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authorGordon Tetlow <gordon@FreeBSD.org>2018-03-07 05:53:35 +0000
committerGordon Tetlow <gordon@FreeBSD.org>2018-03-07 05:53:35 +0000
commitdb9a031547fb7afb369eb4682b10e85a69363a64 (patch)
treea21e24dd0852a875d26da91c7827059c1d21122f
parent778b7c0a70931e839ad663ef880a0257a8fe3a80 (diff)
downloadsrc-db9a031547fb7afb369eb4682b10e85a69363a64.tar.gz
src-db9a031547fb7afb369eb4682b10e85a69363a64.zip
Fix ipsec validation and use-after-free. [SA-18:01.ipsec]
Approved by: so Security: FreeBSD-SA-18:01.ipsec Security: CVE-2018-6916
Notes
Notes: svn path=/releng/10.3/; revision=330566
-rw-r--r--UPDATING13
-rw-r--r--sys/conf/newvers.sh2
-rw-r--r--sys/netipsec/xform_ah.c15
3 files changed, 28 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/UPDATING b/UPDATING
index 7f1e11bd45c8..bc6152842a1d 100644
--- a/UPDATING
+++ b/UPDATING
@@ -16,6 +16,19 @@ from older versions of FreeBSD, try WITHOUT_CLANG to bootstrap to the tip of
stable/10, and then rebuild without this option. The bootstrap process from
older version of current is a bit fragile.
+20180307 p27 FreeBSD-SA-18:01.ipsec
+ FreeBSD-SA-18:02.ntp
+ FreeBSD-EN-18:01.tzdata
+ FreeBSD-EN-18:02.file
+
+ Fix ipsec validation and use-after-free. [SA-18:01.ipsec]
+
+ Fix multiple vulnerabilities in ntp. [SA-18:02.ntp]
+
+ Update timezone database information. [EN-18:01.tzdata]
+
+ Update file(1) to new version with security update. [EN-18:02.file]
+
20171209 p26 FreeBSD-SA-17:12.openssl
Fix OpenSSL error state vulnerability.
diff --git a/sys/conf/newvers.sh b/sys/conf/newvers.sh
index ea4ab58c1e44..1a76473a39fd 100644
--- a/sys/conf/newvers.sh
+++ b/sys/conf/newvers.sh
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
TYPE="FreeBSD"
REVISION="10.3"
-BRANCH="RELEASE-p26"
+BRANCH="RELEASE-p27"
if [ "X${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}" != "X" ]; then
BRANCH=${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}
fi
diff --git a/sys/netipsec/xform_ah.c b/sys/netipsec/xform_ah.c
index afa452cac0bb..3f678414c322 100644
--- a/sys/netipsec/xform_ah.c
+++ b/sys/netipsec/xform_ah.c
@@ -615,6 +615,16 @@ ah_input(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff)
m_freem(m);
return EACCES;
}
+ if (skip + authsize + rplen > m->m_pkthdr.len) {
+ DPRINTF(("%s: bad mbuf length %u (expecting %lu)"
+ " for packet in SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
+ m->m_pkthdr.len, (u_long) (skip + authsize + rplen),
+ ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
+ (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
+ AHSTAT_INC(ahs_badauthl);
+ error = EACCES;
+ goto bad;
+ }
AHSTAT_ADD(ahs_ibytes, m->m_pkthdr.len - skip - hl);
/* Get crypto descriptors. */
@@ -680,6 +690,9 @@ ah_input(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff)
/* Zeroize the authenticator on the packet. */
m_copyback(m, skip + rplen, authsize, ipseczeroes);
+ /* Save ah_nxt, since ah pointer can become invalid after "massage" */
+ hl = ah->ah_nxt;
+
/* "Massage" the packet headers for crypto processing. */
error = ah_massage_headers(&m, sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family,
skip, ahx->type, 0);
@@ -704,7 +717,7 @@ ah_input(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff)
tc->tc_spi = sav->spi;
tc->tc_dst = sav->sah->saidx.dst;
tc->tc_proto = sav->sah->saidx.proto;
- tc->tc_nxt = ah->ah_nxt;
+ tc->tc_nxt = hl;
tc->tc_protoff = protoff;
tc->tc_skip = skip;
tc->tc_ptr = (caddr_t) mtag; /* Save the mtag we've identified. */