d, 14, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8);
/* truncate lower part to 224 bits too */
r_d[BN_NIST_224_TOP-1] &= BN_MASK2l;
#else
- nist_cp_bn_0(buf, a_d + BN_NIST_224_TOP, top - BN_NIST_224_TOP, BN_NIST_224_TOP);
+ nist_cp_bn_0(buf.bn, a_d + BN_NIST_224_TOP, top - BN_NIST_224_TOP, BN_NIST_224_TOP);
#endif
#if defined(NIST_INT64) && BN_BITS2!=64
{
NIST_INT64 acc; /* accumulator */
unsigned int *rp=(unsigned int *)r_d;
- const unsigned int *bp=(const unsigned int *)buf;
+ const unsigned int *bp=(const unsigned int *)buf.ui;
acc = rp[0]; acc -= bp[7-7];
acc -= bp[11-7]; rp[0] = (unsigned int)acc; acc >>= 32;
@@ -565,13 +568,13 @@ int BN_nist_mod_224(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
{
BN_ULONG t_d[BN_NIST_224_TOP];
- nist_set_224(t_d, buf, 10, 9, 8, 7, 0, 0, 0);
+ nist_set_224(t_d, buf.bn, 10, 9, 8, 7, 0, 0, 0);
carry = (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_224_TOP);
- nist_set_224(t_d, buf, 0, 13, 12, 11, 0, 0, 0);
+ nist_set_224(t_d, buf.bn, 0, 13, 12, 11, 0, 0, 0);
carry += (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_224_TOP);
- nist_set_224(t_d, buf, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8, 7);
+ nist_set_224(t_d, buf.bn, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8, 7);
carry -= (int)bn_sub_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_224_TOP);
- nist_set_224(t_d, buf, 0, 0, 0, 0, 13, 12, 11);
+ nist_set_224(t_d, buf.bn, 0, 0, 0, 0, 13, 12, 11);
carry -= (int)bn_sub_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_224_TOP);
#if BN_BITS2==64
@@ -606,7 +609,8 @@ int BN_nist_mod_224(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
/* otherwise it's effectively same as in BN_nist_mod_192... */
mask = 0-(PTR_SIZE_INT)(*u.f)(c_d,r_d,_nist_p_224[0],BN_NIST_224_TOP);
mask &= 0-(PTR_SIZE_INT)carry;
- res = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT)c_d&~mask) |
+ res = c_d;
+ res = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT)res&~mask) |
((PTR_SIZE_INT)r_d&mask));
nist_cp_bn(r_d, res, BN_NIST_224_TOP);
r->top = BN_NIST_224_TOP;
@@ -805,7 +809,8 @@ int BN_nist_mod_256(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
mask = 0-(PTR_SIZE_INT)(*u.f)(c_d,r_d,_nist_p_256[0],BN_NIST_256_TOP);
mask &= 0-(PTR_SIZE_INT)carry;
- res = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT)c_d&~mask) |
+ res = c_d;
+ res = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT)res&~mask) |
((PTR_SIZE_INT)r_d&mask));
nist_cp_bn(r_d, res, BN_NIST_256_TOP);
r->top = BN_NIST_256_TOP;
@@ -1026,7 +1031,8 @@ int BN_nist_mod_384(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
mask = 0-(PTR_SIZE_INT)(*u.f)(c_d,r_d,_nist_p_384[0],BN_NIST_384_TOP);
mask &= 0-(PTR_SIZE_INT)carry;
- res = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT)c_d&~mask) |
+ res = c_d;
+ res = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT)res&~mask) |
((PTR_SIZE_INT)r_d&mask));
nist_cp_bn(r_d, res, BN_NIST_384_TOP);
r->top = BN_NIST_384_TOP;
@@ -1092,7 +1098,8 @@ int BN_nist_mod_521(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
bn_add_words(r_d,r_d,t_d,BN_NIST_521_TOP);
mask = 0-(PTR_SIZE_INT)bn_sub_words(t_d,r_d,_nist_p_521,BN_NIST_521_TOP);
- res = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT)t_d&~mask) |
+ res = t_d;
+ res = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT)res&~mask) |
((PTR_SIZE_INT)r_d&mask));
nist_cp_bn(r_d,res,BN_NIST_521_TOP);
r->top = BN_NIST_521_TOP;
diff --git a/crypto/buffer/buffer.c b/crypto/buffer/buffer.c
index d7aa79ad7f0a..d4a4ce43b3f2 100644
--- a/crypto/buffer/buffer.c
+++ b/crypto/buffer/buffer.c
@@ -179,14 +179,14 @@ int BUF_MEM_grow_clean(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len)
return(len);
}
-void BUF_reverse(unsigned char *out, unsigned char *in, size_t size)
+void BUF_reverse(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t size)
{
size_t i;
if (in)
{
out += size - 1;
for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
- *in++ = *out--;
+ *out-- = *in++;
}
else
{
diff --git a/crypto/buffer/buffer.h b/crypto/buffer/buffer.h
index 178e418282b2..f8da32b48507 100644
--- a/crypto/buffer/buffer.h
+++ b/crypto/buffer/buffer.h
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ int BUF_MEM_grow_clean(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len);
char * BUF_strdup(const char *str);
char * BUF_strndup(const char *str, size_t siz);
void * BUF_memdup(const void *data, size_t siz);
-void BUF_reverse(unsigned char *out, unsigned char *in, size_t siz);
+void BUF_reverse(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t siz);
/* safe string functions */
size_t BUF_strlcpy(char *dst,const char *src,size_t siz);
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c b/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c
index 83909c185359..0ce4524076f1 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static int eckey_param2type(int *pptype, void **ppval, EC_KEY *ec_key)
if (!pstr)
return 0;
pstr->length = i2d_ECParameters(ec_key, &pstr->data);
- if (pstr->length < 0)
+ if (pstr->length <= 0)
{
ASN1_STRING_free(pstr);
ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PARAM2TYPE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c b/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
index 175eec53428b..145807b611a5 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
@@ -89,7 +89,8 @@ int EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis(const EC_GROUP *group, unsigned int *k)
if (group == NULL)
return 0;
- if (EC_GROUP_method_of(group)->group_set_curve != ec_GF2m_simple_group_set_curve
+ if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) !=
+ NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field
|| !((group->poly[0] != 0) && (group->poly[1] != 0) && (group->poly[2] == 0)))
{
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_TRINOMIAL_BASIS, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
@@ -107,7 +108,8 @@ int EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis(const EC_GROUP *group, unsigned int *k1,
if (group == NULL)
return 0;
- if (EC_GROUP_method_of(group)->group_set_curve != ec_GF2m_simple_group_set_curve
+ if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) !=
+ NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field
|| !((group->poly[0] != 0) && (group->poly[1] != 0) && (group->poly[2] != 0) && (group->poly[3] != 0) && (group->poly[4] == 0)))
{
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_PENTANOMIAL_BASIS, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
index 25247b580332..de9a0cc2b37e 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
@@ -480,10 +480,10 @@ int EC_GROUP_cmp(const EC_GROUP *a, const EC_GROUP *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(a)) !=
EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(b)))
return 1;
- /* compare the curve name (if present) */
+ /* compare the curve name (if present in both) */
if (EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(a) && EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(b) &&
- EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(a) == EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(b))
- return 0;
+ EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(a) != EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(b))
+ return 1;
if (!ctx)
ctx_new = ctx = BN_CTX_new();
@@ -993,12 +993,12 @@ int EC_POINT_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN
if (group->meth->point_cmp == 0)
{
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_CMP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
- return 0;
+ return -1;
}
if ((group->meth != a->meth) || (a->meth != b->meth))
{
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_CMP, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
- return 0;
+ return -1;
}
return group->meth->point_cmp(group, a, b, ctx);
}
diff --git a/crypto/engine/eng_rdrand.c b/crypto/engine/eng_rdrand.c
index a9ba5ae6f9ff..4e9e91d54b13 100644
--- a/crypto/engine/eng_rdrand.c
+++ b/crypto/engine/eng_rdrand.c
@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e)
{
if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_e_rdrand_id) ||
!ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_e_rdrand_name) ||
+ !ENGINE_set_flags(e, ENGINE_FLAGS_NO_REGISTER_ALL) ||
!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, rdrand_init) ||
!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &rdrand_meth) )
return 0;
diff --git a/crypto/evp/Makefile b/crypto/evp/Makefile
index 1e46cebf5e76..5d0c6b7db4c9 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/evp/Makefile
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ files:
links:
@$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../include/openssl $(EXHEADER)
@$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../test $(TEST)
- [ ! -f $(TESTDATA) ] || cp $(TESTDATA) ../../test
+ @[ -f $(TESTDATA) ] && cp $(TESTDATA) ../../test && echo "$(TESTDATA) -> ../../test/$(TESTDATA)"
@$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../apps $(APPS)
install:
diff --git a/crypto/evp/digest.c b/crypto/evp/digest.c
index 6fc469f9c452..d14e8e48d5af 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/digest.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/digest.c
@@ -366,8 +366,11 @@ int EVP_Digest(const void *data, size_t count,
void EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
{
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
- OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+ if (ctx)
+ {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+ }
}
/* This call frees resources associated with the context */
diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_aes.c b/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
index 1bfb5d92b340..c7869b69efe2 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
@@ -842,7 +842,10 @@ static int aes_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
gctx->ctr = NULL;
break;
}
+ else
#endif
+ (void)0; /* terminate potentially open 'else' */
+
AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &gctx->ks);
CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks, (block128_f)AES_encrypt);
#ifdef AES_CTR_ASM
@@ -1083,14 +1086,17 @@ static int aes_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f)vpaes_decrypt;
}
- vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key + ctx->key_len/2,
+ vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key + ctx->key_len/2,
ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks2);
- xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f)vpaes_encrypt;
+ xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f)vpaes_encrypt;
- xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
- break;
- }
+ xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
+ break;
+ }
+ else
#endif
+ (void)0; /* terminate potentially open 'else' */
+
if (enc)
{
AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks1);
diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c b/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
index 483e04b605b7..fb2c884a7860 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
@@ -328,10 +328,11 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
if (res!=SHA_CBLOCK) continue;
- mask = 0-((inp_len+8-j)>>(sizeof(j)*8-1));
+ /* j is not incremented yet */
+ mask = 0-((inp_len+7-j)>>(sizeof(j)*8-1));
data->u[SHA_LBLOCK-1] |= bitlen&mask;
sha1_block_data_order(&key->md,data,1);
- mask &= 0-((j-inp_len-73)>>(sizeof(j)*8-1));
+ mask &= 0-((j-inp_len-72)>>(sizeof(j)*8-1));
pmac->u[0] |= key->md.h0 & mask;
pmac->u[1] |= key->md.h1 & mask;
pmac->u[2] |= key->md.h2 & mask;
diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_des3.c b/crypto/evp/e_des3.c
index 1e699726627d..8d7b7de292bc 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/e_des3.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/e_des3.c
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static int des_ede_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
static int des_ede_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
{
- if (inl>=EVP_MAXCHUNK)
+ while (inl>=EVP_MAXCHUNK)
{
DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt(in, out, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK,
&data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2, &data(ctx)->ks3,
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static int des_ede_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
printf("\n");
}
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- if (inl>=EVP_MAXCHUNK)
+ while (inl>=EVP_MAXCHUNK)
{
DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(in, out, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK,
&data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2, &data(ctx)->ks3,
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static int des_ede_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
static int des_ede_cfb64_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
{
- if (inl>=EVP_MAXCHUNK)
+ while (inl>=EVP_MAXCHUNK)
{
DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(in, out, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK,
&data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2, &data(ctx)->ks3,
diff --git a/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c b/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c
index 975d004df473..fe3c6c8813cb 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c
@@ -85,19 +85,24 @@ int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(const char *pass, int passlen,
unsigned char digtmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *p, itmp[4];
int cplen, j, k, tkeylen, mdlen;
unsigned long i = 1;
- HMAC_CTX hctx;
+ HMAC_CTX hctx_tpl, hctx;
mdlen = EVP_MD_size(digest);
if (mdlen < 0)
return 0;
- HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx_tpl);
p = out;
tkeylen = keylen;
if(!pass)
passlen = 0;
else if(passlen == -1)
passlen = strlen(pass);
+ if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx_tpl, pass, passlen, digest, NULL))
+ {
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl);
+ return 0;
+ }
while(tkeylen)
{
if(tkeylen > mdlen)
@@ -111,19 +116,36 @@ int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(const char *pass, int passlen,
itmp[1] = (unsigned char)((i >> 16) & 0xff);
itmp[2] = (unsigned char)((i >> 8) & 0xff);
itmp[3] = (unsigned char)(i & 0xff);
- if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, pass, passlen, digest, NULL)
- || !HMAC_Update(&hctx, salt, saltlen)
- || !HMAC_Update(&hctx, itmp, 4)
- || !HMAC_Final(&hctx, digtmp, NULL))
+ if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(&hctx, &hctx_tpl))
{
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, salt, saltlen)
+ || !HMAC_Update(&hctx, itmp, 4)
+ || !HMAC_Final(&hctx, digtmp, NULL))
+ {
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl);
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
return 0;
}
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
memcpy(p, digtmp, cplen);
for(j = 1; j < iter; j++)
{
- HMAC(digest, pass, passlen,
- digtmp, mdlen, digtmp, NULL);
+ if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(&hctx, &hctx_tpl))
+ {
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, digtmp, mdlen)
+ || !HMAC_Final(&hctx, digtmp, NULL))
+ {
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
for(k = 0; k < cplen; k++)
p[k] ^= digtmp[k];
}
@@ -131,7 +153,7 @@ int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(const char *pass, int passlen,
i++;
p+= cplen;
}
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl);
#ifdef DEBUG_PKCS5V2
fprintf(stderr, "Password:\n");
h__dump (pass, passlen);
diff --git a/crypto/modes/Makefile b/crypto/modes/Makefile
index c825b12f2585..3d8bafd5716c 100644
--- a/crypto/modes/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/modes/Makefile
@@ -53,7 +53,10 @@ ghash-x86_64.s: asm/ghash-x86_64.pl
ghash-sparcv9.s: asm/ghash-sparcv9.pl
$(PERL) asm/ghash-sparcv9.pl $@ $(CFLAGS)
ghash-alpha.s: asm/ghash-alpha.pl
- $(PERL) $< | $(CC) -E - | tee $@ > /dev/null
+ (preproc=/tmp/$$$$.$@; trap "rm $$preproc" INT; \
+ $(PERL) asm/ghash-alpha.pl > $$preproc && \
+ $(CC) -E $$preproc > $@ && rm $$preproc)
+
ghash-parisc.s: asm/ghash-parisc.pl
$(PERL) asm/ghash-parisc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
diff --git a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-parisc.pl b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-parisc.pl
index 8c7454ee9340..d5ad96b40335 100755
--- a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-parisc.pl
+++ b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-parisc.pl
@@ -724,6 +724,7 @@ foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
s/cmpb,\*/comb,/;
s/,\*/,/;
}
+ s/\bbv\b/bve/ if ($SIZE_T==8);
print $_,"\n";
}
diff --git a/crypto/modes/cbc128.c b/crypto/modes/cbc128.c
index 3d3782cbe118..0e54f75470b2 100644
--- a/crypto/modes/cbc128.c
+++ b/crypto/modes/cbc128.c
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ void CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
unsigned char ivec[16], block128_f block)
{
size_t n;
- union { size_t align; unsigned char c[16]; } tmp;
+ union { size_t t[16/sizeof(size_t)]; unsigned char c[16]; } tmp;
assert(in && out && key && ivec);
@@ -137,11 +137,13 @@ void CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
out += 16;
}
}
- else {
+ else if (16%sizeof(size_t) == 0) { /* always true */
while (len>=16) {
+ size_t *out_t=(size_t *)out, *iv_t=(size_t *)iv;
+
(*block)(in, out, key);
- for(n=0; n<16; n+=sizeof(size_t))
- *(size_t *)(out+n) ^= *(size_t *)(iv+n);
+ for(n=0; n<16/sizeof(size_t); n++)
+ out_t[n] ^= iv_t[n];
iv = in;
len -= 16;
in += 16;
@@ -165,15 +167,16 @@ void CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
out += 16;
}
}
- else {
- size_t c;
+ else if (16%sizeof(size_t) == 0) { /* always true */
while (len>=16) {
+ size_t c, *out_t=(size_t *)out, *ivec_t=(size_t *)ivec;
+ const size_t *in_t=(const size_t *)in;
+
(*block)(in, tmp.c, key);
- for(n=0; n<16; n+=sizeof(size_t)) {
- c = *(size_t *)(in+n);
- *(size_t *)(out+n) =
- *(size_t *)(tmp.c+n) ^ *(size_t *)(ivec+n);
- *(size_t *)(ivec+n) = c;
+ for(n=0; n<16/sizeof(size_t); n++) {
+ c = in_t[n];
+ out_t[n] = tmp.t[n] ^ ivec_t[n];
+ ivec_t[n] = c;
}
len -= 16;
in += 16;
diff --git a/crypto/modes/ccm128.c b/crypto/modes/ccm128.c
index c9b35e5b35e5..3ce11d0d984c 100644
--- a/crypto/modes/ccm128.c
+++ b/crypto/modes/ccm128.c
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ int CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(CCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
ctx->nonce.c[11] = (u8)(mlen>>(32%(sizeof(mlen)*8)));
}
else
- *(u32*)(&ctx->nonce.c[8]) = 0;
+ ctx->nonce.u[1] = 0;
ctx->nonce.c[12] = (u8)(mlen>>24);
ctx->nonce.c[13] = (u8)(mlen>>16);
diff --git a/crypto/modes/cts128.c b/crypto/modes/cts128.c
index c0e1f3696c6c..2d583de6f61d 100644
--- a/crypto/modes/cts128.c
+++ b/crypto/modes/cts128.c
@@ -108,12 +108,8 @@ size_t CRYPTO_cts128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
(*cbc)(in,out-16,residue,key,ivec,1);
memcpy(out,tmp.c,residue);
#else
- {
- size_t n;
- for (n=0; n<16; n+=sizeof(size_t))
- *(size_t *)(tmp.c+n) = 0;
+ memset(tmp.c,0,sizeof(tmp));
memcpy(tmp.c,in,residue);
- }
memcpy(out,out-16,residue);
(*cbc)(tmp.c,out-16,16,key,ivec,1);
#endif
@@ -144,12 +140,8 @@ size_t CRYPTO_nistcts128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
#if defined(CBC_HANDLES_TRUNCATED_IO)
(*cbc)(in,out-16+residue,residue,key,ivec,1);
#else
- {
- size_t n;
- for (n=0; n<16; n+=sizeof(size_t))
- *(size_t *)(tmp.c+n) = 0;
+ memset(tmp.c,0,sizeof(tmp));
memcpy(tmp.c,in,residue);
- }
(*cbc)(tmp.c,out-16+residue,16,key,ivec,1);
#endif
return len+residue;
@@ -177,8 +169,7 @@ size_t CRYPTO_cts128_decrypt_block(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
(*block)(in,tmp.c+16,key);
- for (n=0; n<16; n+=sizeof(size_t))
- *(size_t *)(tmp.c+n) = *(size_t *)(tmp.c+16+n);
+ memcpy(tmp.c,tmp.c+16,16);
memcpy(tmp.c,in+16,residue);
(*block)(tmp.c,tmp.c,key);
@@ -220,8 +211,7 @@ size_t CRYPTO_nistcts128_decrypt_block(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *o
(*block)(in+residue,tmp.c+16,key);
- for (n=0; n<16; n+=sizeof(size_t))
- *(size_t *)(tmp.c+n) = *(size_t *)(tmp.c+16+n);
+ memcpy(tmp.c,tmp.c+16,16);
memcpy(tmp.c,in,residue);
(*block)(tmp.c,tmp.c,key);
@@ -240,7 +230,7 @@ size_t CRYPTO_nistcts128_decrypt_block(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *o
size_t CRYPTO_cts128_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
size_t len, const void *key,
unsigned char ivec[16], cbc128_f cbc)
-{ size_t residue, n;
+{ size_t residue;
union { size_t align; unsigned char c[32]; } tmp;
assert (in && out && key && ivec);
@@ -257,8 +247,7 @@ size_t CRYPTO_cts128_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
out += len;
}
- for (n=16; n<32; n+=sizeof(size_t))
- *(size_t *)(tmp.c+n) = 0;
+ memset(tmp.c,0,sizeof(tmp));
/* this places in[16] at &tmp.c[16] and decrypted block at &tmp.c[0] */
(*cbc)(in,tmp.c,16,key,tmp.c+16,0);
@@ -275,7 +264,7 @@ size_t CRYPTO_cts128_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
size_t CRYPTO_nistcts128_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
size_t len, const void *key,
unsigned char ivec[16], cbc128_f cbc)
-{ size_t residue, n;
+{ size_t residue;
union { size_t align; unsigned char c[32]; } tmp;
assert (in && out && key && ivec);
@@ -297,8 +286,7 @@ size_t CRYPTO_nistcts128_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
out += len;
}
- for (n=16; n<32; n+=sizeof(size_t))
- *(size_t *)(tmp.c+n) = 0;
+ memset(tmp.c,0,sizeof(tmp));
/* this places in[16] at &tmp.c[16] and decrypted block at &tmp.c[0] */
(*cbc)(in+residue,tmp.c,16,key,tmp.c+16,0);
diff --git a/crypto/modes/gcm128.c b/crypto/modes/gcm128.c
index 0e6ff8b0a155..250063de86cc 100644
--- a/crypto/modes/gcm128.c
+++ b/crypto/modes/gcm128.c
@@ -941,15 +941,17 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
size_t j=GHASH_CHUNK;
while (j) {
+ size_t *out_t=(size_t *)out;
+ const size_t *in_t=(const size_t *)in;
+
(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
- for (i=0; i<16; i+=sizeof(size_t))
- *(size_t *)(out+i) =
- *(size_t *)(in+i)^*(size_t *)(ctx->EKi.c+i);
+ for (i=0; i<16/sizeof(size_t); ++i)
+ out_t[i] = in_t[i] ^ ctx->EKi.t[i];
out += 16;
in += 16;
j -= 16;
@@ -961,15 +963,17 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
size_t j=i;
while (len>=16) {
+ size_t *out_t=(size_t *)out;
+ const size_t *in_t=(const size_t *)in;
+
(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
- for (i=0; i<16; i+=sizeof(size_t))
- *(size_t *)(out+i) =
- *(size_t *)(in+i)^*(size_t *)(ctx->EKi.c+i);
+ for (i=0; i<16/sizeof(size_t); ++i)
+ out_t[i] = in_t[i] ^ ctx->EKi.t[i];
out += 16;
in += 16;
len -= 16;
@@ -978,16 +982,18 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
}
#else
while (len>=16) {
+ size_t *out_t=(size_t *)out;
+ const size_t *in_t=(const size_t *)in;
+
(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
- for (i=0; i<16; i+=sizeof(size_t))
- *(size_t *)(ctx->Xi.c+i) ^=
- *(size_t *)(out+i) =
- *(size_t *)(in+i)^*(size_t *)(ctx->EKi.c+i);
+ for (i=0; i<16/sizeof(size_t); ++i)
+ ctx->Xi.t[i] ^=
+ out_t[i] = in_t[i]^ctx->EKi.t[i];
GCM_MUL(ctx,Xi);
out += 16;
in += 16;
@@ -1091,15 +1097,17 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
GHASH(ctx,in,GHASH_CHUNK);
while (j) {
+ size_t *out_t=(size_t *)out;
+ const size_t *in_t=(const size_t *)in;
+
(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
- for (i=0; i<16; i+=sizeof(size_t))
- *(size_t *)(out+i) =
- *(size_t *)(in+i)^*(size_t *)(ctx->EKi.c+i);
+ for (i=0; i<16/sizeof(size_t); ++i)
+ out_t[i] = in_t[i]^ctx->EKi.t[i];
out += 16;
in += 16;
j -= 16;
@@ -1109,15 +1117,17 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
if ((i = (len&(size_t)-16))) {
GHASH(ctx,in,i);
while (len>=16) {
+ size_t *out_t=(size_t *)out;
+ const size_t *in_t=(const size_t *)in;
+
(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
- for (i=0; i<16; i+=sizeof(size_t))
- *(size_t *)(out+i) =
- *(size_t *)(in+i)^*(size_t *)(ctx->EKi.c+i);
+ for (i=0; i<16/sizeof(size_t); ++i)
+ out_t[i] = in_t[i]^ctx->EKi.t[i];
out += 16;
in += 16;
len -= 16;
@@ -1125,16 +1135,19 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
}
#else
while (len>=16) {
+ size_t *out_t=(size_t *)out;
+ const size_t *in_t=(const size_t *)in;
+
(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
- for (i=0; i<16; i+=sizeof(size_t)) {
- size_t c = *(size_t *)(in+i);
- *(size_t *)(out+i) = c^*(size_t *)(ctx->EKi.c+i);
- *(size_t *)(ctx->Xi.c+i) ^= c;
+ for (i=0; i<16/sizeof(size_t); ++i) {
+ size_t c = in[i];
+ out[i] = c^ctx->EKi.t[i];
+ ctx->Xi.t[i] ^= c;
}
GCM_MUL(ctx,Xi);
out += 16;
@@ -1669,6 +1682,46 @@ static const u8 IV18[]={0x93,0x13,0x22,0x5d,0xf8,0x84,0x06,0xe5,0x55,0x90,0x9c,0
0xa2,0x41,0x89,0x97,0x20,0x0e,0xf8,0x2e,0x44,0xae,0x7e,0x3f},
T18[]= {0xa4,0x4a,0x82,0x66,0xee,0x1c,0x8e,0xb0,0xc8,0xb5,0xd4,0xcf,0x5a,0xe9,0xf1,0x9a};
+/* Test Case 19 */
+#define K19 K1
+#define P19 P1
+#define IV19 IV1
+#define C19 C1
+static const u8 A19[]= {0xd9,0x31,0x32,0x25,0xf8,0x84,0x06,0xe5,0xa5,0x59,0x09,0xc5,0xaf,0xf5,0x26,0x9a,
+ 0x86,0xa7,0xa9,0x53,0x15,0x34,0xf7,0xda,0x2e,0x4c,0x30,0x3d,0x8a,0x31,0x8a,0x72,
+ 0x1c,0x3c,0x0c,0x95,0x95,0x68,0x09,0x53,0x2f,0xcf,0x0e,0x24,0x49,0xa6,0xb5,0x25,
+ 0xb1,0x6a,0xed,0xf5,0xaa,0x0d,0xe6,0x57,0xba,0x63,0x7b,0x39,0x1a,0xaf,0xd2,0x55,
+ 0x52,0x2d,0xc1,0xf0,0x99,0x56,0x7d,0x07,0xf4,0x7f,0x37,0xa3,0x2a,0x84,0x42,0x7d,
+ 0x64,0x3a,0x8c,0xdc,0xbf,0xe5,0xc0,0xc9,0x75,0x98,0xa2,0xbd,0x25,0x55,0xd1,0xaa,
+ 0x8c,0xb0,0x8e,0x48,0x59,0x0d,0xbb,0x3d,0xa7,0xb0,0x8b,0x10,0x56,0x82,0x88,0x38,
+ 0xc5,0xf6,0x1e,0x63,0x93,0xba,0x7a,0x0a,0xbc,0xc9,0xf6,0x62,0x89,0x80,0x15,0xad},
+ T19[]= {0x5f,0xea,0x79,0x3a,0x2d,0x6f,0x97,0x4d,0x37,0xe6,0x8e,0x0c,0xb8,0xff,0x94,0x92};
+
+/* Test Case 20 */
+#define K20 K1
+#define A20 A1
+static const u8 IV20[64]={0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff}, /* this results in 0xff in counter LSB */
+ P20[288],
+ C20[]= {0x56,0xb3,0x37,0x3c,0xa9,0xef,0x6e,0x4a,0x2b,0x64,0xfe,0x1e,0x9a,0x17,0xb6,0x14,
+ 0x25,0xf1,0x0d,0x47,0xa7,0x5a,0x5f,0xce,0x13,0xef,0xc6,0xbc,0x78,0x4a,0xf2,0x4f,
+ 0x41,0x41,0xbd,0xd4,0x8c,0xf7,0xc7,0x70,0x88,0x7a,0xfd,0x57,0x3c,0xca,0x54,0x18,
+ 0xa9,0xae,0xff,0xcd,0x7c,0x5c,0xed,0xdf,0xc6,0xa7,0x83,0x97,0xb9,0xa8,0x5b,0x49,
+ 0x9d,0xa5,0x58,0x25,0x72,0x67,0xca,0xab,0x2a,0xd0,0xb2,0x3c,0xa4,0x76,0xa5,0x3c,
+ 0xb1,0x7f,0xb4,0x1c,0x4b,0x8b,0x47,0x5c,0xb4,0xf3,0xf7,0x16,0x50,0x94,0xc2,0x29,
+ 0xc9,0xe8,0xc4,0xdc,0x0a,0x2a,0x5f,0xf1,0x90,0x3e,0x50,0x15,0x11,0x22,0x13,0x76,
+ 0xa1,0xcd,0xb8,0x36,0x4c,0x50,0x61,0xa2,0x0c,0xae,0x74,0xbc,0x4a,0xcd,0x76,0xce,
+ 0xb0,0xab,0xc9,0xfd,0x32,0x17,0xef,0x9f,0x8c,0x90,0xbe,0x40,0x2d,0xdf,0x6d,0x86,
+ 0x97,0xf4,0xf8,0x80,0xdf,0xf1,0x5b,0xfb,0x7a,0x6b,0x28,0x24,0x1e,0xc8,0xfe,0x18,
+ 0x3c,0x2d,0x59,0xe3,0xf9,0xdf,0xff,0x65,0x3c,0x71,0x26,0xf0,0xac,0xb9,0xe6,0x42,
+ 0x11,0xf4,0x2b,0xae,0x12,0xaf,0x46,0x2b,0x10,0x70,0xbe,0xf1,0xab,0x5e,0x36,0x06,
+ 0x87,0x2c,0xa1,0x0d,0xee,0x15,0xb3,0x24,0x9b,0x1a,0x1b,0x95,0x8f,0x23,0x13,0x4c,
+ 0x4b,0xcc,0xb7,0xd0,0x32,0x00,0xbc,0xe4,0x20,0xa2,0xf8,0xeb,0x66,0xdc,0xf3,0x64,
+ 0x4d,0x14,0x23,0xc1,0xb5,0x69,0x90,0x03,0xc1,0x3e,0xce,0xf4,0xbf,0x38,0xa3,0xb6,
+ 0x0e,0xed,0xc3,0x40,0x33,0xba,0xc1,0x90,0x27,0x83,0xdc,0x6d,0x89,0xe2,0xe7,0x74,
+ 0x18,0x8a,0x43,0x9c,0x7e,0xbc,0xc0,0x67,0x2d,0xbd,0xa4,0xdd,0xcf,0xb2,0x79,0x46,
+ 0x13,0xb0,0xbe,0x41,0x31,0x5e,0xf7,0x78,0x70,0x8a,0x70,0xee,0x7d,0x75,0x16,0x5c},
+ T20[]= {0x8b,0x30,0x7f,0x6b,0x33,0x28,0x6d,0x0a,0xb0,0x26,0xa9,0xed,0x3f,0xe1,0xe8,0x5f};
+
#define TEST_CASE(n) do { \
u8 out[sizeof(P##n)]; \
AES_set_encrypt_key(K##n,sizeof(K##n)*8,&key); \
@@ -1713,6 +1766,8 @@ int main()
TEST_CASE(16);
TEST_CASE(17);
TEST_CASE(18);
+ TEST_CASE(19);
+ TEST_CASE(20);
#ifdef OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ
{
@@ -1743,11 +1798,16 @@ int main()
ctr_t/(double)sizeof(buf),
(gcm_t-ctr_t)/(double)sizeof(buf));
#ifdef GHASH
- GHASH(&ctx,buf.c,sizeof(buf));
+ {
+ void (*gcm_ghash_p)(u64 Xi[2],const u128 Htable[16],
+ const u8 *inp,size_t len) = ctx.ghash;
+
+ GHASH((&ctx),buf.c,sizeof(buf));
start = OPENSSL_rdtsc();
- for (i=0;i<100;++i) GHASH(&ctx,buf.c,sizeof(buf));
+ for (i=0;i<100;++i) GHASH((&ctx),buf.c,sizeof(buf));
gcm_t = OPENSSL_rdtsc() - start;
printf("%.2f\n",gcm_t/(double)sizeof(buf)/(double)i);
+ }
#endif
}
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h b/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h
index b6dc3c336fe0..9d83e128444e 100644
--- a/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h
+++ b/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h
@@ -29,10 +29,7 @@ typedef unsigned char u8;
#if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || \
defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
defined(_M_IX86) || defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
- defined(__s390__) || defined(__s390x__) || \
- ( (defined(__arm__) || defined(__arm)) && \
- (defined(__ARM_ARCH_7__) || defined(__ARM_ARCH_7A__) || \
- defined(__ARM_ARCH_7R__) || defined(__ARM_ARCH_7M__)) )
+ defined(__s390__) || defined(__s390x__)
# undef STRICT_ALIGNMENT
#endif
@@ -101,8 +98,8 @@ typedef struct { u64 hi,lo; } u128;
struct gcm128_context {
/* Following 6 names follow names in GCM specification */
- union { u64 u[2]; u32 d[4]; u8 c[16]; } Yi,EKi,EK0,len,
- Xi,H;
+ union { u64 u[2]; u32 d[4]; u8 c[16]; size_t t[16/sizeof(size_t)]; }
+ Yi,EKi,EK0,len,Xi,H;
/* Relative position of Xi, H and pre-computed Htable is used
* in some assembler modules, i.e. don't change the order! */
#if TABLE_BITS==8
diff --git a/crypto/opensslv.h b/crypto/opensslv.h
index 5bc8e53e66ad..b27a5bb8c04c 100644
--- a/crypto/opensslv.h
+++ b/crypto/opensslv.h
@@ -25,11 +25,11 @@
* (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
* major minor fix final patch/beta)
*/
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000105fL
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000106fL
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1e-fips 11 Feb 2013"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1f-fips 6 Jan 2014"
#else
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1e 11 Feb 2013"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1f 6 Jan 2014"
#endif
#define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
diff --git a/crypto/pariscid.pl b/crypto/pariscid.pl
index 477ec9b87dd7..bfc56fdc7fc0 100755
--- a/crypto/pariscid.pl
+++ b/crypto/pariscid.pl
@@ -97,33 +97,33 @@ OPENSSL_cleanse
.PROC
.CALLINFO NO_CALLS
.ENTRY
- cmpib,*= 0,$len,Ldone
+ cmpib,*= 0,$len,L\$done
nop
- cmpib,*>>= 15,$len,Little
+ cmpib,*>>= 15,$len,L\$ittle
ldi $SIZE_T-1,%r1
-Lalign
+L\$align
and,*<> $inp,%r1,%r28
- b,n Laligned
+ b,n L\$aligned
stb %r0,0($inp)
ldo -1($len),$len
- b Lalign
+ b L\$align
ldo 1($inp),$inp
-Laligned
+L\$aligned
andcm $len,%r1,%r28
-Lot
+L\$ot
$ST %r0,0($inp)
- addib,*<> -$SIZE_T,%r28,Lot
+ addib,*<> -$SIZE_T,%r28,L\$ot
ldo $SIZE_T($inp),$inp
and,*<> $len,%r1,$len
- b,n Ldone
-Little
+ b,n L\$done
+L\$ittle
stb %r0,0($inp)
- addib,*<> -1,$len,Little
+ addib,*<> -1,$len,L\$ittle
ldo 1($inp),$inp
-Ldone
+L\$done
bv ($rp)
.EXIT
nop
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ OPENSSL_instrument_bus
ldw 0($out),$tick
add $diff,$tick,$tick
stw $tick,0($out)
-Loop
+L\$oop
mfctl %cr16,$tick
sub $tick,$lasttick,$diff
copy $tick,$lasttick
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ Loop
add $diff,$tick,$tick
stw $tick,0($out)
- addib,<> -1,$cnt,Loop
+ addib,<> -1,$cnt,L\$oop
addi 4,$out,$out
bv ($rp)
@@ -190,14 +190,14 @@ OPENSSL_instrument_bus2
mfctl %cr16,$tick
sub $tick,$lasttick,$diff
copy $tick,$lasttick
-Loop2
+L\$oop2
copy $diff,$lastdiff
fdc 0($out)
ldw 0($out),$tick
add $diff,$tick,$tick
stw $tick,0($out)
- addib,= -1,$max,Ldone2
+ addib,= -1,$max,L\$done2
nop
mfctl %cr16,$tick
@@ -208,17 +208,18 @@ Loop2
ldi 1,%r1
xor %r1,$tick,$tick
- addb,<> $tick,$cnt,Loop2
+ addb,<> $tick,$cnt,L\$oop2
shladd,l $tick,2,$out,$out
-Ldone2
+L\$done2
bv ($rp)
.EXIT
add $rv,$cnt,$rv
.PROCEND
___
}
-$code =~ s/cmpib,\*/comib,/gm if ($SIZE_T==4);
-$code =~ s/,\*/,/gm if ($SIZE_T==4);
+$code =~ s/cmpib,\*/comib,/gm if ($SIZE_T==4);
+$code =~ s/,\*/,/gm if ($SIZE_T==4);
+$code =~ s/\bbv\b/bve/gm if ($SIZE_T==8);
print $code;
close STDOUT;
diff --git a/crypto/pem/pem_info.c b/crypto/pem/pem_info.c
index 1b2be527edde..cc7f24a9c1cf 100644
--- a/crypto/pem/pem_info.c
+++ b/crypto/pem/pem_info.c
@@ -167,6 +167,7 @@ start:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (strcmp(name,PEM_STRING_RSA) == 0)
{
+ d2i=(D2I_OF(void))d2i_RSAPrivateKey;
if (xi->x_pkey != NULL)
{
if (!sk_X509_INFO_push(ret,xi)) goto err;
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crt.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crt.c
index 96b131defa0c..a34915d02d14 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crt.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crt.c
@@ -90,7 +90,14 @@ PKCS12 *PKCS12_create(char *pass, char *name, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert,
/* Set defaults */
if (!nid_cert)
+ {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (FIPS_mode())
+ nid_cert = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
+ else
+#endif
nid_cert = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC;
+ }
if (!nid_key)
nid_key = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
if (!iter)
diff --git a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
index 1e3bcb9bc426..dd291637275d 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
@@ -380,8 +380,11 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
* are fed into the hash function and the results are kept in the
* global 'md'.
*/
-
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ /* NB: in FIPS mode we are already under a lock */
+ if (!FIPS_mode())
+#endif
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
/* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
@@ -460,7 +463,10 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
/* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
crypto_lock_rand = 0;
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (!FIPS_mode())
+#endif
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
while (num > 0)
{
@@ -512,10 +518,16 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
MD_Init(&m);
MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (!FIPS_mode())
+#endif
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
MD_Update(&m,md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
MD_Final(&m,md);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (!FIPS_mode())
+#endif
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
if (ok)
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand.h b/crypto/rand/rand.h
index dc8fcf94c5aa..bb5520e80ac1 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand.h
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand.h
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ void ERR_load_RAND_strings(void);
#define RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES 100
/* Reason codes. */
+#define RAND_R_DUAL_EC_DRBG_DISABLED 104
#define RAND_R_ERROR_INITIALISING_DRBG 102
#define RAND_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG 103
#define RAND_R_NO_FIPS_RANDOM_METHOD_SET 101
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_err.c b/crypto/rand/rand_err.c
index b8586c8f4a9c..c4c80fc8ccad 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_err.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_err.c
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RAND_str_functs[]=
static ERR_STRING_DATA RAND_str_reasons[]=
{
+{ERR_REASON(RAND_R_DUAL_EC_DRBG_DISABLED),"dual ec drbg disabled"},
{ERR_REASON(RAND_R_ERROR_INITIALISING_DRBG),"error initialising drbg"},
{ERR_REASON(RAND_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG),"error instantiating drbg"},
{ERR_REASON(RAND_R_NO_FIPS_RANDOM_METHOD_SET),"no fips random method set"},
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
index 476a0cd187ee..5ac0e14caf00 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
@@ -269,6 +269,14 @@ int RAND_init_fips(void)
DRBG_CTX *dctx;
size_t plen;
unsigned char pers[32], *p;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_ALLOW_DUAL_EC_DRBG
+ if (fips_drbg_type >> 16)
+ {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_INIT_FIPS, RAND_R_DUAL_EC_DRBG_DISABLED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+
dctx = FIPS_get_default_drbg();
if (FIPS_drbg_init(dctx, fips_drbg_type, fips_drbg_flags) <= 0)
{
diff --git a/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-parisc.pl b/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-parisc.pl
index 9165067080ef..ad7e65651cf9 100755
--- a/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-parisc.pl
+++ b/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-parisc.pl
@@ -307,7 +307,8 @@ L\$opts
.STRINGZ "RC4 for PA-RISC, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
___
$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
-$code =~ s/cmpib,\*/comib,/gm if ($SIZE_T==4);
+$code =~ s/cmpib,\*/comib,/gm if ($SIZE_T==4);
+$code =~ s/\bbv\b/bve/gm if ($SIZE_T==8);
print $code;
close STDOUT;
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
index 2460910ab278..5a2062f903ae 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
@@ -351,27 +351,27 @@ static int rsa_pss_param_print(BIO *bp, RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss,
if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
goto err;
- if (BIO_puts(bp, "Salt Length: ") <= 0)
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, "Salt Length: 0x") <= 0)
goto err;
if (pss->saltLength)
{
if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, pss->saltLength) <= 0)
goto err;
}
- else if (BIO_puts(bp, "20 (default)") <= 0)
+ else if (BIO_puts(bp, "0x14 (default)") <= 0)
goto err;
BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
goto err;
- if (BIO_puts(bp, "Trailer Field: ") <= 0)
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, "Trailer Field: 0x") <= 0)
goto err;
if (pss->trailerField)
{
if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, pss->trailerField) <= 0)
goto err;
}
- else if (BIO_puts(bp, "0xbc (default)") <= 0)
+ else if (BIO_puts(bp, "BC (default)") <= 0)
goto err;
BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c
index 9d848db8c6c7..cc30e77132fa 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c
@@ -59,6 +59,12 @@ int RSA_check_key(const RSA *key)
BN_CTX *ctx;
int r;
int ret=1;
+
+ if (!key->p || !key->q || !key->n || !key->e || !key->d)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
+ return 0;
+ }
i = BN_new();
j = BN_new();
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
index 5b2ecf56adc7..157aa5c41d2a 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
@@ -611,6 +611,8 @@ static int pkey_rsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
pm = RSA_NO_PADDING;
else if (!strcmp(value, "oeap"))
pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
+ else if (!strcmp(value, "oaep"))
+ pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
else if (!strcmp(value, "x931"))
pm = RSA_X931_PADDING;
else if (!strcmp(value, "pss"))
diff --git a/crypto/sha/Makefile b/crypto/sha/Makefile
index 6d191d3936ee..2eb2b7af992b 100644
--- a/crypto/sha/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/sha/Makefile
@@ -60,7 +60,9 @@ sha256-armv4.S: asm/sha256-armv4.pl
$(PERL) $< $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
sha1-alpha.s: asm/sha1-alpha.pl
- $(PERL) $< | $(CC) -E - | tee $@ > /dev/null
+ (preproc=/tmp/$$$$.$@; trap "rm $$preproc" INT; \
+ $(PERL) asm/sha1-alpha.pl > $$preproc && \
+ $(CC) -E $$preproc > $@ && rm $$preproc)
# Solaris make has to be explicitly told
sha1-x86_64.s: asm/sha1-x86_64.pl; $(PERL) asm/sha1-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-parisc.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-parisc.pl
index 6d7bf495b20a..6e5a328a6f1f 100755
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-parisc.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-parisc.pl
@@ -254,6 +254,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
___
$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
-$code =~ s/,\*/,/gm if ($SIZE_T==4);
+$code =~ s/,\*/,/gm if ($SIZE_T==4);
+$code =~ s/\bbv\b/bve/gm if ($SIZE_T==8);
print $code;
close STDOUT;
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl
index cfdc45cce6da..f15c7ec39b20 100755
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl
@@ -745,7 +745,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
mov %rdi,$ctx # reassigned argument
mov %rsi,$inp # reassigned argument
mov %rdx,$num # reassigned argument
- vzeroall
+ vzeroupper
shl \$6,$num
add $inp,$num
@@ -1038,7 +1038,7 @@ ___
&Xtail_avx(\&body_20_39);
$code.=<<___;
- vzeroall
+ vzeroupper
add 0($ctx),$A # update context
add 4($ctx),@T[0]
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-mips.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-mips.pl
index ba5b250890e0..ffa053bb7d36 100755
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-mips.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-mips.pl
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
$ST $G,6*$SZ($ctx)
$ST $H,7*$SZ($ctx)
- bnel $inp,@X[15],.Loop
+ bne $inp,@X[15],.Loop
$PTR_SUB $Ktbl,`($rounds-16)*$SZ` # rewind $Ktbl
$REG_L $ra,$FRAMESIZE-1*$SZREG($sp)
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-parisc.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-parisc.pl
index e24ee58ae97f..fc0e15b3c059 100755
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-parisc.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-parisc.pl
@@ -785,6 +785,8 @@ foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
s/cmpb,\*/comb,/ if ($SIZE_T==4);
+ s/\bbv\b/bve/ if ($SIZE_T==8);
+
print $_,"\n";
}
diff --git a/crypto/sha/sha512.c b/crypto/sha/sha512.c
index 50dd7dc74437..50c229ddebf2 100644
--- a/crypto/sha/sha512.c
+++ b/crypto/sha/sha512.c
@@ -232,7 +232,14 @@ int SHA384_Update (SHA512_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len)
{ return SHA512_Update (c,data,len); }
void SHA512_Transform (SHA512_CTX *c, const unsigned char *data)
-{ sha512_block_data_order (c,data,1); }
+ {
+#ifndef SHA512_BLOCK_CAN_MANAGE_UNALIGNED_DATA
+ if ((size_t)data%sizeof(c->u.d[0]) != 0)
+ memcpy(c->u.p,data,sizeof(c->u.p)),
+ data = c->u.p;
+#endif
+ sha512_block_data_order (c,data,1);
+ }
unsigned char *SHA384(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md)
{
diff --git a/crypto/srp/srp_grps.h b/crypto/srp/srp_grps.h
index d77c9fff4ba1..8e3c35e3f53f 100644
--- a/crypto/srp/srp_grps.h
+++ b/crypto/srp/srp_grps.h
@@ -1,22 +1,22 @@
/* start of generated data */
static BN_ULONG bn_group_1024_value[] = {
- bn_pack4(9FC6,1D2F,C0EB,06E3),
- bn_pack4(FD51,38FE,8376,435B),
- bn_pack4(2FD4,CBF4,976E,AA9A),
- bn_pack4(68ED,BC3C,0572,6CC0),
- bn_pack4(C529,F566,660E,57EC),
- bn_pack4(8255,9B29,7BCF,1885),
- bn_pack4(CE8E,F4AD,69B1,5D49),
- bn_pack4(5DC7,D7B4,6154,D6B6),
- bn_pack4(8E49,5C1D,6089,DAD1),
- bn_pack4(E0D5,D8E2,50B9,8BE4),
- bn_pack4(383B,4813,D692,C6E0),
- bn_pack4(D674,DF74,96EA,81D3),
- bn_pack4(9EA2,314C,9C25,6576),
- bn_pack4(6072,6187,75FF,3C0B),
- bn_pack4(9C33,F80A,FA8F,C5E8),
- bn_pack4(EEAF,0AB9,ADB3,8DD6)
+ bn_pack4(0x9FC6,0x1D2F,0xC0EB,0x06E3),
+ bn_pack4(0xFD51,0x38FE,0x8376,0x435B),
+ bn_pack4(0x2FD4,0xCBF4,0x976E,0xAA9A),
+ bn_pack4(0x68ED,0xBC3C,0x0572,0x6CC0),
+ bn_pack4(0xC529,0xF566,0x660E,0x57EC),
+ bn_pack4(0x8255,0x9B29,0x7BCF,0x1885),
+ bn_pack4(0xCE8E,0xF4AD,0x69B1,0x5D49),
+ bn_pack4(0x5DC7,0xD7B4,0x6154,0xD6B6),
+ bn_pack4(0x8E49,0x5C1D,0x6089,0xDAD1),
+ bn_pack4(0xE0D5,0xD8E2,0x50B9,0x8BE4),
+ bn_pack4(0x383B,0x4813,0xD692,0xC6E0),
+ bn_pack4(0xD674,0xDF74,0x96EA,0x81D3),
+ bn_pack4(0x9EA2,0x314C,0x9C25,0x6576),
+ bn_pack4(0x6072,0x6187,0x75FF,0x3C0B),
+ bn_pack4(0x9C33,0xF80A,0xFA8F,0xC5E8),
+ bn_pack4(0xEEAF,0x0AB9,0xADB3,0x8DD6)
};
static BIGNUM bn_group_1024 = {
bn_group_1024_value,
@@ -27,30 +27,30 @@ static BIGNUM bn_group_1024 = {
};
static BN_ULONG bn_group_1536_value[] = {
- bn_pack4(CF76,E3FE,D135,F9BB),
- bn_pack4(1518,0F93,499A,234D),
- bn_pack4(8CE7,A28C,2442,C6F3),
- bn_pack4(5A02,1FFF,5E91,479E),
- bn_pack4(7F8A,2FE9,B8B5,292E),
- bn_pack4(837C,264A,E3A9,BEB8),
- bn_pack4(E442,734A,F7CC,B7AE),
- bn_pack4(6577,2E43,7D6C,7F8C),
- bn_pack4(DB2F,D53D,24B7,C486),
- bn_pack4(6EDF,0195,3934,9627),
- bn_pack4(158B,FD3E,2B9C,8CF5),
- bn_pack4(764E,3F4B,53DD,9DA1),
- bn_pack4(4754,8381,DBC5,B1FC),
- bn_pack4(9B60,9E0B,E3BA,B63D),
- bn_pack4(8134,B1C8,B979,8914),
- bn_pack4(DF02,8A7C,EC67,F0D0),
- bn_pack4(80B6,55BB,9A22,E8DC),
- bn_pack4(1558,903B,A0D0,F843),
- bn_pack4(51C6,A94B,E460,7A29),
- bn_pack4(5F4F,5F55,6E27,CBDE),
- bn_pack4(BEEE,A961,4B19,CC4D),
- bn_pack4(DBA5,1DF4,99AC,4C80),
- bn_pack4(B1F1,2A86,17A4,7BBB),
- bn_pack4(9DEF,3CAF,B939,277A)
+ bn_pack4(0xCF76,0xE3FE,0xD135,0xF9BB),
+ bn_pack4(0x1518,0x0F93,0x499A,0x234D),
+ bn_pack4(0x8CE7,0xA28C,0x2442,0xC6F3),
+ bn_pack4(0x5A02,0x1FFF,0x5E91,0x479E),
+ bn_pack4(0x7F8A,0x2FE9,0xB8B5,0x292E),
+ bn_pack4(0x837C,0x264A,0xE3A9,0xBEB8),
+ bn_pack4(0xE442,0x734A,0xF7CC,0xB7AE),
+ bn_pack4(0x6577,0x2E43,0x7D6C,0x7F8C),
+ bn_pack4(0xDB2F,0xD53D,0x24B7,0xC486),
+ bn_pack4(0x6EDF,0x0195,0x3934,0x9627),
+ bn_pack4(0x158B,0xFD3E,0x2B9C,0x8CF5),
+ bn_pack4(0x764E,0x3F4B,0x53DD,0x9DA1),
+ bn_pack4(0x4754,0x8381,0xDBC5,0xB1FC),
+ bn_pack4(0x9B60,0x9E0B,0xE3BA,0xB63D),
+ bn_pack4(0x8134,0xB1C8,0xB979,0x8914),
+ bn_pack4(0xDF02,0x8A7C,0xEC67,0xF0D0),
+ bn_pack4(0x80B6,0x55BB,0x9A22,0xE8DC),
+ bn_pack4(0x1558,0x903B,0xA0D0,0xF843),
+ bn_pack4(0x51C6,0xA94B,0xE460,0x7A29),
+ bn_pack4(0x5F4F,0x5F55,0x6E27,0xCBDE),
+ bn_pack4(0xBEEE,0xA961,0x4B19,0xCC4D),
+ bn_pack4(0xDBA5,0x1DF4,0x99AC,0x4C80),
+ bn_pack4(0xB1F1,0x2A86,0x17A4,0x7BBB),
+ bn_pack4(0x9DEF,0x3CAF,0xB939,0x277A)
};
static BIGNUM bn_group_1536 = {
bn_group_1536_value,
@@ -61,38 +61,38 @@ static BIGNUM bn_group_1536 = {
};
static BN_ULONG bn_group_2048_value[] = {
- bn_pack4(0FA7,111F,9E4A,FF73),
- bn_pack4(9B65,E372,FCD6,8EF2),
- bn_pack4(35DE,236D,525F,5475),
- bn_pack4(94B5,C803,D89F,7AE4),
- bn_pack4(71AE,35F8,E9DB,FBB6),
- bn_pack4(2A56,98F3,A8D0,C382),
- bn_pack4(9CCC,041C,7BC3,08D8),
- bn_pack4(AF87,4E73,03CE,5329),
- bn_pack4(6160,2790,04E5,7AE6),
- bn_pack4(032C,FBDB,F52F,B378),
- bn_pack4(5EA7,7A27,75D2,ECFA),
- bn_pack4(5445,23B5,24B0,D57D),
- bn_pack4(5B9D,32E6,88F8,7748),
- bn_pack4(F1D2,B907,8717,461A),
- bn_pack4(76BD,207A,436C,6481),
- bn_pack4(CA97,B43A,23FB,8016),
- bn_pack4(1D28,1E44,6B14,773B),
- bn_pack4(7359,D041,D5C3,3EA7),
- bn_pack4(A80D,740A,DBF4,FF74),
- bn_pack4(55F9,7993,EC97,5EEA),
- bn_pack4(2918,A996,2F0B,93B8),
- bn_pack4(661A,05FB,D5FA,AAE8),
- bn_pack4(CF60,9517,9A16,3AB3),
- bn_pack4(E808,3969,EDB7,67B0),
- bn_pack4(CD7F,48A9,DA04,FD50),
- bn_pack4(D523,12AB,4B03,310D),
- bn_pack4(8193,E075,7767,A13D),
- bn_pack4(A373,29CB,B4A0,99ED),
- bn_pack4(FC31,9294,3DB5,6050),
- bn_pack4(AF72,B665,1987,EE07),
- bn_pack4(F166,DE5E,1389,582F),
- bn_pack4(AC6B,DB41,324A,9A9B)
+ bn_pack4(0x0FA7,0x111F,0x9E4A,0xFF73),
+ bn_pack4(0x9B65,0xE372,0xFCD6,0x8EF2),
+ bn_pack4(0x35DE,0x236D,0x525F,0x5475),
+ bn_pack4(0x94B5,0xC803,0xD89F,0x7AE4),
+ bn_pack4(0x71AE,0x35F8,0xE9DB,0xFBB6),
+ bn_pack4(0x2A56,0x98F3,0xA8D0,0xC382),
+ bn_pack4(0x9CCC,0x041C,0x7BC3,0x08D8),
+ bn_pack4(0xAF87,0x4E73,0x03CE,0x5329),
+ bn_pack4(0x6160,0x2790,0x04E5,0x7AE6),
+ bn_pack4(0x032C,0xFBDB,0xF52F,0xB378),
+ bn_pack4(0x5EA7,0x7A27,0x75D2,0xECFA),
+ bn_pack4(0x5445,0x23B5,0x24B0,0xD57D),
+ bn_pack4(0x5B9D,0x32E6,0x88F8,0x7748),
+ bn_pack4(0xF1D2,0xB907,0x8717,0x461A),
+ bn_pack4(0x76BD,0x207A,0x436C,0x6481),
+ bn_pack4(0xCA97,0xB43A,0x23FB,0x8016),
+ bn_pack4(0x1D28,0x1E44,0x6B14,0x773B),
+ bn_pack4(0x7359,0xD041,0xD5C3,0x3EA7),
+ bn_pack4(0xA80D,0x740A,0xDBF4,0xFF74),
+ bn_pack4(0x55F9,0x7993,0xEC97,0x5EEA),
+ bn_pack4(0x2918,0xA996,0x2F0B,0x93B8),
+ bn_pack4(0x661A,0x05FB,0xD5FA,0xAAE8),
+ bn_pack4(0xCF60,0x9517,0x9A16,0x3AB3),
+ bn_pack4(0xE808,0x3969,0xEDB7,0x67B0),
+ bn_pack4(0xCD7F,0x48A9,0xDA04,0xFD50),
+ bn_pack4(0xD523,0x12AB,0x4B03,0x310D),
+ bn_pack4(0x8193,0xE075,0x7767,0xA13D),
+ bn_pack4(0xA373,0x29CB,0xB4A0,0x99ED),
+ bn_pack4(0xFC31,0x9294,0x3DB5,0x6050),
+ bn_pack4(0xAF72,0xB665,0x1987,0xEE07),
+ bn_pack4(0xF166,0xDE5E,0x1389,0x582F),
+ bn_pack4(0xAC6B,0xDB41,0x324A,0x9A9B)
};
static BIGNUM bn_group_2048 = {
bn_group_2048_value,
@@ -103,54 +103,54 @@ static BIGNUM bn_group_2048 = {
};
static BN_ULONG bn_group_3072_value[] = {
- bn_pack4(FFFF,FFFF,FFFF,FFFF),
- bn_pack4(4B82,D120,A93A,D2CA),
- bn_pack4(43DB,5BFC,E0FD,108E),
- bn_pack4(08E2,4FA0,74E5,AB31),
- bn_pack4(7709,88C0,BAD9,46E2),
- bn_pack4(BBE1,1757,7A61,5D6C),
- bn_pack4(521F,2B18,177B,200C),
- bn_pack4(D876,0273,3EC8,6A64),
- bn_pack4(F12F,FA06,D98A,0864),
- bn_pack4(CEE3,D226,1AD2,EE6B),
- bn_pack4(1E8C,94E0,4A25,619D),
- bn_pack4(ABF5,AE8C,DB09,33D7),
- bn_pack4(B397,0F85,A6E1,E4C7),
- bn_pack4(8AEA,7157,5D06,0C7D),
- bn_pack4(ECFB,8504,58DB,EF0A),
- bn_pack4(A855,21AB,DF1C,BA64),
- bn_pack4(AD33,170D,0450,7A33),
- bn_pack4(1572,8E5A,8AAA,C42D),
- bn_pack4(15D2,2618,98FA,0510),
- bn_pack4(3995,497C,EA95,6AE5),
- bn_pack4(DE2B,CBF6,9558,1718),
- bn_pack4(B5C5,5DF0,6F4C,52C9),
- bn_pack4(9B27,83A2,EC07,A28F),
- bn_pack4(E39E,772C,180E,8603),
- bn_pack4(3290,5E46,2E36,CE3B),
- bn_pack4(F174,6C08,CA18,217C),
- bn_pack4(670C,354E,4ABC,9804),
- bn_pack4(9ED5,2907,7096,966D),
- bn_pack4(1C62,F356,2085,52BB),
- bn_pack4(8365,5D23,DCA3,AD96),
- bn_pack4(6916,3FA8,FD24,CF5F),
- bn_pack4(98DA,4836,1C55,D39A),
- bn_pack4(C200,7CB8,A163,BF05),
- bn_pack4(4928,6651,ECE4,5B3D),
- bn_pack4(AE9F,2411,7C4B,1FE6),
- bn_pack4(EE38,6BFB,5A89,9FA5),
- bn_pack4(0BFF,5CB6,F406,B7ED),
- bn_pack4(F44C,42E9,A637,ED6B),
- bn_pack4(E485,B576,625E,7EC6),
- bn_pack4(4FE1,356D,6D51,C245),
- bn_pack4(302B,0A6D,F25F,1437),
- bn_pack4(EF95,19B3,CD3A,431B),
- bn_pack4(514A,0879,8E34,04DD),
- bn_pack4(020B,BEA6,3B13,9B22),
- bn_pack4(2902,4E08,8A67,CC74),
- bn_pack4(C4C6,628B,80DC,1CD1),
- bn_pack4(C90F,DAA2,2168,C234),
- bn_pack4(FFFF,FFFF,FFFF,FFFF)
+ bn_pack4(0xFFFF,0xFFFF,0xFFFF,0xFFFF),
+ bn_pack4(0x4B82,0xD120,0xA93A,0xD2CA),
+ bn_pack4(0x43DB,0x5BFC,0xE0FD,0x108E),
+ bn_pack4(0x08E2,0x4FA0,0x74E5,0xAB31),
+ bn_pack4(0x7709,0x88C0,0xBAD9,0x46E2),
+ bn_pack4(0xBBE1,0x1757,0x7A61,0x5D6C),
+ bn_pack4(0x521F,0x2B18,0x177B,0x200C),
+ bn_pack4(0xD876,0x0273,0x3EC8,0x6A64),
+ bn_pack4(0xF12F,0xFA06,0xD98A,0x0864),
+ bn_pack4(0xCEE3,0xD226,0x1AD2,0xEE6B),
+ bn_pack4(0x1E8C,0x94E0,0x4A25,0x619D),
+ bn_pack4(0xABF5,0xAE8C,0xDB09,0x33D7),
+ bn_pack4(0xB397,0x0F85,0xA6E1,0xE4C7),
+ bn_pack4(0x8AEA,0x7157,0x5D06,0x0C7D),
+ bn_pack4(0xECFB,0x8504,0x58DB,0xEF0A),
+ bn_pack4(0xA855,0x21AB,0xDF1C,0xBA64),
+ bn_pack4(0xAD33,0x170D,0x0450,0x7A33),
+ bn_pack4(0x1572,0x8E5A,0x8AAA,0xC42D),
+ bn_pack4(0x15D2,0x2618,0x98FA,0x0510),
+ bn_pack4(0x3995,0x497C,0xEA95,0x6AE5),
+ bn_pack4(0xDE2B,0xCBF6,0x9558,0x1718),
+ bn_pack4(0xB5C5,0x5DF0,0x6F4C,0x52C9),
+ bn_pack4(0x9B27,0x83A2,0xEC07,0xA28F),
+ bn_pack4(0xE39E,0x772C,0x180E,0x8603),
+ bn_pack4(0x3290,0x5E46,0x2E36,0xCE3B),
+ bn_pack4(0xF174,0x6C08,0xCA18,0x217C),
+ bn_pack4(0x670C,0x354E,0x4ABC,0x9804),
+ bn_pack4(0x9ED5,0x2907,0x7096,0x966D),
+ bn_pack4(0x1C62,0xF356,0x2085,0x52BB),
+ bn_pack4(0x8365,0x5D23,0xDCA3,0xAD96),
+ bn_pack4(0x6916,0x3FA8,0xFD24,0xCF5F),
+ bn_pack4(0x98DA,0x4836,0x1C55,0xD39A),
+ bn_pack4(0xC200,0x7CB8,0xA163,0xBF05),
+ bn_pack4(0x4928,0x6651,0xECE4,0x5B3D),
+ bn_pack4(0xAE9F,0x2411,0x7C4B,0x1FE6),
+ bn_pack4(0xEE38,0x6BFB,0x5A89,0x9FA5),
+ bn_pack4(0x0BFF,0x5CB6,0xF406,0xB7ED),
+ bn_pack4(0xF44C,0x42E9,0xA637,0xED6B),
+ bn_pack4(0xE485,0xB576,0x625E,0x7EC6),
+ bn_pack4(0x4FE1,0x356D,0x6D51,0xC245),
+ bn_pack4(0x302B,0x0A6D,0xF25F,0x1437),
+ bn_pack4(0xEF95,0x19B3,0xCD3A,0x431B),
+ bn_pack4(0x514A,0x0879,0x8E34,0x04DD),
+ bn_pack4(0x020B,0xBEA6,0x3B13,0x9B22),
+ bn_pack4(0x2902,0x4E08,0x8A67,0xCC74),
+ bn_pack4(0xC4C6,0x628B,0x80DC,0x1CD1),
+ bn_pack4(0xC90F,0xDAA2,0x2168,0xC234),
+ bn_pack4(0xFFFF,0xFFFF,0xFFFF,0xFFFF)
};
static BIGNUM bn_group_3072 = {
bn_group_3072_value,
@@ -161,70 +161,70 @@ static BIGNUM bn_group_3072 = {
};
static BN_ULONG bn_group_4096_value[] = {
- bn_pack4(FFFF,FFFF,FFFF,FFFF),
- bn_pack4(4DF4,35C9,3406,3199),
- bn_pack4(86FF,B7DC,90A6,C08F),
- bn_pack4(93B4,EA98,8D8F,DDC1),
- bn_pack4(D006,9127,D5B0,5AA9),
- bn_pack4(B81B,DD76,2170,481C),
- bn_pack4(1F61,2970,CEE2,D7AF),
- bn_pack4(233B,A186,515B,E7ED),
- bn_pack4(99B2,964F,A090,C3A2),
- bn_pack4(287C,5947,4E6B,C05D),
- bn_pack4(2E8E,FC14,1FBE,CAA6),
- bn_pack4(DBBB,C2DB,04DE,8EF9),
- bn_pack4(2583,E9CA,2AD4,4CE8),
- bn_pack4(1A94,6834,B615,0BDA),
- bn_pack4(99C3,2718,6AF4,E23C),
- bn_pack4(8871,9A10,BDBA,5B26),
- bn_pack4(1A72,3C12,A787,E6D7),
- bn_pack4(4B82,D120,A921,0801),
- bn_pack4(43DB,5BFC,E0FD,108E),
- bn_pack4(08E2,4FA0,74E5,AB31),
- bn_pack4(7709,88C0,BAD9,46E2),
- bn_pack4(BBE1,1757,7A61,5D6C),
- bn_pack4(521F,2B18,177B,200C),
- bn_pack4(D876,0273,3EC8,6A64),
- bn_pack4(F12F,FA06,D98A,0864),
- bn_pack4(CEE3,D226,1AD2,EE6B),
- bn_pack4(1E8C,94E0,4A25,619D),
- bn_pack4(ABF5,AE8C,DB09,33D7),
- bn_pack4(B397,0F85,A6E1,E4C7),
- bn_pack4(8AEA,7157,5D06,0C7D),
- bn_pack4(ECFB,8504,58DB,EF0A),
- bn_pack4(A855,21AB,DF1C,BA64),
- bn_pack4(AD33,170D,0450,7A33),
- bn_pack4(1572,8E5A,8AAA,C42D),
- bn_pack4(15D2,2618,98FA,0510),
- bn_pack4(3995,497C,EA95,6AE5),
- bn_pack4(DE2B,CBF6,9558,1718),
- bn_pack4(B5C5,5DF0,6F4C,52C9),
- bn_pack4(9B27,83A2,EC07,A28F),
- bn_pack4(E39E,772C,180E,8603),
- bn_pack4(3290,5E46,2E36,CE3B),
- bn_pack4(F174,6C08,CA18,217C),
- bn_pack4(670C,354E,4ABC,9804),
- bn_pack4(9ED5,2907,7096,966D),
- bn_pack4(1C62,F356,2085,52BB),
- bn_pack4(8365,5D23,DCA3,AD96),
- bn_pack4(6916,3FA8,FD24,CF5F),
- bn_pack4(98DA,4836,1C55,D39A),
- bn_pack4(C200,7CB8,A163,BF05),
- bn_pack4(4928,6651,ECE4,5B3D),
- bn_pack4(AE9F,2411,7C4B,1FE6),
- bn_pack4(EE38,6BFB,5A89,9FA5),
- bn_pack4(0BFF,5CB6,F406,B7ED),
- bn_pack4(F44C,42E9,A637,ED6B),
- bn_pack4(E485,B576,625E,7EC6),
- bn_pack4(4FE1,356D,6D51,C245),
- bn_pack4(302B,0A6D,F25F,1437),
- bn_pack4(EF95,19B3,CD3A,431B),
- bn_pack4(514A,0879,8E34,04DD),
- bn_pack4(020B,BEA6,3B13,9B22),
- bn_pack4(2902,4E08,8A67,CC74),
- bn_pack4(C4C6,628B,80DC,1CD1),
- bn_pack4(C90F,DAA2,2168,C234),
- bn_pack4(FFFF,FFFF,FFFF,FFFF)
+ bn_pack4(0xFFFF,0xFFFF,0xFFFF,0xFFFF),
+ bn_pack4(0x4DF4,0x35C9,0x3406,0x3199),
+ bn_pack4(0x86FF,0xB7DC,0x90A6,0xC08F),
+ bn_pack4(0x93B4,0xEA98,0x8D8F,0xDDC1),
+ bn_pack4(0xD006,0x9127,0xD5B0,0x5AA9),
+ bn_pack4(0xB81B,0xDD76,0x2170,0x481C),
+ bn_pack4(0x1F61,0x2970,0xCEE2,0xD7AF),
+ bn_pack4(0x233B,0xA186,0x515B,0xE7ED),
+ bn_pack4(0x99B2,0x964F,0xA090,0xC3A2),
+ bn_pack4(0x287C,0x5947,0x4E6B,0xC05D),
+ bn_pack4(0x2E8E,0xFC14,0x1FBE,0xCAA6),
+ bn_pack4(0xDBBB,0xC2DB,0x04DE,0x8EF9),
+ bn_pack4(0x2583,0xE9CA,0x2AD4,0x4CE8),
+ bn_pack4(0x1A94,0x6834,0xB615,0x0BDA),
+ bn_pack4(0x99C3,0x2718,0x6AF4,0xE23C),
+ bn_pack4(0x8871,0x9A10,0xBDBA,0x5B26),
+ bn_pack4(0x1A72,0x3C12,0xA787,0xE6D7),
+ bn_pack4(0x4B82,0xD120,0xA921,0x0801),
+ bn_pack4(0x43DB,0x5BFC,0xE0FD,0x108E),
+ bn_pack4(0x08E2,0x4FA0,0x74E5,0xAB31),
+ bn_pack4(0x7709,0x88C0,0xBAD9,0x46E2),
+ bn_pack4(0xBBE1,0x1757,0x7A61,0x5D6C),
+ bn_pack4(0x521F,0x2B18,0x177B,0x200C),
+ bn_pack4(0xD876,0x0273,0x3EC8,0x6A64),
+ bn_pack4(0xF12F,0xFA06,0xD98A,0x0864),
+ bn_pack4(0xCEE3,0xD226,0x1AD2,0xEE6B),
+ bn_pack4(0x1E8C,0x94E0,0x4A25,0x619D),
+ bn_pack4(0xABF5,0xAE8C,0xDB09,0x33D7),
+ bn_pack4(0xB397,0x0F85,0xA6E1,0xE4C7),
+ bn_pack4(0x8AEA,0x7157,0x5D06,0x0C7D),
+ bn_pack4(0xECFB,0x8504,0x58DB,0xEF0A),
+ bn_pack4(0xA855,0x21AB,0xDF1C,0xBA64),
+ bn_pack4(0xAD33,0x170D,0x0450,0x7A33),
+ bn_pack4(0x1572,0x8E5A,0x8AAA,0xC42D),
+ bn_pack4(0x15D2,0x2618,0x98FA,0x0510),
+ bn_pack4(0x3995,0x497C,0xEA95,0x6AE5),
+ bn_pack4(0xDE2B,0xCBF6,0x9558,0x1718),
+ bn_pack4(0xB5C5,0x5DF0,0x6F4C,0x52C9),
+ bn_pack4(0x9B27,0x83A2,0xEC07,0xA28F),
+ bn_pack4(0xE39E,0x772C,0x180E,0x8603),
+ bn_pack4(0x3290,0x5E46,0x2E36,0xCE3B),
+ bn_pack4(0xF174,0x6C08,0xCA18,0x217C),
+ bn_pack4(0x670C,0x354E,0x4ABC,0x9804),
+ bn_pack4(0x9ED5,0x2907,0x7096,0x966D),
+ bn_pack4(0x1C62,0xF356,0x2085,0x52BB),
+ bn_pack4(0x8365,0x5D23,0xDCA3,0xAD96),
+ bn_pack4(0x6916,0x3FA8,0xFD24,0xCF5F),
+ bn_pack4(0x98DA,0x4836,0x1C55,0xD39A),
+ bn_pack4(0xC200,0x7CB8,0xA163,0xBF05),
+ bn_pack4(0x4928,0x6651,0xECE4,0x5B3D),
+ bn_pack4(0xAE9F,0x2411,0x7C4B,0x1FE6),
+ bn_pack4(0xEE38,0x6BFB,0x5A89,0x9FA5),
+ bn_pack4(0x0BFF,0x5CB6,0xF406,0xB7ED),
+ bn_pack4(0xF44C,0x42E9,0xA637,0xED6B),
+ bn_pack4(0xE485,0xB576,0x625E,0x7EC6),
+ bn_pack4(0x4FE1,0x356D,0x6D51,0xC245),
+ bn_pack4(0x302B,0x0A6D,0xF25F,0x1437),
+ bn_pack4(0xEF95,0x19B3,0xCD3A,0x431B),
+ bn_pack4(0x514A,0x0879,0x8E34,0x04DD),
+ bn_pack4(0x020B,0xBEA6,0x3B13,0x9B22),
+ bn_pack4(0x2902,0x4E08,0x8A67,0xCC74),
+ bn_pack4(0xC4C6,0x628B,0x80DC,0x1CD1),
+ bn_pack4(0xC90F,0xDAA2,0x2168,0xC234),
+ bn_pack4(0xFFFF,0xFFFF,0xFFFF,0xFFFF)
};
static BIGNUM bn_group_4096 = {
bn_group_4096_value,
@@ -235,102 +235,102 @@ static BIGNUM bn_group_4096 = {
};
static BN_ULONG bn_group_6144_value[] = {
- bn_pack4(FFFF,FFFF,FFFF,FFFF),
- bn_pack4(E694,F91E,6DCC,4024),
- bn_pack4(12BF,2D5B,0B74,74D6),
- bn_pack4(043E,8F66,3F48,60EE),
- bn_pack4(387F,E8D7,6E3C,0468),
- bn_pack4(DA56,C9EC,2EF2,9632),
- bn_pack4(EB19,CCB1,A313,D55C),
- bn_pack4(F550,AA3D,8A1F,BFF0),
- bn_pack4(06A1,D58B,B7C5,DA76),
- bn_pack4(A797,15EE,F29B,E328),
- bn_pack4(14CC,5ED2,0F80,37E0),
- bn_pack4(CC8F,6D7E,BF48,E1D8),
- bn_pack4(4BD4,07B2,2B41,54AA),
- bn_pack4(0F1D,45B7,FF58,5AC5),
- bn_pack4(23A9,7A7E,36CC,88BE),
- bn_pack4(59E7,C97F,BEC7,E8F3),
- bn_pack4(B5A8,4031,900B,1C9E),
- bn_pack4(D55E,702F,4698,0C82),
- bn_pack4(F482,D7CE,6E74,FEF6),
- bn_pack4(F032,EA15,D172,1D03),
- bn_pack4(5983,CA01,C64B,92EC),
- bn_pack4(6FB8,F401,378C,D2BF),
- bn_pack4(3320,5151,2BD7,AF42),
- bn_pack4(DB7F,1447,E6CC,254B),
- bn_pack4(44CE,6CBA,CED4,BB1B),
- bn_pack4(DA3E,DBEB,CF9B,14ED),
- bn_pack4(1797,27B0,865A,8918),
- bn_pack4(B06A,53ED,9027,D831),
- bn_pack4(E5DB,382F,4130,01AE),
- bn_pack4(F8FF,9406,AD9E,530E),
- bn_pack4(C975,1E76,3DBA,37BD),
- bn_pack4(C1D4,DCB2,6026,46DE),
- bn_pack4(36C3,FAB4,D27C,7026),
- bn_pack4(4DF4,35C9,3402,8492),
- bn_pack4(86FF,B7DC,90A6,C08F),
- bn_pack4(93B4,EA98,8D8F,DDC1),
- bn_pack4(D006,9127,D5B0,5AA9),
- bn_pack4(B81B,DD76,2170,481C),
- bn_pack4(1F61,2970,CEE2,D7AF),
- bn_pack4(233B,A186,515B,E7ED),
- bn_pack4(99B2,964F,A090,C3A2),
- bn_pack4(287C,5947,4E6B,C05D),
- bn_pack4(2E8E,FC14,1FBE,CAA6),
- bn_pack4(DBBB,C2DB,04DE,8EF9),
- bn_pack4(2583,E9CA,2AD4,4CE8),
- bn_pack4(1A94,6834,B615,0BDA),
- bn_pack4(99C3,2718,6AF4,E23C),
- bn_pack4(8871,9A10,BDBA,5B26),
- bn_pack4(1A72,3C12,A787,E6D7),
- bn_pack4(4B82,D120,A921,0801),
- bn_pack4(43DB,5BFC,E0FD,108E),
- bn_pack4(08E2,4FA0,74E5,AB31),
- bn_pack4(7709,88C0,BAD9,46E2),
- bn_pack4(BBE1,1757,7A61,5D6C),
- bn_pack4(521F,2B18,177B,200C),
- bn_pack4(D876,0273,3EC8,6A64),
- bn_pack4(F12F,FA06,D98A,0864),
- bn_pack4(CEE3,D226,1AD2,EE6B),
- bn_pack4(1E8C,94E0,4A25,619D),
- bn_pack4(ABF5,AE8C,DB09,33D7),
- bn_pack4(B397,0F85,A6E1,E4C7),
- bn_pack4(8AEA,7157,5D06,0C7D),
- bn_pack4(ECFB,8504,58DB,EF0A),
- bn_pack4(A855,21AB,DF1C,BA64),
- bn_pack4(AD33,170D,0450,7A33),
- bn_pack4(1572,8E5A,8AAA,C42D),
- bn_pack4(15D2,2618,98FA,0510),
- bn_pack4(3995,497C,EA95,6AE5),
- bn_pack4(DE2B,CBF6,9558,1718),
- bn_pack4(B5C5,5DF0,6F4C,52C9),
- bn_pack4(9B27,83A2,EC07,A28F),
- bn_pack4(E39E,772C,180E,8603),
- bn_pack4(3290,5E46,2E36,CE3B),
- bn_pack4(F174,6C08,CA18,217C),
- bn_pack4(670C,354E,4ABC,9804),
- bn_pack4(9ED5,2907,7096,966D),
- bn_pack4(1C62,F356,2085,52BB),
- bn_pack4(8365,5D23,DCA3,AD96),
- bn_pack4(6916,3FA8,FD24,CF5F),
- bn_pack4(98DA,4836,1C55,D39A),
- bn_pack4(C200,7CB8,A163,BF05),
- bn_pack4(4928,6651,ECE4,5B3D),
- bn_pack4(AE9F,2411,7C4B,1FE6),
- bn_pack4(EE38,6BFB,5A89,9FA5),
- bn_pack4(0BFF,5CB6,F406,B7ED),
- bn_pack4(F44C,42E9,A637,ED6B),
- bn_pack4(E485,B576,625E,7EC6),
- bn_pack4(4FE1,356D,6D51,C245),
- bn_pack4(302B,0A6D,F25F,1437),
- bn_pack4(EF95,19B3,CD3A,431B),
- bn_pack4(514A,0879,8E34,04DD),
- bn_pack4(020B,BEA6,3B13,9B22),
- bn_pack4(2902,4E08,8A67,CC74),
- bn_pack4(C4C6,628B,80DC,1CD1),
- bn_pack4(C90F,DAA2,2168,C234),
- bn_pack4(FFFF,FFFF,FFFF,FFFF)
+ bn_pack4(0xFFFF,0xFFFF,0xFFFF,0xFFFF),
+ bn_pack4(0xE694,0xF91E,0x6DCC,0x4024),
+ bn_pack4(0x12BF,0x2D5B,0x0B74,0x74D6),
+ bn_pack4(0x043E,0x8F66,0x3F48,0x60EE),
+ bn_pack4(0x387F,0xE8D7,0x6E3C,0x0468),
+ bn_pack4(0xDA56,0xC9EC,0x2EF2,0x9632),
+ bn_pack4(0xEB19,0xCCB1,0xA313,0xD55C),
+ bn_pack4(0xF550,0xAA3D,0x8A1F,0xBFF0),
+ bn_pack4(0x06A1,0xD58B,0xB7C5,0xDA76),
+ bn_pack4(0xA797,0x15EE,0xF29B,0xE328),
+ bn_pack4(0x14CC,0x5ED2,0x0F80,0x37E0),
+ bn_pack4(0xCC8F,0x6D7E,0xBF48,0xE1D8),
+ bn_pack4(0x4BD4,0x07B2,0x2B41,0x54AA),
+ bn_pack4(0x0F1D,0x45B7,0xFF58,0x5AC5),
+ bn_pack4(0x23A9,0x7A7E,0x36CC,0x88BE),
+ bn_pack4(0x59E7,0xC97F,0xBEC7,0xE8F3),
+ bn_pack4(0xB5A8,0x4031,0x900B,0x1C9E),
+ bn_pack4(0xD55E,0x702F,0x4698,0x0C82),
+ bn_pack4(0xF482,0xD7CE,0x6E74,0xFEF6),
+ bn_pack4(0xF032,0xEA15,0xD172,0x1D03),
+ bn_pack4(0x5983,0xCA01,0xC64B,0x92EC),
+ bn_pack4(0x6FB8,0xF401,0x378C,0xD2BF),
+ bn_pack4(0x3320,0x5151,0x2BD7,0xAF42),
+ bn_pack4(0xDB7F,0x1447,0xE6CC,0x254B),
+ bn_pack4(0x44CE,0x6CBA,0xCED4,0xBB1B),
+ bn_pack4(0xDA3E,0xDBEB,0xCF9B,0x14ED),
+ bn_pack4(0x1797,0x27B0,0x865A,0x8918),
+ bn_pack4(0xB06A,0x53ED,0x9027,0xD831),
+ bn_pack4(0xE5DB,0x382F,0x4130,0x01AE),
+ bn_pack4(0xF8FF,0x9406,0xAD9E,0x530E),
+ bn_pack4(0xC975,0x1E76,0x3DBA,0x37BD),
+ bn_pack4(0xC1D4,0xDCB2,0x6026,0x46DE),
+ bn_pack4(0x36C3,0xFAB4,0xD27C,0x7026),
+ bn_pack4(0x4DF4,0x35C9,0x3402,0x8492),
+ bn_pack4(0x86FF,0xB7DC,0x90A6,0xC08F),
+ bn_pack4(0x93B4,0xEA98,0x8D8F,0xDDC1),
+ bn_pack4(0xD006,0x9127,0xD5B0,0x5AA9),
+ bn_pack4(0xB81B,0xDD76,0x2170,0x481C),
+ bn_pack4(0x1F61,0x2970,0xCEE2,0xD7AF),
+ bn_pack4(0x233B,0xA186,0x515B,0xE7ED),
+ bn_pack4(0x99B2,0x964F,0xA090,0xC3A2),
+ bn_pack4(0x287C,0x5947,0x4E6B,0xC05D),
+ bn_pack4(0x2E8E,0xFC14,0x1FBE,0xCAA6),
+ bn_pack4(0xDBBB,0xC2DB,0x04DE,0x8EF9),
+ bn_pack4(0x2583,0xE9CA,0x2AD4,0x4CE8),
+ bn_pack4(0x1A94,0x6834,0xB615,0x0BDA),
+ bn_pack4(0x99C3,0x2718,0x6AF4,0xE23C),
+ bn_pack4(0x8871,0x9A10,0xBDBA,0x5B26),
+ bn_pack4(0x1A72,0x3C12,0xA787,0xE6D7),
+ bn_pack4(0x4B82,0xD120,0xA921,0x0801),
+ bn_pack4(0x43DB,0x5BFC,0xE0FD,0x108E),
+ bn_pack4(0x08E2,0x4FA0,0x74E5,0xAB31),
+ bn_pack4(0x7709,0x88C0,0xBAD9,0x46E2),
+ bn_pack4(0xBBE1,0x1757,0x7A61,0x5D6C),
+ bn_pack4(0x521F,0x2B18,0x177B,0x200C),
+ bn_pack4(0xD876,0x0273,0x3EC8,0x6A64),
+ bn_pack4(0xF12F,0xFA06,0xD98A,0x0864),
+ bn_pack4(0xCEE3,0xD226,0x1AD2,0xEE6B),
+ bn_pack4(0x1E8C,0x94E0,0x4A25,0x619D),
+ bn_pack4(0xABF5,0xAE8C,0xDB09,0x33D7),
+ bn_pack4(0xB397,0x0F85,0xA6E1,0xE4C7),
+ bn_pack4(0x8AEA,0x7157,0x5D06,0x0C7D),
+ bn_pack4(0xECFB,0x8504,0x58DB,0xEF0A),
+ bn_pack4(0xA855,0x21AB,0xDF1C,0xBA64),
+ bn_pack4(0xAD33,0x170D,0x0450,0x7A33),
+ bn_pack4(0x1572,0x8E5A,0x8AAA,0xC42D),
+ bn_pack4(0x15D2,0x2618,0x98FA,0x0510),
+ bn_pack4(0x3995,0x497C,0xEA95,0x6AE5),
+ bn_pack4(0xDE2B,0xCBF6,0x9558,0x1718),
+ bn_pack4(0xB5C5,0x5DF0,0x6F4C,0x52C9),
+ bn_pack4(0x9B27,0x83A2,0xEC07,0xA28F),
+ bn_pack4(0xE39E,0x772C,0x180E,0x8603),
+ bn_pack4(0x3290,0x5E46,0x2E36,0xCE3B),
+ bn_pack4(0xF174,0x6C08,0xCA18,0x217C),
+ bn_pack4(0x670C,0x354E,0x4ABC,0x9804),
+ bn_pack4(0x9ED5,0x2907,0x7096,0x966D),
+ bn_pack4(0x1C62,0xF356,0x2085,0x52BB),
+ bn_pack4(0x8365,0x5D23,0xDCA3,0xAD96),
+ bn_pack4(0x6916,0x3FA8,0xFD24,0xCF5F),
+ bn_pack4(0x98DA,0x4836,0x1C55,0xD39A),
+ bn_pack4(0xC200,0x7CB8,0xA163,0xBF05),
+ bn_pack4(0x4928,0x6651,0xECE4,0x5B3D),
+ bn_pack4(0xAE9F,0x2411,0x7C4B,0x1FE6),
+ bn_pack4(0xEE38,0x6BFB,0x5A89,0x9FA5),
+ bn_pack4(0x0BFF,0x5CB6,0xF406,0xB7ED),
+ bn_pack4(0xF44C,0x42E9,0xA637,0xED6B),
+ bn_pack4(0xE485,0xB576,0x625E,0x7EC6),
+ bn_pack4(0x4FE1,0x356D,0x6D51,0xC245),
+ bn_pack4(0x302B,0x0A6D,0xF25F,0x1437),
+ bn_pack4(0xEF95,0x19B3,0xCD3A,0x431B),
+ bn_pack4(0x514A,0x0879,0x8E34,0x04DD),
+ bn_pack4(0x020B,0xBEA6,0x3B13,0x9B22),
+ bn_pack4(0x2902,0x4E08,0x8A67,0xCC74),
+ bn_pack4(0xC4C6,0x628B,0x80DC,0x1CD1),
+ bn_pack4(0xC90F,0xDAA2,0x2168,0xC234),
+ bn_pack4(0xFFFF,0xFFFF,0xFFFF,0xFFFF)
};
static BIGNUM bn_group_6144 = {
bn_group_6144_value,
@@ -341,134 +341,134 @@ static BIGNUM bn_group_6144 = {
};
static BN_ULONG bn_group_8192_value[] = {
- bn_pack4(FFFF,FFFF,FFFF,FFFF),
- bn_pack4(60C9,80DD,98ED,D3DF),
- bn_pack4(C81F,56E8,80B9,6E71),
- bn_pack4(9E30,50E2,7656,94DF),
- bn_pack4(9558,E447,5677,E9AA),
- bn_pack4(C919,0DA6,FC02,6E47),
- bn_pack4(889A,002E,D5EE,382B),
- bn_pack4(4009,438B,481C,6CD7),
- bn_pack4(3590,46F4,EB87,9F92),
- bn_pack4(FAF3,6BC3,1ECF,A268),
- bn_pack4(B1D5,10BD,7EE7,4D73),
- bn_pack4(F9AB,4819,5DED,7EA1),
- bn_pack4(64F3,1CC5,0846,851D),
- bn_pack4(4597,E899,A025,5DC1),
- bn_pack4(DF31,0EE0,74AB,6A36),
- bn_pack4(6D2A,13F8,3F44,F82D),
- bn_pack4(062B,3CF5,B3A2,78A6),
- bn_pack4(7968,3303,ED5B,DD3A),
- bn_pack4(FA9D,4B7F,A2C0,87E8),
- bn_pack4(4BCB,C886,2F83,85DD),
- bn_pack4(3473,FC64,6CEA,306B),
- bn_pack4(13EB,57A8,1A23,F0C7),
- bn_pack4(2222,2E04,A403,7C07),
- bn_pack4(E3FD,B8BE,FC84,8AD9),
- bn_pack4(238F,16CB,E39D,652D),
- bn_pack4(3423,B474,2BF1,C978),
- bn_pack4(3AAB,639C,5AE4,F568),
- bn_pack4(2576,F693,6BA4,2466),
- bn_pack4(741F,A7BF,8AFC,47ED),
- bn_pack4(3BC8,32B6,8D9D,D300),
- bn_pack4(D8BE,C4D0,73B9,31BA),
- bn_pack4(3877,7CB6,A932,DF8C),
- bn_pack4(74A3,926F,12FE,E5E4),
- bn_pack4(E694,F91E,6DBE,1159),
- bn_pack4(12BF,2D5B,0B74,74D6),
- bn_pack4(043E,8F66,3F48,60EE),
- bn_pack4(387F,E8D7,6E3C,0468),
- bn_pack4(DA56,C9EC,2EF2,9632),
- bn_pack4(EB19,CCB1,A313,D55C),
- bn_pack4(F550,AA3D,8A1F,BFF0),
- bn_pack4(06A1,D58B,B7C5,DA76),
- bn_pack4(A797,15EE,F29B,E328),
- bn_pack4(14CC,5ED2,0F80,37E0),
- bn_pack4(CC8F,6D7E,BF48,E1D8),
- bn_pack4(4BD4,07B2,2B41,54AA),
- bn_pack4(0F1D,45B7,FF58,5AC5),
- bn_pack4(23A9,7A7E,36CC,88BE),
- bn_pack4(59E7,C97F,BEC7,E8F3),
- bn_pack4(B5A8,4031,900B,1C9E),
- bn_pack4(D55E,702F,4698,0C82),
- bn_pack4(F482,D7CE,6E74,FEF6),
- bn_pack4(F032,EA15,D172,1D03),
- bn_pack4(5983,CA01,C64B,92EC),
- bn_pack4(6FB8,F401,378C,D2BF),
- bn_pack4(3320,5151,2BD7,AF42),
- bn_pack4(DB7F,1447,E6CC,254B),
- bn_pack4(44CE,6CBA,CED4,BB1B),
- bn_pack4(DA3E,DBEB,CF9B,14ED),
- bn_pack4(1797,27B0,865A,8918),
- bn_pack4(B06A,53ED,9027,D831),
- bn_pack4(E5DB,382F,4130,01AE),
- bn_pack4(F8FF,9406,AD9E,530E),
- bn_pack4(C975,1E76,3DBA,37BD),
- bn_pack4(C1D4,DCB2,6026,46DE),
- bn_pack4(36C3,FAB4,D27C,7026),
- bn_pack4(4DF4,35C9,3402,8492),
- bn_pack4(86FF,B7DC,90A6,C08F),
- bn_pack4(93B4,EA98,8D8F,DDC1),
- bn_pack4(D006,9127,D5B0,5AA9),
- bn_pack4(B81B,DD76,2170,481C),
- bn_pack4(1F61,2970,CEE2,D7AF),
- bn_pack4(233B,A186,515B,E7ED),
- bn_pack4(99B2,964F,A090,C3A2),
- bn_pack4(287C,5947,4E6B,C05D),
- bn_pack4(2E8E,FC14,1FBE,CAA6),
- bn_pack4(DBBB,C2DB,04DE,8EF9),
- bn_pack4(2583,E9CA,2AD4,4CE8),
- bn_pack4(1A94,6834,B615,0BDA),
- bn_pack4(99C3,2718,6AF4,E23C),
- bn_pack4(8871,9A10,BDBA,5B26),
- bn_pack4(1A72,3C12,A787,E6D7),
- bn_pack4(4B82,D120,A921,0801),
- bn_pack4(43DB,5BFC,E0FD,108E),
- bn_pack4(08E2,4FA0,74E5,AB31),
- bn_pack4(7709,88C0,BAD9,46E2),
- bn_pack4(BBE1,1757,7A61,5D6C),
- bn_pack4(521F,2B18,177B,200C),
- bn_pack4(D876,0273,3EC8,6A64),
- bn_pack4(F12F,FA06,D98A,0864),
- bn_pack4(CEE3,D226,1AD2,EE6B),
- bn_pack4(1E8C,94E0,4A25,619D),
- bn_pack4(ABF5,AE8C,DB09,33D7),
- bn_pack4(B397,0F85,A6E1,E4C7),
- bn_pack4(8AEA,7157,5D06,0C7D),
- bn_pack4(ECFB,8504,58DB,EF0A),
- bn_pack4(A855,21AB,DF1C,BA64),
- bn_pack4(AD33,170D,0450,7A33),
- bn_pack4(1572,8E5A,8AAA,C42D),
- bn_pack4(15D2,2618,98FA,0510),
- bn_pack4(3995,497C,EA95,6AE5),
- bn_pack4(DE2B,CBF6,9558,1718),
- bn_pack4(B5C5,5DF0,6F4C,52C9),
- bn_pack4(9B27,83A2,EC07,A28F),
- bn_pack4(E39E,772C,180E,8603),
- bn_pack4(3290,5E46,2E36,CE3B),
- bn_pack4(F174,6C08,CA18,217C),
- bn_pack4(670C,354E,4ABC,9804),
- bn_pack4(9ED5,2907,7096,966D),
- bn_pack4(1C62,F356,2085,52BB),
- bn_pack4(8365,5D23,DCA3,AD96),
- bn_pack4(6916,3FA8,FD24,CF5F),
- bn_pack4(98DA,4836,1C55,D39A),
- bn_pack4(C200,7CB8,A163,BF05),
- bn_pack4(4928,6651,ECE4,5B3D),
- bn_pack4(AE9F,2411,7C4B,1FE6),
- bn_pack4(EE38,6BFB,5A89,9FA5),
- bn_pack4(0BFF,5CB6,F406,B7ED),
- bn_pack4(F44C,42E9,A637,ED6B),
- bn_pack4(E485,B576,625E,7EC6),
- bn_pack4(4FE1,356D,6D51,C245),
- bn_pack4(302B,0A6D,F25F,1437),
- bn_pack4(EF95,19B3,CD3A,431B),
- bn_pack4(514A,0879,8E34,04DD),
- bn_pack4(020B,BEA6,3B13,9B22),
- bn_pack4(2902,4E08,8A67,CC74),
- bn_pack4(C4C6,628B,80DC,1CD1),
- bn_pack4(C90F,DAA2,2168,C234),
- bn_pack4(FFFF,FFFF,FFFF,FFFF)
+ bn_pack4(0xFFFF,0xFFFF,0xFFFF,0xFFFF),
+ bn_pack4(0x60C9,0x80DD,0x98ED,0xD3DF),
+ bn_pack4(0xC81F,0x56E8,0x80B9,0x6E71),
+ bn_pack4(0x9E30,0x50E2,0x7656,0x94DF),
+ bn_pack4(0x9558,0xE447,0x5677,0xE9AA),
+ bn_pack4(0xC919,0x0DA6,0xFC02,0x6E47),
+ bn_pack4(0x889A,0x002E,0xD5EE,0x382B),
+ bn_pack4(0x4009,0x438B,0x481C,0x6CD7),
+ bn_pack4(0x3590,0x46F4,0xEB87,0x9F92),
+ bn_pack4(0xFAF3,0x6BC3,0x1ECF,0xA268),
+ bn_pack4(0xB1D5,0x10BD,0x7EE7,0x4D73),
+ bn_pack4(0xF9AB,0x4819,0x5DED,0x7EA1),
+ bn_pack4(0x64F3,0x1CC5,0x0846,0x851D),
+ bn_pack4(0x4597,0xE899,0xA025,0x5DC1),
+ bn_pack4(0xDF31,0x0EE0,0x74AB,0x6A36),
+ bn_pack4(0x6D2A,0x13F8,0x3F44,0xF82D),
+ bn_pack4(0x062B,0x3CF5,0xB3A2,0x78A6),
+ bn_pack4(0x7968,0x3303,0xED5B,0xDD3A),
+ bn_pack4(0xFA9D,0x4B7F,0xA2C0,0x87E8),
+ bn_pack4(0x4BCB,0xC886,0x2F83,0x85DD),
+ bn_pack4(0x3473,0xFC64,0x6CEA,0x306B),
+ bn_pack4(0x13EB,0x57A8,0x1A23,0xF0C7),
+ bn_pack4(0x2222,0x2E04,0xA403,0x7C07),
+ bn_pack4(0xE3FD,0xB8BE,0xFC84,0x8AD9),
+ bn_pack4(0x238F,0x16CB,0xE39D,0x652D),
+ bn_pack4(0x3423,0xB474,0x2BF1,0xC978),
+ bn_pack4(0x3AAB,0x639C,0x5AE4,0xF568),
+ bn_pack4(0x2576,0xF693,0x6BA4,0x2466),
+ bn_pack4(0x741F,0xA7BF,0x8AFC,0x47ED),
+ bn_pack4(0x3BC8,0x32B6,0x8D9D,0xD300),
+ bn_pack4(0xD8BE,0xC4D0,0x73B9,0x31BA),
+ bn_pack4(0x3877,0x7CB6,0xA932,0xDF8C),
+ bn_pack4(0x74A3,0x926F,0x12FE,0xE5E4),
+ bn_pack4(0xE694,0xF91E,0x6DBE,0x1159),
+ bn_pack4(0x12BF,0x2D5B,0x0B74,0x74D6),
+ bn_pack4(0x043E,0x8F66,0x3F48,0x60EE),
+ bn_pack4(0x387F,0xE8D7,0x6E3C,0x0468),
+ bn_pack4(0xDA56,0xC9EC,0x2EF2,0x9632),
+ bn_pack4(0xEB19,0xCCB1,0xA313,0xD55C),
+ bn_pack4(0xF550,0xAA3D,0x8A1F,0xBFF0),
+ bn_pack4(0x06A1,0xD58B,0xB7C5,0xDA76),
+ bn_pack4(0xA797,0x15EE,0xF29B,0xE328),
+ bn_pack4(0x14CC,0x5ED2,0x0F80,0x37E0),
+ bn_pack4(0xCC8F,0x6D7E,0xBF48,0xE1D8),
+ bn_pack4(0x4BD4,0x07B2,0x2B41,0x54AA),
+ bn_pack4(0x0F1D,0x45B7,0xFF58,0x5AC5),
+ bn_pack4(0x23A9,0x7A7E,0x36CC,0x88BE),
+ bn_pack4(0x59E7,0xC97F,0xBEC7,0xE8F3),
+ bn_pack4(0xB5A8,0x4031,0x900B,0x1C9E),
+ bn_pack4(0xD55E,0x702F,0x4698,0x0C82),
+ bn_pack4(0xF482,0xD7CE,0x6E74,0xFEF6),
+ bn_pack4(0xF032,0xEA15,0xD172,0x1D03),
+ bn_pack4(0x5983,0xCA01,0xC64B,0x92EC),
+ bn_pack4(0x6FB8,0xF401,0x378C,0xD2BF),
+ bn_pack4(0x3320,0x5151,0x2BD7,0xAF42),
+ bn_pack4(0xDB7F,0x1447,0xE6CC,0x254B),
+ bn_pack4(0x44CE,0x6CBA,0xCED4,0xBB1B),
+ bn_pack4(0xDA3E,0xDBEB,0xCF9B,0x14ED),
+ bn_pack4(0x1797,0x27B0,0x865A,0x8918),
+ bn_pack4(0xB06A,0x53ED,0x9027,0xD831),
+ bn_pack4(0xE5DB,0x382F,0x4130,0x01AE),
+ bn_pack4(0xF8FF,0x9406,0xAD9E,0x530E),
+ bn_pack4(0xC975,0x1E76,0x3DBA,0x37BD),
+ bn_pack4(0xC1D4,0xDCB2,0x6026,0x46DE),
+ bn_pack4(0x36C3,0xFAB4,0xD27C,0x7026),
+ bn_pack4(0x4DF4,0x35C9,0x3402,0x8492),
+ bn_pack4(0x86FF,0xB7DC,0x90A6,0xC08F),
+ bn_pack4(0x93B4,0xEA98,0x8D8F,0xDDC1),
+ bn_pack4(0xD006,0x9127,0xD5B0,0x5AA9),
+ bn_pack4(0xB81B,0xDD76,0x2170,0x481C),
+ bn_pack4(0x1F61,0x2970,0xCEE2,0xD7AF),
+ bn_pack4(0x233B,0xA186,0x515B,0xE7ED),
+ bn_pack4(0x99B2,0x964F,0xA090,0xC3A2),
+ bn_pack4(0x287C,0x5947,0x4E6B,0xC05D),
+ bn_pack4(0x2E8E,0xFC14,0x1FBE,0xCAA6),
+ bn_pack4(0xDBBB,0xC2DB,0x04DE,0x8EF9),
+ bn_pack4(0x2583,0xE9CA,0x2AD4,0x4CE8),
+ bn_pack4(0x1A94,0x6834,0xB615,0x0BDA),
+ bn_pack4(0x99C3,0x2718,0x6AF4,0xE23C),
+ bn_pack4(0x8871,0x9A10,0xBDBA,0x5B26),
+ bn_pack4(0x1A72,0x3C12,0xA787,0xE6D7),
+ bn_pack4(0x4B82,0xD120,0xA921,0x0801),
+ bn_pack4(0x43DB,0x5BFC,0xE0FD,0x108E),
+ bn_pack4(0x08E2,0x4FA0,0x74E5,0xAB31),
+ bn_pack4(0x7709,0x88C0,0xBAD9,0x46E2),
+ bn_pack4(0xBBE1,0x1757,0x7A61,0x5D6C),
+ bn_pack4(0x521F,0x2B18,0x177B,0x200C),
+ bn_pack4(0xD876,0x0273,0x3EC8,0x6A64),
+ bn_pack4(0xF12F,0xFA06,0xD98A,0x0864),
+ bn_pack4(0xCEE3,0xD226,0x1AD2,0xEE6B),
+ bn_pack4(0x1E8C,0x94E0,0x4A25,0x619D),
+ bn_pack4(0xABF5,0xAE8C,0xDB09,0x33D7),
+ bn_pack4(0xB397,0x0F85,0xA6E1,0xE4C7),
+ bn_pack4(0x8AEA,0x7157,0x5D06,0x0C7D),
+ bn_pack4(0xECFB,0x8504,0x58DB,0xEF0A),
+ bn_pack4(0xA855,0x21AB,0xDF1C,0xBA64),
+ bn_pack4(0xAD33,0x170D,0x0450,0x7A33),
+ bn_pack4(0x1572,0x8E5A,0x8AAA,0xC42D),
+ bn_pack4(0x15D2,0x2618,0x98FA,0x0510),
+ bn_pack4(0x3995,0x497C,0xEA95,0x6AE5),
+ bn_pack4(0xDE2B,0xCBF6,0x9558,0x1718),
+ bn_pack4(0xB5C5,0x5DF0,0x6F4C,0x52C9),
+ bn_pack4(0x9B27,0x83A2,0xEC07,0xA28F),
+ bn_pack4(0xE39E,0x772C,0x180E,0x8603),
+ bn_pack4(0x3290,0x5E46,0x2E36,0xCE3B),
+ bn_pack4(0xF174,0x6C08,0xCA18,0x217C),
+ bn_pack4(0x670C,0x354E,0x4ABC,0x9804),
+ bn_pack4(0x9ED5,0x2907,0x7096,0x966D),
+ bn_pack4(0x1C62,0xF356,0x2085,0x52BB),
+ bn_pack4(0x8365,0x5D23,0xDCA3,0xAD96),
+ bn_pack4(0x6916,0x3FA8,0xFD24,0xCF5F),
+ bn_pack4(0x98DA,0x4836,0x1C55,0xD39A),
+ bn_pack4(0xC200,0x7CB8,0xA163,0xBF05),
+ bn_pack4(0x4928,0x6651,0xECE4,0x5B3D),
+ bn_pack4(0xAE9F,0x2411,0x7C4B,0x1FE6),
+ bn_pack4(0xEE38,0x6BFB,0x5A89,0x9FA5),
+ bn_pack4(0x0BFF,0x5CB6,0xF406,0xB7ED),
+ bn_pack4(0xF44C,0x42E9,0xA637,0xED6B),
+ bn_pack4(0xE485,0xB576,0x625E,0x7EC6),
+ bn_pack4(0x4FE1,0x356D,0x6D51,0xC245),
+ bn_pack4(0x302B,0x0A6D,0xF25F,0x1437),
+ bn_pack4(0xEF95,0x19B3,0xCD3A,0x431B),
+ bn_pack4(0x514A,0x0879,0x8E34,0x04DD),
+ bn_pack4(0x020B,0xBEA6,0x3B13,0x9B22),
+ bn_pack4(0x2902,0x4E08,0x8A67,0xCC74),
+ bn_pack4(0xC4C6,0x628B,0x80DC,0x1CD1),
+ bn_pack4(0xC90F,0xDAA2,0x2168,0xC234),
+ bn_pack4(0xFFFF,0xFFFF,0xFFFF,0xFFFF)
};
static BIGNUM bn_group_8192 = {
bn_group_8192_value,
diff --git a/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c b/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c
index 92cea98dcd6a..7c1dcc5111cf 100644
--- a/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c
@@ -63,13 +63,17 @@
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#if (BN_BYTES == 8)
-#define bn_pack4(a1,a2,a3,a4) 0x##a1##a2##a3##a4##ul
-#endif
-#if (BN_BYTES == 4)
-#define bn_pack4(a1,a2,a3,a4) 0x##a3##a4##ul, 0x##a1##a2##ul
-#endif
-#if (BN_BYTES == 2)
-#define bn_pack4(a1,a2,a3,a4) 0x##a4##u,0x##a3##u,0x##a2##u,0x##a1##u
+# if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN64)) && !defined(__MINGW32__)
+# define bn_pack4(a1,a2,a3,a4) ((a1##UI64<<48)|(a2##UI64<<32)|(a3##UI64<<16)|a4##UI64)
+# elif defined(__arch64__)
+# define bn_pack4(a1,a2,a3,a4) ((a1##UL<<48)|(a2##UL<<32)|(a3##UL<<16)|a4##UL)
+# else
+# define bn_pack4(a1,a2,a3,a4) ((a1##ULL<<48)|(a2##ULL<<32)|(a3##ULL<<16)|a4##ULL)
+# endif
+#elif (BN_BYTES == 4)
+# define bn_pack4(a1,a2,a3,a4) ((a3##UL<<16)|a4##UL), ((a1##UL<<16)|a2##UL)
+#else
+# error "unsupported BN_BYTES"
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index 12d71f54e2e5..5195ffef264d 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -694,6 +694,7 @@ static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
X509 *x;
int ok, cnum;
+ unsigned int last_reasons;
cnum = ctx->error_depth;
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
ctx->current_cert = x;
@@ -702,6 +703,7 @@ static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
ctx->current_reasons = 0;
while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
{
+ last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
/* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
if (ctx->get_crl)
ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
@@ -745,6 +747,15 @@ static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
crl = NULL;
dcrl = NULL;
+ /* If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by
+ * another iteration, so exit loop.
+ */
+ if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons)
+ {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ goto err;
+ }
}
err:
X509_CRL_free(crl);
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x_all.c b/crypto/x509/x_all.c
index b94aeeb873fd..e06602d65abc 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x_all.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x_all.c
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ int X509_sign(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md)
int X509_sign_ctx(X509 *x, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
{
+ x->cert_info->enc.modified = 1;
return ASN1_item_sign_ctx(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CINF),
x->cert_info->signature,
x->sig_alg, x->signature, x->cert_info, ctx);
@@ -123,6 +124,7 @@ int X509_CRL_sign(X509_CRL *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md)
int X509_CRL_sign_ctx(X509_CRL *x, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
{
+ x->crl->enc.modified = 1;
return ASN1_item_sign_ctx(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL_INFO),
x->crl->sig_alg, x->sig_alg, x->signature, x->crl, ctx);
}
diff --git a/crypto/x86cpuid.pl b/crypto/x86cpuid.pl
index c18b0e2486d6..b270b44337d1 100644
--- a/crypto/x86cpuid.pl
+++ b/crypto/x86cpuid.pl
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ for (@ARGV) { $sse2=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); }
&inc ("esi"); # number of cores
&mov ("eax",1);
+ &xor ("ecx","ecx");
&cpuid ();
&bt ("edx",28);
&jnc (&label("generic"));
@@ -91,6 +92,7 @@ for (@ARGV) { $sse2=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); }
&set_label("nocacheinfo");
&mov ("eax",1);
+ &xor ("ecx","ecx");
&cpuid ();
&and ("edx",0xbfefffff); # force reserved bits #20, #30 to 0
&cmp ("ebp",0);
diff --git a/doc/apps/rsa.pod b/doc/apps/rsa.pod
index 69b2bef82cbe..d7d784d52bbe 100644
--- a/doc/apps/rsa.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/rsa.pod
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ B<openssl> B<rsa>
[B<-check>]
[B<-pubin>]
[B<-pubout>]
+[B<-RSAPublicKey_in>]
+[B<-RSAPublicKey_out>]
[B<-engine id>]
=head1 DESCRIPTION
@@ -118,6 +120,10 @@ by default a private key is output: with this option a public
key will be output instead. This option is automatically set if
the input is a public key.
+=item B<-RSAPublicKey_in>, B<-RSAPublicKey_out>
+
+like B<-pubin> and B<-pubout> except B<RSAPublicKey> format is used instead.
+
=item B<-engine id>
specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<rsa>
@@ -139,6 +145,11 @@ The PEM public key format uses the header and footer lines:
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+The PEM B<RSAPublicKey> format uses the header and footer lines:
+
+ -----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
+ -----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
+
The B<NET> form is a format compatible with older Netscape servers
and Microsoft IIS .key files, this uses unsalted RC4 for its encryption.
It is not very secure and so should only be used when necessary.
@@ -173,6 +184,10 @@ To just output the public part of a private key:
openssl rsa -in key.pem -pubout -out pubkey.pem
+Output the public part of a private key in B<RSAPublicKey> format:
+
+ openssl rsa -in key.pem -RSAPublicKey_out -out pubkey.pem
+
=head1 BUGS
The command line password arguments don't currently work with
diff --git a/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod b/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod
index a883f6c09783..60e8332ae9dd 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod
@@ -278,6 +278,8 @@ happen if extended CRL checking is enabled.
an application specific error. This will never be returned unless explicitly
set by an application.
+=back
+
=head1 NOTES
The above functions should be used instead of directly referencing the fields
diff --git a/doc/crypto/ecdsa.pod b/doc/crypto/ecdsa.pod
index 20edff97ffd6..59a5916de123 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/ecdsa.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/ecdsa.pod
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ is ignored.
ECDSA_verify() verifies that the signature in B<sig> of size
B<siglen> is a valid ECDSA signature of the hash value
-value B<dgst> of size B<dgstlen> using the public key B<eckey>.
+B<dgst> of size B<dgstlen> using the public key B<eckey>.
The parameter B<type> is ignored.
ECDSA_do_sign() is wrapper function for ECDSA_do_sign_ex with B<kinv>
@@ -131,16 +131,12 @@ specific)
int ret;
ECDSA_SIG *sig;
- EC_KEY *eckey = EC_KEY_new();
+ EC_KEY *eckey;
+ eckey = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp192k1);
if (eckey == NULL)
{
/* error */
}
- key->group = EC_GROUP_new_by_nid(NID_secp192k1);
- if (key->group == NULL)
- {
- /* error */
- }
if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(eckey))
{
/* error */
diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod
index 632b556d1262..5e6613335c60 100644
--- a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod
+++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod
@@ -66,16 +66,16 @@ values:
=over 4
-=item 1
-
-The operation succeeded.
-
=item 0
A failure while manipulating the STACK_OF(X509_NAME) object occurred or
the X509_NAME could not be extracted from B<cacert>. Check the error stack
to find out the reason.
+=item 1
+
+The operation succeeded.
+
=back
=head1 EXAMPLES
diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod
index cc588f3a78f3..fded0601b566 100644
--- a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod
+++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod
@@ -88,9 +88,10 @@ As of OpenSSL 0.9.8q and 1.0.0c, this option has no effect.
...
-=item SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING
+=item SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG
-As of OpenSSL 0.9.7h and 0.9.8a, this option has no effect.
+Don't prefer ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be Safari on OS X.
+OS X 10.8..10.8.3 has broken support for ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers.
=item SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod
index b80e25be7eaa..7e60df5ba85c 100644
--- a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod
+++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod
@@ -81,6 +81,8 @@ SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint() and SSL_use_psk_identity_hint() return
Return values from the server callback are interpreted as follows:
+=over 4
+
=item > 0
PSK identity was found and the server callback has provided the PSK
@@ -99,4 +101,6 @@ completely.
PSK identity was not found. An "unknown_psk_identity" alert message
will be sent and the connection setup fails.
+=back
+
=cut
diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod
index cc724c0d561a..b1c34d15b6e8 100644
--- a/doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod
+++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod
@@ -44,17 +44,17 @@ The following return values can occur:
=over 4
-=item 1
-
-The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been
-established.
-
=item 0
The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful but was shut down controlled and
by the specifications of the TLS/SSL protocol. Call SSL_get_error() with the
return value B<ret> to find out the reason.
+=item 1
+
+The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been
+established.
+
=item E<lt>0
The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful because a fatal error occurred either
diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod
index cc56ebb75f3f..946ca89d7b7d 100644
--- a/doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod
+++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod
@@ -41,17 +41,17 @@ The following return values can occur:
=over 4
-=item 1
-
-The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been
-established.
-
=item 0
The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful but was shut down controlled and
by the specifications of the TLS/SSL protocol. Call SSL_get_error() with the
return value B<ret> to find out the reason.
+=item 1
+
+The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been
+established.
+
=item E<lt>0
The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful, because a fatal error occurred either
diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod
index 243576451b7f..7f8cf249ec04 100644
--- a/doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod
+++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod
@@ -45,17 +45,17 @@ The following return values can occur:
=over 4
-=item 1
-
-The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been
-established.
-
=item 0
The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful but was shut down controlled and
by the specifications of the TLS/SSL protocol. Call SSL_get_error() with the
return value B<ret> to find out the reason.
+=item 1
+
+The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been
+established.
+
=item E<lt>0
The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful because a fatal error occurred either
diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod
index 89911acbcac8..42a89b7c6b97 100644
--- a/doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod
+++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod
@@ -92,11 +92,6 @@ The following return values can occur:
=over 4
-=item 1
-
-The shutdown was successfully completed. The "close notify" alert was sent
-and the peer's "close notify" alert was received.
-
=item 0
The shutdown is not yet finished. Call SSL_shutdown() for a second time,
@@ -104,6 +99,11 @@ if a bidirectional shutdown shall be performed.
The output of L<SSL_get_error(3)|SSL_get_error(3)> may be misleading, as an
erroneous SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL may be flagged even though no error occurred.
+=item 1
+
+The shutdown was successfully completed. The "close notify" alert was sent
+and the peer's "close notify" alert was received.
+
=item -1
The shutdown was not successful because a fatal error occurred either
diff --git a/engines/ccgost/gost89.h b/engines/ccgost/gost89.h
index 2157852519fd..8da2407b0332 100644
--- a/engines/ccgost/gost89.h
+++ b/engines/ccgost/gost89.h
@@ -87,10 +87,6 @@ extern gost_subst_block Gost28147_CryptoProParamSetB;
extern gost_subst_block Gost28147_CryptoProParamSetC;
extern gost_subst_block Gost28147_CryptoProParamSetD;
extern const byte CryptoProKeyMeshingKey[];
-#if __LONG_MAX__ > 2147483647L
typedef unsigned int word32;
-#else
-typedef unsigned long word32;
-#endif
#endif
diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
index 4c8c77f52934..7a5596a6b373 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -319,9 +319,10 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- /* write atleast DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes */
- if ( len <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
- len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ if ( s->init_num > curr_mtu)
+ len = curr_mtu;
+ else
+ len = s->init_num;
}
dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off,
diff --git a/ssl/d1_clnt.c b/ssl/d1_clnt.c
index a6ed09c51dda..48e5e06bdeb4 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_clnt.c
@@ -538,13 +538,6 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- /* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth,
- * will be ignored if no SCTP used.
- */
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL);
-#endif
-
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num=0;
@@ -571,6 +564,16 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
goto end;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ if (s->hit)
+ {
+ /* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth,
+ * will be ignored if no SCTP used.
+ */
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL);
+ }
+#endif
+
dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
break;
@@ -613,6 +616,13 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
}
else
{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ /* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth,
+ * will be ignored if no SCTP used.
+ */
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL);
+#endif
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
@@ -773,7 +783,7 @@ int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s)
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p,*d;
unsigned int i,j;
- unsigned long Time,l;
+ unsigned long l;
SSL_COMP *comp;
buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
@@ -798,13 +808,11 @@ int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s)
/* if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
* required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify */
- for (i=0;p[i]=='\0' && i<sizeof(s->s3->client_random);i++) ;
+ for (i=0;p[i]=='\0' && i<sizeof(s->s3->client_random);i++)
+ ;
if (i==sizeof(s->s3->client_random))
- {
- Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
- l2n(Time,p);
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,sizeof(s->s3->client_random)-4);
- }
+ ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p,
+ sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
/* Do the message type and length last */
d=p= &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
diff --git a/ssl/d1_lib.c b/ssl/d1_lib.c
index f61f71818308..106939f24177 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_lib.c
@@ -196,6 +196,7 @@ void dtls1_free(SSL *s)
pqueue_free(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
OPENSSL_free(s->d1);
+ s->d1 = NULL;
}
void dtls1_clear(SSL *s)
diff --git a/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
index 0bf87be6d210..8186462d4a6b 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -847,6 +847,12 @@ start:
}
}
+ if (s->d1->listen && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+ {
+ rr->length = 0;
+ goto start;
+ }
+
/* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
@@ -1051,6 +1057,7 @@ start:
!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
!s->s3->renegotiate)
{
+ s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
s->new_session = 1;
ssl3_renegotiate(s);
if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
diff --git a/ssl/d1_srvr.c b/ssl/d1_srvr.c
index 29421da9aace..9975e20873c4 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_srvr.c
@@ -276,10 +276,11 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
s->shutdown=0;
+ dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
dtls1_start_timer(s);
ret=dtls1_send_hello_request(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->init_num=0;
@@ -721,10 +722,13 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- /* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth,
- * will be ignored if no SCTP used.
- */
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL);
+ if (!s->hit)
+ {
+ /* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth,
+ * will be ignored if no SCTP used.
+ */
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL);
+ }
#endif
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
@@ -749,7 +753,16 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
if (s->hit)
+ {
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ /* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth,
+ * will be ignored if no SCTP used.
+ */
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL);
+#endif
+ }
else
{
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
@@ -912,15 +925,13 @@ int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i;
unsigned int sl;
- unsigned long l,Time;
+ unsigned long l;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
{
buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
p=s->s3->server_random;
- Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
- l2n(Time,p);
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4);
+ ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
/* Do the message type and length last */
d=p= &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
diff --git a/ssl/s23_clnt.c b/ssl/s23_clnt.c
index 47673e740abe..84670b6c1c37 100644
--- a/ssl/s23_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s23_clnt.c
@@ -269,12 +269,35 @@ static int ssl23_no_ssl2_ciphers(SSL *s)
return 1;
}
+/* Fill a ClientRandom or ServerRandom field of length len. Returns <= 0
+ * on failure, 1 on success. */
+int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *result, int len)
+ {
+ int send_time = 0;
+
+ if (len < 4)
+ return 0;
+ if (server)
+ send_time = (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME) != 0;
+ else
+ send_time = (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_CLIENTHELLO_TIME) != 0;
+ if (send_time)
+ {
+ unsigned long Time = time(NULL);
+ unsigned char *p = result;
+ l2n(Time, p);
+ return RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, len-4);
+ }
+ else
+ return RAND_pseudo_bytes(result, len);
+ }
+
static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i,ch_len;
- unsigned long Time,l;
+ unsigned long l;
int ssl2_compat;
int version = 0, version_major, version_minor;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
@@ -355,9 +378,7 @@ static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
#endif
p=s->s3->client_random;
- Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
- l2n(Time,p);
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
+ if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
return -1;
if (version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
diff --git a/ssl/s3_both.c b/ssl/s3_both.c
index ae0ee27c41aa..53b9390fdd3a 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_both.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_both.c
@@ -161,6 +161,8 @@ int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen)
i=s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
+ if (i == 0)
+ return 0;
s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i;
memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
p+=i;
diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index 344e2eb1af8c..a6b3c01afa18 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -655,7 +655,7 @@ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i;
- unsigned long Time,l;
+ unsigned long l;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
int j;
SSL_COMP *comp;
@@ -680,9 +680,8 @@ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
/* else use the pre-loaded session */
p=s->s3->client_random;
- Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
- l2n(Time,p);
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
+
+ if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
goto err;
/* Do the message type and length last */
diff --git a/ssl/s3_lib.c b/ssl/s3_lib.c
index 3291e3d8e297..c4ef2738d7b1 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_lib.c
@@ -1683,7 +1683,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
SSL_3DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
168,
168,
@@ -1699,7 +1699,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
SSL_AES128,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
128,
128,
@@ -1715,7 +1715,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
SSL_AES256,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
256,
256,
@@ -3037,6 +3037,11 @@ void ssl3_clear(SSL *s)
s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
}
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ s->s3->is_probably_safari = 0;
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
rp = s->s3->rbuf.buf;
wp = s->s3->wbuf.buf;
@@ -4016,6 +4021,13 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
ii=sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow,c);
if (ii >= 0)
{
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) && (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) && s->s3->is_probably_safari)
+ {
+ if (!ret) ret=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow,ii);
+ continue;
+ }
+#endif
ret=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow,ii);
break;
}
diff --git a/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
index 804291e27c32..96ba63262e44 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
if (version != s->version)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
- if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00))
+ if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
/* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
s->version = (unsigned short)version;
al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
@@ -1459,8 +1459,14 @@ int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
}
- s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
+ i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i;
return(1);
}
diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index bfb84805400c..52efed328a14 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -958,7 +958,8 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
(s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
- if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+ if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
+ !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
{
/* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
s->version = s->client_version;
@@ -1193,12 +1194,9 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
* server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
* SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
{
- unsigned long Time;
unsigned char *pos;
- Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
pos=s->s3->server_random;
- l2n(Time,pos);
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
+ if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
@@ -1435,19 +1433,13 @@ int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i,sl;
unsigned long l;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- unsigned long Time;
-#endif
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
{
buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
p=s->s3->server_random;
- /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
- Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
- l2n(Time,p);
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
+ if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
return -1;
#endif
/* Do the message type and length last */
diff --git a/ssl/ssl.h b/ssl/ssl.h
index 593579ed3670..dece04de0129 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl.h
@@ -555,11 +555,14 @@ struct ssl_session_st
#define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG 0x00000008L
#define SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG 0x00000010L
#define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER 0x00000020L
-#define SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING 0x00000040L /* no effect since 0.9.7h and 0.9.8b */
+#define SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG 0x00000040L
#define SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG 0x00000080L
#define SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG 0x00000100L
#define SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG 0x00000200L
+/* Hasn't done anything since OpenSSL 0.9.7h, retained for compatibility */
+#define SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING 0x0
+
/* Disable SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability workaround that was added
* in OpenSSL 0.9.6d. Usually (depending on the application protocol)
* the workaround is not needed. Unfortunately some broken SSL/TLS
@@ -641,6 +644,12 @@ struct ssl_session_st
* TLS only.) "Released" buffers are put onto a free-list in the context
* or just freed (depending on the context's setting for freelist_max_len). */
#define SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS 0x00000010L
+/* Send the current time in the Random fields of the ClientHello and
+ * ServerHello records for compatibility with hypothetical implementations
+ * that require it.
+ */
+#define SSL_MODE_SEND_CLIENTHELLO_TIME 0x00000020L
+#define SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME 0x00000040L
/* Note: SSL[_CTX]_set_{options,mode} use |= op on the previous value,
* they cannot be used to clear bits. */
diff --git a/ssl/ssl3.h b/ssl/ssl3.h
index 247e88c2d631..cb8b2492ec97 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl3.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl3.h
@@ -539,6 +539,15 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
/* Set if we saw the Next Protocol Negotiation extension from our peer. */
int next_proto_neg_seen;
#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ /* This is set to true if we believe that this is a version of Safari
+ * running on OS X 10.6 or newer. We wish to know this because Safari
+ * on 10.8 .. 10.8.3 has broken ECDHE-ECDSA support. */
+ char is_probably_safari;
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
} SSL3_STATE;
#endif
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index 14d143da0441..6dbc3c1f7d0a 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -1797,7 +1797,9 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data);
ret->extra_certs=NULL;
- ret->comp_methods=SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
+ /* No compression for DTLS */
+ if (meth->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ ret->comp_methods=SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
@@ -2792,9 +2794,7 @@ void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s)
/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s)
{
- if (s->server)
- return(ssl_get_server_send_cert(s));
- else if (s->cert != NULL)
+ if (s->cert != NULL)
return(s->cert->key->x509);
else
return(NULL);
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
index ada800854953..e48590774815 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
@@ -849,6 +849,7 @@ void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s);
int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type);
void ssl_load_ciphers(void);
+int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *field, int len);
int ssl2_enc_init(SSL *s, int client);
int ssl2_generate_key_material(SSL *s);
diff --git a/ssl/ssltest.c b/ssl/ssltest.c
index 316bbb0c9582..4f80be8ee4d8 100644
--- a/ssl/ssltest.c
+++ b/ssl/ssltest.c
@@ -881,7 +881,13 @@ bad:
meth=SSLv23_method();
#else
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
- meth=SSLv3_method();
+ if (tls1)
+ meth=TLSv1_method();
+ else
+ if (ssl3)
+ meth=SSLv3_method();
+ else
+ meth=SSLv23_method();
#else
meth=SSLv2_method();
#endif
diff --git a/ssl/t1_enc.c b/ssl/t1_enc.c
index b1a803d57bd3..56db83430630 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -920,18 +920,19 @@ int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
if (mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s))
{
int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
- if (hashsize < 0 || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q-buf)))
+ EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx];
+ if (!hdgst || hashsize < 0 || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q-buf)))
{
/* internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite! */
err = 1;
}
else
{
- EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx]);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,q,&i);
- if (i != (unsigned int)hashsize) /* can't really happen */
+ if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst) ||
+ !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,q,&i) ||
+ (i != (unsigned int)hashsize))
err = 1;
- q+=i;
+ q+=hashsize;
}
}
}
diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index e08088c57eff..33afdeba33e5 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -342,19 +342,11 @@ static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
- tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
-#endif
};
int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
{
size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
- if (FIPS_mode())
- slen -= 2;
-#endif
if (p)
memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
return (int)slen;
@@ -866,6 +858,89 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
return ret;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+/* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
+ * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
+ * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
+ * SNI,
+ * elliptic_curves
+ * ec_point_formats
+ *
+ * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
+ * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
+ * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
+ * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
+ */
+static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
+ unsigned short type, size;
+ static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
+ 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
+ 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
+ 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
+ 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
+ 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
+
+ 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
+ 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
+ 0x01, /* 1 point format */
+ 0x00, /* uncompressed */
+ };
+
+ /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
+ static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
+ 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
+ 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
+ 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
+ 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
+ 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
+ 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
+ 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
+ };
+
+ if (data >= (d+n-2))
+ return;
+ data += 2;
+
+ if (data > (d+n-4))
+ return;
+ n2s(data,type);
+ n2s(data,size);
+
+ if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
+ return;
+
+ if (data+size > d+n)
+ return;
+ data += size;
+
+ if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+ {
+ const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+ const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
+
+ if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
+ return;
+ if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
+ return;
+ if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
+ return;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+
+ if (data + len != d+n)
+ return;
+ if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
+ return;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
+}
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
{
unsigned short type;
@@ -886,6 +961,11 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
+ ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
if (data >= (d+n-2))
goto ri_check;
n2s(data,len);
@@ -2364,14 +2444,6 @@ const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
{
switch(hash_alg)
{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
- case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- if (FIPS_mode())
- return NULL;
-#endif
- return EVP_md5();
-#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
return EVP_sha1();
diff --git a/util/shlib_wrap.sh b/util/shlib_wrap.sh
index 9416d593d2b8..8775cb5411e1 100755
--- a/util/shlib_wrap.sh
+++ b/util/shlib_wrap.sh
@@ -90,4 +90,8 @@ fi
cmd="$1${EXE_EXT}"
shift
-exec "$cmd" "$@"
+if [ $# -eq 0 ]; then
+ exec "$cmd" # old sh, such as Tru64 4.x, fails to expand empty "$@"
+else
+ exec "$cmd" "$@"
+fi