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authorXin LI <delphij@FreeBSD.org>2016-10-10 07:18:54 +0000
committerXin LI <delphij@FreeBSD.org>2016-10-10 07:18:54 +0000
commita97d006c65a7bf99f6761e54084f1c24cc186148 (patch)
treef0f11145ec819dbc441fac37a4cdf72cdcdf34da
parent69f7d1337c31dddaee8e9bb03a2e5d28d758faab (diff)
downloadsrc-a97d006c65a7bf99f6761e54084f1c24cc186148.tar.gz
src-a97d006c65a7bf99f6761e54084f1c24cc186148.zip
Fix bspatch heap overflow vulnerability. [SA-16:29]
Fix multiple portsnap vulnerabilities. [SA-16:30] Fix multiple libarchive vulnerabilities. [SA-16:31] Approved by: so
Notes
Notes: svn path=/releng/10.3/; revision=306941
-rw-r--r--UPDATING10
-rw-r--r--contrib/libarchive/libarchive/archive_read_disk_entry_from_file.c131
-rw-r--r--contrib/libarchive/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_tar.c17
-rw-r--r--contrib/libarchive/libarchive/archive_write_disk_acl.c96
-rw-r--r--contrib/libarchive/libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c322
-rw-r--r--contrib/libarchive/libarchive/test/main.c25
-rw-r--r--contrib/libarchive/libarchive/test/test.h3
-rw-r--r--contrib/libarchive/libarchive/test/test_write_disk_secure744.c190
-rw-r--r--contrib/libarchive/libarchive/test/test_write_disk_secure745.c158
-rw-r--r--contrib/libarchive/libarchive/test/test_write_disk_secure746.c258
-rw-r--r--lib/libarchive/tests/Makefile3
-rw-r--r--sys/conf/newvers.sh2
-rw-r--r--usr.bin/bsdiff/bspatch/bspatch.c228
-rw-r--r--usr.sbin/portsnap/portsnap/portsnap.sh15
14 files changed, 1255 insertions, 203 deletions
diff --git a/UPDATING b/UPDATING
index 066d5e6ab867..ab10750aba97 100644
--- a/UPDATING
+++ b/UPDATING
@@ -16,6 +16,16 @@ from older versions of FreeBSD, try WITHOUT_CLANG to bootstrap to the tip of
stable/10, and then rebuild without this option. The bootstrap process from
older version of current is a bit fragile.
+20161010 p10 FreeBSD-SA-16:29.bspatch
+ FreeBSD-SA-16:30.portsnap
+ FreeBSD-SA-16:31.libarchive
+
+ Fix bspatch heap overflow vulnerability. [SA-16:29]
+
+ Fix multiple portsnap vulnerabilities. [SA-16:30]
+
+ Fix multiple libarchive vulnerabilities. [SA-16:31]
+
20160926 p9 FreeBSD-SA-16:26.openssl [revised]
Fix OpenSSL regression introduced in SA-16:26.
diff --git a/contrib/libarchive/libarchive/archive_read_disk_entry_from_file.c b/contrib/libarchive/libarchive/archive_read_disk_entry_from_file.c
index 29ea2da2876f..a6703400cfdc 100644
--- a/contrib/libarchive/libarchive/archive_read_disk_entry_from_file.c
+++ b/contrib/libarchive/libarchive/archive_read_disk_entry_from_file.c
@@ -409,9 +409,7 @@ setup_acls(struct archive_read_disk *a,
{
const char *accpath;
acl_t acl;
-#if HAVE_ACL_IS_TRIVIAL_NP
int r;
-#endif
accpath = archive_entry_sourcepath(entry);
if (accpath == NULL)
@@ -443,9 +441,13 @@ setup_acls(struct archive_read_disk *a,
}
#endif
if (acl != NULL) {
- translate_acl(a, entry, acl, ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_NFS4);
+ r = translate_acl(a, entry, acl, ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_NFS4);
acl_free(acl);
- return (ARCHIVE_OK);
+ if (r != ARCHIVE_OK) {
+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
+ "Couldn't translate NFSv4 ACLs: %s", accpath);
+ }
+ return (r);
}
/* Retrieve access ACL from file. */
@@ -464,18 +466,29 @@ setup_acls(struct archive_read_disk *a,
else
acl = acl_get_file(accpath, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);
if (acl != NULL) {
- translate_acl(a, entry, acl,
+ r = translate_acl(a, entry, acl,
ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);
acl_free(acl);
+ if (r != ARCHIVE_OK) {
+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
+ "Couldn't translate access ACLs: %s", accpath);
+ return (r);
+ }
}
/* Only directories can have default ACLs. */
if (S_ISDIR(archive_entry_mode(entry))) {
acl = acl_get_file(accpath, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT);
if (acl != NULL) {
- translate_acl(a, entry, acl,
+ r = translate_acl(a, entry, acl,
ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT);
acl_free(acl);
+ if (r != ARCHIVE_OK) {
+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
+ "Couldn't translate default ACLs: %s",
+ accpath);
+ return (r);
+ }
}
}
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
@@ -536,7 +549,11 @@ translate_acl(struct archive_read_disk *a,
// FreeBSD "brands" ACLs as POSIX.1e or NFSv4
// Make sure the "brand" on this ACL is consistent
// with the default_entry_acl_type bits provided.
- acl_get_brand_np(acl, &brand);
+ if (acl_get_brand_np(acl, &brand) != 0) {
+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
+ "Failed to read ACL brand");
+ return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
+ }
switch (brand) {
case ACL_BRAND_POSIX:
switch (default_entry_acl_type) {
@@ -544,30 +561,42 @@ translate_acl(struct archive_read_disk *a,
case ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
break;
default:
- // XXX set warning message?
- return ARCHIVE_FAILED;
+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
+ "Invalid ACL entry type for POSIX.1e ACL");
+ return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
}
break;
case ACL_BRAND_NFS4:
if (default_entry_acl_type & ~ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_NFS4) {
- // XXX set warning message?
- return ARCHIVE_FAILED;
+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
+ "Invalid ACL entry type for NFSv4 ACL");
+ return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
}
break;
default:
- // XXX set warning message?
- return ARCHIVE_FAILED;
+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
+ "Unknown ACL brand");
+ return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
break;
}
s = acl_get_entry(acl, ACL_FIRST_ENTRY, &acl_entry);
+ if (s == -1) {
+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
+ "Failed to get first ACL entry");
+ return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
+ }
while (s == 1) {
ae_id = -1;
ae_name = NULL;
ae_perm = 0;
- acl_get_tag_type(acl_entry, &acl_tag);
+ if (acl_get_tag_type(acl_entry, &acl_tag) != 0) {
+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
+ "Failed to get ACL tag type");
+ return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
+ }
switch (acl_tag) {
case ACL_USER:
ae_id = (int)*(uid_t *)acl_get_qualifier(acl_entry);
@@ -600,12 +629,17 @@ translate_acl(struct archive_read_disk *a,
continue;
}
- // XXX acl type maps to allow/deny/audit/YYYY bits
- // XXX acl_get_entry_type_np on FreeBSD returns EINVAL for
- // non-NFSv4 ACLs
+ // XXX acl_type maps to allow/deny/audit/YYYY bits
entry_acl_type = default_entry_acl_type;
- r = acl_get_entry_type_np(acl_entry, &acl_type);
- if (r == 0) {
+ if (default_entry_acl_type & ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_NFS4) {
+ /*
+ * acl_get_entry_type_np() falis with non-NFSv4 ACLs
+ */
+ if (acl_get_entry_type_np(acl_entry, &acl_type) != 0) {
+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno, "Failed "
+ "to get ACL type from a NFSv4 ACL entry");
+ return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
+ }
switch (acl_type) {
case ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW:
entry_acl_type = ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_ALLOW;
@@ -619,28 +653,52 @@ translate_acl(struct archive_read_disk *a,
case ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALARM:
entry_acl_type = ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_ALARM;
break;
+ default:
+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
+ "Invalid NFSv4 ACL entry type");
+ return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
}
- }
-
- /*
- * Libarchive stores "flag" (NFSv4 inheritance bits)
- * in the ae_perm bitmap.
- */
- acl_get_flagset_np(acl_entry, &acl_flagset);
- for (i = 0; i < (int)(sizeof(acl_inherit_map) / sizeof(acl_inherit_map[0])); ++i) {
- if (acl_get_flag_np(acl_flagset,
- acl_inherit_map[i].platform_inherit))
- ae_perm |= acl_inherit_map[i].archive_inherit;
- }
+ /*
+ * Libarchive stores "flag" (NFSv4 inheritance bits)
+ * in the ae_perm bitmap.
+ *
+ * acl_get_flagset_np() fails with non-NFSv4 ACLs
+ */
+ if (acl_get_flagset_np(acl_entry, &acl_flagset) != 0) {
+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
+ "Failed to get flagset from a NFSv4 ACL entry");
+ return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < (int)(sizeof(acl_inherit_map) / sizeof(acl_inherit_map[0])); ++i) {
+ r = acl_get_flag_np(acl_flagset,
+ acl_inherit_map[i].platform_inherit);
+ if (r == -1) {
+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
+ "Failed to check flag in a NFSv4 "
+ "ACL flagset");
+ return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
+ } else if (r)
+ ae_perm |= acl_inherit_map[i].archive_inherit;
+ }
+ }
- acl_get_permset(acl_entry, &acl_permset);
- for (i = 0; i < (int)(sizeof(acl_perm_map) / sizeof(acl_perm_map[0])); ++i) {
+ if (acl_get_permset(acl_entry, &acl_permset) != 0) {
+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
+ "Failed to get ACL permission set");
+ return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < (int)(sizeof(acl_perm_map) / sizeof(acl_perm_map[0])); ++i) {
/*
* acl_get_perm() is spelled differently on different
* platforms; see above.
*/
- if (ACL_GET_PERM(acl_permset, acl_perm_map[i].platform_perm))
+ r = ACL_GET_PERM(acl_permset, acl_perm_map[i].platform_perm);
+ if (r == -1) {
+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
+ "Failed to check permission in an ACL permission set");
+ return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
+ } else if (r)
ae_perm |= acl_perm_map[i].archive_perm;
}
@@ -649,6 +707,11 @@ translate_acl(struct archive_read_disk *a,
ae_id, ae_name);
s = acl_get_entry(acl, ACL_NEXT_ENTRY, &acl_entry);
+ if (s == -1) {
+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
+ "Failed to get next ACL entry");
+ return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
+ }
}
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
diff --git a/contrib/libarchive/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_tar.c b/contrib/libarchive/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_tar.c
index c2003e78acb6..2ead16f03c31 100644
--- a/contrib/libarchive/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_tar.c
+++ b/contrib/libarchive/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_tar.c
@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ struct tar {
int64_t entry_padding;
int64_t entry_bytes_unconsumed;
int64_t realsize;
+ int sparse_allowed;
struct sparse_block *sparse_list;
struct sparse_block *sparse_last;
int64_t sparse_offset;
@@ -1226,6 +1227,14 @@ header_common(struct archive_read *a, struct tar *tar,
* sparse information in the extended area.
*/
/* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case '0':
+ /*
+ * Enable sparse file "read" support only for regular
+ * files and explicit GNU sparse files. However, we
+ * don't allow non-standard file types to be sparse.
+ */
+ tar->sparse_allowed = 1;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
default: /* Regular file and non-standard types */
/*
* Per POSIX: non-recognized types should always be
@@ -1685,6 +1694,14 @@ pax_attribute(struct archive_read *a, struct tar *tar,
#endif
switch (key[0]) {
case 'G':
+ /* Reject GNU.sparse.* headers on non-regular files. */
+ if (strncmp(key, "GNU.sparse", 10) == 0 &&
+ !tar->sparse_allowed) {
+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
+ "Non-regular file cannot be sparse");
+ return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
+ }
+
/* GNU "0.0" sparse pax format. */
if (strcmp(key, "GNU.sparse.numblocks") == 0) {
tar->sparse_offset = -1;
diff --git a/contrib/libarchive/libarchive/archive_write_disk_acl.c b/contrib/libarchive/libarchive/archive_write_disk_acl.c
index 97972033c080..69808ed7ff16 100644
--- a/contrib/libarchive/libarchive/archive_write_disk_acl.c
+++ b/contrib/libarchive/libarchive/archive_write_disk_acl.c
@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ set_acl(struct archive *a, int fd, const char *name,
acl_entry_t acl_entry;
acl_permset_t acl_permset;
acl_flagset_t acl_flagset;
+ int r;
int ret;
int ae_type, ae_permset, ae_tag, ae_id;
uid_t ae_uid;
@@ -144,9 +145,19 @@ set_acl(struct archive *a, int fd, const char *name,
if (entries == 0)
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
acl = acl_init(entries);
+ if (acl == (acl_t)NULL) {
+ archive_set_error(a, errno,
+ "Failed to initialize ACL working storage");
+ return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
+ }
while (archive_acl_next(a, abstract_acl, ae_requested_type, &ae_type,
&ae_permset, &ae_tag, &ae_id, &ae_name) == ARCHIVE_OK) {
- acl_create_entry(&acl, &acl_entry);
+ if (acl_create_entry(&acl, &acl_entry) != 0) {
+ archive_set_error(a, errno,
+ "Failed to create a new ACL entry");
+ ret = ARCHIVE_FAILED;
+ goto exit_free;
+ }
switch (ae_tag) {
case ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_USER:
@@ -175,47 +186,95 @@ set_acl(struct archive *a, int fd, const char *name,
acl_set_tag_type(acl_entry, ACL_EVERYONE);
break;
default:
- /* XXX */
- break;
+ archive_set_error(a, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
+ "Unknown ACL tag");
+ ret = ARCHIVE_FAILED;
+ goto exit_free;
}
+ r = 0;
switch (ae_type) {
case ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_ALLOW:
- acl_set_entry_type_np(acl_entry, ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW);
+ r = acl_set_entry_type_np(acl_entry, ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW);
break;
case ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_DENY:
- acl_set_entry_type_np(acl_entry, ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_DENY);
+ r = acl_set_entry_type_np(acl_entry, ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_DENY);
break;
case ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_AUDIT:
- acl_set_entry_type_np(acl_entry, ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_AUDIT);
+ r = acl_set_entry_type_np(acl_entry, ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_AUDIT);
break;
case ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_ALARM:
- acl_set_entry_type_np(acl_entry, ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALARM);
+ r = acl_set_entry_type_np(acl_entry, ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALARM);
break;
case ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
case ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
// These don't translate directly into the system ACL.
break;
default:
- // XXX error handling here.
- break;
+ archive_set_error(a, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
+ "Unknown ACL entry type");
+ ret = ARCHIVE_FAILED;
+ goto exit_free;
+ }
+ if (r != 0) {
+ archive_set_error(a, errno,
+ "Failed to set ACL entry type");
+ ret = ARCHIVE_FAILED;
+ goto exit_free;
}
- acl_get_permset(acl_entry, &acl_permset);
- acl_clear_perms(acl_permset);
+ if (acl_get_permset(acl_entry, &acl_permset) != 0) {
+ archive_set_error(a, errno,
+ "Failed to get ACL permission set");
+ ret = ARCHIVE_FAILED;
+ goto exit_free;
+ }
+ if (acl_clear_perms(acl_permset) != 0) {
+ archive_set_error(a, errno,
+ "Failed to clear ACL permissions");
+ ret = ARCHIVE_FAILED;
+ goto exit_free;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < (int)(sizeof(acl_perm_map) / sizeof(acl_perm_map[0])); ++i) {
if (ae_permset & acl_perm_map[i].archive_perm)
- acl_add_perm(acl_permset,
- acl_perm_map[i].platform_perm);
+ if (acl_add_perm(acl_permset,
+ acl_perm_map[i].platform_perm) != 0) {
+ archive_set_error(a, errno,
+ "Failed to add ACL permission");
+ ret = ARCHIVE_FAILED;
+ goto exit_free;
+ }
}
acl_get_flagset_np(acl_entry, &acl_flagset);
- acl_clear_flags_np(acl_flagset);
- for (i = 0; i < (int)(sizeof(acl_inherit_map) / sizeof(acl_inherit_map[0])); ++i) {
- if (ae_permset & acl_inherit_map[i].archive_inherit)
- acl_add_flag_np(acl_flagset,
- acl_inherit_map[i].platform_inherit);
+ if (acl_type == ACL_TYPE_NFS4) {
+ /*
+ * acl_get_flagset_np() fails with non-NFSv4 ACLs
+ */
+ if (acl_get_flagset_np(acl_entry, &acl_flagset) != 0) {
+ archive_set_error(a, errno,
+ "Failed to get flagset from an NFSv4 ACL entry");
+ ret = ARCHIVE_FAILED;
+ goto exit_free;
+ }
+ if (acl_clear_flags_np(acl_flagset) != 0) {
+ archive_set_error(a, errno,
+ "Failed to clear flags from an NFSv4 ACL flagset");
+ ret = ARCHIVE_FAILED;
+ goto exit_free;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < (int)(sizeof(acl_inherit_map) / sizeof(acl_inherit_map[0])); ++i) {
+ if (ae_permset & acl_inherit_map[i].archive_inherit) {
+ if (acl_add_flag_np(acl_flagset,
+ acl_inherit_map[i].platform_inherit) != 0) {
+ archive_set_error(a, errno,
+ "Failed to add flag to NFSv4 ACL flagset");
+ ret = ARCHIVE_FAILED;
+ goto exit_free;
+ }
+ }
+ }
}
}
@@ -243,6 +302,7 @@ set_acl(struct archive *a, int fd, const char *name,
ret = ARCHIVE_WARN;
}
#endif
+exit_free:
acl_free(acl);
return (ret);
}
diff --git a/contrib/libarchive/libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c b/contrib/libarchive/libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c
index f7ef7cb81db4..5b4e613c5031 100644
--- a/contrib/libarchive/libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c
+++ b/contrib/libarchive/libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c
@@ -140,7 +140,17 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#define O_BINARY 0
#endif
#ifndef O_CLOEXEC
-#define O_CLOEXEC 0
+#define O_CLOEXEC 0
+#endif
+
+/* Ignore non-int O_NOFOLLOW constant. */
+/* gnulib's fcntl.h does this on AIX, but it seems practical everywhere */
+#if defined O_NOFOLLOW && !(INT_MIN <= O_NOFOLLOW && O_NOFOLLOW <= INT_MAX)
+#undef O_NOFOLLOW
+#endif
+
+#ifndef O_NOFOLLOW
+#define O_NOFOLLOW 0
#endif
struct fixup_entry {
@@ -326,12 +336,14 @@ struct archive_write_disk {
#define HFS_BLOCKS(s) ((s) >> 12)
+static int check_symlinks_fsobj(char *path, int *error_number, struct archive_string *error_string, int flags);
static int check_symlinks(struct archive_write_disk *);
static int create_filesystem_object(struct archive_write_disk *);
static struct fixup_entry *current_fixup(struct archive_write_disk *, const char *pathname);
#if defined(HAVE_FCHDIR) && defined(PATH_MAX)
static void edit_deep_directories(struct archive_write_disk *ad);
#endif
+static int cleanup_pathname_fsobj(char *path, int *error_number, struct archive_string *error_string, int flags);
static int cleanup_pathname(struct archive_write_disk *);
static int create_dir(struct archive_write_disk *, char *);
static int create_parent_dir(struct archive_write_disk *, char *);
@@ -1791,7 +1803,7 @@ edit_deep_directories(struct archive_write_disk *a)
char *tail = a->name;
/* If path is short, avoid the open() below. */
- if (strlen(tail) <= PATH_MAX)
+ if (strlen(tail) < PATH_MAX)
return;
/* Try to record our starting dir. */
@@ -1801,7 +1813,7 @@ edit_deep_directories(struct archive_write_disk *a)
return;
/* As long as the path is too long... */
- while (strlen(tail) > PATH_MAX) {
+ while (strlen(tail) >= PATH_MAX) {
/* Locate a dir prefix shorter than PATH_MAX. */
tail += PATH_MAX - 8;
while (tail > a->name && *tail != '/')
@@ -1996,6 +2008,10 @@ create_filesystem_object(struct archive_write_disk *a)
const char *linkname;
mode_t final_mode, mode;
int r;
+ /* these for check_symlinks_fsobj */
+ char *linkname_copy; /* non-const copy of linkname */
+ struct archive_string error_string;
+ int error_number;
/* We identify hard/symlinks according to the link names. */
/* Since link(2) and symlink(2) don't handle modes, we're done here. */
@@ -2004,6 +2020,27 @@ create_filesystem_object(struct archive_write_disk *a)
#if !HAVE_LINK
return (EPERM);
#else
+ archive_string_init(&error_string);
+ linkname_copy = strdup(linkname);
+ if (linkname_copy == NULL) {
+ return (EPERM);
+ }
+ /* TODO: consider using the cleaned-up path as the link target? */
+ r = cleanup_pathname_fsobj(linkname_copy, &error_number, &error_string, a->flags);
+ if (r != ARCHIVE_OK) {
+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, error_number, "%s", error_string.s);
+ free(linkname_copy);
+ /* EPERM is more appropriate than error_number for our callers */
+ return (EPERM);
+ }
+ r = check_symlinks_fsobj(linkname_copy, &error_number, &error_string, a->flags);
+ if (r != ARCHIVE_OK) {
+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, error_number, "%s", error_string.s);
+ free(linkname_copy);
+ /* EPERM is more appropriate than error_number for our callers */
+ return (EPERM);
+ }
+ free(linkname_copy);
r = link(linkname, a->name) ? errno : 0;
/*
* New cpio and pax formats allow hardlink entries
@@ -2022,7 +2059,7 @@ create_filesystem_object(struct archive_write_disk *a)
a->deferred = 0;
} else if (r == 0 && a->filesize > 0) {
a->fd = open(a->name,
- O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC | O_BINARY | O_CLOEXEC);
+ O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC | O_BINARY | O_CLOEXEC | O_NOFOLLOW);
__archive_ensure_cloexec_flag(a->fd);
if (a->fd < 0)
r = errno;
@@ -2332,110 +2369,233 @@ current_fixup(struct archive_write_disk *a, const char *pathname)
return (a->current_fixup);
}
-/* TODO: Make this work. */
-/*
- * TODO: The deep-directory support bypasses this; disable deep directory
- * support if we're doing symlink checks.
- */
/*
* TODO: Someday, integrate this with the deep dir support; they both
* scan the path and both can be optimized by comparing against other
* recent paths.
*/
/* TODO: Extend this to support symlinks on Windows Vista and later. */
+
+/*
+ * Checks the given path to see if any elements along it are symlinks. Returns
+ * ARCHIVE_OK if there are none, otherwise puts an error in errmsg.
+ */
static int
-check_symlinks(struct archive_write_disk *a)
+check_symlinks_fsobj(char *path, int *error_number, struct archive_string *error_string, int flags)
{
#if !defined(HAVE_LSTAT)
/* Platform doesn't have lstat, so we can't look for symlinks. */
- (void)a; /* UNUSED */
+ (void)path; /* UNUSED */
+ (void)error_number; /* UNUSED */
+ (void)error_string; /* UNUSED */
+ (void)flags; /* UNUSED */
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
#else
- char *pn;
+ int res = ARCHIVE_OK;
+ char *tail;
+ char *head;
+ int last;
char c;
int r;
struct stat st;
+ int restore_pwd;
+
+ /* Nothing to do here if name is empty */
+ if(path[0] == '\0')
+ return (ARCHIVE_OK);
/*
* Guard against symlink tricks. Reject any archive entry whose
* destination would be altered by a symlink.
+ *
+ * Walk the filename in chunks separated by '/'. For each segment:
+ * - if it doesn't exist, continue
+ * - if it's symlink, abort or remove it
+ * - if it's a directory and it's not the last chunk, cd into it
+ * As we go:
+ * head points to the current (relative) path
+ * tail points to the temporary \0 terminating the segment we're currently examining
+ * c holds what used to be in *tail
+ * last is 1 if this is the last tail
+ */
+ restore_pwd = open(".", O_RDONLY | O_BINARY | O_CLOEXEC);
+ __archive_ensure_cloexec_flag(restore_pwd);
+ if (restore_pwd < 0)
+ return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
+ head = path;
+ tail = path;
+ last = 0;
+ /* TODO: reintroduce a safe cache here? */
+ /* Skip the root directory if the path is absolute. */
+ if(tail == path && tail[0] == '/')
+ ++tail;
+ /* Keep going until we've checked the entire name.
+ * head, tail, path all alias the same string, which is
+ * temporarily zeroed at tail, so be careful restoring the
+ * stashed (c=tail[0]) for error messages.
+ * Exiting the loop with break is okay; continue is not.
*/
- /* Whatever we checked last time doesn't need to be re-checked. */
- pn = a->name;
- if (archive_strlen(&(a->path_safe)) > 0) {
- char *p = a->path_safe.s;
- while ((*pn != '\0') && (*p == *pn))
- ++p, ++pn;
- }
- c = pn[0];
- /* Keep going until we've checked the entire name. */
- while (pn[0] != '\0' && (pn[0] != '/' || pn[1] != '\0')) {
+ while (!last) {
+ /* Skip the separator we just consumed, plus any adjacent ones */
+ while (*tail == '/')
+ ++tail;
/* Skip the next path element. */
- while (*pn != '\0' && *pn != '/')
- ++pn;
- c = pn[0];
- pn[0] = '\0';
+ while (*tail != '\0' && *tail != '/')
+ ++tail;
+ /* is this the last path component? */
+ last = (tail[0] == '\0') || (tail[0] == '/' && tail[1] == '\0');
+ /* temporarily truncate the string here */
+ c = tail[0];
+ tail[0] = '\0';
/* Check that we haven't hit a symlink. */
- r = lstat(a->name, &st);
+ r = lstat(head, &st);
if (r != 0) {
+ tail[0] = c;
/* We've hit a dir that doesn't exist; stop now. */
- if (errno == ENOENT)
+ if (errno == ENOENT) {
break;
+ } else {
+ /* Treat any other error as fatal - best to be paranoid here
+ * Note: This effectively disables deep directory
+ * support when security checks are enabled.
+ * Otherwise, very long pathnames that trigger
+ * an error here could evade the sandbox.
+ * TODO: We could do better, but it would probably
+ * require merging the symlink checks with the
+ * deep-directory editing. */
+ if (error_number) *error_number = errno;
+ if (error_string)
+ archive_string_sprintf(error_string,
+ "Could not stat %s",
+ path);
+ res = ARCHIVE_FAILED;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else if (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
+ if (!last) {
+ if (chdir(head) != 0) {
+ tail[0] = c;
+ if (error_number) *error_number = errno;
+ if (error_string)
+ archive_string_sprintf(error_string,
+ "Could not chdir %s",
+ path);
+ res = (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
+ break;
+ }
+ /* Our view is now from inside this dir: */
+ head = tail + 1;
+ }
} else if (S_ISLNK(st.st_mode)) {
- if (c == '\0') {
+ if (last) {
/*
* Last element is symlink; remove it
* so we can overwrite it with the
* item being extracted.
*/
- if (unlink(a->name)) {
- archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
- "Could not remove symlink %s",
- a->name);
- pn[0] = c;
- return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
+ if (unlink(head)) {
+ tail[0] = c;
+ if (error_number) *error_number = errno;
+ if (error_string)
+ archive_string_sprintf(error_string,
+ "Could not remove symlink %s",
+ path);
+ res = ARCHIVE_FAILED;
+ break;
}
- a->pst = NULL;
/*
* Even if we did remove it, a warning
* is in order. The warning is silly,
* though, if we're just replacing one
* symlink with another symlink.
*/
- if (!S_ISLNK(a->mode)) {
- archive_set_error(&a->archive, 0,
- "Removing symlink %s",
- a->name);
+ tail[0] = c;
+ /* FIXME: not sure how important this is to restore
+ if (!S_ISLNK(path)) {
+ if (error_number) *error_number = 0;
+ if (error_string)
+ archive_string_sprintf(error_string,
+ "Removing symlink %s",
+ path);
}
+ */
/* Symlink gone. No more problem! */
- pn[0] = c;
- return (0);
- } else if (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_UNLINK) {
+ res = ARCHIVE_OK;
+ break;
+ } else if (flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_UNLINK) {
/* User asked us to remove problems. */
- if (unlink(a->name) != 0) {
- archive_set_error(&a->archive, 0,
- "Cannot remove intervening symlink %s",
- a->name);
- pn[0] = c;
- return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
+ if (unlink(head) != 0) {
+ tail[0] = c;
+ if (error_number) *error_number = 0;
+ if (error_string)
+ archive_string_sprintf(error_string,
+ "Cannot remove intervening symlink %s",
+ path);
+ res = ARCHIVE_FAILED;
+ break;
}
- a->pst = NULL;
+ tail[0] = c;
} else {
- archive_set_error(&a->archive, 0,
- "Cannot extract through symlink %s",
- a->name);
- pn[0] = c;
- return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
+ tail[0] = c;
+ if (error_number) *error_number = 0;
+ if (error_string)
+ archive_string_sprintf(error_string,
+ "Cannot extract through symlink %s",
+ path);
+ res = ARCHIVE_FAILED;
+ break;
}
}
+ /* be sure to always maintain this */
+ tail[0] = c;
+ if (tail[0] != '\0')
+ tail++; /* Advance to the next segment. */
}
- pn[0] = c;
- /* We've checked and/or cleaned the whole path, so remember it. */
- archive_strcpy(&a->path_safe, a->name);
- return (ARCHIVE_OK);
+ /* Catches loop exits via break */
+ tail[0] = c;
+#ifdef HAVE_FCHDIR
+ /* If we changed directory above, restore it here. */
+ if (restore_pwd >= 0) {
+ r = fchdir(restore_pwd);
+ if (r != 0) {
+ if(error_number) *error_number = errno;
+ if(error_string)
+ archive_string_sprintf(error_string,
+ "chdir() failure");
+ }
+ close(restore_pwd);
+ restore_pwd = -1;
+ if (r != 0) {
+ res = (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ /* TODO: reintroduce a safe cache here? */
+ return res;
#endif
}
+/*
+ * Check a->name for symlinks, returning ARCHIVE_OK if its clean, otherwise
+ * calls archive_set_error and returns ARCHIVE_{FATAL,FAILED}
+ */
+static int
+check_symlinks(struct archive_write_disk *a)
+{
+ struct archive_string error_string;
+ int error_number;
+ int rc;
+ archive_string_init(&error_string);
+ rc = check_symlinks_fsobj(a->name, &error_number, &error_string, a->flags);
+ if (rc != ARCHIVE_OK) {
+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, error_number, "%s", error_string.s);
+ }
+ archive_string_free(&error_string);
+ a->pst = NULL; /* to be safe */
+ return rc;
+}
+
+
#if defined(__CYGWIN__)
/*
* 1. Convert a path separator from '\' to '/' .
@@ -2509,15 +2669,17 @@ cleanup_pathname_win(struct archive_write_disk *a)
* is set) if the path is absolute.
*/
static int
-cleanup_pathname(struct archive_write_disk *a)
+cleanup_pathname_fsobj(char *path, int *error_number, struct archive_string *error_string, int flags)
{
char *dest, *src;
char separator = '\0';
- dest = src = a->name;
+ dest = src = path;
if (*src == '\0') {
- archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
- "Invalid empty pathname");
+ if (error_number) *error_number = ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC;
+ if (error_string)
+ archive_string_sprintf(error_string,
+ "Invalid empty pathname");
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
@@ -2526,9 +2688,11 @@ cleanup_pathname(struct archive_write_disk *a)
#endif
/* Skip leading '/'. */
if (*src == '/') {
- if (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS) {
- archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
- "Path is absolute");
+ if (flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS) {
+ if (error_number) *error_number = ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC;
+ if (error_string)
+ archive_string_sprintf(error_string,
+ "Path is absolute");
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
@@ -2555,10 +2719,11 @@ cleanup_pathname(struct archive_write_disk *a)
} else if (src[1] == '.') {
if (src[2] == '/' || src[2] == '\0') {
/* Conditionally warn about '..' */
- if (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NODOTDOT) {
- archive_set_error(&a->archive,
- ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
- "Path contains '..'");
+ if (flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NODOTDOT) {
+ if (error_number) *error_number = ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC;
+ if (error_string)
+ archive_string_sprintf(error_string,
+ "Path contains '..'");
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
}
@@ -2589,7 +2754,7 @@ cleanup_pathname(struct archive_write_disk *a)
* We've just copied zero or more path elements, not including the
* final '/'.
*/
- if (dest == a->name) {
+ if (dest == path) {
/*
* Nothing got copied. The path must have been something
* like '.' or '/' or './' or '/././././/./'.
@@ -2604,6 +2769,21 @@ cleanup_pathname(struct archive_write_disk *a)
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
+static int
+cleanup_pathname(struct archive_write_disk *a)
+{
+ struct archive_string error_string;
+ int error_number;
+ int rc;
+ archive_string_init(&error_string);
+ rc = cleanup_pathname_fsobj(a->name, &error_number, &error_string, a->flags);
+ if (rc != ARCHIVE_OK) {
+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, error_number, "%s", error_string.s);
+ }
+ archive_string_free(&error_string);
+ return rc;
+}
+
/*
* Create the parent directory of the specified path, assuming path
* is already in mutable storage.
diff --git a/contrib/libarchive/libarchive/test/main.c b/contrib/libarchive/libarchive/test/main.c
index cdb853890b39..7e411c38aecc 100644
--- a/contrib/libarchive/libarchive/test/main.c
+++ b/contrib/libarchive/libarchive/test/main.c
@@ -1396,6 +1396,31 @@ assertion_file_size(const char *file, int line, const char *pathname, long size)
return (0);
}
+/* Verify mode of 'pathname'. */
+int
+assertion_file_mode(const char *file, int line, const char *pathname, int expected_mode)
+{
+ int mode;
+ int r;
+
+ assertion_count(file, line);
+#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__CYGWIN__)
+ failure_start(file, line, "assertFileMode not yet implemented for Windows");
+#else
+ {
+ struct stat st;
+ r = lstat(pathname, &st);
+ mode = (int)(st.st_mode & 0777);
+ }
+ if (r == 0 && mode == expected_mode)
+ return (1);
+ failure_start(file, line, "File %s has mode %o, expected %o",
+ pathname, mode, expected_mode);
+#endif
+ failure_finish(NULL);
+ return (0);
+}
+
/* Assert that 'pathname' is a dir. If mode >= 0, verify that too. */
int
assertion_is_dir(const char *file, int line, const char *pathname, int mode)
diff --git a/contrib/libarchive/libarchive/test/test.h b/contrib/libarchive/libarchive/test/test.h
index 3b00bfbe3364..8010ecdea007 100644
--- a/contrib/libarchive/libarchive/test/test.h
+++ b/contrib/libarchive/libarchive/test/test.h
@@ -176,6 +176,8 @@
assertion_file_nlinks(__FILE__, __LINE__, pathname, nlinks)
#define assertFileSize(pathname, size) \
assertion_file_size(__FILE__, __LINE__, pathname, size)
+#define assertFileMode(pathname, mode) \
+ assertion_file_mode(__FILE__, __LINE__, pathname, mode)
#define assertTextFileContents(text, pathname) \
assertion_text_file_contents(__FILE__, __LINE__, text, pathname)
#define assertFileContainsLinesAnyOrder(pathname, lines) \
@@ -239,6 +241,7 @@ int assertion_file_mtime_recent(const char *, int, const char *);
int assertion_file_nlinks(const char *, int, const char *, int);
int assertion_file_not_exists(const char *, int, const char *);
int assertion_file_size(const char *, int, const char *, long);
+int assertion_file_mode(const char *, int, const char *, int);
int assertion_is_dir(const char *, int, const char *, int);
int assertion_is_hardlink(const char *, int, const char *, const char *);
int assertion_is_not_hardlink(const char *, int, const char *, const char *);
diff --git a/contrib/libarchive/libarchive/test/test_write_disk_secure744.c b/contrib/libarchive/libarchive/test/test_write_disk_secure744.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..008161df74fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/libarchive/libarchive/test/test_write_disk_secure744.c
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 2003-2007,2016 Tim Kientzle
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#include "test.h"
+__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
+
+#define UMASK 022
+
+/*
+ * Github Issue #744 describes a bug in the sandboxing code that
+ * causes very long pathnames to not get checked for symlinks.
+ */
+
+DEFINE_TEST(test_write_disk_secure744)
+{
+#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__CYGWIN__)
+ skipping("archive_write_disk security checks not supported on Windows");
+#else
+ struct archive *a;
+ struct archive_entry *ae;
+ size_t buff_size = 8192;
+ char *buff = malloc(buff_size);
+ char *p = buff;
+ int n = 0;
+ int t;
+
+ assert(buff != NULL);
+
+ /* Start with a known umask. */
+ assertUmask(UMASK);
+
+ /* Create an archive_write_disk object. */
+ assert((a = archive_write_disk_new()) != NULL);
+ archive_write_disk_set_options(a, ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_SYMLINKS);
+
+ while (p + 500 < buff + buff_size) {
+ memset(p, 'x', 100);
+ p += 100;
+ p[0] = '\0';
+
+ buff[0] = ((n / 1000) % 10) + '0';
+ buff[1] = ((n / 100) % 10)+ '0';
+ buff[2] = ((n / 10) % 10)+ '0';
+ buff[3] = ((n / 1) % 10)+ '0';
+ buff[4] = '_';
+ ++n;
+
+ /* Create a symlink pointing to the testworkdir */
+ assert((ae = archive_entry_new()) != NULL);
+ archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, buff);
+ archive_entry_set_mode(ae, S_IFREG | 0777);
+ archive_entry_copy_symlink(ae, testworkdir);
+ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_write_header(a, ae));
+ archive_entry_free(ae);
+
+ *p++ = '/';
+ sprintf(p, "target%d", n);
+
+ /* Try to create a file through the symlink, should fail. */
+ assert((ae = archive_entry_new()) != NULL);
+ archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, buff);
+ archive_entry_set_mode(ae, S_IFDIR | 0777);
+
+ t = archive_write_header(a, ae);
+ archive_entry_free(ae);
+ failure("Attempt to create target%d via %d-character symlink should have failed", n, (int)strlen(buff));
+ if(!assertEqualInt(ARCHIVE_FAILED, t)) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ archive_free(a);
+ free(buff);
+#endif
+}
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 2003-2007,2016 Tim Kientzle
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#include "test.h"
+__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
+
+#define UMASK 022
+
+/*
+ * Github Issue #744 describes a bug in the sandboxing code that
+ * causes very long pathnames to not get checked for symlinks.
+ */
+
+DEFINE_TEST(test_write_disk_secure744)
+{
+#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__CYGWIN__)
+ skipping("archive_write_disk security checks not supported on Windows");
+#else
+ struct archive *a;
+ struct archive_entry *ae;
+ size_t buff_size = 8192;
+ char *buff = malloc(buff_size);
+ char *p = buff;
+ int n = 0;
+ int t;
+
+ assert(buff != NULL);
+
+ /* Start with a known umask. */
+ assertUmask(UMASK);
+
+ /* Create an archive_write_disk object. */
+ assert((a = archive_write_disk_new()) != NULL);
+ archive_write_disk_set_options(a, ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_SYMLINKS);
+
+ while (p + 500 < buff + buff_size) {
+ memset(p, 'x', 100);
+ p += 100;
+ p[0] = '\0';
+
+ buff[0] = ((n / 1000) % 10) + '0';
+ buff[1] = ((n / 100) % 10)+ '0';
+ buff[2] = ((n / 10) % 10)+ '0';
+ buff[3] = ((n / 1) % 10)+ '0';
+ buff[4] = '_';
+ ++n;
+
+ /* Create a symlink pointing to the testworkdir */
+ assert((ae = archive_entry_new()) != NULL);
+ archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, buff);
+ archive_entry_set_mode(ae, S_IFREG | 0777);
+ archive_entry_copy_symlink(ae, testworkdir);
+ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_write_header(a, ae));
+ archive_entry_free(ae);
+
+ *p++ = '/';
+ sprintf(p, "target%d", n);
+
+ /* Try to create a file through the symlink, should fail. */
+ assert((ae = archive_entry_new()) != NULL);
+ archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, buff);
+ archive_entry_set_mode(ae, S_IFDIR | 0777);
+
+ t = archive_write_header(a, ae);
+ archive_entry_free(ae);
+ failure("Attempt to create target%d via %d-character symlink should have failed", n, (int)strlen(buff));
+ if(!assertEqualInt(ARCHIVE_FAILED, t)) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ archive_free(a);
+ free(buff);
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/contrib/libarchive/libarchive/test/test_write_disk_secure745.c b/contrib/libarchive/libarchive/test/test_write_disk_secure745.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..86946766f127
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/libarchive/libarchive/test/test_write_disk_secure745.c
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 2003-2007,2016 Tim Kientzle
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#include "test.h"
+__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
+
+#define UMASK 022
+
+/*
+ * Github Issue #745 describes a bug in the sandboxing code that
+ * allows one to use a symlink to edit the permissions on a file or
+ * directory outside of the sandbox.
+ */
+
+DEFINE_TEST(test_write_disk_secure745)
+{
+#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__CYGWIN__)
+ skipping("archive_write_disk security checks not supported on Windows");
+#else
+ struct archive *a;
+ struct archive_entry *ae;
+
+ /* Start with a known umask. */
+ assertUmask(UMASK);
+
+ /* Create an archive_write_disk object. */
+ assert((a = archive_write_disk_new()) != NULL);
+ archive_write_disk_set_options(a, ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_SYMLINKS);
+
+ /* The target dir: The one we're going to try to change permission on */
+ assertMakeDir("target", 0700);
+
+ /* The sandbox dir we're going to run inside of. */
+ assertMakeDir("sandbox", 0700);
+ assertChdir("sandbox");
+
+ /* Create a symlink pointing to the target directory */
+ assert((ae = archive_entry_new()) != NULL);
+ archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, "sym");
+ archive_entry_set_mode(ae, AE_IFLNK | 0777);
+ archive_entry_copy_symlink(ae, "../target");
+ assert(0 == archive_write_header(a, ae));
+ archive_entry_free(ae);
+
+ /* Try to alter the target dir through the symlink; this should fail. */
+ assert((ae = archive_entry_new()) != NULL);
+ archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, "sym");
+ archive_entry_set_mode(ae, S_IFDIR | 0777);
+ assert(0 == archive_write_header(a, ae));
+ archive_entry_free(ae);
+
+ /* Permission of target dir should not have changed. */
+ assertFileMode("../target", 0700);
+
+ assert(0 == archive_write_close(a));
+ archive_write_free(a);
+#endif
+}
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 2003-2007,2016 Tim Kientzle
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#include "test.h"
+__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
+
+#define UMASK 022
+
+/*
+ * Github Issue #745 describes a bug in the sandboxing code that
+ * allows one to use a symlink to edit the permissions on a file or
+ * directory outside of the sandbox.
+ */
+
+DEFINE_TEST(test_write_disk_secure745)
+{
+#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__CYGWIN__)
+ skipping("archive_write_disk security checks not supported on Windows");
+#else
+ struct archive *a;
+ struct archive_entry *ae;
+
+ /* Start with a known umask. */
+ assertUmask(UMASK);
+
+ /* Create an archive_write_disk object. */
+ assert((a = archive_write_disk_new()) != NULL);
+ archive_write_disk_set_options(a, ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_SYMLINKS);
+
+ /* The target dir: The one we're going to try to change permission on */
+ assertMakeDir("target", 0700);
+
+ /* The sandbox dir we're going to run inside of. */
+ assertMakeDir("sandbox", 0700);
+ assertChdir("sandbox");
+
+ /* Create a symlink pointing to the target directory */
+ assert((ae = archive_entry_new()) != NULL);
+ archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, "sym");
+ archive_entry_set_mode(ae, AE_IFLNK | 0777);
+ archive_entry_copy_symlink(ae, "../target");
+ assert(0 == archive_write_header(a, ae));
+ archive_entry_free(ae);
+
+ /* Try to alter the target dir through the symlink; this should fail. */
+ assert((ae = archive_entry_new()) != NULL);
+ archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, "sym");
+ archive_entry_set_mode(ae, S_IFDIR | 0777);
+ assert(0 == archive_write_header(a, ae));
+ archive_entry_free(ae);
+
+ /* Permission of target dir should not have changed. */
+ assertFileMode("../target", 0700);
+
+ assert(0 == archive_write_close(a));
+ archive_write_free(a);
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/contrib/libarchive/libarchive/test/test_write_disk_secure746.c b/contrib/libarchive/libarchive/test/test_write_disk_secure746.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..72df2831b4b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/libarchive/libarchive/test/test_write_disk_secure746.c
@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 2003-2007,2016 Tim Kientzle
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#include "test.h"
+__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
+
+#define UMASK 022
+
+/*
+ * Github Issue #746 describes a problem in which hardlink targets are
+ * not adequately checked and can be used to modify entries outside of
+ * the sandbox.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Verify that ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NODOTDOT disallows '..' in hardlink
+ * targets.
+ */
+DEFINE_TEST(test_write_disk_secure746a)
+{
+#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__CYGWIN__)
+ skipping("archive_write_disk security checks not supported on Windows");
+#else
+ struct archive *a;
+ struct archive_entry *ae;
+
+ /* Start with a known umask. */
+ assertUmask(UMASK);
+
+ /* The target directory we're going to try to affect. */
+ assertMakeDir("target", 0700);
+ assertMakeFile("target/foo", 0700, "unmodified");
+
+ /* The sandbox dir we're going to work within. */
+ assertMakeDir("sandbox", 0700);
+ assertChdir("sandbox");
+
+ /* Create an archive_write_disk object. */
+ assert((a = archive_write_disk_new()) != NULL);
+ archive_write_disk_set_options(a, ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NODOTDOT);
+
+ /* Attempt to hardlink to the target directory. */
+ assert((ae = archive_entry_new()) != NULL);
+ archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, "bar");
+ archive_entry_set_mode(ae, AE_IFREG | 0777);
+ archive_entry_set_size(ae, 8);
+ archive_entry_copy_hardlink(ae, "../target/foo");
+ assertEqualInt(ARCHIVE_FAILED, archive_write_header(a, ae));
+ assertEqualInt(ARCHIVE_FATAL, archive_write_data(a, "modified", 8));
+ archive_entry_free(ae);
+
+ /* Verify that target file contents are unchanged. */
+ assertTextFileContents("unmodified", "../target/foo");
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOSYMLINK disallows symlinks in hardlink
+ * targets.
+ */
+DEFINE_TEST(test_write_disk_secure746b)
+{
+#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__CYGWIN__)
+ skipping("archive_write_disk security checks not supported on Windows");
+#else
+ struct archive *a;
+ struct archive_entry *ae;
+
+ /* Start with a known umask. */
+ assertUmask(UMASK);
+
+ /* The target directory we're going to try to affect. */
+ assertMakeDir("target", 0700);
+ assertMakeFile("target/foo", 0700, "unmodified");
+
+ /* The sandbox dir we're going to work within. */
+ assertMakeDir("sandbox", 0700);
+ assertChdir("sandbox");
+
+ /* Create an archive_write_disk object. */
+ assert((a = archive_write_disk_new()) != NULL);
+ archive_write_disk_set_options(a, ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_SYMLINKS);
+
+ /* Create a symlink to the target directory. */
+ assert((ae = archive_entry_new()) != NULL);
+ archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, "symlink");
+ archive_entry_set_mode(ae, AE_IFLNK | 0777);
+ archive_entry_copy_symlink(ae, "../target");
+ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_write_header(a, ae));
+ archive_entry_free(ae);
+
+ /* Attempt to hardlink to the target directory via the symlink. */
+ assert((ae = archive_entry_new()) != NULL);
+ archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, "bar");
+ archive_entry_set_mode(ae, AE_IFREG | 0777);
+ archive_entry_set_size(ae, 8);
+ archive_entry_copy_hardlink(ae, "symlink/foo");
+ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_FAILED, archive_write_header(a, ae));
+ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_FATAL, archive_write_data(a, "modified", 8));
+ archive_entry_free(ae);
+
+ /* Verify that target file contents are unchanged. */
+ assertTextFileContents("unmodified", "../target/foo");
+
+ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_FATAL, archive_write_close(a));
+ archive_write_free(a);
+#endif
+}
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 2003-2007,2016 Tim Kientzle
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#include "test.h"
+__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
+
+#define UMASK 022
+
+/*
+ * Github Issue #746 describes a problem in which hardlink targets are
+ * not adequately checked and can be used to modify entries outside of
+ * the sandbox.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Verify that ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NODOTDOT disallows '..' in hardlink
+ * targets.
+ */
+DEFINE_TEST(test_write_disk_secure746a)
+{
+#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__CYGWIN__)
+ skipping("archive_write_disk security checks not supported on Windows");
+#else
+ struct archive *a;
+ struct archive_entry *ae;
+
+ /* Start with a known umask. */
+ assertUmask(UMASK);
+
+ /* The target directory we're going to try to affect. */
+ assertMakeDir("target", 0700);
+ assertMakeFile("target/foo", 0700, "unmodified");
+
+ /* The sandbox dir we're going to work within. */
+ assertMakeDir("sandbox", 0700);
+ assertChdir("sandbox");
+
+ /* Create an archive_write_disk object. */
+ assert((a = archive_write_disk_new()) != NULL);
+ archive_write_disk_set_options(a, ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NODOTDOT);
+
+ /* Attempt to hardlink to the target directory. */
+ assert((ae = archive_entry_new()) != NULL);
+ archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, "bar");
+ archive_entry_set_mode(ae, AE_IFREG | 0777);
+ archive_entry_set_size(ae, 8);
+ archive_entry_copy_hardlink(ae, "../target/foo");
+ assertEqualInt(ARCHIVE_FAILED, archive_write_header(a, ae));
+ assertEqualInt(ARCHIVE_FATAL, archive_write_data(a, "modified", 8));
+ archive_entry_free(ae);
+
+ /* Verify that target file contents are unchanged. */
+ assertTextFileContents("unmodified", "../target/foo");
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOSYMLINK disallows symlinks in hardlink
+ * targets.
+ */
+DEFINE_TEST(test_write_disk_secure746b)
+{
+#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__CYGWIN__)
+ skipping("archive_write_disk security checks not supported on Windows");
+#else
+ struct archive *a;
+ struct archive_entry *ae;
+
+ /* Start with a known umask. */
+ assertUmask(UMASK);
+
+ /* The target directory we're going to try to affect. */
+ assertMakeDir("target", 0700);
+ assertMakeFile("target/foo", 0700, "unmodified");
+
+ /* The sandbox dir we're going to work within. */
+ assertMakeDir("sandbox", 0700);
+ assertChdir("sandbox");
+
+ /* Create an archive_write_disk object. */
+ assert((a = archive_write_disk_new()) != NULL);
+ archive_write_disk_set_options(a, ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_SYMLINKS);
+
+ /* Create a symlink to the target directory. */
+ assert((ae = archive_entry_new()) != NULL);
+ archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, "symlink");
+ archive_entry_set_mode(ae, AE_IFLNK | 0777);
+ archive_entry_copy_symlink(ae, "../target");
+ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_write_header(a, ae));
+ archive_entry_free(ae);
+
+ /* Attempt to hardlink to the target directory via the symlink. */
+ assert((ae = archive_entry_new()) != NULL);
+ archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, "bar");
+ archive_entry_set_mode(ae, AE_IFREG | 0777);
+ archive_entry_set_size(ae, 8);
+ archive_entry_copy_hardlink(ae, "symlink/foo");
+ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_FAILED, archive_write_header(a, ae));
+ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_FATAL, archive_write_data(a, "modified", 8));
+ archive_entry_free(ae);
+
+ /* Verify that target file contents are unchanged. */
+ assertTextFileContents("unmodified", "../target/foo");
+
+ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_FATAL, archive_write_close(a));
+ archive_write_free(a);
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/lib/libarchive/tests/Makefile b/lib/libarchive/tests/Makefile
index ddb36faa0cb9..ff2a63fb3920 100644
--- a/lib/libarchive/tests/Makefile
+++ b/lib/libarchive/tests/Makefile
@@ -177,6 +177,9 @@ TESTS_SRCS= \
test_write_disk_no_hfs_compression.c \
test_write_disk_perms.c \
test_write_disk_secure.c \
+ test_write_disk_secure744.c \
+ test_write_disk_secure745.c \
+ test_write_disk_secure746.c \
test_write_disk_sparse.c \
test_write_disk_symlink.c \
test_write_disk_times.c \
diff --git a/sys/conf/newvers.sh b/sys/conf/newvers.sh
index 880d7402b7af..a12fc8cf48bd 100644
--- a/sys/conf/newvers.sh
+++ b/sys/conf/newvers.sh
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
TYPE="FreeBSD"
REVISION="10.3"
-BRANCH="RELEASE-p9"
+BRANCH="RELEASE-p10"
if [ "X${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}" != "X" ]; then
BRANCH=${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}
fi
diff --git a/usr.bin/bsdiff/bspatch/bspatch.c b/usr.bin/bsdiff/bspatch/bspatch.c
index 92bc75b63d25..680685e3c6ba 100644
--- a/usr.bin/bsdiff/bspatch/bspatch.c
+++ b/usr.bin/bsdiff/bspatch/bspatch.c
@@ -27,56 +27,133 @@
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
+#if defined(__FreeBSD__)
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#if __FreeBSD_version >= 1001511
+#include <sys/capsicum.h>
+#define HAVE_CAPSICUM
+#endif
+#endif
+
#include <bzlib.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <err.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <libgen.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
-#include <err.h>
#include <unistd.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
#ifndef O_BINARY
#define O_BINARY 0
#endif
+#define HEADER_SIZE 32
+
+static char *newfile;
+static int dirfd = -1;
+
+static void
+exit_cleanup(void)
+{
+
+ if (dirfd != -1 && newfile != NULL)
+ if (unlinkat(dirfd, newfile, 0))
+ warn("unlinkat");
+}
static off_t offtin(u_char *buf)
{
off_t y;
- y=buf[7]&0x7F;
- y=y*256;y+=buf[6];
- y=y*256;y+=buf[5];
- y=y*256;y+=buf[4];
- y=y*256;y+=buf[3];
- y=y*256;y+=buf[2];
- y=y*256;y+=buf[1];
- y=y*256;y+=buf[0];
+ y = buf[7] & 0x7F;
+ y = y * 256; y += buf[6];
+ y = y * 256; y += buf[5];
+ y = y * 256; y += buf[4];
+ y = y * 256; y += buf[3];
+ y = y * 256; y += buf[2];
+ y = y * 256; y += buf[1];
+ y = y * 256; y += buf[0];
- if(buf[7]&0x80) y=-y;
+ if (buf[7] & 0x80)
+ y = -y;
- return y;
+ return (y);
}
-int main(int argc,char * argv[])
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
- FILE * f, * cpf, * dpf, * epf;
- BZFILE * cpfbz2, * dpfbz2, * epfbz2;
+ FILE *f, *cpf, *dpf, *epf;
+ BZFILE *cpfbz2, *dpfbz2, *epfbz2;
+ char *directory, *namebuf;
int cbz2err, dbz2err, ebz2err;
- int fd;
- ssize_t oldsize,newsize;
- ssize_t bzctrllen,bzdatalen;
- u_char header[32],buf[8];
+ int newfd, oldfd;
+ off_t oldsize, newsize;
+ off_t bzctrllen, bzdatalen;
+ u_char header[HEADER_SIZE], buf[8];
u_char *old, *new;
- off_t oldpos,newpos;
+ off_t oldpos, newpos;
off_t ctrl[3];
- off_t lenread;
- off_t i;
+ off_t i, lenread, offset;
+#ifdef HAVE_CAPSICUM
+ cap_rights_t rights_dir, rights_ro, rights_wr;
+#endif
if(argc!=4) errx(1,"usage: %s oldfile newfile patchfile\n",argv[0]);
/* Open patch file */
if ((f = fopen(argv[3], "rb")) == NULL)
err(1, "fopen(%s)", argv[3]);
+ /* Open patch file for control block */
+ if ((cpf = fopen(argv[3], "rb")) == NULL)
+ err(1, "fopen(%s)", argv[3]);
+ /* open patch file for diff block */
+ if ((dpf = fopen(argv[3], "rb")) == NULL)
+ err(1, "fopen(%s)", argv[3]);
+ /* open patch file for extra block */
+ if ((epf = fopen(argv[3], "rb")) == NULL)
+ err(1, "fopen(%s)", argv[3]);
+ /* open oldfile */
+ if ((oldfd = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY | O_BINARY, 0)) < 0)
+ err(1, "open(%s)", argv[1]);
+ /* open directory where we'll write newfile */
+ if ((namebuf = strdup(argv[2])) == NULL ||
+ (directory = dirname(namebuf)) == NULL ||
+ (dirfd = open(directory, O_DIRECTORY)) < 0)
+ err(1, "open %s", argv[2]);
+ free(namebuf);
+ if ((newfile = basename(argv[2])) == NULL)
+ err(1, "basename");
+ /* open newfile */
+ if ((newfd = openat(dirfd, newfile,
+ O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_WRONLY | O_BINARY, 0666)) < 0)
+ err(1, "open(%s)", argv[2]);
+ atexit(exit_cleanup);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CAPSICUM
+ if (cap_enter() < 0) {
+ /* Failed to sandbox, fatal if CAPABILITY_MODE enabled */
+ if (errno != ENOSYS)
+ err(1, "failed to enter security sandbox");
+ } else {
+ /* Capsicum Available */
+ cap_rights_init(&rights_ro, CAP_READ, CAP_FSTAT, CAP_SEEK);
+ cap_rights_init(&rights_wr, CAP_WRITE);
+ cap_rights_init(&rights_dir, CAP_UNLINKAT);
+
+ if (cap_rights_limit(fileno(f), &rights_ro) < 0 ||
+ cap_rights_limit(fileno(cpf), &rights_ro) < 0 ||
+ cap_rights_limit(fileno(dpf), &rights_ro) < 0 ||
+ cap_rights_limit(fileno(epf), &rights_ro) < 0 ||
+ cap_rights_limit(oldfd, &rights_ro) < 0 ||
+ cap_rights_limit(newfd, &rights_wr) < 0 ||
+ cap_rights_limit(dirfd, &rights_dir) < 0)
+ err(1, "cap_rights_limit() failed, could not restrict"
+ " capabilities");
+ }
+#endif
/*
File format:
@@ -93,99 +170,99 @@ int main(int argc,char * argv[])
*/
/* Read header */
- if (fread(header, 1, 32, f) < 32) {
+ if (fread(header, 1, HEADER_SIZE, f) < HEADER_SIZE) {
if (feof(f))
- errx(1, "Corrupt patch\n");
+ errx(1, "Corrupt patch");
err(1, "fread(%s)", argv[3]);
}
/* Check for appropriate magic */
if (memcmp(header, "BSDIFF40", 8) != 0)
- errx(1, "Corrupt patch\n");
+ errx(1, "Corrupt patch");
/* Read lengths from header */
- bzctrllen=offtin(header+8);
- bzdatalen=offtin(header+16);
- newsize=offtin(header+24);
- if((bzctrllen<0) || (bzdatalen<0) || (newsize<0))
- errx(1,"Corrupt patch\n");
+ bzctrllen = offtin(header + 8);
+ bzdatalen = offtin(header + 16);
+ newsize = offtin(header + 24);
+ if (bzctrllen < 0 || bzctrllen > OFF_MAX - HEADER_SIZE ||
+ bzdatalen < 0 || bzctrllen + HEADER_SIZE > OFF_MAX - bzdatalen ||
+ newsize < 0 || newsize > SSIZE_MAX)
+ errx(1, "Corrupt patch");
/* Close patch file and re-open it via libbzip2 at the right places */
if (fclose(f))
err(1, "fclose(%s)", argv[3]);
- if ((cpf = fopen(argv[3], "rb")) == NULL)
- err(1, "fopen(%s)", argv[3]);
- if (fseeko(cpf, 32, SEEK_SET))
- err(1, "fseeko(%s, %lld)", argv[3],
- (long long)32);
+ offset = HEADER_SIZE;
+ if (fseeko(cpf, offset, SEEK_SET))
+ err(1, "fseeko(%s, %jd)", argv[3], (intmax_t)offset);
if ((cpfbz2 = BZ2_bzReadOpen(&cbz2err, cpf, 0, 0, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
errx(1, "BZ2_bzReadOpen, bz2err = %d", cbz2err);
- if ((dpf = fopen(argv[3], "rb")) == NULL)
- err(1, "fopen(%s)", argv[3]);
- if (fseeko(dpf, 32 + bzctrllen, SEEK_SET))
- err(1, "fseeko(%s, %lld)", argv[3],
- (long long)(32 + bzctrllen));
+ offset += bzctrllen;
+ if (fseeko(dpf, offset, SEEK_SET))
+ err(1, "fseeko(%s, %jd)", argv[3], (intmax_t)offset);
if ((dpfbz2 = BZ2_bzReadOpen(&dbz2err, dpf, 0, 0, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
errx(1, "BZ2_bzReadOpen, bz2err = %d", dbz2err);
- if ((epf = fopen(argv[3], "rb")) == NULL)
- err(1, "fopen(%s)", argv[3]);
- if (fseeko(epf, 32 + bzctrllen + bzdatalen, SEEK_SET))
- err(1, "fseeko(%s, %lld)", argv[3],
- (long long)(32 + bzctrllen + bzdatalen));
+ offset += bzdatalen;
+ if (fseeko(epf, offset, SEEK_SET))
+ err(1, "fseeko(%s, %jd)", argv[3], (intmax_t)offset);
if ((epfbz2 = BZ2_bzReadOpen(&ebz2err, epf, 0, 0, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
errx(1, "BZ2_bzReadOpen, bz2err = %d", ebz2err);
- if(((fd=open(argv[1],O_RDONLY|O_BINARY,0))<0) ||
- ((oldsize=lseek(fd,0,SEEK_END))==-1) ||
- ((old=malloc(oldsize+1))==NULL) ||
- (lseek(fd,0,SEEK_SET)!=0) ||
- (read(fd,old,oldsize)!=oldsize) ||
- (close(fd)==-1)) err(1,"%s",argv[1]);
- if((new=malloc(newsize+1))==NULL) err(1,NULL);
+ if ((oldsize = lseek(oldfd, 0, SEEK_END)) == -1 ||
+ oldsize > SSIZE_MAX ||
+ (old = malloc(oldsize)) == NULL ||
+ lseek(oldfd, 0, SEEK_SET) != 0 ||
+ read(oldfd, old, oldsize) != oldsize ||
+ close(oldfd) == -1)
+ err(1, "%s", argv[1]);
+ if ((new = malloc(newsize)) == NULL)
+ err(1, NULL);
- oldpos=0;newpos=0;
- while(newpos<newsize) {
+ oldpos = 0;
+ newpos = 0;
+ while (newpos < newsize) {
/* Read control data */
- for(i=0;i<=2;i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i <= 2; i++) {
lenread = BZ2_bzRead(&cbz2err, cpfbz2, buf, 8);
if ((lenread < 8) || ((cbz2err != BZ_OK) &&
(cbz2err != BZ_STREAM_END)))
- errx(1, "Corrupt patch\n");
- ctrl[i]=offtin(buf);
+ errx(1, "Corrupt patch");
+ ctrl[i] = offtin(buf);
};
/* Sanity-check */
- if ((ctrl[0] < 0) || (ctrl[1] < 0))
- errx(1,"Corrupt patch\n");
+ if (ctrl[0] < 0 || ctrl[0] > INT_MAX ||
+ ctrl[1] < 0 || ctrl[1] > INT_MAX)
+ errx(1, "Corrupt patch");
/* Sanity-check */
- if(newpos+ctrl[0]>newsize)
- errx(1,"Corrupt patch\n");
+ if (newpos + ctrl[0] > newsize)
+ errx(1, "Corrupt patch");
/* Read diff string */
lenread = BZ2_bzRead(&dbz2err, dpfbz2, new + newpos, ctrl[0]);
if ((lenread < ctrl[0]) ||
((dbz2err != BZ_OK) && (dbz2err != BZ_STREAM_END)))
- errx(1, "Corrupt patch\n");
+ errx(1, "Corrupt patch");
/* Add old data to diff string */
- for(i=0;i<ctrl[0];i++)
- if((oldpos+i>=0) && (oldpos+i<oldsize))
- new[newpos+i]+=old[oldpos+i];
+ for (i = 0; i < ctrl[0]; i++)
+ if ((oldpos + i >= 0) && (oldpos + i < oldsize))
+ new[newpos + i] += old[oldpos + i];
/* Adjust pointers */
- newpos+=ctrl[0];
- oldpos+=ctrl[0];
+ newpos += ctrl[0];
+ oldpos += ctrl[0];
/* Sanity-check */
- if(newpos+ctrl[1]>newsize)
- errx(1,"Corrupt patch\n");
+ if (newpos + ctrl[1] > newsize)
+ errx(1, "Corrupt patch");
/* Read extra string */
lenread = BZ2_bzRead(&ebz2err, epfbz2, new + newpos, ctrl[1]);
if ((lenread < ctrl[1]) ||
((ebz2err != BZ_OK) && (ebz2err != BZ_STREAM_END)))
- errx(1, "Corrupt patch\n");
+ errx(1, "Corrupt patch");
/* Adjust pointers */
newpos+=ctrl[1];
@@ -200,12 +277,13 @@ int main(int argc,char * argv[])
err(1, "fclose(%s)", argv[3]);
/* Write the new file */
- if(((fd=open(argv[2],O_CREAT|O_TRUNC|O_WRONLY|O_BINARY,0666))<0) ||
- (write(fd,new,newsize)!=newsize) || (close(fd)==-1))
- err(1,"%s",argv[2]);
+ if (write(newfd, new, newsize) != newsize || close(newfd) == -1)
+ err(1, "%s", argv[2]);
+ /* Disable atexit cleanup */
+ newfile = NULL;
free(new);
free(old);
- return 0;
+ return (0);
}
diff --git a/usr.sbin/portsnap/portsnap/portsnap.sh b/usr.sbin/portsnap/portsnap/portsnap.sh
index 90a875e7b6de..176dc136ed00 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/portsnap/portsnap/portsnap.sh
+++ b/usr.sbin/portsnap/portsnap/portsnap.sh
@@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ fetch_index_sanity() {
# Verify a list of files
fetch_snapshot_verify() {
while read F; do
- if [ "`gunzip -c snap/${F} | ${SHA256} -q`" != ${F} ]; then
+ if [ "`gunzip -c < snap/${F}.gz | ${SHA256} -q`" != ${F} ]; then
echo "snapshot corrupt."
return 1
fi
@@ -681,11 +681,18 @@ fetch_snapshot() {
cut -f 2 -d '|' tINDEX.new | fetch_snapshot_verify || return 1
# Extract the index
rm -f INDEX.new
- gunzip -c snap/`look INDEX tINDEX.new |
+ gunzip -c < snap/`look INDEX tINDEX.new |
cut -f 2 -d '|'`.gz > INDEX.new
fetch_index_sanity || return 1
# Verify the snapshot contents
cut -f 2 -d '|' INDEX.new | fetch_snapshot_verify || return 1
+ cut -f 2 -d '|' tINDEX.new INDEX.new | sort -u > files.expected
+ find snap -mindepth 1 | sed -E 's^snap/(.*)\.gz^\1^' | sort > files.snap
+ if ! cmp -s files.expected files.snap; then
+ echo "unexpected files in snapshot."
+ return 1
+ fi
+ rm files.expected files.snap
echo "done."
# Move files into their proper locations
@@ -777,7 +784,7 @@ fetch_update() {
# Extract the index
echo -n "Extracting index... " 1>${QUIETREDIR}
- gunzip -c files/`look INDEX tINDEX.new |
+ gunzip -c < files/`look INDEX tINDEX.new |
cut -f 2 -d '|'`.gz > INDEX.new
fetch_index_sanity || return 1
@@ -897,7 +904,7 @@ extract_make_index() {
echo -n "$1 not provided by portsnap server; "
echo "$2 not being generated."
else
- gunzip -c "${WORKDIR}/files/`look $1 ${WORKDIR}/tINDEX |
+ gunzip -c < "${WORKDIR}/files/`look $1 ${WORKDIR}/tINDEX |
cut -f 2 -d '|'`.gz" |
cat - ${LOCALDESC} |
${MKINDEX} /dev/stdin > ${PORTSDIR}/$2